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The basic set of existing multilateral disciplines on governments’ use of subsidies and 
countervailing measures has been in place since the birth of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1995.  The Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-1994) resulted in the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), disciplining subsidization 
affecting trade in goods, as well as in the Agreement on Agriculture, elaborating specific 
disciplines on agricultural subsidies.   
 
This strengthening of subsidy disciplines elicited a vivid discussion on whether the SCM 
Agreement overly confines developing countries’ policy space to use subsidies as a 
development tool.  For instance, the UNCTAD has openly regretted these countries’ loss of 
policy space resulting from the Uruguay Round trade agreements.  The 2006 UNCTAD Trade 
and Development Report referred to the SCM Agreement as one of the agreements that 
‘impinges directly on national rulemaking authority’.1  The WTO Director-General, Pascal 
Lamy, firmly responded to what he called an accusation:  
 
The alternative, it seems, would be to have no subsidy disciplines, which raises an intriguing 
question. Do we want to argue that the best contribution the WTO can make to development is 
to ensure that developing countries have no obligations in this area? Or that export subsidies 
should be allowed?2 
 
However, this ‘intriguing question’ is not confined to the situation of developing countries.  
Indeed, it is equally disputed whether the current WTO subsidy disciplines leave sufficient 
policy space upon developed countries.  Some scholars have reached the conclusion that the 
SCM Agreement is one of the ‘least economics-informed agreements in the WTO’.3  Others 
have even revealed a ‘basic dilemma’ in the restrictions on export subsidies, as they precisely 
run ‘counter to the essential purpose of international trade agreements’ to expand trade 
beyond unilateral levels.4  This debate on the balance struck under the WTO subsidy regime 
has further intensified since the outbreak of the global financial and economic crisis in 
2007/2008.  While some have questioned whether the SCM Agreement leaves sufficient 
policy space to adequately respond to the challenges of the crisis, others have precisely 
                                                 
1 UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 2006 – Global Partnership and National Policies for 
Development (New York: United Nations Publications, 2006), 237 pp., at 169. 
2 WTO, Lamy Calls for Debate on ‘Flexibility’ and What Makes Good ‘Policy Space’ (27 
September 2006) (emphasis added).  Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl40_e.htm.  
3 P. C. Mavroidis, P. A. Messerlin, and J. M. Wauters, The Law and Economics of Contingent 
Protection in the WTO (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 606 pp., at 462. 
4 M. E. Janow and R. W. Staiger, ‘Canada – Dairy, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation 
of Dairy Products and the Exportation of Milk (WT/DS113; WT/DS103; DSR 1999:V, 2057, DSR 
1999:VI, 2097; DSR 2001:XIII, 6829; DSR 2001:XIII, 6865; DSR 2003:I, 213; DSR 2003:I, 
255)’, in H. Horn and P. C. Mavroidis (eds), The American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies on 
WTO Case Law – Legal and Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
249-292, at 264.   
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pointed to the current system’s weaknesses to prevent detrimental subsidy competition among 
WTO Members.  A parallel discussion applies to the flexibility on agricultural subsidies left 
under the Agreement on Agriculture.  Here, it is rather debated whether the current balance 
does not incline toward too much policy flexibility.  
 
This dissertation precisely aims at addressing this ‘intriguing question’ from the perspective 
of both developing and developed countries.  Does the set of multilateral disciplines, 
elaborated in the SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture, find an adequate 
balance between ‘policy space’ left to WTO Members and ‘policy constraints’ imposed upon 
them?  To answer this overarching research question, a threefold analysis should be 
conducted.  First of all, an economic analysis should help understand why governments have 
an incentive to offer different forms of subsidies and to impose countervailing measures and 
what the welfare impact of such interventions is.  Next, a legal analysis should address the 
existing constraints on both types of interventions under the WTO.  Confronting the economic 
and legal analysis, a normative analysis should finally evaluate whether an appropriate 
balance is reached under existing multilateral disciplines.  
 
This study embraces this threefold analysis not only in a general way but also with regard to 
the disciplines on export credit support in particular.  To this end, four general parts are 
distinguished.   
Part I entails the economic analysis and critically reviews economic theory and empirical 
evidence on governments’ rationales to subsidize and install countervailing measures.  In fact, 
this analysis aims at responding both a positive as well as a normative question.  Why do 
governments in reality offer subsidies and impose countervailing duties?  At the same time, 
why should governments have an interest to preserve policy space to make both types of 
interventions?  The basic assumption in the latter normative analysis is that governments 
should strive at maximizing welfare or at fostering sustainable development more generally.  
This Part starts from explaining how a welfare-maximizing country would not be interested in 
offering subsidies and imposing countervailing duties in the absence of market failures.  Yet, 
a government’s stance on both types of interventions might change in the presence of market 
failures inhibiting welfare and economic growth.  Therefore, the analysis shifts to strategic 
trade theory as well as to specific market failures that might be corrected as part of an 
industrial policy in both developed and developing countries.  Finally, this first Part ends with 
a discussion of a number of non-economic rationales, such as environmental protection or 
political-economy reasons, that might likewise explain why governments offer subsidies and 
impose countervailing measures. 
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Part II conducts the core legal analysis and turns to the framework elaborated under the SCM 
Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture.  Tracing the origins of existing disciplines, this 
legal analysis will first provide some insights on why countries have agreed to confine their 
policy space on subsidization and the imposition of countervailing measures.  Next, the 
current disciplines imposed upon both developed and developing countries are systematically 
discussed.  Finally, it is examined to what extent the Agreement on Agriculture still delineates 
more flexibility on agricultural subsidies.  In this legal analysis, the vast amount of case law is 
integrated and critically evaluated.5  Likewise, proposals touching upon these disciplines that 
are tabled in the Doha Round negotiations are assessed.  
Part III illustrates the threefold analysis in a case study on export credit support.  Here, the 
analysis focuses on the policy space left to WTO Members to offer export credit support for 
industrial and agricultural products as well as for services.  The complexity and particularity 
of the legal framework as well as the specificity of the rationales for government intervention 
explain why a separate case study is devoted to this topic.  Grasping and evaluating the 
balance struck under the WTO regime on export credit support seems far from evident.  
Observe, for instance, that the WTO Director-General has urged for increased export credit 
support to fill the gap in private trade financing resulting from the financial and economic 
crisis.  However, by analyzing existing disciplines in light of the case law, it will be 
demonstrated that WTO Members simply seem to be prohibited to respond to this call.  
Disciplines on export credit support for industrial and agricultural products will be explored 
in parallel so as to elucidate the differences between both regulatory regimes.  Next, this Part 
will turn to export credit support affecting trade in services.  This is only meant to illustrate 
the limited reach of substantive disciplines on subsidies under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS).  After discussing the proposals circulating in the Doha Round 
negotiations, a normative assessment of the disciplines on export credit support for industrial 
and agricultural products will be conducted. 
Part IV finally arrives at the overarching normative analysis on the appropriateness of the 
balance between ‘policy space’ and ‘policy constraints’ under WTO disciplines on subsidies 
and countervailing measures, based on the premise that trade agreements should foster global 
welfare.  The policy space under the SCM Agreement and Agreement on Agriculture, 
elaborated upon in Part II and further explained in Part III, is assessed in light of the rationales 
for government interventions on subsidies and countervailing measures as revealed in Part I.  
After evaluating the scope of the SCM Agreement, the policy space left to WTO Members on 
domestic as well as on export subsidies will be assessed.  This exercise is conducted for 
                                                 
5 This manuscript was finalized in June 2010 prior to the issuing of the Panel Report in European 
Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft 
(WT/DS316/R, issued on 30 June 2010). 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 16
developed and developing countries, respectively.  Next, WTO Members’ flexibility to use 
unilateral countervailing action is critically evaluated.  Finally, the analysis reflects upon the 
query whether the existing disciplines should be reconsidered in light of government 
interventions in response to the financial and economic crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION AND TERMINOLOGICAL DELINEATION 
This opening part analyzes governments’ incentives to offer subsidies and hereto presents a 
literature review of economic theory and empirical studies.  This question on governments’ 
rationales to subsidize is approached from both a positive and normative perspective.  First, 
why does a government de facto offer subsidies?  Second, why should a government offer 
subsidies?6  Complementary to these positive and normative analyses, this chapter equally 
addresses why other governments, when confronted with subsidized imports, (should) impose 
countervailing duties.  The basic assumption in this normative analysis is that governments 
should strive at maximizing welfare or at fostering sustainable development more generally.   
Some important terminological specifications apply to this opening economic literature 
review.  A countervailing duty (CVD) refers to a special tax levied for the purpose of 
offsetting a subsidy bestowed on imports.7  In general terms, the concept of ‘subsidy’ in the 
SCM Agreement ‘captures situations in which something of economic value is transferred by 
a government to the advantage of a recipient’.8  In this first part, the thorny issue on which 
situations are exactly covered by the term ‘subsidy’ is left aside.  Parallel to most non-legal 
studies discussed below, this opening Part adheres to a narrow use of the term, namely as an 
acronym to a tax, and thus connotes to a transfer of money from the government to a private 
actor.9  Taxation and subsidization are hereby considered as two alternative fiscal instruments 
by which a government could intervene in the market and are on this basis distinguished from 
non-fiscal or ‘regulatory’ government interventions (e.g., technical regulations).  Puzzling 
observations that a tax or regulatory burden on some private actors might very well be 
considered as a subsidy onto other private actors or that a subsidy might simply compensate 
for another tax or regulatory burden are thus provisionally neglected.  Subsequent Parts will 
devote sufficient discussion on whether these and other government interventions could be 
labeled as ‘subsidies’ under the SCM Agreement and/or Agreement on Agriculture.  
Depending on the direct recipient, ‘consumer subsidies’ are primarily distinguished from 
‘producer subsidies’ in the literature.  Depending on the conditions for receiving producer 
subsidies, different types are further distinguished.  First of all, a fundamental distinction is 
drawn between ‘export subsidies’ and all other types of subsidies, often labeled ‘domestic 
subsidies’.  When discussed in the economic literature, an export subsidy is only paid on 
                                                 
6 Such a distinction between a ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ theory of trade policy is made, for example, 
by A. K. Dixit, ‘Trade Policy: An Agenda for Research’, in P. Krugman (ed), Strategic Trade Policy 
and the New International Economics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), 283-304, at 296; A. O. 
Sykes, ‘The economics of “injury” in antidumping and countervailing duty case’, 16:5 International 
Review of Law and Economics (1996), 5-26, at 26. 
7 See also footnote 36 of the SCM Agreement.   
8 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 51. 
9 WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2006 – Exploring the links between subsidies, trade and the 
WTO (Geneva: WTO Publications, 2006), 223 pp., at 47.   
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production that is exported and, as it thus directly stimulates exportation, is often categorized 
as a ‘trade instrument’.  In contrast, ‘a production or output subsidy’ is a form of domestic 
subsidy that is granted on all production/output, regardless whether it is exported or not.  
Other types of domestic subsidies are those offered to specific inputs or activities in the 
production process, such as subsidies for research and development (R&D subsidies) or labor 
subsidies.  ‘Import substitution subsidies’, also named ‘local content subsidies’, are a specific 
sort of input subsidies as they are offered on the condition of the use of domestic over 
imported inputs.  Whereas such production or input subsidies are mostly recurring, 
governments sometimes also offer non-recurring, one-time subsidies, for instance for the 
acquisition of fixed assets (e.g., equipment, plant).  In short, producer subsidies are 
distinguished on the basis of the conditions attached thereto and thus on the specific activity 
(e.g., exports, production, R&D, acquisition of fixed asset) they directly or indirectly aim at 
stimulating.  Accordingly, the concept of ‘subsidies’ is occasionally discerned from so-called 
‘transfers’, as the latter are not conditioned on any specific use and are therefore considered to 
leave the allocation of resources unaffected.  
With these broad, non-legal descriptions in mind, we now turn to the insights offered by 
economic theory explaining why individual governments who aim at maximizing welfare or 
economic growth would and should (not) be interested in offering one or more of these types 
of subsidies or in imposing CVDs.  Whereas Chapter 1 addresses these rationales for 
subsidizing or imposing CVDs under the assumption of a perfectly functioning market, 
Chapter 2 analyzes this same question in situations where market failures are present. Finally, 
Chapter 3 takes non-economic rationales for subsidization and the imposition of CVDs on 
board.    
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1. ECONOMIC RATIONALES FOR SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES IN THE 
ABSENCE OF MARKET FAILURES 
Under the assumption of the absence of market failures, markets are complete and perfectly 
competitive and mere interaction between supply and demand results in an efficient allocation 
of resources and a level of output produced at the lowest possible price, which equals the 
marginal cost of production and the socially optimal price.10  Put otherwise, welfare is 
maximized under market forces (Pareto optimum11) and government intervention would only 
distort efficient resource allocation by creating a wedge between the marginal cost-price and 
the socially optimal price.  Welfare is commonly defined as the sum of consumer surplus (i.e., 
the difference between the price consumers have to pay and are willing to pay or their 
‘marginal benefit’), producer surplus (i.e., the difference between the price at which 
producers sell and are willing to sell or their ‘marginal cost’) and government revenue.   
Figure 1 illustrates how, in case a country is closed to international trade (autarky), a 
production subsidy results in higher output (Q’H; Figure 1) and a lower market price (P’H; 
Figure 1), which obviously benefits consumers.12  It also improves producer welfare because 
producers benefit from higher output as well from the subsidy which they receive on top of 
the new market price.13  A production subsidy thus creates a wedge between the market price 
(P’H; Figure 1) and the actual price paid to producers (P’H + S; Figure 1).  Yet, the net welfare 
effect of the subsidy is negative because the cost to the government (i.e., taxpayers) 
outweighs the welfare benefits to consumers and producers.14  The net welfare loss occurs 
because the low market price gives consumers an incentive to consume too much 
(consumption distortion loss), whereas the high price paid to producers induces them to 
produce too much (production distortion loss).  This efficiency loss of the subsidy is 
represented by the well-known deadweight loss triangles15, indicating that the new 
equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.16  Accordingly, in the absence of market failures, a 
                                                 
10 In a perfectly competitive market, firms are price takers and can enter/exit freely and products are 
homogeneous.  As a result, price will equal marginal costs of production.  Complete markets are 
characterized by full information and the absence of externalities, resulting in a price which also equals 
the socially optimal price.  
11 Marginal costs to producers equal marginal benefits to consumers, implying that no one can be made 
better off without someone else being made worse off. 
12 The gain in consumer welfare is represented by the area (+d, +e, +f) in Figure 1. 
13 The gain in producer welfare is represented by the area (+a, +b) in Figure 1. 
14 The cost to the government is represented by the area (-a, -b, -c, -d, -e, -f, -g).  The total welfare 
effect of the production subsidy is represented by the area (-c, -g) in Figure 1.                       
15 The consumption distortion is represented by the area (g) and the production distortion is represented 
by the area (c) in Figure 1. 
16 All consumers having a marginal benefit at or above the subsidized price buy the good, which 
includes consumers whose marginal benefit was below the free market price (deadweight loss).  
Conversely, producers whose marginal cost is higher than the free market price also start producing the 
good in question if their marginal cost is not above the market price plus the subsidy (deadweight loss). 
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production subsidy is welfare reducing for the subsidizing country in a closed economy 
because it results in an inefficient allocation of resources.   
 
 
  
 
What is the welfare effect if the subsidizing country is not closed but instead, open to 
international trade?  In this case, a fundamental distinction has to be made between small and 
large countries.  If a country is small, changes in its supply and demand cannot affect the 
world price (price taker) and thus its terms of trade (i.e., ratio of export prices to import 
prices), whereas such changes in a large country have an impact on the world price and its 
terms of trade.  Subsidies by a large country to its export-competing industry affect world 
supply, and subsidies to their import-competing industry affect world demand.  As indicated 
above, another important distinction is drawn between export subsidies, which are contingent 
upon exportation, and production or output subsidies, which are dependent upon output.17  
                                                 
17 The analysis for other types of recurring domestic subsidies (e.g., input subsidies) is similar to the 
analysis on production subsidies.  The analysis of non-recurring subsidies entails the extra complexity 
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FIGURE 1: WELFARE EFFECTS OF PRODUCTION SUBSIDY BY CLOSED COUNTRY
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Notice that, based on the theory of relative comparative advantage, welfare is improved if a 
country shifts from autarky to free trade because resources are re-allocated in a more efficient 
way.18  Compared this welfare level in the absence of any government intervention, how does 
a subsidy impact welfare not only in the subsidizing country but also in third countries and 
the world as a whole?19 
 
1.1. WELFARE EFFECTS OF SUBSIDIZATION BY A SMALL COUNTRY  
Consider a production subsidy given by a small country.  This subsidy increases domestic 
production and thus producer welfare, but leaves the world price unaffected and does not 
affect consumer welfare accordingly.  A welfare loss arises to the subsidizing country because 
the increase in producer welfare does not cover the cost to the government (production 
distortion loss).20  If this small subsidizing country is an importing country, domestic 
consumers will (partly) shift from more efficient foreign suppliers to subsidized domestic 
suppliers.  Accordingly, a production subsidy has a similar effect than a tariff in protecting the 
domestic industry but, in contrast to a tariff, has no cost to domestic consumers.  The 
assumption of ‘small’ country implies that this domestic subsidy generates no impact on third 
countries’ welfare.  Although foreign producers would export less to the small subsidizing 
country, this effect would be considered negligible.21  Parallel to a production subsidy, an 
export subsidy also benefits domestic producers but the incentive upon them to export (lower 
marginal costs of exporting) contracts their supply for the domestic market at the expense of 
domestic consumers (higher price, lower consumption).  Of course, this extra consumption 
distortion loss in case of an export subsidy only takes place if importation at the world price is 
blocked (prohibition on re-importation and restrictions on other imports).22  Again, the small 
country assumption by definition implies that third countries’ welfare is unaffected.23    In 
sum, production subsidies offered by small countries only distort the production side of the 
                                                                                                                                            
of determining whether it affects producers’ marginal costs and thus their output decision.  If not, the 
subsidy simply shifts welfare from the government to producers. 
18 The static benefits from trade result from specialization (shift to efficient resource allocation).   
19 World welfare is the sum of the welfare effects on the subsidizing country and the rest of the world 
(third countries).   
20 The marginal cost of production is higher than the price of imports for the extra output levels 
generated by the subsidy (represented by the deadweight loss triangle). 
21 The assumption of small country precisely means that the world price – and thus world supply – is 
left unaffected.   
22 If importation is not restricted, domestic consumers would shift from domestic producers, which are 
only willing to sell at the world price plus the subsidy, to importation at the (fixed) world price.  
23 Reconciling an export subsidy with the assumption that world supply is left unaffected might be 
difficult to imagine.  It assumes that exporters are too small to have a noticeable effect on world 
supply.  Alternatively, Sykes gives the example of a subsidy to exporters which have, in the short run, 
no capacity to expand production.  Hence, they will simply continue to sell at the world market price 
and collect the subsidy.  A. O. Sykes, ‘Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective’, in R. 
Howse (ed), The World Trading System: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy – Volume 3 – 
Administered Protection (London: Routledge, 1997), 315-380, at 329.  
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domestic market, whereas export subsidies and tariffs not only affect the production but also 
the consumption side.24  A tariff is indeed equivalent to a production subsidy combined with a 
consumption tax.25 
 
1.2. WELFARE EFFECTS OF SUBSIDIZATION BY A LARGE COUNTRY 
In contrast to a small country, a production or export subsidy offered by a large country 
affects the world price and, therefore, also the welfare of third countries.  Here, two situations 
should be distinguished.  First, production or export subsidies to export-competing industries 
increase the world supply and thus put downward pressure on the world price, which has a 
negative terms of trade effect (making exports cheaper) upon the subsidizing country.  
Second, a production subsidy to import-competing industries in a large country could also put 
downward pressure on the world price, as such a subsidy reduces world demand for the good 
in question. Yet, this reflects a positive terms of trade effect from the perspective of the 
subsidizing country as it makes imports cheaper.26   
We consider the welfare effects of export and production subsidies to both export- and 
import-competing industries. First, what are the welfare effects of export and production 
subsidies to export-competing industries?  The welfare effect of an export subsidy offered by 
a large country is illustrated in Figure 2.27  From the perspective of the subsidizing country, 
the lower price resulting from export subsidies to export-competing industries (P’W ; Figure 2) 
thus negatively affects its terms of trade, creating an extra welfare loss in addition to the 
production and consumption distortion losses that are also present in the small country 
scenario.28  Compared to this small country scenario, welfare in the subsidizing country 
deteriorates even more when an export subsidy is given by a large country.29  A wedge is 
                                                 
24 M. Michaely, ‘A Note on Tariffs and Subsidies’, 57:4 The American Economic Review (September, 
1967), 888-891; Y-H. Yeh, ‘On subsidies vs. tariffs’, 38:1 Southern Economic Journal (July, 1971), 
89-92; W. M. Corden, Trade Policy and Economic Welfare (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 423 pp., 
at 9-14; K. Anderson, W. Martin and E. Valenzuela, ‘The relative importance of global agricultural 
subsidies and market access’, 5:3 World Trade Review (2006), 357-376, at 359.  Yet, the paper by 
Anderson et al does not mention (and their model does not reflect) that production subsidies given by 
large countries could also affect the consumption side in the subsidizing country through the terms of 
trade (see below, n 30).     
25 K. Bagwell, ‘Remedies in the WTO: An Economic Perspective’, Working Paper (9 January 2007), 
34 pp., at 25. 
26 It is assumed that the production subsidy to the import competing industry is not that large to turn the 
import competing industry into an exporter.   
27 Figures 2-4 depict the welfare effects of different types of subsidies by a large country open to 
international trade.  Next to the effect on the subsidizing country itself, the effects on world trade and 
the rest of the world are illustrated.  Alternatively, the situation of the ‘rest of the world’ could be 
understood as an individual importing country.  In these Figures, countries are considered to be either 
exporters or importers of the subsidized product in question.  
28 Part of the subsidy per exported product (PW - P’W; Figure 2) flows abroad to foreign consumers who 
benefit from a lower world price (P’W ; Figure 2). 
29 However, Feenstra has developed a model (three goods and two countries) in which welfare of the 
subsidizing country increases as a result of an export subsidy.  The necessary condition is that the 
PART I CHAPTER 1 – ECONOMIC RATIONALES IN THE ABSENCE OF MARKET FAILURES 
 25
driven between the depressed world market price (P’W; Figure 2), benefiting foreign 
consumers, and a higher domestic price (P’H; Figure 2), hurting domestic consumers.   
On the other hand, if a production subsidy is offered as in Figure 3, domestic consumers 
could also benefit from the lower world market price (P’W; Figure 3) but the welfare gains to 
producers and consumers do not offset the cost to the government.30  Again, the welfare effect 
upon the subsidizing country is therefore negative.  Instead of subsidizing exporting industries 
by offering export or production subsidies, a welfare maximizing large country is advised to 
tax exports up to the level whereby the difference between the positive terms of trade effect 
and the negative distortion losses is maximized.31   
Consumers in the rest of the world benefit from the lower world price and extra output 
induced by export or production subsidies, whereas foreign producers are negatively 
affected.32  Taking a country perspective, net-importing countries benefit from the subsidized 
imports (positive terms of trade effect), whereas net-exporting countries are adversely 
impacted (negative terms of trade effect).  A subsidy to the exporting industry thus only forms 
‘unfair’ competition from the viewpoint of foreign import-competing and export-competing 
producers as they are partly replaced by subsidized exports (volume effect) and have to accept 
a lower price (price effect).33  For the same level of subsidy per respectively exported product 
                                                                                                                                            
subsidized export forms a stronger substitute to another export good or stronger complements an 
import good in the subsidizing country than abroad. In this case, the distortion is the large country’s 
failure to exploit market power in the second or third good.  Indeed, the first-best solution would be an 
optimal export tax or optimal tariff on those goods respectively.  R. C. Feenstra, ‘Trade Policy with 
Several Goods and ‘Market Linkages’’, 20:3/4 Journal of International Economics (May, 1986), at 
249-267. 
30 The total welfare effect is represented by area (-c, -f, -h, -i) in Figure 3. A production subsidy given 
to an exporting industry (or importing industry) in a large country also indirectly creates a consumption 
distortion in the exporting country through its effect on the terms of trade (consumers consume too 
much). 
31 This export tax argument mirrors the optimal tariff theory on the import side.  Large countries could 
be seen as having some degree of market power: they can use trade instruments to affect the world 
price with the aim of making imports cheaper in terms of exports.  Such a terms of trade benefit could 
be obtained in a double way, namely by targeting either demand or supply at respectively the import or 
export side. On the import side, they can through the imposition of an ‘optimal tariff’ depress the world 
market price for imports. On the export side, they can through the imposition of an ‘optimal’ export tax 
cheer up the world market price.  By manipulating their terms of trade, part of the revenue of the tax is 
derived from respectively foreign producers (on the products subject to a tariff still exported to the 
large country) and foreign consumers (on the products subject to the export tax still imported from the 
large country).  Under the optimal level, this revenue outweighs the deadweight losses (efficiency loss) 
resulting from the tax.  Failure by a large country to exploit this market power by an optimal tariff or 
export tax creates a so-called international or foreign distortion.   A production subsidy to an importing 
competing industry would be a second-best option if a tariff is unavailable.   For a seminal explanation 
on the terms of trade, see J. E. Meade, The Theory of International Economic Policy – Volume II - 
Trade and Welfare (London: Oxford University Press, 1955, reprinted 1966), 618 pp., at 272-289.  
32 The positive effect of export and production subsidies on foreign consumer welfare is represented in 
area (+a*, +b*, +c*, +d*, +e*) in Figure 2 and area (+a*, +b*, +c*, +d*, +e*) in Figure 3, respectively.  
The negative effect on foreign producer welfare is represented in area (-a*, -b*) in Figure 2 and area (-
a*, -b*) in Figure 3, respectively. 
33 Applied by the Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) with respect to the US export 
credit programme ‘GSM 102’, which operated at subsidized terms: ‘(…) like any export subsidy, it can 
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and produced product, the effect on the terms of trade and thus the effects on third countries 
are larger in case of export subsidies than in case of production subsidies.34  Therefore, export 
subsidies are indeed more trade-distortive than production subsidies.  Importantly, the 
benefits to foreign consumers (increased consumption at a lower price) of such export or 
production subsidies outweigh the costs on foreign producers.35  Hence, whereas welfare in 
the subsidizing country certainly shrinks as a result of efficiency and terms of trade losses, the 
rest of the world undeniably benefits overall.  A subsidy by a large country to its exporting 
industry thus channels welfare from the subsidizing country to (consumers in) the rest of the 
world.  But the loss to the subsidizing country is certainly not fully absorbed by a terms of 
trade gain in importing countries as the subsidy also creates production and consumption 
distortions in the latter countries.36  From the perspective of world welfare, the export subsidy 
creates an inefficient allocation of resources: too much (little) production and too little (much) 
consumption in the exporting (importing) country. Likewise, a production subsidy to an 
export industry creates too much (little) production in the exporting (importing) country and 
too much consumption in both countries.  In conclusion, compared to the situation under free 
trade, an export or production subsidy by a large country to its export-competing industry has 
a positive welfare effect on the rest of the world and on net-importing countries but a negative 
welfare effect on the subsidizing country itself, on net-exporting countries, as well as on 
global world welfare.   
Yet, as pointed out above and illustrated in Figure 4, a production subsidy offered by a large 
country to import-competing industries has a similar effect on the terms of trade (through its 
effect on world demand) but this represents a positive terms of trade effect upon the 
subsidizing country as it makes its imports cheaper (P’W < PW; Figure 4).  Therefore, an 
optimal production subsidy could in theory be imposed whereby the benefits to domestic 
producers and consumers outweigh the cost to the government.37  Nevertheless, it has been 
demonstrated that a tariff would be preferable to a subsidy when a large country in a perfectly 
                                                                                                                                            
be expected to affect both the volume of trade and the price at which trade takes place. The GSM 102 
programme can potentially stimulate additional US exports and influence the price of those exports in 
the target markets. This illegally subsidized competition has adverse effects on producers and exporters 
in the rest of the world’. Interestingly, the Arbitrator observed that these trade effects and not the 
welfare effect of the GSM 102 programme were relevant for calculating the appropriate amount of 
countermeasures (see below Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3.1.2).  Decision by the Arbitrator, US – 
Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), para 4.183. 
34 For the same subsidy level (S) in Figure 2 and Figure 3, its world price depressing effect (PW - P’W) is 
larger in the export subsidy scenario (Figure 2) than in the production subsidy scenario (Figure 3). 
35 The total welfare effect to the rest of the world of export subsidies and production subsidies are 
represented by area (+c*, +d*, +e*; Figure 2) and area (+c*, +d*, +e*; Figure 3) respectively. 
36 Here, consumption and production distortions in the exporting and importing markets are thus 
created and world welfare decreases as a result of this efficiency loss.  The effect on world welfare of 
the export subsidy and production subsidy are represented by area (-b, -d, -e, -f, -g, +c*, +d*, +e*) in 
Figure 2 and area (-c, -f, -h, -i, +c*, +d*, +e*) in Figure 3 respectively, which are both certainly 
negative. 
37 The welfare effect upon the subsidizing country is the sum of (+ a, +b, +c, -h) in Figure 4. 
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competitive market aims at maximizing its national welfare.38  Moreover, the welfare effect 
upon the rest of the world is clearly negative as it absorbs a negative terms of trade effect and 
global world welfare would also be reduced because of inefficiency losses.39 
                                                 
38 Whereas a domestic instrument is optimal to correct a domestic distortion, a trade instrument (tariff 
or export tax) is optimal to correct this international distortion (see above n 31).  J. N. Bhagwati and V. 
K. Ramaswami, ‘Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy’, 71:1 The Journal 
of Political Economy (February, 1963), 44-50; Yeh, above n 24, at 89-92.  Yeh has shown that a tariff 
is superior to a production subsidy for large countries when the degree of protection wanted for the 
import competing industry is not greater than the protection obtained under the optimal tariff.  For 
higher levels of protection, Aiello has shown that tariffs remain optimal if the desired level is not too 
high, while a subsidy is preferred for larger quantities. He refers to non-economic rationales explaining 
why a country might be interested in providing a higher level of protection, namely political-economy 
reasons or food security (see below Part I, Chapter 3).  F. Aiello, ‘Ranking Production Subsidies and 
Import Tariffs under Different Scenarios’, 9 Applied Economics Letters (2002), 715-720. 
39 The welfare effect upon the rest of the world is represented by area (-c*) in Figure 4 and the effect on 
world welfare is (-c*, -h, +a, +b, +c) in Figure 4, which is clearly negative. 
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FIGURE 2: WELFARE EFFECTS OF EXPORT SUBSIDY BY LARGE HOME COUNTRY 
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FIGURE 3: WELFARE EFFECTS OF PRODUCTION SUBSIDY TO EXPORT-COMPETING INDUSTRY BY LARGE HOME COUNTRY 
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1.3.  WELFARE EFFECTS OF THE IMPOSITION OF COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 
Even though the previous analysis has shown it has it no economic underpinning under the 
perfect market assumption, suppose one large country nonetheless offers a subsidy to its 
export-competing industry which depresses the world market price.  Should third importing 
countries react by imposing countervailing duties?40   
The welfare improving effect on net-importing countries is the reason why these countries 
were once advised by Krugman to send a thank you note to the subsidizing country’s embassy 
instead of imposing countervailing duties upon importation of its subsidized goods.41  
Nevertheless, assume that producers convince their governments to impose CVDs in order to 
offset the price effect of the subsidy in the importing market and thus to ‘level the playing 
field’ on the domestic market.42  Here again, the distinction between large and small countries 
should be made, because CVDs imposed on subsidized imports by the former depresses the 
world price as world demand falls.43  In case CVDs by a large country offset the price effect 
of an export subsidy in the importing country, the distortion created by the subsidy will be 
fully eliminated and world welfare would return to the pre-subsidy, free trade level.44  The 
                                                 
40 By definition, CVDs can only be imposed upon imports.  A subsidy to exporters in small countries 
will not affect the world price and foreign producers will therefore unlikely request for CVDs and, in 
the absence of injury to their domestic industry, no CVDs could legally be imposed (see below Part II, 
Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.).  Nonetheless, Sykes demonstrates that in case a subsidy is given to exporters 
with no effect on their output level (see above n 23), a CVD by one country will have no effect as 
subsidized exports will be redirected at another source and the country in question will import from 
another source.  But if all countries impose CVDs, the subsidized exporters will be unable to 
circumvent it and the welfare in the CVDs-imposing countries will improve by the amount of the 
revenue from the duty (at the expense of the exporters).  Sykes, above n 23, at 329-330. 
41 Cited in A. O. Sykes, ‘Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, in P. F. J., Macrory, A. E., Appleton, 
M. G., Plummer (eds), The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis 
(Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2005) vol. 2, 83-107, at 92.  Trebilcock even suggests that they should 
express ‘their regret that the subsidies are not larger and timeless’ in their thank you note.  M. J. 
Trebilcock, ‘Is the Game Worth the Candle: Comments on A Search for Economic and Financial 
Principles in the Administration of US Countervailing Duty Law’, 21 Law & Policy in International 
Business (1990), 723-737, at 729. 
42 The CVDs will bring consumer and producer surplus back to their original pre-subsidy level in the 
importing country.  Given that the benefits of a subsidy to consumers outweigh the losses upon 
producers, such CVDs thus result in a net loss to the sum of consumer and producer surplus.  Except 
for the optimal tariff exception, the revenue collected by the government from imposing CVDs will 
certainly not fully compensate this net loss because of the deadweight loss triangles. 
43 Because of this terms of trade effect, the level of CVDs needed to return to the pre-subsidy price 
level in the importing countries is larger in the large country case than in the small country case. 
44 In case CVDs respond to production subsidies, the distortion generated by the subsidy is not fully 
neutralized.  The importing country can return to the pre-subsidy level and neutralize the distortion by 
imposing CVDs.  Yet, because in case of production subsidies the level of subsidies is larger than the 
CVDs which only neutralize the price effect in the importing country, production in the subsidizing 
country does not fall back to the pre-subsidy level and consumers in that market benefit from a further 
depressed price (induced by CVDs).  Next to a transfer from subsidizing to importing governments 
(channelled via producers), a distortion in the subsidizing country is thus present.  K. Baylis, ‘Unfair 
subsidies and countervailing duties’, in W. Kerr and J. D. Gaisford (eds), Handbook on International 
Trade Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007), 347-360, at 349; WTO Secretariat, World Trade 
Report 2009 – Trade Policy Commitments and Contingency Measures (Geneva: WTO Publications, 
2009), 171 pp., at 91. 
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only difference with the free trade situation is that welfare (in this case the full amount of the 
subsidy) is channeled via producers (collecting export subsidies in their home country and 
paying CVDs in the importing country) from the subsidizing country to the importing 
country.45  Welfare in the importing country is thus definitely greater than under the free trade 
situation but whether it also outweighs the situation where the export subsidies are not 
responded to by CVDs depends on the relative importance of the distortion introduced by the 
CVDs (deadweight loss triangles) compared to the positive terms of trade effect.46  Parallel to 
the ‘optimal tariff’ theory, if a country is sufficiently large, the terms of trade benefit 
generated by CVDs could potentially more than compensate for the efficiency losses and 
could thus improve the welfare of the importing country even further.47  If so, the tariff 
revenue resulting from collecting CVDs is larger than the net loss to consumers and producers 
which results from countervailing the subsidy.48   
Yet, three arguments cast doubt on the relevance of this scenario.49  First, if the deterrence 
effect of CVDs leads to the withdrawal of the subsidy,50 the beneficial terms of trade effect of 
both the foreign subsidy and the CVDs – that in turn will have to be cancelled – vanish.51  
Welfare in the importing country would fall back to the lower pre-subsidy level.  Second, the 
information required on demand and supply to decide whether CVDs will effectively be 
welfare improving might be too demanding.52  On the other hand, CVDs imposed by small 
countries will certainly reduce their welfare as they could not affect the terms of trade and 
                                                 
45 World Trade Report 2009, above n 44, at 89. 
46 The deadweight or efficiency loss represents the fact that consumers pay a higher price, while the 
marginal cost of production is higher than the price of (subsidized) imports in case CVDs are imposed.  
The picture is somewhat more complicated if third countries are included in the model.  If demand in 
other markets is sufficiently elastic, producers faced with CVDs imposed by one country might simply 
shift exports to these markets, which would result in a welfare decline in the country imposing CVDs 
(no revenue from the CVDs is collected and net decline in the sum of consumer and producer surplus).  
But if not all exports are redirected to other markets (e.g., because demand in those markets is 
inelastic), the CVDs-imposing country’s welfare might improve in case the revenue from the CVDs 
offsets the net decline in the sum of consumer and producer surplus.  Sykes, above n 23, at 323-326.   
47 The terms of trade benefit thus implies that some of the revenue collected by the government is not 
extracted from domestic consumer surplus (paying a higher price) but from foreign producer surplus 
(producers absorb part of the duty on the products they continue to import) (see above n 31).  In 
contrast to a small country, the full amount of the duty is not absorbed by domestic consumers.  The 
less elastic the import supply curve (i.e., the less sensitive foreign producers are to a change in import 
price), the larger the part is that is extracted from foreign producers and the less CVDs are thus welfare 
reducing.  A. O. Sykes, ‘Second-best countervailing duty policy: A critique of the entitlement 
approach’, 21 Law & Policy in International Business (1990), 699-737, at 705-706; Sykes, above n 6, 
at 110. 
48 As the benefits of subsidization to consumers outweigh the loss upon producers, CVDs canceling 
these effects indeed generate a net loss to the sum of consumer and producer surplus. 
49 Sykes, above n 23, at 331. 
50 In the example elaborated in the full text, this will likely happen as the full amount of the subsidy is 
channelled to the foreign government.   
51 Of course, the large importing country could still impose an ordinary customs duty as an optimal 
tariff but can only do so if this level is not above its bound level of commitments under Article II of the 
GATT.     
52 This argument also casts doubt on the practical use of the general ‘optimal tariff’ argument. 
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could therefore not compensate the efficiency loss from the duty.  Because the terms of trade 
is unaffected, the level of CVDs needed to return to the pre-subsidy price level in the 
importing countries is smaller in the small country case than in the large country case and 
only part of the subsidy will be channelled to the small country if it imposes CVDs.53  Hence, 
except for the ‘optimal CVDs’ scenario for large countries, a countervailing duty would be 
welfare depressing under perfect market assumptions and consequently make the importing 
country worse off compared to the situation where it does not react against the subsidized 
imports.54  Third, the narrow focus on terms of trade improvements in the welfare analysis 
neglects that, from a dynamic perspective, trade protective measures such as CVDs might 
very well inhibit productivity improvements in the importing country.55 
 
Turning to the perspective of world welfare and net-exporting countries, CVDs might be 
justified if they succeed in deterring subsidization, given that subsidies reduce world welfare 
and net-exporting countries’ welfare under perfect market conditions.56  This is called the 
‘deterrence’ or ‘global efficiency’ rationale for CVDs: CVDs (or threat thereof) simply deter 
other countries from offering global welfare reducing or ‘inefficient’ subsidies.  Yet, in order 
for this deterrence effect to be present, two conditions should at minimum be fulfilled.  First, 
only CVDs imposed by large countries and thus generating a terms of trade effect could 
potentially deter subsidization as they negatively affect the output of the subsidized importing 
                                                 
53 World Trade Report 2009, above n 44, at 89. 
54 Consumers pay a higher price and the marginal cost of production is higher than the price of 
(subsidized) imports in case CVDs are imposed.  CVDs thus reduce welfare of the net-importing 
country even if the subsidy is not withdrawn (except for the large country exception).   
55 Estimating the effect of anti-dumping duties on the productivity of domestic import-competing firms, 
Konings and Vandenbussche have found that this moderately improves on average, but in an 
insufficient way to close the productivity gap with firms not involved in anti-dumping cases.  
Therefore, they conclude that trade protection is a poor instrument to spur average firm-level 
productivity.  Moreover, whereas domestic firms with low initial productivity levels have productivity 
gains, firms with high initial productivity levels (i.e., frontier firms) experience productivity losses 
during protection.  Hence, Konings and Vandenbussche argue that this productivity drop of frontier 
firms is an additional cost of protection that should be added to the loss in consumer surplus and the 
sub-optimal level of exit resulting from protection.  See J. Konings and H. Vandenbussche, 
‘Heterogeneous Responses of Firms to Trade Protection’, 76 Journal of International Economics 
(2008), 371-383. 
56 Standard models mostly assume that a country is either an importer or exporter of a certain product, 
which implies that (i) besides the large country exception, CVDs are always welfare reducing because 
a country imposing CVDs does by definition not export; (ii) exporting countries could also by 
definition not impose CVDs so as to deter subsidization and thus, indirectly, offset their harm in third 
countries.  Of course, such an exporting country would benefit from CVDs deterring subsidization 
imposed by importing countries, which would act against their own welfare.  Nonetheless, a country 
could be an importer as well as exporter of the same product, for example, because of the existence of 
transport costs.  If CVDs result in the abolishment of the export subsidies, prices may increase in third 
markets and hereby benefit exporters.  Sykes, above n 23, at 323; World Trade Report 2009, above n 
44, at 90. 
PART I CHAPTER 1 – ECONOMIC RATIONALES IN ABSENCE OF MARKET FAILURES 
 
 34
producer.57  Second, the level of CVDs should at minimum reach the level of the benefit 
received from the subsidy to deter subsidization.58  As will be covered below, the 
‘entitlement’ school rejected this ‘deterrence’ or ‘global efficiency’ rationale as an 
explanation to why the US imposed CVDs.  From a normative viewpoint, the ‘deterrence’ or 
‘global efficiency’ rationale could potentially justify why CVDs should be allowed under 
multilateral trade rules.59   
 
1.4. SUBSIDIES AS A TOOL FOR SHIFTING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
Under the perfect market assumption, no argument can be made for subsidizing domestic 
industries in order to alter the pattern of trade.  Reflecting upon the concern in the 1980s that 
foreign targeting (mainly by Japan) of US industries would harm the US, Krugman wondered 
why high-technology sectors should be treated any differently than other sectors:  ‘What, if 
anything, makes the production of computers a more desirable activity at the margin than 
production of textiles?’60  To borrow an example by Dixit who refers to a statement wrongly 
attributed by Samuelson to Abraham Lincoln: ‘When I buy a coat from England, I have the 
coat and England has the money.  But when I buy a coat in America, I have the coat and 
America has the money’.61  Transposed to the debate of today, ‘England’ could be better 
replaced by ‘China’ in this example.  As Dixit highlights, the quote fails to recognize that it 
would require labor and capital input to produce this coat in the US and that the US would 
thus lose the opportunity to deploy these inputs in another and maybe more efficient way.62  
Hence, would the US be better off by producing the coat itself instead of importing it from 
China?  If China has a lower opportunity cost of producing coats in terms of computers and 
thus has a comparative advantage in producing coats, the answer is simply ‘no’. 63  The law of 
comparative advantage explains why Lincoln today would import its coat from China and 
export computers to China (positive aspect) and shows how this makes both countries better 
off or at least no country worse off (normative aspect; Pareto improvement).  A coat 
                                                 
57 See, for example, J. H. Jackson, ‘Perspectives on Countervailing Duties’, 21 Law & Policy in 
International Business (1990), 739-769, at 744. 
58 See R. Diamond, ‘A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration of United 
States Countervailing Duty Law’, 21 Law & Policy in International Business (1990), 507-608, at 525. 
59 See below Part IV, Chapter 4. 
60 P. Krugman, ‘The US Response to Foreign Industrial Targeting’, 1984:1 Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity (1984), 77-131, at 106. 
61 Dixit, above n 6, at 287. 
62 Assuming the option of producing two types of goods (coats or computers), the opportunity cost of 
producing one extra coat is the number of computers that could have been produced with the 
resources/inputs used to produce this coat.  More generally, the opportunity cost of producing a product 
is the value of the best alternative which could have been produced with the same amount of inputs.   
63 How can we know that China has a comparative advantage in producing coats?  The Ricardian one-
factor model points to differences in labor productivity (output per worker), whereas the multi-factor 
Heckscher-Ohlin model explains trade in terms of differences in relative resource endowments 
(quantities of land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurs) between countries.   
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(computer) costs the US (China) less in terms of computers (coats) if imported than if 
produced domestically.  In Krugman’s clear-cut words, ‘an export is an indirect way to 
produce an import, which is worth doing because it is more efficient than producing our 
imports ourselves’.64  The static welfare benefit of trade opening results from countries’ 
specialization in what they do relatively best (reallocation of resources), whereas market 
forces automatically lead to such specialization if trade is opened.65  If markets function 
perfectly, the Lincoln of today will and should therefore import coats from China in exchange 
for computers.  From a static welfare perspective, no argument can thus be made to support 
the local production of coats (computers) in the US (China) by subsidization or trade 
barriers.66  If China (the US) would nonetheless target the computer (coat) sector, the US 
(China) would incur a terms of trade loss as a net-exporting country.67,68       
                                                 
64 P. Krugman, ‘Making sense of the competitiveness debate’, 12:3 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
(1996), 17-25, at 19. 
65 Given that no economies of scale are assumed (opportunity costs are constant), benefits of trade do 
not result from market expansion in these traditional trade models.   
66 As elaborated, an optimal tariff (or production subsidy as second-best alternative) could be welfare 
improving for large countries, but its objective is not to set up local production.  See also G. M. 
Grossman, ‘Promoting New Industrial Activities: a survey of recent arguments and evidence’, 14 
OECD Economic Studies (Spring, 1990), 87-125, at 93-94.    
67 In the two-country, two-goods model, both countries are assumed to be large.  Krugman indeed 
found that US terms of trade had deteriorated during the 1960s-1970s but this would have had just a 
small effect on real income and could certainly not be completely attributed to foreign industrial 
policies.  Therefore, he concluded that any serious adverse effect from foreign targeting should be 
occurring through channels other than the terms of trade.  Krugman, above n 60, at 85-87. Dixit and 
Grossman even observed that since the 1990s, the US terms of trade has been steady or perhaps even 
improved.  A. Dixit and G. Grossman, ‘The Limits of Free Trade’, 19:3 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives (Summer 2005), at 241-242. 
68 If the rise in labor productivity resulting from subsidization (or likewise, if it does not result from 
subsidization) occurs in the US exporting sector (computers) and up to the level at which the relative 
labor productivity of computers in China matches that of the US, all static benefits of trade would 
vanish and US welfare would fall back to the level of autarky as the opportunity cost of a coat would 
equal its relative world price.  This ‘worst-case scenario’ was elaborated in a controversial article of 
Samuelson, in which he more generally demonstrated that a foreign productivity gain (e.g., in China) in 
the US’ exporting sector depresses the static gains from trade to the US  But Dixit and Grossman 
correctly emphasized that Samuelson simply proved that such productivity gain in China would depress 
the US terms of trade (for which they found no evidence in practice, see above n 67) and that free trade 
remains optimal for the US under the situation that productivity has improved in China (only in the 
worst case scenario the US that would be indifferent on whether or not to trade).  Indeed, if China turns 
out to be relatively more productive than the US in producing computers (compared to producing 
cloths), the US would benefit from importing computers (and exporting cloths).  P. A. Samuelson, 
‘Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting 
Globalization’, 18:3 Journal of Economic Perspectives (Summer 2004), 135-146; Dixit and Grossman, 
above n 67, at 241-242. 
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2. ECONOMIC RATIONALES FOR SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES IN THE 
PRESENCE OF MARKET FAILURES  
Why do governments in practice subsidize and impose CVDs even if welfare theory teaches 
that this contracts their own country’s welfare under the perfect market assumption?  These 
government interventions can be explained if the perfect market assumption does not hold.  In 
reality, markets indeed often fail to reach a Pareto optimal outcome in case they are 
imperfectly competitive or incomplete.  For the purpose of the present study, five broad 
categories of market failures could be highlighted.  First, the market itself might function 
imperfectly (e.g., monopoly or oligopoly) in a way that firms are not price takers but have 
some market power to set the price above marginal costs.69  Such imperfectly competitive 
markets thus generate insufficient output at an inflated price, which is a Pareto inefficient 
outcome.70  Second, even if markets are perfectly competitive so that the market price equals 
the marginal cost of production, this market price may not reflect all benefits or costs to 
society and thus deviate from the ‘socially optimal price’.  Positive or negative externalities 
(also called ‘spillovers’) are, respectively, benefits or costs resulting from consumer or 
producer actions that are not reflected in the market price and, thus, external to the market.  
Such marginal external benefits or costs can be internalized by government intervention in a 
way that the new market price equals the socially optimal price.  Third, for ‘public goods’, no 
private market develops because these goods can be made available at low or no additional 
costs to extra consumers (nonrival) and cannot be shielded away from additional consumption 
(nonexclusive).  As consumers cannot be excluded (‘free rider problem’), no private market 
offering these public goods will emerge on itself.71  Fourth, ‘complementarities’ 
(‘substitutes’) as a particular type of externalities exist when an action of one economic actor 
does not only have a positive or negative externality on other actors but, at the same time, 
increases (decreases) the incentive of other actors to act similarly.72  If such 
complementarities are pervasive, the market might get stuck in a Pareto sub-optimal 
equilibrium because economic actors fail to coordinate their actions (coordination failure).  
Fifth, an information failure is present if economic actors dispose of incomplete information 
to make decisions that would lead to an efficient allocation of resources. Or, in some markets 
(e.g., capital markets) information might also be asymmetrically available among producers 
and consumers, which again, could prevent these markets from operating efficiently.    
                                                 
69 For example, a monopolist maximizes profit by choosing an output level where marginal costs equal 
marginal revenue.  The corresponding price is higher than marginal costs. 
70 The marginal benefit to consumers is higher than the marginal costs to producers.  Put otherwise, the 
value to consumers of additional output exceeds the cost of producing it. 
71 One could also look at certain ‘positive externalities’ (e.g., clean air, knowledge) as having some 
public goods characteristics: these positive side-effects of the product in question are enjoyed by other 
actors at no additional costs and/or these actors could not be excluded from its consumption.     
72 D. Ray, Development Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 848 pp., at 114-116. 
PART I CHAPTER 2 – ECONOMIC RATIONALES IN THE PRESENCE OF MARKET FAILURES 
 
 37
 
In the presence of such market failures, the Pareto-efficient outcome does not result from 
market forces but requires government intervention.  Of course, government intervention does 
not guarantee that a Pareto optimal outcome will be reached.  To this end, governments 
should intervene in an effective way and tackle the market failure as directly as possible and 
choose the appropriate instrument (e.g., some type of subsidy, tax, regulation) thereto 
(targeting principle).73  In case of a non-effective strategy, the government intervention leads 
to distortions in other markets.74  Yet, this assumes that these other markets are functioning 
properly and that correcting the market failure directly is not unfeasible for political or other 
reasons.  If not, the theory of the second-best applies: governments have to take recourse to a 
second-best option to solve the market failure by intervening in other segments of the 
economy, but only insofar the benefits of correcting the market failure still outweigh the costs 
that result from the creation of new distortions in those other segments (cost-benefit 
analysis).75  As illustrated below, if a domestic market failure occurs (e.g., inflexible labor 
market), a trade policy response (e.g., CVDs) is at most a second-best option because a new 
distortion is created.  Domestic distortions should in principle be corrected by domestic 
instruments (e.g., taxes or subsidies on domestic consumption, production or input factors) 
and not by trade instruments (e.g., tariffs, export taxes or export subsidies).76  In general, if 
domestic production is too low because of a domestic market failure, a production subsidy is 
superior to an import barrier or export subsidy as the latter also negatively affect consumers in 
the domestic market.77  Equally, a production or output subsidy is an optimal instrument only 
in case the externality is directly linked (or fixed) to the level of production.78  If not, a policy 
intervention directly targeting the market distortion would in principle be more suited on 
efficiency grounds.  From a national and world welfare perspective, all countries in which 
                                                 
73 J. N. Bhagwati, ‘The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare’, in J. N. Bhagwati (ed), 
International Trade: Selected Readings, 2 ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), 265-286.   
74 See also Corden, above n 24, at 28-31. 
75 For an overview of papers dealing with second best interventions, see P. Krishna and A. Panagariya, 
‘A Unification of Second Best Results in International Trade’, 52 Journal of International Economics 
(2000), 235–257.  
76 Bhagwati and Ramaswami, above n 38, 44-50; H. G. Johnson, ‘Optimal Trade Intervention in the 
presence of Domestic Distortions’, in J. N. Bhagwati (ed), International Trade: Selected Readings, 2 
ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), 235-263.   
77 J. J. Barceló, ‘Subsidies and Countervailing Duties – Analysis and Proposal’, in Robert Howse (ed), 
The World Trading System: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy – Volume 3 – Administered 
Protection (London: Routledge, 1997), 252-314, at 259; Bagwell, above n 25, at 25.  This statement is 
certainly correct for small countries, which cannot affect the terms of trade, but might have to be 
nuanced for large countries in case only one instrument could be used.  Surely, a production subsidy is 
still superior to correct the domestic distortion but a tariff is optimal to correct the ‘foreign’ distortion 
(e.g., to induce a positive terms of trade effect).  Indeed, a production subsidy to the import competing 
industry also positively affects the terms of trade but Yeh has shown that, in the absence of domestic 
market failures, tariffs are optimal to this end (see above n 38).  If both cannot be applied at the same 
time, there seems to be no clear-cut ranking on the option that should be preferred. 
78 Grossman, above n 66, at 118. 
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distortions are present are advised to adopt corrective measures (e.g., subsidies).  Conversely, 
countries in which such distortions are not displayed should not intervene, even though they 
might be confronted with corrective measures (e.g., subsidies) abroad and might thus claim 
that the playing field is not level.79   
 
In the following section, the aforementioned types of market failures and the potential role of 
subsidization and CVDs are illustrated.80  First, strategic trade theory has shown that by 
subsidization, governments could shift foreign profits to domestic firms that operate in 
oligopolistic markets (Section 2.1).  Hereby, the government aims at exploiting the market 
failure imperfection rather than correcting it.  The latter is in principle the objective of a 
country’s industrial policy, which could be defined broadly as all government measures 
attempting to speed or alter the process of resource allocation among or within industrial and 
service sectors with the aim of correcting market distortions that inhibit economic growth. 81,82  
Second, the role of subsidies as well as CVDs as corrective instruments in case of labor 
market imperfections are assessed from the perspective of both developed and developing 
countries (Section 2.2).  Further, the discussion will turn to market failures that typically 
function on the agenda of industrial policies in developed countries and developing countries 
respectively.  A third section addresses Research and Development (R&D) subsidies allocated 
so as to stimulate knowledge generating activities, as an important tool of industrial policy 
mainly used in developed countries who have their comparative advantage in technology-
intensive sectors (Section 2.3).  Fourth, the much debated role of corrective industrial policies 
in developing countries is analyzed in the subsequent (Section 2.4). Indeed, it is generally 
acknowledged that some types of market failures, such as information or coordination 
failures, are more pervasive and widespread in developing countries.  To be clear, the option 
of analyzing different types of market failures from different angles (namely, the angles of 
developed and developing countries, respectively), does not mean that the market failure in 
question is not relevant for the industrial policy agenda of the other group of countries but 
simply illustrates its case from the most important angle.  Finally, the global economic 
recession (2009-10), rooted in market failures in the US housing and financial markets, called 
for government interventions in both developed and developing countries, often taking the 
                                                 
79 See also A. V. Deardoff, ‘Economic Effects of “levelling the playing field” in International Trade’, 
RSIE Discussion Paper No. 289 (July 2009), 42 pp., at 20. 
80 Obviously, only an illustrative list of potential market failures is offered, which is far from 
exhaustive.  The focus is on those market failures that might call for subsidization and/or CVDs as 
optimal or second-best solutions.   
81 This definition is partly derived from D. Rutherford, Routledge Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed. 
(London: Routledge, 2002), 671 pp., at 270.   
82 Of course, it could also be argued that strategic trade policy could be part of a country’s industrial 
policy.  For a broader discussion on the concept of ‘industrial policy’, see below n 243. 
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form of subsidies in its broad meaning (Section 2.5).  Corrective governmental policies which 
are strictly speaking not motivated on the basis of static welfare or economic growth 
considerations (e.g., environmental protection) are discussed under Chapter III.83  
 
2.1. SUBSIDIES AND CVDS AS STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS  
In some markets such as aircraft84, barriers to entry (e.g., large fixed costs) have as a result 
that only a limited number of firms account for most or all production because a sufficient 
high level of production is required to recover these initial costs.85  In such oligopolistic 
markets, individual firms are not price takers as under perfect competition but set output 
(Cournot model86) or price levels (Bertrand model) taking into account output and price 
decisions by competitors.87  Hence, profits of one firm are directly affected by strategic 
decisions of its competitors.88  The central insight of strategic trade theory, which developed 
since the 1980s, is that governments’ trade policy can alter this strategic interaction between 
firms in a way that national welfare is optimized.89  Hereby, governments do not intervene to 
correct market imperfections as a central policy motive of industrial policy, but to 
strategically shift profit from foreign competitors to domestic firms. 
 
2.1.1. Subsidies as strategic trade instrument 
Whereas no case can be made for subsidies under the perfect market assumption, Brander and 
Spencer have shown that a welfare maximizing country should provide export subsidies to 
                                                 
83 With the term ‘economic rationales’ as used in this first Part’s title, I refer to arguments for 
subsidization from the perspective of welfare (static) or economic growth sensu stricto (dynamic).  
Environmental protection, as related to sustainable development arguments, is therefore not listed as an 
‘economic rationale’. 
84 Cline also refers to the steel and automobile industry.  W. R. Cline, ‘US Trade and Industrial Policy: 
The Experience of Textiles, Steel, and Automobile’, in P. Krugman (ed), Strategic Trade Policy and 
the New International Economics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), 211-239. See also K. Bagwell 
and R. W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002), 
224 pp., at 169, n 5. 
85 These barriers to entry might be related to the market (e.g., economies of scale or access to 
technology) or strategic actions by incumbent firms deterring entry (e.g., threat to flood the market). 
86 The Cournot model is an oligopoly model with the following features: (i) firms produce an identical 
good; (ii) each firm treats the output of its competitors as fixed; and (iii) all firms decide 
simultaneously how much to produce.  See R. S. Pindyck and D. L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, 5th ed 
(London: Prentice Hall International, 2001), 700 pp., at 431 
87 Notice that producers in oligopolistic markets are by definition operating in a large country.   
88 Of course, competitors should be aware that they have a strategic relationship (playing a strategic 
game).  This is thus not the case under perfect competition (firms are price takers and do not make 
profit) or under pure monopoly, unless potential entry of other firms is an important consideration (see 
below n 94).  Strategic interaction is also typically absent in case of monopolist competition.  See J. A. 
Brander, ‘Strategic Trade Policy’, in G. M. Grossman and K. Rogoff (eds) Handbook of International 
Economics – Volume 3 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995), 1395-1455, at 1397.  
89 Strategic trade policy is defined by Brander as ‘trade policy that conditions or alters a strategic 
relationship between firms’.  Brander, above n 88, at 1397.  Targeting sectors generating national R&D 
spillovers is therefore not considered as a strategic trade policy.  Of course, R&D subsidies could be 
used as strategic trade policy instruments (see below Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.3).   
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firms operating in oligopolistic markets if these firms behave as Cournot competitors.90  A 
firm operating in a Cournot type of oligopolistic model sets its output at a profit-maximizing 
level given the quantity produced by competitors (Nash equilibrium).  The more it assumes 
that competitors will produce, the less it will produce itself (downward sloping reaction 
function).  In the Cournot equilibrium, an example of a Nash equilibrium, no firm can 
increase its profits by changing output given the output produced by its competitors.  In this 
equilibrium, firms are making true profit (‘economic profit’; price is higher than average 
costs) and total output is less than under perfect competition and thus below the Pareto 
efficient level (oligipolistic distortion).  This ‘market failure’-feature of oligopolistic markets 
has important consequences for the design of trade policy.  Indeed, Brander and Spencer have 
demonstrated that a country could shift a larger share of profitable output from foreign 
competitors to domestic firms by subsidizing domestic exports.  The export subsidy commits 
domestic firms to a higher level of exports,91 resulting in a reaction by foreign competitors to 
contract their output.92  Given that the profit gain to domestic firms (expanded output and 
market share at a price above average costs) is larger than the subsidy amount (or the negative 
terms of trade effect), net welfare of the subsidizing country increases.93  In addition, total 
output also increases, resulting in lower world prices to the benefit of importing countries.  
On the other hand, exporting countries are hurt as profitable output is shifted away from their 
firms.  Accordingly, such strategic trade policy has a beggar-thy-neighbour element: the 
subsidizing country’s welfare increases but at the expense of other exporting countries’ 
welfare.  The change in total world welfare of this profit-shifting export subsidy is 
nonetheless positive because the oligipolistic distortion shrinks: the world price lowers and 
output increases, both coming closer to the competitive equilibrium.94,95  In conclusion, this 
                                                 
90 J. A. Brander and B. J. Spencer, ‘Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry’, 18 
Journal of International Economics (1985), 83-100.  
91 The subsidy lowers marginal costs of the domestic firm and thus shifts it to a higher reaction 
function. 
92 In the model, which assumes that there is no domestic consumption (third-market model), 
governments act first (play Stackelberg against firms) by setting subsidy levels before (one foreign and 
one domestic) firms simultaneously decide on output levels (play Nash against each other and against 
governments).  The government has to precommit itself to a certain subsidy level even if it would turn 
out suboptimal once firms decide on output levels.  The new equilibrium resulting from the export 
subsidy corresponds to the equilibrium in absence of the subsidy whereby the domestic firm would be 
the Stackelberg leader.  In essence, the government is thus able ‘to turn its first-mover advantage into 
an equivalent advantage to the domestic firm’.  Brander, above n 88, at 1409.  In the Cournot model, 
output levels are considered ‘unfriendly’ (lowering competitors’ profit in total) and ‘strategic 
substitutes’ (lowering competitors’ profit at the margin). 
93 The contribution of the subsidy to the profit of the domestic firm is offset by the subsidy cost to the 
government (transfer).  Yet, the subsidy has an additional indirect positive effect on domestic firms’ 
profit by lowering the output level of foreign firms.  The subsidy’s strategic effect on foreign firms’ 
behaviour exactly explains the positive welfare effect in the subsidizing country.  See also Krugman, 
above n 60, at 98-99. 
94 This is the case unless the subsidy drives foreign competitors out of the market (or deters entrance), 
turning the domestic competitor into a monopolist.  Conversely, promoting new entrance in 
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Brander-Spencer model provides an economic rationale for welfare maximizing countries to 
subsidize output (as such or only exports) of firms operating in oligopolistic markets.96  
Because firms in these markets make profit, governments have an incentive to channel such 
profits from foreign to domestic firms by extending output subsidies (profit-shifting 
rationale).  In the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, both countries will offer export subsidies 
with the largest export subsidies given by the country with the most competitive firm.97  
Neary and de Meza have shown that the profit shifting potential of competitive firms is higher 
than that of cost inefficient firms because the former are more likely to gain market share.  
Governments should therefore subsidize winners more heavily.98  This differs from the 
traditional infant industry theory prescription, which would suggest channeling subsidies to 
firms having high costs in the present but low costs in the future resulting from economies of 
scale (e.g., learning-by-doing) (see below).   
Yet, the specific assumptions adopted in the Brander-Spencer model make export or general 
output subsidies not a robust policy recommendation for governments.  First, the assumption 
that firms act like Cournot competitors seems crucial to make the model’s ‘profit-shifting’-
claim.  Eaton and Grossman have illustrated that if firms in the oligopolistic market compete 
on price instead of quantity (Bertrand competition instead of Cournot competition), the 
optimal policy would be an export tax rather than an export subsidy.99,100  
                                                                                                                                            
oligopolistic or monopolistic markets might also lead to excessive entry from the viewpoint of 
achieving economies of scale.  D. R. Collie, ‘A Rationale for the WTO Prohibition on Export 
Subsidies: Strategic Export Subsidies and World Welfare’, 11 Open Economies Review (2000), 229-
245, at 230; D. Leahy, J. P. Neary, ‘Multilateral Subsidy Games’, 41:1 Economic Theory (October, 
2009), 41-66, at 2.  Brander is also sceptical that decentralized strategic trade policies will achieve 
outcomes that approach the world-level normative ideal.  Brander, above n 88, at 1409.    
95 The analysis is similar in case of output or production subsidies not dependent on exportation as the 
model assumes that there is no domestic consumption in both exporting countries.   
96 Brander and Spencer have also demonstrated that subsidization remains optimal when firms are 
unionized under Cournot competition.  J. A. Brander and B. J. Spencer, ‘Unionized Oligopoly and 
International Trade Policy’, 24:3-4 Journal of International Economics (May, 1988), 217-234. 
97 However, both countries would usually be better off if they cooperate to end subsidization (see 
below).  D. De Meza, ‘Export Subsidies and High Productivity: Cause or Effect?’, 19:2 The Canadian 
Journal of Economics (May, 1986), 347-350; D. Collie, ‘Profit-Shifting Export Subsidies and the 
Sustainability of Free Trade’, 40:4 Scottish Journal of Political Economy (November, 1993), 408-419. 
98 J. P. Neary, ‘Cost Asymmetries and International Subsidy Games: Should Governments help 
Winners or Losers?’, 37 Journal of International Economics (1994), 197-218; de Meza, above n 97, at 
347-350. An exception might have to be made for promoting entrance in monopolist or oligopolistic 
markets.  
99 The export tax commits the domestic firm to a higher price, hereby giving an incentive to foreign 
firms to set a higher price (price increases are thus considered as ‘friendly’).  Thus, the export tax is 
rather a promise than a threat.  In contrast to Cournot competition, foreign firms therefore also benefit 
from the export tax and total global welfare is reduced (higher price and lower output compared to the 
competitive equilibrium).  See J. Eaton and G. M. Grossman, ‘Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy 
under Oligopoly’, 101:2 The Quarterly Journal of Economics (May, 1986), 383-406, at 392-394; 
Brander, above n 88, at 1416. 
100 However, Bandyopadhyay et al have shown that if both firms are unionized, export subsidies 
become optimal under Bertrand competition (see also above n 96).  S. Bandyopadhyay, S. C. 
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Second, the Eaton-Grossman model as well as the Brander-Spencer model assume that 
governments act before firms, whereas Carmichael has argued that, in case of fields such as 
official export credits, it is more realistic to assume that firms act first.101  If firms set a price 
first (‘stated price’) and know that a subsidy programme is in place that keeps demand for 
exports102 – and thus the ‘effective price’ – constant, they have an incentive to inflate their 
stated price so as to induce a higher subsidy.  Indeed, a higher stated price forces the 
government to provide a higher subsidy if the effective price has to be kept constant.  In 
Carmichael’s view, this explains why export credit subsidies are offered.  Hereby, 
governments do not act with a profit-shifting motive but merely react with a higher subsidy to 
a firm’s rent seeking behavior expressed by an inflated stated price.  In this game, welfare is 
simply shifted from governments (subsidy expense) to firms (higher profit).  As Brander has 
observed, the strategic decision in this game is in fact the decision to set up a subsidy 
programme (e.g., export credit agency) in the first place.103  If this step is considered 
separately, the case for non-intervention becomes more plausible.  Hence, this literature 
shows that sequencing plays an important role in designing the optimal policy.   
Third, even if the government acts first as the Brander-Spencer model assumes, it can only 
influence the strategic decision of competitors if it can effectively precommit itself to a 
certain level of subsidization.  Thus, the government should be able to play the game and be 
recognized by competitors as a player.  In practice, the government might lack the knowledge 
on the characteristics of the oligipolistic market to set an efficient level of subsidization or 
might lack credibility to commit itself to such subsidization (government failure).104   
Fourth, the Brander-Spencer model only looks at the effect on the targeted industry (partial 
equilibrium model) and does not acknowledge the fact that expansion of the targeted industry 
as a result of the export (or other output) subsidy drains off resources from other industries 
(general equilibrium).  Indeed, Dixit and Grossman have shown that profit-shifting subsidies 
to one oligopolistic industry might even cause a greater profit-extracting loss in other 
oligopolistic industries in case they compete for the same scarce production factor (e.g., 
highly skilled labor).105  The subsidy raises the output of the supported oligopolistic industry 
                                                                                                                                            
Bandyopadhyay, and E. Park, ‘Unionized Bertrand Duopoly and Strategic Export Policy’, 8:1 Review 
of International Economics (2000), 164–174. 
101 C. M. Carmichael, ‘The Control of Export Credit Subsidies and its Welfare Consequences’, 23 
Journal of International Economics (1987), 1-19. 
102 In this model, a negative export credit subsidy (i.e., export credit tax) is not considered an option. 
103 Brander, above n 88, at 1420. 
104 On the lack of adequate information, see P. R. Krugman and M. Obstfeld, International Economics 
– Theory and Policy, 6th ed. (Boston: Addison Wesley, 2003), 754 pp., at 280-281; see also, J. P. Neary 
and Dermot Leahy, ‘Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy Towards Dynamic Oligopolies’, 110 The 
Economic Journal (April, 2000), 484-508. 
105 If all other industries are perfectly competitive, no rents are lost by subsidizing the oligopolistic 
industry as it draws resources from industries where prices equal marginal costs. A. K. Dixit and G. M. 
Grossman, ‘Targeted export promotion with several oligopolistic industries’, 21:3-4 Journal of 
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but also increases the price of the scarce production factor and thus decreases the output of 
other oligopolistic industries.  In principle, the government should therefore support the 
oligopolistic industry with the highest profit-shifting potential but this imposes even more 
demanding information requirements on the government.    
Fifth, in line with general welfare theory, the Brander-Spencer model gives equal weight to 
welfare of consumers, producers, and governments.  Thus, an extra dollar of profit for 
producers has the same value as an extra dollar in the government budget.  In practice, 
however, the opportunity cost of public funds likely exceeds unity as these are often collected 
on the basis of distortionary taxation (i.e., if lump-sum taxation is not available).106  
Alternatively, giving government welfare relatively greater weight than producer profit might 
reflect the fact that subsidized domestic producers in question are in part foreign-owned and 
that the share of profit to these shareholders would not be incorporated in national welfare.  
Equally, it may point to the fact that the government values producer profit lower for income 
distributional or other social reasons.  If, for one of these reasons, the cost of public funds 
exceeds unity, the case for export subsidies becomes less evident.107  Neary has calculated that 
subsidies only remain optimal for surprisingly low levels of additional costs attached to public 
funds and this regardless whether Cournot or Bertrand competition is at work.108 
Sixth, Dixit has demonstrated that the Brander-Spencer model also holds when it is extended 
to more than two firms, but only if the number of domestic firms is not too large.109   
As a result, the case for export subsidies (or output subsidies in general) is sensitive to aspects 
such as the mode of competition (Bertrand or Cournot), the opportunity cost of public funds, 
and the number of firms, and is for that reason not considered a robust policy 
recommendation for governments.  Nevertheless, Bagwell and Staiger have demonstrated that 
R&D-subsidies could be a somewhat more robust recommendation as they remain optimal 
                                                                                                                                            
International Economics (1986), 233-249;  G. M. Grossman, ‘Strategic Export Promotion: A Critique’, 
in P. Krugman (ed), Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1986), 47-68,  at 58-60. 
106 J. P. Neary, ‘Cost asymmetries in international subsidy game: Should governments Help Winners or 
Losers’, 37 Journal of International Economics (1994), 197-218. 
107 See H. K. Gruenspecht, ‘Export Subsidies for Differentiated Products’, 24 Journal of International 
Economics (1988), 331-344; Neary, above n 106, at 197-218; Brander, above n 88, at 1410; J. Ma, ‘Is 
an Export Subsidy a Robust Trade Policy Recommendation toward a Unionized Duopoly?’, 20(2) 
Economics & Politics (June, 2008), 141-155. 
108 Neary, above n 106, at 197-218. 
109 A. Dixit, ‘International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries’, 94 (supplement) The Economic 
Journal (1984), 1-16, at 11-12; see also P. A.G. van Bergeijk and D. L. Kabel, ‘Strategic Trade 
Theories and Trade Policy’, 27:6 Journal of World Trade (December, 1993), 175-186, at 182.  The 
monopoly rents of each domestic firm decrease in case the number of domestic firms increases, 
implying that the distortion becomes less prominent relative to the terms of trade argument.  Brander 
has indicated that the number of domestic firms relative to the number of foreign firms is important: if 
the number of foreign firms grows (declines) relative to the number of domestic, a subsidy (an export 
tax) becomes more attractive.  Brander, above n 88, at 1411.     
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under Cournot as well as Bertrand competition.110  Another motivation among economists in 
the field of strategic trade theory to focus on R&D or investment subsidies in general, is the 
fact that export subsidies are deemed prohibited under international agreements (e.g., EC and 
WTO level), whereas investment subsidies are given more leeway.111  Hence, focusing on 
investment subsidies would be more relevant from a policy perspective.  Investment subsidies 
could indeed be used as strategic trade tools given that they may indirectly have a similar 
profit-shifting effect as export or output subsidies: their cost-reducing effect commits the 
domestic firm to a higher output level, inducing an output-contracting reaction by foreign 
competitors.  Yet, investment subsidies are only a second-best outcome as they induce firms 
to over-invest in the input factor in question (e.g., R&D), although causing such a distortion 
assumes that there are no significant positive spillovers attached to the investment in question.  
Section 2.3 departs from this assumption.  
In light of the above-mentioned reasons, it should not come as a surprise that several ‘new 
trade theorists’ remain skeptical about the extent to which this strategic trade theory can be 
used as a justification for government intervention.  Next to the fact that the theory is 
sensitive to specific assumptions, Krugman also points out that the profit-shifting rents might 
turn out to be small in practice112 and that it is very difficult to gain sufficient understanding 
of a particular market to formulate an adequate policy given that ‘each imperfectly 
competitive industry is imperfect in its own way’.113  As a result, ‘surprisingly few of the new 
trade theorists themselves are strategists’, as Krugman noted.114  Still, Brander underlines the 
strategic trade theory’s robust general finding that an oligopoly almost always creates an 
incentive for intervention. At the same time, another robust finding is that such exporting 
countries are equally stimulated to conclude an agreement limiting such subsidization.115      
 
                                                 
110 K. Bagwell and R. W. Staiger, ‘The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in 
Oligopolistic Industries’, 36 Journal of International Economics (1994), 133-150; D. Leahy and J. P. 
Neary, ‘Robust rules for industrial policy in open economies’, 10:4 The Journal of International Trade 
& Economic Development (2001), 393-409. 
111 See, for example, Leahy and Neary, above n 94, at 42-43; Leahy and Neary, above n 110, at 393-
409.  D. R. Collie, ‘State Aid to Investment and R&D’, European Commission – Economic Papers No. 
231 (July 2005), 14 pp.  Yet, this argument has to be nuanced under the WTO framework because 
general output or production subsidies are currently disciplined similarly as investment subsidies (see 
below Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.2).  Consequently, the prohibition on export subsidies does not 
mandate a shift in focus to investment subsidies given that output or production subsidies are 
disciplined similarly and are first-best options as profit-shifting instrument.  
112 Yet, Krugman acknowledges that this position is based on limited empirical evidence.  He refers to a 
study by Dixit on the US automobile sector.  A. K. Dixit, ‘Optimal Trade and Industrial Policies for the 
US Automobile Industry’, in D. B. Audretsch (ed), Industrial Policy and Competitive Advantage 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), vol. 1, 175-200. 
113 P. Krugman, ‘The Narrow and Broad Arguments for Free Trade’, 83:2 The American Economic 
Review (1993), 362-366, at 263-264.   
114 P. Krugman, above n 113, at 263-264. 
115 Brander, above n 88, at 1447.  See also below Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2.2. 
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2.1.2. Countervailing duties as strategic trade instrument 
Profit-shifting export subsidies by trading parties also imply that, under certain conditions, 
CVDs could be used as welfare improving instruments by importing countries as they would 
claw back some rents to domestic producers and the government as well as expand domestic 
production resulting from the protection of the domestic market.116 But again, the information 
requirements to design these CVDs in a welfare-enhancing way might be highly demanding.  
Sykes therefore concludes that, ‘for all practical purposes, it is impossible to determine 
whether a duty will enhance national welfare in a given case’.117  Compared to the perfect 
market situation, such CVDs will nonetheless be less harmful in cases that more or less fit to 
the strategic trade situation.118  Qiu has found that the threat of retaliation by CVDs might in 
theory deter export subsidization and thus make free trade optimal.119  However, under the 
constraints imposed by the GATT/WTO (i.e., CVD cannot exceed the level of subsidization), 
the level of potential retaliation would be too low to fully deter export subsidization for profit-
shifting reasons.120,121      
 
                                                 
116 Dixit, above n 109, at 11-12; Sykes, above n 23, at 352; Baylis, above n 44, at 351; D. R. Collie, 
‘Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties under Oligopoly: A Comment’, 35:5 European Economic 
Review (July, 1991), 1185-1187.  For an overview on the literature on CVDs and strategic trade policy, 
see World Trade Report 2009, above n 44, at 91-93.      
117 Sykes, above n 23, at 353. 
118 Sykes also refers to industries generating national R&D spillovers.  Sykes, above n 47, at 707.   
119 Qiu’s model assumes that (i) CVDs are imposed after the imposition of export subsidies by the 
foreign country (sequencing); (ii) CVDs can only be imposed if subsidization is present; and (iii) there 
can be a delay between subsidization and the imposition of CVDs.  The first assumption, which was 
not included in the first models generated by Dixit (see above n 116), is also considered by Collie.  Yet, 
Collie does not consider the latter two assumptions, even though their integration would clearly make 
the model more realistic.  This also explains why Collie arrives at a different conclusion, namely that 
with a domestic CVDs response to a foreign country’s tariffs, the foreign country’s optimal policy to 
this response is usually an export tax.  See D. R. Collie, Export Subsidies and Countervailing Tariffs, 
31:3-4 Journal of International Economics (November, 1991), 309-324; L. D. Qiu, ‘Why can’t 
countervailing duties deter export subsidization?’, 39 Journal of International Economics  (1995), 249-
272.  
120 A delay in the imposition of CVDs might also make the case of export subsidization more likely.  
Hartigan finds that the time-consuming demonstration of injury required under the GATT/WTO offers 
a first-mover advantage for the subsidizing country.  Qiu, above n 119, at 249-272; J. C. Hartigan 
‘Perverse Consequences of the GATT: Export Subsidies and Switching Costs’, 63:249 Economica 
(February, 1996), 153-161. 
121 Spencer has also shown that the maximum level of CVDs under the GATT/WTO would, under 
certain conditions, not deter subsidization of capital.  Yet, only a sufficiently small subsidy would 
generate a positive – but by definition small – welfare effect to the subsidizing country in case it is 
retaliated by a maximum CVD.  Hence, Spencer indicates that a credible threat to impose such 
maximum CVDs might likely be sufficient to deter profit-shifting subsidization of capital.  B. J. 
Spencer, ‘Capital Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in Oligopolistic Industries’, 25:1/2 Journal of 
International Economics (August, 1988), 217-234.  
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2.1.3. Subsidies as a tool for shifting comparative advantage 
Interestingly, imperfect competition also explains trade flows which cannot be explained on 
the basis of the law of comparative advantage.122  Indeed, the traditional trade models 
(Ricardo and Heckser-Ohlin) show that countries that differ in relative labor productivity or 
factor endowment could take advantage of trade by totally specializing in the production of 
what they do relatively best (inter-industry specialization). But these traditional models failed 
to explain two important aspects of international trade flows: why do countries with similar 
labor productivity (technology) or factor endowment trade and why do countries often import 
as well export similar products (intra-industry trade).  The ‘new’ trade theory (1970s-1980s) 
explained these trade flows on the basis of internal or external economies of scale at the 
producer’s side and ‘love of variety’ at the consumer’s side.123   
In Krugman’s classical ‘monopolistic competition model’, trade increases market size and 
thus gives firms (or the industry124) the opportunity to produce at a larger scale.  At the same 
time, a single firm (or industry) supplying the total market does not emerge as consumers 
prefer to choose between different varieties of a single product (‘love of variety’). The 
benefits of trade are threefold: it enables firms (or industries) to exploit their internal (or 
external) economies scale and thus to produce at lower average costs and consumers to enjoy 
not only a larger variety of products but also at a lower price.125  Small firms (or industries) 
unable to benefit from market opening will go out of business but the location of the 
remaining ‘grown up’ firms (or industries) is much more arbitrary and unpredictable than 
under the traditional trade model.126   
Now, does it matter if foreign countries target markets in which internal or external 
economies of scale play an important role?127  As will be explored below, it does indeed 
                                                 
122 See above Chapter 1, Section 1.4. 
123 In case of internal economies of scale (e.g., large fixed costs), the cost per unit diminishes if the size 
of an individual firm enlarges, whereas under external economies of scale, the cost per unit does not 
depend on the size of firm but on the size of the industry.  So-called ‘Marshallian externalities’ (e.g., 
local knowledge spillovers) explain why such external economies of scale could be present (see below 
n 185).   
124 Krugman’s model relates to internal economies of scale but Eaton extends it to the presence of 
external economies of scale.  J. Eaton, ‘Credit Policy and International Competition’, in P. Krugman 
(ed), Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), 
115-145, at 125-126. 
125 WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2008 – Trade in a Globalizing World (Geneva: WTO 
Publications, 2008), 178 pp., at 46. 
126 If trade costs are substantial, firms in sectors enjoying economies of scale would settle in countries 
having a large domestic market (‘home market effect’).  In the monopolistic competition, two-country 
model, each country will produce different varieties of the same product (intra-industry trade). Each 
country will produce fewer varieties than under autarky (which enables them to benefit from economies 
of scale) but more varieties (domestically produced plus imported) will be available to consumers. 
127 While the monopolistic competition model is useful to explain why countries with similar 
technology or factor endowment would still trade and benefit from it, the most common form of market 
structure in case of internal economies of scale are oligopolies, in which only a few firms compete.  
Krugman and Obstfeld, above n 104, at 131. 
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matter in case of external economies of scale (below Section 2.3).  Equally, as this section has 
demonstrated, it also matters in case of internal economies of scale resulting in a market form 
(e.g., oligopoly or monopoly) where firms generate true economic profits (price is above 
average costs) even if trade is opened.128  Recalling the example attributed to Lincoln, the US 
would not only have the production of the good in question but also something extra, namely 
‘money’, which should be better understood as true ‘economic profit’ or excess returns.129  
So, it is in the US interest to keep or capture such excess returns.  Importantly, it may use its 
trade policy to this end.  As this section has shown, governments could give their firms a 
strategic advantage in oligopolistic markets by offering output subsidies (profit-shifting) and, 
under certain conditions, CVDs could be an effective response by other countries.  In markets 
where firms have occupied a monopoly position, governments could by subsidization and/or 
CVDs deter foreign firms from entering this profitable market.  CVDs might indeed be 
employed to deter entrance in monopolies or, alternatively, to respond to foreign predatory 
pricing fuelled by subsidies which aims at monopolizing the market.130   
An example still topical today is the entrance of Airbus in the 1980s in the market for 
intermediate-range commercial jets, at the time dominated by US firms Boeing and 
McDonnell-Douglas.  This entrance was realized by protection in the EC market and 
government subsidization, which were deemed required to cover the high sunk costs of the 
project.131  The EC clearly had an interest in entering this market in which true ‘economic 
profits’ could be reaped (and local knowledge spillovers could be generated) but the world as 
a whole would also benefit from increased competition in this market.132,133  On the other 
hand, the US had an interest in deterring entrance of Airbus in this market and therefore 
considered the EC protection and subsidies as unfair practices mandating countermeasures 
                                                 
128 In monopolistic competition models, all economic profits are assumed to be competed away in the 
long run.   
129 Dixit, above n 6, at 289. 
130 Obviously, world welfare is reduced in the first case, whereas it would improve in the second case.  
In case of predatory pricing, CVDs are second-best because anti-trust law would be optimal.  But there 
is very little evidence that predatory pricing supported by governments is undertaken.  Sykes, above n 
23, at 344-354; World Trade Report 2009, above n 44, at 91; Jackson, above n 57, at 744. 
131 This is in fact parallel to the traditional infant industry argument (see below).  A. K. Dixit and A. S. 
Kyle, ‘The Use of Protection and Subsidies for Entry Promotion and Deterrence’ 75:1 The American 
Economic Review (March, 1985), 139-152; W. H. Branson and A. K. Klevorick, ‘Strategic Behavior 
and Trade Policy’, P. Krugman (ed), Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), 241-255, at 244-246; B. J. Spencer, ‘What Should Trade Policy 
Target?’, in P. Krugman (ed), Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), 69-89, at 84-85. 
132 This is the case unless entrance would induce firms to produce at an inefficient scale.        
133 It has been estimated that the entrance of Airbus has reduced average price for commercial aircrafts 
by 3.5 per cent.  See World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 88. 
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(e.g., CVDs).134  The Airbus – Boeing rivalry finally resulted in mutual claims by the US and 
EC before the WTO. 
 
2.2. LABOR MARKET IMPERFECTIONS 
As explained above, no case for either subsidizing or CVDs can be constructed under perfect 
market assumptions.135  Such a model also assumes that labor markets function perfectly, 
indicating that wages in any particular sector are competitive: they equate marginal product 
and do not exceed the returns available elsewhere (opportunity cost) to marginal workers.136  
These workers are therefore indifferent between their current job and the next best alternative, 
implying the absence of involuntary unemployment.137  Hence, there is no reason to offer 
wage subsidies or any other type of subsidies (e.g., production subsidies) to boost labor in a 
particular industry.  If a country is confronted with subsidized imports, CVDs to protect 
employment in the affected industry are also not an optimal instrument as the benefits of 
subsidized imports to consumers are larger than the loss to producers (capital and labor 
inputs).138  Workers in the affected industry are indeed always worse off.  They will have to 
accept lower wages if they are unwilling or unable to move or, in case they move to other 
sectors, they will have to accept lower wages insofar their previous earnings were based on 
industry-specific skills.139 In theory, however, the net welfare gain allows governments to 
directly compensate those inputs negatively affected and still benefit overall.140   
Yet, the competitive labor market assumption might not always hold.  Two paragraphs 
illustrate this issue through an analysis of somewhat prototypical situations occurring in 
developed and developing countries respectively. Both analyses have in common that 
government intervention might be warranted in case wages in some sectors are higher than the 
opportunity cost of labor because of a market failure.  The final part of this section looks at 
how the case for subsidization and/or CVDs might change if adjustment costs, such as 
(temporary) involuntary unemployment, are taken on board in the model.   
 
                                                 
134 Entrance could only be blocked by imposing CVDs if, in addition to protection and subsidization, 
entrance to the US market was needed for Airbus to cover its sunk costs.  Boeing mainly complained 
about the subsidies and less about protection.  Krugman, above n 60, at 116. 
135 Such a model also assumes that the labor market functions perfectly, implying that wages (marginal 
cost of labor) equal their marginal product in the labor market equilibrium.   
136 Sykes, above n 23, at 336. 
137 Unemployed workers searching for jobs only do so by choice.  A. O. Sykes, ‘Protectionism as a 
"Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations’, 58:1 
The University of Chicago Law Review (Winter, 1991), 255-305, at 266. 
138 This assumes that the country is a net-importer of the subsidized good.   
139 Krugman, above n 60, at 90. 
140 Thus, this also assumes that the taxes levied to channel welfare from consumers to producers do not 
in turn create new distortions. 
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2.2.1. Labor market failures in developed countries 
In developed countries, institutional factors such as labor unions might have the result that 
wages (marginal cost of labor) in those unionized sectors are higher than the returns available 
in the next best employment alternative to marginal workers.141  Workers in those sectors thus 
receive a wage premium or ‘rent’ above the competitive wage paid elsewhere.142  As a 
consequence, a domestic market failure in the labor market occurs: too little employment in 
the industry’s labor market equilibrium results in a price above and output below the perfect 
market equilibrium level.  Government intervention thus seems warranted but the first-best 
option of simply neutralizing the wage premium might be politically unacceptable because of 
the strong position of labor unions.  Recalling the theory of the second-best, a wage subsidy 
or production subsidy could be suggested as respectively second- and third-best responses as 
these would boost employment and output in the unionized sectors.  But, as Krugman as well 
as Sykes have indicated, these options might as well be politically unacceptable (as it would 
subsidize an already unionized sector) and hard to calculate.143  These authors have 
demonstrated that, under those circumstances, CVDs might become appropriate as a second-
best (or maybe better labeled as ‘fourth-best’) response in case foreign subsidization pushes 
down price and employment in unionized sectors.144  If the premium wage remains intact 
(domestic distortion is unaffected), domestic output would indeed be reduced even further as 
a result of subsidized imports.  In the presence of such distortion, subsidized imports are not 
per se welfare improving for net-importing countries any more because part of the loss to 
producers (i.e., the wage premium multiplied by the unemployment) is certainly not translated 
into a benefit to domestic consumers but is instead captured by foreign subsidized 
producers.145  Depending on whether the total loss to producers would not be compensated by 
a benefit to consumers, CVDs could thus be a welfare-improving though second-best 
instrument.146  On the other hand, if the depressed price induces a reduction or even 
elimination of the domestic distortion (i.e., workers accept a wage comparable to the 
opportunity cost), employment and domestic output would expand at the lower price caused 
by foreign subsidization. Framed otherwise, if foreign subsidization induces the country in 
                                                 
141 Sykes also refers to minimum wages.  Sykes, above n 23, at 336. 
142 The wage in those sectors is above the opportunity cost of labor: marginal workers earn a premium 
over the returns available in the next best employment alternative.   
143 Krugman, above n 60, at 337. 
144 The same response applies if the lower price is not the result of a foreign subsidy but, for example, a 
consequence of foreign industries’ higher productivity.  In those cases, a tariff could become 
appropriate as second-best response. 
145 The crux of the argument is that the foreign subsidized industry takes advantage of the domestic 
distortion reflected in a higher price and output compared to the equilibrium level without domestic 
distortion.   
146 For example, this would be the case if the price decline would be small or demand inelastic.   
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question to reduce or eliminate the distortion, it will more likely become welfare 
enhancing.147  
 
2.2.2. Labor market failures in developing countries 
A specific feature of many developing countries’ labor markets is that they present a surplus 
of labor supply, resulting in low wages and high levels of ‘self-employment’.  In Lewis’ 
classical model, agricultural labor was so abundant that its marginal product was close to 
zero.  Put otherwise, if a worker would leave the farming sector to work in an export industry, 
the agricultural output would not be reduced (marginal product is zero) and society would 
gain by any value added to the manufacturing sector.148  Yet, the 2008 Growth Report drafted 
by the Commission on Growth and Development observed that the exporter in the 
manufacturing sector, which operates in the formal labor market, cannot distract such surplus 
labor by simply paying one cent but that it has to pay more.149  As a result, wages in the 
exporting sector are greater than the opportunity cost of labor (which is close to zero).  Hence, 
the social benefits of employment in the exporting sector are higher than their private returns 
until surplus labor is absorbed and wages converge to the opportunity cost in the agriculture 
sector.  According to the Growth Report, this would justify industrial policies supporting the 
exporting industry so that the private returns become closer to their social benefits.  As a 
pragmatic and temporarily solution, the Report proposes to allow export-oriented firms to 
recruit workers on easier terms (e.g., in special economic zones) than those prevailing in the 
formal sector, without however curtailing minimum labor rights.150,151   
 
                                                 
147 The more the domestic distortion is reduced, the higher the likelihood that foreign subsidized 
competition is welfare enhancing. 
148 Ray explains why workers in the informal sector (e.g., agriculture) are employed even beyond the 
point where the marginal product equals the ‘wage’.  In self-employed farming, the income of all 
family members is added and their ‘wage’ simply reflects the average output (income sharing). Ray, 
above n 72, at 357.  
149 The Growth Report does not clearly mention which type of market failure precludes the exporting 
sector from distracting surplus labor by only paying one cent.  It seems that the market failure is related 
to the strict division between a formal sector, in which exporters operate, and an informal sector.  
Higher wages and terms in the formal economy are fenced off by regulations or labor agreements, 
which prevent outsiders from bidding down the wages of insiders.  In the words of the Growth Report: 
‘In a surplus-labor economy, they are playing something close to a zero-sum game: there are only so 
many well-paid, tightly regulated jobs to go round.  If you gain, I lose’.  As elaborated in the full text, 
the Growth Report’s solution is not to dismantle the formal economy but to create a limited exception 
for export-oriented firms.  Commission on Growth and Development, The Growth Report – Strategies 
for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2008), 190 pp., 
at 45-48.  
150 The Report points to China’s successful strategy which did not require the emerging exporting 
sector to offer the same wages or terms than the wages/terms provided by state-owned companies.   
151 In fact, the Report does not explain why exporters should be treated any different from other 
manufacturers operating in the formal economy with regard to this argument related to the labor 
market. 
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2.2.3. Government intervention to ease adjustment costs 
The perfect market assumption does not take into account that workers in the import-
competing industry not only face a reduction in their wage (which is more than compensated 
by a benefit to consumers in net-importing countries) but that they also bear short-term 
adjustment costs as it takes time (temporary unemployment) and investments (e.g., retraining) 
to find a new job in another sector.152  Temporary unemployment presents such an adjustment 
cost to a country as it at minimum loses the value added by those workers during this search 
period.153  Here, government intervention might be warranted to facilitate this adjustment 
process.154  First, offering subsidized credit to the import-competing industry so as to give it 
some ‘breathing space’ to become competitive again (or simply to remain operational in case 
of temporary foreign subsidization) and thus to avoid such adjustment costs for workers, 
might be justified.  Yet, this is only a second-best response as it assumes that the private 
capital market does not function perfectly (i.e., unwilling to bridge this phase).155  Second, 
government intervention in the form of subsidization or ‘contingent’ protection (e.g., 
safeguards, CVDs) might also be useful to slow down the adjustment process in the import 
competing industry in case of congestion in the labor market.156  Such congestion might, for 
example, be present when the targeted industry is a major employer in the economy.   The 
more workers are unemployed at the same time, the less likely that they will find a job.  
Hence, by temporarily protecting jobs in the import-competing industry, the chances for 
unemployed workers to find a job increases (congestion is reduced).  Such benefits of 
contingent protection (e.g., CVDs) or subsidization should be included into the calculation of 
their welfare effect.157  This argument somewhat corresponds to Lawrence’s observation back 
in the 1980s that foreign targeting of US industries in the short run could lead to ‘the 
exporting of unemployment’ in case there is great excess capacity in an industry (e.g., steel) 
during periods of generally high unemployment.158  Whereas the US benefited from cheaper 
imports of steel, it also had to pay for the costs of unemployment and other trade adjustment 
assistance.  Under those kinds of circumstances, subsidizing steel becomes a beggar-thy-
                                                 
152 Similarly, there might be adjustment costs related to the reallocation of capital.   
153 Equally, other types of adjustment costs exist (e.g., retraining costs). M. Bacchetta and M. Jansen, 
‘Adjusting to trade liberalization – The role of policy, institutions and WTO disciplines’, WTO 
Publications Special Studies 7 (Geneva: WTO, April 2003), 69 pp., at 15. 
154 World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 97-98; World Trade Report 2009, above n 44, at 27. 
155 It also assumes that the government is able to pick those industries that would become competitive 
again.  Trade protection in the form of CVDs or safeguards would only be a third-best response as they 
hurt domestic consumers.  Sykes, above n 137, at 264; World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 97. 
156 The models include the assumption of ‘congestion externalities’, which means that if workers search 
for a job in the exporting sector they make it harder for other searchers in that sector to find a job.  
Hence, as the pool of searchers grows, the probability for finding a job falls.    
157 However, safeguards might be more appropriate than CVDs as they restrict importation from all 
importing countries.  See also Sykes, above n 23, at 343-344. 
158 See R. Z. Lawrence, comment on Krugman in P. Krugman, ‘The US Response to Foreign Industrial 
Targeting’, 1984:1 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1984), 77-131, at 126-127. 
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neighbor policy: it might make the subsidizing country better off but only at the expense of 
trading partners.  According to Lawrence, the imposition of CVDs could therefore be an 
adequate response by trading partners.  As will be discussed in Section 2.5, this argument is 
highly relevant in the current situation of an economic downturn (e.g., automobile bailouts). 
 
2.3. INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: THE ROLE OF SUBSIDIES FOR 
SPURRING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT  
Knowledge spillovers occur when knowledge generated by one firm could be captured  by 
other firms in the same industry (intra-industry spillover) or in other industries (inter-industry 
spillover) without adequate compensation.159  As a result, firms under-invest in R&D as part 
of the benefits of their investment, namely its ‘marginal external benefit’, spillovers to other 
firms without return (non-excludable).   Put differently, the social return of investment in 
knowledge is higher than the private return.  As noticed above, governments should target 
market failures as precisely as possible to prevent distortions elsewhere in the economy 
(targeting principle).   
Now, how should a government correct the market failure in which firms cannot appropriate 
the knowledge generated by R&D investments?  The benefits of the investment could be 
appropriated by the investing firms if adequate intellectual property rights are put in place but, 
in practice, these seem to offer only limited protection to innovations.160  Alternatively, 
governments could stimulate R&D investment by subsidization.161  But how should such a 
R&D subsidy look like?  Subsidizing technology intensive industries (e.g., production 
subsidy) might not be sufficiently fine-tuned as it would not directly target R&D 
investment.162  Instead, governments could subsidize R&D investment directly and 
independently of the sector where it takes place but, in turn, this might be difficult to 
                                                 
159 Knowledge, which has public good characteristics, is defined broadly by economists as ‘any trick, 
technique, or insight that allows an economy to generate more out of its existing resources of land, 
labor, and capital’. Commission on Growth and Development, above n 149, at 41.      
160 Krugman and Obstfeld, above n 104, at 277; E. Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 203 pp., at 44.  Intellectual 
property rights also do not remedy other types of market failures linked to R&D investments, such as 
economies of scale. The high fixed costs often associated with R&D investments imply an increase of 
economies of scale, whereby the initial R&D-cost might never be fully recovered by the private 
investor.  Nonetheless, such investment might be justified on the basis of the gains to consumers (see 
also below n 209).  World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 83; Grossman, above n 66, at 97-98.  
161 By subsidizing investment, the marginal private benefit of investment increases, optimally up to the 
level that equals the marginal social benefit. If firms would cooperate in setting R&D investment 
levels, the positive spillovers would in theory become internal and as a consequence, no government 
intervention would be needed.  D. Leahy and J. P. Neary, ‘R&D spillovers and the case for industrial 
policy in an open economy’, 51 Oxford Economic Papers (1999), 40-59, at 47- 48.  Rodrik indicates 
that R&D subsidies are the first-best option, whereas patent protection is only second-best.  D. Rodrik, 
One Economics – Many Recipes – Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 255 pp., at 106, footnote 106. 
162 See, for example, Grossman, above n 66, at 108-109. 
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implement, for example due to the difficulty to define ‘R&D investment’.163  Whereas a broad 
interpretation of R&D-investment might cause misuse, a strict definition risks favoring formal 
and traditional forms of research units over the informal set-ups which are known to be more 
innovative.164  Furthermore, because governments maximize their national welfare, they are 
only interested in internalizing ‘national spillovers’, which benefit other domestic firms.  In 
contrast, they have no incentive to subsidize investments that merely have spillovers to 
foreign firms, even though world welfare would rise if investments having such ‘international 
spillovers’ are also subsidized.  So, the lower the level of spillovers flowing abroad, the more 
likely domestic firms’ investments will be subsidized.165  This analysis holds for subsidies to 
R&D investments in competitive or monopolistic competitive markets where firms do not 
behave strategically and profits are zero.166   
The picture is somewhat more complicated in case of R&D subsidies to firms operating in 
oligopolistic markets.167  If no significant positive spillovers on the profits of competitors are 
present, investment levels can be considered as ‘unfriendly’ (lowering competitors’ profit in 
total)168 and as strategic substitutes (lowering competitors’ profit in the margin).169  If R&D 
does not have positive spillover effects but is used as a strategic tool between competitors, 
governments would better tax R&D investment to undo the distortion caused by over-
investment in R&D for strategic reasons and, at the same time, offer export subsidies to 
channel foreign profits to domestic firms.  If export or other output subsidies would be 
unavailable, R&D subsidies could be a second-best instrument for capturing foreign profit.170  
The effect on world welfare is unclear.  As a strategic tool, the investment subsidy boosts 
overall output, hereby reducing the oligopolistic distortion.  At the same time however, it 
creates a new distortion in the input market.  Accordingly, introducing a prohibition on export 
                                                 
163 Malony and Rodriguez-Clare hold that focusing on high R&D sectors might be relevant if targeting 
R&D directly is not advisable for practical reasons. W. Maloney and A. Rodríguez-Clare, ‘Innovation 
Shortfalls’, 11:4 Review of Development Economics (2007), 665–684, at 669.   
164 Krugman and Obstfeld, above n 104, at 278. 
165 B. J. Spencer, ‘What Should Trade Policy Target?’, in P. Krugman (ed), Strategic Trade Policy and 
the New International Economics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), 69-89, at 78-79; Maloney and 
Rodríguez-Clare, above n 163, at 669.  
166 In case of monopolistic competition, this at least holds true in the long run.  
167 Leahy and Neary, above n 94, at 41-66; Collie, above n 111; Krugman, above n 60, at 109.  
168 The cost reducing effect of investment subsidies leads to in an increase of domestic output, resulting 
in lower foreign output levels and thus lower foreign profit. 
169 If investment levels are strategic substitutes, an increase in the domestic firm’s investment level 
leads to a lower optimal level of investment for competitors.  The marginal profitability of competitors’ 
investment lowers because an increase in the domestic firm’s investment level reduces their output 
(non-strategic element) as well as their return from pushing the domestic firm down its output reaction 
function (strategic element).  Leahy and Neary, above n 110, at 400 and 405.   
170 By increasing home investment, foreign investment is reduced (because of strategic substitutability) 
which in turn raises home profits (because of unfriendliness).  Leahy and Neary, above n 110, at 405-
406.  
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or output subsidies and allowing R&D subsidies is sub-optimal for world welfare if R&D 
investments in oligopolistic markets do not generate significant spillovers.  
In contrast, if investment levels generate high positive spillovers on the profit of competitors, 
they are considered as ‘friendly’ and as ‘strategic complements’.171  In this case, spillovers not 
only increase competitors’ profits but also boost their incentive to invest more in R&D.  Two 
types of spillovers could be present.  First, if R&D does have spillover effects but only on 
domestic firms, the optimal intervention depends on whether R&D is used as a strategic tool 
next to output levels.172  If R&D is not used as a strategic tool, domestic firms under-invest in 
R&D because they do not internalize the positive spillover effects on other firms.  Thus, a 
welfare optimizing government would provide a R&D subsidy to internalize the externality, 
combined again with an export subsidy which generates the profit-shifting effect.  Yet, if 
R&D is used as a strategic tool, the optimal policy is unclear given that the government 
should at the same time tax R&D to correct strategic over-investment in R&D together with 
subsidization of output/export and equally subsidize R&D to internalize the externality.  
Hence, if R&D is used as a strategic tool, domestic spillovers make subsidization a more 
probable option than under the situation where no spillovers are present.173  Second, if R&D 
generates positive intra-industry international spillovers (i.e., to foreign competitors),   the 
policy recommendation depends on whether the spillovers are high.174  From the perspective 
of profit-shifting, governments would better tax R&D to induce lower R&D and thus lower 
foreign output.175  However, contracted foreign R&D implies reduced ‘spillback’ effects to 
domestic firms, which in turn result from foreign R&D investment.  In this respect, the fact 
that R&D subsidies benefit foreign firms is an argument in favor of subsidization because of 
this spillback effect: higher domestic R&D has a positive spillover effect on foreign R&D, 
which, in turn, has a positive ‘spillback’ effect on domestic R&D.  The rent-shifting effect 
thus works towards a tax, whereas the spillback effect works towards a subsidy.  If the 
spillover is sufficiently high, the national government would offer a subsidy.176  Tempered by 
the negative rent-shifting effect, however, governments still under-subsidize from the 
perspective of world welfare when high international spillovers are present.177  Indeed, if 
                                                 
171 They lower competitors’ cost and thus increase their profit in total and at the margin.  They become 
friendly if the spillover effect is high enough to offset the strategic effect. Leahy and Neary, above n 
94, at 41-66. 
172 There is no strategic relationship between domestic firms.  If spillovers are purely domestic, R&D 
investments are thus still unfriendly and strategic substitutes vis-à-vis foreign competitors.      
173 Leahy and Neary, above n 161, at 44-49. 
174 Recall that output levels are unfriendly and strategic substitutes under Cournot competition.   
175 Thus, R&D is also used as a strategic tool. 
176 If R&D is used as a strategic tool, firms strategically under-invest in R&D in case high spillovers 
are present.  The optimal subsidy would be higher than under the situation when R&D is not used as 
strategic tool to correct for this additional under-investment in R&D.  Leahy and Neary, above n 161, at 
50. 
177 Leahy and Neary, above n 161, at 49-53; Leahy and Neary, above n 94, at 41-66. 
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countries would cooperate in tackling international spillovers, the incentive to tax R&D for 
strategic reasons would disappear and they would subsidize up to the point where the 
international spillover is fully internalized.  The case for subsidization would even be stronger 
if the beneficial effect of the subsidy to consumers is taken into account. 
It is generally acknowledged that R&D investments indeed generate persistent and 
widespread positive spillovers.178  Broadly speaking, subsidizing such R&D investment seems 
therefore justified as an industrial policy instrument in competitive as well as imperfectly 
competitive markets, and national governments will be more willing to offer such subsidies if 
spillovers remain local.179  The ‘new’ or endogenous growth theory exactly points to these 
positive knowledge spillovers as engines of economic growth as they foster productivity.180  
By investing in R&D, firms aim at gaining market power flowing from the invention of 
higher-quality products (‘vertical innovations’) or totally new products (‘horizontal 
innovations’).181  In this way, firms generate private knowledge but equally contribute to the 
aggregate stock of public knowledge and thus do not grasp all the benefits of their 
investment.182  While such knowledge could spillover to other sectors (‘inter-industry’), the 
strongest spillovers take place between industries in the same sector (‘intra-industry’), 
particularly in those sectors that are knowledge-intensive.183  Moreover, spillovers are 
                                                 
178 For example, see D. Audretsch and M. Feldman, ‘Knowledge Spillovers and the Geography of 
Innovation’, in V. Henderson and J. F. Thisse (eds), Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics, vol 
4, (Amsterdam: North Holland, 2004), 2713-2739; Leahy and Neary, above n 161, at 50; Helpman, 
above n 160, at 42; Grossman, above n 66, at 106-108. 
179 Alternatively, R&D subsidies are considered legitimate because the scale, uncertainty, and long-
term horizon of R&D investments often make private capital sector funding unavailable. In this case, 
an R&D subsidy is only a second-best solution as the first-best policy would be to tackle the capital 
market failure directly.  D. B. Audretsch, ‘An Evaluation of Japanese R&D and Industrial Policies’, in 
D. B. Audretsch (ed), Industrial Policy and Competitive Advantage (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), 
vol. 1, 315-343, at 332. 
180 Technological change is no longer determined ‘exogenously’ as under the neoclassical growth 
model (Solow model) but results from investment decisions by firms which can be stimulated by 
government interventions.  Such technological change spurs total factor productivity (i.e., the amount 
of output that can be produced with a given amount of inputs). Further, by making investment more 
profitable, this increase in total factor productivity also induces capital accumulation, which is a second  
and indirect channel of growth creation.  Helpman, above n 160, at 84. 
181 Innovation could be defined broadly as ‘all the activities that increase the knowledge available to a 
firm so that it can produce more or better goods at lower cost’.  A. Rodríguez-Clare, Microeconomic 
Interventions After the Washington Consensus (Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 
February 2005), 37 pp., at 14; World Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 65-66.   
182 This externality explains why aggregate increasing returns to scale with a rising marginal 
productivity of public knowledge (permitting continuing growth) and a declining marginal productivity 
of private knowledge (permitting firms to behave competitive as price takers) can coexist.  As a result, 
economies of scale (aggregate level) and competitive markets (firms as price takers) can exist 
simultaneously.  Helpman, above n 160, at 38. 
183 Rodríguez-Clare, above n 181, at 14, 18 and 22; Maloney and Rodríguez-Clare, above n 163, at 
669-672.     
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attenuated by geographical distance because of the tacit nature of knowledge.184  Hence, local 
knowledge spillovers are important factors explaining the emergence of a ‘cluster’, which is 
‘a group of related industries and agents located in the same region or country’ (e.g., Silicon 
Valley).  Because of such local knowledge spillovers or other so-called ‘Marshallian 
externalities’, firms benefit from geographical concentration (agglomeration effects) and their 
productivity thus depends on the size of the cluster to which they belong (external economies 
of scale).185  As the ‘new trade theory’ explained (see above), trade enables countries to reap 
these external economies of scale and the world as a whole benefits from concentrating such 
industries in certain locations as a higher level of productivity is reached.  Yet, countries 
benefit more from trade if those industries are located in their territory.186  Importantly, 
Norman and Venables have demonstrated that world welfare is maximized when countries 
can unrestrictedly compete for attracting such clusters by offering subsidies.187  On the other 
hand, international disciplines restricting such subsidization would be world welfare 
depressing as it would result in too many clusters, each operating at an inefficient low 
scale.188   
Consequently, the ‘new trade theory’ highlighted the presence of external economies of scale 
as a second circumstance legitimizing a country’s active trade policy, next to securing profits 
in oligopolistic or monopolistic markets (excess returns).189  In terms of the Lincoln-example 
elaborated above, producing computers would generate something extra, namely positive 
knowledge spillovers to other firms in the same or related industries (or the wider economy), 
                                                 
184 Rodríguez-Clare, above n 181, at 14, 22; A. Rodríguez-Clare, ‘Coordination Failures, Clusters, and 
Microeconomic Interventions’, Economia (Fall, 2005), 1-42, at 18; Audretsch and Feldman, above n 
178, at 2713-2739.   
185 Rodríguez-Clare, above n 184, at 9.  Clusters emerge in the presence of externalities that are 
industry-specific and local (‘Marshallian externalities’), implying that firms benefit from production 
and innovation of neighbouring firms in the same and related industries.  Marshall identified three 
types of benefits: knowledge spillovers, input sharing, and labor market pooling.  The World Trade 
Report 2008 also points to the importance of knowledge spillovers in explaining geographical 
concentration.  World Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 92. 
186 P. Krugman and A. J. Venables, ‘Globalization and the Inequality of Nations’, 110:4 The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (November, 1995), 857-880; V. D. Norman and A. J. Venables, ‘Industrial 
Clusters: Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy’, 71 Economica (2004), 543–558.  Such external economies 
of scale can also imply that countries are ‘locked in’ in wrong areas of specialization and therefore 
justify infant industry protection.   
187 The model’s intuition is that competition for clusters will decrease the price and increase the output 
level of the sector, which through the terms of trade will also benefit importing countries not having 
reaped the cluster and thus reduce their incentive to subsidize in order to attract the cluster.  The 
Norman and Venables standard model assumes that individual countries cannot affect the terms of 
trade (small country assumption).  In case of large countries, the negative terms of trade effect resulting 
from subsidization will lead countries to subsidize too little.  Norman and Venables, above n 186, at 
543–558.   
188 The limitation on subsidies has the effect of both reducing the size of clusters and increasing their 
number as it induces more countries to offer subsidies so as to attract clusters. Norman and Venables, 
above n 186, at 551-552.  
189 As elaborated below, such local knowledge spillovers also underpin the infant industry argument.  
See P. R. Krugman, ‘Introduction: New Thinking about Trade Policy’, in P. Krugman (ed), Strategic 
Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), 1-22, at 10-14.   
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and countries would therefore benefit from producing such computers locally.190,191  If foreign 
targeting leads a country to invest less in sectors generating such spillovers (i.e., social return 
is higher than the private return), technological innovation and growth would slow down.  
Importantly, this argument thus hinges on the assumption that spillovers are present and that 
they are national instead of international in nature.  Indeed, if such spillovers are international, 
industries abroad would equally benefit from technological progress generated in the 
computer sector.192   
The classical example on potential external economies is the fierce rivalry for the 
semiconductor industry that started in the 1970s and is still ongoing today.193  Combining 
protection and promotion, Japan started targeting the semiconductor market dominated by the 
US and already led production of one type of semiconductors, namely Random Access 
Memories (RAM), in the mid-1980s.  The US’ concern was that this lead in RAM production 
would be used as a springboard to dominate the whole semiconductor industry (and other 
industries making use of semiconductors) because of strong local technological spillovers as 
well as excess returns attached to it.194  Since the 1990s, however, it became clear that these 
effects did in fact not materialize given that the US still dominated leading-edge segments of 
the market and other Asian countries (e.g., Taiwan, South-Korea and China) started targeting 
and entering the semi-conductor industry, pushing down the price.195 By the end of the 1990s, 
RAM production had become much like a commodity as many firms could produce it and no 
strategic benefits seemed to be involved.196  Hence, Krugman and Obstfeld conclude that this 
                                                 
190 The profit-securing argument in oligopolistic markets or monopolies relates to the exceptionally 
high returns generated by capital and labor in those sectors.  In contrast, the externality argument 
relates to higher returns generated by a sector to capital and labor employed elsewhere in the economy.  
Eaton indicates that this would be a reason for subsidizing exports from industries generating 
significant economies of scale as the latter improves the chances that the country would specialize in 
those industries, although the external economies of scale rather call for a production subsidy.  
Kurgman, above n 189, at 13; Eaton, above n 124, at 118-120.   
191 In theory, if spillovers remain purely intra-industry, other countries could still benefit through their 
effect on the terms of trade. 
192 If innovations do not generate spillovers but are fully appropriable by the innovator (e.g., patent 
protection), no case for R&D subsidies can be made.  It could in principle raise a strategic trade policy 
argument in case such industries generate true economic profits.  If such industries have the 
characteristics of an oligopoly, firms might even invest too much in R&D (see above).  See Krugman, 
above n 60, at 109.    
193 M. Borrus, L. D’Andrea Tyson, and J. Zysman, ‘Creating Advantage: How Government Policies 
Shape International Trade in the Semiconductor Industry’, in P. Krugman (ed), Strategic Trade Policy 
and the New International Economics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), 91-114. 
194 The US believed that the excess returns in the RAM segment were needed to finance innovation in 
other products.  Krugman, above n 60, at 113. 
195 In the 1980s already, Krugman expressed doubts that such external economies were important in the 
RAM segment but equally did not foreclose the possibility that the success of such programmes had 
contributed to Japan’s high-technology growth. Krugman, above n 60, at 111-112, 119-121. 
196 The chipmarket is also compared with commodity markets as both have a tendency to oversupply 
the market and as this oversupply is fuelled by government support.  See‘The Semi-Conductor 
Industry: Under New Management’, The Economist (2 April, 2009). 
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textbook example turned out as ‘a lesson in the pitfalls of activist trade policy’.197  In 
conclusion, the presence of knowledge spillovers therefore not only justifies government 
support but might also warrant government intervention in order to capture or keep industries 
generating such spillovers (e.g., knowledge intensive industries) if these spillovers are indeed 
predominantly local in nature.  Yet, targeting high-tech sectors might be a risky trade policy 
for two reasons, namely the information requirements for detecting and calculating such 
spillovers, which ‘by definition leave no trace in market transactions’198, and subsidization by 
other countries, which depresses the terms of trade.  The more R&D spillovers become 
international in nature, the lesser governments are inclined to offer subsidies in order to keep 
the sector in question or spur R&D levels and, from the perspective of other countries, the less 
important it becomes to target the sector in question.  However, the world as a whole would 
still benefit if such investments are stimulated by R&D subsidies.     
Given that developed countries have their comparative advantage in industries generating 
most spillovers (knowledge-intensive industries), they should invest more in R&D.199  
Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of R&D investments are indeed made in 
industrialized countries.200,201  From the perspective of knowledge-lagging developing 
countries, this raises the important question on whether some of the generated stock of 
knowledge could nonetheless spill over and thus boost the productivity of their domestic 
firms.202  Important channels of such knowledge spillovers across the board could be 
                                                 
197 Krugman and Obstfeld, above n 104, at 282; Krugman, above n 64, at 23-24.  The Economist 
foresees that the semiconductor market will become largely concentrated in Asian countries, but excess 
returns will be minimal, partly because these Asian countries will sustain support for their national 
‘champions’.  See ‘The Semi-Conductor Industry: Under New Management’, The Economist (2 April, 
2009). 
198 R. E. Baldwin and P. R. Krugman, ‘Market Access and International Competition: A Simulation of 
16K Random Access Memories’, in D. B. Audretsch (ed), Industrial Policy and Competitive 
Advantage – Volume 1 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), 22-48, at 171. 
199 The higher level of R&D- spending in OECD countries might be explained and justified on the basis 
of their comparative advantage in knowledge-intensive industries.  Developing countries should not 
invest in R&D up to the level of knowledge-intensive countries as their level of R&D spending might 
just reflect their different specialization pattern (i.e., their comparative advantage).  See also below n 
328.  Maloney and Rodríguez-Clare, above n 163, at 665–684. 
200 Helpman held in 2004 that 95% of R&D investments are made in industrialized countries and Keller 
specified in 2002 that Germany, the US, and Japan together accounted for more than 75% of R&D 
spending.  On the basis of UNESCO data, Brahmbhatt and Hu also found that almost 80% of R&D 
investments are made by developed countries.  M. Brahmbhatt and A. Hu, ‘Ideas and Innovation in 
East Asia’, The World Bank - Policy Research Working Paper No. 4403 (November, 2007), 48 pp., at 
18; Helpman, above n 160, at 64; W. Keller, ‘Geographic Localization of International Technology 
Diffusion’, 92:1 The American Economic Review (March, 2002), 120-142, at 120; World Trade Report 
2006, above n 9, at 83. 
201 Moreover, most innovations are made in a small number of developed countries.  World Trade 
Report 2008, above n 125, at 70. 
202 Again, this should not mean that a foreign country ipso facto loses from R&D investments 
generating merely domestic spillovers given that this foreign country could benefit from a positive 
terms of trade effect if both countries trade (see below Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3).         
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international trade (attached to imports as well as exports) and foreign direct investment.203  
Given that such knowledge is more easily adapted to local circumstances by domestic firms 
that invest in R&D and in the case sufficient human capital is in place, knowledge-lagging 
developing countries are advised to not merely to open these channels but to improve their 
capacity to absorb such innovations (‘absorptive capacity’) as well.204  As will be analyzed in-
depth in the following section, this potential dynamic benefit of both trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) could be an argument for developing countries to follow an export 
promotion strategy and to offer incentives so as to attract FDI. 
 
2.4. INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE ROLE OF SUBSIDIES FOR 
SPURRING ECONOMIC GROWTH 
2.4.1. Development strategies: Import-substitution and export-promoting strategies 
Ideas on the proper role of the government in the allocation of resources in developing 
countries have evolved over the last decennia.  A central notion still adhered to today was 
developed in ‘the infant industry argument’, which in its broad meaning is often used as a 
justification of different sorts of government interventions during the first ‘kick-off’ stage of 
economic development.  This ‘infant industry argument’ starts from the observation that new 
firms in developing countries, simply because of their high initial costs of production, are 
unable to compete with well-established firms in developed countries and, as a result, should 
be temporarily protected by the government from competition.  This temporary government 
shelter in the form of import restrictions (protection) and subsidies (promotion), offers the 
‘infant firm’ breathing space to grow up so as to cover high initial costs (static scale 
economies205) and/or to ‘learn by doing’ (dynamic scale economies206) and hence to cut its 
                                                 
203 Directly purchasing international knowledge, acquiring it through telecom systems, or the 
movement of people are other channels of knowledge spillovers across the board.  Brahmbhatt and Hu,  
above n 200, at 6, 13; B. M. Hoekman, K. E. Maskus, and K. Saggi, ‘Transfer of Technology to 
Developing Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options’, IBS, Research Program on Political 
and Economic Change, Working Paper PEC 2004-2003 (May, 2004), 34 pp.; R. Baldwin, H. 
Braconier, and R. Forslid, ‘Multinationals, Endogenous Growth, and Technological Spillovers: Theory 
and Evidence’, 13:5 Review of International Economics (2005), 945–963; W. Keller and S. R. Yeaple, 
‘Multinational Enterprises, International Trade, and Productivity Growth: Firm-Level Evidence from 
the United States’, 91:4 The Review of Economics and Statistics (2009), 821-831; W. Keller, ‘Transfer 
of Technology’, in S. N. Durlauf and L. Blume (eds), New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed. 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 367-371; W. Keller, ‘Trade and the Transmission of 
Technology’, 7 Journal of Economic Growth (2002), 5-24. 
204 See Brahmbhatt and Hu, above n 200, at 6-7; Hoekman, Maskus, and Saggi, above n 203, at 12; 
World Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 157-160. 
205 These static economies of scale are represented by a downward-sloping long-term average cost 
function. 
206 Dynamic scale economies refer to situations in which costs fall with cumulative production over 
time (shift downward of long term average cost curve), rather than with the actual level of production.  
See P. Succar, ‘The Need for Industrial Policy in LDC's - A Re-Statement of the Infant Industry 
Argument’, 28:2 International Economic Review (June, 1987), 521-534, at 521, footnote 2. 
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average production costs over time.207  Once the firm has become mature, the argument 
assumes, it will be capable to compete on the international market without further government 
support.   In the presence of market failures, even a perfectly functioning capital market might 
not provide sufficient credit to bridge this initial phase.208  Whereas such promotion or 
protection would be welfare-reducing from a static perspective,209 it would generate dynamic 
welfare benefits (i.e., over time) by initiating the establishment of internationally competitive 
and productive industries.210  Such policy might even boost world welfare by reducing world 
prices if the mature firm turns out to be more productive than previously established foreign 
rivals in developed countries or if its entrance creates more competition in non-competitive 
(e.g., oligopolistic or monopolist) markets.211   
In the 1950s and 1960s, several developing countries put the infant industry argument into 
practice by adopting an import-substitution (IS) strategy, which sheltered domestic firms from 
foreign competition by a variety of import restrictions such as tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions (QRs) on final manufactured goods, combined with prioritizing intermediate and 
capital goods (and fuel) imports.212  Such substitution by domestic final production was 
indirectly biased against exports as it channeled resources away from actual or potential 
export industries.213  Aggravated by an appreciation of exchange rates resulting from the 
                                                 
207 If no dynamic scale economies would exist, a non-recurring subsidy would be sufficient to cover 
initial start-up costs (static scale economies).  Next to internal economies of scale (cost per unit 
depends on the size of an individual firm), external economies of scale (cost per unit depends on the 
size of the industry and not on the size of an individual firm) could be an argument for infant industry 
protection (see below Rodriguez-Clare on clustering; see below Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2.2).  
This temporal aspect of the infant industry argument is also reflected in Article XVII GATT: ‘promote 
the rapid development of domestic industries’.  P. A. Messerlin, ‘Enlarging the Vision for Trade Policy 
Space: Special and Differentiated Treatment and Infant Industry Issues’, The World Economy (2006), 
1359-1407. 
208 Evidently, a perfectly functioning capital market is often absent in developing countries. 
209 From a static welfare perspective and assuming the entrance of a monopolist (i.e., no other producer 
is present), a subsidy might also be welfare increasing in case of static economies of scale.  If a 
monopolist’s average cost of production is higher than the potential market price (marginal costs equal 
marginal benefits), no production would occur (welfare is zero).  A subsidy covering this difference 
would induce production and be welfare increasing if its cost is lower than the benefit to consumers.  In 
fact, this may be an argument for permanent subsidization.  But if entry is promoted in a market where 
another firm already sells profitably without government support (duopoly), the welfare effect should 
also take into account the negative effect on the latter’s profit.  Grossman, above n 66, at 96-98.  
210 See below Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3. 
211 Of course, this assumes that production is sufficiently large to decrease the world price (large 
country assumption).  For example, the firm would exploit the intrinsic relative comparative advantage 
of the developing country in the sector in question.  See also H. Pack and K. Saggi, ‘Is There a Case for 
Industrial Policy? A Critical Survey’, 21:2 The World Bank Research Observer (Fall, 2006), 267-297, 
at 269.  In oligopolistic or monopolist markets however, new entrance might also result in production at 
an inefficient scale (e.g., if fixed costs are very high).   
212 The goal was to replace the production of final stage imported goods by domestically produced final 
goods (e.g., automobiles) in the first phase and to protect intermediate goods (e.g., automobile parts) in 
the second phase so as to launch a domestic industry in intermediate products.  
213 Firms were stimulated to produce for the protected domestic market where they received a higher 
price than on the world market.  Krugman and Obstfeld, above n 104, at 258-259.  Bhagwati defines an 
IS-strategy as the adoption of an effective exchange rate for the country’s exports (which includes 
PART I CHAPTER 2 – ECONOMIC RATIONALES IN THE PRESENCE OF MARKET FAILURES 
 
 61
import restrictions itself, this anti-export bias equally formed a deliberative policy choice 
because an overvalued exchange rate made the importation of intermediate and capital goods 
cheaper.214  The IS-strategy also attracted FDI which aimed at circumventing the tariff/QR 
wall (tariff-jumping FDI).215  The objective was to diversify out of agriculture into 
manufacturing as reliance on primary exports would deteriorate its terms of trade (the 
Prebish-Singer thesis).216  Hence, this process of industrialization would kick off by 
encouraging the importation of intermediate and capital goods and by discouraging imports of 
manufactured goods and exports of primary goods.  This inward-oriented policy emerged 
from a belief that exporting manufactured goods was simply impossible in the short run (so-
called ‘export pessimism’; economic argument) and from the influence of an influential lobby 
in import-competing sectors that remained absent at the export side (political-economy 
argument).217  Once the industry had grown up by selling in the protected domestic market, it 
would be able to produce for the international market as well.  The import-substitution phase 
was thus seen as a prerequisite to be satisfied before a country could enter the phase of 
exporting manufacturing goods.   
By the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, distortions generated by the IS-strategy 
came more and more to the surface.218  Unemployment amplified, capital remained 
underutilized, and total factor productivity had not improved significantly.  Instead of having 
‘learned by doing’, many infant firms never grew up as they invested in successfully 
capturing their governments to keep protection walls standing (rent-seeking behavior).219  As 
a consequence, the price of their products remained well above world prices, hurting domestic 
consumers and downstream industries. Moreover, there was a shortage of export earnings as 
                                                                                                                                            
export subsidies) which is less than that for imports (which includes import charges).  This creates an 
‘anti-export bias’ (i.e., an overall incentive to import-substitute relative to what international prices 
dictate).  J. N. Bhagwati, ‘Export-Promoting Trade Strategy, Issues and Evidence’ 3:1 World Bank 
Research Observer (January, 1988), 27-57, at 32.   
214 In line with the Harrod-Domar model, capital was understood to be the main engine of growth.  The 
overvalued exchange rate was welcomed as it discouraged the traditional exportation of primary goods, 
making resources available for the manufacturing sector. 
215 Bhagwati, above n 213, at 27-57.  
216 At the same time, developing countries emphasized the importance of enhanced market access on 
primary product markets in developed countries.  WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2003 (Geneva: 
WTO Publications, 2003), 242 pp., at 152. 
217 Krugman and Obstfeld, above n 104, at 258-259. 
218 Nonetheless, the period of 1950s and early 1960s (the so-called ‘easy stage of import-substitution’) 
had offered some promising results.  World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 66; Commission on 
Growth and Development, above n 149, at 21; J. A. Frieden, Global Capitalism – Its Fall and Rise in 
the Twentieth Century (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 556 pp., at 351-356.  The 
downsides of the import-substitution strategy also generated a shift in thinking on Special and 
Differential treatment (S&D treatment) in the GATT (Tokyo Round), whereby the focus shifted to 
developing countries’ own trade policies as well as on market access for their exports.  World Trade 
Report 2003, above n 216, at 153.  
219 World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 66.   
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industries failed to start exporting.220  At the same time, the exceptional growth rates of East 
Asian countries started to attract attention of policymakers and scholars.221  Although the 
exact formulae of their success was and still is debated, it was generally recognized that these 
countries had shifted timely from an IS-strategy to an export promotion (EP) strategy, 
facilitating a fast technological catch-up.222,223  The neoclassical or neoliberal reading of this 
success stressed the role of the market and outward orientation but, as the revisionist or 
structuralist view correctly criticized, overlooked the fact that in several of these countries 
(e.g., Japan, Korea, Taiwan) government interventions were central for explaining their 
successful EP-strategy.224  The neoclassical school’s mistrust of government interventions 
also emerged from the negative experience with the extended IS-strategy adopted in Latin 
America and Sub-Saharian Africa.225  Still, this neoclassical but one-sided reading was 
adopted by the World Bank and IMF as well as by US government agencies during the 1980s 
and resulted in the ‘Washington Consensus’, as labeled by Williamson.226  This Consensus 
prescribed an outward orientation strategy with minimal government intervention.  Hence, 
under the Washington Consensus, an export ‘promotion’ strategy was a trade-neutral or ‘free 
trade’ strategy with no significant intervention: the benefits of exportation were highlighted 
and governments were prescribed to refrain from policies with an anti-export bias.227  Indeed, 
                                                 
220 Failing export earnings resulted in a shortage of foreign exchange, needed to finance imports of 
capital and intermediate goods.  Exchange controls (e.g., those prohibiting exporters to hold their 
earnings abroad) were imposed to ensure that foreign exchange was used for the importation of those 
goods. A. O. Krueger, ‘Why Trade Liberalisation is Good for Growth’, 108:450 The Economic Journal 
(September, 1998), 1513-1522, at 1516. 
221 From a theoretical side as well, the IS-strategy became subjected to severe criticism for a first time 
by an influential paper by R. E. Baldwin, ‘The Case against Infant-Industry Tariff Protection’, 77:3 
Journal of Political Economy (May - June, 1969), 295-305. 
222 Bhagwati observed in the literature, an EP-strategy also captures strategies that are neutral against 
imports and exports. These could equally be called ‘trade-neutral’ or ‘bias-free’ strategies or, as 
labelled by Krueger, as ‘outer-oriented strategies’.  Therefore, Bhagwati proposed to label a strategy 
with a neutral incentive regime as an EP-strategy and a strategy with a net incentive for exporting as an 
ultra EP-strategy, although an EP-strategy in most literature covers both.  Bhagwati, above n 213, at 
32-33; Krueger, above n 220, at 1514. 
223 World Trade Report 2003, above n 216, at 67.  
224 Authors belonging to the neoliberal school in the 1980s included Von Hayek, Buchaman, Krueger, 
and Depaak Lal.  On the difference between the neoliberal and structuralist approach, see S. Lall, 
‘Strategy: The Role of the State in the Face of Globalization’, in K. P. Callagher (ed), Putting 
Development First – The Importance of Policy Space in the WTO and the International Financial 
Institutions (London: Zed Books, 2005), 301 pp., 33-68, at 33-34.  
225 World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 67. 
226 See J. Williamson, ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’, in J. Williamson (ed), Latin 
American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 1990), 7-20.  
227 Bhagwati also underlined that, even in the meaning of a trade neutral strategy, an EP-strategy should 
not necessarily be equated with the absence of government intervention.  To the contrary, ‘such 
intervention can be of great value, and almost certainly has been so, in making the EP-strategy work 
successfully’ because: 
‘By publicly supporting the outward-oriented strategy, by even bending in some cases toward 
ultra-export promotion, and by gearing the credit institutions to supporting export activities in an 
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the elimination of barriers to importation and FDI were listed among the ten elements of the 
Washington Consensus.228  Generally speaking, the Washington consensus reflected a 
conviction that government failures were far more prevalent than market failures.  Therefore, 
the legitimate role for governments was confined to guaranteeing a stable macro economic 
environment, enforcing property rights, and providing essential public goods such as 
education and global infrastructure.229  According to Lall, this Washington Consensus also 
found its way to the new trade rules drafted during the Uruguay Round.230    
 
In a pivotal 1993 study, the World Bank revised its explanations for the exceptional high 
growth rates in the East Asian region between 1965 and 1990, commonly known as the ‘East 
Asian Miracle’.231  In the first stage, East Asian countries often combined import protection 
with an EP promotion strategy, for example by exempting exports from import duties (e.g., 
export processing zones) before gradually liberalizing imports.232  Yet, assistance to exporters 
went much further than undoing the disincentives created by import barriers and thus ‘getting 
prices right’, but included guaranteed financing, tax incentives, subsidized infrastructure, FDI 
incentives, and other types of subsidies for exports.233  Importantly, it was also recognized 
that there was no single East Asian model: the East Asian countries significantly differed in 
the way they employed these export incentives234 and even within one country the strategy 
varied over time.  Indeed, a key to the East Asian success was the policy flexibility put in 
place: strategies were revised if deemed necessary in light of changing international or 
national circumstances or if previous strategies turned out to be unsuccessful.235  This is what 
Stiglitz called the high ‘adaptability’ of East Asian countries.236  Overall, an essential 
                                                                                                                                            
overt fashion, governments in these countries appear to have established the necessary 
confidence that their commitment to the EP-strategy is serious’. 
This aspect is not recognized under a laissez-faire model.  Bhagwati, above n 213, at 33-34. 
228 The recipe of the Washington Consensus is often summarized in the catch-phrase: ‘stabilize, 
privatize, and liberalize’. Commission on Growth and Development, above n 149, at 5. 
229 S. Lall, ‘Reinventing Industrial Strategy: The Role of Government Policy in Building Industrial 
Competitiveness’, QEH Working Paper Series No. 111 (October 2003), 35 pp., at 2; M. Noland and H. 
Pack, Industrial Policy in an Era of Globalization: Lessons from Asia (Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics, 2003), 144 pp., at 5-6.  According to the World Trade Report 2006, the 
suspicion of targeted government interventions was ‘itself largely based on anecdotal evidence and 
stylized facts’.  World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 67.   
230 Lall, above n 229, at 2. 
231 The eight countries concerned were: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Taiwan.  World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 389 pp. 
232 Except for Hong Kong that did not develop an early IS-strategy.  World Bank Report 1993, above n 
231.  
233 World Bank Report 1993, above n 231, at 143;    
234 For example, Hong Kong adopted a free market approach, whereas Korea and Taiwan adhered most 
intensively to an interventionist strategy. 
235 World Bank Report 1993, above n 231, at 86, 145. 
236 World Bank Report 1993, above n 231, at 154; J. E. Stiglitz, ‘Some Lessons from the East Asian 
Miracle’, 11:2 The World Bank Research Observer (August, 1996), 151-17, at 154. 
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ingredient of the East Asian success was attributed to a stable and well-functioning macro 
economic environment which kept the exchange rate stable and inflation, budget deficits, and 
external debt under control.  In line with the endogenous growth theory, the World Bank 
further pointed to the benefits of booming exports, which accelerated economic growth 
through productivity improvements that result from technology spillovers (productivity-based 
catching up).237  In this respect, the World Bank Report explicitly acknowledged the 
contribution of functional government interventions in explaining this export push, in 
particular those which targeted exports in general.  For example, exporters had access to 
credits, often at subsidized rates.238  In contrast, selective interventions which promoted 
specific industries or firms were considered less successful, except for Japan.239  The World 
Bank acknowledged that some selective interventions in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan effectively 
shifted resources to high-yielding activities but again stressed that these resulted from close 
monitoring and interaction with the private sector.240  In sum, the World Bank accepted that it 
was not the absence of governance interventions that turned the East Asian economies into ‘a 
miracle’ but that this miracle in fact showed how governments have a significant role to play 
in correcting market failures that are more widespread than previously understood.  Yet, such 
interventions should be functional and aim at boosting exports in general, rather than being 
selective.  After all, the record on selective interventions is mixed and the ones that were 
successful seem hard to duplicate elsewhere in the developing world.    
Importantly, most authors at the neoliberal as well as at the structuralist side of the spectrum 
seemed to agree with several conclusions drawn by this World Bank study.  There was no 
single East Asian Model, implying that there is no ‘one size fits all’ formula for economic 
development and indicating that adoption of similar policies is no guarantee for success.  But 
even in absence of a single receipt, all East Asian countries shared a stable macro economic 
environment, an orientation on exports and investments in human resources, and an 
institutional framework which managed to avoid that markets and governments acted as 
antagonists.241,242   
                                                 
237 World Bank Report 1993, above n 231, at 261, 316. 
238 The provision of credit to exporters was more successful than in other developing countries because, 
on average, credits contained a lower subsidy element and the intensive institutional cooperation 
between governments and the private sector reduced moral hazard behavior.   
239 Except for Japan, these selective interventions did not generate above average productivity gains nor 
did they result in changing industrial structure.  The World Bank Report 1993 concludes ‘that selective 
interventions were neither as important as their advocates suggest nor as irrelevant as their critics 
contend’ but ‘(t)he most successful intervention (…) – the commitment to manufactured exports – was 
also the most general one’.  World Bank Report 1993, above n 231, at 324-326.   
240 World Bank Report 1993, above n 231, at 325. 
241 See, for example, D. Rodrik, ‘TFPG controversies, institutions, and economic performance in East 
Asia’, NBER Working Paper No. 5914 (February, 1997), 37 pp., at 1; R. Hausmann and D. Rodrik, 
‘Economic development as self-discovery’, 72 Journal of Development Economics (2003), 603– 633, 
at 604-605.   
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Yet, one particular aspect of the World Bank Report provoked an intense debate among 
economists and policymakers, crystallizing around the concept of ‘industrial policy’.243  In its 
broad meaning as also adhered to in this dissertation, industrial policy encompasses all 
government measures that to speed or alter the process of resource allocation among or within 
industrial or service sectors with the aim of correcting market distortions that inhibit 
economic growth.244  If understood as such, not only specific interventions inducing certain 
specific industries but also functional or horizontal interventions inducing particular activities 
such as R&D and exports are considered part of a country’s industrial policy strategy.245   In 
many studies and in the 1993 World Bank Report, however, industrial policy is deemed to 
capture only those interventions that are selective in the sense of targeting specific sectors, 
even though the degree of specificity is often left undefined.  As mentioned above, the World 
Bank Report largely rejected the case for an industrial policy defined in this narrow way.   
At the neoliberal side of the spectrum, several scholars agreed with this reading and 
conclusion.  Reviewing the literature on the East Asian Miracle, Noland and Pack for example 
conclude that only a minor part of the East Asian’s growth success is attributed to selective 
interventions. Instead, they emphasized the importance of macro economic fundamentals and 
acknowledged the benefits of a slight pro-export bias.246  Along the same lines, Pack and 
Saggi suggested that for other developing countries the original Washington Consensus 
receipt holds more promises than complex strategies of selective government interventions.  
Whereas the neoliberal school increasingly recognized the existence of significant market 
failures in developing countries, it stressed the difficulty of correcting these by selective 
interventions: ‘picking winners’ requires detailed information which governments likely miss 
and gives rise to rent seeking behavior and corruption.   
                                                                                                                                            
242 Market-friendly policies, prioritizing economic growth and maintenance of macro economic 
stability are in the words of Rodrik ‘the sine qua non of economic growth’.  D. Rodrik, ‘Growth After 
the Crisis’, Paper Prepared for the Commission on Growth and Development (May, 2009), 42 pp., at 7. 
243 The difficulties in defining ‘industrial policy’ exactly reveal the divergence in views on the 
appropriate role of governments in the market.  Other aspects of the World Bank study were equally 
disputed.  For example, Lawrence and Weinstein have criticized the Report’s narrow focus on exports 
as engines of economic growth, whereas imports were important sources of productivity growth 
through channelling knowledge spillovers and inducing innovation.  R. Z. Lawrence and D. E. 
Weinstein, ‘Trade and growth: import-led or export-led? Evidence from Japan and Korea’, NBER 
Working Paper No. 7264 (July, 1999), 43 pp. 
244 This definition is partly derived from Rutherford, above n 81, at 270.  As Rodrik rightly indicates, 
the term ‘industrial’ policy might be somewhat misleading as it also refers to resource allocation in the 
service sector.  For other broad definitions, see D. Rodrik, ‘Normalizing Industrial Policy’, Working 
Paper (September, 2007), 50 pp., at 3 (‘policies that stimulate specific economic activities and promote 
structural change’).  A list of definitions can be found in Z. Hernandez, ‘Industrial Policy in East Asia: 
In Search for Lessons’, Background paper prepared for the World Development Report 2005 
(September, 2004), 33 pp., at 5.  
245 See Hernandez, above n 244, at 5.  In this meaning, the World Bank, by emphasizing functional 
interventions such as exports, also preserved a role for industrial policy in the East Asian Miracle.   
246 Yet, they left open the possibility that selective interventions could have had an important impetus 
for the initial phase of industrialization in Korea and Taiwan. Noland and Pack, above n 229, at 93-
100. 
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At the structuralist or revisionist side of the spectrum, however, authors emphasized the 
success of selective interventions not only in several East Asian countries but also in high-
income countries in their early stages of development.247  Here, some convergence the 
neoliberal view emerged.  Indeed, the structuralist school increasingly acknowledged the 
important role of private markets and the danger of government failures, certainly in case of 
selective interventions.  According to Lall, the lower the government’s capabilities, the lower 
the degree of selectivity it can be entrusted with.248  Yet, these authors emphasize the risk of 
government failures should not refrain governments from taking action but should stimulate 
the improvement of government capabilities and ensure that efficient monitoring systems are 
put in place.249  Market failures in developing countries are too fundamental to be left 
untouched.250  Part of their argument is that the strengthening of disciplines under the WTO 
(or under regional/bilateral agreements and World Bank and IMF programmes) has to some 
extent foreclosed the potential of low-income countries to employ the type of industrial 
policies underpinning the East Asian Miracle.251  This conclusion was also reached by the 
2006 UNCTAD Trade and Development Report.252 
                                                 
247 See, for example, Lall, above n 224, at 46-48.  A recent example is given by Barnes et al in 
reporting the success of selective policy interventions (through export incentives) in the South-African 
Automobile Sector.  This suggests a useful role for selective targeting.  J. Barnes, R. Kaplinsky, and M. 
Morris, ‘Industrial Policy in Developing Economies: Developing Dynamic Comparative Advantage in 
the South African Automobile Sector’, 8:2 Competition & Change (June, 2004), 153–172. 
248 S. Lall, ‘Selective Industrial and Trade Policies in Developing Countries: Theoretical and Empirical 
Issues’, QEH Working Paper Series (April, 2000), 38 pp., at 28-29. 
249 In the words of Hausman et al: ‘many promoted activities will necessarily fail. But this is as it 
should be. The absence of failure is a sure sign that the government’s industrial policies were too timid. 
The ultimate test of whether industrial policy is working is not whether a government can reliably pick 
winners (no government reliably can) but whether a government is able to let losers go’.  R. Hausmann, 
D. Rodrik, and C. F. Sabel, ‘Reconfiguring Industrial Policy: A Framework with an Application to 
South Africa’, CID Working Paper No. 168 (May, 2008), 22 pp., at 12; see also Rodrik, above n 244, 
at 42; J. E. Stiglitz, ‘Development Policies in a World of Globalization’, in K. P. Callagher (ed), 
Putting Development First – The Importance of Policy Space in the WTO and the International 
Financial Institutions (London: Zed Books, 2005), 15-32, at 27. 
250 In recent writings, the importance of the process of industrial policy is also underlined, which would 
minimize the risk of government failures.  See, for example, Hausmann, Rodrik, and Sabel, above n 
249. 
251 See, for example, Rodrik, above n 161, at 148-149; D. Rodrik, ‘How to Save Globalization from its 
Cheerleaders’, Working Paper (September, 2007), 33 pp., at 24; Lall, above n 248, at 30-31; Y-S. Lee, 
‘Facilitating Development in the World Trading System – A Proposal for Development Facilitation 
Tariff and Development Facilitating Subsidy’, 38:6 Journal of World Trade (2004), 935-954; J. S. 
Mah, ‘Export Promotion and Economic Development: The Case of Korea’, 40:1 Journal of World 
Trade (2006), 153-166; S. M. Shafaeddin, ‘Towards an Alternative Perspective on Trade and Industrial 
Policy’, 36:6 Development and Change (2005), 1144-1162; H-J. Chang, ‘Kicking Away the Ladder: 
“Good Policies” and “Good Institutions” in Historical Perspective’, in K. P. Callagher (ed), Putting 
Development First – The Importance of Policy Space in the WTO and the International Financial 
Institutions (London: Zed Books, 2005), 102-125.  But Amsden, who also pleads for sufficient policy 
space for industrial policy, has concluded that WTO rules are overall sufficiently flexible to this end.  
See A. H. Amsden, ‘Promoting Industry under the WTO’, in K. P. Callagher (ed), Putting 
Development First – The Importance of Policy Space in the WTO and the International Financial 
Institutions (London: Zed Books, 2005), 301 pp., at 216-232; A. H. Amsden and T. Hiking, ‘The Bark 
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In recent years, the World Bank has emphasized that market failures in low income countries 
are deeply rooted and that governments have an important role to play in correcting these 
market failures.  Significantly, the World Bank even started to accept that selective policies 
might be part of a broader agenda to overcome market failures and to implement an EP-
promotion or outward-oriented industrial policy.253  In an important 2009 study, the World 
Bank stressed that low-income countries should prioritize the correction of market failures 
affecting export diversification, given that such diversification is seen as pivotal for economic 
growth.254  The study underlined the importance of export diversification for economic 
growth as it unleashes productivity-inducing externalities (e.g., knowledge spillovers), 
progressively facilitates more rapid moves to a better allocation of production factors,255 and 
tempers macro economic volatility (portfolio effect)256 as well as the vulnerability for elite 
                                                                                                                                            
Is Worse Than the Bite: New WTO Law and Late Industrialization’, 570 Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science (July, 2000), 104-114.  
252 UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 2006 – Global Partnership and National Policies for 
Development (New York: United Nations Publications, 2006), 237 pp., at 169. 
253 Although the 2005 World Development Report already acknowledged that growth could possibly be 
accelerated by selective interventions, it remained largely sceptical of their use.  In its 2008 World 
Economic Prospect, the World Bank, however, emphasized that governments have an important role in 
overcoming market failures in developing countries and listed successful industry-specific and product-
specific interventions.  World Bank, World Development Report 2005 - A Better Investment Climate for 
Everyone (New York: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2005), 271 pp., at 157-174; World 
Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2008 - Technology Diffusion in the Developing World (Washington 
DC: The World Bank, 2008), 201 pp., at 142-145. 
254 R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, and P. Walkenhorst (eds), Breaking into New Markets – Emerging 
Lessons for Export Diversification (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009), 265 pp.  Parallel to the 
findings by Imbs and Wacziarg on the pattern of domestic production in relation to income, an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between export diversification and income is found: in the first phase of 
development countries diversify their exports, whereas they start specializing at a certain level of 
income and diversification thus falls.  Of course, this U-shaped relationship (merely revealing a 
positive correlation) does an sich not imply that export diversification spurs economic growth in low-
income countries. As Brenton et al observed, ‘in one sense, the causality runs from growth to 
diversification’ but, for the reasons spelled out in the full text, diversification is also considered to lead 
to higher growth. Hesse finds ‘some robust empirical evidence of a positive effect of export 
diversification on per capita income growth’.  Theoretical arguments for specialization are the 
Ricardian theory of trade (specialization resulting from falling barriers-to-trade such as lower tariffs 
and transport costs) and agglomeration economies (clustering).  P. Brenton, R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, 
and P. Walkenhorts, ‘Breaking Into New Markets: Overview’, in R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, and P. 
Walkenhorst (eds), Breaking into New Markets – Emerging Lessons for Export Diversification 
(Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009) 1-35, at 2 and 6-7; H. Hesse, ‘Export Diversification and 
Economic Growth’, R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, and P. Walkenhorst (eds), Breaking into New Markets – 
Emerging Lessons for Export Diversification (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009), 55-80, at 56-
57; J. Imbs and R. Wacziarg, ‘Stages of Diversification’, The American Economic Review (March, 
2003), 63-86, at 82; O. Cadot, C. Carrère, and V. Strauss-Kahn, ‘Export Diversification: What’s behind 
the Hump?’, CEPR Discussion Papers No. 6590 (November, 2007), 46 pp.    
255 Cumulative investments in traditional activities will in most cases exhaust activity-specific 
economies of scale and lead to stagnating or decreasing returns.  See also R. Hausmann, J. Hwang, D. 
Rodrik, ‘What You Export Matters’, 12:1 Journal of Economic Growth (March, 2007), 1-25. 
256 Openness makes a country vulnerable to external shocks by increasing volatility of output, which 
negatively affects growth and private investment.  Export diversification into new products (product 
diversification) could reduce the vulnerability to price shocks (i.e., shocks to the prices of imported and 
exported products), but diversification of existing products into new markets (geographical 
diversification) could also be important to soften the vulnerability to country-specific shocks in 
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capture.  However, contrary to conventional wisdom (e.g., Prebish-Singer thesis257), 
concentration an sich and not its dependency of commodities seems to be negatively 
correlated with growth, hereby suggesting that the call for diversification should not 
necessarily mean diversifying out of commodities into manufacturing.258  The concept of 
export diversification does not only mean exporting ‘new’ products that were not exported 
previously from the low-income country in question (‘product diversification’), but also 
covers the penetration of new export markets by existing exports (‘geographical 
diversification’).259  Because market failures inhibit (the speed of) such export diversification, 
developing countries – in particular low-income countries – should be supported in 
implementing an explicit policy of diversifying exports that should consist of a mix of general 
– affecting all firms and consumers – and specific interventions.  The general framework 
includes macro economic stability, rectifying any anti-export bias, lowering the cost of trade-
related services (e.g., telecommunications, finance), as well as proactive policies to support 
trade (e.g., public-private cooperation, export promoting agencies, agencies to support 
innovation and clusters, export processing zones, and duty refund schemes).260  Further, the 
World Bank study called for specific interventions for ‘particular industries through tax, 
credit, and budget subsidies’ to correct market failures and hereby acknowledges that, ‘in fact, 
most countries have some de facto policies that stimulate specific economic activities’.261  In 
order to ensure that such industrial policy promotes instead of impedes structural change, it 
should be transparent, well-focused, and flexible.262  Hence, the risk of government failures, 
which could ‘make things worse’, no longer seems to serve as an argument to leave market 
                                                                                                                                            
exporting markets.  M. Bacchetta, M. Jansen, C. Lennon, and R. Piermartini, ‘Exposure to External 
Shocks and the Geographical Diversification of Exports’, in R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, and P. 
Walkenhorst (eds), Breaking into New Markets – Emerging Lessons for Export Diversification 
(Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009), 81-100, at 97. 
257 This thesis suggested that exporters of natural resources would face a decline in terms of trade over 
time.  
258 D. Lederman and W. F. Malony, ‘Trade Structure and Growth’, in R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, and P. 
Walkenhorst (eds), Breaking into New Markets – Emerging Lessons for Export Diversification 
(Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009), 39-54.  Next to the terms of trade argument, however, 
Hesse refers to the volatility of commodity markets and holds that diversifying into other products 
could stabilize export earnings (i.e., portfolio argument).  Equally, according to Cadot et al, the 
evidence for the Prebish-Singer hypothesis is fairly strong.  Hesse, above n 254, at 56-57; Cadot, 
Carrère, and Strauss-Kahn, above n 254, at 2. 
259 Yet, the 2009 World Bank study also underlined that the primary source of export growth consists 
of increases in existing bilateral trade flows (the intensive margin), rather than in increases in ‘new’ 
products or ‘new’ markets (the extensive margin).  Within the extensive margin, exporting to ‘new’ 
markets (geographical diversification) mostly contributed to export growth.  Brenton, Newfarmer, 
Shaw, and Walkenhorts, above n 254, at 4.  See also Messerlin, above n 207, at 1400-1401.   
260 The 2009 World Bank study also pointed to the mixed result of export processing zones.  Brenton, 
Newfarmer, Shaw, and Walkenhorts, above n 254, at 23-24 and 27-28.   
261 Brenton, Newfarmer, Shaw, and Walkenhorts, above n 254, at 25.   
262 In particular, a four-step approach is suggested: (i) the current incentive regime should be mapped; 
(ii) its cost price should be calculated and made public; (iii) its achievements should be assessed; and 
(iv) its content should be reconfigured around a national programme of competiveness.          
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failures untouched but should be addressed in the design of the industrial policy programme 
itself.263  As the ‘trick is to identify the shortcomings of the marketplace and then tailor the 
right combination of tax, tariff, and subsidy policies to offset those shortcomings and promote 
growth’,264 insight in the particular market failures impeding export diversification and 
economic growth in general seems pivotal.   
 
2.4.2. Identification of specific market failures calling for an industrial policy 
The standard rationale for the infant industry argument rests on the assumption of a capital 
market failure.  Indeed, under a perfectly functioning capital market, there seems to be no 
reason why the private market would not finance ‘infant industries’ so as to bridge the 
learning phase (dynamic) or to set-up a sufficiently large plant (static).265  A subsidy or import 
restriction would at most serve as a second-best option as fixing the capital market 
imperfections would be optimal.266  Yet, and somewhat related to the case for R&D subsidies, 
subsidizing ‘infant industries’ is warranted in case their learning spills over to other actors in 
the economy (intra- or inter-industry) given that the capital market would not compensate 
infants for generating such external benefits.267  Two other, though interrelated, market 
failures recently received renewed attention for underpinning the case for industrial policy.268  
Even if capital markets function perfectly, potentially competitive industries could be 
inhibited from popping up (or expanding their activities), either by the risk that the discovery 
of first-movers might be copied by imitators or by the failure of private actors to coordinate 
their complementary actions.269  Starting from the angle of each of these types of market 
failures, our discussion turns to the World Bank’s advice on how to stimulate product 
(Section 2.4.2.1) and geographical (Section 2.4.2.2) diversification, respectively.  
  
                                                 
263 In the words of the 2009 World Bank study, ‘industrial policies can help, but they have to be 
carefully designed and administered to avoid private capture’. R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, P. 
Walkenhorst (eds), Breaking into New Markets – Emerging Lessons for Export Diversification 
(Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009), 265 pp., at xxiii. 
264 Brenton, Newfarmer, Shaw, and Walkenhorts, above n 254, at 29.   
265 See, for example, Meade, above n 31, at 256; Baldwin, above n 221, at 297; Pack and Saggi, above 
n 211, at 270. 
266 Baldwin, above n 221, at 297; Krugman and Obstfeld, above n 104, at 258; World Trade Report 
2006, above n 9, at 60. 
267 See Succar, above n 206, at 521-534; Baldwin, above n 221, at 297-300, 303-304. 
268 See, for example, Rodrik, above n 161, at 102; Hausmann, Rodrik, and Sabel, above n 249.  These 
market failures are labelled ‘new’, not so much because they were revealed recently, but because they 
have gained renewed attention and acceptance (see, for example, below n 273).  Moreover, other types 
of market failures are often attached to these types of market failures.            
269 Indeed, the capital market would not take into account the benefits generated by an investment 
which spill over to other actors and are thus not appropriable by the investor. 
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2.4.2.1. Information failures, discovery, and the search for product diversification 
Hausmann and Rodrik point to an information externality hampering product diversification 
in a developing country and its transformation into a modern economy.270  Entrepreneurs 
looking for more productive activities than those traditionally produced in these countries 
have to ‘discover’ which nontraditional products could be produced at low enough costs to be 
competitive on the world market.  Contrary to traditional R&D investments (see above), this 
process does not directly aim at inventing new products or higher quality variants (‘on-the-
frontier innovation’).  Rather, it seeks to discover which products already provided on the 
world market could be produced locally at world market prices (‘inside-the-frontier 
innovation’271).  Yet, this self-discovery process is neither self-evident nor costless.  A lot of 
uncertainty is involved in finding out which products are profitable as the labor productivity 
model (Ricardo) and factor-endowment model (Heckser-Ohlin) only roughly explain the 
specialization of countries.272  This cost of discovery is borne by the initial investor but his 
investment, if successful, has a ‘demonstration effect’ on others to enter this profitable market 
without having to make the initial sunk cost (free rider problem).273  Assuming that entry in 
the profitable market is free (no or low barriers to entry; see below),274 this information 
externality implies that market forces lead to underinvestment in self-discovery and thus in 
underproduction of nontraditional, high-productivity products in developing countries.  As a 
result, governments in developing countries should encourage entrepreneurship and 
investment in nontraditional industries ex ante while, ex post, phasing out those investments 
that turn out to be unproductive (sunset clause).  As Hausmann and Rodrik argue, an optimal 
                                                 
270 Hausmann and Rodrik, above n 241, at 603– 633; D. Rodrik, ‘What’s So Special About China’s 
Exports?’, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5484 (February, 2006), 27 pp.  
271 These terms are employed by B. Klinger and D. Lederman, ‘Diversification, Innovation, and 
Imitation of the Global Technology Frontier’, in R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, and P. Walkenhorst (eds), 
Breaking into New Markets – Emerging Lessons for Export Diversification (Washington DC: The 
World Bank, 2009), 101-110, at 103. 
272 For example, these models fail to explain why the IT sector in India is profitable or why Pakistan 
exports bed sheets but no hats, while both are labor-intensive. 
273 Analyzing the East Asian Miracle, Krugman has also sketched out this idea in 1989, labelling it as 
the ‘It’ theory:     
 ‘Firms may not know whether they can produce profitably in a country until one of them tries 
 it. That is, some countries have "It," the ability to produce manufactures competitively, while 
 others do not, and the only way to find out if a country has It is to try producing there. Yet to 
 try producing, a firm must make a significant investment, much of which cannot be recovered 
 if a country doesn't turn out to have what it takes. Countries that really have It do not get a 
 chance to prove it if nobody takes the risk. (…) Suppose that a change in policies makes a few 
 businesses domestic or foreign willing to try exporting manufactures. Then the country may 
 suddenly find itself "discovered" (or may discover itself)’.   
Interestingly, Krugman predicted that China (and Mexico) also have ‘It’.  P. R. Krugman, ‘Developing 
Countries in the World Economy’, 118:1 Daedalus (Winter, 1989), 183-210, at 191.  
274 To be precise, this holds true as long as entry is not retarded until the sunk cost is recovered.  
Contrary to on-the-frontier innovations, such inside-the-frontier innovations cannot be protected by 
intellectual property rights.  See Klinger and Lederman, above n 271, at 101; Hausmann and Rodrik, 
above n 241, at 606. 
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instrument therefore has to have the feature of a carrot-and-stick strategy.  A subsidy (e.g., in 
the form of government loans or guarantees) has the benefit that it could discriminate between 
‘first movers’ in nontraditional sectors and imitators/copycats but could lead to moral hazard 
behavior and too much diversification.  On the other hand, trade protection is not an optimal 
instrument as it fails to differentiate between innovators and imitators and focuses on 
innovations in the narrow domestic market, hereby generating smaller social benefit than 
innovations targeting the larger world market.  Although equally failing to discriminate 
between innovators and imitators, an export subsidy might be more suited as it directs 
innovations at the world market and offers a straightforward criterion to filter out 
unsuccessful innovations ex post (performance criteria).275  Hausmann and Rodrik argue that 
the East Asian countries were so successful because they adequately employed a carrot-and-
stick strategy by extending export subsidies and thus subsidize (carrot) only those industries 
able to export (stick).276  In contrast, Latin American’s poor growth record under the IS-
strategy was a consequence of too much promotion (carrot) without discipline (stick), 
whereas its weak performance in the 1990s might have resulted from the opposite policy, 
namely too much discipline without promotion as mandated by the Washington Consensus 
recipe.   
Next to the demonstration effect of a profitable activity, the first mover generates other 
positive spillovers for which he is not compensated.  First, the technology embodied in 
foreign products is often ‘tacit’ and has to be adapted to local circumstances which demands 
substantive investments.277  Yet, given that this process is mostly not patentable, such locally 
adapted technology spills over on other firms entering the profitable market (knowledge 
spillover).278,279  Further, the first mover might have invested in specific on-the-job training 
but such labor training might again benefit other firms if they engage these trained workers.280  
Next, the first mover might have built a reputation in foreign markets, and this reputation 
                                                 
275 Hausmann and Rodrik, above n 241, at 629-630.   
276 According to Hausmann and Rodrik, ‘(n)ew international agreements in the context of the World 
Trade Organization have made such subsidies illegal’. Yet, this statement fails to take into account the 
S&D treatment offered to some low-income countries to offer export subsidies.  Hausmann and Rodrik, 
above n 241, at 630. 
277 Hausmann and Rodrik, above n 241, at 624. 
278 Contrary to R&D innovations, existing technologies adapted to local circumstances are indeed 
mostly not patentable and developing countries often also lack efficient patent laws (see above n 274).  
Somewhat parallel to the case for R&D subsidies, a perfectly functioning capital market would not 
compensate firms for the benefits of learning which spills over to others intra- or inter-industry (above 
n 267).     
279 See also W. F. Schwartz and E. W. Harper, ‘The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International 
Trade’, 70:5 Michigan Law Review (April, 1972), 831-858, at 847. 
280 See Baldwin, above n 221, at 300-301.  According to Baldwin, government intervention might not 
be needed given that workers, as beneficiaries, will invest (by accepting lower wages or borrowing on 
the capital market) in such on the job training.   
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might benefit new entrants if it is linked to the country of production.281  These free rider 
problems in R&D investments, worker training, and reputation would justify subsidies 
stimulating these activities. As mentioned above, tariff protection would be inferior to correct 
such domestic market failures as it creates an extra distortion (consumers paying a higher 
price). 
Relevantly, the World Bank study on export diversification includes a study by Klinger and 
Lederman that presents empirical support to underpin Hausmann and Rodrik’s hypothesis that 
free riding of imitators hampers inside-the-border innovations in developing counties and thus 
the diversification of the economy in developing countries.282  Indeed, they have found that 
barriers to entry encourage discovery by reducing the impact of imitators on the return to 
discovery of the first-mover.283  To be sure, they do not plead for constructing such barriers to 
entry as a way to spur discovery because such barriers are correlated to lower levels of private 
sector development, lead to under-specialization by scaling down imitation,284 and protect 
beneficiaries from market discipline.285  Instead, imitation should be encouraged rather than 
hampered and the best way to tackle the under-investment in self-discovery is to offer ‘public 
support for experimentation in new sectors and activities’.286  Similarly to the case for R&D 
investments for on-the-frontier innovations (above Section 2.3), laissez-faire is thus not an 
optimal policy for inside-the-frontier innovations but an activist industrial policy is 
required.287 
At the same time, the same World Bank study also acknowledged that, in fact, such threat of 
imitation might not always reduce first-mover profits and thus discourage innovation.  In 
particular, Nassif found that first movers in her case study were mostly hampered by limited 
access to finance and did not regard imitators as a threat. Instead, they were experienced as an 
opportunity to achieve economies of agglomeration (clustering; external scale economies), to 
                                                 
281 See Klinger and Lederman, above n 271, at 108; Schwartz and Harper, above n 279, at 847. 
282 They also found confirmation for the U-shaped relationship between export diversification and 
growth (above n 254). Klinger and Lederman, above n 271, at 101-110. 
283 Entry barriers were measured on the basis of the costs and delays of starting a new business, 
enforcing contracts and hiring employees. Klinger and Lederman not only confirm that export growth 
has a positive and significant effect on the frequency of discoveries, but also found that the magnitude 
of this effect rises with the level of barriers to entry. 
284 Widespread imitation leads to efficient focusing of resources on the most efficient sector in the 
Hausmann and Rodrik model. 
285 Such barriers to entry would generate the IS-strategy’s errors by not allowing the market to ‘pick 
winners’.  Klinger and Lederman, above n 271, at 108. 
286 Imitation is the ‘channel through which through which the returns of inside-the-frontier’ innovations 
are socialized.  Klinger and Lederman, above n 271, at 108.  For example, Nassif refers to the success 
of the Tunisian export promotion programme ‘FAMEX’, which specifically addressed business 
innovation by offering subsidies to firms with no previous export experience, to exporters of new 
products, and to exporters looking for new markets.  C. Nassif, ‘Promoting New Exports: Experience 
from the Middle East and North Africa’, in R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, and P. Walkenhorst (eds), 
Breaking into New Markets – Emerging Lessons for Export Diversification (Washington DC: The 
World Bank, 2009), 145-159, at 156. 
287 Hausmann and Rodrik, above n 241, at 606. 
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build reputation in export markets, or to lobby for better regulations or infrastructure.288, 289  
Overcoming such coordination failures seems particularly important for consolidating and 
expanding exports into new markets.  We turn to this type of market failure in the next 
section. 
 
2.4.2.2. Coordination failures, clustering, and the search for geographical diversification 
2.4.2.2.1. The emergence of coordination failures 
Many actions in the economy are complementary to actions of others, meaning that one 
agent’s action increases the incentive for other agents to act similarly.  Some actions might 
even only become viable if complementary actions by other agents are taken simultaneously.  
For example, an investment decisions to set up a factory might only be profitable if 
complementary downstream and upstream investments are made at the same time.  If agents 
could coordinate these actions, they would all be profitable and a high equilibrium would thus 
be reached.290  But if this coordination fails, no action is undertaken and the market might get 
stuck in a Pareto sub-optimal equilibrium.291  Even though all private actors would be better 
off, coordination of actions might fail. This coordination failure can occur even if information 
is available on both options, for example because of low expectations that complementary 
investments will effectively be made or given the incentive upon all agents to wait upon 
others to move first (free rider problem).292  According to big-push models of development, 
such coordination failures are widespread in developing countries, resulting in a low growth 
equilibrium trap.293  Hence, governments should intervene in a way that pushes the economy 
                                                 
288 Moreover, if demand on the world market is limitless from the perspective of a developing country 
exporter, expanding supply by the entrance of imitators will have no or minimal effect on the first-
mover.  Hence, imitation in export markets is less a concern that in the more limited domestic market.  
But competition could become more critical as production expands and input supply (e.g., labor) 
becomes scarce.  Another reason for Nassif’s findings could result from the methodology used as it did 
not observe examples of failed discoveries.  Brenton, Newfarmer, Shaw, and Walkenhorts, above n 
254, at 11; Nassif, above n 286, at 150-153.     
289 Hence, a twofold approach should be developed: reduce the cost of experimentation (by crediting 
first-movers, along the lines suggested by Hausmann and Rodrik) but, at the same time, foster imitation 
without undermining the emergence of new activities (e.g., promote clustering).  Nassif, above n 286, 
at 156-157.    
290 As both actions are profitable, a socially optimal output would indeed be achieved. 
291 A coordination failure occurs when agents’ inability to coordinate their behaviour (choices) leads to 
an outcome (equilibrium) that leaves all agents worse off than in an alternative situation that is also an 
equilibrium. See M. P. Todaro and S. C. Smith, Economic Development, 9th ed. (Harlow: Pearson, 
2006), 851 pp., at 808; see also K. Hoff, ‘Beyond Rosenstein-Rodan: The Modern Theory of 
Underdevelopment Traps’, Working Paper (April 2000), 56 pp., at 3.  
292 The latter will occur if there is a lag between the investment and the return on investment.  Todaro 
and Smith, above n 291, at 145-146. 
293 For example, a past history of underdevelopment might lead to low expectations on future 
investments.  This theory could explain why countries with similar fundamental characteristics could 
follow a radical different development path.  Already in 1943, Rosenstein and Rodan laid the 
foundations for this theory. 
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to the high-investment equilibrium.  Because all actions are viable if coordination is reached 
(high-level equilibrium), such intervention is only temporal and does not ipso facto require 
subsidization.   Several government interventions could be installed. First, the government 
could act as a coordination facilitator between private actors, though this offers no guarantee 
that investments will effectively be made.294  Second, the government could offer subsidies to 
induce investments, for example in the form of a guarantee,295  Importantly, not all 
complementary actions should be subsidized to overcome the coordination failure because the 
set-up of one subsidized investment induces other private actors to make complementary 
investments, which in turn make the former investment profitable without further support.296  
However, the coordination failure argument on its own does not give much guidance on 
which actions should be chosen.  Indeed, it is not a priori obvious which complementary 
actions will become viable (i.e., competitive) once made simultaneously.     
 
In all cases, the emergence of coordination failures rests on one key assumption, namely the 
imperfect tradability (or proximity requirement) of inputs (goods, services, or technology).  
Obviously, if all inputs could be imported at no significant cost, no coordination among local 
agents would be needed and no multiple equilibria would arise.  An investor could simply rely 
on imported inputs and its profitability would not depend on complementary local 
investments.  Yet, imperfect tradability could result, for example, from high transportation 
costs of intermediate goods (e.g., ‘pecuniary externality’) but, according to Saggi and Pack, 
this assumption fails to recognize that most trade exactly takes place in such intermediate 
goods.297  Alternatively, the requirement of proximity could be linked to producer services 
(such as consulting, machine repair, or telecommunications), labor, infrastructure, or the tacit 
nature of technology.298  Indeed, whereas the traditional coordination failure argument was 
mainly grounded on the physical unavailability of inputs and is now largely superseded by the 
boost in international trade, its more recent underpinning refers to the tacit nature of 
knowledge and thus to the benefits of proximity (local knowledge spillovers).299   
                                                 
294 In principle, the government could also command coordination.  D. Rodrik, ‘Coordination Failures 
and Government Policy: A model with Applications to East Asia and Eastern Europe’, 40 Journal of 
International Economics (1996), 1-22, at 14.  
295 Rodrik, above n 161, at 108. 
296 See also Ray, above n 72, at 140. 
297 Noland and Pack, above n 229, at 276.  Yet, Rodriguez-Clare refers to a study by Steinberg who 
found that even for small and open economies such as Singapore, domestic demand drives domestic 
production of tradable goods.  Rodríguez-Clare, above n 184, at 5, footnote 12. 
298 Rodríguez-Clare, above n 184, at 4; A. Rodriguez-Clare, ‘The Division of Labor and Economic 
Development’, 49 Journal of Development Economics (1996), 3-32.     
299 Stiglitz also observed that the benefit of proximity (information flow between producers and users) 
explains why importation of intermediate goods does not serve as a perfect substitute for domestic 
production.  See Stiglitz, above n 236, at 160-161. 
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Although imperfect tradability of inputs is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient for a 
coordination failure to arise.  Indeed, multiple equilibria only emerge if an additional element 
ensuring that actions by different local agents are indeed complementary is present.300  This 
additional condition could be fulfilled in several ways.  First, most coordination failures’ 
examples in the literature relate to downstream-upstream linkages. Hereby, the additional 
assumption of economies of scale in the intermediate goods market is formulated.301,302,  
Second, in case ‘labor’ is considered as non-tradable input, the coordination failure could 
arise between workers considering investing in training and firms considering investment in 
using technology that requires skilled-labor (high productivity).303  Third, as elaborated above, 
knowledge spillovers are often complementary and could, according to Rodriguez-Clare, give 
rise to coordination failures.304  The market failure resulting from the non-excludability of 
knowledge could lead to multiple equilibria: one in which firms decide to invest in modern 
technology305 and one in which firms choose to use the backward technology.306  Fourth, 
some actions might never become profitable (e.g., provision of public goods) and hence imply 
the absence of multiple equilibria, but are complementary to several other actions that become 
viable if the former investment is made.  For example, infrastructure investment might have 
public goods characteristics (more or less non-excludable in developing countries) and too 
high fixed costs to be profitable but would still turn other private actions profitable.307  In case 
                                                 
300 Here, this additional element makes the action of one agent dependent on (or influenced by) similar 
action by another agent.   
301 Rodrik, above n 294, at 14; Noland and Pack, above n 229, at 274-276; Rodriguez-Clare, above n 
298, at 3-32. 
302 A higher variety of intermediate goods increases the productivity of the downstream industry and, in 
turn, a higher demand from the downstream industry increases the incentive to enter the intermediate 
good market.  In order for the downstream industry to produce with the modern technology (higher 
productivity), a sufficient large amount of specialized intermediate producers should be present (love of 
variety).  But if all firms use the backward technology (labor intensive), insufficient varieties of inputs 
are produced to make producing with the modern technology profitable, hence resulting in production 
with the traditional, backward technology.  Only if a large number of firms use the modern technology, 
sufficient intermediate varieties are produced to enable the industry to produce profitable with the 
modern technology.  As Rodriguez-Clare indicates, the emergence of multiple equilibria (producing 
with the traditional or modern technology) is indeed based on the assumption of economies of scale.  
Rodríguez-Clare, above n 184, at 4-5.  
303 In this case, coordination failures might arise because of thick effects related to search costs.  The 
high equilibrium will only be reached if thick markets function such that firms and workers do not care 
about the risk of separation.  This will only be the case if search costs are not too high to match with 
another modern firm/worker.  Rodríguez-Clare, above n 184, at 5-6. 
304 Given that these spillovers attenuate with distance, the proximity requirement is also considered to 
be fulfilled. Rodríguez-Clare, above n 184, at 6-8. 
305 This is accompanied by spillover effects to other firms using modern technology. 
306 According to Rodriguez-Clare, knowledge spillovers could give rise to coordination failures even in 
absence of multiple equilibria, namely in case of spillover effects from the modern to the backward 
technology.  Here, the adoption of the modern technology is no longer an equilibrium, but all agents 
would be better off if this technology would be adopted.  Rodríguez-Clare, above n 184, at 7.  
307 The coordination failure concerning infrastructure projects might also be formulated in terms of 
economies of scale.  Rodríguez-Clare, above n 184, at 6-8; Ray, above n 72, at 141.  
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of public goods, the role of the government would be to (permanently) invest in this 
unprofitable activity.308  
 
In sum, in the presence of economies of scale, thick market effects, knowledge spillovers, or 
public goods, actions by different agents become complementary. As Rodriguez-Clare argues, 
these actions are often imperfectly tradable and thus somehow local in nature (e.g., 
nontradable inputs, skilled workers, knowledge, and public goods or infrastructure).  Turning 
the focus from the country-wide level of big-push models309 to coordination failures on the 
sector level, Rodriguez-Clare links this argument to the theory of clusters that emerge in case 
of industry-specific and local externalities (‘Marshallian externalities’).310  In essence, the 
cluster theory points to the benefits of geographical proximity of related industries.  From the 
angle of coordination failures, a cluster could be described as a collection of related industries 
and public or private agents which have the potential to reach a higher level of productivity 
through coordination.311  More commonly, a ‘cluster’ alternatively refers to those related 
industries and agents that have already successfully coordinated (‘clustered’) their actions, 
resulting in higher productivity.312  There are many examples of industries which have 
successfully clustered/coordinated without any government intervention (e.g., Silicon Valley) 
but instead emerged from high expectations of complementary actions or strategic action by 
an important agent.313  Yet, if coordination among complementary agents fails, as is often the 
case in low-income countries, governments might have a legitimate role in spurring 
coordination/clustering.   
 
2.4.2.2.2. Promoting clustering 
Should the government promote those sectors with the highest clustering potential?  As the 
benefits of clustering are often attributed to knowledge spillovers, should low-income 
                                                 
308 See also above n 71. 
309 According to Glăvan, Jeffrey Sachs is the foremost advocate of such a big-push model.  B. Glăvan, 
‘Coordination Economics, Poverty Traps, and the Market Process – A New Case for Industrial 
Policy?’, 13:2 The Independent Review (Fall 2008), 225-243, at 227. 
310 See Rodríguez-Clare, above n 184, at 8. 
311 A cluster might thus also fail to coordinate. According to Rodriguez-Clare, this feature differentiates 
a cluster from the concept of agglomeration economies, which suggests that proximity necessarily leads 
to higher productivity.  If a cluster succeeds in cooperation, it to some extent leads to agglomeration 
economies.  Rodríguez-Clare, above n 184, at 10.    
312 Rodriguez-Clare also implicitly refers to ‘clusters’ or ‘clustering’ in this meaning.  Hereby, clusters 
are related industries or agents which have realized agglomeration economies.  See, for example, 
Rodríguez-Clare, above n 184, at 12, 20; A. Rodríguez-Clare, ‘Clusters and Comparative Advantage: 
Implications for Industrial Policy’, 82 Journal of Development Economics (2007), 43– 57; see also B. 
Glăvan, ‘Coordination Failures, Cluster Theory, and Entrepreneurship: A Critical View’, 11 Quart J 
Austrian Econ (2008), 43–59, at 47, 52. 
313 Rodriguez-Clare gives the example of Stanford University as a key player in the emergence of the 
information-technology cluster in Silicon Valley.  Rodríguez-Clare, above n 184, at 10. 
PART I CHAPTER 2 – ECONOMIC RATIONALES IN THE PRESENCE OF MARKET FAILURES 
 
 77
countries induce knowledge-intensive industries (often called ‘advanced industry’)?314  
Rodriguez-Clare firmly dismisses this option, mainly for two reasons.  Firstly, knowledge 
intensity is not an intrinsic characteristic of an industry because the same product which is 
produced in an advanced, skilled-intensive way in developed countries can often also be 
produced on the basis of a backward, unskilled-intensive technology.315  Hence, the same 
industry could generate clustering benefits in one place but not in another.  Put otherwise, 
whether or not the benefits of clustering (e.g., knowledge spillovers) are reaped depends on 
the way the good is produced (i.e., the technology).  Consequently, simply stimulating (via 
import substitution or export promotion tools) local production of goods that in developed 
countries are produced with an advanced technology might result in a local industry using a 
backward technology, with no clustering benefits attached to it.316  Secondly, and somewhat 
more fundamental317, if an industry generates strong clustering benefits, developed countries 
have probably already reaped these benefits, resulting in high productivity and a low 
international price of the product in question.  This could in turn nullify potential benefits of 
clustering in low-income countries.318  In the view of Rodriguez-Clare, what matters is thus 
not the level of an industry’s clustering potential but ‘plain old comparative advantage’.319  
Assuming all industries have some clustering potential320, countries should induce clustering 
in those sectors in which they have revealed a natural or Ricardian comparative advantage 
(factor endowment), except if an industry outside a country’s comparative advantage 
generates large economy-wide (i.e., inter-industry) externalities.321  Therefore, industrial 
policy is not about creating comparative advantage, but about achieving higher productivity 
that flows from clustering in sectors in which a country has revealed or ‘discovered’ its 
comparative advantage.  In the first stage of development, government policy should thus 
focus on inducing self-discovery, as along the lines developed by Hausmann and Rodrik (see 
                                                 
314 Although different types of coordination failures are elaborated, Rodriguez-Clare puts most 
emphasis on those emerging from knowledge spillovers (see also below n 327). 
315 In this respect, Rodriguez-Clare draws a parallel with the ‘product-cycle’-hypothesis.  
316 Citing Porters, Rodriguez-Clare indicates that what matters is not ‘what you produce, but how’.  
Rodríguez-Clare, above n 312, at 44.  Compare and contrast with below n 380.  
317 The first argument could be countered by linking support to the technology rather than to the sector.  
See also Rodrik, above n 161, at 109, 115. 
318 See above n 188. 
319 Rodríguez-Clare, above n 312, at 44.  
320 Rodríguez-Clare, above n 181, at 20. 
321 This is only valid if knowledge spills over inter-industry on a national and not on an international 
level (see above).  Rodríguez-Clare, above n 312, at 55; Maloney and Rodríguez-Clare, above n 163, at 
669.  Nordås et al also hold that duplicating clustering has been successful only when it is built on local 
comparative advantage.  H. K. Nordås, S. Miroudot, and P. Kowalski, ‘Dynamic Gains from Trade’, 
OECD Trade Policy Working Papers No 43 (2006), 53 pp., at 20. 
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above).322  If, as a result, countries have ‘discovered’ their comparative advantage, policies 
promoting clustering in some of those sectors should be put in place.   
But how should those sectors be selected?323  First, strong export performance might already 
filter out sectors in which a country has discovered its comparative advantage.  Yet, because 
many sectors would satisfy this export performance criterion and clustering support entails 
significant human and financial resources, a further selection should be made.  Those sectors 
in which only a few firms operate are likely to overcome coordination failures without 
government intervention and would therefore drop out.  In contrast, large sectors interacting 
closely with other sectors in the economy might be selected.  Moreover, the chances of 
successful support are higher if offered to sectors clearly committed and organized, which 
could be revealed by a selection process whereby different private sector proposals are 
evaluated.324   
Further, how should the few sectors resulting from such a selection process be supported?  
Overall, as the purpose is not to create comparative advantage, policies should not distort 
prices so as to reallocate resources to certain sectors (e.g., through ‘hard’ industrial policies 
such as import substitution or export promotion325).326  Instead, Rodriguez-Clare calls for a 
‘soft’ industrial policy that aims at inducing clustering, which depends on the particular 
coordination failure inhibiting (further) clustering.  Assuming coordination failures resulting 
from knowledge spillovers attached to modern technologies, countries should induce 
innovation around these selected sectors (‘innovation clusters’) by providing R&D subsidies 
(e.g., tax breaks, fixed grants for innovative research, or collaborative research between the 
private sector and universities), infrastructure investments and/or regulatory reforms.  Given 
that knowledge spillovers attenuate with geographic distance and are stronger for firms 
                                                 
322 According to Rodriguez-Clare, the appropriate mix of both types of industrial policy depends on the 
level of development.   In particular, he refers to findings by Imbs and Wacziarg revealing a U-shaped 
relationship between growth and diversification: countries first diversify and later on start specializing 
(above n 254). Hence, poor countries should induce self-discovery and more advanced countries should 
induce specialization. However, Imbs and Wacziarg show that countries start specializing relatively 
late in their development process and specialization of exports even kicks in at a much later stage, 
suggesting that only high income countries would benefit from concentrating their production/exports.  
Note that Rodriguez-Clare’s own example of Costa Rica as a candidate for clustering would in fact still 
be in the phase of self-discovery.  The World Bank study seems to approach both types of interventions 
in a complementary rather than sequential way (below n 338).  Rodrik, above n 161, at 114; Rodríguez-
Clare, above n 181, at 23-24; Imbs and Wacziarg, above n 254, at 69; Brenton, Newfarmer, Shaw, and 
Walkenhorts, above n 254, at 3-4; Hesse, above n 254, at 58. 
323 According to Rodriguez-Clare, only a limited number of clusters should be selected.  This somewhat 
differs from Porter’s view, who holds that all existing and emerging clusters deserve attention.  On 
Porter’s view, see P. Desrochers, F. Sautet, ‘Cluster-Based Economic Strategy, Facilitation Policy and 
the Market Process’, 17:2/3 The Review of Austrian Economics (2004), 233–245, at 236; Glăvan, above 
n 312, at 49. 
324 Rodríguez-Clare, above n 181, at 29. 
325 Yet, a soft type of export promotion is considered legitimate (e.g., subsidies for the exploration of 
foreign markets or a country’s marketing abroad).  Rodríguez-Clare, above n 181, at 10-11.   
326 They should therefore not create clustering from scratch. Rodríguez-Clare, above n 312, at 52. 
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engaged in similar or related activities, such selective support would be more effective than 
stimulating innovation across the board or in knowledge-intensive industries (high-tech 
goods) in which they do not have a comparative advantage.327  In addition, complementary 
investments in infrastructure and regulatory reforms could be undertaken related to the 
selected sectors.328  Such ‘soft policies’ focusing on a set of selected sectors in which a 
country has a comparative advantage are likely to be more transparent and less costly than the 
‘hard policies’ (e.g., export processing zones329) as those undertaken in Latin American 
countries in previous decades .330  These types of micro-economic (or competiveness) policies 
should complement macroeconomic and institutional reforms.331   
This theory of clustering, originated in the work of Porter,332 has attracted significant attention 
from national governments as well from international organizations (e.g., OECD, World 
Bank, UNCTAD) in recent years.333  Still, some criticism on its theoretical foundations as 
well as its practical relevance is emerging.334  For instance, clustering entails the risk of 
collusion and congestion and the question is raised whether it is conductive for long-term 
economic development as reliance on a particular sector makes regions vulnerable (portfolio 
argument).335  Further, as clusters’ geographic boundaries are vague, empirical evidence on 
the benefits of clustering is hard to advance and translating the cluster theory into concrete 
policy advice seems difficult given the heterogeneity of clusters.336  As many actions of 
                                                 
327 Overall, Rodriguez-Clare seems to emphasize the importance of inducing ‘innovative clusters’.  To 
be precise, the advice for developing countries is not to bring R&D spending up to the level of 
knowledge-intensive countries (see above 199).  Instead, even when they are not knowledge-intensive, 
developing countries should induce innovation in some sectors in their comparative advantage, if it is 
not producing these goods at the global technological frontier (i.e., the level of R&D spending in those 
sector is relatively low) (‘innovation shortfalls’) due to a lack of knowledge accumulation caused, for 
example, by inadequate internalization of knowledge spillovers.  Rodríguez-Clare, above n 312, at 52; 
Maloney and Rodríguez-Clare, above n 163, at 683. 
328 Rodríguez-Clare, above n 181, at 24.  According to Rodriguez-Clare, both are necessarily selective 
in nature.  Hence, Rodriguez-Clare’s proposal does not seem to avoid picking (revealed) winners.  
329 Notice that Rodriguez-Clare rejects the installation of export processing zones, while most authors 
consider these as examples of clusters.  See, for example, Pack and Saggi, above n 211, at 285, 286. 
330 According to Rodriguez-Clare, many of these ‘hard policies’ (e.g., export processing zones) should 
also be removed because of WTO obligations. Rodríguez-Clare, above n 181, at 29.  However, this 
view seems overly restrictive (see below). 
331 Rodríguez-Clare, above n 181, at 5. 
332 In fact, the theory’s origins can be traced back to the 1960s, with some of its elements even up to the 
end of the 19th century (Marshall).  Y. Motoyama, ‘What Was New About the Cluster Theory?: What 
Could It Answer and What It Not Answer?’, 22:4 Economic Development Quarterly (2008), 353-363, 
at 354-355.    
333 Glăvan, above n 312, at 48.  Nonetheless, the World Development Report 2005 also lists downsides 
of fostering clustering (see below n 336).  
334 See, for example, Glăvan, above n 312; Glăvan, above n 309; Desrochers and Sautet, above n 323, 
at 233–245.  
335 Hence, it should be taken care of that at least some different clusters are stimulated in one region.   
336 See, for example, World Development Report 2005, above n 253, at 166. 
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agents are complementary, the question on which set of actions has to be supported is hard to 
decide on.337  
Rodriguez-Clare’s suggestion to target existing exporters seems to correspond with the 2009 
World Bank study policy recommendation to not only devote attention to the ‘discovery’ 
phase, but equally to the ‘rapid-growth’ or acceleration phase of exports.338  Next to ‘product 
diversification’,339 ‘geographical’ diversification equally seems to be positively correlated 
with growth: high-income countries tend to be more successful in penetrating the available 
markets for their products.  Conversely, low-income countries only take advantage of a small 
portion of potential new markets.340  Brenton and Newfarmer list several potential market 
failures that might justify government intervention to spur this rapid-growth phase (e.g., 
factor market imperfections, for example in the capital market, information asymmetries on 
new export markets, imperfections in domestic services or infrastructure).341  What is more, 
because of their important share in total export growth, an export promotion strategy should 
not ignore the potential expansion of existing products to old markets (by productivity 
improvements).  In sum, the World Bank advocates a very comprehensive export promoting 
strategy for low-income countries which pays attention to potential new export products, new 
markets as well as old markets.  Emphasizing that ‘policy can make a difference’, the World 
Bank study suggests that, though ‘there is no magic receipt to promote diversification’, ‘a 
broad array of policies, ranging from getting the incentive structure right, to lowering the cost 
of trade-related services, to proactive policies’, can be on the agenda.342  
 
At first sight, this World Bank’s current vision seems to fit well with the argument expressed 
by leading author Rodrik.  Starting from the observation that ‘no one size fits all’, Rodrik 
acknowledges that market-friendly policies, prioritizing economic growth, and maintenance 
of macro economic stability are ‘the sine qua non of economic growth’.  The World Bank 
equally agrees that ‘something more’, namely industrial policies in the meaning of functional 
                                                 
337 With respect to Rodriguez-Clare’s proposal to spur clustering of existing exporters because of 
coordination failures, two questions might be raised. First, existing exporters might be those that have 
succeeded to overcome coordination failures by themselves and thus might not need government 
intervention to this end (see along these lines, Rodriguez’ comment on Rodríguez-Clare, above n 184, 
at 35-36).  Second, potential exporters might exactly fail to start or sustain exports because of their 
failure to coordinate.   
338 As indicated above, the World Bank seems not to agree with Rodriguez-Clare’s sequencing proposal 
(above n 322) given that stimulating existing exporters (to old as well as to new markets) should 
equally form part of the development strategy used by low-income countries. 
339 This only holds true up to certain level of income. 
340 Indeed, their exports reached only 6.5 per cent of nations importing the same product, whereas fast 
growing countries reached some 26 per cent of nations importing the products they produce.  As 
mentioned above, geographic diversification could also reduce the vulnerability for third country 
shocks.     
341 Cost of gathering information on export opportunities to new markets might be relatively high as not 
many other firms export to that country compared to firms from other countries. 
342 Brenton, Newfarmer, Shaw, and Walkenhorts, above n 254, at 1-35. 
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ánd selective policy interventions, is in most instances needed to overcome market failures so 
as to initiate structural change in low-income countries.   
Yet, a fundamental divergence remains present between both these perspectives, which hinges 
on the importance attached to trade (and FDI) as driver(s) of economic growth.  Indeed, this 
section has illustrated that both stances agree subsidies to exporters might be useful 
instruments for correcting market failures, but a careful reader might have identified how the 
World Bank’s plea was in addition underpinned by another argument, namely that exports 
(and export diversification) are an engine of economic growth.  This is further clarified in the 
next section.   
 
2.4.3. Trade and economic growth 
A pivotal but unsettled question is to what extent trade openness spurs economic growth.  In 
examining this relationship, one should look beyond the static effects of trade, as these only 
generate one-time benefits, and address the dynamic effect of trade on technological progress, 
given that such progress is the dominant factor explaining sustained economic growth 
(increasing total factor productivity).343  From both empirical and theoretical perspectives, 
opposite views are expressed on whether trade contributes to long-term economic growth.344  
On the empirical side, most economists have found that trade openness is beneficial for 
economic growth, although Rodriguez and Rodrik have criticized this empirical evidence on 
the basis of methodological shortcomings.345  An OECD study concluded that ‘there is robust 
evidence of a link between productivity levels and trade as measured by (exports + 
imports)/GDP, but a causal and robust link between trade liberalization, as measured by 
changes in tariff restrictions or non-tariff barriers, and productivity growth is yet to be 
established’. 346 
                                                 
343 Indeed, the static gains of trade (e.g., specialization) cannot explain long-term patterns of economic 
growth as these only generate one-time gains in GDP growth at the moment a country opens to trade 
(more efficient allocation of resources).  As the endogenous growth literature indicates, long-term 
economic growth is explained mainly by technological change.  Hence, the endogenous growth theory 
looks at factors (such as trade) which can explain the change in technological improvements.  World 
Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 65; Nordås, Miroudot, and Kowalski, above n 321. 
344 D. Acemoglu, Introduction to Modern Economic Growth (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2009), 1008 pp., at 678-679. 
345 Tracing the causal relationship is a recurring difficulty in regression studies.  Acemoglu, above n 
344, at 678-679;  F. Rodríguez and D. Rodrik, ‘Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s guide 
to the Cross-national Evidence’, Working Paper (May, 2000), 73 pp.; OECD, Trading Out of Poverty – 
How aid for trade can help (Paris: OECD, 2009), 38 pp., at 13-14; J. E. Stiglitz and A. Charlton, Fair 
Trade For All – How Trade Can Promote Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 315 
pp., at 33-35.  Still, the 2008 World Trade Report concluded that ‘while the conclusions of the macro 
economic evidence have been questioned recently, the evidence on knowledge spillovers and firm 
productivity provides a more clear-cut (even if indirect) answer about the positive effect of 
international trade and growth’.  World Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 71. 
346 Nordås, Miroudot, and Kowalski, above n 321, at 15.  Recent research of Freund and Bolaky has 
revealed that trade openness spurs economic growth in flexible economies but not in rigid economies, 
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2.4.3.1. Theoretical arguments on trade opening: Reversing comparative advantage 
through trade instruments? 
Theoretical arguments also point to different directions.  On the downward side, the static 
benefits of opening up to trade that result from efficient resource allocation through 
specialization might come at the cost of dynamic gains of trade in case of difference in 
learning-by-doing potential between sectors.347  From a static welfare perspective, developing 
countries’ gains of opening up to trade result from specialization according to existing 
patterns of comparative advantage (often low-tech sectors featuring low levels of productivity 
growth) and no case could be made for policy intervention.  However, from a dynamic 
welfare perspective, such specialization in the low-tech sector might imply that developing 
countries forgo the high potential of learning-by-doing in the high-tech sector.348  Recalling 
the Lincoln-example elaborated above, by specializing in the low-tech clothing sector 
(characterized by low learning-by-doing potential and low productivity growth), China 
foregoes the potential to learn-by-doing in the high-tech computer sector.  In fact, this model 
underpins the infant industry argument related to dynamic economies of scale.  Yet, it should 
not be overlooked that importing countries (like China) can nonetheless benefit from learning-
by-doing in the high-tech sector in the exporting country through its effect on the terms of 
trade.  Indeed, an increase in productivity in an exporting sector creates a negative terms of 
trade effect against the exporting country (and other exporting countries) but a positive terms 
of trade effect for importing countries.  As such, China would also indirectly benefit form the 
productivity improvement in the US computer sector through a positive terms of trade effect 
(lower price of computers in terms cloths), which would temper or even neutralize the 
dynamic loss of specializing in the ‘wrong’ low-growth sector.349  Nonetheless, Redding 
shows that in case a developing country has a large potential for learning-by-doing 
(productivity growth) in the high-tech sector relative to its trading partners, welfare could 
certainly be improved by temporary subsidization of the high-tech sector so as to reverse the 
                                                                                                                                            
hereby suggests that flexible trade regulation on firm entry is important for trade opening to have an 
impact on resource reallocation.  Hence, improvement of the business climate might have to be 
undertaken before (or together with) trade opening in rigid economies. C. Freund and B. Bolaky, 
‘Trade, Regulations, and Income’, 87 Journal of Development Economics (2008), 309–321. 
347 See, for example, World Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 68. 
348  Yet, the country gains from (the low) learning-by-doing in the low-tech sector because trade 
expands the market for their low-tech goods (scale effect).  Hence, trade not only has a direct effect on 
resource allocation (static) but such reallocation also affects the learning-by-doing and productivity 
growth over time (dynamic effect). 
349  The exact effect on the terms of trade depends inter alia on the elasticity of demand.  If demand for 
computers would be highly inelastic, productivity improvements in the US computer sector could even 
hurt the US because of a sharp decline in its terms of trade (this phenomenon is called immiserizing 
growth).  Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note’ 25:3 The Review of 
Economic Studies (June, 1958), at 201-205; World Trade Report 2003, above n 216, at 102. 
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pattern of specialization.350  Hence, an argument could be made for temporal subsidization in 
sectors in which a developing country currently lacks a static comparative advantage but 
exhibits a large potential for productivity growth relative to its trading partner (dynamic 
comparative advantage).351  Moreover, even world welfare would be boosted by inducing a 
more efficient allocation of resources as the higher potential of productivity growth in the 
high-tech sector could pay off.352  Concretely, countries with high levels of human capital, 
which could achieve high rates of productivity growth through imitation, are presented as 
examples where a case for intervention could be made.353  Further, any indirect effect through 
the terms of trade could also not substitute for producing the high-tech good itself in case 
learning-by-doing in that sector not only raises productivity in the sector itself (affecting their 
price and thus terms of trade) but also affects the productivity of related industries or the 
entire economy.354  Indeed, the potential benefit for China in producing computers not only 
lays in the high-growth potential of the computer sector (which could potentially be ‘tapped’ 
off from abroad through the terms of trade) but is equally situated in the generated knowledge 
that spills over to other sectors of the economy.  This conforms to the observation made 
above, detailing how countries are interested in those sectors which generate local knowledge 
spillovers (external economies of scale).  For example, Succar has formally shown that 
subsidization of infant industries is required in case of intra- or inter-industry spillovers and 
that this would make the economy better off than being an importer.355  Greenwald and 
Stiglitz also make a case for infant industry protection (i.e., imposing a uniform tariff) for the 
industrial sector because innovation in the domestic industrial sector would generate positive 
spillovers for the agricultural sector.356    
                                                 
350 S. Redding, ‘Dynamic Comparative Advantage and the Welfare Effects of Trade’, 51 Oxford 
Economic Papers (1999), 15-39.  
351 Similarly, a country could have a static comparative advantage because of a head start which 
enabled it to reap external economies of scale and thus to capture the industry in question, even though 
the newcomer would potentially be more efficient if it would be allowed (by protection and/or 
promotion) to equally reap such economies of scale.  Krugman and Obstfeld, above n 104, at 150-152. 
352 To be sure, foreign targeting of the high-tech sector (e.g., computer sector) depresses the terms of 
trade of net-exporting countries of computers (US) (see above n 68). 
353 S. Redding, ‘Dynamic Comparative Advantage and the Welfare Effects of Trade’, 51 Oxford 
Economic Papers (1999), 15-39, at 35-39. 
354 This is the definition of learning-by-doing externalities given in the 2008 World Trade Report.  
World Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 68. 
355 The subsidy would be higher in case learning-by-doing not occurs only intra-industry but also inter-
industry.  Such inter-industry benefits could even legitimize subsidies to industries turning out 
inefficient after learning-by-doing, if total benefits outweigh total costs of the subsidy.  In case it only 
generates intra-industry spillovers, subsidizing such inefficient industry is not legitimate as the cost of 
the subsidy is by definition larger than its benefits.  Succar, above n 206, at 533.  Succar does not 
consider terms of trade effects (i.e., two small countries model).  
356 Their model assumes that the industrial sector is the source of innovation and that spillovers are 
concentrated within borders.  To be precise, the model allows for (and would even be strengthened in 
case of) international knowledge spillovers within the industrial sector insofar as transmission 
increases with the size of the domestic industrial sector.  The tariff would be self-limiting as successful 
local producers would start exporting and be in favour of liberalization.  B. Greenwald and J. E. 
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In contrast to these negative theoretical predictions, other arguments integrate the potential of 
international knowledge spillovers.  Indeed, in the previous models learning-by-doing only 
affects the productivity of sector(s) within a country, hereby implying that specialization in 
the wrong sector is quasi-permanent unless the government intervenes (by subsidies or tariffs) 
so as to alter the pattern of specialization.  However, patterns of specialization might change 
over time even if a country is open to trade and trade itself could facilitate this process as it 
generates international knowledge spillovers, implying that foreign learning-by-doing could 
also affect the productivity of (both) sectors in the developing country and thus its growth 
rate.357  If the fundamentals of comparative advantage are altered (e.g., through capital 
accumulation or investment in human capital), developing countries could still ‘capture’ the 
high-tech sector in case previous foreign learning-by-doing (‘learning-by-imitation’) is 
available, which is more likely if trade is open.358  In general, theoretical arguments predicting 
a positive growth effect of trade opening point to the productivity improvements resulting 
from importation and exportation.  Next to a competition effect, the presence of international 
knowledge spillovers could hereby be seen as ‘crucial for the realization of the dynamic gains 
from trade’.359   
First, imports, especially those of high-tech products, would generate knowledge spillovers to 
the importing country and thus boost its total factor productivity.360  For example, firms in 
East Asian countries have strengthened their technological capabilities by ‘reverse-
engineering’ of capital imports.361  Second, a robust finding in empirical studies documents 
                                                                                                                                            
Stiglitz, ‘Helping Infant Economies Grow: Foundations of Trade Policies for Developing Countries’, 
AEA Papers and Proceedings (May, 2006), 141-146.  Yet, the model fails to acknowledge that 
imposing trade barriers might precisely cut the domestic industry off from such international 
knowledge spillovers. 
357 World Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 68 and 72; Nordås, Miroudot, and Kowalski, above n 
321, at 19.     
358 Trade opening increases the flows of information.  An increase in human capital not simply 
translates into higher productivity but also facilitates the adoption of new technologies and thus the 
diffusion of technology. Acemoglu, above n 344, at 618. 
359 World Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 72.  Hence, one can identify a tension between the theory 
of clustering, which requires proximity (e.g., local knowledge spillovers), and theoretical arguments 
suggesting dynamic benefits of trade, which depend on the presence of international spillovers.  See 
also Nordås, Miroudot, and Kowalski, above n 321, at 21.   
360 Such spillovers would be higher if a country imports relatively more from high income countries.  
World Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 72; Nordås, Miroudot, and Kowalski, above n 321.  Next to 
knowledge spillovers, imports could also generate extra competitive pressure on import-competing 
industries (competition effect) and hereby induce innovation and thus productivity improvements.  On 
the other hand, Shumpeter has argued that innovation requires some monopoly rents and increased 
competition might thus also lower incentives to innovate.  Theoretical arguments on the link between 
competition and innovation are therefore mixed and the ultimate result thus rests on empirical 
evidence.  For example, Lawrence and Weinstein have found that competitive pressure and potential 
learning from foreign rivals were important sources of growth explaining the economic success in 
Japan and Korea.  Lawrence and Weinstein, above n 243; World Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 
69; OECD, Trading Out of Poverty – How Aid for Trade Can Help (Paris: OECD, 2009), 38 pp., at 10-
11. 
361 Brahmbhatt and Hu, above n 200, at 6. 
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that exporting firms are more productive than non-exporting firms.362  We focus more closely 
on the positive effects of exports in the next paragraph. 
 
2.4.3.2. The role of exports in spurring economic growth 
Largely, the relatively higher productivity of exporting firms is explained on the basis of self-
selection: more productive firms choose to start exporting.  Yet, some studies have also found 
that firms become more productive because of the process of exportation (learning-by-
exporting) as they succeed in absorbing foreign knowledge.363  This would imply that the 
observed correlation between exports and economic growth at least partly runs from the 
former to the latter.   
Hence, two reasons for subsidizing exports should be distinguished.  First, the simple but 
robust evidence that exporting firms are more productive (even if this is so due to the self-
selection effect) supports the argument to link subsidization to export performance (carrot-
and-stick argument), certainly because market failures are often considered relatively more 
prevalent in the exporting sector.  It is generally accepted that the East Asian countries 
successfully imposed exportation as a performance criterion.364  This carrot-and-stick 
argument, combined with the high prevalence of market failures in the tradable sector, also 
explains why authors such as Rodrik, who rejects the learning-by-exporting argument and 
generally doubts that trade openness is conductive for economic growth, are nonetheless in 
favor of export subsidies so as to overcome market failures related to discovery or clustering.   
Second, the theoretical argument of and empirical evidence on learning-by-exportation 
effects, often combined with the assumption that such learning spills over to other segments 
of the economy (and thus generates a real spillover)365, offers another justification for 
subsidizing exports.366  The fact that these spillovers are considered more prominent in 
                                                 
362 World Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 138 
363 For an overview of the mixed evidence, see World Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 138-139; W. 
Keller, ‘Transfer of Technology’, in S. N. Durlauf and L. Blume (eds), New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics – Volume 8, 2nd ed (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 367-371, at 367-371; Brahmbhatt 
and Hu, above n 200, at 10-13; B. Eichengreen, ‘The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth’, 
Commission on Growth and Development – Working Paper No. 4 (2008), 35 pp., at 17-19.  On the 
export side as well, increased competition in exporting markets might induce innovation (see above n 
360).  Starting to export also generates a temporary boost in innovation through scale effects (inventing 
new inputs becomes more profitable).  Acemoglu, above n 324, at 680. 
364 See, for example, World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2008, above n 253, at 145.  
365 An sich, the learning-by-exporting evidence does not justify government intervention: under perfect 
market conditions, firms would grasp the opportunities of exporting if this brings productivity gains.  
Therefore, the evidence is often combined with the assumption that such learning spills over.  
Alternatively, it would justify a focus on other market failures (e.g., capital market failures, labor 
market failures) which inhibit exportation or export diversification.  Hence, such support should not 
always take the form of an export subsidy, i.e., a subsidy contingent upon exportation (see also below 
on the definition of export contingency; Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1).   
366 This might explain why the World Bank also emphasizes the importance of spurring existing 
exports. 
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manufacturing than in agriculture is one of the theoretical arguments explaining why export 
diversification is seen as conductive for economic growth.367  Hence, empirical evidence on 
the link between exports (and export diversification) and economic growth combined with 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggesting that causality at least partly runs 
from exportation (diversification) to growth  would offer a supplementary argument for policy 
interventions affecting exportation.  Indeed, this exactly underpins the World Bank’s plea for 
proactive policies to support trade and export (diversification) in particular.368 In this respect, 
the 2009 World Bank study on export diversification acknowledged that ‘laissez-faire policies 
combined with low tariffs are rarely sufficient to prompt dynamic export drives or overcome 
obstacles in other areas’.369  Hence, opening up to trade and its generating of inter alia 
channels through which international spillovers become available is seen as conductive for 
economic growth but insufficient to bring structural change because of the presence of market 
failures.370  Observing that a flourishing export sector is a critical ingredient of high growth, 
especially in the early stages, the 2008 Report of the Growth Commission analogously 
stressed that ‘if an economy is failing to diversify its exports and failing to generate 
productive jobs in new industries, governments do look for ways to try to jump-start the 
process, and they should’.371  Therefore, developing countries ‘may also need some latitude to 
promote their exports until their economies have matured and their competitive position has 
improved’.372  Such export-led or outward-looking strategy does not imply that the benefits 
generated through imports are overlooked.  To the contrary, according to the Growth Report 
the purpose of higher exports is not to increase reserves or build up a trade surplus (as would 
                                                 
367 Brenton, Newfarmer, Shaw, and Walkenhorts, above n 254, at 7. 
368 For example, Brenton et al conclude that ‘there is enough evidence on the relationship between 
diversification of exports, exports growth, and economic growth to support developing countries, 
especially low-income countries, in implementing an explicit policy of diversifying exports’.  
Moreover, ‘the significant productivity enhancements from exporting argue for government 
interventions to subsidize some export activities, and many governments in both developing and high-
income countries have set up export promotion agencies’. Brenton, Newfarmer, Shaw, and 
Walkenhorts, above n 254, at 22, 25. 
369 Brenton, Newfarmer, Shaw, and Walkenhorts, above n 254, at 27-28. 
370 Hence, a double motivation seems to underpin the World Bank’s plea for targeting export 
(diversification): (i) it spurs economic growth (see n 368), which is in itself partly explained on the 
basis of knowledge spillovers (and is thus related to a market failure); (ii) it is hampered by market 
failures.    
371 Such support should be temporary, quickly evaluated and remain as neutral as possible about those 
exports to be supported (though this is not a rigid rule).  With regard to selective government 
interventions, the Growth Report at the same time observed that these policies are still highly 
controversial and ‘(w)ithin the Commission and the broader policy community, there is a wide range of 
opinion about their benefits and risks’.  Commission on Growth and Development, above n 149, at 7, 
48, 49. 
372 Commission on Growth and Development, above n 149, at 11.  The classic version of ‘export-led 
growth’ is premised on rapid growth in imports of inputs and capital.  Yet, the neo-mercantilist version 
features a lagging of import growth behind exports and hence a growing trade surplus.  W. R. Cline, 
‘Exports of Manufactures and Economic Growth: The Fallacy of Composition Revisited’, Commission 
on Growth and Development – Working Paper No. 36 (2008), 38 pp., at 32. 
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be the case under a mercantilist vision on trade), but to generate higher levels of export 
learning as well as to enable higher levels of imports embodying new knowledge.373  Along 
the same lines, the 2009 Annual Report by the WTO Director-General underlined that the 
export-led strategy followed by emerging Asian countries have ‘in large measure been 
remarkably successful in spurring economic growth’.374  Yet, given the drop in foreign 
demand caused by the economic crisis of 2008-2010, rebalancing towards domestic demand 
is urged for, not only to reduce global trade imbalances but also to serve those countries’ own 
interest (see below Section 2.5).375    
 
Rodrik adequately summarizes the differing arguments underpinning the case for subsidizing 
exports: 
 
For export quantities to matter over the longer run, one must believe either in learning or other 
spillovers from exports, which have been hard to document, or in the story I laid out above, in 
which tradables are special because that is where the higher productivity activities are. The 
two accounts differ on the importance they attach to the act of exporting per se. The 
‘spillovers-from-exporting’ story relies on the technological or marketing externalities that are 
created when a tradable good crosses an international boundary. The ‘tradables-are-special’ 
story is indifferent to whether international trade actually takes place or not.376 
 
As this quote indicates, Rodrik adheres to the ‘tradables-are-special’ story because these 
activities are characterized by higher productivity than the non-tradable sector and he 
emphasizes that tradable goods are likely to suffer relatively more than non-tradables from 
institutional and market failures (e.g., those related to discovery, coordination failures, capital 
market failures).377  High growth is achieved by a successful transformation from traditional 
(agricultural) towards more productive activities (industrial sector).378  Next to sustaining 
macro economic stability, ‘productivist policies’ stimulating the transformation towards such 
‘tradables’ should be employed, which all have in common that they act as subsidies on 
tradables.  Although Rodrik thus holds a fundamentally different view on the importance of 
                                                 
373 Commission on Growth and Development, above n 149, at 51; Cline, above n 372, at 32. 
374 WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, Annual Report by the Director-General, Overview of 
Developments in the International Trading Environment – Part B: Shaping factors for trade: looking 
into the future (WT/TPR/OV/12, 18 November 2009), 39 pp., at paras 7-8 and 65-66. 
375 This could be done by channelling corporate profits to households through the tax system, by 
developing social safety nets, by improving the domestic investment climate and financial system, by 
altering the structure of output towards domestic demand (e.g., undoing the bias against services), or by 
giving those countries a greater voice in international financial affairs so that they become less 
dependent on accumulating foreign exchange reserves.  WTO, Annual Report by the Director-General, 
above n 374, at paras 65-66. 
376 Rodrik, above n 242, at 15. 
377 See D. Rodrik, ‘The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth’, Working Paper (October, 2008), 
35 pp; Rodrik, above n 242, at 19. 
378 However, Rodrik acknowledges that there are also modern activities in agriculture (e.g., 
horticulture) and services (e.g., call centers). 
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trade in the growth process379, both ‘spillovers-from-exporting’ (endorsed, for example, by the 
World Bank) and ‘tradables-are-special’ (endorsed by Rodrik) arguments would suggest that 
industrial policies, targeting the exporting sector and consisting of functional as well as 
selective interventions, should be on the agenda of developing countries.380     
One of these functional interventions acting as a subsidy on exports could be an exchange rate 
regime that results in an undervalued currency.381  Rodrik argues that undervaluation 
facilitates growth and the Growth Commission Report, though expressing mixed opinions, 
overall also seems to suggest that it could be a useful instrument in the early stage of 
development.382  Such an undervalued currency, which acts as both an across-the-board 
subsidy on exports and a tax on imports, is less vulnerable for being captured by private 
interests than selective interventions.383  Yet, a downside in Rodrik’s view is that it fails to 
distinguish between traditional export sectors (which do not deserve subsidization) and more 
productive sectors.384  As analyzed in the Growth Commission Report, another disadvantage 
accompanying an undervalued currency is that it generates a trade surplus by encouraging 
exportation and discouraging importation.385  As such trade surplus is mirrored by a trade 
deficit abroad, an undervalued currency indeed comes at the expense of other countries.386  If 
                                                 
379 ‘What matters for growth is the ability to expand industrial economic activities, not trade per se.  
Industrial activity can increase without increasing trade, if domestic demand rises alongside’.  His 
different view on trade could also be revealed from his differing stance on the relevance of imports.  
According to Rodrik, an increase in world trade might be a mixed blessing for developing countries: 
‘imports are dominated by industrial products, as is the case in many developing countries, a large 
expansion of trade can even be bad for domestic industrial output’.  In parallel, Rodrik expresses 
doubts on the benefits of improvements in trade facilitation because this not only helps export activities 
but also takes protection away from import-substitution activities.  Hence, Aid for Trade would not 
necessarily present a win-win situation in Rodrik’s view.  Here, Rodrik also seems to be more open to 
implement an export-promoting strategy together with only gradually liberalizing import barriers. 
Rodrik, above n 242, at 16; see also D. Rodrik, ‘Second-best Institutions’, NBER Working Paper Series 
No. 14050 (June, 2008), 12 pp., at 7-8.  
380 Rodrik also seems to support a more aggressive type of industrial policy which stimulates activities 
that might be further away from a country’s current comparative advantage.  See, for example, Rodrik, 
above n 270.  Rodrik holds that what matters is not so much how, but what you produce as a country.  
See also Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, above n 255, at 1-25.  Yet, other authors have challenged this 
latter paper.  For a discussion, see Brenton, Newfarmer, Shaw, and Walkenhorts, above n 254, at 8-9. 
381 Policy tools to affect the real exchange rate are listed in Rodrik, above n 377. 
382 Rodrik refers not only to China but also to India, Uganda and Tanzania.  See also D. Rodrik, 
‘Industrial development: Some Stylized Facts and Policy Directions’, in United Nations - Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, Industrial Development for the 21st Century: Sustainable Development 
Perspectives (New York: United Nations, 2007), 7-28; A. Mattoo and A. Subramanian, ‘Currency 
Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role for the World Trade, Organization’, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics - Working Paper Series (January 2008), 31 pp., at 12.  
For a more skeptical stance, see Eichengreen, above n 363.  Aizenman and Lee find mixed results on 
whether a slightly undervalued exchange rate is an appropriate instrument to internalize learning-by-
doing externalities. J. Aizenman and J. Lee, ‘The Real Exchange Rate, Mercantilism and the Learning 
by Doing Externality’, NBER Working Paper Series No. 13853 (March, 2008), 16 pp. 
383 It could consist of a devaluation or a suppression of an appreciation.    
384 Also, it fails to distinguish between first-movers and copycats (see above on discovery). 
385 See also Cline, above n 372, at 32-35. 
386 See also, O. Blanchard and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti, ‘Global Imbalances: In Midstream?’, IMF Staff 
Position Note (22 December 2009), 31 pp. 
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the initiating country has a substantive share in world trade, other countries might be tempted 
to act likewise, and thus inflict ‘competitive devaluations’ (as happened in the 1930s), or take 
recourse to other types of protectionist measures to restore their current account, making all 
countries worse off in the end.  Therefore, Rodrik shows that selective subsidization of 
‘tradables’ is a better option as it does not generate a trade surplus in the long run.387 On this 
basis, Rodrik criticizes the SCM Agreement for being the main external obstacle for larger 
developing countries to employ such optimal industrial policies as it prohibits export 
subsidies and makes other subsidies ‘actionable’ under certain conditions, while at the same 
time leaving undervalued currencies untouched.  In particular, he concludes that: 
 
In a world where economic growth requires the encouragement of modern economic activities 
in developing nations, the Agreement on Subsidies makes little economic sense. It rules out a 
desirable second-best policy for promoting economic diversification and structural change. It 
has the unintended consequence of inducing governments to favor an inferior policy (in view 
of its spillovers into trade imbalances), namely undervalued currencies. Worse still, it may 
encourage trade protection as a defensive measure against industrial imports. If we want 
greater international oversight on currency practices, as I think we should, we will need to 
substantially relax discipline over industrial subsidies.388 
 
Following an in-depth legal analysis of the disciplines on different types of subsidies imposed 
on developing countries, we return to this criticism on the SCM Agreement in Part IV.389   
 
2.4.4. Foreign direct investment and economic growth 
Next to exports, foreign direct investment (FDI) is what Rodrik labels the other ‘fetish’ of the 
Washington Consensus.390  Indeed, one of the Washington Consensus assumptions was that 
FDI is conductive for development and should thus be attracted, although the East Asian 
success stories widely differed in their openness to FDI.391  In order to attract FDI, many 
developing countries have put an investment promotion regime in place, covering (i) 
information sharing, often conducted by investment promotion agencies (IPA), (ii) upgraded 
                                                 
387 The trade surplus generated by subsidizing tradables is undone by an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate as this, in turn, spurs consumption of ‘tradables’.  Yet, the effect of the subsidy is not 
undone because the appreciation needed to bring the trade balance back to zero is (proportionally) less 
than the magnitude of the subsidy as it affects both production and consumption margins. Rodrik, 
above n 242,  at 19-20.   
388 Rodrik, above n 242, at 23. 
389 See also Rodrik, above n 251.  See below Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3. 
390 According to Rodrik, ‘one dollar of FDI is worth no more (and no less) than a dollar of any other 
investment’.  Rodrik as cited in T. H. Moran, E. M. Graham, and M. Blomström, ‘Introduction and 
Overview’, in T. H. Moran, E. M. Graham, and M. Blomström (eds), Does Foreign Direct Investment 
Promote Development? (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2005), 1-19, at 2. 
391 For example, Korea has been restrictive to FDI and instead emphasized licensing of foreign 
technology and building of local capabilities, while Singapore was much more open to FDI.  
Brahmbhatt and Hu, above n 200, at 14; Moran, Graham, and Blomström, above n 390, at 2. 
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infrastructure, mostly located in special economic zones, and (iii) fiscal incentives (e.g., tax 
credits) or financial incentives (e.g., direct subsidies).392   
Now, on what basis is such government intervention generally legitimized?393  By enlarging 
the stock of capital, FDI positively affects economic growth394 but long-term benefits depend 
on the productivity improvements that are generated.  FDI could have an impact on the host 
country’s productivity in a threefold way. Foreign-investors might be more productive and 
thus increase industry-level productivity (compositional effect).395  Next, they might generate 
extra competition with domestic firms and therefore affect their productivity (competition 
effect).396  As often emphasized by policymakers, a third effect is the potential spilling over of 
increased knowledge channeled by foreign-investors to domestic firms in the same industry 
(intra-industry; horizontal spillovers) and/or to upstream industries (inter-industry; vertical 
spillovers).  Such knowledge could, for example, be channeled by imitation through 
observation (e.g., technology itself or managerial/organizational innovations) or through labor 
movements or training.397  Hence, governments have not only created incentives for attracting 
FDI in the first place but have also imposed measures to extract more knowledge from a given 
investment (e.g., local content requirements, licensing requirements).398   
However, empirical evidence on productivity growth generated by FDI in developing 
countries has generated mixed results.  With regard to the intra-industry level (horizontal 
                                                 
392 Harding and Javorcikr have found that investment promotion indeed leads to higher FDI inflows in 
developing countries.  T. Harding and B. S. Javorcikr, ‘Developing Economies and International 
Investors: Do Investment Promotion Agencies Bring Them Together?’, World Bank – Policy Research 
Working Paper No 4339 (August, 2007), 50 pp.  In 1998, more than 100 countries offered tax 
concessions to FDI.  L. Alfaro and A. Rodriguez-Clare, ‘Multinationals and Linkages: An Empirical 
Investigation’, Economia (Spring, 2004), 113-169, at 114; T. H. Moran, E. M. Graham, and M. 
Blomström, ‘Conclusions and Implications for FDI Policy in Developing Countries, New Methods of 
Research, and a Future Research Agenda’, in T. H. Moran, E. M. Graham, and M. Blomström (eds), 
Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? (Washington DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 2005), 375-395.       
393 The literature displays the same duality than the one discussed concerning exports and economic 
growth: some authors argue government intervention is legitimate if proven that FDI spurs economic 
growth, whereas others seem to stress that the presence of a market failure is also required.  Still, the 
element that explains a potential positive impact on economic growth also points to a market failure, 
namely knowledge spillovers. 
394 This holds true unless capital is raised in the country.  Employment is another argument often raised 
to justify FDI incentives is.  See Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare, above n 392, at 114; B. S. Javorcik, ‘Can 
Survey Evidence Shed Light on Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment?’, 23:2 The World Bank 
Research Observer (Fall 2008), 139-159, at 139. 
395 For example, a study on Indonesian manufacturing has shown that firms become more productive 
after foreign acquisition. J. M. Arnold and B. S. Javorcik, ‘Gifted Kids or Pushy Parents?  Foreign 
Acquisitions and Plant Performance in Indonesia’, Centro Studi Luca D’Agliano Development Studies 
Working Papers No 197 (March 2005), 35 pp.; Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare, above n 392, at 116.  
396 J. Bitzer and H. Görg, ‘Foreign Direct Investment, Competition and Industry Performance’, 32:2 
The World Economy (2009), 221-233, at 223. 
397 On a horizontal level, trained employees might for example move to domestic firms, while on a 
vertical level foreign firms might offer training to employees of their local suppliers.  Next to 
knowledge spillovers, FDI might also generate ‘demonstration effects’ to other potential investors or 
acquire reputation in foreign markets, benefiting other domestic firms.    
398 Commission on Growth and Development, above n 149, at 42. 
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effect), ambiguous and sometimes even negative productivity effects have been found. Here, 
arguments related to all three channels have been advanced to explain these results.  First, the 
assumption that foreign-investors are more productive might not always hold, especially when 
FDI takes the form of mergers and acquisitions.399  Second, the competition effect might also 
work negatively if FDI induces domestic firms to cut production back to an inefficient 
scale.400  Third, foreign-investors might be particularly keen to minimize knowledge leakages 
to domestic competitors and domestic firms might be unable to learn-by-imitation if they do 
not have the capacity to absorb potential spillover.  The latter occurs in case of low levels of 
human capital and a wide technological gap between foreign and domestic firms.401  
Differences in levels of absorptive ability would also explain why horizontal spillover effects 
are stronger in developed than in developing countries.402   
On the other hand, empirical evidence on positive productivity effects of FDI on suppliers in 
developing countries is more promising (vertical effect).403  This might not come as a surprise 
given that foreign investors have a direct interest in improving the productivity of upstream 
suppliers.404 The presence of vertical knowledge spillovers is indeed well documented, 
whereby its degree depends again on the local conditions of the host country and suppliers 
(e.g., R&D level, human capital level, financial market development).405 
Overall, ‘the jury is still out on whether or not inward FDI generally is conductive to domestic 
productivity growth’.406  The existence of vertical knowledge spillovers might offer some 
                                                 
399 L. Colen, M. Maertens, and J. Swinnen, ‘Foreign Direct Investment as an Engine for Economic 
Growth and Human Development: A Review of the Arguments and Empirical Evidence’, Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance, Working Paper No. 16 (September, 2008), 48 pp. 
400 Hence, this assumes economies of scale.  J. Konings, ‘The Effects of Foreign Direct Investments on 
Domestic Firms – Evidence from Firm-level Panel Data in Emerging Economies’, 9:3 Economics of 
Transition (2001), 619-633. 
401 Alfaro et al also point to the importance of developed financial markets.  L. Alfaro, S. Kalemli-
Ozcan, and S. Sayek, ‘FDI, Productivity and Financial Development’, The World Economy (2009), 
111-135. 
402 Brahmbhatt and Hu, above n 200, at 16. Mayer-Foulkes and Nunnenkamp have also indicated that 
developing countries often lack the absorptive capacity to benefit from FDI.  Local firms are often too 
much behind the technological frontier to learn by imitation.  They have found that US FDI contributes 
to convergence only for high-income countries but could lead to divergence for many middle- and low 
income countries.  D. Mayer-Foulkes and P. Nunnenkamp, ‘Do Multinational Enterprises Contribute to 
Convergence or Divergence? A Disaggregated Analysis of US FDI’, 13:2 Review of Development 
Economics (2009), 304–318. 
403 Spillovers to downstream sectors are not supported by robust evidence.  Javorcik, above n 394, at 
151. 
404 Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare, above n 392, at 121. 
405 Brahmbhatt and Hu, above n 200, at 17; G. Blalock and P. J. Gertler, ‘Foreign Direct Investment 
and Externalities: The Case for Public Intervention’, in T. H. Moran, E. M. Graham, and M. Blomström 
(eds), Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? (Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics, 2005), 73-106, at 79; Javorcik, above n 394, at 146 and 149.  A spillover 
would be present if the enhanced productivity of suppliers also results in lower prices to other firms in 
the local economy.  Moran, Graham, and Blomström, above n 390, at 3. 
406 Bitzer and Görg, above n 396, at 222.  Carkovic and Levine have found that FDI does not exert an 
independent influence on economic growth and, therefore, reject the case for subsidizing FDI.  Yet, 
other authors in the same volume reject their findings. M. Carkovic and R. Levine, ‘Does Foreign 
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justification for subsidizing FDI but the mixed evidence on horizontal spillovers warrants that 
the benefits of FDI should certainly not be overestimated and that the overall result might 
even turn out to be negative.407  As a general rule, the value of any subsidy should certainly 
not exceed the positive externality generated by FDI, but the difficulty in measuring this 
magnitude of potential positive spillovers (if any) makes this a thorny exercise.408  The 
absorptive capacity of the host country as well as the particular industry seems to form a 
crucial factor determining whether or not positive spillover effects are generated by FDI, 
suggesting a role for investing in human capital and local R&D.409  Whereas the question on 
whether incentives should be given to attract FDI is thus still open, Moran et al nonetheless 
conclude that restrictive policies on FDI (e.g., local content requirements, technology sharing 
regulations) and trade are certainly not conductive for spurring economic growth through FDI 
as these host country policies are unlikely to generate intra-industry spillovers.  Restrictive 
policies on FDI would lead to ‘outdated technology, inefficient production processes, and a 
wasteful use of host country resources’.410  The gains from knowledge attached to imported 
intermediate products as well as its disincentive effect on attracting FDI in the first place 
might further question the validity of local content requirements.411  Moreover, FDI to 
protected trade regimes (market-seeking FDI; e.g., motivated by tariff jumping) is less likely 
to generate positive spillovers as the absorptive capacity of the local industry is often 
insufficient.412   
 
2.4.5. In conclusion: From infant industry protection to infant industry promotion 
Empirical evidence resulting from the experience of the ‘East Asian Miracle’ has shown that 
an outward-oriented (EP) strategy offers more guarantees than an inward-oriented (IS) 
                                                                                                                                            
Direct Investment Accelerate Economic Growth’, in T. H. Moran, E. M. Graham, and M. Blomström 
(eds), Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? (Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics, 2005), 195-222; Moran, Graham, and Blomström, above n 392, at 377-382, 
389-390. 
407 Strictly speaking, only in the presence of true knowledge spillovers (see above n 405 ) could a case 
for public intervention be made on the basis of knowledge transfers.  Another market failure justifying 
policy intervention, although only for first movers, is related to information asymmetries inhibiting 
potential foreign investors to invest in a new location and demonstrating profitability once new foreign 
investors are located (demonstration effect).  See Harding and Javorcikr, above n 392, at 9; Moran, 
Graham, and Blomström, above n 390, at 4; Javorcik, above n 394, at 156.  Lastly, Blalock and Gertler 
point to the role of providing credit liquidity in times of financial crisis as a justification for public 
intervention so as to attract FDI.  Blalock and Gertler, above n 405, at 102-104. 
408 Commission on Growth and Development, above n 149, at 42. 
409 In the words of Nunnenkamp, ‘(f)or all we can tell, however, it appears much more difficult to 
benefit from FDI than to attract FDI’.  P. Nunnenkamp, To What Extent Can Foreign Direct Investment 
Help Achieve International Development Goals?, 27:5 The World Economy (May, 2004), 657-677, at 
674. 
410 At the same time, the success of the China’s Special Export Zones is also documented by the same 
authors.   
411 World Development Report 2005, above n 253, at 171; Brahmbhatt and Hu, above n 200, at 38. 
412 See also Nunnenkamp, above n 409, at 674. 
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strategy for reaching sustained economic growth.  Further, the 2008 World Trade Report also 
observed important similarities between this East Asian Miracle and China’s recent growth 
process: the take-off was marked by a shift towards outward-oriented policies and China 
gradually demonstrated its ability to upgrade its performance in technologically more 
advanced sectors.413  Reviewing all 13 ‘success stories’ of high sustained growth since the 
postwar period, the Growth Commission’s central lesson entailed that the integration in the 
global economy formed a critical ingredient of these countries’ transformation from an 
agriculture-dependent towards a more diversified economy (e.g., labor-intensive 
manufacturing).414  An inward-looking strategy might have worked occasionally (e.g., 
Brazil415), but always reached its limits.   
Theoretical arguments are also advanced explaining the superiority of an outward-oriented 
strategy, although such a strategy might be combined with an import-substitution policy in 
selected sectors during a first phase.416  First, one disadvantage of the inward-looking strategy 
is that the ‘infant industries’ rely on the domestic market to grow up.417  Here, this domestic 
market might often be too small in the first place to produce at an efficient level and grasp 
economies of scale.418  In addition, the advantage of an export promotion strategy is that 
world market demand is relatively elastic and that output could thus be expanded as 
productivity grows without incurring a sharp price decline (terms of trade), whereas an 
inward-looking strategy focuses on the limited domestic market with a much more inelastic 
demand.  Equally, the larger world market also allows for more specialization.  Second, the 
endogenous growth theory shows that the restrictive trade regime resulting from an inward-
looking strategy implies that those countries are cut off from dynamic gains from trade.419  In 
particular, it has been argued that knowledge spillovers attached to exportation and 
importation could be important for inducing growth, although evidence is not conclusive.420  
                                                 
413 Yet, the Report also acknowledged that it is debated to what extent the performance of China is 
export-led.  World Trade Report 2008, above n 125, at 74; Frieden, above n 218, at 421-426. 
414 These countries are: Botswana, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Singapore, Taiwan, China, and Thailand. Two other countries, India 
and Vietnam, may be on their way to join this group. 
415 The Report observes how, at first glance, Brazil ‘sits uneasily beside the other 12’ as it successfully 
implemented an IS-strategy until the 1980s by relying on a large domestic market and abundant 
agricultural resources.  Yet, economic growth lost its momentum in the 1980s.  Commission on Growth 
and Development, above n 149, at 21. 
416 The above mentioned examples of semi-conductor protection and promotion in Japan and the 
aircraft protection and promotion in Europe might illustrate such a combination.  Bhagwati also 
observed that in most East Asian countries the EP-strategy was combined with import-substitution in 
selected sectors.  Bhagwati, above n 213, at 27-57; Frieden, above n 218, at 421.  
417 The failure to encourage exports under an IS-strategy is also called the home market bias.  See 
Corden, above n 24, at 24-27. 
418 Or, the domestic market might be so small that only a few firms could operate, implying monopoly 
or quasi-monopoly positions.  Krueger, above n 220, at 515; Bhagwati, above n 213, at 39. 
419 See, for example, Krueger, above n 220, at 1518; Messerlin, above n 207, at 1359-1407. 
420 Next to a competition effect (see above n 360 and n 363).    
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By spurring exports and imports, an outward-oriented strategy might generate important 
channels for ‘learning-by-imitation’ and hence result in faster productivity catch-up.  Third, a 
restrictive trade and investment regime would be less likely to attract FDI that generates 
positive spillovers.  Market-seeking FDI attracted under an import-substitution regime (e.g., 
tariff jumping) would be inferior to efficiency-seeking FDI.421  Fourth, the specific market 
failures underpinning the case for active government intervention call for subsidies instead of 
for tariff/QR protection.422  Indeed, subsidized credits – and not import restrictions – are 
second-best solutions for correcting capital market failures.  Moreover, targeted subsidies to 
first-movers are optimal for inducing discovery and the externalities creating coordination 
failures (e.g., knowledge spillovers) also call for subsidization (e.g., R&D subsidies) instead 
of for import protection.423 Generally speaking, a production subsidy is more appropriate than 
an import restriction for spurring domestic production that is too low due to a domestic 
market failure, as the latter also negatively affects domestic consumers.424  Hence, the infant 
industry argument invites promotion, rather than protection.425  Fifth, an outward-oriented 
strategy might generally offer more guarantees that government failures do not ‘make things 
worse’.  In contrast to an IS-strategy generating tariff revenue, subsidization as part of an 
outward-oriented strategy entails a cost to the government and therefore induces the 
government to (re-) think twice in supporting an industry.426  Moreover, an IS-strategy 
provides no guarantee that the protected infant will ever grow up, whereas a subsidy 
contingent upon export performance could be employed under an outward-oriented strategy to 
ensure that only ‘winners’ will be awarded (performance criteria).   
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence as well as theoretical arguments on the superiority of an 
outward-oriented strategy still cover large differences in viewpoints.427  According to the 
Growth Commission Report, ‘the crucial role of exports in their success is not much disputed 
(…) (b)ut the role of export promotion is’.428  On the one hand, the neoliberal school would 
downplay the specific government interventions in explaining the export growth of the 
success stories and underline those theoretical arguments of an outward-oriented strategy that 
                                                 
421 See also Bhagwati, above n 213, at 38. 
422 See also Messerlin, above n 207, at 1400; Baldwin, above n 221, at 303-304.     
423 Given that a product could also be produced using a backward technology, import protection is not a 
good instrument for inducing the use of new technologies. Rodriguez-Clare, above n 298, at 3-32. 
424 An export subsidy also negatively affects consumers in the domestic market.  See Bagwell, above n 
25; K. Bagwell and R. W. Staiger, ‘Will International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading 
System?’, The American Economic Review (June, 2006), 877-895; M. J. Melitz, ‘When and How 
Should Infant Industries Be Protected?’, 66 Journal of International Economics (2005), 177-196, at 
179. 
425 Johnson, above n 76, at 256. 
426 See, for example, Bhagwati, above n 213, at 37. 
427 Such disagreement is also related to the question on the extent to which an import-substitution 
strategy could be warranted in the first phase of economic development and/or in selected sectors. 
428 Commission on Growth and Development, above n 149, at 48. 
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fit a free trade agenda (arguments 1-3).429  This school is much more skeptical about the 
usefulness of specific and functional government interventions, which would go beyond 
general investments in human (e.g., education, health) and physical capital (e.g., general 
infrastructure).  On the other hand, authors being more skeptical about the intrinsic benefits of 
trade and FDI (e.g., Rodrik) point to the tradable sector’s market failures which could and 
should be corrected by those instruments through which an outward-oriented strategy is 
promoted as well (e.g. (export) subsidies) (arguments 4-5).430   
Reconciling aspects of both views, the new paradigm expressed in the 2009 World Bank 
study and Growth Report seems to take on board all the listed benefits of an outward-oriented 
strategy (arguments 1-5).  Here, the benefits of opening up to trade are emphasized.  At the 
same time, it is recognized that such benefits often do not flow automatically from trade 
opening but might require active government intervention to overcome market failures and 
that the exact implementation thereof depends on the characteristics of each country (‘one 
size does not fit all’).  Such a country-specific outward-oriented strategy suggests that S&D 
treatment for developing countries might be more important at their export side (e.g., need for 
subsidization, access to markets in developed countries) than at their import side (e.g., border 
charges).431   
What is more, the Aid for Trade agenda launched under the Doha Round suggests that this 
policy space might even be insufficient and that development aid is needed to help those 
countries grasping the benefits of trade opening.  Next to trade-related infrastructure (which 
has a strong public good characteristic), one of the other categories on the Aid for Trade 
agenda is ‘productive capacity building’, which includes ‘supporting the private sector to 
exploit their comparative advantages and diversify their exports’ (covering agriculture, 
industry as well as services).432  An interesting question is to what extent this Aid for Trade 
agenda fits with the rationale of – and disciplines imposed under – the SCM Agreement.433  
One of the main novelties of the SCM Agreement was precisely its introduction of more 
stringent disciplines on certain developing countries.  Indeed, the successful outward-oriented 
strategy that was used by the Asian tigers and that started to threaten knowledge-intensive 
                                                 
429 See, for example, A. Panagariya, ‘Evaluating the Case for Export Subsidies’, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 2276 (January 2000), 30 pp. 
430 Although the specific market failures rather call for subsidization, trade protection is also considered 
as a complementary instrument because less weight is attached to the benefits of trade.  See, for 
example, Rodrik, above n 242, at 8 and 19-20.  Somewhat anecdotical, Rodrik’s biography invited him 
to consider himself as ‘the creation of import substitution’.  See L. Uchitelle, ‘A Global Balancing 
Act’, The New York Times (30 January 2007).   
431 See below on the different approaches towards S&D treatment in the GATT/WTO history.  See also 
above n 218. 
432 OECD, Aid-for-Trade data: Creditor Reporting System – Explanatory Note (Paris: OECD), 8 pp., at 
1.  
433 The Aid for Trade-agenda mainly focuses on LDCs, which are exempted from many disciplines on 
subsidies (see below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1).   
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sectors of developed countries in the 1980s, explains why developed countries have pushed 
for such strengthened disciplines during the Uruguay Round.  This raises the normative 
question (addressed in Part IV) whether the SCM Agreement leaves sufficient policy space 
for the different types of developing countries to implement an outward-oriented strategy.   
Yet, the call for an outward-oriented strategy also raises an economic puzzle: can all countries 
pursue such outward-oriented strategy at the same time (added-up problem)?434  What is good 
for one country in isolation might be logically inconsistent if generalized.435  Two reasons 
might indeed suggest that export-led growth cannot add up: if all developing countries start to 
exploit their surplus labor by setting up labor-intensive sectors, the price of those goods might 
be depressed, whereas a flood in exports might equally give rise to a protectionist reflex in 
other countries.  These effects at the supply and demand side would negatively affect the 
terms of trade of exporting developing countries and thus their return on such investments.  In 
particular, the boom of Chinese exports in labor-intensive manufacturing has depressed the 
relative price of labor-intensive manufactured goods (crowding-out effect).  Nonetheless, 
several reasons suggest that it would still be beneficial for low-income countries to diversify 
exports into labor-intensive industries.  First, their low labor cost would still make their return 
of investment positive and their potential aggregate supply would be relatively low compared 
to world demand.  Second, the ‘product ladder’ phenomenon suggests that developing 
countries move on the ladder of comparative advantage and exit labor-intensive industries if 
their income rises.  The original Asian tigers have indeed largely left the labor-intensive 
industry.  China forcefully entered this field but there is some evidence that it is already 
moving away from labor-intensive sectors as it is growing rapidly.436  Third, these developing 
countries’ growth generates additional demand and thus increases export opportunities for 
other countries (complementarity effect).437  Fourth, the protectionist reflex in importing 
countries does not seem not to materialize, partly because of the existence of WTO 
disciplines.438  Hence, low-income developing countries would still benefit from an outward-
oriented strategy diversifying into labor-intensive manufactured goods.   
 
2.5. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN TIMES OF GLOBAL RECESSION: THE ROLE OF 
SUBSIDIES FOR RECOVERY 
Infected by a crisis in the US housing and financial markets in 2007-2008, the world economy 
in 2009-2010 faced its deepest economic recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s.  
                                                 
434 Commission on Growth and Development, above n 149, at 94-96. 
435 This is also known as the ‘fallacy of composition’ problem.  See Cline, above n 372. 
436 Qureshi and Wan also find that China’s export structure is changing from labor-intensive products 
towards skill-intensive and medium-to high-technology products.  M. S. Qureshi and G. Wan, ‘Trade 
Expansion of China and India: Threat or Opportunity?’, The World Economy (2008), 1327-1350. 
437 See Qureshi and Wan, above n 436, at 1327-1350.  It could also generate knowledge spillovers. 
438 See Cline, above n 372, at 2 and 21.   
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Indeed, a combination of a reduction in wealth, a sharp decrease in available credit, and a loss 
of consumer and investment confidence has resulted in a large drop of aggregate demand and, 
in turn, of the volume of world trade, both larger than in any period since the 1930s.439  To 
recover from this global recession, a successful policy response should have two 
components.440  
First, measures aiming at revitalizing the financial sector should be put in place.  As an 
immediate response, governments bailed out large financial institutions under stress, which 
was legitimized on the basis of the systemic risk that their potential bankruptcy would pose to 
the entire financial system and real economy (‘too big to fail’ argument).  Next to such direct 
financial bailouts, reforming the financial regulatory system should be on the agenda in the 
longer run in order to efficiently ease this systemic risk, as it leads to moral hazard behaviour 
on the part of financial institutions.441  By getting the financial system back on track, credit 
flows should revive, hereby stimulating investments and thus aggregate demand.   
Second, macro economic policies directly stimulating aggregate demand should be 
implemented so that spending is brought back to the level at which the available productive 
resources are again effectively deployed and full employment is achieved.  Indeed, due to 
price rigidity, such recovery in private demand does not occur automatically (at least not in 
the short run) but has to be accelerated by macro economic interventions in the form of 
monetary and/or fiscal policies.442  Given that most developed countries have already used 
monetary expansion resulting in low interest rates, there is little room for further stimulating 
demand through monetary policy (‘world liquidity trap’).443  Although some Chicago School 
scholars might still question its effectiveness, most economists, in particular those from the 
New Keynesian School (e.g., Krugman, Stiglitz), as well as international institutions such as 
                                                 
439 Some experts even suggest that the rate of contraction in merchandise trade was larger than that 
experienced during a similar stage of the Great Depression.   
440 See, for example, A. Spilimbergo, S. Symansky, O. Blanchard, and C. Cottarelli, ‘Fiscal Policy for 
the Crisis’, IMF Staff Position Note (29 December 2008), 37 pp., at 2-3; P. Krugman, The Return of 
Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 207 pp., 
at 181-191. 
441 The financial bailout only aggravated such moral hazard behaviour.   
442 If prices would fall quickly, demand would recover without government intervention.  Reasons for 
price rigidity (e.g., wage rigidity, menu costs) are disputed among economists.   
443 Nominal interest rates cannot be negative.  There are a variety of reasons explaining why an 
expansive monetary policy does not substantively boost investments.  First, the interest rate set by 
central banks is not necessarily channelled to investors as intermediate financial institutions might add 
a surcharge to compensate for their losses.  Second, given nominal rates cannot be negative, they 
cannot prevent real interest rates from rising when prices fall.  Third, investments are not only 
determined by the cost of borrowing but also by the expectation of profit.  If the latter will fall below 
zero, no money will be borrowed.  See R. Skidelsky, Keynes – The Return of the Master (London: 
Penguin Group, 2009), 214 pp., at 18.   
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the IMF, therefore agree that what is needed to break this vicious circle of deteriorating 
aggregate demand is ‘good old Keynesian fiscal stimulus’.444,445   
The IMF has advocated that such fiscal stimulus should be large, timely, lasting, contingent, 
collective, and sustainable.446  Because of the uncertainty on what effectively works in 
response to the current crisis, such stimulus package should also be diversified, meaning that 
it should be composed of several different tools.  First, the IMF, echoing Keynes, points to 
public spending on goods and services as the most effective tool because its direct effect on 
demand is larger than (income) tax cuts or transfers to households or firms, which are partly 
saved rather than spent.  Public works generating large environmental externalities could be 
good examples thereof.  The traditional argument against public spending, namely that it 
takes too long to generate effects, is considered less relevant given the recession’s long 
duration.447  Second, fiscal stimulus aimed at consumers could consist of transfers and income 
tax cuts, preferably targeted at those consumers most likely affected by credit constrains, but 
its effectiveness depends on the impact on the marginal propensity to consume.  Likewise, the 
effectiveness of cuts in indirect taxes (e.g., VAT) or cash transfers for purchases (e.g., of 
more efficient cars) that were undertaken by some countries, also depends on whether they 
are sufficiently large to boost consumer spending.448  Third, fiscal stimulus aimed at 
producers is put in place in several countries.  In the IMF’s view, the key challenge for 
policy-makers is in this respect ‘to avoid that firms have to cut down their current operations 
for lack of financing, including reasonably-priced credit’.  Given the private capital market’s 
failure, the IMF sees a legitimate role for non-sector specific credit guarantees by 
governments for firms under economic distress, as this would facilitate their process of 
restructuring (in line of the IMF’s ‘lending plus policy adjustment’ advice).  On the other 
hand, direct subsidies to specific sectors (e.g., car sector in the US) could not be legitimized.  
Although the IMF accepts that bankruptcy of ‘high-visibility’ sectors may adversely affect 
expectations and thus demand, such support is inherently arbitrary and the risk of political 
capture (political-economy argument) makes proper implementation too difficult.  Moreover, 
such direct subsidies create an ‘uneven playing field’ with foreign competitors, and thus could 
lead to retaliation and trade wars.  Therefore, according to the IMF, an ‘important principle of 
support should be to minimize interference with operational decisions’.449  Yet, it is hard to 
                                                 
444 Krugman, above n 440, at 187; ‘Stiglitz Urges ‘Powell Doctrine’ to Fix Jobs Picture’ Bloomberg (10 
December 2009); ‘Big government fights back’, The Economist (29 January 2009).  On the debate on 
the stimulus plan between the different schools, see Skidelsky, above n 443, at 46-51.  
445 However, others might have to be credited for inventing Keynesianism before Keynes.  See Frieden, 
above n 218, at 240-241. 
446 Spilimbergo, Symansky, Blanchard, and Cottarelli, above n 440, at 3-9. 
447 Krugman, above n 440, at 183-184. 
448 In case of cuts in indirect taxes, their effect is also dependent on whether they are passed through to 
consumers. 
449 Spilimbergo, Symansky, Blanchard, and Cottarelli, above n 440, at 7. 
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see how fiscal stimulus measures aimed at producers under economic distress could adhere to 
this principle in practice. 
In sum, demand and thus production could be boosted by increasing public spending as well 
as by stimulating private spending through fiscal incentives, targeted at either consumers or 
producers.  The crux is that by raising income and confidence, such an expansionary fiscal 
policy multiplies its effect on GDP growth.450  Yet, in an open economy, some of the fiscal 
stimulus spent by a government does not accelerate its national GDP growth (i.e., national 
multiplier) by boosting domestic production but leaks abroad in the form of increased imports 
and thus benefits other countries.451  Because countries aim at maximizing their national 
multiplier and given increased imports may result in trade deficits, countries have an incentive 
(i) to set fiscal stimulus at a suboptimal low level and ‘free ride’ on stimulus packages taken 
by foreign countries, and/or (ii) to impose trade-distortive measures so as to prevent leakage 
when implementing their own stimulus package.  Hence, to reach the Pareto-optimal outcome 
in this classic prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation between countries is needed to ensure, as some 
have phrased it, both ‘Keynes at home’ and ‘Adam Smith abroad’. 452   
The importance of implementing stimulus packages in a non-trade-distortive way and thus 
respects ‘Smith abroad’, is that it ensures that the generated demand is spent in the most 
efficient manner and that the ‘global multiplier’ (i.e., the rise in global GDP as a result of 
governments’ spending) is maximized (Pareto-optimal outcome).  As recognized by the WTO 
Director-General, in case subsidization can be undertaken, its full value as a stimulus for 
global activity will therefore ‘come from targeting them at consumption, not production, with 
consumers free to choose internationally the goods and services that they buy’.453  In contrast, 
trade-distortive fiscal stimulus measures are not neutral on the way the generated demand 
should be spent but rather induce spending towards, or directly offer support to, domestic 
products/services.  Examples of such trade-distortive government stimulus measures are 
direct government spending containing a ‘buy national’ provision, but also fiscal stimulus 
aimed at domestic producers (e.g., car bailouts).  Although individual countries might be 
tempted to prevent leakage abroad and maximize their national multiplier in this way, it 
diverts resource allocation from more efficient foreign producers to less efficient domestic 
producers and therefore ‘acts like a tax on income and production’454, undermining the ‘global 
                                                 
450 At the same time, an accommodating monetary policy that prevents interest rates from rising as a 
result of fiscal expansion should be put in place, as this would undercut demand again. 
451 See, for example, O. Blanchard, Macroeconomics (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997), 623 pp., at 
232-238. 
452 See F. Erixon and R. Sally, ‘Keynes at Home, Smith Abroad - Domestic Stimulus Spills Over to 
Protectionism’, The Wall Street Journal (9 September 2009).  
453 Report to the TPRB from the Director-General on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-
related Developments (JOB(09)/30, 26 March 2009), para 8. 
454 Report to the TPRB from the Director-General, above n 453, para 43.   
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multiplier’.  Moreover, such trade-distortive government stimulus could even be 
counterproductive for their ‘national multiplier’ as their adverse effects on foreign producers 
competing in the same contracted market could trigger retaliation by other countries (e.g., 
raising import barriers or competitive subsidization) and thus result in a trade war, hereby 
further deteriorating the ‘global multiplier’.455  Recalling Lawrence’s observation regarding 
subsidization in the 1980s, subsidizing industries in sectors confronted with great excess 
capacity (e.g., steel) during periods of high unemployment leads to ‘the exportation of 
unemployment’, inducing trade responses by trading partners.456  The WTO Director-General 
equally referred to ‘the failure of trade restrictions and subsidies to provide effective 
industrial support in the 1970s and 1980s, and the long-term costs imposed on world trade 
until they were unwound during the Uruguay Round’.457  In Part IV, we will examine whether 
the existing legal framework on subsidy disciplines can effectively guarantee that ‘the same 
mistakes (are) not … made again’458 in countries’ responses to the current crisis.459 
At the same time, one has to recognize that if international disciplines ensure ‘Smith abroad’, 
this might inhibit ‘Keynes at home’ as countries open to trade might have an incentive to just 
wait for Keynes to come from abroad.460  Therefore, coordination is needed to ensure that 
countries effectively implement their own fiscal stimulus. This coordination mainly takes 
place in the IMF as well as in the G-20 setting, which brings together industrial and 
emerging-market industries.461462  Apparently, coordination among G-20 countries seems to 
have been rather successful so far.  After some initial hesitance,463 they reached the IMF’s 
                                                 
455 On competitive subsidization in the car industry, see, for example, A. O. Krueger, ‘Trade Openness 
Is Now More Important Than Ever’, World Bank Institute, Development Outreach (December 2009), 
37-49, at 38. 
456 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.5. 
457 Report to the TPRB from the Director-General, above n 453, para 7.     
458 Report to the TPRB from the Director-General, above n 453, para 7. 
459 See below Part IV, Chapter 5.  Determined to ‘not repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism of 
previous eras’, G-20 Leaders at the 2010 London meeting had promised ‘to refrain from raising new 
barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or 
implementing WTO inconsistent measures to stimulate exports’ until the end of 2010, and to 
‘...minimize any negative impact on trade and investment of our domestic policy actions including 
fiscal policy and action in support of the financial sector’. Only a few days before, the WTO Director-
General had observed a ‘significant slippage’ towards protectionist actions.  See G-20, The Global Plan 
for Recovery and Reform (2 April 2009), para 22.  
460 See Blanchard, above n 451, at 238; J. Stiglitz, ‘The Imperative for Improved Global Economic 
Coordination’, World Bank Institute, Development Outreach (December 2009), 39-42. 
461 This should not be confronted with the G-20 coalition in the Doha Negotiations (see below Part II, 
Chapter 1, Section 1.5). 
462 Compared to the situation in which a region acts alone in implementing fiscal stimulus, 
simultaneous fiscal stimulus could raise each region’s multiplier by a factor of about 1.5 as a result of 
international spillovers of demand.  See C. Freedman, M. Kumhof, D. Laxton, and J. Lee, ‘The Case 
for Global Stimulus’, IMF Staff Position Note (March 2009), 27 pp.  
463 See, Report to the TPRB from the Director-General, above n 453, para 45. 
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proposed additional total stimulus of around 2 per cent of world GDP ($ 1.2 trillion) for 
2009.464   
Developing countries have far less ‘fiscal space’ than developed countries to implement such 
expansionary fiscal policies in response to the economic downturn,465 even though they were 
severely affected by a ‘sudden stop’ of capital inflows as well as by a collapse in export 
demand, which in turn caused a deterioration of domestic credit conditions and sharp fall in 
aggregate demand.466  Hence, for these countries, it is pivotal that stimulus plans by other 
countries are implemented in a non-trade-distortive way so that their export sectors could 
benefit from additionally generated demand abroad (leakage).  Further both the IMF and 
World Bank have rather fruitfully urged for a substantive increase in official financing to 
these countries so as to somewhat expand their own ‘fiscal space’.467  Next, the IMF 
suggested that exchange rate depreciation might be one of their few available options.  Even 
though this is by definition not an option for the world as a whole, it would in particular be 
advisable for those developing countries that incurred a terms of trade loss, though not for 
those developing countries (e.g., China) having a large current account surplus.468  Lastly, the 
tightening of available credit as well as the re-assessment of risks by commercial banks has 
resulted in a sharp increase in the cost of trade finance instruments for developing countries’ 
importers and exporters.  In response, international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, 
and even the WTO have welcomed the G-20 pledge in April 2009 to ensure availability of at 
                                                 
464 Yet, it was also observed that revenue measures and social transfers have been implemented more 
quickly than infrastructure projects, even though the latter have a large multiplier effect.  At the April 
2009 London Summit, the G-20 Leaders had pledged that an ‘unprecedented and concerted fiscal 
expansion’ would be undertaken, which would amount to $5 trillion by the end of 2010 and would 
‘raise output by 4 per cent, and accelerate the transition to a green economy’.  See G-20, The Global 
Plan for Recovery and Reform (2 April 2009), para 6; See also G-20, Leaders’ Statement – The 
Pittsburgh Summit (September 24-25 2009); G-20, Progress Report on the Actions of the London and 
Washington G-20 Summits (5 September 2009); IMF, ‘'Istanbul Decisions' to Guide IMF as Countries 
Shape Post-Crisis World’, IMF Survey Online (6 October 2009). 
465 Fiscal space is defined by the IMF as ‘the scope for financing a deficit without undue crowding out 
of private activity, sharp increases in funding costs, or undermining debt sustainability’.  See A. R. 
Ghosh, M. Chamon, C. Crowe, J. I. Kim, and J. D. Ostry, ‘Coping with the Crisis: Policy Options for 
Emerging Market Countries’, IMF Staff Position Paper (April 23, 2009), 29 pp., at 5.  
466 See Ghosh, Chamon, Crowe, Kim, and Ostry, above n 465, at 3.  The World Bank calculated that 
the crisis would result in a surplus of 53 million people living in extreme poverty (below $1.25 a day) 
and would jeopardize the progress made on reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
See World Bank, World Bank Group Response to the Financial Crisis (24 March 2009), at 1. 
467 World Bank President Zoellick suggested that developed countries contributed an equivalent to 0.7 
per cent of their stimulus packages as additional aid.  See World Bank, World Bank Group Response to 
the Financial Crisis (24 March 2009); Ghosh, Chamon, Crowe, Kim, and Ostry, above n 465, at 8; G-
20, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform (2 April 2009); G-20, Leaders’ Statement – The 
Pittsburgh Summit (24-25 September 2009); G-20, Progress Report on the Actions of the London and 
Washington G-20 Summits (5 September 2009). 
468 Ghosh, Chamon, Crowe, Kim, and Ostry, above n 465, at 6, 15-19. 
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least $250 billion over the next two years to support trade finance.469  Apparently, this pledge 
is successfully implemented. Still, as Part III of this dissertation will show, it is highly 
questionable whether this could be done in a WTO consistent way under the current rules.470   
 
 
                                                 
469 G-20, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform (2 April 2009); OECD, Working Party on Export 
Credits and Credit Guarantees, Statement: The Global Financial Crisis and Export Credits 
(TAD/ECG(2009)3, 23 April 2009).     
470 On its implementation, see M. Auboin, ‘Restoring Trade Finance During a Period of Financial 
Crisis: Stock-taking of Recent Initiatives’, WTO Working Paper (December 2009), 24 pp., at 16-19; G-
20, Progress Report on the Actions of the London and Washington G-20 Summits (5 September 2009); 
G-20, Progress Report on the Economic and Financial Actions of the London, Washington and 
Pittsburgh G20 Summits (7 November 2009). 
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3. NON-ECONOMIC RATIONALES FOR SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 
This paragraph addresses distinct non-economic reasons explaining subsidization and the 
imposition of countervailing duties. First, consensus is emerging that industrial policy should 
not merely focus on economic growth sensu stricto but on the broader concept of sustainable 
development.  Subsidies related to environmental protection exactly aim at correcting market 
failures inhibiting sustainable development (Section 3.1).  Second, the discussion on 
multifunctionality in agriculture will illustrate that, next to market failures inhibiting 
economic development sensu strictu or sustainable development, markets might also be seen 
as failing to honour non-economic concerns such as landscape preservation or food security 
(Section 3.2).471  Third, in case of subsidization for reasons of redistribution, subsidies do not 
aim at correcting a certain market failure but at changing the market outcome for reasons of 
equity or political stability (Section 3.3).  Fourth, the ‘political-economy’ rationale for 
subsidies and CVDs is fundamentally different from all the previous (non-)economic 
rationales as the assumption that governments aim at maximizing (non-)economic welfare of 
their constituencies is replaced by the assumption that politicians simply aim at maximizing 
their own welfare (Section 3.4).  
 
3.1. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
The international community displays a growing recognition that economic growth can only 
be supported insofar it is sustainable, which ‘implies meeting the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.472  Yet, a variety of 
market failures explains why markets do not generate such a sustainable development 
outcome on their own.  This could be illustrated by two examples.   
First, environmental degradation generated by production or consumption (e.g., greenhouse 
gas emissions) represents a classic example of a negative externality because this 
environmental cost upon society (marginal external cost) is not reflected in the market price, 
which merely reflects marginal costs of production.  As producers (consumers) do not have to 
pay for the marginal external costs, they produce (consume) too much from a socially optimal 
point of view.473  Government intervention is thus warranted in order to this cost to be 
internalized and the market price to reflects the marginal social cost of production474 
(consumption), implying that output levels are reduced.  However, two elements might put 
doubt on whether individual governments’ efforts will reach the socially optimal outcome 
                                                 
471 Another example, not further discussed, is the protection of cultural heritage. 
472 United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (A/RES/42/187, 11 December 1987). 
473 See also M. S. LeClair and D. Franceschi, ‘Externalities in International Trade: The Case for 
Differential Tariffs’, 58 Ecological Economics (2006), 462– 472. 
474 Marginal cost of production plus the marginal external cost.   
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implementing such ‘polluter pays’ principle.  First, in case negative externalities are 
international in nature (e.g., climate change), individual governments’ incentives to correct 
such market failure might be too low from a global perspective, as part of the marginal 
external cost falls on others.475  Second, if the ‘polluter pays principle’ is introduced in some 
countries but not in others, this might hamper the competitiveness of those producers 
subjected to such principle and undermine the effectiveness of environmental protection, as 
those producers might simply choose to relocate to countries with weaker environmental 
policies (‘carbon leakage’).476  Tackling these free rider problems in an optimal way requires 
international cooperation (e.g., Kyoto Protocol).477  Insofar such cooperation has not 
equalized environmental protection among countries (e.g., no internationally agreed price on 
carbon478 reflected by the non-universal acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol), both concerns 
remain and present the question to what extent WTO disciplines allow individual countries to 
correct, at the import as well as at the export side, the negative impact on their producers’ 
competitive position so as to prevent carbon leakage.479   
Second, production (or consumption) of certain goods or services might generate positive 
externalities (e.g., ‘green technology’), whereby the positive external benefits on society are 
not appropriated by producers making the investment.480  Accordingly, such positive 
externality leads to underinvestment in the production in question (e.g., solar energy 
technology481) and government intervention is again needed.482  The socially optimal level of 
                                                 
475 A. V. Deardoff, ‘International Conflict and Coordination in Environmental Policies’, in J. S. 
Bhandari and A. O. Sykes (eds), Economic Dimensions in International Law – Comparative and 
Empirical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 248-274, at 256-257. 
476 WTO – UNEP Report, Trade and Climate Change (Geneva: WTO Publications, 2009), 166 pp., at 
98.  Van Calster has suggested that such reallocation might not only neutralize but even worsen 
environmental protection as firms would reallocate to countries with less stringent environmental 
standards overall.  See G. Van Calster, International & EU Trade Law – The Environmental Challenge 
(London: Cameron May, 2000), 564 pp., at 421. 
477 Multilateral efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are listed in the WTO – UNEP Report, 
above n 476, at 68-83. 
478 WTO – UNEP Report, above n 476, at 98. 
479  In the WTO – UNEP Report, competitiveness is defined as the ‘ability to maintain profits and 
market shares’.  WTO – UNEP Report, above n 476, at 98.  Aichele and Felbermayr have found that 
the non-universal acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol has, on average, led to substantive carbon leakage.  
See R. Aichele and G. Felbermayr, ‘Kyoto and the Carbon Content of Trade’, FZID Discussion Paper 
No. 10-2010 (2010), 63 pp. 
480 The benefit (positive impact on climate change) has public good characteristics as it is non-rival in 
consumption and non-excludable.  On the other hand, such subsidization would not be needed in case 
the negative externality caused by environment-unfriendly products would be fully internalized. 
481 Interestingly, the 2006 World Trade Report gives the example of solar energy technologies, which is 
actually one of the fields in which companies of different countries (e.g., Germany, China, and US) are 
fiercely competing for market shares and whereby those governments actively intervene by different 
forms of subsidization.   
482 This argument for government intervention does not rest on the social external benefit in the form of 
knowledge that can be appropriated by others, but in the form of positive effects on the environment.  
Subsidies for R&D on environmentally green technologies might thus be legitimized on double 
grounds.      
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output is higher than the free market level.483  Here, the question arises to what extent 
government incentives to spur output levels are restricted under the SCM Agreement.  In 
principle, individual governments would underinvest in such promotion in case positive 
externalities are international in nature.    
In sum, both market failures legitimate a corrective role for governments, who should opt for 
those instruments (e.g., taxes, subsidies, standards, and technical regulations) targeting the 
market failure as directly as possible (targeting principle).  The debate on climate change 
could serve as a topical example of how governments have in practice developed such 
instruments with regard to an international externality.  The 2009 WTO – UNEP Report has 
grouped these interventions into three categories.   
First, governments have developed price and market mechanisms to internalize the 
environmental costs of greenhouse gas emissions (negative externality).  For example, a 
‘carbon tax’, which is a tax based on CO2 emissions, is levied by several countries on the use 
of fossil fuels and is often directly levied on consumption (tax ‘at the pump’).484  In theory, an 
optimal carbon tax would implement the ‘polluter pays principle’ and thus be set at a level 
that internalizes the marginal external cost on the environment (so-called ‘Pigouvian tax’), 
which corresponds to a socially optimal level of pollution.485  Taxing production levels of 
CO2-intensive industries instead of directly taxing CO2 emissions would only be a second-
best solution as it is less targeted on the source of the distortion.  Compared to taxing CO2 
emission, subsidizing CO2 emission reductions would equally reduce firms’ emission levels 
but is in the long run inferior as well, as it could induce firms to enter the market, thus lead to 
more pollution overall, and does not correspond with the ‘polluter pays principle’ 486  Similar 
to a carbon tax, emission trading schemes could also ensure that emission reductions will be 
                                                 
483 World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 99-100.  Next to these two examples, the report also points 
to public goods characteristics of certain environmental resources.  For example, fish stocks or woods 
are so-called ‘impure’ public goods or ‘common property resources’ (as these are non-excludable but 
rival in consumption), which lead to free rider problems as individuals acting in their self-interest have 
the incentive to capture the limited available resources as quickly as possible before someone else 
captures them.  Individuals do not calculate the cost their actions have on society (social external cost), 
namely how they reduce the overall stock of resources (negative externality).  Hence, over-exploitation 
will be the result if no restrictions (e.g., regulation, government ownership, single ownership) 
preventing such a so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’ are installed.  Another market failure is 
asymmetric information between consumers and producers about the quality of the good or the 
environmental standards used in the production process.  See also Pindyck and Rubinfeld, above n 86, 
at 642-643. 
484 Although I use it as a synonym for a ‘carbon tax’, an ‘energy tax’ is in fact a broader concept as it is 
based on the energy content of energy sources and could thus also be imposed on carbon-free energy 
sources.  WTO – UNEP Report, above n 476, at 90-91. 
485 WTO – UNEP Report, above n 476, at 96; World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 100. 
486 The ‘polluter pays principle’ holds that environmental resources are publicly owned and that those 
who damage such resources should pay for it.  World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 100-101.   
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achieved in an efficient way.487  Such cap-and-trade schemes ‘(i) fix a cap on total emissions, 
(ii) translate this cap into ‘allowed emission’ or allowances to cover emissions, and (iii) create 
a market in which these allowances can be auctioned and/or traded, at a price set by the 
market (i.e., tradable allowance system)’.488   
Second, governments have developed financial mechanisms to promote the development and 
deployment of climate-friendly goods and technologies.  Next to the positive environment 
externality generated by such goods and technologies, the WTO – UNEP Report lists a 
number of other market failures (e.g., positive R&D externality) legitimizing such 
governmental funding.489  Such measures include for example subsidies (e.g., grants or fiscal 
measures) for (i) R&D of greenhouse gas emission-reducing technologies or renewing energy 
technologies, (ii) offsetting the cost of installing emission-reducing technologies, or (iii) using 
climate-friendly inputs.  Development and deployment could therefore be stimulated at the 
production as well as at the consumption side.   
Third, governments have installed technical requirements (in the form of mandatory technical 
regulations or voluntary standards) for products as well as for production methods which 
generally aim at improving their energy efficiency and reduce their emission levels during 
consumption or processing.490.  In fact, such requirements are an alternative way to internalize 
negative or positive environmental externalities generated by the production or consumption 
of goods or technologies.491   
In Part IV, the analysis will address to what extent the WTO Agreements, and in particular 
the SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture, offer policy space for governments 
to implement these three types of measures as well as to counteract against failure of third 
countries to internalize negative externalities.492     
 
3.2. MULTIFUNCTIONALITY IN AGRICULTURE 
The concept of ‘multifunctionality’ in the context of agriculture reflects the idea that 
agriculture has many functions in addition to producing commodities, such as environmental 
                                                 
487 In case of a carbon tax, the price on greenhouse gas emissions is set by the government, while the 
quantity of emission reductions is determined by the industry.  In case of emission trading schemes, the 
quantity of emission reductions is set by the government, while the price is determined by the market.  
Depending on whether price certainty is more important than quantity certainty, a carbon tax system 
might be superior to an emission trading system.  WTO – UNEP Report, above n 476, at 97-98. 
488 WTO – UNEP Report, above n 476, at 91. 
489 For example, companies investing in such technologies may not be successful in convincing private 
investors because they may be unable to demonstrate the environmental effectiveness of their product 
until it has been brought into use on a large scale.  WTO – UNEP Report, above n 476, at 110-111.  Of 
course, the latter rationale assumes a failure in the capital market.   
490 WTO – UNEP Report, above n 476, at 117.      
491 They could also be legitimized on the basis of asymmetric information between producers and 
consumers.  On the effectiveness of such regulations and standards, see WTO – UNEP Report, above n 
476, at 123-124.    
492 See below Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.2. 
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protection, landscape preservation, rural employment, and food security (non-commodity 
outputs).493  Domestic production is considered to generate positive externalities in the form 
of non-economic societal benefits which a society deems appropriate to protect.  Some of 
these so-called ‘non-trade concerns’ or non-commodity outputs are explicitly recognized in 
the preamble of the Agriculture Agreement (i.e., food security and environmental protection) 
as well as in the Doha Ministerial Declaration.494  As OECD studies have demonstrated, the 
assumptions needed for legitimizing government intervention are that these other functions 
(non-commodity outputs) reflect external benefits from commodity production, for which no 
functioning private market exists (market failure in non-commodity production because of 
public goods characteristics) and for which domestic commodity production is needed 
(jointness of production).495  For example, a rural landscape has public goods characteristics 
(non-rival in consumption and non-excludable) for which domestic production of 
commodities might be required.  Because domestic farmers are not compensated for this 
external benefit as it is not reflected in the market price, payments to farmers could be 
appropriate.  Importantly, the case for stimulating domestic production thus hinges on the 
premises that a rural landscape is considered by a society as an external benefit not delivered 
by the market and that domestic production is needed to this end: a rural (or equally 
satisfying) landscape could not be obtained in another, more efficient way. If both conditions 
are fulfilled, the most efficient government intervention depends on the nature of jointness 
and the nature of the specific public goods characteristics of the non-commodity output.  For 
instance, a production or output subsidy would not be sufficiently targeted in the likely case 
that non-commodity outputs are not directly linked to the level of production, but for example 
to the amount of land (e.g., rural landscape).496  If so, area payments conditional on the 
delivery of the non-commodity output would be more appropriate.  The OECD only considers 
output or production subsidies recommendable when a direct or fixed link is present between 
non-commodity output and production intensity at farm level.497  Thus, the pivotal question 
                                                 
493 WTO Secretariat, Glossary of Terms.  In broader terms, ‘multifunctionality’ refers ‘to the fact that 
an economic activity may have multiple outputs and, by virtue of this, may contribute to several 
societal objectives at once’.  OECD, Multifunctionality, Towards an Analytical Framework (Paris: 
OECD, 2001), 159 pp., at 11. 
494 To be precise, the preamble of the Agriculture Agreement does not explicitly link food security and 
environmental protection to the need for domestic production.  Article 20 of the Agriculture Agreement 
also indicates that non-trade concerns should be taken into account in the reform process.  See also 
WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001), para 13.  
495 Even in case those assumptions are fulfilled, government intervention might not always be the most 
efficient strategy.  Non-governmental options such as facilitating market creation or voluntary 
provision might be preferable.  OECD, above n 493, at 23.   
496 Output subsidies ‘to sustain this minimum level of commodity production would generally be 
inefficient since they are likely to stimulate the production intensity above this minimum level’.  
OECD, Multifunctionality, The Policy Implications (Paris: OECD, 2003), 106 pp., at 43. 
497 OECD, Multifunctionality, The Policy Implications (Paris: OECD, 2003), 106 pp., at 44. 
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seems whether production or output subsidies respect the targeting principle for correcting 
market failures. 
The OECD studies further indicate that the inclusion of some non-commodity outputs in the 
debate on ‘multifunctionality’ of agriculture is contested.  For example, ‘rural employment’ is 
an input and not a non-commodity output of agriculture.  Yet, it could have consequences on 
societies that could be labelled as positive externalities (e.g., slowing the migration from rural 
to urban areas).  Again, the pivotal question is whether such regional employment is a joint 
product of rural production and could not be reached in a more efficient way.498  The 
inclusion of ‘food security’ is equally disputed in this framework because it assumes that 
domestic production secures and not hampers food security.499  The premise is that domestic 
production reduces the probability of food shortage caused by disruption in imports (resulting 
from e.g., wars, embargoes, price shocks, or natural disasters).  This contribution to food 
security, which is non-excludable in consumption, is however not reflected in the market 
price and this positive externality generated by domestic production therefore legitimizes 
subsidization.  But the jointness of production could once more be questioned as domestic 
production not necessarily generates food security, nor might it be the most efficient way to 
do so.500,501  Likewise, it could be argued that maintaining domestic production by 
subsidization could even generate negative externalities related to food security as it could 
reduce diversification of imports and innovation.  Therefore, the net contribution of domestic 
production to food security is an empirical question.502   
The major disagreement among WTO Members in essence concerns the existence and the 
nature of jointness of production of commodity and non-commodity outputs.  On the one 
hand, several developed WTO Members (e.g., Japan, Korea, Norway, Switzerland, and the 
EC) rely on the multifunctionality argument to underpin their plea for policy space domestic 
support linked to production (e.g., amber and blue box support).503  In their view, such 
production-stimulating support is needed in their view to grasp the non-trade benefits.  On the 
                                                 
498 OECD, above n 493, at 74-75. 
499 According to the 1996 World Food Summit, food security is obtained ‘when all people, at all times, 
have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs 
and food preferences for an active and healthy life’. FAO, World Food Summit - Plan of Action (WFS 
96/3, November 1996); see also Schwartz and Harper, above n 279, at 846. 
500 For example; the 2006 World Trade Report considers that holding stocks and trading with a 
diversity of suppliers probably is a more efficient strategy than subsidizing domestic production.  
World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 104; see also World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2008, 
above n 253, at 124-125. 
501 Other elements explaining why it does not properly fit with other non-trade concerns is that food 
security is not a non-food item and that it is doubtful whether it has public good characteristics because 
a functioning market exists.  D. Vanzetti and E. Wynen, ‘The “Multifunctionality” of Agriculture and 
its Implications for Policy’, in Merlinda D. Ingco, John D. Nash (eds), Agriculture and the WTO: 
creating a Trading System for Development (Washington DC: World Bank, 2004), 387 pp., 167-177, at 
174-175.   
502 OECD, above n 493, at 47-48, 74. 
503 Vanzetti and Wynen, above n 501, at 168.  See below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2. 
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other hand, WTO Members such as the US and Australia have questioned the link between 
commodity production levels and the achievement of non-trade concerns.504  For instance, 
flood mitigation is articulated by the Japanese government as a justification for subsidies to 
paddy rice production. But opponents have argued that other methods (e.g., dams) might be 
equally effective without stimulating agricultural production.505   
 
3.3. REDISTRIBUTION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Subsidies are regularly used as governmental instruments to redistribute income among 
regions as this is seen as imperative not only from an equity point of view but equally to 
lower potential social or political tensions between regions.506  Such in-country disparities in 
income levels might be the result of differences in resources (e.g., natural resource) between 
regions. Alternatively, the mere presence of external economies of scale could explain why 
production might cluster in some regions and not in others.  Whereas from an economic 
viewpoint governments might rather opt for stimulating further clustering, they could choose 
for subsidizing production in backward regions for redistributive reasons.  Thus, subsidies on 
these latter grounds do not aim at correcting a certain market failure, but at altering the market 
outcome.507  Redistribution is preferably reached through domestic subsidies rather than 
through export subsidies and/or import duties, as the latter two options negatively affect 
domestic consumers.508  Still, under the assumption of complete and perfectly competitive 
markets, such subsidies stimulating production in backward regions might not be first-best 
instruments to achieve redistribution.509  Indeed, redistribution of income could in principle be 
better obtained by using so-called lump-sum taxes and transfers, which by definition do not 
affect the efficient allocation of resources (no deadweight losses).   In that case, income 
would simply be transferred from inhabitants of advanced regions to backward regions 
through a system of direct taxes on high incomes and transfers (i.e., not conditioned on any 
use) to low incomes.510  Of course, transfers are not costless as they could have an adverse 
effect on incentives and incur an administrative cost.511  Moreover, if regional labor 
distribution generates external benefits that are not reflected in wages (e.g., reducing 
                                                 
504 They observe how the multifunctionality argument is supported by those countries having the 
largest amount of production supporting domestic support, which might suggest that these non-trade 
concerns are simply used as pretext for legitimizing protection.  For an overview of the different 
positions and arguments, see Vanzetti and Wynen, above n 501, at 168. 
505 Vanzetti and Wynen, above n 501, at 168. 
506 Different reasons explaining why societies redistribute income are listed in World Trade Report 
2006, above n 9, at 89-90 and 95. 
507 World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 107. 
508 Meade, above n 31, at 314. 
509 IMF, Fuel and Food Price Subsidies: Issues and Reform Options (Washington DC: IMF, 
September, 2008), 55 pp., at 35.   
510 For instance, this was already described by Meade, above n 31, at 314. 
511 World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 90. 
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congestion in cities), stimulating employment (wage subsidy) or production in backward 
regions could become appropriate.512      
 
3.4. POLITICAL ECONOMY  
The political-economy or public choice literature does not start from the assumption that 
decision-makers aim at maximizing economic (or non-economic) welfare of their 
constituencies but instead assumes that politicians aim at maximizing their own welfare (self-
interest), which is often modeled in terms of maximizing their chances on (re-)election.  The 
outcome of the decision-making process, for example on offering subsidies or imposing 
CVDs, thus depends on its effect in the political ‘marketplace’.513  In the standard model, this 
‘marketplace’ is constructed as a democracy, in which politicians have to obtain the support 
of the majority to be elected.  Under simple majority voting, the outcome of a decision 
depends on whether it has a positive or negative effect on the median voter.  Subsidies benefit 
its recipients, while other voters merely bear a cost in the form of taxes raised to pay for the 
subsidy.  Here, a subsidy would only be offered if the median voter is one of those 
beneficiaries.  Hence, this model would predict that sector-specific subsidies are unlikely to 
be offered as only few benefit.514  Similarly, the imposition of CVDs or any other tariff would 
be improbable, because only a limited group of import-competing producers generally 
benefits at the expense of a large group of consumers.  In reality, however, the opposite 
situation seems to happen more frequently: the more benefits are concentrated and the more 
costs are diffused, the more likely that promotion or protection is given. This insight was 
offered and modeled by Olson who explained the conditions for the emergence of ‘special 
interest groups’.  Promotion (e.g., subsidies) or protection (e.g., CVDs) might offer large 
individual gains to individual producers, and thus give these beneficiaries an incentive to 
lobby for such an outcome.  Their relatively small number also makes it easy to efficiently 
organize theirselves so as to overcome free rider problems and collectively lobby for 
influence.515  These ‘special interest groups’ thus manage to devote time and resources (e.g., 
campaign contributions) to influence the decision-making process in a way that makes them 
better off. Complementary, politicians are willing to accept their contributions and thus take 
their interests into account, as it improves their chances on re-election.516  On the other hand, 
the costs of subsidies and CVDs on respectively taxpayers and consumers are highly diffuse, 
                                                 
512 Here again, a market failure would be present, which could be targeted directly by a wage subsidy. 
513 Sykes, above n 137, at 275. 
514 World Trade Report 2006, above n 9, at 64. 
515 The incentive upon each individual firm might already be sufficient to lobby for influence.  Hence, 
free-rider problems are unlikely to impede lobbying efforts.  Sykes, above n 137, at 275. 
516 Because self-interest is often modelled as maximizing the chances on (re-)election, the contributions 
made by special interest groups are often assumed to take the form of campaign contributions.  
Likewise, these contributions could simply be seen as enriching the decision-makers in question.   
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implying that each individual has not much to gain if those measures are not adopted and that 
organizing themselves to this end is much more difficult (e.g., free rider problem).   
Grossman and Helpman constructed a formal model517 in which (i) ‘special interest groups’ 
offer campaign contributions to politicians running for re-election so as to influence their 
choice of trade policy (e.g., tariffs and export subsidies) and (ii) politicians aim at maximizing 
their chances on re-election (self-interest), which depends on the amount of such 
contributions as well as on the overall economic welfare generated by their trade policy.518  
Under the small country hypothesis, free trade would maximize overall welfare.  Yet, because 
campaign contributions also influence politicians’ behavior, the equilibrium in the Grossman 
and Helpman model deviates from this welfare optimum: tariffs and export subsidies are 
offered to all sectors that are organized as special interest groups, implying higher prices on 
those products in the domestic market than under the free trade situation.519   
Two interesting extensions of the model are further presented.  First, different special interest 
groups might have opposite interests as producers.  In particular, downstream producers who 
use intermediate inputs are very often organized as a special interest group and would oppose 
to any import barrier or export promotion on this product as it pushes the price upwards.  
Facing opposition of downstream producers, producers of intermediate goods are less likely 
to be rewarded with import protection or export promotion than producers of final goods.  
Second, the introduction of a large country assumption not only alters the (unilateral) 
equilibrium of the country in question but could also result in cooperation (trade negotiations) 
with third countries, because this trade policy has an impact on those third countries.  Under 
the non-cooperative equilibrium (‘trade war’), producers are more likely to get tariff 
protection (e.g., CVDs) but are less likely to receive export subsidies than under the small 
country hypothesis, given large countries’ overall welfare could be maximized by imposing 
an optimal tariff and/or export tax.520  Grossman and Helpman show why politicians 
                                                 
517 G. M. Grossman and E. Helpman, ‘Protection for Sale’, 84:4 The American Economic Review 
(September, 1994), 833-850. A detailed example of such political-economy forces is given by Gardner 
in an article explaining the rationale for export subsidies for wheat production in the US (1985-1993).  
B. L. Gardner, The Political Economy of US Export Subsidies for Wheat’, in A. O. Krueger, The 
Political Economy of American Trade Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 291-
331. 
518 To be clear, politicians’ (potential) concern for overall welfare thus only arises because of self-
interest as it might increase their chances on re-election.  
519 In the equilibrium, the joint welfare of politicians (which is a function of campaign contributions 
and overall welfare) and special interest groups is maximized.  Obviously, the smaller the weight given 
to overall welfare by politicians, the larger the levels of tariffs and export subsidies.  Grossman and 
Helpman, above n 517, at 833-850. 
520 The ‘concern’ for overall welfare pushes the government towards an export tax, whereas export 
industries bid for export subsidies.  Hence, the equilibrium might be either an export tax or an export 
subsidy (or free trade).  Compared to the small country situation, export industries bidding for export 
subsidies not only compete with other producers who have an opposite interest (e.g., downstream 
producers) but also face opposition of the negative effect on overall welfare.    
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motivated by self-interest would nonetheless gain from concluding a trade agreement (‘trade 
talk’).521,522     
In sum, the political-economy literature explains why countries would be willing to offer 
subsidies or CVDs, even though this would not benefit their overall welfare.  Subsidies are 
hereby not offered to correct market failures, and thus to improve overall welfare, but because 
its beneficiaries (i.e., special interest groups) are successful in lobbying.  In political-economy 
terms, an export subsidy may very well be perceived as a gain to an exporting country (e.g., 
rewarded by exporters) and a cost to an importing country (e.g., harm to import-competing 
industries).  Here, a ‘government failure’ is present, not because the government lacks the 
administrative capacity or information to efficiently correct market failures, but because it is 
captured by special interest groups.523  Similarly, CVDs, as mostly welfare-reducing 
instruments from the perspective of overall welfare, are imposed on demand of the small 
group of producers that hurt by subsidized imports.524,525   
Importantly, political-economy reasons might thus help explain why subsidies and CVDs are 
installed (positive theory) as well as regulated but, contrary to economic theory, do not offer 
an argument why they should be supported (normative theory).526  To the contrary, if 
governments are mainly driven by political-economy reasons when offering subsidies and 
                                                 
521 Compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium, politicians’ benefits that result from concluding an 
agreement flow from the extra market access generated in third countries and from the reduction in 
government support for foreign firms competing in the import market for which they will be rewarded 
by export industries and import-competing industries respectively. G. M. Grossman and E. Helpman, 
‘Trade Wars and Trade Talks’, NBER Working Paper Series No 4280 (February, 1993), 40 pp.  
522 Next to political-economy motivations, Ethier criticizes this model because it incorporates terms of 
trade motivations on the part of the government.  The central premise of the ‘Received Theory’ 
elaborated in this model (as also adopted by Bagwell and Staiger) is that trade agreements are 
concluded because, at least to some degree, governments are concerned with terms of trade 
considerations.  According to Ethier, such models, however, do not correspond with reality.  For 
example, the Grossman and Helpman model would suggest that, under certain conditions (see above n 
520), countries would impose an export tax to manipulate terms of trade (non-cooperative equilibrium).  
This model would thus predict that countries would multilaterally agree to limit such terms of trade 
manipulations (cooperative equilibrium).  In reality, however, countries almost never impose export 
taxes (and certainly not for terms of trade reasons).  Moreover, these taxes are in principle not restricted 
under the WTO unless these are bound in a Member’s Schedule.  As Ethier argues, the Grossman and 
Helpman model only fits with reality if political-economy motivations completely dominate terms of 
trade motivations.  See W. J. Ethier, ‘The Theory of Trade Policy and Trade Agreements: A Critique’, 
23 European Journal of Political Economy (2007), 605-623.  
523 A variant is that governments do aim at maximizing global welfare but to this end have to rely on 
special interest groups for information and thus anyway fail to reach the welfare optimum.  Baylis, 
above n 44, at 351-352.   
524 The fact that CVDs react against actions of foreign governments (i.e., subsidization) might partly 
explain why anti-dumping duties (reacting against behaviour of foreign firms) are nonetheless more 
popular.  World Trade Report 2009, above n 44, at xx.   
525 The political-economy rationale for CVDs could be linked to the ‘entitlement model’ insofar the 
latter is used as a positive theory (see below Part IV, Chapter 4).   
526 See also W. J. Ethier and A. L. Hillman, ‘Introduction’, in W. J. Ethier and A. L. Hillman (eds), The 
WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy – Part I (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 599 pp., 
xi-xviii, at xiii.  
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CVDs, international disciplines restricting their use and thus ‘tying the hands of governments’ 
would likely be welfare-improving.            
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INTRODUCTION 
The legal analysis on the multilateral disciplines on subsidies affecting trade in goods is 
structured around six chapters.  After an overview of the legal and historical context (Chapter 
1), the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement is clarified (Chapter 2) and the various 
aspects of the definition of a specific subsidy included in the SCM Agreement are explained 
(Chapter 3).  When a specific subsidy is deemed to exist under the SCM Agreement, a traffic 
light metaphor can be used to categorize subsidies (Chapter 4).  Some types of subsidies are 
prohibited (red light), whereas all other specific subsidies are allowed as long as they do not 
cause adverse effects to other WTO Members (amber light).  At present, no type of subsidy 
gets ipso facto the green light under the SCM Agreement.  Later in this part, the way WTO 
Members may respond to subsidies provided by other WTO Members is explored (Chapter 5).  
WTO Members can challenge red light and amber light subsidies before the WTO-
adjudicating bodies (multilateral remedy), or in case subsidized imports cause injury to their 
domestic industry, they can alternatively opt for the imposition of CVDs (unilateral remedy).  
However, not all WTO Members and types of subsidies are treated equally.  Indeed, in the 
final chapter of this Part (Chapter 6), the special and differential treatment provided to 
developing countries is studied before the focus is shifted to the different treatment of 
agricultural subsidies under the Agreement on Agriculture. 
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1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
This general historical overview serves a double purpose.  First, tracing back the origins of 
the current disciplines is meaningful not only for interpreting their specific meaning but also 
for grasping the basic structure of the SCM Agreement and Agreement on Agriculture.  
Second, this overview aims at giving an insight in the reasons why countries have agreed to 
gradually strengthen multilateral disciplines on subsidization and the imposition of 
countervailing measures, which is important for understanding the dynamism of current and 
future negotiations in this domain.   
 
1.1. GATT 1947 
Already during World War II, it was broadly recognized that enhanced international 
economic cooperation was needed to prevent beggar-thy-neighbour policies, such as 
competitive devaluations, import restrictions, and export subsidies, that had plunged 
international trade and turned the international economy into the Great Depression (1930s), 
contributing to the circumstances leading to World War II.527  Next to the IMF and World 
Bank528, resulting from the Bretton Woods Conference (1944), an International Trade 
Organization (ITO) had to become the third pillar of this international economic 
architecture.529  The US, as main driving force to set up this third pillar, introduced the text 
which served as the basis for the ITO negotiations (1946-1948),530 though its Suggested 
Charter had de facto been drafted in close cooperation with the UK.  Regarding subsidies, 
both countries had defended ‘diametrically opposed’531 views: the US wished to phase out 
domestic (agriculture) subsidies but preserve export subsidies, whereas the UK pushed for the 
opposite.  As a compromise somewhat more in line with the UK’s position,532 the Suggested 
                                                 
527 According to some economists like Krugman, World War II not only indirectly resulted from the 
economic recession but, at the same time, also halted the recession in the US by generating massive 
government spending, though this interpretation has also been challenged.  See P. Krugman, The 
Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 
207 pp., at 71.  For an overview of this discussion, see A. Spilimbergo, S. Symansky, O. Blanchard, 
and C. Cottarelli, ‘Fiscal Policy for the Crisis’, IMF Staff Position Note (29 December 2008), 37 pp., at 
23. 
528 More precisely, one pillar of the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, was set up.   
529 Irwin, Mavroidis and Sykes nuance that there is little evidence that the ITO was supposed to become 
an equal partner but agree that all three institutions at least shared the same goal to help promote 
international economic cooperation.  D. A. Irwin, P. C. Mavroidis, and A. O. Sykes, The Genesis of 
GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 314 pp., at 99. 
530 In full: Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization of the United Nations (September 
1946). 
531 Irwin, Mavroidis, and Sykes, above n 529, at 70. 
532 According to one British negotiator, the Americans ‘quarreled so much among themselves (State 
Department versus Agriculture Department) that by invoking one or other of the antagonists, it was 
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Charter stipulated next to procedural requirements on all trade affecting subsidies also a 
prohibition on export subsidies (over a three year period), except under circumstances of 
burdensome world surplus in a product.533  Such bifurcation between disciplines on domestic 
and export subsidies appeared pivotal to other countries during the ITO negotiations because 
export subsidies were considered more likely to distort trade (as the Great Depression had 
demonstrated534) and the flexibility on domestic subsidies preserved their role as a tool to spur 
industrialization, though developing countries already underlined that in practice it was only 
an affordable tool to richer countries.535  In the end, the Havana Charter disciplined subsidies 
largely along the same lines as initially suggested by the US and UK:536 all trade affecting 
subsidies had to be notified and their limitation discussed if causing serious prejudice to other 
Members and export subsidies were prohibited (over a two year period),537 with exception of 
export subsidies on primary commodities, which were in essence only prohibited if leading to 
a ‘more than equitable share of world trade’.538  However, due to the non-approval of the 
Havana Charter by the US Senate, the Havana Charter and by consequence the ITO never saw 
the light of day and only the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947 or GATT) 
came into force.539  Because negotiated tariff schedules could not easily be postponed until 
final approval on ITO, it had indeed been decided in the course of the ITO negotiations to 
detach and already provisionally apply the core disciplines on tariff reductions in a separate 
document, the GATT.  Yet, even though some countries had favoured their inclusion540, the 
                                                                                                                                            
always possible to have a majority for our views’.  As cited in Irwin, Mavroidis, and Sykes, above n 
529, at 70, footnote 90. 
533 Although the carve out did not explicitly single out primary products, these were intended to be 
prime candidates to be in surplus.  If cooperation among Members to deal with surpluses (e.g., by 
signing inter-governmental commodity agreements) failed, export subsidies could be offered provided 
that previous market shares were respected (Article 25 of the Suggested Charter). 
534 R. E. Baldwin, ‘Imposing Multilateral Discipline on Administered Protection’, in A. O. Krueger 
(ed), The WTO as an International Organization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
297-327, at 86. 
535 London Draft (E/PC/T/33), at 8, 16, 17, 32.  The US State Department had reported the same 
observation when discussing a draft of its Suggested Charter with developing countries: 
‘These countries, deeply concerned with the problem of industrialization and full employment, 
want to use restrictive measures to protect their infant industries. In general, they remain 
unimpressed with our contention that subsidies offer the least objectionable method for this 
purpose. They point out that, while tariffs and subsidies both amount to charges on their 
economies, the very real difficulties in raising the revenue to pay subsidies make the latter 
impractical for them’. 
As cited in Irwin, Mavroidis, and Sykes, above n 529, at 76, 104-105.   
536 For a detailed comparison, see Note by the Secretariat (AG/W/4, 12 September 1983), at 4-16. 
537 Articles 25, 26 of the Havana Charter. 
538 This follows from a combined reading of Articles 26, 27:3, and 28:1 of the Havana Charter.  See 
also above n 533. 
539 GATT 1947 came into effect on 1 January 1948 by virtue of the Protocol on Provisional 
Application.   
540 Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and China. Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment (E/PC/T/TAC/PV/11, 5 September 1947), at 13-18; Report of 
Working Party No. 3 on Modifications to the General Agreement (GATT/CP.2/22, 27 August 1948). 
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substantive disciplines on export subsidies were, for several reasons, not transferred to the 
GATT.541  First, export subsidy disciplines, which related to export treatment, did not fit into 
the GATT’s focus on import treatment.542  In the words of the US representative, export 
subsidy disciplines ‘got into the realms of competition between countries in markets of a third 
country’, an area not covered by the GATT.543  Second, the US executive branch did not have 
the mandate to agree upon the GATT without approval of Congress if a prohibition on export 
subsidies was also inscribed.544  Third, inclusion in the GATT was considered not highly 
relevant as it was foreseen that the substantive disciplines on export subsidies would anyway 
enter into force together with the ITO.545  On the other hand, the US successfully suggested 
including the procedural disciplines on trade affecting subsidies into the GATT as it 
recognized that domestic subsidies could have a limiting effect on imports and thus erode 
tariff concessions.546   
                                                 
541 But, in light of Article XXIX of the GATT, the Contracting Parties undertook to apply the principles 
of the Havana Charter relating to export subsidies to the full extent of their executive authority (Report 
of Working Party No. 3 on Modifications to the General Agreement (GATT/CP.2/22, 27 August 1948), 
at 4). 
542 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment (E/PC/T/TAC/PV/11, 5 September 1949), at 13.  Irwin, Mavroidis, and Sykes argued that, 
given that the GATT aimed at giving effect to tariff concessions, it was only required to ensure that 
subsidies could not circumvent tariff reductions, which was dealt with under the non-violation 
complaint (see below), and not to prohibit export subsidies as well (Irwin, Mavroidis, and Sykes, above 
n 529, at 113).  Although their reasoning somewhat resembles the argument made in the body text, the 
motivation to exclude the prohibition on export subsidies from the GATT seemed not that a prohibition 
would be too far reaching to preserve tariff concessions but that substantive disciplines on export 
subsidies simply did not fit in the GATT scope as the latter dealt with the import realm.  A non-
violation complaint under Article XXIII of the GATT is useful to discipline tariff concession eroding 
domestic subsidies but not export subsidies as their effect occurs in third countries (see also below Part 
IV, Chapter 2).  See also G. C. Hufbauer, J. S. Erb, Subsidies in International Trade (Washington DC: 
Institute for International Economics, 1984), 283 pp., at 33; R. E. Hudec, ‘Regulation of Domestic 
Subsidies Under the MTN Subsidies Code’, in D. Wallace, F. J. Loftus and V. Z. Krikorian (eds), 
Interface Three: Legal Treatment of Domestic Subsidies (Washington DC: The International Law 
Institute, 1984), 1-18. 
543 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment (E/PC/T/TAC/PV/11, 5 September 1947), at 14-15. 
544 Summary Record of Second Meeting (E/PC/T/C.6/46, 6 February 1947), at 2.  See also J.H. Jackson, 
World Trade and the Law of GATT – A Legal Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969), 948 pp., at 44, 370. 
545 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment (E/PC/T/TAC/PV/11, 5 September 1947), at 16-17; Jackson, above n 544, at 370. 
546 Summary Record of Second Meeting (E/PC/T/C.6/46, 6 February 1947), at 2; Second Session of the 
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment 
(E/PC/T/TAC/PV/11, 5 September 1947), at 14.  To be precise, the text of Article XVI of the GATT is 
identical to Article XIV of the New York draft (E/PC/T/C.6/85, 15 February 1947).  On demand of the 
US, this provision was further strengthened during the negotiations on the Havana Charter.  As a result, 
the corresponding provision of the Havana Charter (Article 25) differs from Article XVI:1 of the 
GATT.  Yet, these modifications were not substituted in the GATT 1947 because they were considered 
to be not of a ‘substantial nature’.  Indeed, the working party agreed that the modifications included in 
the Havana Charter could be read into Article XVI: (i) the phrase ‘increased exports’ in Article XVI 
was intended to include the concept of maintaining exports at a level higher than would otherwise exist 
in the absence of the subsidy; (ii) consultation shall proceed upon request of a contracting party when it 
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As a result, the original GATT was very lenient toward subsidies provided by its Contracting 
Parties.  Article XVI of the GATT merely imposed the procedural disciplines to notify 
subsidies that were export stimulating or import reducing and, upon request, to discuss the 
limitation of these subsidies if they caused or threatened to cause serious prejudice to other 
Contracting Parties.547  This should be read together with Article III:8(b) of the GATT, which 
exempts the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers from the national 
treatment discipline.548  On the other hand, other Contracting Parties preserved two options to 
react against such foreign subsidization affecting respectively their import- or export- 
competing industry.549   
First, Contracting Parties whose industry was injured by subsidized imports were allowed to 
‘countervail’, i.e., to impose countervailing duties, up to the amount of the subsidy (Article 
VI:3 of the GATT) but the concept of ‘subsidy’ itself was left undefined.550  This right was 
made subject to the determination by the countervailing country that the subsidy caused (or 
threatened to cause) material injury to its domestic industry.  However, the exact procedural 
and substantive obligations were not spelled out.551  These loose disciplines on CVDs were 
modeled on US laws.552  In a way, the possibility to impose CVDs helped to safeguard tariff 
negotiations as it ensured that Contracting Parties could effectively protect their domestic 
industry up to their bound level without being eroded by foreign subsidization.553   
Second, Contracting Parties could also bring a non-violation complaint (NVC) under Article 
XXIII(b) of the GATT, claiming that subsidization had nullified the benefits of tariff 
concessions (or of other GATT obligations) to their exporters.  Negotiators had indeed been 
aware of the equivalence between a tariff and a production subsidy combined with a 
consumption tax, implying that tariff concessions could be undone by a combination of both 
instruments.554   
However, NVCs, securing negotiated market access in the subsidizing country, as well as 
CVDs, securing ‘fair’ competition in the home country, were ineffective instruments to 
                                                                                                                                            
considers that prejudice is caused or threatened and would not require a prior international 
determination.  See Note by the Secretariat (AG/W/4, 12 September 1983), at 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16. 
547 The original Article XVI was thus limited to paragraph 1 of the current Article XVI of the GATT. 
All Contracting Parties were bound by this obligation.  For an overview of the drafting history of 
Article XVI of the GATT 1994, see Note by the Secretariat (AG/W/4, 12 September 1983). 
548 For the exact scope of this exemption, see below Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1.3. 
549 Moreover, the escape clause in Article XIX of the GATT (later elaborated in the Safeguards 
Agreement) could also be relevant to respond to subsidies resulting in increased imports that cause or 
threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers. See Jackson, above n 544, at 377-378. 
550 See also Article II:2(b) of the GATT.  The UK had thus unsuccessfully advocated during the GATT 
negotiations that all CVDs and anti-dumping duties should be prohibited.  See Committee II - Draft 
report of the technical Sub-Committee. (E/PC/T/C.II/54, 16 November 1946), at 16. 
551 See Articles VI:3, VI:4, VI:5, and VI:6 of the GATT. 
552 For an excellent overview of the evolution in US CVDs law, see Baldwin, above n 534, at 303.        
553 See below Part IV, Chapter 4. 
554 See Irwin, Mavroidis, and Sykes, above n 529, at 172.  See above Part I, Chapter 1. 
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protect exporters’ interests in third markets.555  If Contracting Parties aimed at securing these 
interests (for whatever reasons, see Part I), they had no other option than to respond by 
(export) subsidizing their exporters.556  Already in the next decade, the potential of such 
destructive subsidy competition would prove to be an important impetus to launch 
negotiations on substantive disciplines on export subsidies in both the GATT and the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC/OECD).   
 
1.2. THE 1954-1955 REVIEW SESSION AND THE 1960 DECLARATION  
During the 1954-1955 Review Session of the GATT, developed countries generally agreed on 
the principle of prohibiting export subsidies, at least for non-primary products.557  Even some 
developing countries such as India did not principally oppose such prohibition (certainly not 
on developed countries558) as they acknowledged that they would never win any export 
subsidy competition with their limited financial resources.559 On the other hand, many 
countries, even several European countries such as France, opposed – but finally gave way to 
– the US’ obstinate position to preserve important leeway for export subsidies on primary 
products.560   
                                                 
555 There was only one limited exception inscribed.  Article VI:6(b) of the GATT 1947 allows a 
country (Country A) to impose CVDs (or anti-dumping duties) on the importation of any product for 
the purpose of offsetting subsidization (or dumping) by another country (Country C) (or anti-dumping) 
which caused injury to an industry of another Contracting Party (Country B) also exporting to the 
importing country (Country A).  However, only a waiver by Contracting Parties could open the door 
for such CVDs protecting trading interests of trading partners.  The 1954-1955 amendment made this 
option somewhat more flexible with regard to CVDs (see below n 562).  This provision offers a limited 
option for countries (in this case, Country A) whose own domestic industry is not injured by subsidized 
imports (e.g., lack of domestic industry) to impose CVDs so as to protect the interests in its territory of 
exporters from a trading partner (in this case, Country B).  Next to the legal hurdle under Article VI:6 
(see also below n 562), the fact that subsidized imports might very likely be welfare improving for this 
importing country (in this case, Country A) explains why this option is not used in practice. 
556 See, for example, the statement of India in Summary Record of the Seventeenth Meeting (SR.9/17, 
23 November 1954), at 17.   
557 For an overview of all different positions, see Note by the Secretariat (AG/W/4, 12 September 
1983), at 17-20.  
558 See below n 571. 
559 This was India’s response to Brazil’s plea for the right (and even duty) to offer export subsidies 
under certain circumstances. See Summary Record of the Twenty-Third Meeting (SR.9/23, 22 
December 1954); Summary Record of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting (SR.9/24, 22 December 1954).     
560 The US even obtained an open-ended waiver in 1955 for its domestic agricultural program.  For the 
US proposal, see Article XVI – Subsidies - Proposed Draft Presented by the United States Delegation 
(W.9/103, 15 December 1994).  The UK’s proposal also included more leeway for primary products 
but less extensive as under the US proposal and, contrary to the US proposal, also included a list of 
‘artificially incentives to exports’ (e.g., export credit guarantees at non-commercial terms), which were 
covered under the prohibition on export subsidies for non-primary goods (Subsidies - Draft Submitted 
by the United Kingdom Delegation as a Basis for Discussion - Article XVI (W.9/104, 16 December 
1954)).  Denmark tabled the most stringent proposal as it suggested to simply ban all export subsidies 
after a transition period (Proposals by the Danish Government (L/273, 9 November 1954)).  See also 
Canadian Proposal for Amendment to Article XVI (W.9/119, 17 December 1954).  For discussions, see 
Summary Record of the Forty-First Meeting (SR.9/41, 15 March 1955); Summary Record of the 
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In the end, Contracting Parties agreed to facilitate challenging domestic subsidies on the basis 
of the NVC561 and, more fundamentally, included the first specific substantive obligations on 
export subsidies in Article XVI GATT. 562  These substantive disciplines introduced in a new 
Section B of Article XVI of the GATT were largely in line with the subsidy disciplines already 
foreseen in the Havana Charter, though Jackson revealed that the differential treatment of 
primary products had even become stronger.563   
Regarding primary products,564 paragraph 3 of Article XVI GATT only provided for an 
obligation to ‘seek to avoid’ the use of export subsidies and, if Contracting Parties did grant a 
subsidy that had the effect of increasing exports, it was made subject to a highly ambiguous 
trade effect test insisted upon by the US:565 it could not be used in a way that resulted in ‘more 
than an equitable share of world export trade in that product’.566 
                                                                                                                                            
Twenty-Fourth Meeting (SR.9/24, 22 December 1954); Summary Record of the Twenty-Third Meeting 
(SR.9/23, 22 December 1954); Progress Report by the Chairman of Working Party III (W.9/122, 18 
December 1954); Progress Report of the Chairman of Sub-Group III-A on Subsidies (W.9/102, 15 
December 1954); Summary Record of the Seventeenth Meeting (SR.9/17, 23 November 1954). 
561 It was also observed that Contracting Parties had the option to negotiate on subsidies which might 
affect tariff concessions and to schedule the results of these negotiations.  See Report of Review 
Working Party III on Barriers to Trade other than Restrictions or Tariffs (L/334, 1 March 1955), paras 
13-14. 
562 With regard to CVDs action, paragraph 6 of Article VI was amended.  The meaning of ‘injury’ was 
clarified and the circumstances whereby CVDs may be used when injury is occurring in another 
Contracting Party were expanded (see above n 555).  Interestingly, the latter amendment was initiated 
by New Zealand and Australia because they considered it, at that time, ‘unlikely that very strict rules 
will apply to the use of export subsidies’ (Proposal by Australian and New Zealand Delegations, 
Amendments to Paragraph 6 of Article VI (W.9/214, 21 February 1955); a more far reaching proposal 
by New Zealand was not adopted (see L/270/Add.1, 18 November 1954)).  Whereas under the original 
GATT 1947 Contracting Parties had the discretionary power to decide on such a waiver, Article 
VI:6(b) was amended in a way that Contracting Parties should provide a waiver in case they find 
material injury caused by subsidization (Article VI:(b), second sentence).  Moreover, Article VI:6(c) 
was added, which allows ‘in exceptional circumstances’ the imposition of CVDs without prior approval 
but these have to be withdrawn immediately if Contracting Parties disapprove afterwards.  Yet, Jackson 
observed back in the 1969 that no waiver has ever been requested.  See also Final Report of Sub-Group 
III-A (W.9/220, 22 February 1955), paras 12, 14; Report of Review Working Party III on Barriers to 
Trade other than Restrictions or Tariffs (L/334, 1 March 1955), para 13.  
563 Jackson, above n 544, at 371. 
564 For the purpose of Article XVI of the GATT, primary products are defined as ‘any product of farm, 
forest or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is 
customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade’ (para 2 of 
Ad Article XVI:Section B of the GATT). 
565 See Progress Report of the Chairman of Sub-Group III-A on Subsidies (W.9/102, 15 December 
1954), at 3. 
566 All Contracting Parties that accepted the 1955 amendment to Parts II and III of the GATT were 
subject to this obligation. See Jackson, above n 544, at 376.  Although firmly criticized by other 
countries, the reference to the world market (instead of individual markets) under this equitable market 
share standard was pushed through by the US.  To determine the ‘equitable share’ of a Contracting 
Party, account would be taken of the shares in the product during a previous representative period and 
‘any specific factor’ affecting trade in the product (Article XVI:3 of the GATT).  Yet, on request of 
developing countries, it was clarified that the fact that a Contracting Party had not exported the product 
in question during the previous representative period would not in itself preclude that party from 
establishing its right to obtain a share of the trade in the product concerned (para 1 of Ad Article XVI:3 
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Regarding non-primary products, on the other hand, Contracting Parties had, from 1958 or 
‘the earliest practicable date thereafter’, to cease to grant export subsidies when they resulted 
in a sale at a price for export lower than that for the domestic market (bi-level pricing test) 
(Article XVI:4 of the GATT).567  Only in 1960, Contracting Parties could agree on a 
Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI:4 (1960 Declaration), which 
elaborated a non-exhaustive list of export subsidies on non-primary goods.568  A general 
definition of the term ‘subsidy’ was thus still lacking but an illustrative list of prohibited 
export subsidies was agreed upon.  This list was in fact based on a previous list of prohibited 
‘aids to export’ drafted in the OEEC569, which was transferred to the GATT when the OEEC 
transformed into the OECD in 1960.  This transfer to the GATT was initiated by France so as 
to broaden its application also to non-OECD countries.570  Yet, because of the difference in 
treatment between primary and non-primary goods as well as the wish to preserve policy 
space, all developing countries (except for Zimbabwe) as well as some developed countries 
(e.g., Australia) were unwilling to adopt the 1960 Declaration,571 which was in the end only 
accepted by 17 Contracting Parties.572   
In sum, the 1955 GATT amendment and 1960 Declaration formally introduced three types of 
bifurcation on subsidy disciplines that were already circulating during the GATT/ITO 
                                                                                                                                            
of the GATT). See also the exception for certain price stabilization schemes (para 2 of Ad Article 
XVI:3 of the GATT). 
567 The second sentence of Article XVI:4 of the GATT provided for a standstill obligation until the end 
of 1957. The expectancy was that the Contracting Parties would by that time have agreed to prohibit all 
non-primary export subsidies, but an agreement was only reached in 1960 with the 1960 Declaration, 
which was not accepted by all Contracting Parties.  Therefore, the standstill obligation was extended 
several times (for some Contracting Parties up to the end of 1967).  After 1967, Contracting Parties 
which did not accept the 1960 Declaration were not subject anymore to the standstill obligation.    
568 The 1960 Declaration became effective on 14 November 1962. 
569 Already in 1955, the OEEC, which was founded in 1947 to administer American and Canadian aid 
under the Marshall plan, succeeded to adopt an initial list of prohibited measures that were considered 
artificially aid to exporters and this list was further expanded in 1958.  See also below Part III. 
570 See Action by the Contracting Parties under Article XVI:4 (L/1260, 1 August 1960); Summary record 
of the Third Meeting (SR.17/3, 9 November 1960); Action under Article XVI:4 (W.17/3, 2 November 
1960); Report of the working party on subsidies (L/1381, November 1960); Conference on the 
Reorganization of the O.E.E.C (OECD/P/36, 25 October 1960).       
571 Jackson, above n 544, at 399.  Although recognizing its limited financial resources, India observed 
that a ban would impede export subsidy competition with non-GATT countries and Pakistan was also 
unwilling to accept a prohibition at its stage of development. At the same time, India also recognized 
that a ban on export credit support at non-commercial terms for developed countries would make it 
difficult for less developed countries to import capital goods.  See Summary record of the Third 
Meeting (SR.17/3, 9 November 1960), at 19-2 (see also below Part III).  Hence, India’s statements (see 
above n 559) reveal the ambiguous position of developing countries on export subsidy disciplines upon 
developed countries: their importers are at the losing end, while their exporters benefit.  See also Note 
by the Secretariat on the Meeting of June 1972 (Spec(72)61, 12 July 1972), para 10. 
572  Some of these countries, like the US, accepted this 1960 Declaration with reservations.  A list of all 
17 countries can be found in Note by the Secretariat, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(MTN.GNG/NG10/W/4, 28 April 1987), at 75, footnote 1.  Contracting Parties that did not accept the 
1960 Declaration were thus not subject to the obligation to cease export subsidies on non-primary 
products (Article XVI:4, first sentence of the GATT).   
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negotiations.  First, export subsidies are primarily targeted and only to a lesser extent 
domestic subsidies because the former are more likely to distort trade and the latter are also 
considered more important and legitimate as instruments to correct market failures.  Second, 
as a result of the negotiating power of subsidizing developed countries, disciplines on 
agricultural subsidies573 are also less severe when compared with disciplines on industrial 
subsidies.574  Observe that, already in 1958, the Haberler Report had, nonetheless, come to the 
conclusion that agricultural subsidies and import protection hindered the development of 
developing countries.575  Third, not all countries are subject to the same set of disciplines on 
subsidies as more policy space is given to developing countries to use export and domestic 
subsidies as tools to spur development.  Over the next decades, all three types of asymmetries 
would gradually contract, though they are still present today.   
 
1.3. THE TOKYO ROUND: THE SUBSIDIES CODE  
The Tokyo Round negotiations (1973-1979) focused on the reduction of nontariff barriers to 
trade, such as subsidies.  One of the most important agreements576 emanating from this Round 
was the Subsidies Code, which was a plurilateral agreement, only accepted by 24 countries,577 
that entered into force in 1980.578  In essence, the Subsidies Code constituted a compromise 
between the US, aiming at more stringent rules on the use of export and domestic subsidies 
for non-primary products, and the EC and other countries, aiming at disciplining the extensive 
                                                 
573 To be precise, the Subsidies Code and GATT referred ‘primary products’ (see above n 564). 
574 In fact, a differential treatment of agricultural subsidies was already inscribed in the original GATT 
1947 given that Article VI:7 of the GATT excludes the possibility to countervail certain agricultural 
subsidies for which a domestic stabilization scheme exists.  See World Trade Report 2006, Exploring 
the Links between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2006), 223 pp., 
at 190. 
575 The Report concluded that agricultural protectionism in the industrial countries, which ‘is the 
outcome of a complicated system of agricultural support schemes, whose object is stabilization as well 
as protection’, should ‘be moderated in exporting as well as importing countries, and should be 
combined with a shift towards giving economic aid to under-developed countries more and more in 
direct financial grants and less and less in the form of low-priced exports’.  To minimize the adverse 
effect of agricultural protection, a shift from price support to deficiency payments was suggested.  
Moreover, developing countries’ exports should receive easier access to developed countries’ markets.  
See Report of a Panel of Experts, Trends in International Trade (Geneva: GATT, October 1958), 138 
pp., paras 45, 49, and 341-350. 
576 According to several developed countries (Minutes of the Meeting held on 8 May 1980 (SCM/M/3, 
27 June 1980), at 3, 5, 6, 7). 
577 Some countries accepted this with exceptions or reservations. The full list of countries: Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, the European Economic Community, 
Finland, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States, and Uruguay. 
578 In full: ‘Agreement on interpretation and application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’.  See Note by the Chairman, Subsidies/Countervailing Measures 
(MTN/NTM/W/236, 5 April 1979). 
PART II CHAPTER 1 – HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
 
 126
use of CVDs by the US during the 1970s.579  Since the end of the 1960s, increased 
competition from countries such as Japan in industrial sectors traditionally dominated by the 
US had put pressure upon the US to call for more stringent disciplines on what it called 
‘unfair’ trade actions by trading partners and to unilaterally react against such practices by 
imposing CVDs and anti-dumping duties.580,581  Furthermore, in response to the economic 
downturn in the 1970s resulting from the two oil crises, countries had embarked on extensive 
subsidization programmes, which, according to the GATT General-Director, led to trade 
based in some sectors (e.g., shipbuilding) on ‘competitive subsidization’ rather than on 
market forces.582  Whereas during the 1940s and 1950s the US had been the main obstacle for 
concluding stricter disciplines on agricultural subsidies, this defensive role was taken over by 
the EC (e.g., France) during the Tokyo Round583, resulting in no substantive progress on 
disciplining (export) subsidies on primary products in the Subsidies Code.584   
                                                 
579 As expressed by the representative of the US, ‘(t)he fundamental negotiating position of the United 
States had been that they would give other countries a material injury test (…) in return for increased 
discipline over other countries' trade distorting subsidy practices’.  See Minutes of the Meeting held on 
8 May 1980 (SCM/M/3, 27 June 1980), at 4, 8; J. Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System – A 
History of the Uruguay Round, 2nd ed (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 360 pp., at 60; T. 
P. Stewart (ed), The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History (1986–1992) – Volume 1 
(Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), 1382 pp., at 817; R. C. Grey, ‘Some Notes on Subsidies and the 
International Rules’, in D. Wallace, F. J. Loftus and V. Z. Krikorian (eds), Interface Three: Legal 
Treatment of Domestic Subsidies (Washington DC: The International Law Institute, 1984), 61-70, at 
61. 
580 To be sure, already during the GATT negotiations had countries (e.g., UK) complained about low 
priced Japanese goods, which resulted in their view from low labor standards (i.e., social dumping), 
exchange manipulation (i.e., exchange dumping), and subsidies.  See Committee II - Summary record 
of technical Sub-Committee (E/PC/T/C.II/48, 11 November 1946). 
581 Next, the reduction in Cold War tensions also spurred the protectionist reflex given that the liberal 
agenda pursued before was legitimized on the basis of national security ground (i.e., resist expansion of 
Soviet influence).  The anti-subsidy stance of the US was also influenced by the anti-distortion school, 
which questioned the usefulness of subsidies.  See Baldwin, above n 534, at 304-305; Hufbauer and 
Erb, above n 542, at 22. 
582 The GATT Director-General as cited in Stewart, above n 579, at 815. 
583 Contrary to the negotiation positions under the 1954-1955 Review Session, it was France who, for 
instance, insisted upon the use of the world market as benchmark under the equitable share standard, 
while the US advocated the individual market approach (Hufbauer and Erb, above n 542, at 38).  
Whereas the US thus started to call for more efficiency, the EC Commission had only received a 
limited negotiating mandate from its Member States.  The principles and mechanisms of its Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) could not be affected.  Set up already in the 1950s and further extended 
during the 1960s, the CAP was based on the principles of common prices, common financing, and 
Community preferences, which were operated through a system of intervention (e.g., price support) and 
import protection.  See J. A. McMahon, ‘The Agreement on Agriculture’, in P. F. J. Macrory, A. E. 
Appleton, and M. G. Plummer (eds), The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political 
Analysis – Volume I (New York: Springer, 2005), 187-229, at 191-196.  
584 In line with Article XVI:3 of the GATT 1947, signatories agreed not to grant such subsidies ‘in a 
manner which results in a more than equitable share of world export trade in such product’ (Article 
10.1 of the Subsidies Code) and only agreed on some clarifications on this benchmark in Article 10.2 
of the Subsidies Code. Moreover, export subsidies on certain primary products to a particular market 
could not be offered in a manner ‘which results in prices materially below those of other suppliers’ to 
the same market (Article 10:3 of the Subsidies Code). 
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The compromise character on disciplines for non-primary products becomes clear from the 
Subsidies Code’s provisions. On the one hand, in its so-called ‘track I’, the substantive and 
procedural rules on imposing CVDs were elaborated.585  Importantly, the imposition of CVDs 
was made subject to a material injury test, which was lacking in the US CVDs procedure.586 
Alternatively, signatories could also opt for the multilateral remedy and apply the specific 
procedural rules on consultation, conciliation, and dispute settlement mapped out by the 
Subsidies Code.587  
On the other hand, under ‘track II’, the Subsidies Code categorically prohibited the use of 
export subsidies on non-primary goods,588 included a non-exhaustive list that built on the 
1960 Declaration,589 and introduced for the first time rather flexible substantive disciplines on 
the use of domestic subsidies.590  These reflected the sensitive balancing act when disciplining 
domestic subsidies: on the one hand, signatories underlined that domestic subsidies are widely 
used as important instruments to promote social and economic policy objectives. 591  On the 
other hand, on the demand of the US, signatories also acknowledged that such subsidies 
could, at the same time, adversely affect the interests of other signatories, including when 
they displaced their exports in third country markets.592  Recall hereby that trade-distorting 
effects of domestic subsidies in third countries could not be effectively addressed under the 
GATT instruments (unilateral CVDs, or multilateral NVCs593).  Those subsidies granted ‘with 
the aim of giving an advantage to certain enterprises’ and which ‘are normally granted either 
                                                 
585 Articles 2–6 of the Subsidies Code.  
586 Article 6 of the Subsidies Code. Article VI:6(a) of the GATT already requires the determination of 
(threat of) material injury. However, the US CVDs law (1897) dated from before GATT 1947 and was 
thus grandfathered from Article VI of the GATT pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application. 
See Minutes of the Meeting held on 8 May 1980 (SCM/M/3, 27 June 1980), at 4.  But Baldwin 
indicated that ‘material’ was weakly defined under US law as ‘harm which is not inconsequential, 
immaterial, or unimportant’. See Baldwin, above n 534, at 305.  
587 Articles 12, 13, 17, and 18 of the Subsidies Code. Signatories could opt between a claim under 
Article VI and/or XVI of the GATT or under the Subsidies Code in case the other party had also signed 
the Subsidies Code. See P. A. Clarke and G. N. Horlick, ‘The Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures’, in P. F. J. Macrory, A. E. Appleton, and M. G. Plummer (eds), The World 
Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis – Volume I (New York: Springer, 2005), 
679-748, at 686. 
588 Although it purported merely to interpret Article XVI of the GATT, the Subsidies Code was thus 
more stringent because it did not adopt the bi-level pricing test. See J. H. Jackson, The World Trading 
System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd ed (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997), 
441 pp., at 288–289.  
589 Articles 8 and 9 of the Subsidies Code and the Annex to the Subsidies Code. 
590 Articles 8 and 11 of the Subsidies Code.  
591 A non-exhaustive list of objectives was included (Article 11:2 of the Subsidies Code). 
592 Different types of adverse effects were thus distinguished.  Next to injury to the domestic industry 
of another signatory and nullification or impairment, ‘serious prejudice’ to the industry of another 
signatory (Article 11:2 of the Subsidies Code) was included.    
593 The NVC claim was always applied with respect to tariff concessions, although it was strictly 
speaking not confined thereto.  See also footnotes 24 and 26 of the Subsidies Code.  
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regionally or by sector’ were targeted in particular.594  In principle, countries were only 
obliged to seek to avoid causing such adverse effects.595,596     
Raising the infant-industry argument,597 developing countries also urged for more flexibility 
on both export and domestic subsidies.598  As a result, the Subsidies Code explicitly 
recognized that subsidies were an integral part of their economic development programmes 
and that it therefore did not prevent developing countries ‘to assist their industries, including 
those in the exporting sector’.599 In particular, next to even more flexibility on domestic 
subsidies,600 developing countries were not prevented from offering export subsidies but these 
could not be used in a manner that would cause serious prejudice to other signatories (trade 
effect test).  Furthermore, they had to endeavour to enter into a commitment to reduce or 
eliminate export subsidies when these were inconsistent with their competitive and 
development needs (Article 14:5 of the Subsidies Code).601 
An important incentive upon Contracting Parties to become a party to the plurilateral 
Subsidies Code was that this ensured Subsidies Code treatment by other signatories.  Invoking 
the non-application provision602, the US however refrained from offering such treatment to 
developing countries that did not enter into a commitment to reduce export subsidies (Article 
14:5 of the Subsidies Code), which implied that their subsidized exports could still be 
countervailed by the US without causing ‘material injury’ even if they had become 
                                                 
594 Article 11:3 of the Subsidies Code; see also Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
Draft Guidelines for the Application of the Concept of Specificity in the Calculation of the Amount of a 
Subsidy other than an Export Subsidy (SCM/W/89, 25 April 1985).  This was the predecessor of the 
‘specificity’ test of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.  Yet, contrary to the SCM Agreement, the 
Subsidies Code did not explicitly limit the imposition of CVDs to these types of ‘specific’ subsidies 
elaborated in Article 11:3 of the Subsidies Code (see Article 2 of the Subsidies Code).   
595 Article 11:2 of the Subsidies Code.  The GATT Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Committee 
could review whether such adverse effects had occurred (Article 13 of the Subsidies Code). 
596 On the flexibility of the domestic subsidy disciplines, see also E. McGovern, International Trade 
Regulation – GATT, The United States and the European Community, 2nd ed (Exeter: Globefield Press, 
1986), 629 pp., at 321; J. H. J. Bourgeois, ‘The GATT Rules for Industrial Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties and the New GATT Round – The Weather and the Seeds’, in E-U Petersmann 
and M. Hilf (eds), The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Deventer: Kluwer Law 
and Taxation, 1988), 219-235, at 228-231. 
597 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.  Developing countries also justified export subsidies as a 
means of offsetting other distortions (e.g., overvalued exchange rate, expensive domestically produced 
capital goods, high tariffs on imported capital goods).  See Hufbauer and Erb, above n 542, at 41. 
598 The S&D treatment provisions of the first draft of the Subsidies Code proposed by developed 
countries (Canada, the EC, Japan, the Nordic countries, and the US; see MTN/NTM/W/168, 10 July 
1978) were substantially altered after discussions with developing countries (MTN/NTM/W/210, 19 
December 1978).   
599 Article 14:1, 14:2 of the Subsidies Code. 
600 Article 14:7 of the Subsidies Code. 
601 The disciplines on domestic subsidies (see above n 590) were also more flexible with respect to 
developing countries (see Article 14:7 of the Subsidies Code). 
602 Article 19:9 of the Subsidies Code.  
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signatory.603  Developing countries (as well as the EC) objected the legality of this position,604 
which complicated and in some instances even prevented their accession to the Subsidies 
Code.605  Apart from illustrating one of the many conflicts in the interpretation of key 
provisions of the Subsidies Code, this discussion shows the growing unease on the part of the 
US on what it called ‘unfair’ competition from producers of developing countries.  
 
1.4. THE URUGUAY ROUND: THE SCM AGREEMENT AND THE AGREEMENT ON 
AGRICULTURE  
The economic recession in the early 1980s further increased the pressure on countries to 
support their domestic industry and agricultural sector. The Subsidies Code proved incapable 
of halting this subsidy reflex, leading to over-capacity in several sectors such as steel.606  The 
GATT Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Committee, set up by the Subsidies Code,607 
was unable to resolve conflicts among parties because each of the parties could block the 
adoption of panel reports by the Committee and, more generally, the Committee could not 
agree on the interpretation or application of the Subsidies Code.608  The Leutwiler Report, an 
independent expert report commissioned by the GATT Director-General, observed in the first 
half of the 1980s that ‘subsidies have become the main source of unfair competition, and are 
at the root of the most serious and intractable trade disputes that have been brought before the 
GATT’.609 
                                                 
603 See Minutes of the Meeting held on 8 May 1980 (SCM/M/3, 27 June 1980), at 3-9; Note by the 
Secretariat, Application of Articles 14:5 and 19:9 of the Agreement (SCM/W/116, 5 September 1986); 
Note by the Secretariat, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/4, 28 April 
1987), at 87-93. 
604 In essence, they claimed that the commitments under Article 14:5 of the Subsidies Code were 
unilateral and autonomous.  See Minutes of the Meeting held on 8 May 1980 (SCM/M/3, 27 June 
1980), at 5-10. 
605 For example, the US required full elimination of export subsidies from Columbia (Minutes of the 
Meeting held on 17 November 1983 (SCM/M/19, 21 February 1984), at 9-11; Minutes of the Meeting 
held on 8 May 1980 (SCM/M/3, 27 June 1980)).  Contracting Parties were unable to solve this 
disagreement (Minutes of the Meeting held on 26 April 1985 (SCM/M/28, 24 May 1985)). 
606 The actual average subsidy rates of OECD countries increased in the 1970s and thereafter stabilized 
or even declined in the late 1980s.  At the same time, even a constant level of subsidization could be 
perceived as having larger effects in face of falling tariff barriers.  See G. Hufbauer, ‘A View of the 
Forest’, in B. Balassa (ed), Subsidies and Countervailing Measures – Critical Issues for the Uruguay 
Round (Washington: The World Bank, 1989), 13-25, at 13; Stewart, above n 579, 809-812.  
607 See Articles 13, 16, and 18 of the Subsidies Code. 
608 The Committee was unable to adopt any GATT Panel Report or resolve any conflict before the 
completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations. Only in 1994 and 1995, three of the GATT Panel 
Reports that had been blocked previously were adopted by the Committee (see Stewart, above n 579, at 
836; Clarke and Horlick, above n 587, at 687, footnote 35).  For an overview of interpretation 
problems, see Note by the Secretariat, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(MTN.GNG/NG10/W/4, 28 April 1987); Note by the Secretariat, Problems in the Area of Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/3, 17 March 1987). 
609 See A. Dunkel, Trade Policies for a Better Future – The ‘Leutwiler Report’, the GATT and the 
Uruguay Round (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 174 pp., at 46. 
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Unsurprisingly, with the launch of the Uruguay Round (1986), the Contracting Parties again 
picked up the theme of subsidies and CVDs, still defending the same interests: the US 
continued its ‘anti-subsidy crusade’,610 whereas the EC and others, including developing 
countries, advocated more stringent rules on CVDs.611 At the same time, Croome underscored 
that a compromise was facilitated by a growing shared understanding among most countries 
on the heavy budgetary implications of subsidization and on the risk that any subsidy to gain a 
competitive advantage would simply be matched by foreign subsidization,612 leading to ‘a 
self-defeating spiral of subsidization’.613  Negotiations finally resulted at the end of the 
Uruguay Round (1994) in the multilateral SCM Agreement, which thus binds all WTO 
Members and is applicable in addition to, but goes ‘well beyond merely applying and 
interpreting’,614 Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT . 
The US hereby successfully advocated for narrowing the three above-mentioned bifurcations.  
Next to agricultural subsidies, S&D treatment for the more advanced developing countries 
had to be curtailed, certainly in sectors where they had become internationally competitive.615  
Furthermore, the US called for more effective disciplines on domestic subsidies as practice 
had shown that they could very well have trade-distorting effects similar to export subsidies 
(e.g., in the steel sector).616  In particular, the US proposed to simply prohibit some types of 
domestic subsidies (operationalized inter alia through specified quantitative limits)617 and, in 
general, to provide more effective tools to challenge the adverse effects of other domestic 
subsidies occurring in third country markets as well as in the subsidizing market when no 
prior tariff concessions have been made.618  A specific demand of the US was also to 
discipline more severely the so-called ‘targeting’ strategy of countries like Japan and some 
European countries, which it described as ‘a government plan or scheme of coordinated 
                                                 
610 Yet, following the election of Bill Clinton (1992), the negative stance on subsidies altered somewhat 
(certainly on subsidies for research and development, see below n 1259). See G. Kleinfeld and D. 
Kaye, ‘Red Light, Green Light? The 1994 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
Research and Development Assistance, and US Policy’, 28:6 Journal of World Trade (1994), 43-63, at 
43. 
611 J. H. Barton, J. L. Goldstein, T. E. Josling, and R. H. Steinberg, The Evolution of the Trade Regime 
– Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006), 242 pp., at 115-116; Croome, above n 579 , at 60.   
612 Croome, above n 579, at 60. 
613 Communication from the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20, 15 June 1988), at 2. 
614 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, at 181. 
615 If they had become internationally competitive, the US argued, ‘the need for subsidies to facilitate 
the economic development program of that country is not readily apparent’.  Submission by the United 
States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, 22 November 1989), at 2; Communication from the United States 
(MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20, 15 June 1988), at 7. 
616 See Submission by the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, 22 November 1989). 
617 See Submission by the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/39, 27 September 1990). 
618 See Communication from the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20, 15 June 1988); Submission by 
the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/40, 5 October 1990). 
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measures to assist specific export-oriented industries’.619  Through a combination of 
subsidization (e.g., R&D subsidies) and market access restrictions, such targeting aimed at 
obtaining market dominance in technology-intensive sectors (e.g., computer, semi-conductor, 
aircraft, space) and inflicted a subsidy race among developed countries.620  Interestingly, the 
US hereby recognized ‘that there are philosophical differences with respect to the appropriate 
level of government intervention in structuring domestic economic activity and fostering 
exports’, but wanted examination ‘whether at a certain point such policies can go beyond the 
bounds of appropriate government involvement in promoting exports’.621   
Next to pleading for more stringent multilateral disciplines, the US also unilaterally stepped 
up the imposition of CVDs and anti-dumping duties in response to foreign ‘subsidization’ and 
dumping and the scope of both laws was amended several times to facilitate such imposition 
during the 1980s.622  Because Contracting Parties had failed to agree upon a definition of the 
concept of ‘subsidy’ in the Subsidies Code623, all kinds of government interventions (and even 
private interventions) which (potentially) distort trade could be countervailable, which was in 
theory the case under US law.624  Hence, by urging for a narrow subsidy definition and the 
inclusion of a specificity test, the EC and other countries aimed to curtail the coverage of 
these CVDs laws.625 The inclusion of such a subsidy definition in the SCM Agreement was 
                                                 
619 Communication from the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/1, 16 March 1987), at 3; 
Communication from the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20, 15 June 1988), at 4; Submission by 
the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, 22 November 1989), at 1.   
620 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3.  See also, P. Krugman, ‘The US Response to Foreign 
Industrial Targeting’, 1984:1 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1984), 77-131; Hufbauer and 
Erb, above n 542, at 107-110; A. B. Zampetti, ‘The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies – A 
Forward-Looking Assessment’, 29:6 Journal of World Trade (1995), 5-29, at 8; T. O. Bayard, K. A. 
Elliot, Reciprocity and Retaliation in US Trade Policy (Washington DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 1994), 503 pp.. 
621 Communication from the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20, 15 June 1988), at 4.  See also, 
Note by the Secretariat (MTN.GNG/NG10/20, 3 July 1990). 
622 Baldwin noticed that this rise could be partly explained by the new way anti-dumping and CVDs 
were administered in the US because this competence was transferred from the Treasury Department to 
the more protectionist Commerce Department. For the exact numbers of CVD cases over the period of 
1954-1994, see Baldwin, above n 534, at 297-327, at 306-309; Hufbauer and Erb, above n 542, at 16-
17. 
623 During the Tokyo Round, they considered that any definition would be either under- or over-
inclusive and, instead, focused on the effect rather than on the intrinsic nature of subsidies.  See 
Stewart, above n 579, 820. As McGovern observed back in 1986: ‘the term “subsidy” is one of the 
most frequently used and infrequently defined in the whole vocabulary of international trade 
regulation’. McGovern, above n 596, at 312.   
624 After all, countries could unilaterally define the term ‘subsidy’ for their CVDs law.  The scope in 
US CVDs law was limited by the ‘specificity’ requirement.  On the evolution of the subsidy definition 
in US CVDs law, see R. E. Hudec, Essays on the Nature of International Trade Law (London: 
Cameron May, 1999), 396 pp., at 265-267. 
625 Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, paras 8.63–8.69. 
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therefore ‘generally considered to represent one of the most important achievements of the 
Uruguay Round in the area of subsidy disciplines’.626 
 
In addition to the SCM Agreement, the sector-specific multilateral Agreement on Agriculture 
was agreed upon in the Uruguay Round after years of demanding negotiations.  The Cairns 
group was formed as a coalition of developed and developing agricultural exporting countries 
that collectively pushed for further liberalization in this field.627  Although it subsidized and 
protected its agricultural market, the US firmly defended the same interests to break the 
‘vicious circle’ of agricultural subsidization mainly because of the severe budgetary 
implications of its support and the conviction that its agricultural sector would be competitive 
in an undistorted market.628  As Croome indicated, the US heavily subsidized its exports but 
stressed that this was purely to counter subsidization offered by other countries, such as the 
EC.629  The US had extensive export credit support and food aid programmes in place under 
which, according to other countries and observers, exports were indirectly subsidized.630  On 
the defending side of the negotiation table were the EC (domestic and export subsidies), Japan 
and Korea (domestic subsidies), and those developing countries which benefited from 
preferential access to the EC market or were net-food importing.631  Targeting primarily EC 
agricultural export subsidies, the US proposed phasing out all agricultural export subsidies 
over a period of five years.632  Most other countries (even the Cairns Group) did not go that 
far but nonetheless agreed that export subsidies had to be phased out gradually.  Hence, the 
                                                 
626 Panel Report, US – FSC, para 7.80. See also T. Collins-Williams and G. Salembier, ‘International 
Disciplines on Subsidies – The GATT, the WTO and the Future Agenda’, 30:1 Journal of World Trade 
(1996), 5–17, at 9–10.  According to the Leutwiler Report, ‘(u)nless there can be agreement on 
definition, talk of ‘subsidy’ is useless’.  See Dunkel, above n 609, at 47-48. 
627 At that time, the group consisted of 14 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay.  
Today, the group consists of 19 agricultural exporting countries: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay.   
628 See C. Yeutter, ‘US Negotiating Proposal on Agriculture in the Uruguay Round’, in E-U 
Petersmann, and M. Hilf (eds), The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Deventer: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1988), 265-270, at 267; Stewart, above n 579, at 142-145 and 172; Croome, 
above n 579, at 93.   
629 According to the same author, the US was highly competitive in various agricultural markets such as 
cereals and meat.  Croome, above n 579, at 93.   
630 Next to food aid policies, Stewart pointed inter alia to the US export credit guarantees scheme, 
which ‘in intent if not in form’ is ‘similar to the export subsidies offered by the EC and other 
countries’.  Stewart, above n 579, at 145.  See also below Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2.2. 
631 Croome, above n 579, at 93. 
632 It is debated whether this ambitious proposal, which even went further than the Cairns group 
position, genuinely reflected the United States’ position or was also inspired by strategic considerations 
(e.g., to please domestic constituencies or even to undermine the entire negotiations). See Stewart, 
above n 579, at 172; Croome, above n 579, at 95-96; M. G. Desta, The Law of International Trade in 
Agricultural Products – From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002), 488 pp., at 207, footnote 16. 
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EC was largely isolated in its position in which it only agreed with the reduction of export 
subsidies but did not suggest any timetable.633  Targeting in return US practice, the EC and 
most other countries called to discipline indirect forms of export subsidies (e.g., export credit, 
food aid).  In the end, six types of ‘direct’ export subsidies were made subject to reduction 
commitments over an agreed implementation period and other, ‘indirect’ forms of export 
subsidies were made subject to an anti-circumvention provision.634  Next, in line with an 
initial US proposal, domestic support that had the most distorting impact on trade was 
aggregated and also made subject to reduction commitments.  The details of these subsidy 
disciplines under the Agreement on Agriculture, and their relationship to the SCM Agreement 
disciplines, are specified in Chapter 6.635 
 
Both the SCM Agreement and Agreement on Agriculture deal with subsidies affecting trade 
in goods.636  The Agreement on Agriculture applies to agricultural products and also the SCM 
Agreement, elaborating the GATT rules on subsidies and CVDs, leaves subsidies affecting 
trade in services sectors untouched.637  Indeed, these are exclusively disciplined by the GATS 
but this agreement, which also resulted from the Uruguay Round, seems rather flexible on 
subsidization.  Article XV GATS, dealing explicitly with subsidies, does not impose any 
substantive obligation upon WTO Members.  WTO Members recognize that subsidies may 
have a distorting effect on trade in services though are only under an obligation to enter 
negotiations to develop disciplines on subsidies.  So far, these negotiations under the Doha 
Development Round were not very fruitful.638  In addition, Article XV:2 of the GATS 
stipulates that if a Member considers that it is adversely affected by a subsidy of another 
Member it ‘may request consultations with that Member’ but such request must only be given 
‘sympathetic consideration’.  As illustrated in the case study on export credit support (Part III, 
Chapter 6), only the non-discrimination principles (i.e., MFN-principle and national treatment 
principle) might impose substantive obligations on subsidization under GATS.  Notice that, 
contrary to GATT, the obligation of national treatment under the GATS does not explicitly 
                                                 
633 Stewart, above n 579, at 179.  As they did not have substantive export subsidy schemes in place, 
Japan, Korea, and other countries agreed that agricultural export subsidies had to be gradually phased 
out.  Stewart, above n 579, at 186-190; Croome, above n 579, at 201. 
634 Article 10 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
635 See below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2. 
636 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, List of Annexes.  Both are listed 
under ‘Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods’ (Annex 1A ).  See also Panel Report, US – 
Softwood Lumber IV, para 7.28; Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1144. 
637 The subsidy itself can, of course, consist of the provision of a service. See Article 1.1(a)1(iii) of the 
SCM Agreement (see below Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1.2).  
638 Article XV of the GATS. A look at the Annual Report of the Working Party on GATS Rules to the 
Council for Trade in Services (2009) (S/WPGR/19, 2 October 2009, para 5) reveals that negotiations 
are not yet in an advanced stage.  See R. Adlung, ‘Negotiations on Safeguards and Subsidies in 
Services: A Never-ending Story?’, 10:2 Journal of International Economic Law (2007), 235-265. 
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exclude subsidies but is at the same time dependent on specific commitments (Article XVII of 
the GATS).639 
 
1.5. THE DOHA ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 
Disciplines under both the SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture are under 
revision in the Doha Development Round, which was launched in November 2001 but is still 
not concluded anno 2010.  
First, WTO Members agreed to open the rules set out in the SCM Agreement and Anti-
Dumping Agreement for negotiations, with the goal of ‘clarifying and improving disciplines’ 
under both agreements, while preserving their ‘basic concepts, principles and effectiveness 
(…) and their instruments and objectives, and taking into account the needs of developing and 
least-developed participants’.640  Broadly speaking, the same negotiation positions as under 
previous rounds seem to be endorsed in implementing this negotiating mandate: the US seems 
to carry on its anti-subsidy crusade, whereas other WTO Members, in particular developing 
countries, advocate more policy space for subsidization and more policy constraints upon 
CVDs.641  Importantly, this statement also needs to be somewhat nuanced.  For instance, the 
EC endorsed the reinstallation of the green light subsidies but, on the other hand, also 
proposed to expand the scope of red light subsidies.642  The US government interventions in 
response to the financial and economic crisis of 2009/10 (e.g., bailouts in the car industry) 
might likewise have reduced its appetite to expand the red light category of subsidies along 
the lines of its own previous proposal.  Interestingly, several of the tabled proposals by WTO 
Members were a direct response to interpretations offered by panels and the Appellate Body 
and aimed at either codifying or altering their interpretation of SCM Agreement provisions.  
The latest state of the negotiations is reflected in the draft consolidated text of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement and SCM Agreement circulated by the chairman of the Negotiating 
Group on Rules in December 2008 (Draft Consolidated Chair Text).643  The most important 
amendments to the existing disciplines proposed in this Draft Consolidated Chair Text will be 
                                                 
639 Compare Article III:8(b) of the GATT and Article XVII of the GATS.   
640 Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001), 
para 28. 
641 For an overview of all proposals until 2004, see J. R. Magnus, ‘World Trade Subsidy Discipline: Is 
This the “Retrenchment Round”?’, 38:6 Journal of World Trade (2004), 985-1047; see also, World 
Trade Report 2006, above n 574, at 206-207.  Magnus concluded at that time that the US position on 
subsidy disciplines was mixed because it also tabled proposals weakening these disciplines.  On 
balance, the US position seems to be largely in line with their stricter stance towards subsidization 
adopted in previous rounds.     
642 The EC pushes in particular for stricter disciplines on practices that have the effect of making inputs 
available to local producers at prices substantially lower than on the international market (see, for 
example, Submission of the European Communities, Subsidies (TN/RL/GEN/135, 24 April 2006). 
643 Negotiating Group on Rules, New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM Agreement 
(TN/RL/W/236, 19 December 2008). 
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integrated in our discussion on the SCM Agreement, though one should keep hereby in mind 
that this text does not reflect the end of the negotiating process.  To paraphrase the words of 
the chair:  
 
Not only are there large gaps where on issues of great importance to delegations no solutions 
are proposed; but few, if any, of the textual proposals that can be found in these new texts can 
be considered to attract consensus support.644 
 
Reflecting upon this draft text at the end of 2009, the Chairman further specified the most 
controversial and difficult issues in his text: 
 
(…) there are four major bracketed issues in my draft ASCM text, regarding certain financing 
by loss-making institutions, export competitiveness, export credits – market benchmarks and 
export credits – successor undertakings.  These are important and challenging issues.  In 
addition, the un-bracketed issues related to regulated pricing are highly controversial and of 
comparable importance.  And significant issues, such as pass-through and subsidy allocation, 
are also addressed through un-bracketed text.645   
 
Second, one of the stumbling blocks for closing the Doha Development Round is the 
disagreement among WTO Members on stricter disciplines under the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  In the Doha Declaration, Members committed with regard to subsidies to 
negotiate aimed at ‘reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies’ as 
well as ‘substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support’.646  The objective to 
establish a fair and market-oriented trading system was restated, but non-trade concerns were 
noted as well.  Moreover, S&D treatment of developing countries had to become an integral 
part of the negotiations.  The negotiating positions at the opening of this round were largely in 
line with those adopted during the Uruguay Round.  On the defending side were still situated 
the industrialized countries such as the European countries (EC, Switzerland, Norway), Japan, 
and Korea, but also those developing countries which benefited from preferential access to the 
EC market or were net-food importing.  These countries emphasized the multi-functionality 
of agriculture (i.e., non-trade concerns) to underpin their defensive liberalization stance.647  
‘Demandeurs’ of further liberalization were apart from the Cairns group members the US, 
which indicated its willingness to further cut its support upon the condition of parallel cuts by 
other countries (e.g., EC) and tariff reductions in both developed as well as developing 
countries.  Finally, a number of developing countries (e.g., India, Turkey, Kenya)648 shared 
                                                 
644 Draft Consolidated Chair Text, above n 643, at 1. 
645 Reflecting upon the work undertaken in 2009 on the basis of this draft text, the Chairman conceded 
that ‘(t)he process has been long, time-consuming and sometimes tedious’.  Rules Negotiating Group, 
Statement by the Chairman, Informal Open-Ended Meeting with Senior Officials: 25 November 2009 
(TN/RL/W/246, 27 November 2009), at 4 (emphasis added).    
646 Doha Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001), para 13. 
647 See above Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3.2. 
648 This was not an organized group.  Also included were inter alia Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua, 
Kenya, Dominican Republic, Hondouras, El Salvador, Venezuela, Philippines, Indonesia.   
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the offensive interests of further liberalization in developed countries but adopted a defensive 
stance regarding domestic liberalization.  During the negotiations, several coalitions have 
been formed (with overlapping and changing membership), whereby countries bundle their 
negotiating power to advocate shared specific interests.  Figure 1 offers an overview of the 
most active groupings in the agriculture negotiations and amply illustrates the variety of 
interests among developed as well as developing countries. 
   
 
FIGURE 1: COALITIONS IN AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS649,650 
 
One of the most important new groupings regarding the agricultural subsidies negotiations is 
the G-20.  In the run-up to the Cancun Ministerial Conference (2003), this alliance of 
                                                 
649 ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries with preferences in the EU); African group (African 
members of the WTO); Cairns group (seeking agricultural trade liberalization); G-10 (defensive 
interests in negotiations by emphasizing non-trade concerns, also known as ‘Friends of 
Multifunctionality’); G-20 (seeking ambitious reforms in developed countries while preserving S&D 
treatment); G-33 (seeking flexibility for developing countries to undertake limited market opening in 
agriculture; also known as ‘Friends of Special Products’); G-90 (African Group + ACP + LDCs); LDCs 
(least-developed countries); Recent new members (RAMs) (seeking lesser commitments because of 
their accession commitments); Tropical products (seeking greater market access for tropical products).  
A specific group missing in the figure is the Cotton-4, also called ‘C-4’ (a West African coalition of 
cotton producing countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali) seeking cuts in cotton subsidies and 
tariffs). 
650 WTO website, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negoti_groups_e.htm.  
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developing countries was formed and brought together countries belonging to the Cairns 
group as well as other developing countries that push for more liberalization in developed 
countries, while aiming at preserving substantive S&D treatment for their own agricultural 
policies.651  The emergence of the G-20 is a good illustration of the general more active and 
shared position claimed by larger developing countries in the negotiations.  Arguably, this 
presents the single most important difference with the negotiating setting in the Uruguay 
Round.  In analyzing the relevant current disciplines on agricultural subsidies, the 
modifications inscribed in the latest Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture (December 
2008) will be scrutinized.652  Needless to say, these texts certainly do not reflect a consensus 
among these different coalitions, though they give a good impression of the state and future 
directions of the negotiations.  To paraphrase the words of this chair: 
 
Everything is conditional in the deepest sense in any case. But the changes made at this time 
now represent a best estimate of where there is additional good reason to believe there would 
prove to be consensus if everything was to come together as a modalities package.653 
 
If the Doha Round would be put back on track, the Draft Consolidated Chair Text and 
Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture dating from the end of 2008 would likely form the 
point of departure in the negotiations on new disciplines for industrial and agricultural 
subsidies.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
651 This alliance was a direct response to the EC – US Joint Text.  To break the deadlock of the 
negotiations in the run-up to the Cancun Ministerial Conference (2003), Members agreed that the US 
and EC had to take the lead to bridge their disagreement and propose a joint draft for further 
negotiations.  This resulted in the EC – US Joint Text (August 2003), which was, however, not well 
received by the other Member as it reflected too much their own interests.   
652 See Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, 6 December 2008). 
653 Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, above n 652, at 1. 
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2. OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE SCM AGREEMENT 
The SCM Agreement does not contain a preamble,654 which might indicate the wide 
divergence in views on subsidies among the drafters.655  The object and purpose of the 
agreement has been clarified in the case law.656  In the view of the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft, 
the SCM Agreement aims to ‘impose multilateral disciplines on subsidies which distort 
international trade’.657  In the light of the negotiating history outlined above, this description 
might just tell half the story.  Indeed, the Appellate Body in US – Carbon Steel more broadly 
described its main object and purpose as ‘to increase and improve GATT disciplines relating 
to the use of both subsidies and countervailing measures’.658  In US – Softwood Lumber IV, the 
Appellate Body finally confirmed, in an even more nuanced way, that the SCM Agreement aims 
indeed to strengthen the GATT disciplines on the use of both subsidies and CVDs, ‘while, 
recognizing at the same time, the right of Members to impose such measures under certain 
conditions’.659,660  
 
                                                 
654 The Anti-Dumping Agreement also does not provide a preamble.  In contrast, a preamble was 
included in the Subsidies Code. 
655 Another explanation might be that the drafters did not consider a preamble necessary. The drafts of 
the SCM Agreement (Dunkel Text and Cartland Drafts) did not contain a draft preamble either. 
656 In absence of any explicit statement on its object and purpose, the Panel in Canada – Aircraft, 
considered it ‘unwise to attach undue importance to arguments concerning the object and purpose of 
the SCM Agreement’.  Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 9.119.  Yet, such implicit downplaying of 
the relevance of the object and purpose in the interpretative process as stipulated in the Vienna 
Convention is not reflected in other relevant case law.   
657 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 7.26; see also Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, paras 
8.60–8.62.  
658 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para 73. 
659 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, paras 64, 95.  The Appellate Body referred to its 
decision in US – Carbon Steel.  
660 Citing this statement, the Appellate Body in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS 
also referred to the SCM Agreement as reflecting a ‘delicate balance between the Members that sought 
to impose more disciplines on the use of subsidies and those that sought to impose more disciplines on 
the application of countervailing measures’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMS, para 115. 
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3. SCOPE OF THE SCM AGREEMENT 
Pursuant to the SCM Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if two distinctive 
elements are present: (i) a financial contribution by a government661 or any form of income or 
price support in the sense of Article XVI of the GATT662 (ii) that confers a benefit.663 
Moreover, to be subject to the disciplines of the SCM Agreement, the subsidy must be 
specific.664 
 
3.1. FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION BY A GOVERNMENT OR INCOME OR PRICE SUPPORT 
3.1.1. Financial contribution 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement points to three different kinds of financial 
contributions:665 
 
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans, and equity 
infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g., loan guarantees); 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g., fiscal 
incentives such as tax credits);666 
(iii)a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases 
goods. 
 
The Panel in US – Export Restraints correctly decided that this list is exhaustive and this 
reading was implicitly confirmed by the Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV.667  As 
a result, the Panel decided that export restraints are not captured, even though they could very 
well benefit domestic producers similarly as when a financial contribution is offered.668  
                                                 
661 Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. 
662 Article 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement. 
663 Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. 
664 Article 1.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
665 Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement is not considered as a type of financial contribution 
because it deals with the way, namely indirectly, that the government provides one of the different 
forms of financial contributions [(i) through (iii)] (see below Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.1.2.2). This 
approach is consistent with the case law.  See, for example, Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para 
8.73; Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.53; Appellate Body 
Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, paras 124-125. 
666 For the exception provided by footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement, see below Part II, Chapter 3, 
Section 3.1.1.3. 
667 Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para 8.69.  Referring to this Panel report, the Appellate Body 
observed ‘that not all government measures capable of conferring benefits would necessarily fall within 
Article 1.1(a). If that were the case, there would be no need for Article 1.1(a), because all government 
measures conferring benefits, per se, would be subsidies’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood 
Lumber IV, para 52, footnote 35; see also Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMS, para 114. 
668 See, however, below for the discussion on the scope of ‘income or price support’ (Part II, Chapter 3, 
Section 3.1.3). Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para 8.75.  In its reasoning, the Panel stressed that 
the requirement of ‘financial contribution’ was precisely advocated by most countries to counter the 
purely effect-based definition of the US (paras 8.63–8.72). The US proposed during the Uruguay 
Round that the term ‘(actionable) subsidy’ was defined as ‘any government action or combination of 
actions which confers a benefit on the recipient firm(s)’. See Elements of the Framework for 
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Although some authors regret such a closed list in the light of the ingenuity of governments to 
invent new forms of assistance, the interpretation is legally solid.669  Moreover, our discussion 
will illustrate that these three types of financial contributions are formulated, and interpreted, 
broadly to cover a wide variety of financial contributions. 
 
3.1.1.1. The (potential) direct transfer of funds and liabilities 
The first type of financial contribution (Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement) refers to a 
government practice involving (potential) direct transfers of funds and liabilities.  The 
Appellate Body in Japan – DRAMs (Korea) concluded that the term ‘funds’ not only refers to 
‘money’ but that it encompasses financial resources and other financial claims more 
generally.670  Transactions similar to those explicitly listed (i.e., grants, loans, and equity 
infusion) are thus also covered.  For instance, debt forgiveness, the extension of a loan 
maturity, and an interest rate reduction are all considered direct transfers of funds because 
they improve the financial position of the borrower.671  Likewise, a debt-to-equity swap 
intended to address a company’s deteriorating financial condition is deemed a direct transfer 
of funds to the company.672  This broad reading implies that the change in ownership (by an 
equity infusion or debt-to-equity swap) itself can constitute a financial contribution and that it 
is perfectly possible for an owner to make a financial contribution to itself (e.g., cash grant by 
a government to a government-owned company).673  Export credit guarantees or insurance are 
examples of potential direct transfer of funds because funds are only transferred in case the 
export credit is not repaid due to a covered risk.674  Obviously, a financial contribution exists 
regardless whether these funds have to be paid in the end and thus whether the potential 
transfer effectively materializes.675   
 
                                                                                                                                            
Negotiations – Submission by the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, November 22, 1989), section 
II.1(a).  See also Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 52, footnote 35. 
669 In the view of Rubini, the provision presents contradictory indications on the exhaustive, or merely 
illustrative, nature of the list.  However, the notion ‘i.e.’ in Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, 
meaning ‘id est (Latin), that is’ (Oxford English Dictionary) indicates that this list is closed. Moreover, 
the Cartland I draft referred to ‘such as’, instead of ‘i.e.’, which suggests that the latter is not included 
by coincidence.  L. Rubini, ‘The International Context of EC State Aid Law and Policy: The 
Regulation of Subsidies in the WTO’, in A. Bondi, P. Eeckhout, and J. Flynn (eds), The Law of State 
Aid in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 149-188, at 160. 
670 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 250. 
671 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 251; Panel Report, Korea – Commercial 
Vessels, para 7.413. 
672 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 252; Panel Report, Korea – Commercial 
Vessels, paras 7.411-7.413 
673 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.419-7.423. 
674 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.87.  See also below Part III. 
675 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.87. 
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Such (potential) direct transfer of funds and liabilities made by governments or public bodies 
are covered, according to the Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels, ‘irrespective of whether 
or not they involve the exercise of regulatory powers or taxation authority’.676 The Panel 
indeed concluded that the phrase ‘governance practice’ in Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the SCM 
Agreement simply denotes the author of the action (i.e., government).  Hence, this phrase 
does not restrict the scope of this financial contribution to functions normally performed by 
governments.677  The phrase ‘government practice’ is thus redundant to interpret this first type 
of financial contribution. 
 
3.1.1.2. The provision of goods or services or purchase of goods other than general 
infrastructure 
The second form of financial contribution (Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement) 
refers to the provision of goods or services by the government.  The Appellate Body in US – 
Softwood Lumber IV endorsed an expansive definition of the terms ‘goods’ and ‘provision’.  
First, goods include ‘property and possessions’, and thus also immovable property.678  
Second, goods or services are provided by the government not only when they are directly 
supplied or given but also when an intangible right is offered having the effect of making 
these goods/services available.679  What matters is that the transaction makes the 
goods/services available.680  This only supposes ‘a reasonably proximate relationship between 
the action of the government providing the good or service on the one hand, and the use or 
enjoyment of the good or service by the recipient on the other’.681  Accordingly, the Appellate 
Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV agreed with the Panel that the Canadian provincial 
governments ‘provided’ ‘goods’ by granting ‘the right to harvest’ ‘standing timber’.682  The 
fact that these goods are natural resources is irrelevant because an exception is only made for 
‘general infrastructure’.683 
                                                 
676 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.29. 
677 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.28-7.31. 
678 The Appellate Body thereby even expanded the definition of the Panel, which understood the term 
‘goods’ in its broad ordinary meaning as ‘tangible or movable personal property, other than money’.  It 
is not required according to the Appellate Body that such goods are tradable.  See Appellate Body 
Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, paras 58–67; Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, paras 7.23–
7.30. 
679 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, paras 68-75. 
680 ‘Rights over felled trees or logs crystallize as a natural and inevitable consequence of the harvesters' 
exercise of their harvesting rights’. Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 75. 
681 Hence, ‘a government must have some control over the availability of a specific thing being "made 
available"’. It therefore does not capture general government acts such as any property law in a 
jurisdiction.  Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, paras 70-71. 
682 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 76. 
683 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 7.25.  See also G. Gagné and F. Roch, ‘The US – 
Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute and the WTO Definition of Subsidy’, 7:3 World Trade Review (2008), 
547-572, at 555. 
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Indeed, governmental provision of ‘general infrastructure’ is explicitly excluded from the 
subsidy definition (Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement).684  The scope of this 
exception is, however, not yet clarified in the case law.  The Appellate Body has only 
underscored that, by its terms, only ‘infrastructure of a general nature’ and thus not all kinds 
of infrastructure is excluded.685  The ordinary meaning as well as the negotiating history 
suggest that ‘infrastructure’ includes inter alia transport infrastructure (e.g., roads, railways, 
or ports) but also power supplies.686  The pivotal issue is, of course, how generally available 
such infrastructure should be to be covered under this exception.  The negotiating history 
indicates that this exception was often discussed together with the ‘specificity’ element 
(Article 2 of the SCM Agreement) and green light subsidies.687  Some scholars have therefore 
argued that Article 2 of the SCM Agreement could provide useful context for interpreting the 
term ‘general infrastructure’.688 
 
Next to providing goods/services, the government makes a financial contribution under 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement when it purchases goods.  To be precise, the 
purchase of services is not covered because this might affect trade in services rather than 
trade in goods.  Hence, only the GATS disciplines would be relevant to discipline such 
purchases of services. 
 
3.1.1.3. The government foregoes revenue which is otherwise due 
The previous discussion has illustrated that a government could subsidize by positive action 
when it makes financial (Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement) or in-kind (Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement) transfers.  This final type of financial contribution 
confirms that a government could likewise subsidize by negative action when it refrains from 
collecting revenue which is otherwise due.  Internal taxes, covering direct (raised on income) 
                                                 
684 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 72. 
685 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 60. 
686 The Oxford Dictionary Online describes infrastructure as ‘the basic physical and organizational 
structures (e.g., buildings, roads, power supplies) needed for the operation of a society or enterprise’.  
Examples of ‘infrastructure’ are mostly not listed in communications of negotiating Members, except 
for Korea, which referred to ‘harbour facilities, electric power, or transportation systems’ as examples 
of social infrastructure.  Communication from the Republic of Korea (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/34, 18 
January 1990). 
687 See, for example, Communication from the Republic of Korea (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/34, 18 January 
1990).  See also, World Trade Report 2006, above n 574, at xxxviii. 
688 See K. Adamantopoulos, ‘Article 1 SCMA’, in R. Wolfrum, P-T. Stoll, and M. Koebele (eds), 
WTO: Trade Remedies (Heidelberg: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and 
International Law, 2008), 423-452, at 439.  The US also referred to ‘basic infrastructure where there 
are no de iure or de facto limitations on use’, which resembles the elements for determining specificity 
under Article 2 (see below Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.3).  See Submission by the United States 
(MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, 22 November 1989). 
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as well as indirect (raised on products) taxes,689 and import duties (tariffs) present two general 
sources of government revenue.  WTO case law has dealt, in a rather expansive way, with 
cases concerning revenue alleged to be foregone under both sources.   
 
Before analyzing this case law, it should be highlighted that the SCM Agreement explicitly 
excludes from the subsidy definition, and thus from the scope of the SCM Agreement, rebates 
of indirect taxes and import duties upon exportation.690  The remission or exemption for 
exports of indirect taxes and import duties are therefore not considered as revenue foregone. 
The Appellate Body in US – FSC confirmed that rebates on direct taxes are not covered by 
this exception.691  We will return to this exception regarding indirect taxes and import duties 
when discussing remission and drawback systems under the Illustrative List of Export 
Subsidies.692 
 
Under what conditions would other forms of internal tax and tariff measures qualify as 
revenue foregone?  Regarding internal taxes, WTO-adjudicating bodies provided some 
important insight in the US – FSC case.693  In this politically sensitive case, the EC challenged 
the US income tax exemption for FSCs under the SCM Agreement.  The US direct tax system 
is a worldwide tax system because it generally taxes income of US citizens and residents 
earned anywhere in the world.  Nonetheless, foreign-source income of FSCs was exempted 
from worldwide taxation (‘FSC exemption’).694  Consequently, the EC argued, and the Panel 
as well as the Appellate Body agreed, that the US was foregoing revenue by virtue of the FSC 
exemption.  The Appellate Body clarified that ‘foregoing’ suggests that the government has 
given up an entitlement to raise revenue that it would otherwise have raised.  This cannot 
                                                 
689 For a definition of ‘direct tax’ and ‘indirect tax,’ see footnote 58 of the SCM Agreement. 
690 Footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement. See also Ad Article XVI of the GATT, Article VI:4 of the 
GATT, and Annex I, items (g), (h), and (i) of the SCM Agreement (see below). 
691 Because footnote 1 refers to ‘the exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by 
the like product’ (emphasis added).  See Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 93.  The same 
argument holds for Ad Article XVI of the GATT (and Article VI:4 of the GATT).  The exclusion of 
direct taxes is also confirmed by the different treatment of indirect and direct taxes under Annex I SCM 
Agreement [compare items (g) and (e)].  See on the exclusion of direct taxes in the GATT provisions, 
Jackson, above n 544, at 300–303. 
692 See below Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1.2.2. 
693 For comments on these cases, see C. Carmichael, ‘Foreign Sales Corporation – Subsidies, Sanctions, 
and Trade Wars’, 35 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2002), 151–210; R. Howse and D. J. 
Neven, ‘United States – Tax treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’ Recourse to Arbitration by the 
United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement 
(WT/DS108/ARB)’, 4:1 World Trade Review (2005), 101–124; R. E. Hudec, ‘Industrial Subsidies: Tax 
Treatment of ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’, in E-U. Petersmann and M. A. Pollack (eds), Transatlantic 
Economic Disputes – the EU, the US, and the WTO (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 175–205. 
694 The FSCs are foreign corporations responsible for the sale or lease of goods produced in the US for 
export. If these FSCs are foreign subsidiaries of US corporations, they received greater benefits under 
the FSC laws. 
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refer to an ‘entitlement in the abstract, because governments, in theory, could tax all 
revenues’.695  Instead, it implies ‘some defined, normative benchmark against which a 
comparison can be made’.696  As to the basis of this comparison, the Appellate Body 
concluded that it must be the ‘tax rules applied by the member in question’.697  As to the 
substance of this comparison, the Appellate Body (in US – FSC and US – FSC (Article 21.5 – 
EC)) seems to have developed a two-prong test.698  When the measure at issue can be 
described as an ‘exception’ to a ‘general rule’, the ‘but for’ test can be applied.699  Here, the 
benchmark is the situation that would exist but for the measure at issue.  Applied to the US – 
FSC case, the Panel examined whether foreign income of FSCs would be taxed higher if the 
FSCs scheme did not exist.700  However, the Appellate Body realized that the ‘but for’ test is 
not watertight.701  After all, ‘it is usually very difficult to isolate a “general rule” of taxation 
and “exceptions” to that “general” rule’ given the variety and complexity of domestic tax 
systems.702  Moreover, the Appellate Body realized that ‘it would not be difficult to 
circumvent such a test by designing a tax regime under which there would be no general rule 
that applied formally to the revenues in question, absent the contested measure’.703  Therefore, 
in most cases, panels should use the fiscal treatment of ‘legitimately comparable income’ as 
benchmark.704  The Appellate Body applied this test to the ETI Act,705 by which the US aimed 
to bring its tax system in conformity with the US – FSC ruling.706  It compared the way the US 
                                                 
695 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 90 (emphasis in the original). 
696 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 90. 
697 Otherwise, the WTO would ‘somehow compel Members to choose a particular kind of tax system’. 
Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 90. 
698 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para 91.  
699 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para 91. 
700 Panel Report, US – FSC, para 7.45. 
701 Some authors read the report of the Appellate Body in US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) as rejecting the 
‘but for’ test in all cases.  Although some elements in paragraph 91 might underpin this reading (e.g., 
the last sentence), the general thrust of paragraph 91 seems to indicate that the Appellate Body is not 
outlawing the ‘but for’ test in those cases where it is still possible to apply it.  The wording ‘not (…) 
always requires’ (emphasis by the Appellate Body itself) indicates that panels are still allowed to apply 
it whenever possible.  The ‘but for’ test is applicable when but for the measure at issue, the income 
falls under the general tax rule.  The general tax rule applies by definition to legitimately comparable 
income.  So, the outcome of both tests would be the same.  As an indication, the Panel, applying the 
‘but for’ test and the Appellate Body, applying the ‘legitimately comparable income’ test, reached the 
same conclusion in US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC). 
702 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para 91. 
703 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para 91 (emphasis in the original). 
704 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para 91. As an illustration, the Appellate 
Body explains that ‘if the measure at issue is concerned with the taxation of foreign-source income in 
the hands of a domestic corporation, it might not be appropriate to compare the measure with the fiscal 
treatment of such income in the hands of a foreign corporation’. Appellate Body Report, US – FSC 
(Article 21.5 – EC), para 92. 
705 ‘ETI’ stands for the ‘FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000’. 
706 This was contested again by the EC (Panel Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC); Appellate Body 
Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC)). Both the Panel and Appellate Body concluded that the US had 
not implemented the Dispute Settlement Body’s recommendations and rulings. In response, the US 
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taxed income under the ETI Act with the way it taxed ‘other’ foreign-source income and 
found a ‘marked contrast’ between them.707  So, without much ado, the Appellate Body 
considered other foreign-source income as legitimately comparable income.708 It observed 
that ‘absent the ETI measure, the US would tax the income under the “otherwise” applicable 
rules of taxation’.709  Apparently, the ‘but for’ test seems to examine how the income at issue 
is taxed but for the tax measure at issue from a legal viewpoint, whereas the ‘legitimately 
comparable income’ test seems to find out how the income would be taxed but for the 
measure at issue from a policy viewpoint.710  In essence, the ‘legitimately comparable income’ 
test would thus close the loopholes left open by the ‘but for’ test.  Yet, the determination by 
panels of ‘legitimately comparable income’ is even more difficult and intrusive than the 
application of the ‘but for’ test. 
The second source of government revenue discussed in the case law consists of import duties 
(tariffs).  It seems obvious that the imposition of tariffs as such cannot constitute a subsidy. 
Yet, as the Panel explained in US – Export Restraints, a solely effect-based approach toward 
subsidies would encompass tariffs.  Indeed, import duties are, par excellence, government 
measures that distort trade.  So, in the Panel’s view, the financial contribution requirement 
precisely blocks the effect-based approach and thus avoids that tariffs as such fall under the 
ambit of the SCM Agreement.711  The imposition of tariffs is not considered as a subsidy to 
                                                                                                                                            
enacted the ‘American Jobs Creation Act of 2004’.  Yet, the Panel and Appellate Body determined that 
the US still did not meet its obligations (Panel Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC II); Appellate Body 
Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC II)). 
707 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), paras 98–105.  
708 What if legitimately comparable income is subject to different tax rules?  The Appellate Body 
addressed this complex question but did not solve it in abstracto:  
‘We recognize that a Member may have several rules for taxing comparable income in different 
ways. For instance, one portion of a domestic corporation’s foreign-source income may not be 
subject to tax in any circumstances; another portion of such income may always be subject to 
tax; while a third portion may be subject to tax in some circumstances. In such a situation, the 
outcome of the dispute would depend on which aspect of the rules of taxation was challenged 
and on a detailed examination of the relationship between the different rules of taxation. The 
examination under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement must be sufficiently flexible to 
adjust to the complexities of a Member’s domestic rules of taxation’.  
Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para 91, footnote 66. 
709 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para 103 (emphasis added). 
710 If the ‘but for’ test is applicable, both tests would reach the same conclusion (see above n 701). 
711 In the words of the Panel:  
‘It is, however, doubtful that the concept of financial contribution contained in Article 1.1(a) of 
the SCM Agreement seeks to bring such government action within the ambit of the SCM 
Agreement. To the contrary, by introducing the notion of financial contribution, the drafters 
foreclosed the possibility of the treatment of any government action that resulted in a benefit as a 
subsidy. (…) To hold that the concept of financial contribution is about the effects, rather than 
the nature, of a government action would be effectively to write it out of the Agreement, leaving 
the concepts of benefit and specificity as the sole determinants of the scope of the Agreement’.  
Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para 8.38 (emphasis in the original). 
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the import-competing industry.712  However, the government does provide a financial 
contribution to the importer when it foregoes revenue by providing tariff exemptions (similar 
to when it provides tax exemptions).713  In Indonesia – Autos, the parties agreed that the 
import duty (and the sales tax) exemptions represented revenue foregone by Indonesia.714  The 
Appellate Body reached the same conclusion in Canada – Autos, applying the ‘but for’ test715 
as developed in the US – FSC case: ‘through the import duty exemption, Canada has ignored 
the “defined, normative benchmark” that it established for itself for import duties on motor 
vehicles under its normal MFN rate and, in so doing, has foregone “government revenue that 
is otherwise due” ’.716  
 
Before concluding upon these three categories of financial contributions, it seems appropriate 
to take one step back and reconsider the scope of Article III:8(b) of the GATT.  This 
provision exempts the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers from the 
national treatment discipline.717 Are all three types of financial contribution covered by this 
exemption?  The answer seems to be negative because, as the Appellate Body in Canada – 
Periodicals held, this exemption covers ‘only the payment of subsidies which involves the 
expenditure of revenue by a government’.718  Clearly, when the government refrains from 
collecting revenue it would otherwise raise (type 3 of a financial contribution; Article 
1.1(a)1(ii) of the SCM Agreement), the government does not spend any revenue.719  Indeed, 
                                                 
712 As the Panel recognized, deciding otherwise would raise a question of consistency with Article II of 
GATT 1994, dealing with Members’ schedules of concessions. If a Member applies a bound tariff rate 
(thus consistent with its schedule of commitment), another Member would still be allowed to argue that 
this constitutes an actionable subsidy if it causes adverse effects. Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, 
paras 8.36–8.38. 
713 Recall that footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement provides an exception. 
714 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.155. 
715 ‘We note, once more, that Canada has established a normal MFN duty rate for imports of motor 
vehicles of 6.1 per cent. Absent the import duty exemption, this duty would be paid on imports of 
motor vehicles’. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para 91. 
716 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para 91. As a defense, Canada invoked the exemption 
provided by footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement. Yet, the Appellate Body dismissed this argument 
because footnote 1 deals with duty or tax exemptions for exported goods, whereas the measure at issue 
applied to imports of motor vehicles sold for consumption in Canada (Appellate Body Report, Canada 
– Autos, para 92). 
717 Article III:8(b) of the GATT elaborates that this includes ‘payments to domestic producers derived 
from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article 
and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic goods’. 
718 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, at 34 (emphasis added). 
719 Also other types of financial contributions seem to fall outside the scope of Article III:8 of the 
GATT. In Canada – Periodicals, Canada applied reduced postal rates to Canadian publications.  The 
provision of postal services can be considered as a financial contribution in the sense of 1.1(a)1(iii) 
SCM Agreement.  The Appellate Body stated that it did ‘not see a reason to distinguish a reduction of 
tax rates on a product from a reduction in transportation or postal rates’ and concluded that the reduced 
postal rates were not justified by Article III:8(b) of the GATT. Consequently, the Appellate Body 
reversed the Panel’s finding that the Canadian postal rate scheme was compatible with Article III:8(b) 
of the GATT.  Appellate Body, Canada – Periodicals, at 34–35. 
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the GATT Panel in US – Malt Beverages, on which the Appellate Body in Canada – 
Periodicals relied, held that the reduction of taxes on a good does not qualify as a payment of 
a subsidy under Article III:8(b).  Hence, it is not exempted from the national treatment 
discipline.720  In conclusion, this case law indicates that measures whereby the government 
refrains from collecting taxes otherwise due can be scrutinized under the GATT national 
treatment provision.721  Such a financial contribution is, if it confers a benefit and is specific, 
also disciplined by the SCM Agreement.  Additionally, as elaborated below, local content 
subsidies, which are subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods, also 
fall outside the scope of the exception of Article III:8(b) of the GATT.722 
 
3.1.2. By a government 
3.1.2.1. Direct financial contribution: By a government or public body  
The financial contribution should be made by ‘a government or any public body within the 
territory of a Member’ (Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement).  This provision covers, first 
of all, financial contributions by national, regional, as well as local governments.  This 
conforms to the public international law principle that the conduct of any organ of the State, 
at whatever layer, is attributable to that State.723   
In addition, a financial contribution could be made by a public body.  Yet, this concept is not 
further defined in the SCM Agreement.  According to the Panel in Korea – Commercial 
Vessels, a public body is one that is ‘controlled by the government’ and government 
ownership of 100 per cent is considered ‘highly relevant and often determinative of 
government control’.724  To reach the conclusion of government control over the Export-
Import Bank of Korea (KEXIM), the Panel thus found primary evidence in 100 per cent 
government ownership.  But the Panel also took other factors into account, such as the role of 
                                                 
720 GATT Panel Report, US – Malt Beverages, paras 5.7–5.12; Appellate Body, Canada – Periodicals, 
at 34. 
721 This covers at least indirect taxation, which is captured by Article III:2 of the GATT (see, for 
example, GATT Panel Report, US – Malt Beverages). Direct taxes (on income), in contrast, are 
considered as outside the scope of Article III:2 of the GATT.  See, for example, M. Matsushita, T. J. 
Schoenbaum, and P. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization – Law, Practice and Policy, 2nd ed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 889 pp., at 246; R. Bhala, Modern GATT Law – A Treatise on 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), 1269 pp., at 108–110. 
Nonetheless, the Panel in US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) concluded that measures related to direct 
taxation can be captured by Article III:4 of the GATT: ‘Article III:4 applies to measures conditioning 
access to income tax advantages in respect of certain products’ (para 8.144). After all, as the Panel 
observed, ‘nothing in the plain language of the provision (Article III:4) specifically excludes 
requirements conditioning access to income tax measures from the scope of application of Article III 
(…)’ (emphasis added). Panel Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para 8.142. See also M. Daly, 
‘WTO Rules on Direct Taxation’, 29:5 The World Economy (May 2006), 527-557. 
722 See GATT Panel Report, Italy – Agricultural Machinery. 
723 Article 4 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
724 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.50-7.56 and 7.352–7.356. 
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the government in appointing key functions, its extensive control over the parameters within 
which KEXIM had to operate, and its description as an ‘export credit agency’, suggesting an 
hierarchical relationship of a principal (i.e., government) and an agent (i.e., KEXIM).725  
Likewise, the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) was considered a public 
body because it was 100 per cent government owned and government-appointed officials held 
important positions.726   
The Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels thus opted for the control criterion as a sufficient 
condition applicable to single out whether a ‘public body’ is present and 100 per cent 
ownership seems largely sufficient to meet this control criterion.  On the other hand, the same 
Panel considered that ‘a public policy objective’ or ‘creation through public statute’ might 
also be indicative of the public nature of an entity.727  But both elements are neither sufficient 
nor necessary to determine the existence of a public body since the control criterion is 
sufficient on its own to tackle this question.728  Importantly, the Panel thus dismissed that a 
government controlled entity needs to pursue a public policy objective to label it as a ‘public 
body’.  In case an entity is effectively controlled by the government (or other public bodies), 
it qualifies as a public body and ‘any action by that entity is attributable to the government’.729 
 
As Mavroidis et al have pointed to, WTO Members such as the US and EC seemed to have 
been somewhat surprised by this wide interpretation of ‘public body’.  Indeed, they had 
treated 100 per cent government-owned entities as private instead of public bodies in their 
respective CVDs procedures on Korean imports of DRAMs (see next section).  This 
qualification implied that the presence of an indirect financial contribution had to be 
demonstrated.  They had to show that these ‘private’ entities were ‘entrusted or directed’ by 
the Korean government to make a financial contribution.730  Indeed, the Panel in US – 
Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS observed that ‘depending on the circumstances, 
100 per cent government ownership might well have justified the treatment of such creditors 
                                                 
725 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.50-7.56. 
726 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.352–7.356. 
727 Clarifying that both criteria are not sufficient conditions on their own to determine the existence of a 
public body, the Panel gave as examples: ‘(…) the fact that a private philanthropist may pursue public 
policy objectives should probably not cause that person to be treated as a "public body".  In addition, 
the privatization of a company might be finalized through a public statute’.  Panel Report, Korea – 
Commercial Vessels, para 7.55. 
728 Korea’s argument that an entity does not constitute a ‘public body’ if it engages in market (non-
official) activities on commercial terms failed, according to the Panel, to distinguish between the 
‘financial contribution by a government’ element and ‘benefit’ element of the subsidy definition.  The 
Panel considered it simply irrelevant whether transactions are made on commercial terms to determine 
whether an entity is a ‘public body’.  Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.44-7.49. 
729 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.50-7.51.  See also P. C. Mavroidis, P. A. 
Messerlin, and J. M. Wauters, The Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in the WTO 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 606 pp., at 316. 
730 Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters, above n 729, at 317-318. 
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as public bodies’. 731  Yet, because the US Department of Commerce (USDOC) had 
considered these as private bodies, the additional demonstration of entrustment or direction 
had to be fulfilled.  Likewise, the Panel in EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips 
remarked that it did ‘not wish to imply that it would not be possible or justified to treat a 100 
per cent government owned entity as a public body, depending on the circumstances’.732  
Again, the Panel examined the entrustment/direction issue regarding a 100 per cent 
government-owned Korean bank that had been qualified by the EC as a private bank.  In this 
examination, the Panel in EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips stressed that the 
extent of government-ownership could also be ‘a very relevant factor’ in assessing 
entrustment or direction.733  Yet, government control is not sufficient on itself because it 
should be demonstrated, ‘(i)n the case of a 100 per cent government-owned bank (…) that the 
government actually exercised its shareholder power to direct the bank’ to offer subsidized 
financing.734  The EC was successful in demonstrating such direction, whereas the US failed 
to meet the burden of ‘entrustment or direction’.735  In sum, when confronted with 100 per 
cent government owned entities, CVDs authorities are well advised to simply qualify these 
entities as public bodies in first order.  The same advice holds in case the government is not 
the only shareholder but holds the large majority of shares.736  In second order, CVDs 
authorities could still seek to demonstrate that these entities were ‘entrusted or directed’ by 
the government, whereby the degree of government ownership would again be a relevant 
factor. 
 
                                                 
731 Although the Panel explicitly stated that ‘we do not make any findings that 100 per cent 
government-owned entities will necessarily constitute public bodies’.  Panel Report, US – 
Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, paras 6.11, 7.8, footnote 29, para 7.62, footnote 80. 
732 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.119, footnote 129.  On the 
other hand, the EC had considered that the Korea Development Bank (KDB) was a public body 
because it was not only 100 per cent government-owned, but ‘also entrusted with a specific public 
policy role which obliged it to carry out policies normally followed by the government’.  The EC thus 
seemed to consider a public policy objective as a necessary element of a ‘public body’.  See Panel 
Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.90. 
733 After all, ‘(i)t is clear that, as the sole shareholder, it is easier for the government to direct the bank 
to act in a certain manner than in a situation of no or only minor government involvement’.  Panel 
Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.119. 
734 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, paras 7.119-1.120; see also, Panel 
Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 7.62. 
735 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.125; Panel Report, US – 
Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 7.63. 
736 In footnote 129 (see above n 732 and full text), the Panel in EC – Countervailing Measures on 
DRAM Chips continued that a ‘similar consideration applies to our discussion and analysis of Chohung 
Bank and the KEB in which the government of Korea held 80 per cent and 43 per cent of the shares, 
respectively, at the time of the investigation’.  See also Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures 
on DRAM Chips, paras 7.127, footnote 136, 7.134, footnote 142. 
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3.1.2.2. Indirect financial contribution: Entrustment or direction of a private body 
In addition to direct financial contributions by the government or a public body, Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement shows that such contributions can be made indirectly by 
a government.  This occurs when the government (or any public body within its territory737) 
makes payments to a funding mechanism or when it entrusts or directs a private body to carry 
out one of the three types of financial contribution.738  This provision is ‘in essence, an anti-
circumvention provision’:739 it prevents governments from circumventing the SCM 
Agreement by channeling their contribution through an intermediary or by using a private 
body as a ‘proxy’740 to make that contribution.741  Hence, it assumes ‘a demonstrable link 
between the government and the conduct of the private body’.742  What is the required 
strength of this link and how should it be demonstrated?  Insights on both questions could be 
revealed from the three cases in which Korea challenged CVDs imposed by respectively the 
US, the EC, and Japan.  These three WTO Members had imposed CVDs on the imports of 
DRAMs (i.e., dynamic-random access memories) from Korea.743  A common question that 
that had to be solved in all three cases was indeed whether it was demonstrated that private 
                                                 
737 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.49. 
738 Strictly speaking, five different elements can be distinguished in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM 
Agreement:  (1) a government ‘entrusts or directs’; (2) ‘a private body’; (3) ‘to carry out one or more of 
the type of functions illustrated in’ subparagraphs (i)–(iii) of Article 1.1(a)(1); (4) ‘which would 
normally be vested in the government’; and (5) ‘the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices 
normally followed by governments’. See Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para 8.25.  Reviewing 
the meaning of elements (4) and (5) in light of the negotiating history, panels have understood a 
function ‘normally vested in the government’ broadly as any function which ‘involves the levy of 
taxation or the expenditure of revenue’ (e.g., loans, restructuring measures).  Panel Report, US – 
Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 737; Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, 
para 7.30. This broad description implies that the scope of this provision seems not narrowed by 
elements (4) and (5) as all cases of government entrustment or direction of a private body to carry out 
one of the functions illustrated under (i)-(iii) (elements (1) to (3)) ipso facto seem to involve the levy of 
taxation or the expenditure of revenue.  Adamantopoulos also viewed these elements ‘of a clarificatory 
nature rather than qualifying or conditional’.  Adamantopoulos, above n 688, at 444.  See also 
Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 108. 
739 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 113; Appellate 
Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 52. 
740 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, paras 108, 115, 116. 
741 See Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 52. 
742 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 112.  
Interestingly, the Appellate Body referred to the Commentaries to the ILC Draft Articles (Article 8, 
footnote 8, Commentary (6), pp. 107-108) to conclude that ‘the conduct of private bodies is 
presumptively not attributable to the State’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMS, para 112, footnote 179. 
743 See US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS; EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM 
Chips; Japan – DRAMs (Korea).  For a discussion of Japan’s first CVDs determination, see Y. J. Cho, 
‘Japan’s First CVDs Determination: With Particular Emphasis on the Issue of Direction and 
Entrustment’, 43:2 Journal of World Trade (2009), 417-437. 
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creditors were ‘entrusted or directed’ by the Korean government to bailout one of its DRAMs 
producers (i.e., Hynix Semiconductor).744    
First, regarding the required strength of this link, the Appellate Body in US – Countervailing 
Duty Investigation on DRAMS explained that ‘entrustment’ does not only cover acts of 
delegation but occurs more broadly where a government gives responsibility to a private 
body.  Similarly, ‘direction’ is not limited to acts of command but covers all situations where 
the government exercises its authority over a private body.745  The Appellate Body thus 
endorsed a broad interpretation of both standards but, at the same time, also emphasized that 
‘(i)n most cases, one would expect entrustment or direction of a private body to involve some 
form of threat or inducement’.746  Certainly, ‘mere policy pronouncements by a government 
would not, by themselves’ be sufficient and the required nexus implies ‘a more active role 
than mere acts of encouragement’.747  Further, entrustment or direction ‘cannot be inadvertent 
or a mere by-product of governmental regulation’.748  Lastly and importantly, the Appellate 
Body agreed with the Panel in US – Export Restraints that entrustment and direction do not 
cover ‘the situation in which the government intervenes in the market in some way, which 
may or may not have a particular result simply based on the given factual circumstances and 
the exercise of free choice by the actors in that market’.749  It always has to be demonstrated 
that private bodies were effectively entrusted or directed by the government to make a 
financial contribution in the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. 
    
Second, regarding the demonstration of such link between the government and private bodies, 
this ‘will hinge on the particular facts of the case’.750  No specific standard for demonstrating 
entrustment or direction is in place.  The Appellate Body has correctly specified that such 
demonstration is, strictly speaking, not a pure fact but ‘a legal assessment based on a proven 
                                                 
744 Recall that, in some instances, panels have indicated that they would consider some of these private 
creditors rather as public bodies (see above n 733, 734). 
745 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 116. Indeed, 
panels had limited the terms ‘entrusts’ and ‘directs’ to, respectively, acts of ‘delegation’ and 
‘command’. See Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, paras 8.28–8.29; Panel Report, Korea – 
Commercial Vessels, para 7.368; Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 
7.52.  
746 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 116. 
747 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 114. 
748 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 114. 
749 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 114; Panel 
Report, US – Export Restraints, para 8.31.  The Panel in US – Export Restraints had therefore rejected 
the US argument that an export restriction should be labeled as an entrustment or direction by the 
government on private upstream producers to provide goods domestically because the US saw no 
functional difference between a restriction on exporting a product and an instruction to sell that product 
domestically.  Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, paras 8.26-8.44. 
750 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, paras 116, 138. 
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set of facts’.751  Acknowledging that such entrustment or direction ‘will rarely be formal, or 
explicit’ (i.e., lack of so-called ‘smoking gun’), the Panel in Japan – DRAMs (Korea) agreed 
that it is ‘likely to be based on pieces of circumstantial evidence’.752  In this respect, the 
Appellate Body in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS had underscored that 
‘individual pieces of circumstantial evidence are unlikely to establish entrustment or 
direction’.753  All such pieces should be put together to determine whether, on the basis of the 
totality of evidence, ‘entrustment or direction’ might be reasonably inferred.754   
A first indication of government entrustment or direction is present if the private actor acts 
against its commercial interests.755  As explained above, a second relevant factor in the view 
of several panels is the degree of government ownership of the private body.756  To be sure, 
both elements are not sufficient on their own because they do not reveal anything about the 
government’s actual conduct.757  Nonetheless, the Panel in EC – Countervailing Measures on 
DRAM Chips had concluded that a combination of both elements (i.e., large government 
shareholder status and commercial unreasonableness) could, in the absence of strong evidence 
to the contrary, suffice to infer government direction.758  Moreover, both elements are not 
strictly needed to reach the conclusion of government entrustment/direction.  For instance, 
entrustment or direction by the government could be present ‘even where the financial 
contribution is made on commercially reasonable terms’.759 
                                                 
751 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 150, footnote 277 
(emphasis in the original). 
752 Panel Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 7.73.  The Panel in EC – Countervailing Measures on 
DRAM Chips (para 7.57) had also stressed that entrustment or direction could be ‘explicit or implicit, 
informal or formal’.   
753 The Appellate Body acknowledged that in cases of entrustment or direction, ‘the evidence that is 
publicly-available, (…) , will likely be of a circumstantial nature’.  Appellate Body Report, US – 
Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 150, footnote 277, para 154. 
754 After all, ‘the significance of individual pieces of evidence may become clear only when viewed 
together with other evidence’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on 
DRAMS, para 154.  For a discussion, see J. F. Francois and D. Palmeter, ‘US – Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMs’, 7:1 World Trade Review (2008), 219-229, at 222-225. 
755 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 138; Panel in Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 
7.70; Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.59. 
756 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, paras 7.119-7.120; see also, Panel 
Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 7.62. 
757 Commercial unreasonableness could, according to the Panel in Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (para 7.70), 
not be determinative of itself because it says nothing about the conduct of the government itself, and 
thus needs to be coupled with other evidence.  See also, Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs 
(Korea), para 138; Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, paras 7.59, 7.119-
7.120, 7.127. 
758 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, paras 7.131, 7.134.  The Panel in 
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) seemed to endorse this conclusion (para 7.253, footnote 462), though, in my 
view, even the combination of both elements reveals nothing about the government’s effective conduct, 
which was the reason why the same panels rejected that government ownership and commercial 
unreasonableness on their own were sufficient (see above n 757). 
759 Of course, such transaction might fail to pass the benefit threshold (see below Part II, Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2).  Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 138.  Obviously, a government 
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Next to these two factors, other findings for demonstrating ‘entrustment or direction’ have 
also been considered relevant.  These elements include the government’s revealed intent or 
motivation (e.g., the Korean government’s intent to save Hynix, through direct intervention if 
needed)760, its coercive behaviour in related transactions761, or, when demonstrated in a CVDs 
investigation, the failure of interested parties to cooperate with the investigating authority.762   
All such pieces of evidence should be put together so as to determine whether the legal 
assessment of ‘entrustment or direction’ could be reasonably inferred.763   
 
In conclusion, as advocated by the US and Australia during the Uruguay Round, the SCM 
Agreement covers so-called ‘private subsidies’, wherein the financial contribution is made by 
a private body but at the direction or entrustment of the government.  Hence, a subsidy does 
not necessarily involve a financial contribution by the government itself.  What is more, this 
illustrates that a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement not 
necessarily involves a cost upon the government itself.764  Nevertheless, purely ‘private 
subsidies’, without any form of governmental involvement, are not targeted.765  In the words 
of the Appellate Body, ‘situations involving exclusively private conduct – that is, conduct that 
is not in some way attributable to a government or public body –’ fall outside the scope of 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement.766   
                                                                                                                                            
does not need to be a shareholder but the quality of evidence for demonstrating direction/entrustment is 
set higher in case the government holds no shareholder power.  See Panel Report, EC – Countervailing 
Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.140. 
760 This is revealed ‘on the basis of statements properly attributed to named government agencies or 
representatives, in the absence of express denials, corrections, or other evidence to the contrary’.  Panel 
Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 7.104; Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 
133.  In US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, the Panel had also found that the Korean 
government had a policy to save Hynix.  Panel Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on 
DRAMS; Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, paras 155, 186. 
761 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 156. 
762 Again, non-cooperation is insufficient on its own to show entrustment or direction. Combined with 
commercial unreasonableness, complete failure to cooperate by Citibank sufficed to show direction by 
the Korean government.  Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, paras 7.60-
7.61, 7.139-7.145.  Other factors, such as the fact that the restructuring took place in the framework of 
a formal government act, have also been considered.  See, for example, Panel Report, EC – 
Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para7.125; Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing 
Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 186. 
763 This means that when a panel is requested to review a CVDs-investigating authority’s determination 
of ‘entrustment or direction’ based on several of such different individual pieces of circumstantial 
evidence, it should, according to the Appellate Body, ‘consider that evidence in its totality, rather than 
individually, in order to assess its probative value with respect to the agency's determination’.  
Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 150.  See below Part 
II, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.5. 
764 Appellate Body, Canada – Aircraft, para 160; Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 9.115. 
765 Such private subsidies were countervailable under US law. See Stewart, above n 579, at 898–899. 
766 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 107; see also 
Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.50.  To be precise, it might be 
covered under the notion of ‘income or price support’ (Article 1.1(a)(2)). 
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3.1.3. Income or price support 
A subsidy in the meaning of the SCM Agreement can exist, not only when the government 
directly or indirectly provides a financial contribution but also when there is ‘any form of 
income or price support in the sense of Article XVI GATT 1994’ (Article 1.1(a)(2) of the 
SCM Agreement). 767  Yet, the notions of income and price support are not defined by either 
the GATT or the SCM Agreement.  Given that these provisions do not clearly demarcate the 
scope of this second alternative, one would hope to find some further guidance in the case 
law.  Unfortunately, no panel or Appellate Body Report has interpreted this second alternative 
so far.  What is more, panels and the Appellate Body sometimes seem to overlook it when 
they define the term ‘subsidy’ under the SCM Agreement.768  Most Members – and maybe 
also those panel and Appellate Body reports that neglect this second alternative – might hold 
the view that ‘income or price support’ is only relevant to the field of agriculture.769  But the 
reference to income and price support in Article 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement juncto 
Article XVI of the GATT is not explicitly limited to the field of agriculture.770 
The inclusion of this second alternative in the definition of ‘subsidy’ was, as Luengo clarifies, 
a way to include Article XVI of the GATT into the SCM Agreement.  Yet, no one reflected 
upon the consequences of this inclusion.771  Whereas most authors tend to pay little attention 
to this second alternative,772  Luengo argues that it is vital for defining subsidies because it 
substantially broadens the scope of subsidies beyond financial contributions by a government 
to include any form of income or price support that causes trade distortion.773  Consequently, 
the notion of ‘any form of income support’ would capture government measures that directly 
or indirectly have an impact on the income of the recipient, without involving a financial 
                                                 
767 The Appellate Body in US – FSC noted that Article 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement is a reference 
to Article XVI:1 of the GATT and not to Article XVI:4 of the GATT. See Appellate Body Report, US – 
FSC, para 117, footnote 135. 
768 See, for example, Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para 8.69; Appellate Body Report, Canada 
– Aircraft, para 156; Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, 
para 139.  In contrast, the Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV correctly noticed that that the 
range of government measures capable of providing subsidies (i.e., Article 1.1(a)(i)-(iv) SCM 
Agreement) ‘is broadened still further by the concept of ‘income or price support’ in paragraph 2 of 
Article 1.1(a)’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 52. 
769 It was invoked in two cases concerning agricultural subsidies.  See Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras 92 and 98; Panel Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New 
Zealand and US II), para 5.147. 
770 As indicated, Article XVI:1 of the GATT refers to ‘subsidies, including any form of income or price 
support’. Moreover, in the view of Jackson, the definition of ‘subsidy’ in Article XVI:4 (on export 
subsidies for non-primary products) encompasses government price-support schemes (e.g., government 
purchases and sales with net infusion of government funds), even though the phrase ‘including income 
or price support’ is not included in Article XVI:4. See Jackson, above n 544, at 397.   
771 G. Luengo, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law (The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Law International, 2006), 586 pp., at 122. 
772 Notice also that the World Trade Report 2006 was rather cryptic on this issue. World Trade Report 
2006, above n 574, at 197. 
773 Luengo, above n 771, at 120–123. 
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contribution.  For example, Luengo holds that an export restraint on a certain product can be 
considered a subsidy in the sense of the SCM Agreement given that it provides an indirect 
income support to the domestic purchasers of the product in question because they can buy 
the product at a reduced price.774  So, it should have been possible for the Panel in US – 
Export Restraints, which only considered and dismissed the first alternative (‘financial 
contribution’), to conclude that export restraints were a form of income support in the sense of 
Article 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement.775 
Nonetheless, such a broad interpretation seems to render the first alternative meaningless.  At 
first sight, all financial contributions might have a (direct or indirect) impact on the income of 
the recipient.  As the Panel in US – Export Restraints stressed, the requirement of ‘financial 
contribution’ into the definition of subsidy was precisely advocated by most countries to 
counter the purely effect-based definition by the US.776  An expansive interpretation of 
‘income or price support in the sense of Article XVI GATT’ as advocated by Luengo would 
bring the definition of ‘subsidy’ close to such an effect-based approach, covering almost any 
government action that confers a benefit and causes trade distortion.777   
 
3.2. BENEFIT 
To be labeled a subsidy under the SCM Agreement, the financial contribution by the 
government (or income/price support) should ‘confer a benefit’ (Article 1.1(b) of the SCM 
Agreement).  In Canada – Aircraft, the Appellate Body has set out the essential elements on 
how this second layer of the subsidy definition should be understood.  Two fundamental 
aspects of this determination were discerned. 
First, the Appellate Body started from the observation that such a benefit ‘could not exist in 
the abstract, but must be received and enjoyed by a beneficiary or a recipient’.778  This 
recipient could be a ‘person, natural or legal, or a group of persons’.779  Whereas the financial 
contribution element focuses on the government, in the determination of a ‘benefit’ the focus 
shifts toward the recipient of the contribution.780  The benefit element should thus be clearly 
                                                 
774 Luengo, above n 771, at 120. 
775 Luengo, above n 771, at 120, footnote 60. 
776 Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, paras 8.63–8.72. 
777 Paraphrasing the Panel in US – Export Restraints, ‘the door would be reopened to the countervailing 
of benefits regardless of the nature of the government action that gave rise to them’ and this ‘would 
effectively render the "financial contribution" requirement meaningless’.  Panel Report, US – Export 
Restraints, para 8.74.  Recall also the wording of the Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV as 
cited above n 667. 
778 Appellate Body Report, Canada –Aircraft , para 154. 
779 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 154. 
780 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 156. 
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distinguished from the ‘financial contribution’ component, although, as illustrated below, this 
might de facto not always be relevant.   
Second, to determine whether such a recipient has received a benefit by virtue of the financial 
contribution (or income/price support), the Appellate Body observed that ‘this implies some 
kind of comparison’ because:  
 
(…) there can be no ‘benefit’ to the recipient unless the ‘financial contribution’ makes the 
recipient ‘better off’ than it would otherwise have been, absent that contribution. In our view, 
the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for comparison in determining whether a 
‘benefit’ has been ‘conferred’, because the trade-distorting potential of a ‘financial 
contribution’ can be identified by determining whether the recipient has received a ‘financial 
contribution’ on terms more favorable than those available to the recipient in the market.781 
 
Hence, the Appellate Body developed what could be labeled the private market test.782  A 
benefit arises if ‘the recipient has received a "financial contribution" on terms more 
favourable than those available to the recipient in the market’.783  Thus, if private actors 
would have provided the financial contribution at the same conditions, the government’s 
action would not confer a benefit upon the recipient.  As illuminated in the Appellate Body’s 
statement, this private market test exactly fits the rationale behind the ‘benefit’ element.  This 
rationale has been adequately formulated by the Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels: it ‘acts 
as a screen to filter out commercial conduct’.784  If the government acts similarly as a 
commercial player, its action does not distort trade.  
In developing both parts of its reasoning, the Appellate Body found contextual guidance in 
Article 14 of the SCM Agreement.  This provision sets guidelines for the calculation by the 
CVDs-investigating authority of the amount ‘of a subsidy in terms of the benefit to the 
recipient’.785  A benefit is conferred by each of the listed examples of financial contributions 
(i.e., equity investments, loans, loan guarantees, the provision of goods or services or 
purchase of goods) when made on more favourable than market terms.  Article 14 of the SCM 
Agreement is therefore considered ‘highly relevant context’786 at the disposal of the WTO-
adjudicating bodies or CVDs-investigating authorities to decide on whether these listed 
examples confer a benefit under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.  Notice that these 
listed examples in Article 14 of the SCM Agreement cover the two types of financial 
                                                 
781 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 157. 
782 It is sometimes labeled as the private investor test.  Given that not all types of financial contributions 
are made by ‘investors’, the broader term ‘private market test’ seems more appropriate.   
783 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 158.  The Appellate Body hereby agreed with the 
Panel.  See Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, paras 9.111-9.120. 
784 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.28. 
785 Article 14 of the SCM Agreement (emphasis added).  The Panel and Appellate Body considered this 
relevant context in particular because it explicitly refers to the benefit ‘conferred pursuant to paragraph 
1 of Article 1’.  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, paras 155, 158; Panel Report, Canada – 
Aircraft, para 9.112.  See also Appellate Body Report, US – Lead and Bismuth II, para 57. 
786 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.173. 
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contributions for which a substantive benefit analysis will have to be undertaken: (potential) 
direct transfer of funds787 and the provision of goods/services or purchase of goods.788  
Indeed, the benchmark for determining whether a financial contribution is given in the form 
of ‘revenue foregone’ equally detects whether a benefit is conferred.  Although the benefit 
threshold should formally still be passed for this third type of financial contribution, a 
separate substantive analysis will not be required because a benefit upon the recipient is ipso 
facto generated in all cases whereby revenue is foregone by the government.789 
 
By turning the benefit analysis to the recipient and focusing on the marketplace as point of 
comparison, the Appellate Body in Canada – Aircraft sided with the Panel that the benefit 
analysis is not concerned with the notion of a cost-to-government.790,791  Read together with 
the financial contribution element, this implies that a subsidy does not necessarily involve a 
cost upon the government.792  Indeed, even if a financial contribution involves no cost upon 
the government, a subsidy exists when it makes the recipient better off.  For example, the 
government can borrow funding on the private market and pass this through to a private actor 
at an interest rate that is not available to the latter when he would borrow directly on the 
private market. Without any cost to the government,793 a subsidy is provided because the 
financial contribution (Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)) made by the government confers a benefit upon 
the recipient.794  Hence, the requirement of a cost-to-government as a necessary element of a 
subsidy is rejected.  This had been fruitlessly proposed by the EC and some other countries 
                                                 
787 See Article 1.1.(a)(1)(i) juncto Article 14(a),(b),(c) of the SCM Agreement.  Those examples of 
financial contributions explicitly mentioned under Article 1.1(c)(1)(i) are also listed under Article 14 of 
the SCM Agreement: (a) equity capital, (b) loan, (c) loan guarantees.  The items listed in Article 14 
could also be used by analogy for those types of financial contributions that are not explicitly 
mentioned under Article 1.1(c)(1)(i) (e.g., debt-to-equity swap).  Obviously, in case a grant (Article 
1.1.(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement) is provided by the government, a benefit is ipso facto conferred.  
Hence, this item is not listed under Article 14 of the SCM Agreement.  See also, Panel Report, Mexico 
– Olive Oil, para 1.158. 
788 See Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) juncto Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement.   
789 Likewise, the concept of ‘income, or prices support’ also seems to imply a benefit. 
790 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, paras 154–156; Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, paras 
9.111-9.120; Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.84.   
791 Notice that those provisions in the SCM Agreement referring to a cost-to-government standard, such 
as some items of the Illustrative List on Export Subsidies (Illustrative List) as well as Annex IV, are not 
considered relevant context with regard to the benefit analysis.  The Illustrative List is not relevant 
because it determines whether a prohibited export subsidy exists and not whether a subsidy exists 
within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement (Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 9.117).  
Regarding Annex IV of the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body concluded that this ‘has nothing to 
do with whether a "benefit" has been conferred, nor with whether a measure constitutes a subsidy 
within the meaning of Article 1.1’ (Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 159; Panel Report, 
Canada – Aircraft, paras 9.113, 9.116).   
792 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.191; Panel Report, Canada – 
Aircraft, para 9.117. 
793 To be precise, the governments still incur an opportunity cost. 
794 Contextual support could be found in Article 14(b) of the SCM Agreement. 
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when drafting the SCM Agreement.795  Instead, as endorsed by the US during the Uruguay 
Round, the benefit-to-recipient forms the relevant benchmark under the subsidy definition of 
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.796  It will be illustrated in the case study on export credit 
support (Part III) that this interpretation ensures that all WTO Members are treated equally 
regarding the subsidy definition in Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.  At the same time, it 
raises the interesting question on how this definition relates to the cost-to-government 
standard elaborated under some items of the Illustrative List on Export Subsidies.   
 
In sum, shifting the focal point to the recipient and taking the marketplace as benchmark has 
been the consistent response of panels and the Appellate Body to decide on the benefit 
element.  Yet, they have been confronted with complex interpretative questions on both 
aspects, which will be analyzed in the next sections. 
 
3.2.1. Determination of the relevant benchmark 
3.2.1.1. The adequacy of remuneration in case the government provides goods or services  
As the Panel in Japan – DRAMs (Korea) accurately summarized, it is ‘now well established’ 
that the benefit-concept is ‘defined by reference to the market, such that a financial 
contribution confers a benefit when it is made available on terms that are more favourable 
than the recipient could have obtained on the market’.797  Private market prices that are 
effectively available to the recipient should be used as relevant point of reference: would the 
recipient operating in its particular market be worse off absent the government contribution?  
When the government provides goods or services, the adequacy of remuneration should 
therefore be determined in relation to the market conditions in the country of provision 
(Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement).  But could such private market prices prevailing in the 
domestic market still be used as benchmark in case these prices are distorted by the very same 
financial contribution made by the government?   
 
                                                 
795 See Note by the Secretariat, Meeting of 6 November 1990 (MTN.GNG/NG10/24, 29 November 
1990). 
796 See Submission by the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/39, 27 September 1990).  This holds 
insofar the benefit-to-recipient is, of course, the result of a financial contribution by the government or 
income, or price support. 
797 Panel Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 7.275. 
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This thorny query was central in the US – Softwood Lumber dispute.798,799  In its CVDs 
investigation, USDOC had relied on US private stumpage fees as relevant benchmark for 
deciding on whether Canadian public stumpage fees conferred a benefit to Canadian lumber 
producers.  Because the Canadian government ‘so dominates the Canadian market for timber 
that the below-market government prices suppress prices in the small private market for 
timber in Canada’, USDOC considered that the only reasonable alternative was to make ‘use 
of other prices commercially available to Canadian lumber producers on the world market’.800  
Canada, on the other hand, argued that the question whether a benefit is conferred ‘depends 
on whether the Canadian producers were better off than other purchasers who buy the same 
good from other sellers in the country subject to the investigation’.801  After all, it highlighted 
that this benchmark was prescribed under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement.  This 
establishes that the provision of goods by a government shall not be considered as conferring 
a benefit unless it is made for less than adequate remuneration and this:  
 
(…) shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or service in 
question in the country of provision or purchase (including price, quality, availability, 
marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale).802 
 
Significantly, both the Panel in US – Softwood Lumber IV and the Appellate Body endorsed 
the US reasoning from an economic point of view.  In situations where government 
involvement is so substantial that private prices may be artificially suppressed because of the 
prices charged for the same goods by the government, the Panel reasoned that: 
  
A comparison of the conditions of the government financial contribution with the conditions 
prevailing in the private market would not fully capture the extent of the distortion arising 
from the government financial contribution, a result that in our view would not necessarily be 
the most sensible one from the perspective of economic logic.803 
 
The use of private market prices as a benchmark in those circumstances could, as the US 
highlighted, lead to ‘a circular comparison of a government price with, in effect, itself’.804  
Indeed, one could not but agree that the private market test assumes that the price setting by 
                                                 
798 See, in particular, US – Softwood Lumber III (US preliminary CVDs determination challenged by 
Canada) and US – Softwood Lumber IV (US final CVDs determination challenged by Canada).  For an 
elaborated case note of the Softwood – Lumber dispute, see Gagné and Roch, above n 683.  
799 This discussion concentrated on the calculation of the benefit (Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement) 
but is, of course, highly relevant to the question of whether a benefit exists in the first place (Article 
1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement).  For the close link between both provisions, see Appellate Body 
Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, paras 84–85. 
800 According to the US, the Canadian government timber sales accounted for more than 80 per cent of 
the total market.  Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber III, para 7.36 (emphasis added).  
801 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber III, para 7.31 (emphasis in the original). 
802 Emphasis added. 
803 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 7.58. 
804 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 7.58; Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber 
IV, para 93. 
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private actors is not determined by the very same financial contribution.  What is more, it 
might even be suggested that, to some extent, the private market test fails to detect exactly 
those domestic subsidies that have the most trade-distorting potential.  After all, this test is not 
suitable in cases where the government’s involvement is so dominant that it effectively 
determines the domestic market prices or that it even prevents the emergence of a private 
market for the same good.  Notice already that this argument referring to the government’s 
predominant role in the economy exactly explains why there was a tradition to not impose 
CVDs against so-called ‘non-market economies’.805 
 
Even though it shared the economic logic behind the US approach, the Panel rejected this 
approach from a legal perspective.  Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement left in its 
interpretation no other option than to use in-country market prices, unless in the exceptional 
cases in which the government is the sole domestic provider or administratively controls all of 
the prices.806  Because none of these exceptional cases was present in casu and it could not 
‘substitute its economic judgment for that of the drafters’, the Panel sided with Canada that 
USDOC should have used Canadian private lumber prices as benchmark.807  The Appellate 
Body, however, endorsed a broader reading of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement that 
could respect the economic logic.  Hence, it concurred with the US basic point that ‘prices in 
the market of the country of provision are the primary, but not the exclusive, benchmark for 
calculating benefit’. 808  The Appellate Body further clarified, at least to some extent, when 
ánd how such an alternative benchmark could be used.  Both elements are discussed in turn. 
The Appellate Body considered that other than in-country market prices could be used in 
situations ‘where the government has such a predominant role in the market, as a provider of 
certain goods, that private suppliers will align their prices with those of the government-
provided goods; in other words, a situation where the government effectively acts as a "price-
setter" and private suppliers are "price-takers"’.809  To be clear, this concerns situations 
whereby private suppliers become de facto price takers as a result of the government’s 
predominant role in that very same market.  Moreover, the Appellate Body emphasized that 
the required degree of dominance is not present simply because the government is a 
                                                 
805 See below Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.2. 
806 After all, in those cases there would simply not be another in-country price than the government 
price if it is assumed that there are no imports.  This implies that there would not be ‘a market’ in the 
sense of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement.  Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, paras 7.57, 
7.60. 
807 See Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, paras 7.59–7.60; Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber 
III, paras 7.39–7.59.  For a comment, see M. Benitah, ‘Softwood Lumber: Exact Significance of the 
Recent Canadian Victory before the WTO and Prospects in the Context the Pending Second Lumber 
Case’, 3:2 The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy (2002), 346–356. 
808 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, paras 82-97. 
809 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 99. 
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significant provider of the good in question.810  In the exceptional circumstances singled out 
by the Panel, the Appellate Body’s argumentation to apply other than in-country prices would 
a fortiori apply.  If the government is the sole domestic provider or administratively controls 
all of those prices, other than in-country prices will indeed have to be used.811  In Canada – 
Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), the Appellate Body had, for instance, relied upon 
an alternative benchmark (i.e., production costs) since the domestic price was an administered 
price fixed by the Canadian government.812  Overall, however, the Appellate Body stressed 
that the possibility to use an alternative benchmark is ‘very limited’ and should be determined 
on a ‘case-by-case’ basis.813   
 
In these limited situations where other than in-country market prices could be used, how 
should such an alternative benchmark be constructed?  Refraining to give a full overview, the 
Appellate Body only indicated that it would agree with benchmarks that would be based on 
world market prices or prices constructed on the basis of production costs.814  As discussed in 
more detail below, production costs have already been used as benchmark in some disputes 
on agricultural export subsidies.815  Yet, the Appellate Body warned that it must be ensured 
that such alternative prices are always related to market conditions in the country under 
investigation.  Somehow, these prices will thus have to be adapted to reflect in-country 
market conditions such as ‘price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other 
conditions of purchase or sale, as required by Article 14(d)’.816   
Although the Appellate Body refrained from explicitly taking position due to lack of 
sufficient facts, it seemed to hint that it would not have easily agreed with USDOC’s decision 
to use private market prices in another country (e.g., the US) as an alternative benchmark.  
After all, the Appellate Body considered it be ‘very difficult, from a practical viewpoint’, to 
adapt those prices to market conditions in the country of provision.817  In any event, the use of 
                                                 
810 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 102. 
811 Indeed, the Appellate Body expressed some difficulty with the Panel's approach of treating a 
situation in which the government is the sole supplier of certain goods differently from a situation in 
which the government is the predominant supplier of those goods because there would be little 
difference in terms of market distortion.  Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 100; 
see also above n 806.   
812 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para 82. 
813 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, paras 99, 102. 
814 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 106. 
815 See also Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, footnote 128.  The Panel and Appellate 
Body also relied upon production costs as benchmark in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (see below 
Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.2.1.1). 
816 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 106. 
817 The Appellate Body considered it difficult in practice ‘for investigating authorities to replicate 
reliably market conditions prevailing in one country on the basis of market conditions prevailing in 
another country’ because ‘there are numerous factors to be taken into account in making adjustments’ 
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this benchmark would require that foreign country market prices are adapted so that any 
comparative advantage of the prevailing country is respected.  Indeed, the Appellate Body 
reasoned: 
 
(…) countervailing measures may be used only for the purpose of offsetting a subsidy 
bestowed upon a product, provided that it causes injury to the domestic industry producing the 
like product. They must not be used to offset differences in comparative advantages between 
countries.818 
 
The Appellate Body’s concern seems that foreign country market prices might be higher 
simply because the country under investigation has a comparative advantage in producing the 
good in question.  Obviously, if such higher foreign country market prices would be used as 
benchmark, the price at which the country under investigation provides the good in question 
will be considered at subsidized terms even if such lower price merely reflects its comparative 
advantage.  Unless foreign country prices are corrected for any difference in comparative 
advantage – which is a highly difficult exercise –, their use as point of comparison would thus 
lead to false positive determinations of subsidization.  Albeit the Appellate Body’s concern 
therefore seems legitimate, the dividing line between the legitimate use of CVDs for 
‘offsetting a subsidy’ and their illegitimate use ‘to offset differences in comparative 
advantage’ seems hard to draw in practice.  As illustrated in Part I, differences in comparative 
advantage could very well be created by subsidization. 
 
Several scholars have aligned with the economic logic behind the US reasoning but have 
labeled the Appellate Body’s finding to read this logic into Article 14(d) of the SCM 
Agreement as impermissible judicial activism.819  On balance, the Panel’s position seems 
indeed correct that such a reading would require a formal amendment to Article 14(d) of the 
SCM Agreement since its role is ‘to explain what it means, not what in our view it should 
mean’.820  In the Rules Negotiations, WTO Members have taken on the Panel’s suggestion 
                                                                                                                                            
and ‘it would be difficult to ensure that all necessary adjustments are made’.  Appellate Body Report, 
US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 108. 
818 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 109.  Interestingly, Canada had argued 
during the Uruguay Round that ‘natural-resource pricing policies, because they related both to matters 
of national sovereignty as well as comparative advantage, were of fundamental importance to the 
contracting parties. (…)  (T)he unilateral right to countervail (…) was not intended to be used to negate 
a country’s general comparative advantage’.  Note by the Secretariat, Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/4, 28 April 1987), at 27. 
819 Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters, above above n 729, at 347; H. Horn and P. C. Mavroidis, 
‘United States – Final Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada 
(WT/DS257/AB/R: DSR 2004:II, 571; DSR 2004:II, 641)’, in H. Horn and P. C. Mavroidis (eds), The 
American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies on WTO Case Law – Legal and Economic Analysis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 700-715, at 708-709. 
820 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 7.60.  Three aspects at the core of the Appellate 
Body’s reading are indeed not convincing.   
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and proposed a formal amendment that would codify the principle that under certain 
circumstances an alternative benchmark could be used.821  According to the Draft 
Consolidated Chair Text, the following new paragraph would be added to Article 14(d) of the 
SCM Agreement:  
 
Where the price level of goods or services provided by a government is regulated, the 
adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for 
the goods or services in the country of provision when sold at unregulated prices, adjusting for 
quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of sale; provided that, 
when there is no unregulated price, or such unregulated price is distorted because of the 
predominant role of the government in the market as a provider of the same or similar goods 
or services, the adequacy of remuneration may be determined by reference to the export price 
for these goods or services, or to a market-determined price outside the country of provision, 
adjusting for quality, availability, marketability, transportation, and other conditions of sale.822   
 
This amendment would ensure that an alternative benchmark could only be constructed in the 
two factual situations that already came to the surface in the case law: in case prices are 
regulated prices or in case the government has a predominant role as a provider of the good in 
question, including when it is the sole provider.  In those two situations, the adequacy of 
remuneration ‘may’ be determined by reference either to export prices or to market-
                                                                                                                                            
First, the Appellate Body argued that the phrase ‘in relation to’ in Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement 
should not be narrowly understood as ‘in comparison with’, like the Panel had read it, but refers more 
broadly to ‘relation, comparison, reference’.  This implies, according to the Appellate Body, that the 
benchmark chosen under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement should not strictly be made in 
‘comparison with’ but only has ‘to relate or refer to, or is connected with’ the conditions prevailing in 
the market.  Yet, I agree with Horn and Mavroidis (above n 819, at 708) that it is very questionable that 
such a broad reading would have been in the drafters’ mind.  On the other hand, the Appellate Body’s 
reading is not, as Horn and Mavroidis seem to suggest, so broad that if this would have been in the 
drafters’ mind, they would have used another phrase such as ‘inter alia’.  After all, there still needs to 
be a link to prevailing market conditions even in the Appellate Body’s overly broad reading.   
Second, the chapeau of Article 14 provides that any method used by an investigating authority in 
calculating benefit ‘shall be consistent with the (...) guidelines’ (emphasis added) set out under 
paragraphs (a) through (d).  According to the Appellate Body (paras 91-92), this indeed indicates that 
the calculation of the benefit consistent with the guidelines is mandatory.  At the same time, it does not 
mandate ‘using only one methodology for determining the adequacy of remuneration (…)’.  This, in 
turn, implies that the term ‘guidelines’ suggests that paragraphs (a) through (d) should not be 
interpreted as ‘rigid rules that purport to contemplate every conceivable factual circumstance’.  Yet, 
like correctly revealed by Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters (above above n 729, at 355), the 
Appellate Body hereby seems to confuse ‘methods’ and ‘guidelines’.  Indeed, the text clearly requires 
that any methodology chosen by a WTO Member (flexible aspect) respects the guidelines for 
determining the adequacy of remuneration (inflexible aspect).  Here, consider that the Appellate Body 
also understood the term ‘guidelines’ as the ‘framework within which this calculation is to performed’ 
(para 92, emphasis added).   
Third and finally, it is hard to read the previous two Appellate Body’s interpretations in a mutually 
supportive way.  Its broad reading of ‘in relation to’ (and all other aspects of its interpretation) clearly 
suggests that it considers that an alternative benchmark in case of a predominantly role of the 
government could be covered under Article 14(d) itself, whereas its reading of the chapeau would 
suggest that such factual situations would simply not be captured under the circumstances set out in 
Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement.   
821 The Panel considered that ‘if the Members feel the rules as laid down in the WTO Agreements do 
not address certain situations in what they consider to be a satisfactory manner, they should raise this 
issue during negotiations’.  Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 7.60. 
822 Draft Consolidated Chair Text, above n 643 (emphasis added). 
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determined prices outside the country.  In line with the current case law, both prices should be 
adjusted to in-country conditions before they could be used as alternative benchmark.  
Whereas their use seems not mandatory,823 the construction of other proxies seems to be 
excluded.  Hence, the use of production costs as suggested by the Appellate Body would 
appear not to be allowed.  On the other hand, the use of foreign market-determined prices, 
upon which the Appellate Body had expressed reservations because of its difficult 
adaptability to in-country conditions, would explicitly be allowed as proxy. 
 
3.2.1.2. Non-market economies 
Two WTO Members, China and Vietnam, have made a commitment when they acceded 
allowing other WTO Members to rely more easily on other than in-country prices for 
identifying or calculating the benefit element in their CVDs or multilateral actions.  To grasp 
this difference in treatment under the SCM Agreement, the concept and treatment of so-called 
‘non-market economies’ (NME) has to be introduced shortly. 
 
Because of the predominant role of the government in the economy, CVDs were traditionally 
not applied against such ‘non-market economies’ (NME).  Instead, countries such as the US 
and EC only imposed anti-dumping duties as ‘unfair trade remedy’ instrument against imports 
from these NME.  Here, they made use of (generally higher) third country prices instead of 
(lower) in-country prices to construct the normal value of the product because the 
government’s impact on in-country prices made these unreliable.  Since the export price of 
the alleged dumped product was compared with this inflated benchmark, the NME 
methodology generally resulted in more positive dumping determinations and higher dumping 
margins.  The dismissal of the CVDs instrument (and choice for the anti-dumping instrument 
with an alternative methodology) was thus explained by the fact that the government’s impact 
on the economy was considered so pervasive that it could simply not be distinguished from 
actions of private actors.  Therefore, no adequate subsidy calculation could be made in the 
absence of a distinct private market.824  Looking back at its practice since the 1980s, USDOC 
explained that:  
 
The Soviet-style economies at that time made it impossible to apply (the criteria to establish a 
countervailing duty) because they were so integrated as to constitute, in essence, one large 
                                                 
823 This follows from the use of the verb ‘may’. 
824 With regard to the US, this was established by the US Court of Appeals in Georgetown Steel Corp. v 
United States (Judgment of 18 September 1986).  
PART II CHAPTER 3 – SCOPE OF THE SCM AGREEMENT 
 
 
 165
entity. In such a situation, subsidies could not be separated out from the amalgam of 
government directives and controls.825   
 
Hence, USDOC concluded that ‘subsidies would have no meaning in such an economy’ and 
therefore did not impose CVDs against NME.  In 2006, however, the US changed this 
practice and launched its first CVDs investigation against China.826  This move was 
considered justified because ‘China’s economy, though riddled with the distortions attendant 
to the extensive intervention of the PRC Government, is more flexible than these Soviet-style 
economies’.827  At the same time, the significant role of the Chinese government in the 
economy still justified, according to USDOC, to uphold China’s status as NME for its anti-
dumping investigations.  The same reasoning was applied to Vietnam, resulting in a first 
positive preliminary CVDs determination by USDOC in 2009.828  Since the beginning of its 
new approach, the US has initiated a substantive number of CVDs investigations against 
China, resulting in at least ten cases in the effective imposition of CVDs measures.  At the 
end of 2008, China challenged before the WTO USDOC’s anti-dumping and CVDs 
determinations in several of those investigations.  In this pending case, the panel will have to 
decide whether the US respected its WTO trade remedy obligations in light of China’s 
commitments made at the time of accession.  
 
Clearly, WTO trade remedy obligations do certainly not preclude CVDs (or multilateral) 
action against subsidization by countries having NME status for anti-dumping 
investigations.829  Somewhat contrary, at the time China and Vietnam acceded to the WTO (in 
                                                 
825 See Memorandum for David M. Spooner, CVD Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper from the 
People’s Republic of China – Whether the Analytical Elements of the Georgetown Steel Opinion are 
Applicable to China’s Present-Day Economy (29 March 2007). 
826 On the discussion in the EC to likewise change its practice, see J. Cornelis, ‘Applying 
Countervailing Duty Law to Non-market Economies – Will the EC Follow the US Example?’, 2:11/12 
Global Trade and Customs Journal (2007), 421-424. 
827 See Memorandum for David M. Spooner, above n 825.  This was accepted by the US Court of 
International Trade (ITC), see below n 829. 
828 For an extensive discussion, see D. A. Gantz, ‘Non-Market Economy Status and US Unfair Trade 
Actions Against Vietnam’, Arizona Legal Studies – Discussion Paper (December 2009), 35 pp. 
829 The only prohibition is that imported products cannot ‘be subject to both anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or export subsidization’ (Article 
VI.5 of the GATT).  One of the pivotal questions before the Panel is whether USDOC’s methodology 
respected this obligation and did not result in double-counting by applying parallel anti-dumping duties 
and CVDs.  Note in this respect that the US Court of International Trade (ITC) has already found that 
USDOC’s methodology indeed results in double-counting.  It concluded that:    
‘Commerce is not barred by statutory language from applying the CVD law to imports from the 
PRC, but that Commerce’s current interpretation of the NME AD statute in relation to the CVD 
statute here was unreasonable. If Commerce is to apply CVD remedies where it also utilizes 
NME AD methodology, Commerce must adopt additional policies and procedures for its NME 
AD and CVD methodologies to account for the imposition of the CVD law to products from an 
NME country and avoid to the extent possible double counting of duties’. 
United States Court of International Trade, GPX International Tire Corporation et al. v. United States 
(18 September 2009, Slip. Op. 09-103).      
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2001 and 2007, respectively), other WTO Members explicitly preserved their right to treat 
these countries as NME for anti-dumping purposes, whereas they inscribed more flexibility to 
take action against both governments’ interventions under the SCM Agreement.830  First, 
concerning anti-dumping duties, other WTO Members obtained temporary allowance (at most 
until 2016 with regard to China and 2018 with regard to Vietnam) to use other than in-country 
prices if producers fail to demonstrate that market conditions prevail in their industry.831  
Second and more relevant for our discussion, both countries have also given more leeway to 
other WTO Members to rely upon alternative benchmarks in their benefit analysis and 
calculation.  Indeed, one of China’s commitments in its Protocol of Accession is that:   
 
In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the SCM Agreement, when addressing subsidies 
described in Articles 14(a), 14(b), 14(c) and 14(d), relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement 
shall apply; however, if there are special difficulties in that application, the importing WTO 
Member may then use methodologies for identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit which 
take into account the possibility that prevailing terms and conditions in China may not always 
be available as appropriate benchmarks. In applying such methodologies, where practicable, 
the importing WTO Member should adjust such prevailing terms and conditions before 
considering the use of terms and conditions prevailing outside China.832 
 
In somewhat similar terms, Vietnam accepted that:  
 
In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the SCM Agreement, when addressing subsidies, 
the relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement shall apply; however, if there are special 
difficulties in that application, the importing WTO Member may then use alternative 
methodologies for identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit which take into account the 
possibility that prevailing terms and conditions in Viet Nam may not be available as 
appropriate benchmarks.833 
 
Thus, WTO Members taking CVDs or multilateral action against China or Vietnam could 
make use of other than in-country prices as benchmark if ‘special difficulties’, which arguably 
have to relate to the dominant role of the government, would prevent the use of the normal 
benchmarks stipulated under Article 14 of the SCM Agreement.834  In case of China, recourse 
to foreign country prices could only be taken if the WTO Member has, ‘where practicable’, 
                                                 
830 These commitments are an integral part of the WTO Agreement and thus enforceable in the WTO 
dispute settlement procedures.  See Appellate Body Report, China – Audiovisual Services, para 133; 
Panel Report, China – Auto Parts, paras 7.740-7.741.  See China’s Protocol of Accession (WT/L/432, 
23 November 2001); Vietnam’s Protocol of Access (WT/L/662, 15 November 2006); Report of the 
Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam (WT/ACC/VNM/48, 27 October 2006), paras 255, 527. 
831 China’s Protocol of Accession (WT/L/432, 23 November 2001), para 151, item (a),(c),(d); Report of 
the Working Party Report on the Accession of China (WT/ACC/CHN/49), para 151; Report of the 
Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam (WT/ACC/VNM/48, 27 October 2006), para 255, items 
(a), (c),(d).  
832 China’s Protocol of Accession (WT/L/432, 23 November 2001), para 151, item (b) (emphasis 
added). 
833 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam (WT/ACC/VNM/48, 27 October 2006), 
para 255, item (b) (emphasis added). 
834 These methodologies have to be notified to the SCM Committee.  China’s Protocol of Accession 
(WT/L/432, 23 November 2001), para 151, item (c); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
Viet Nam (WT/ACC/VNM/48, 27 October 2006), para 255, item (c). 
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explored the option to adjust prevailing terms and conditions in China.  One of the pivotal 
questions that the Panel will have to tackle in the pending case is how much more leeway is 
given under these vaguely formulated commitments to use alternative benchmarks than under 
the rather strict US – Softwood Lumber jurisprudence sketched out above.  To be sure, these 
commitments regarding the SCM Agreement are not dependent on whether or not NME status 
under anti-dumping investigations is still applied.  Whereas the latter right is subject to 
extinction, the commitments on benefit identification and calculation are not explicitly limited 
in time.835 
 
3.2.2. Determination of the relevant recipient 
It has been explained that the benefit analysis focalizes on the recipient of the financial 
contribution (or income/price support).  This recipient could be ‘a legal or natural person, or a 
group of persons’.836  Yet, the Appellate Body in US – Countervailing Measures on Certain 
EC Products further clarified that the recipient of the benefit might be different from the 
recipient of the financial contribution and that a benefit might be received by different 
recipients.837  The beneficiaries of a financial contribution could thus include a firm (legal 
person) and its owners (natural persons) at the same time.  For instance, the Appellate Body 
observed that:  
 
(A) transfer of funds could be provided directly from the government to the legal person that 
is the producer of the subsidized product, or it could be provided indirectly, say, through an 
income tax concession to the natural persons that own the firm (inasmuch as they invest in the 
legal person's productive activities).838 
 
In light of this and related case law, two further specifications on the identification of the 
beneficiary under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement should be articulated.   
First, the focus of the ‘benefit’ analysis is on legal or natural persons instead of on their 
productive operations.839  It is therefore not required to demonstrate that a financial 
contribution to a firm or its owners effectively affects the firm’s productive operations.  Read 
together with the interpretation of the relevant market benchmark, this implies that the benefit 
analysis does not merely single out those financial contributions that effectively improve a 
firm’s competitive position.840   
                                                 
835 China’s Protocol of Accession (WT/L/432, 23 November 2001), para 151, items (b),(d); Report of 
the Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam (WT/ACC/VNM/48, 27 October 2006), para 255, 
items (b),(d). 
836 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 154. 
837 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 110. 
838 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 113. 
839 Appellate Body Report, US – Lead and Bismuth II, paras 56-58; Appellate Body Report, US – 
Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 110. 
840 For a discussion, see below Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 1.2.   
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Second, only the existence of a benefit to the recipient and not the exact amount of such 
benefit should be demonstrated to pass the threshold of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM 
Agreement.841  The quantification of the exact benefit amount only becomes relevant for 
deciding on the appropriate CVDs level given that CVDs could not surpass the level of 
subsidization.842  In contrast, the exact benefit upon the recipient should not be calculated for 
multilateral claims against subsidization. 
 
In sum, a financial contribution might thus potentially benefit many different recipients (i.e., 
legal and/or natural persons) and only the existence of a benefit should be demonstrated under 
Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.  Yet, the direct recipient of the financial contribution is 
not always the appropriate focus of the benefit analysis.843  For example, in case of official 
export credit support, the relevant question is whether such support is beneficial to the 
exporter and not whether it is beneficial to the foreign purchaser receiving such an officially 
supported export credit.844  As will be illustrated in the case study on export credit support 
(see below Part III), such pass through of the benefit to the exporter will be rather easily 
established since this is in principle inherent in the export credit support transaction itself.  
More difficult is the question whether a benefit is ‘passed through’ to the buyer in case he has 
freely negotiated the price of a previously subsidized good or asset.  Has the subsidy in whole 
or in part passed through to the buyer?  This hard question is addressed in two sorts of cases, 
namely so-called ‘pass through cases’, involving CVDs imposed on final products that have 
used subsidized inputs, and ‘privatization cases’, involving CVDs imposed on products 
                                                 
841 See, for example, Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 462; Panel Report, Mexico – 
Olive Oil, paras 7.151-1.152. 
842 Article VI:3 of the GATT, Article 10, footnote 36 of the SCM Agreement; Panel Report, Mexico – 
Olive Oil, para 7.145.  Arguably, the benefit amount is also relevant under Article 11.9 of the SCM 
Agreement (de minimis level of subsidization) (see below Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1.1). 
843 Reflecting upon the above-mentioned Appellate Body’s statements in US – Countervailing 
Measures on Certain EC Products (above n 837), the Panel in Mexico – Olive Oil (para 7.152) 
suggested that the relevant recipient should not be specified:  
‘(I)t is not necessary to identify the particular recipient or recipients of the benefit and the 
particular manner in which a subsidy is bestowed in order to determine that a benefit has been 
conferred, and that therefore a subsidy exists, within the meaning of Article 1.1(b)’. 
In my view, the Panel hereby read too much into the Appellate Body’s holdings.  Its conclusion could 
simply not be inferred from the Appellate Body’s summarized findings.  Further, its interpretation is at 
odds with other case law which considered that the existence of a benefit upon the relevant entity 
should very well be identified under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.  For example, the Appellate 
Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV was very clear that, by virtue of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, 
the ‘investigating authority must (…) also establish that the benefit resulting from the subsidy has 
passed through, at least in part, from the input downstream, so as to benefit indirectly the processed 
product to be countervailed’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 142 (emphasis 
in the original). 
844 Panel Report, Brazil–Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II ), paras 5.27-5.28.  In Canada – Aircraft, 
Brazil also argued that EDC’s financial contributions were beneficial to Canadian exporters (Panel 
Report, Canada – Aircraft, paras 9.183 and 9.247).   
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produced in previously subsidized state-owned entities.845  Both types of cases are addressed 
in the following sections. 
 
3.2.2.1. Pass-through of benefit 
Suppose that a subsidy in the meaning of the SCM Agreement is given to upstream producers 
but that an investigating authority aims at imposing CVDs on products of downstream 
producers.  Should the CVDs-investigating authority demonstrate that the benefit conferred 
by the subsidy upon upstream producers was ‘passed through’ to unrelated downstream 
producers or could this simply be assumed?  As the case law currently stands, a ‘pass 
through’ analysis should, under certain circumstances, be undertaken by virtue of the 
prohibition to impose CVDs in excess of the amount of the total subsidy accruing to that 
product (Article VI:3 of the GATT and 10 of the SCM Agreement).    
Under the GATT era, the GATT Panel in US – Canadian Pork had already found that, in 
order to impose CVDs on pork, USDOC had to demonstrate that the subsidy to swine 
producers (upstream) was passed through to pork producers (downstream) because the pork 
and swine industries were separate and operated at arm’s length.846  Under such 
circumstances, ‘the subsidies granted to swine producers could be considered to be bestowed 
on the production of pork only if they had led to a decrease in the level of prices for Canadian 
swine paid by Canadian pork producers below the level they have to pay for swine from other 
commercially available sources of supply’.847  The idea is thus that, if the price of a 
transaction is determined by negotiations between unrelated producers (i.e., the transaction is 
made at arm’s length), it might happen that the subsidy upon the upstream producer (i.e., 
swine producers) is not, or only to a lesser extent, reflected in a lower price charged to 
downstream producers (i.e., pork).  A pass-through analysis would have to reveal whether the 
price paid by the downstream producer for the input (i.e., swine) was effectively lower than 
the market price, and thus whether he would indirectly benefit from the subsidy offered to 
upstream producers.  If a market price would have been paid, the downstream producer does 
                                                 
845 As will be illustrated in Part IV, the pass-through of the benefit to the new owner in case of 
privatization also seems inherent in the transaction itself but this is not recognized in the case law (see 
below Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2). 
846 Transactions between unrelated actors are, by definition, at arm’s length (see also below n 878).  
Obviously, a transaction at arm’s length does not does imply that the negotiated price corresponds to 
the market price.  The question whether this occurs is exactly the object of the pass-through analysis.  
847 Panel Report, US – Canadian Pork, para 4.9 (emphasis added).  Hence, the following US practice, 
as summarized by the Panel in Mexico – Olive Oil, was considered inconsistent with Article VI:3 of the 
GATT insofar it related to separate industries that operated at arm’s length:   
‘Under US law at the time, subsidies provided to the producers of a raw agricultural product 
were deemed to be provided in respect of production of processed products made from the raw 
products if the demand for the raw product was "substantially dependent" on the demand for the 
processed product and the processing operation added only limited value to the raw product’. 
Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.134. 
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not benefit from the subsidy because he would have paid the same price for its inputs when he 
would have bought it from other upstream producers. 
  
In the WTO era, the US – Softwood Lumber IV case confronted the WTO-adjudicating bodies 
with a similar question.  As explained above, Canada had offered a financial contribution in the 
form of the provision of a good by granting the right to harvest ‘standing timber’ (i.e., 
stumpage) at terms alleged to be beneficial to harvesters.848  When such stumpage was 
harvested, these logs were further processed into primary lumber by sawmills.  Part of such 
lumber was then further processed by independent remanufactures into remanufactured 
lumber.  USDOC had applied CVDs on primary and remanufactured lumber on the basis of a 
determination that stumpage had been subsidized.  It had not assessed whether the benefit was 
effectively passed through to independent (i.e., not vertically integrated) lumber processing 
producers.  Figure 2 clarifies the different situations on how the processing of standing timber 
into lumber (lumberPRIM and lumberREMAN) was undertaken.  Notice hereby that the four 
identified producers operated at arm’s length and that the alleged subsidy was given to 
stumpage.   
Along the lines set out by the GATT Panel in US – Canadian Pork, the Appellate Body 
decided that:  
 
Where countervailing duties are used to offset subsidies granted to producers of input 
products, while the duties are to be imposed on processed products, and where input producers 
and downstream processors operate at arm's length, the investigating authority must establish 
that the benefit conferred by a financial contribution directly on input producers is passed 
through, at least in part, to producers of the processed product subject to the investigation.849 
 
In absence of such pass-through determination, the Appellate Body underlined that ‘it cannot 
be shown that the essential elements of the subsidy definition in Article 1 are present in 
respect of the processed product’.850  At the same time, the Appellate Body recognized that 
WTO Members are by virtue of Article 19 of the SCM Agreement authorized to perform an 
investigation on an aggregate basis.  This right implies that CVDs could be imposed on 
imports from producers or exporters not investigated individually.851   
 
                                                 
848 On the question whether it was beneficial to timber harvester, see above Part II, Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.1.1. 
849 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 141.     
850 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 143 (emphasis in the original). 
851 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 154.  See below Part II, Chapter 5, Section 
5.2.3. 
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Turning to the facts of the case852, the Appellate Body decided that, with regard to situation 1 
(see Figure 2),853 the US should have undertaken a pass-through analysis because the sales 
transaction between the harvester/sawmill producer and unrelated sawmill producers 
concerned a product (in this case logs) not subject to the investigation.854,855  With regard to 
situation 2856, however, the Appellate Body concluded that, by virtue of USDOC’s right to 
conduct an aggregate investigation, no pass-through analysis was required since the 
transaction concerned a product (in this case lumberPRIM) subject to the investigation.857  
                                                 
852 With regard to situation 3, whereby harvesters sell logs to an independent sawmill for further 
processing into lumberPRIM, the US had acknowledged that a pass-through analysis was required but it 
had not done so because these transactions were insignificant. 
853 This concerned the situation where a tenured timber harvester owns a sawmill and processes some 
of the logs it harvests into lumberPRIM, but, at the same time, sells at arm's length some of the logs it 
harvests to other, unrelated sawmills for further processing into lumberPRIM. 
854 Only lumberPRIM and lumberMAN were subject to the investigation.     
855 The Appellate Body agreed ‘in the abstract, that a transfer of benefits from logs sold in arm's length 
transactions to lumber produced in-house from different logs is possible for a harvester that owns a 
sawmill’ but this could not be assumed.  Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 157 
(emphasis in the original). 
856 This concerned the situation where the tenured timber harvesters that own or are related to sawmills 
(sawmill/harvesters) process the logs they harvest into lumberPRIM and sell this lumber to unrelated 
remanufactures for further processing into lumberMAN. 
857 After all, the Appellate Body reasoned:  
‘Once it has been established that benefits from subsidies received by producers of non-subject 
products (that is, inputs) have passed through to producers of subject products (primary and 
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Importantly, such a pass-through investigation should under those circumstances not be 
undertaken if CVDs-investigating authorities effectively conduct an aggregate investigation.  
The Appellate Body acknowledged that its conclusion might very well lead to CVDs on 
processed products (in this case lumberREMAN) not subsidized at all, ‘especially if the 
remanufacturer purchased the primary lumber it processed at arm's length’.858  Yet, it 
considered that this result is inherent in the right of Members to conduct an aggregate 
investigation.  Importantly, exporters (in this case remanufactures) not investigated 
individually in an aggregate investigation have the right on a review procedure in order for an 
individual CVDs rate to be established.  In such a review process, the Appellate Body 
stressed, it would be ‘likely’ that a pass-through analysis would be required to determine that 
a benefit was also passed through to the processed product (in this case from lumberPRIM inputs 
to lumberREMAN).859  In sum, the Appellate Body did not fundamentally confine the situations in 
which a pass-through analysis has to be conducted. 
   
Summarizing this case law, the Panel in Mexico – Olive Oil concluded that a pass-through 
analysis is required when two conditions are present simultaneously: ‘(1) a subsidy is 
provided in respect of a product that is an input into the processed, imported product that is 
the subject of the countervail investigation; and (2) the producer of the input product and the 
producer of the imported product subject to the countervail investigation are unrelated’.860  If 
the input producer and the processed product producer are related (i.e., vertically integrated), 
the pass-through of a benefit could thus be assumed.861  On the other hand, the set of two 
conditions likewise implies, contrary to what the EC had advocated, that a pass-through 
analysis should not be conducted whenever the second condition is fulfilled, i.e., whenever 
there is any arm’s length transaction between unrelated companies.862,863  The Panel spelled 
out a hypothetical example illustrating why it could not agree with the EC’s view:  
                                                                                                                                            
remanufactured softwood lumber), we do not see why a further pass-through analysis between 
producers of subject products should be required in an investigation conducted on an aggregate 
basis.  In this situation, it is not necessary to calculate precisely how subsidy benefits are divided 
up between the producers of subject products (…)’. 
Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 154.   
858 The Appellate Body emphasized the important difference between an individual and collective 
investigation regarding the calculation of the appropriate CVDs amount (see below n 1546).  See 
Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 164, footnote 196. 
859 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 164. 
860 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.142. 
861 Similar to the general benefit benchmark, it is, however, not established that the competitive 
position of the downstream producer has improved as a result of subsidization. 
862 The Panel reasoned that, if this is not required for certain arm’s length sales of inputs between 
unrelated firms, as the Appellate Body had found in US – Lumber IV, ‘then a fortiori the mere 
existence of an arms'-length transaction between firms involving the product under investigation 
somewhere between the receipt of the subsidy and the export of the merchandise should not, by itself, 
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Taking the simplest hypothetical example, where a subsidy is provided directly to a producer 
of a product coming within the scope of a countervailing duty investigation, we do not see 
how that company's eventual sale of the product to an unrelated firm (e.g., a distributor) would 
have a bearing on the fact that a subsidy has been bestowed in respect of the "production" of 
that product.864 
 
Deciding otherwise, the Panel continued, would mandate a pass-through analysis ‘in almost 
every countervail investigation, even when the subsidy was provided directly on the 
investigated product’.865  A relevant but open question is whether the Panel’s conclusions are, 
like the finding by the Appellate Body in Canada – Softwood Lumber IV, also confined to 
aggregate CVDs investigations.866   
 
The Panel not only rejected the EC’s argument on a substantive level but likewise found that 
the EC wrongly based its argument on Articles 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.867  Because the 
EC did not question the existence of any benefit but only alleged that the amount was not 
properly calculated,868 the failure to conduct a pass-through analysis could not be based on 
Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.  Instead, such claim had to be based on Article VI:3 of 
the GATT and/or Article 10 of the SCM Agreement.  These provisions mandate that CVDs 
could not be imposed above the level of subsidies.  I concur with this conclusion but for 
another, more fundamental reason: a government measure (e.g., CVDs investigation) cannot 
be inconsistent with Article 1 of the SCM Agreement on itself as the EC had claimed.  
Indeed, Mexico correctly explained that this opening provision of the SCM Agreement ‘only 
establishes, in a conceptual way, which elements must be present in order to determine that a 
                                                                                                                                            
give rise to an obligation to conduct a pass-through analysis’.  Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 
7.143. 
863 Regarding the facts of the case, the EC had argued that Mexico should have demonstrated that 
subsidies to olive growers, producing a very basic version of olive oil, were passed through to olive oil 
exporters, who further processed the crude olive oil before exporting.  Yet, the Panel concluded that 
Mexico had made a reasonable case that the subsidy to olive growers was not provided on an input 
product (in this case olives) but on their production of the product under investigation itself (in this 
case olive oil) and, therefore, no pass-through analysis was required.  Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, 
para 7.168. 
864 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.144. 
865 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.144. 
866 When discussing the Appellate Body report, the Panel recalled that ‘the situation in that 
investigation, as in the one that is the subject of the present dispute, was that the per unit subsidy 
amount was established on an aggregate, country-wide basis’.  See Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, 
para 7.140 (footnote 180) and paras 6.22, 7.168.  However, its general interpretations on when a pass-
through analysis should (not) be conducted were not explicitly confined to aggregate investigations.   
867 The EC also argued that Mexico failed to respect Article 14 of the SCM Agreement but this was 
also rejected by the Panel, partly because the financial contribution at issue (i.e., grant) is not listed 
under Article 14 of the SCM Agreement.  See Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, paras 7.154-7.169.  
868 However, the Panel failed to clarify whether the EC indeed acknowledged that some benefit was 
passed through to olive oil exporters or merely agreed that a benefit upon olive growers existed.  See 
Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.150 (see above n 866). 
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subsidy exists’.869  The Panel, however, explicitly disagreed with this reasoning.  If CVDs are 
imposed upon financial contributions not conferring a benefit, the Panel considered that ‘the 
investigated measure would not constitute a subsidy, and application of a countervailing duty 
would be inconsistent with Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement’.870  So, in line with the Panel 
in EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips,871 the Panel in Mexico – Olive Oil 
considered that government measures could be inconsistent with Article 1 of the SCM 
Agreement as such and thus that a claim could be solely based on this provision.  From a 
conceptual stance, I have to disagree with this interpretation.872   
 
The substantive aspects of this case law have also found their way to the Doha negotiations.  
Indeed, according to the Draft Consolidated Chair Text, a new paragraph relevant to CVDs 
investigations would be added to Article 14 of the SCM Agreement: 
      
Where a subsidy is granted in respect of an input used to produce the product under 
consideration, and the producer of the product under consideration is unrelated to the 
producer of the input, no benefit from the subsidy in respect of the input shall be attributed to 
the product under consideration unless a determination has been made that the producer of the 
product under consideration obtained the input on terms more favourable than otherwise 
would have been commercially available to that producer in the market.873 
 
The obligation to conduct a pass-through analysis would thus be triggered if the two elements 
disentangled by the Panel in Mexico – Olive Oil would be present: (1) a subsidy is granted in 
respect of an input used to produce the product under consideration and (2) the producer of 
the product under consideration is unrelated to the input producer.  In that case, a CVDs-
investigating authority is, similar as under the general market benchmark, required to assess 
whether the processing producer has received the input at better-than-market terms.874  If a 
market price would have been charged, no pass-through of any benefit would have taken 
place.  In line with the case law on the relevant benchmark,875 it is foreseen that the very same 
subsidy might distort such private prices and thus undermine their relevance as benchmark:   
 
                                                 
869 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.129. 
870 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.149 (emphasis added).  
871 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, paras 7.186, 8.1. 
872 In my understanding, the following Appellate Body’s reasoning is more accurate:   
‘In the absence of (a pass through analysis), it cannot be shown that the essential elements of the 
subsidy definition in Article 1 are present in respect of the processed product. In turn, the right to 
impose a countervailing duty on the processed product for the purpose of offsetting an input 
subsidy, would not have been established in accordance with Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994, 
and, consequently, would also not have been in accordance with Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM 
Agreement’.  
Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 143 (emphasis added). 
873 Draft Consolidated Chair Text, above n 643 (emphasis added). 
874 This is also in line with the test articulated by the GATT Panel in US – Canadian Pork (see above n 
847). 
875 See above Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.1. 
PART II CHAPTER 3 – SCOPE OF THE SCM AGREEMENT 
 
 
 175
Where, however, it has been established that the effect of the subsidy is so substantial that 
other relevant prices available to the producer of the product under consideration are distorted 
and do not reasonably reflect commercial prices that would prevail in the absence of the 
subsidization, other sources, such as world market prices, can be used as the basis for the 
determination in question. 
 
If the subsidy is ‘so substantial’ that private market prices are distorted and these prices do not 
‘reasonably reflect commercial prices’, the threshold to use an alternative benchmark would 
already be met.  In that case, one potential alternative benchmark is suggested (i.e., world 
market prices) but other options would be allowed as well.  Apparently, no requirement to 
adapt such an alternative benchmark to local conditions is explicitly foreseen.   
 
3.2.2.2. Privatization of a subsidized enterprise 
Does privatization of a firm at arm’s length and for fair market value extinguish the continued 
existence of a benefit derived from a non-recurring (i.e., one time) financial contribution prior 
privatization?  Put otherwise, does the privatized firm still enjoy a benefit in the meaning of 
Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement?  In US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC 
Products, the Appellate Body somewhat altered its previous stance on this complex issue. 
 
To grasp this case law, it should be explained that the benefits of non-recurring subsidies are 
often allocated over a period of time, which is ‘normally presumed to be the average useful 
life of assets in the relevant industry’.876  Observing agreement among both parties (EC and 
US) that such allocation is normal and accepted practice, the Appellate Body in US – 
Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products found such ‘useful life’ practice 
permissible under the SCM Agreement insofar the presumption is not irrebuttable.877  For 
instance, if the government has financed at favourable terms the acquisition of a machine with 
‘utility value’ of ten years, the benefit of such subsidy under the ‘useful life’ approach would 
be spread over ten years.  The core legal issue at stake was whether such allocation over a 
period of time is interrupted by privatization at arm’s length and for fair market value.878  The 
Appellate Body explained its approach as follows: 
                                                 
876 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 12, footnote 
23.  The benefits of recurring subsidies are usually considered fully absorbed in the year of receipt.  
See, for example, Paper by Brazil, Allocation of Subsidy Benefits (TN/RL/W/192, 23 November 2005), 
para 4. 
877 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 84; Appellate 
Body Report, US – Lead and Bismuth II, para 62; see also Panel Report, Japan – DRAMS 
Countervailing Duties, para 7.360. 
878 At arm’s length means that transaction (in this case privatization) is ‘negotiated between unrelated 
parties, each acting in their own interest, or between related parties such that the terms of the 
transaction are those that would exist if the transaction had been negotiated between unrelated parties’. 
The fair market value test examines whether the purchaser paid ‘the full amount that the company or its 
assets (including the value of any subsidy benefits) were actually worth under the prevailing market 
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(F)ollowing privatization, the utility value of equipment acquired as a result of a financial 
contribution is not extinguished, because it is transferred to the newly-privatized firm. But, the 
utility value of such equipment to the newly-privatized firm is legally irrelevant for purposes 
of determining the continued existence of a "benefit" under the SCM Agreement. As we found 
in Canada – Aircraft, the value of the "benefit" under the SCM Agreement is to be assessed 
using the marketplace as the basis for comparison. It follows, therefore, that once a fair market 
price is paid for the equipment, its market value is redeemed, regardless of the utility the firm 
may derive from the equipment. Accordingly, it is the market value of the equipment that is 
the focal point of analysis, and not the equipment's utility value to the privatized firm.879 
 
Accordingly, the Appellate Body acknowledged that the utility value of the equipment 
acquired at subsidized terms does not extinguish as a result of privatization.  Yet, it simply 
considered this element irrelevant under the benefit analysis because this test looks at the 
market value as benchmark: if a fair market value is paid at the moment of privatization, ‘the 
market value is redeemed’ and the benefit thus, in principle, extinguishes.  The idea as 
articulated by the Panel in the same case is that the value of the continuing benefit is reflected 
in the fair market price and, as a result, fully paid for by the privatized producer: he does not 
enjoy a benefit in wealth terms from the previous subsidization as he paid a market price for 
it.880,881  Deviating from prior case law in US – Lead and Bismuth II, the Appellate Body 
decided that a fair market price does not necessarily extinguish prior subsidization.882  In 
reasonably competitive markets, ‘the actual exchange value’ of the continuing benefit will be 
fairly reflected in the market price and the benefit will indeed extinguish.883  But governments 
might not always be price takers in the process of privatization since they could, by designing 
economic and other policies, ‘influence the circumstances and the conditions of the sale so as 
to obtain a certain market valuation of the enterprise’.884  Because such ‘induced’ market 
valuation could differ from the fair market value, the benefit of past non-recurring subsidies 
could continue after privatization.  Regrettably, the Appellate Body did not offer any 
                                                                                                                                            
conditions’.  Definitions applied under US CVDs procedure, as cited in Panel Report, US – 
Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 – EC), para 7.89, footnote 313. 
879 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 102 (emphasis 
in the original). 
880 Panel Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, footnote 333 and paras 7.72-
7.76. 
881 The Panel also understood that market distortions created by prior subsidization might very well 
remain in place after privatization at arm’s length and for fair market value but likewise considered this 
irrelevant under the ‘benefit’ analysis of the SCM Agreement.  In the words of the Panel: 
‘(C)ountervailing duties are not designed to counteract all market distortions or resource 
misallocations which might have been caused by subsidization. For the purpose of determining 
the existence of a benefit under the SCM Agreement, it is irrelevant whether or not any potential 
market distortions resulting from the prior subsidy remain after the privatization at arm's-length 
and for fair market value’. 
Panel Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 7.80. 
882 The Panel had followed the interpretation of the Appellate Body in US – Lead and Bismuth II and 
thus decided that a benefit could never continue after privatization at arm’s length and for fair market 
value.  Panel Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, paras 7.72-7.91. 
883 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, paras 122 and 124. 
884 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 124. 
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illustration on what it had exactly in mind.885  Anyway, the Appellate Body concluded that 
privatization at arm’s length and for fair market value only presumes extinction of any benefit 
attached to past non-recurring financial contributions.886  In Part IV, the fundamental criticism 
articulated by Grossman and Mavroidis on this privatization case law is examined in detail.887  
This fits in their broader criticism on the benefit-concept developed in the case law and 
explained in this section. 
   
The two constitutive elements of the subsidy definition as stipulated in Article 1 of the SCM 
Agreement have thus been explored: a government offers a subsidy if it makes a financial 
contribution (or income/price support) that confers a benefit upon the recipient.  In the next 
section, the focus shifts to the ‘specificity’ element elaborated under Article 2 of the SCM 
Agreement.   
 
3.3. SPECIFICITY 
Specificity, as defined in Article 2 of the SCM Agreement, is not a constitutive element of a 
subsidy but a necessary condition for subsidies to be subject to the disciplines of the SCM 
Agreement.888  Accordingly, non-specific subsidies are non-actionable under the SCM 
Agreement and can also not be countervailed.889  Only financial contributions, or 
income/price support, that benefit a specific recipient are covered under the substantive 
disciplines of the SCM Agreement. 
 
3.3.1. The rationale for the specificity test 
It is not self-evident why this specificity test is included in the SCM Agreement.  Broadly 
speaking, three different reasons could be distinguished.  First, the World Trade Report 2006 
endorsed an economic rationale:  
 
The approach in the legal texts towards “specificity” reflects the expectation that subsidies 
carry the potential to be more trade distorting the more specific they are. Indeed, in economic 
                                                 
885 For example, to what extent could the ‘fair market’ assumption, which is the point of departure of 
the analysis, still be considered fulfilled?   
886 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, paras 126-127. 
887 See below Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2.1. 
888 Article 1.2 of the SCM Agreement.  See, for example, Appellate Body, Softwood – Lumber IV, para 
72. 
889 Concerning non-actionable subsidies, this was confirmed by Article 8.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, 
indicating that non-specific subsidies fell into the category of ‘non-actionable subsidies’. Moreover, 
non-specific subsidies were in any case non-actionable, in contrast to other non-actionable subsidies 
(Article 9.1 only refers to Article 8.1(a)). However, pursuant to Article 31 of the SCM Agreement, the 
category of non-actionable subsidy expired at the end of 1999.  Nevertheless, non-specific subsidies are 
still non-actionable, simply because only specific subsidies can be actionable subsidies by virtue of 
Article 1.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
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terms the more closely targeted a subsidy towards its intended beneficiaries, the more 
concentrated its relative price effect will tend to be. In many circumstances, this could be 
taken to imply a higher probability that the subsidy is distorting. A subsidy to a single 
industry, for example, rather than to many industries could impart a narrow advantage. The 
more broadly based subsidy recipients are defined, then, the more “spread out” and shallower 
will be the likely subsidy impact. 890 
 
Obviously, the trade-distorting effect of a subsidy programme is indeed less in case a 
particular subsidy amount is spread out over a large number of industries and not concentrated 
to a single industry.  Yet, in first instance, its trade-distorting impact seems to depend on the 
amount of the subsidy, and not on whether it is generally available.891  For example, the trade- 
distorting impact on a particular industry of interest-free loans does, at first sight, not depend 
on whether many other industries could also benefit from such loans.  Nevertheless, scholars 
have argued that, in simple economic models, an effort to stimulate all industrial activity 
uniformly would in the longer run ‘presumably have no real effects at all, and would wash out 
following some combination of price and exchange rate adjustments’.892  This idea that trade 
would not be distorted (i.e., no international distortion) as long as the competitive conditions 
between domestic industries are not affected (i.e., no domestic distortion) by subsidization 
was also expressed by several Contracting Parties during the Uruguay Round to justify the 
inclusion of the specificity test.893  At the same time, some of the same scholars acknowledge 
that a government measure will in practice almost never be so uniform that it does not favour 
de facto one economic sector over another.894  Hence, such measures will de facto affect 
domestic resource allocation.  As Trebilcock and Howse point to, investing in basic 
infrastructure or education alters a country’s comparative advantage (dynamic concept) and 
                                                 
890 See World Trade Report 2006, above n 574, at 51, and 198; see also Jackson, above n 588, 296–297.   
891 The general availability just makes it less probable that this amount to a particular industry is 
significant.   
892 A. O. Sykes, ‘The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective’, 
Working Paper (April 2009), 41 pp., at 32; Jackson, above n 588, at 297; see also Hufbauer and Erb, 
above n 542, at 55 (in the context of general tax measures). 
893 For example, according to the EC, ‘a distinction should be drawn between general measures 
designed to stimulate economic activity as a whole and specific measures with identifiable 
beneficiaries whose competitive position is improved by the intervention’.  Likewise, Korea argued 
that generally available subsidies should be non-countervailable as they ‘do not give specific 
enterprises or industries any particular articular benefit or advantage not available to other enterprises 
or industries’.  See Submission by the European Community (MTN.GNG/NG4/W/36, 2 February 
1990); Communication from the Republic of Korea (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/34, 18 January 1990).  Other 
scholars have also referred to this idea that general subsidies do not distort trade because it does not 
distort resource allocation among domestic industries.  See M. Benitah, The Law of Subsidies under the 
GATT/WTO System (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), 424 pp., at 258-260; Luengo, above 
n 771, at 129-130. 
894 Sykes, above n 892, at 32 (in the context of general tax measures); M. Trebilcock and M. Fishbein, 
‘International Trade: Barriers to Trade’, in A. T. Guzman and A. O. Sykes (eds), Research Handbook 
in International Economic Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007), 1-61, at 22; Trebilcock and Howse 
also doubt that the exchange rate adjustment assumption holds in a world where exchange rates are 
increasingly determined by capital flows rather than trade flows.  M. J. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The 
Regulation of International Trade, 3rd ed (London: Routledge, 2005), 759 pp., at 289. 
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thus affects domestic resource allocation.  The fact that a subsidy will de facto always benefit 
some industries over others implies that an economic rationale for underpinning the 
‘specificity’ element is not watertight.895  Although the ‘specificity’ test is inspired on its own 
CVDs procedure,896 the US had even reached the conclusion during the Uruguay Round that 
such test simply had ‘no economic justification’.897,898 
Second, part of the rationale to exclude non-specific subsidies seems to be related to the 
nature of the government action rather than to the question whether it affects firms’ 
competitive position.  In the view of Jackson, the specificity test is not only based on an 
economic rationale but is also a useful tool to exclude from the scope of the SCM Agreement 
general activities by all governments (such as police or fire protection, education, roads) 
‘which really ought not to be brought into a countervailing duty or other international 
process’.899  Hence, the provision of non-specific goods/services with public goods 
characteristics900 is considered non trade-distorting, not so much because it might not affect 
trade but because it would do so in a corrective rather than distortive way.901  In contrast, 
specific subsidies would give an ‘unfair’ advantage to the beneficiary.902   
This is somewhat related to a third potential rationale indicated by Sykes.  Specific subsidies 
might be considered more likely to be motivated by protectionist considerations, and thus by 
political-economy rather than welfare motivations.903  Although this argument has some 
merit, Sykes likewise considers it highly ‘speculative’ because the degree of specificity of a 
subsidy programme might very well be based on political rather than economic 
                                                 
895 See also Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters, above n 729, at 350-351.   
896 EC state aid disciplines also only targeted aid favouring ‘certain undertakings’.  See B. Evtimov, 
‘Article 2 SCMA’, in R. Wolfrum, P-T. Stoll, and M. Koebele (eds), WTO: Trade Remedies 
(Heidelberg: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 2008), 453-470, 
at 456; Luengo, above n 771, at 330.  
897 See Minutes of the Meeting help on 25 October 1990 (SCM/M/48, 21 December 1990), paras 74, 
76. 
898 Rubini doubted the accuracy of the economic justification and pointed to practical reasons for such a 
test in avoiding a review of all programmes and their distorting effects.  Rubini, above n 669, 173; see 
also Jackson, above n 588, at 298.  
899 Jackson, above n 588, at 297.  See also D. Palmeter, ‘Safeguard, Anti-Dumping, and Countervailing 
Duty Disputes in the Transatlantic Partnership: How to Control “Contingency Protection” More 
Effectively,’ in E-U. Petersmann and M.A. Pollack (eds), Transatlantic Economic Disputes – the EU, 
the US, and the WTO (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 141-173, at 155; A. O. Sykes, 
‘International trade: Trade Remedies’, in A. T. Guzman and A. O. Sykes (eds), Research Handbook in 
International Economic Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2007), 62-112, at 103. 
900 Pure public goods are nonrival and nonexclusive in consumption (see above Part I, Chapter 2). 
901 As Sykes observes, ‘basic expenditures on publication education and road construction, for 
example, can have profound effects on costs’. Sykes, above n 892, at 31-32. 
902 See also Sykes, above n 899, at 103.  
903 See also A. O. Sykes, ‘Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, in P. F. J., Macrory, A. E. 
Appleton, and M. G. Plummer (eds), The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political 
Analysis – Volume II (Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2005), 83-107, at 100; see also, Trebilcock and 
Howse, above n 894, at 289. 
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considerations, which is illustrated by the widespread subsidization of the agricultural 
sector.904 
So far, the case law has not offered much guidance on how it interpreted the rationale for the 
specificity test.  The Panel in US – Upland Cotton merely considered that: 
 
We see merit in the shared view of the parties that the concept of ‘specificity’ in Article 2 of 
the SCM Agreement serves to acknowledge that some subsidies are broadly available and 
widely used throughout an economy and are therefore not subject to the Agreement's subsidy 
disciplines.905 
 
3.3.2. Subsidies deemed to be specific 
The difficult legal question remains, of course, what is considered ‘general’ and what degree 
of specificity is thus targeted under the SCM Agreement.  This threshold question should, 
however, not be passed in case export subsidies and local content subsidies are challenged or 
countervailed.  Both types of subsidies are presumed to be specific.906  In light of the above-
mentioned rationales for the specificity test, such an exception seems understandable, at least 
for export subsidies.907,908  To be precise, as the text of Article 2.3 of the SCM Agreement 
suggests and the Panel in Indonesia – Autos confirmed,909 the irrefutable presumption of 
specificity is not dependent on whether these subsidies are prohibited but on whether they 
qualify as export/local content subsidies.  Hence, the Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels 
correctly decided that ‘a subsidy that is specific under Article 2.3 (as a result of export 
contingency) is specific for the purpose of both Part II (prohibited export subsidy) and Part III 
(actionable subsidy) claims’.910  Likewise, such subsidies could be deemed to be specific in 
CVDs procedures.   
 
                                                 
904 Some agricultural subsidies could be deemed non-specific as a legal matter but might very well be 
motivated by political-economy considerations.   
905 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1143. 
906 Article 2.3 of the SCM Agreement.  Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1153; Panel Report, 
Indonesia – Autos, para 14.155. 
907 Export subsidies have a more direct effect on trade (see above Part I, Chapter 1) and such subsidies 
also favour exporting industries at the expense of the other industries from which resources could be 
channeled.  Moreover, export subsidies are hard to consider as legitimate general activities by all 
governments (see below Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2.2).   
908 From a conceptual viewpoint, Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters argue that it would have been 
more accurate to exempt these types of subsidies from the specificity test rather than to stipulate that 
they are deemed specific.  See Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters, above n 729, at 351.    
909 Indonesia benefited from S&D treatment on local content subsidies (by virtue of Article 27.3 of the 
SCM Agreement) but these subsidies were, nonetheless, deemed to be specific by virtue of Article 2.3 
of the SCM Agreement for the actionable subsidy claim.  Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.155. 
910 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.514. 
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3.3.3. Specificity de jure and de facto 
Regarding all other types of subsidies, specificity in the meaning of Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the 
SCM Agreement ‘should be clearly substantiated on the basis of positive evidence’ if 
challenged before the WTO-adjudicating bodies or scrutinized in a countervailing duty 
investigation.911  ‘Positive’ evidence means that it is of ‘an affirmative, objective and 
verifiable character, and that it must be credible’.912  The burden of proof for passing this test 
rests on the complaining party or CVDs-investigating authority.913  Clarke and Horlick 
explain that this was contrary to US CVDs practice since specificity was assumed unless 
positive evidence to the contrary was provided.914  Because the subsidizing country is the one 
having direct access to information for assessing specificity, they further argue that this shift 
in the burden of proof has the ‘potential for creating a significant hurdle to take action’.915 
 
Regarding the substance of this specificity test, the chapeau of Article 2.1 of the SCM 
Agreement somewhat cryptically describes that the subsidy should be specific to ‘an 
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries’ (further referred to in the SCM 
Agreement as ‘certain enterprises’).916,917  On this basis, the Panel in US – Softwood Lumber 
IV found that specificity has ‘to be determined at the enterprise or industry level, not at the 
product level’ and that ‘a single industry may make a broad range of end products’.918  
Similarly, the Panel in US – Upland Cotton clarified that ‘an industry’ covers ‘producers of 
certain products’, but recognized that:  
 
The breadth of this concept of "industry" may depend on several factors in a given case. At 
some point that is not made precise in the text of the agreement, and which may modulate 
according to the particular circumstances of a given case, a subsidy would cease to be specific 
                                                 
911 Article 2.4 of the SCM Agreement. 
912 This was elaborated by the Appellate Body in US – Hot Rolled Steel (para 192) in the context of 
anti-dumping and considered applicable by the Panel in EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM 
Chips under Article 2.4 of the SCM Agreement (para 7.226, footnote 191). 
913 The fact that the burden is on the complainant in case subsidization by other WTO Members is 
challenged before WTO-adjudicating bodies conforms to the general rule as first explained by the 
Appellate Body in US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, at 14.  The initial burden of proof rests upon the 
party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence.  
See also, Clarke and Horlick, above n 587, at 296; Luengo, above n 771, at 140-141. 
914 See Clarke and Horlick, above n 587, at 296. 
915 See Clarke and Horlick, above n 587, at 296. 
916 Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement.  Pursuant to the World Trade Report 2006, this and other 
provisions in the SCM Agreement referring to producers of subsidized products imply that transfers to 
consumers ‘may not be covered’ by the SCM Agreement.  World Trade Report 2006, above n 574, at 
54. 
917 On the vagueness of the delineation between general and specific subsidies, see Trebilcock and 
Fishbein, above n 894, at 21-22; Sykes, above 902, at 103. 
918 For example, a subsidy to the car industry would be specific even though producers make a diversity 
of products.  Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 7.121. 
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because it is sufficiently broadly available throughout an economy as not to benefit a 
particular limited group of producers of certain products.919 
 
Although the determination should therefore be made on a case-by-case basis, both Panels 
have endorsed a wide reading of an industry or group of industries.  Indeed, subsidies to 
‘industries producing wood products’920 and to ‘a subset of basic agricultural products’921 
were sufficiently specific to pass the specificity test.  Such subsidies to certain enterprises are 
either de jure or de facto specific.   
 
First of all, de jure specificity occurs if the subsidy is explicitly limited to certain enterprises 
(Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement).  According to Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, 
specificity would, however, not exist if objective criteria or conditions are established 
governing the eligibility for subsidies.  Such eligibility has to be automatic and the criteria 
should be strictly adhered to and ‘clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official 
document, so as to be capable of verification’.922  These criteria or conditions are considered 
‘objective’ if they are neutral, do not favor certain enterprises over others, and are economic 
in nature and horizontal in application.923   
 
Yet, subsidies that are not limited in law to certain enterprises or that are based on objective 
criteria can in practice still benefit only certain enterprises.  Therefore, the SCM Agreement 
also encompasses de facto specificity (Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement), whereby four 
factors ‘may’ be taken into consideration: the use of a subsidy programme by a limited 
number of enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of 
disproportionately large amounts of the subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner in 
which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to offer a 
subsidy.924  Based on the ordinary meaning (‘may’) of Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement, 
the Panel in US – Softwood Lumber IV concluded that not all four factors have to be examined 
                                                 
919 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1142. 
920 This could, for example, encompass the pulp industry, the paper industry, the lumber industry, and 
the lumber remanufacturing industry.  Panel, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 7.121. 
921 The Panel, hereby, stressed that ‘(t)he fact that some of the subsidies go to farmers who may 
produce different commodities, or, in theory, may not produce a given commodity does not mean, by 
some process of reverse reasoning, that the specificity that is apparent from the face of the grant 
instrument no longer exists’.  Likewise, US crop insurance subsidies that were ‘generally, available for 
most crops but (…) not generally available in respect of the entire agricultural sector in all areas’ were 
considered specific.  Panel, US – Upland Cotton, paras 7.1148, 7.1150. 
922 Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. 
923 Article 2.1(b), footnote 2 of the SCM Agreement. 
924 Regarding the final factor, footnote 3 of the SCM Agreement stipulates that information on the 
frequency with which applications for a subsidy are refused or approved and the reasons for such 
decisions shall be considered.  
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and evaluated cumulatively to find that a subsidy is de facto specific.925  Moreover, the same 
Panel held that the text of this provision does not limit specificity to those subsidies deliberately 
limited to certain enterprises: ‘Article 2 SCM Agreement is concerned with the distortion that 
is created by a subsidy which either in law or in fact is not broadly available’ and does, 
therefore, not require an investigation into the intent of the subsidizing country.926  As a result, 
a determination by the US CVDs-investigating authority (USDOC) that the Canadian subsidy 
programme (i.e., stumpage programmes) was used by a limited number of enterprises (i.e., 
wood product industries) sufficed to find de facto specificity.  This conclusion was not altered 
by the fact that it was inherent in the nature of the subsidy in question (i.e., standing timber) that 
its use was limited to certain enterprises only.927  In EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM 
Chips, the disproportionate use by Hynix of the funds made available under the Korea 
Development Bank Debenture Programme formed the basis for the finding that this 
programme, as applied, constituted a de facto specific subsidy.928   
In determining the presence of de facto specificity, Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement 
mandates to take into account the extent of economic diversification in the subsidizing country 
as well as the duration of the subsidy programme.  Yet, according to the case law, both elements 
should not explicitly be addressed by the CVDs-investigating authority if this was not raised by 
one of the parties during the investigation.929  The first element comes, in rather vague terms, in 
to objections of small developing countries that their subsidy programmes would easily meet the 
standard of de facto specificity simply because of the undiversified nature of their economy.   
It should be emphasized, as this is often overlooked in the literature and case law, that the 
opening clause of Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement explicitly stipulates that such de facto 
specificity could be found ‘notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the 
application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) [de jure specificity] and (b) 
                                                 
925 In contrast, all four factors were considered by the EC in its CVDs investigation on Korean DRAM 
Chips.  See EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, paras 7.226-7.230. 
926 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 7.116.  Draft guidelines for the concept of specificity 
that circulated in the SCM Committee (SCM/W/89, 25 April 1985) had referred to ‘de facto 
deliberately granting an advantage to certain enterprises’ (emphasis added).   
927 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, paras 7.121, 7.123.  The Panel observed that a subsidy 
which is limited by the inherent characteristics of the good cannot be based on ‘objective criteria’ in the 
sense of footnote 2 to Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.  Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, 
para 7.116, footnote 179. 
928 More generally, the Panel agreed with the EC’s determination of specificity which had found that 
‘(1) the subsidy programme was used by a very limited number of companies, as only six out of an 
eligible two hundred companies used the programme; (2) that it was predominantly used by the 
Hyundai group companies among which Hynix190; and (3) that a disproportionate 41 per cent of the 
total subsidy amount of KRW 2.9 trillion was granted to Hynix’.  Panel Report, EC – Countervailing 
Measures on DRAM Chips, paras 7.226-7227. 
929 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.229.  The Panel in US – 
Softwood Lumber IV considered it public knowledge that the Canadian economy is diversified and ‘is 
more than just wood products alone’.  Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 7.124. 
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[objective criteria]’.  As a result, a subsidy programme could still be de facto specific even if it 
is not only de jure not limited to certain enterprises but also based on objective criteria as set out 
above.930  Hence, the Panel’s statement in US – Upland Cotton that a programme based on such 
objective criteria ‘would preclude an affirmative conclusion of specificity’ seems simply 
premature.931  Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement clearly provides that such a programme 
could still be applied in a way that it turns out to be a de facto specific subsidy.  The case law on 
de facto specificity has illustrated that this would already be the case if, for example, such 
programme is – by incidence – predominantly used by ‘certain enterprises’.  Recall in this 
respect that the term ‘certain enterprises’ should not be understood narrowly but that this might 
cover a group of industries each making a broad range of end products.   
 
3.3.4. Regional subsidies  
Regarding regional subsidies, Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement stipulates that: 
 
A subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical 
region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority shall be specific. It is understood that 
the setting or change of generally applicable tax rates by all levels of government entitled to 
do so shall not be deemed to be a specific subsidy for the purposes of this Agreement.932 
 
The first sentence qualifies all sorts of subsidies limited to certain enterprises within a 
geographical region of the granting authority to be specific, whereas the second sentence 
clarifies that the setting of general tax rates by all competent levels of the government is 
deemed non-specific.  Giving substance to both sentences seems not straightforward.    
At first sight, the plain wording of the first, general sentence does not seem to have significant 
legal implications.  After all, a similar interpretation would have been reached on the basis of 
Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement: because subsidies limited to certain enterprises on the 
national level are specific, they are a fortiori specific if restricted to certain enterprises within 
a region.  To grasp its meaning, Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement should, however, be 
contrasted with the language in the latest draft version of the SCM Agreement (i.e., Dunkel 
Draft).  The Dunkel Draft stipulated that a ‘subsidy which is available to all enterprises 
located within a designated geographical region shall be specific irrespective of the nature of 
the granting authority’.933  Clarke and Horlick have revealed that the change to the current 
version was the result of a compromise between the US and Canada in late 1993.  The US 
hereby agreed upon fewer disciplines on subsidies in return for more trade-restrictive anti-
                                                 
930 See Article 2.1(b) and footnote 2 of the SCM Agreement. 
931 The Panel seems to assume that if those objective criteria are effectively adhered to, it would ipso 
facto not be de facto specific.  See Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1143. 
932 Emphasis added.  
933 Article 2.2 of the Dunkel Draft (MTN.TNC/W/FA, 20 December 1991) (emphasis added). 
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dumping rules.934  To give meaning to this modification, several scholars have therefore 
suggested that Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement means, a contrario, that subsidies to all 
enterprises located within a designated geographical region are non-specific under the SCM 
Agreement.935  Yet, most scholars correctly consider that this a contrario reading only holds 
in case the subsidy is granted by the regional government itself and not when it is offered by 
the central authority.936  Several arguments suggest that regional subsidies offered by the 
central government are indeed ‘specific’ under the SCM Agreement.  First of all, Benitah and 
Evtimov point to contextual support in the opening clause of Article 2 of the SCM 
Agreement.  This refers to subsidies specific to certain enterprises ‘within the jurisdiction of 
the granting authority’.937  Next, contextual support might also be found in the (temporal) 
green light status of subsidies given to disadvantaged regions (Article 8.2(b) of the SCM 
Agreement).  Indeed, this ‘green light’ status, subject to specific and stringent conditions,938 
would have had no meaning if national subsidies to all industries within such a region would 
have already qualified as non-specific under Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement.939  Lastly, 
one of the elements underpinning the US – Upland Cotton Panel’s conclusion that the national 
US crop insurance was specific related to the fact that it was only available in certain regions 
and not in the entire US.940  This limited a contrario reading would thus imply that specificity 
is determined by reference to the level of the granting authority: a subsidy is non-specific if 
the granting authority (federal or regional) makes a subsidy available to all enterprises in its 
territory (nationwide or region), whereas such subsidy would be specific if it is limited to 
certain enterprises within the authority’s jurisdiction.  The latter implies that a subsidy is 
specific if the granting authority limits it to a sub-geographical entity.   
 
                                                 
934 See Clarke and Horlick, above n 587, at 695, footnote 82. 
935 See Clarke and Horlick, above n 587, at 695; Benitah, above n 893, at 260; Luengo, above n 771, at 
139. 
936 Benitah, above n 893, at 260; Evtimov, above n 896, at 460-461, 467-468.  This is also how 
Adamantopoulos and Pereyra read this provision as incorporated in the EC’s Basic Regulation, which 
sets out the conditions for imposing CVDs.  See K. Adamantopoulos and M. J. Pereyra, EU Anti-
Subsidy Law and Practice, 2nd ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), 475 pp., at 164.  In contrast, 
Luengo does not make this distinction.  He concluded that the change to the Dunkel draft ‘was included 
in order to allow subsidies granted by federal or regional governments to all enterprises or industries 
located in that territory’ (emphasis added).  Luengo, above n 771, at 139.   
937 Benitah, above n 893, at 260; Evtimov, above n 896, at 460-461, 467- 468. 
938 One of the conditions was that such a subsidy was ‘non-specific (within the meaning of Article 2) 
within eligible regions’.  See also below Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.3. 
939 Under the Dunkel Draft, Article 8.2(b), which was formulated similarly as the current version, was 
clearly written to give ‘green light’ status to some regional subsidies that were explicitly deemed 
specific on the basis of its version of Article 2.2. 
940 ‘We note that, even assuming arguendo that the text of the granting instrument shows any 
appearance of non-specificity, record evidence indicates that there are pilotprogrammes for livestock – 
AGR and "AGR-lite" in certain regions – but that these programmes are not universally available in 
respect of all livestock within the United States’.  Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.118, 
footnote 1276.  See also above n 921. 
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The second sentence of Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement stipulates that the setting of 
general tax rates by all competent government levels is deemed non-specific.  Under the 
original Dunkel Draft, this second sentence clearly served as an exception to the general rule 
set out in the first sentence: general tax policies were exempted from the general principle that 
subsidies available to all enterprises located within a designated geographical region were 
deemed specific irrespectively of the granting authority.  Yet, under the limited a contrario 
reading of the first sentence of Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement, this second sentence would 
rather confirm the general rule set out in the first sentence.  The determination of specificity is 
made at the level of the granting authority.  The setting of general tax rates by all competent 
levels of government is deemed non-specific.  In contrast, a regional tax reduction given by 
the central government would be considered specific.941 
 
Observe that in earlier negotiations in the Uruguay Round, the EC had firmly opposed that the 
determination of ‘general availability’ relates to the jurisdiction of the granting authority.  
After all, such an interpretation was not tenable on economic grounds because ‘there is no 
difference, as to their economic effect, between a subsidy granted by a regional or local 
government to all firms in that region on one hand, and the same subsidy granted to the same 
firms in the same region but by the central government on the other hand’.942  Yet, the last-
minute compromise between Canada and US might have exactly generated such result.  The 
leeway given to regions to offer generally available subsidies without being captured under 
the SCM Agreement (i.e., neither challengeable, nor countervailable) is considered legitimate 
because it respects the federal structure of some WTO Members.    
 
 
                                                 
941 See also Evtimov, above n 896, at 468. 
942 Submission by the European Community (MTN.GNG/NG4/W/36, 2 February 1990), at 6. 
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4. DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES 
Evidently but importantly, the SCM Agreement does not condemn all specific subsidies 
covered under Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body, recognizing the 
broad definition of the subsidy-concept, stressed that: 
 
The granting of a subsidy is not, in and of itself, prohibited under the SCM Agreement. Nor 
does granting a ‘subsidy’, without more, constitute an inconsistency with that Agreement. The 
universe of subsidies is vast. Not all subsidies are inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.943 
 
Articles 1 and 2 merely define the concepts of subsidy and specificity and do not in 
themselves impose any obligation with respect to such ‘specific subsidies’.  These articles 
serve as a threshold for the application of the disciplines prescribed by Parts II, III, IV, and V 
of the SCM Agreement.944  The SCM Agreement aims at targeting those subsidies that are 
trade-distorting.  To this end, the agreement as originally implemented when the WTO 
Agreement came into effect grouped subsidies in three categories, each imposing different 
disciplines.945 This so-called ‘traffic light approach’ proved pivotal to find a compromise 
between the harsh stance of the US and the looser stance of other countries on disciplining 
subsidies.  On the one end, two types of subsidies were principally prohibited in and of 
themselves (red light) because of their direct trade-distorting effect, namely export subsidies 
and local content subsidies (Part II of the SCM Agreement). On the other end, three types of 
subsidies, namely, for research activities, for disadvantaged regions, and for the adaptation to 
environmental requirements, were deemed non-actionable (green light).  These were in 
principle allowed under the SCM Agreement (Part IV of the SCM Agreement). All other 
subsidies were actionable subsidies (rest category, amber light), meaning that they could be 
challenged or countervailed if they caused adverse effects (Part III of the SCM Agreement). 
However, the category of green light subsidies already expired at the end of 1999.946  Since 
then, just two categories are in place: those subsidies that are prohibited as such (red light) 
and all others that can be challenged if they cause adverse effects to the interests of other 
WTO Members (amber light).  Specific subsidies that were previously granted green light 
status are thus currently actionable if they cause adverse effects.  The category of prohibited 
                                                 
943 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 47.   
944 See also Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), paras 85–87.  Given that they merely 
define the terms ‘subsidy’ and ‘specificity’, Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement cannot be 
considered to be ‘violated’, as the Panel in US – Export Restraints seemed to suggest.  See Panel 
Report, US – Export Restraints, para 9.1.  Likewise, as elaborated above (see above n 869, 871, 872), a 
CVDs procedure can, in my opinion, not be merely inconsistent with Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, 
even though some panels have reached this conclusion. 
945 The origins of the traffic light approach date back to proposals made by the US during the Tokyo 
Round.  See Hufbauer and Erb, above n 542, at 22; Croome, above n 579, at 62. 
946 Article 31 of the SCM Agreement. 
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subsidies circumvents the difficult proof of adverse effects947 and more powerful tools are 
provided to challenge such prohibited subsidies.  We start with an analysis of those subsidies 
that are captured under this prohibition set out under Part II of the SCM Agreement.  
   
4.1. PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES 
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement targets two types of subsidies: 
 
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, 
upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I; 
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of 
domestic over imported goods. 
 
These export subsidies (a) and local content subsidies (b) are prohibited and may thus not be 
granted nor maintained948 because they are considered trade-distorting by their very nature.949 
Expansion of the red light category beyond the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies of the 
Subsidies Code was one of the most contentious issues during the Uruguay Round, with the 
US as its main proponent.950  In the Doha negotiations, the US and the EC also proposed an 
expansion of the red light subsidies beyond these two types of subsidies.  Whereas the US 
mainly aimed to bring the so-called ‘dark amber’ types of domestic subsidies under the 
category of export subsidies, the EC primarily aimed at expanding the scope of local content 
subsidies.951 
Before examining the substance of both types of prohibited subsidies, we look at the 
requirement of ‘contingency’, which is a cross-cutting issue.  To qualify as export subsidy, it 
has to be shown that a subsidy is ‘contingent’ upon exportation.  To qualify as local content 
subsidy, it has to be shown that a subsidy is ‘contingent’ upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods. 
                                                 
947 As mentioned above, prohibited subsidies are also deemed to be specific (Article 2.3 of the SCM 
Agreement). 
948 Article 3.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
949 Stewart, above n 579, at 886. 
950 Recall that the US aimed to expand the Illustrative List of prohibited subsidies to primary products, 
as well as to domestic subsidies having a significant effect on trade or competitiveness.  The trade 
effect had to be determined on the basis of objective criteria such as the amount of the subsidy.  See 
Communication from the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20, June 15, 1988), at 3-4. See Stewart, 
above n 579, at 886–890. 
951 For example, the US proposed to move all but one (i.e., Article 6.1(a)) of the subsidies spelled out in 
Article 6 of the SCM Agreement to the category of prohibited subsidies.  Communication from the 
United States, Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement (TN/RL/W/78, 19 
March 2003); Paper from the United States, Expanding the Prohibited “red light” Subsidy Category 
(TN/RL/GEN/94, 16 January 2006); Proposal from the United States, Expanding the Prohibited “red 
light” Subsidy Category, Draft Text (TN/RL/GEN/146, 5 June 2007); Submission of the European 
Communities, Subsidies (TN/RL/GEN/135, 24 April 2006). 
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The term ‘contingent’ in these definitions should be understood as ‘conditional’ or ‘depending 
for its existence on something else’.952  This conditionality could operate in law but also in 
fact, which prevents governments from circumventing the prohibition by linking subsidies to 
export performance or local content without prescribing it explicitly in their laws.953  
As to export subsidies (Article 3(1)(a)), de jure export conditionality should be ‘demonstrated 
on the basis of the words of the relevant legislation, regulation or other legal instrument’.954 
De facto export conditionality is explicitly prescribed in the SCM Agreement, which even 
indicates how this should be determined.  The complaining party should demonstrate three 
different substantive elements955: (i) the granting of a subsidy956 is (ii) in fact tied to957 (iii) 
actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings.958  The mere fact that a subsidy is granted 
to export-oriented industries is considered insufficient in itself.959   
As far as local content subsidies (Article 3(1)(b)) are concerned, the type of conditionality is 
not explicitly prescribed, but case law indicates that it likewise covers both de jure and de 
facto contingency.  Indeed, the Appellate Body in Canada – Autos disagreed with the Panel’s 
decision that limited the scope to conditionality in law.960  Moreover, the Appellate Body 
contemplated the legal standard of de jure contingency similar to that under Article 3(1)(a).961 
 
The question arises as to what degree of conditionality is required by the term ‘contingent 
upon’.962  What is sure is that, as indicated, the mere fact that a subsidy is granted to export-
oriented industries does not reach the required degree of conditionality.963  Furthermore, the 
definitions indicate that a subsidy could qualify as an export subsidy (or local content 
subsidy) if export performance (or local content) is one among other conditions for receiving 
the subsidy.  In other words, export performance (or local content) does not have to be a 
                                                 
952 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 166. 
953 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 167. 
954 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 167. See also Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
Autos, para 100. 
955 See Article 3.1(a), footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement. 
956 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 170. 
957 This second element is ‘at the very heart of the legal standard in footnote 4’. ‘Tied to’ refers to ‘limit 
or restrict as to (…) conditions’. It requires a demonstration of a relationship of conditionality or 
dependence. Therefore, ‘tied to’ is similar to ‘contingent upon’. See Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
Aircraft, para 171. 
958 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 172. 
959 Article 3.1(a), footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement. 
960 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, paras 135-143. The primary reason of the Appellate Body 
seemed to be the circumvention argument (see para 142). 
961 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para 123. The Appellate Body did not decide upon de facto 
contingency because of the incomplete analysis of the Panel. 
962 Article 3.1(a) and (b) of the SCM Agreement. 
963 Article 3.1(a), footnote 4, second sentence of the SCM Agreement. Export orientation can be a 
relevant fact to demonstrate that the subsidy is ‘tied to’ exportation or export earnings, provided that it 
is one of several other facts which are considered.  See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 
173. 
PART II CHAPTER 4 – DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES 
 
 
 190
sufficient condition for receiving the subsidy: other conditions might in addition be 
required.964  In contrast, one could ask oneself whether export performance (or local content) 
must constitute a necessary condition for receiving the subsidy. 
Whereas the text of the SCM Agreement does not provide a clear answer, the Panel in 
Canada – Aircraft considered export performance a necessary condition because it applied a 
‘but for’ test.  The essential question was whether Canada would have granted the subsidy but 
for the export performance.965  Although the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel’s ‘overall 
approach to de facto export contingency’, it dismissed the ‘but for’ test because this test did 
not fit into the actual language of the Agreement.966  The Appellate Body did not indicate, 
however, what degree of conditionality it exactly had in mind.  It only clarified that ‘it does 
not suffice to demonstrate solely that a government granting a subsidy anticipated that 
exports would result’.967 
The measure at issue in Canada – Autos illustrates that the question of necessary 
conditionality of the measure as a whole might not be decisive in all cases.  First, concerning 
export contingency, a manufacturer could receive a certain amount of import duty exemptions 
(subsidies) even if he did not export. Yet, ‘the more motor vehicles a manufacturer exports 
(export performance), the more motor vehicles that manufacturer is entitled to import duty-
free (subsidy)’.968 On this basis, the Appellate Body concluded that the measure was 
contingent upon export.969  Referring to footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement, the Appellate 
                                                 
964 See Article 3.1(a) and (b): ‘whether solely or as one of several other conditions’. See, for example, 
Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para 111 in fine. 
965 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, paras 9.332 and 9.340.  
966 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 171, footnote 102. 
967 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 171 (emphasis in the original). 
968 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para 106 (emphasis added). Two situations were 
distinguished by the Panel and Appellate Body.  The first situation is where the production-to-sales 
ratio requirements are 100:100 or higher, which was a condition to be eligible for the import duty 
exemption.  It is in essence a ratio of the net sales value of the vehicles produced in Canada to the net 
sales value of all vehicles of that class sold for consumption in Canada. So, as the Panel indicated 
correctly, to meet such standard, for every unit a manufacturer imports duty-free, it would have to 
export an equivalent unit value.  Thus, exportation is, in this first situation, clearly a necessary 
condition for receiving the subsidy (import duty exemption).  Yet, the stringent production-to-sales 
ratio requirements were relaxed to some extent under situation 2.  For example, manufacturers with a 
ratio of 95:100 that do not export are nevertheless entitled to import duty-free vehicles with a sales 
value of 5.  Up to this amount, the Panel and the Appellate Body reasoned that the import duty 
exemption is not contingent upon export performance.  For any amount above this duty-free allowance, 
the value of vehicles imported duty-free is strictly limited to the value of vehicles exported and, as a 
consequence, for that amount there is a clear relationship of contingency pursuant to the Panel and 
Appellate Body. 
969 Is export contingency a necessary condition to receive the subsidy?  This question is indeed not fine-
tuned enough to be answered for the measure as a whole. Up to a certain amount of subsidies, 
exportation is not a necessary condition.  If a manufacturer aims to receive more duty-free (subsidized) 
imports, it should export the same value, and exportation becomes thus a necessary condition.  The 
level of the amount upon which exportation becomes necessary is essential to decide whether the 
measure as a whole can be considered as contingent upon export.  This was, however, not considered 
relevant by the Appellate Body. 
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Body thus required a ‘tie’970 (i.e., a positive correlation) between the export performance and 
the subsidy without clarifying the required strength of the tie (i.e., the degree of 
correlation).971  Second, concerning local content contingency, the import duty exemption was 
contingent upon certain Canadian Value Added (CVA) requirements.  The definition of CVA 
included parts and materials of Canadian origin (i.e., local content) among other elements 
such as labor costs and manufacturing overheads.  The Panel considered the subsidy as not 
contingent upon local content because a manufacturer might be able to satisfy the CVA 
requirement without using any domestic good whatsoever.  However, the Appellate Body 
rejected the Panel’s conclusion because it had overlooked the level of CVA requirements. As 
an example, the Appellate Body indicated that ‘if the level of the CVA requirements is very 
high, we can see that the use of domestic goods may well be a necessity and thus be, in 
practice, required as a condition for eligibility for the import duty exemption’.972 The 
Appellate Body thus also seems to refer to ‘necessary conditionality’, but this had to be 
determined in relation to the level of CVA requirements.973 
In US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), the US contended that export contingency should be 
understood as a necessary condition and therefore argued that the ETI measure was export-
neutral.  After all, the ETI measure granted a tax exemption (subsidy) when goods are sold for 
use abroad and was thus available with respect to goods not produced in the US.974  Yet, the 
Panel and the Appellate Body reached a different conclusion by distinguishing two situations. 
First, when goods are produced domestically and sold for use abroad, exporting is obviously a 
necessary condition for receiving the tax exemption and the tax benefit is thus contingent 
                                                 
970 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, paras 107–108. See also Panel Report, Australia – 
Automotive Leather II, paras 9.55-9.71.  
971 As indicated, the level of the amount upon which exportation becomes necessary might have to be 
taken into consideration (see above n 969).  This might be illustrated by a far-fetched example: What if 
the Canadian subsidy program allowed that even manufacturers with a production sales ratio of 10:100 
that do not export were still entitled to import duty-free vehicles?  This implies that they could import 
90 per cent of (the value of) their sales duty-free (subsidy) without any exportation requirement. Is this 
subsidy really contingent upon exportation?  If the test is ‘whether they could import more if they 
exported more’, the answer is nevertheless affirmative. 
972 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para 130 (first emphasis added). 
973 After all, the Appellate Body continued:  
‘By contrast, if the level of the CVA requirements is very low, it would be much easier to satisfy 
those requirements without actually using domestic goods; for example, where the CVA 
requirements are set at 40 per cent, it might be possible to satisfy that level simply with the 
aggregate of other elements of Canadian value added, in particular, labor costs. The multiplicity 
of possibilities for compliance with the CVA requirements, when these requirements are set at 
low levels, may, depending on the specific level applicable to a particular manufacturer, make 
the use of domestic goods only one possible means (means which might not, in fact, be utilized) 
of satisfying the CVA requirements’.  
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para 130 (emphasis in the original).  The emphasized wording 
‘only one possible mean’ indicates that this example is not considered as a condition. 
974 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para 110. 
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upon export.975 The Panel and Appellate Body did not decide upon the second situation, 
whereby goods are produced abroad and sold for use abroad, which does clearly not involve 
any exportation from the US.976  Importantly, the fact that the subsidies granted in the second 
situation might not be export contingent ‘does not dissolve the export contingency’ arising in 
the first situation977 because it concerns two different factual situations.978  The crux of the 
argument seems that both situations are different because they are mutually exclusive.  For 
property produced in the US, exportation is the only option to benefit from the tax exemption.  
Whereas export contingency is thus not a necessary condition for receiving the subsidy in 
light of the ETI measure as a whole, the ETI measure with respect to the first situation is 
considered export contingent.979 
This case law has illustrated that the ‘contingency’-test is rather complex and that this 
determination will have to be decided upon on a case-by-case basis.  In this exercise, the text 
of the SCM Agreement does not provide much guidance to the WTO-adjudicating bodies on 
where they have to draw the line.980  Overall, the case law does not seem to require a very 
stringent ‘tie’ between the subsidy and export (local content) performance to qualify a subsidy 
as an export subsidy (local content subsidy). 
 
                                                 
975 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), paras 116-118. 
976 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), paras 109 and 120. 
977 ‘Conversely, the export contingency arising in these circumstances (situation 1) has no bearing on 
whether there is an export contingent subsidy in the second set of circumstances’ (emphasis added). 
See Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para 119. 
978 See Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), paras 113-115.  The Appellate Body 
indicated that the distinctiveness is confirmed by the text of the ETI measure.  Moreover, the two 
situations ‘must be different since the very same property cannot be produced both within and outside 
the United States’.  One and the same natural or legal person may, of course, benefit under both 
situations (see para 119). 
979 Because exportation is a necessary condition in this situation and another sufficient condition 
involves a different situation.  See also, Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 556-584.   
980 Raising concerns about different interpretations by the WTO-adjudicating bodies, Australia and 
Brazil have introduced proposals in the Negotiation Group on Rules to amend the text of the SCM 
Agreement on this issue (Communication from Australia, Prohibited Export Subsidies 
(TN/RL/GEN/34, March 23, 2005); Paper from Brazil, De Facto Export Contingency 
(TN/RL/GEN/88, November 18, 2005)).  In response to the Panel Report in Australia – Automotive 
Leather II (see above n 970), Australia raised the concern that the current rules would disadvantage 
Members with small domestic markets because ‘WTO case law has appeared to place a greater weight 
on the export propensity of a product in the range of factors which are examined to determine export 
contingency. (…) A subsidy provided to a product by a WTO Member with a large domestic market for 
that product may be actionable but carry little if no risk of being found to be export contingent.  The 
same subsidy provided to a product by a WTO Member with a relatively small domestic market may 
represent a very high risk of being contingent on export performance given a much higher export 
orientation’. See Communication from Australia, Prohibited Export Subsidies (TN/RL/GEN/22, 
October 19, 2004). See also T. Chen, P. Wu, and J. Juo, ‘Reconsidering Prohibited Export Subsidies in 
Doha Negotiations,’ in M. Matsushita, D. Ahn, and T. Chen (eds), The WTO Trade Remedy System: 
East Asian Perspectives (London, Cameron May, 2007), 337–355. 
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4.1.1. Export subsidies 
Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement reads in the relevant part:  
 
Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the 
meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited: 
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, 
upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I (…). 
 
Notice, first of all, that the opening part of Article 3.1 installs an exception on agricultural 
export subsidies that are in conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture.  In Chapter 6, it 
will be examined whether such export subsidies are still exempted from this prohibition set 
out in the SCM Agreement.981  Turning to non-agricultural subsidies, these are prohibited if 
‘contingent (…) upon export performance, including those illustrated in (the Illustrative 
List)’.982   
 
Two undisputed conclusions can be derived from this text of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM 
Agreement on its relationship with the Illustrative List (Annex I).983  First, the Illustrative 
List, by definition, only lists ‘examples – illustrations’984 of export subsidies.  Some subsidies 
thus fall outside the Illustrative List’s scope but are covered under the export subsidy 
definition stipulated in Article 1 juncto 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.985  Second, a subsidy 
that falls within the scope of the Illustrative List is deemed to be a prohibited export 
subsidy.986  Consequently, the complaining party does not first have to demonstrate that these 
subsidies are contingent upon export performance under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM 
Agreement.  Complainants could by-pass the export contingency demonstration spelled out in 
the previous section and directly base their claim on one of the items of the Illustrative List.   
Yet, could complainants use the Illustrative List not only to jump the ‘export contingency’ 
test of Article 3.1(a) SCM Agreement but also to by-pass the ‘subsidy’ test under Article 1 of 
the SCM Agreement?  Recall that Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement explicitly states that ‘the 
following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited: (a) subsidies 
                                                 
981 See below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3.1. 
982 Wording between brackets added.  As will be explained below (Part, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3.1), the 
same prohibition applies to agricultural export subsidies not in conformity with the Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
983 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 6.29-6.31. 
984 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 61.   
985 This also follows from the wording ‘including’ (Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement).  Some 
countries had suggested during the Uruguay Round to convert it into a definitive and exhaustive list.  
Yet, this was opposed by other countries such as the US and EC. See Stewart, above n 579, at 888. 
986 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras 6.30–6.31.  This was implicitly 
endorsed by the Appellate Body Report.  Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – 
Canada), para 61. 
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contingent, (…), upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I’.987  Above, 
the subsidy definition of Article 1 also leaves no doubt that it applies ‘for the purpose of this 
Agreement’, which implies, in the words of the Appellate Body, that this ‘applies wherever 
the word "subsidy" occurs throughout the SCM Agreement and conditions the application of 
the provisions of that Agreement regarding prohibited subsidies in Part II (…)’.988  This might 
suggest that only subsidies within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement could be 
prohibited under the SCM Agreement and that complainants should, as a result, not be 
allowed to jump directly to the Illustrative List.989  On the other hand, this reading would 
firmly reduce the relevance of the Illustrative List.  Indeed, the Illustrative List, predating the 
subsidy definition, provides more guidance on what GATT Contracting Parties considered a 
‘subsidy’ than on the ‘export contingency’ element.  By including the Illustrative List in the 
SCM Agreement, WTO Members apparently agreed that this list should still be relevant.990  
This might also explain why the panels in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada) and Korea 
– Commercial Vessels have explicitly stated that complainants could very well directly rely on 
the Illustrative List without the need for demonstrating the subsidy element.991  Similarly, 
panels and the Appellate Body (as well as all parties) in all US – Upland Cotton proceedings 
agreed that measures that fall under item (j) of the Illustrative List are per se export subsidies 
without the need for a separate analysis under Articles 1 and 3 of the SCM Agreement.992,993  
According to the Panel in US – Upland Cotton, Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement sets out 
‘a prohibition on subsidies contingent upon export performance, "including those illustrated 
in Annex I"’.994   
                                                 
987 Emphasis added. 
988 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 93.  According to the Panel in US – Softwood Lumber IV (para 
7.104, footnotes deleted): 
‘The chapeau of Article 1.1 SCM Agreement explicitly states that the concept and definition of 
what constitutes a "subsidy", as set forth in that Article, applies to the entire Agreement.  Thus, it 
is clear that this most basic definition of the Agreement informs every other reference to 
"subsidy" in the Agreement’.  
989 Unless, of course, all items in the Illustrative List are, by definition, beneficial financial 
contributions in the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement (or income or price support).     
990 The cost-to-government approach under the Illustrative List (advocated by the EC) is generally 
considered more flexible than the benefit-to-recipient approach elaborated under Article 1 of the SCM 
Agreement. 
991 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras 6.43-6.44. See also Panel Report, 
Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.204.  The Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels observed that this 
‘perhaps reflects the historical context of the Illustrative List, in the sense that it was first drafted before 
the definition of "subsidy" set forth in the SCM Agreement was introduced’ (footnote 126). 
992 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 7.802-7.803, 7.946-7.948 and 8.1(d)(i); Appellate Body 
Report , US – Upland Cotton, paras 666, 720-733 and 763(e)(iv); Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 14.52; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), 
paras 322-323.   
993 See also Panel Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para 5.154. 
994 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, footnote 1125.  This should be contrasted with the Panel’s view 
on local content subsidies where it found support in the sentence ‘within the meaning of Article 1’ 
(which is part of the introducing sentence of Article 3.1 and not of Article 3.1(b) as the Panel seems to 
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In sum, complainants can make use of two different tracks to demonstrate that a subsidy is a 
prohibited export subsidy under the SCM Agreement: on the basis of Article 1 juncto 3 of the 
SCM Agreement or by reference to the Illustrative List if the measure is listed under one of its 
items.  Because the subsidy definition under both approaches might differ, the question on the 
correct implementation might arise: does implementation differ depending on whether the 
existence of an export subsidy is demonstrated on the basis of Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM 
Agreement or the Illustrative List?  Part III will explain in detail how this question was solved 
in the case US – Upland Cotton.995   
 
Both tracks to meet the export subsidy definition are further explored.  Importantly, as will be 
explained subsequently, the Illustrative List might in some instances be used a contrario as 
well, namely to demonstrate that some forms of export subsidies (in the meaning of Article 1 
juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement or the Illustrative List) are not prohibited under the SCM 
Agreement. 
 
4.1.1.1. Export subsidies in the meaning of Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement 
Under this first track, all elements to demonstrate the existence of an ‘export subsidy’ have 
been introduced above.  First, the complainant should demonstrate the presence of a ‘subsidy’ 
under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement: a financial contribution by the government (or 
income/price support) confers a benefit.  In contrast to some items of the Illustrative List, this 
subsidy definition applies a benefit-to-recipient standard and not a cost-to-government 
standard.  The relevant question under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement is not whether the 
government incurred a cost when making the financial contribution, but whether this financial 
contribution was beneficial to the recipient.  Second, the complainant should demonstrate that 
such a subsidy is de jure or de facto ‘contingent’ upon exportation along the lines explained in 
the previous section.  The specificity test should not be passed because ‘export subsidies’ are 
deemed to be specific.996  These export subsidies are prohibited by virtue of Article 3.1 and 
3.2 of the SCM Agreement unless an exception in the Illustrative List could be invoked (see 
below Section 4.1.1.3). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
present it) for its interpretation that, in order to be a local content subsidy, it must be a subsidy in the 
meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.  Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1076.     
995 See below Part III, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3.2; Part III, Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1.2.2. 
996 Article 2.3 of the SCM Agreement. 
PART II CHAPTER 4 – DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES 
 
 
 196
4.1.1.2. Export subsidies in the meaning of one of the items of the Illustrative List 
Alternatively, measures are prohibited ‘export subsidies’ if they are covered by one of the 
items of the Illustrative List, which is basically the same as the list included in the Subsidies 
Code.997 
Three listed examples of export subsidies do not need much explanation.  They either do not 
add anything to the Article 1 juncto 3 export subsidy definition or are insignificant nowadays. 
An example of the first category is the opening item of the list, which refers to the provision 
by governments of ‘direct subsidies’ to a firm or an industry contingent upon export 
performance [item (a)].  Likewise, the last item of the list, which was included as a residual 
category in the Subsidies Code, also seems redundant because it refers to any other charge on 
the public account constituting an export subsidy in the sense of Article XVI of the GATT 
[item (l)].998  Lastly, currency retention schemes or any similar practice that involves a bonus 
on exports are likewise prohibited [item (b)].999  Such multiple currency practices, for which 
IMF approval is required, were prevalent when the list was originally drafted in the 1950s but 
are almost non-existent today.1000  
The remaining items of the Illustrative List could be grouped into three categories, each 
relating to one of the three types of financial contributions singled out under Article 1 of the 
SCM Agreement.  To be clear, this categorization is only made for analytical purposes and 
does not imply that those items would ipso facto be covered under Article 1 of the SCM 
Agreement.   
 
                                                 
997 As explained, the list of the Subsidies Code was based on the 1960 Declaration (see above Part II, 
Chapter 1, Section 1.2). 
998 Luengo reveals that this item was included in the Subsidies Code because of the different 
interpretation of ‘subsidy’ between the US (focusing on benefit) and the EC (focusing on the cost to 
government or charge on the public account).  Luengo, above n 771, 151. 
999 Siegel indicated that a currency retention scheme ‘usually involves allowing certain exporters to 
retain a portion of their foreign exchange earnings notwithstanding a general rule for residents to 
surrender receipts of foreign exchange to local banks, or the central bank, in exchange for local 
currency’. As Dam explained, such currency retention scheme could form an important incentive to 
export because, depending upon the details of the scheme, such foreign exchange earnings could either 
be sold by exporters on the free market, where, because of the scarcity of foreign exchange, they could 
charge a higher price than under the official exchange rate, or they could be used to import goods that 
were otherwise unavailable under the applicable exchange control regulation.  Such currency retention 
schemes involving a bonus upon exports are thus prohibited export subsidies.  D. E. Siegel, ‘Legal 
Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund’s Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreements’, 
96:3 American Journal of International Law (2002), 561-599, at 596; K. W. Dam, The GATT – Law 
and International Economic Organization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 480 pp., 
at 137-138.  
1000 The relevance of this item was already questioned during the 1970s.  See Note by the Secretariat on 
the Meeting of June 1972 (Spec(72)61, 12 July 1972), at 2.   
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4.1.1.2.1. The provision of goods or services favourable to exporters  
Two items of the Illustrative List relate to the provision of goods or services favourable to 
exporters.  First, the government is not allowed to subsidize exports by providing or 
mandating internal transport and freight charges on export shipments on terms more favorable 
than for domestic shipments [item (c)].1001,1002  The second type is broader and requires some 
further discussion [item (d)].  In essence, item (d) prohibits governments to provide products 
(or services) on more favourable terms if these are used in export production.  In particular, 
the panels in Canada – Dairy distinguished three elements that should be present to find a 
violation of item (d): ‘(1) the provision of products for use in export production on terms 
more favourable than for provision of like products for use in domestic production; (2) by 
governments either directly or indirectly through government mandated schemes; and (3) on 
terms more favourable than those commercially available on world markets’.1003   
Item (d) thus explicitly covers the indirect provision of goods/services through government 
mandated schemes.  This also covers situations whereby the government delegates authority 
to its agency, ‘which, in turn, set up a “government-mandated” scheme’.1004  Yet, one might 
wonder whether the required government nexus under item (d) is looser than under the 
entrustment/direction standard stipulated in Article 1.1(a)(iv) of the SCM Agreement.1005  In 
Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), this seemed to be the parties’ 
assumption since the complainants based their argumentation on item (d) of the Illustrative 
List, whereas Canada argued that the scope of item (d) should be interpreted in light of Article 
1.1(a)(iv) of the SCM Agreement.  The Panel, however, followed the complainants’ view 
because the Illustrative List contains per se violations.  To interpret item (d) of the Illustrative 
List, the Panel therefore disregarded the entrustment/direction standard of Article 1.1(a)(iv) of 
the SCM Agreement.1006  The Panel concluded that ‘the provision of goods is made or 
                                                 
1001 See Dam, above n 999, at 140.  Because the exporter receives a service in return for its 
contribution, such a ‘charge’ should not be considered a ‘tax’ and item (c) is therefore not discussed as 
an example of revenue foregone.  The concept of ‘tax’ is not defined in any of the WTO Agreements.  
For a definition of the terms ‘tax’ and ‘charge’ in the context of the OECD, see Note by the Chairman, 
Definition of Taxes (DAFFE/MAI/EG2(96)3, 16 April 1996). 
1002 The comparison is thus made between charges for export shipments and those for domestic 
shipments.  As the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft underscored, this is ‘irrespective of whether those charges 
are higher, lower or equal to the charges paid with respect to the shipments of competing products from 
other Members’.  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 7.25. 
1003 Panel Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para 5.157.  Panel Report, 
Canada – Dairy, paras 7.128-7.131. 
1004 Panel Report, Canada – Dairy, para 7.130. 
1005 Regarding the scope of Article 1.1(a)(iv) of the SCM Agreement, see above Part II, Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.2. 
1006 The Panel relied upon item (d) of the Illustrative List to interpret the meaning of ‘export subsidy’ 
under Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  The Panel had previously found a violation of 
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture but also scrutinized Article 10.1 in the alternative.  
Panel Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), paras 5.153, 5.154, 5.159, 5.160. 
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mandated by government for export as a result of the prohibition on diversion of CEM back 
into the domestic regulated market and the exemption which gives processors for export 
access to the lower CEM prices’.1007  In response to previous rulings, Canada had attempted to 
remove government action from the export transactions by introducing a new category of 
milk for export processing, Commercial Export Milk (CEM).  This CEM was exempted from 
the pricing regulations applicable to other types of milk.1008  Price and volume of CEM were 
negotiated directly between processor and producer and the diversion of CEM onto the 
domestic market was prohibited.  Yet, Canada’s argument based on Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of 
the SCM Agreement that ‘there is no provision of products through a government mandated 
scheme because the government does not command or direct producers to produce CEM’ was 
thus simply considered irrelevant.  Although the Appellate Body did not go into the 
interpretation of item (d),1009 it seemed to qualify the Panel’s wide interpretation of this item 
of the Illustrative List.  After all, the Appellate Body explicitly contrasted the loose 
government nexus under the listed types of agricultural export subsidies (i.e., Article 9.1(c) of 
the Agreement on Agriculture) with both Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement and 
item (d) of the Illustrative List.1010  Drawing this comparison, the Appellate Body observed 
that, even though Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture ‘certainly covers situations 
where government mandates or directs that payments be made, it also covers other situations 
where no such compulsion is involved’.1011  A contrario, some kind of compulsion of a third 
party seems required not only under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement but also 
under item (d) of the Illustrative List.1012  Whereas the Appellate Body did not equate the 
required government nexus under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) and item (d) of the Illustrative List, its 
                                                 
1007 Panel Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para 5.160.  The Panel also 
found support in Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture.   
1008 The operation of the system challenged before the original panel is summarized in Panel Report, 
US – Export Restraints, para 8.43. 
1009 Because the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that the Canadian measure was an export 
subsidy under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture (listed type of export subsidy), it 
reasoned that such a subsidy could not qualify as a non-listed type of export subsidy (Article 10.1 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture).  Therefore, the Appellate Body considered the Panel’s reasoning under 
Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, whereby the Panel relied on item (d) for contextual 
support, as moot and of no legal effect.  See Appellate Body, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New 
Zealand and US II), para 158. 
1010 The Appellate Body also referred to other items of the Illustrative List.   
1011 Appellate Body, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para 128 (emphasis 
added).   
1012 Arguably, the Canadian scheme was such a situation in which no compulsion was involved.  
Hence, it would seem to fall outside the scope of item (d) of the Illustrative List and Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement.  Yet, the required nexus between the government and the 
payment was sufficient to bring it within the scope of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture 
(see above n 1009; below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.2.1.1).   
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conclusion implies that both have at least in common that they necessitate some form of 
compulsion in case a subsidy is provided through a third party.1013   
 
4.1.1.2.2. Border tax adjustments and duty drawback systems 
Five examples of export subsidies in the Illustrative List deal with fiscal incentives (items e, f, 
g, h, i) in which the government foregoes revenue otherwise due by exporters.  As the 
following two sections explain, these items address under what conditions taxes as well as 
import duties could be rebated upon exportation. 
 
4.1.1.2.2.1. Border tax adjustments 
Border tax adjustments encompass the imposition of a tax on imported products equal to a 
corresponding tax on domestic products (import side) and the rebate of such a tax on exported 
products (export side).  Hence, such tax adjustments put into effect the destination principle, 
in which products are only taxed in the country of consumption.1014  These adjustments would 
generate trade neutrality: they level the playing field between products from different 
countries with regard to such taxes.  Indeed, adjustments by all trading countries applied 
symmetrically at the import and export side ensure that products are not double taxed but 
could likewise not take advantage of low taxes in their country of origin.1015     
However, the GATT/WTO disciplines only allow for border tax adjustments on indirect 
taxes, which are imposed directly or indirectly on products, but not on direct taxes, which are 
considered to be imposed upon the producer.  Framed differently, the destination principle is 
installed with regard to indirect taxes, whereas the origin principle is applied to direct taxes.  
Direct taxes are imposed in the country of production and cannot be adjusted at either the 
import or export side.  The rationale underpinning this distinction is twofold.  First, the 
economic assumption holds that indirect taxes are fully shifted forward by the taxpayer into 
the final price charged to consumers (i.e., consumption tax), whereas direct taxes would be 
completely shifted backward and thus be borne by the producer (i.e., income tax).  Direct 
                                                 
1013 Referring inter alia to Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement and item (d) of the Illustrative 
List, the Appellate Body stated that ‘(i)n these provisions, some kind of government mandate, 
direction, or control is an element of a subsidy provided through a third party’.  Appellate Body Report, 
Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para 128, footnote 113.  Recall that the concept 
of ‘direction’ is interpreted broadly by the Appellate Body.  Hence, there is no high degree of compulsion 
required under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement (see above n 745). 
1014 See, for example, Border Tax Adjustments, Report of the Working Party adopted on 2 December 
1970 (L/3464), para 4. 
1015 See, for example, P. Demaret and R. Stewardson, ‘Border Tax Adjustments under GATT and EC 
Law and General Implications for Environmental Taxes’, 28:4 Journal of World Trade (1994), 5-64, at 
6. 
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taxes would therefore not be reflected in the final price of the product.1016  Already during the 
GATT era, however, GATT Contracting Parties understood that this assumption does not 
entirely hold because, for instance, direct taxes could very well be reflected in the final 
price.1017  Second, this dichotomy might be partly explained on the basis of tradition: it 
codified GATT Contracting Parties’ practices to only adjust for indirect taxes and not direct 
taxes.1018  
Despite its questionable economic underpinning, which is voiced particularly by those 
countries such as the US relying predominantly on direct instead of indirect taxes, this 
dichotomy is still in place under the current WTO framework.  WTO Members have the right 
– but not the obligation – to adjust indirect taxes on the import and/or export side and 
symmetric application on both sides is not even required.  On the import side, Article II:2(b) 
juncto Article III:2 of the GATT allows WTO Members to impose an equivalent indirect tax 
upon imported products.1019  More relevant for our discussion, several items of the Illustrative 
List elaborate upon Note Ad Article XVI of the GATT, which allows adjustments of indirect 
taxes on the export side.1020  During the Doha negotiations, the US urged once more to 
stronger equalize the treatment on direct and indirect taxation under the SCM Agreement.1021  
Yet, it seems unlikely that this call will be answered given that the Draft Consolidated Chair 
Text does not amend the existing provisions.1022  These provisions under the Illustrative List 
implementing the distinction between direct and indirect taxes are explained further.   
 
First, item (e) installs the origin principle for direct taxes and social welfare charges.1023  Their 
full or partial exemption specifically related to exports qualifies as a prohibited export 
                                                 
1016 See Note by the Secretariat, Taxes and Charges for Environmental Purposes – Border Tax 
Adjustment (WT/CTE/W/47, 2 May 1997), para 36. 
1017 See, for example, Border Tax Adjustments, Report of the Working Party adopted on 2 December 
1970 (L/3464), para 8.  See also J. Bhagwati and P. Mavroidis, ‘Is Action Against US Exports for 
Failure to Sign Kyoto Protocol Legal?’, 6:2 World Trade Review (2007), 299-310, at 306. 
1018 See, for example, Border Tax Adjustments, Report of the Working Party adopted on 2 December 
1970 (L/3464), para 8; Dam, above n 999, at 139. 
1019 The import side of border tax adjustments is not relevant for our discussion on export subsidies.    
1020 For an overview of the negotiating history, see G. C. Hufbauer, Fundamental Tax Reform and 
Border Tax Adjustments (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, January 1996), 89 pp., 
at 47-50; Hufbauer and Erb, above n 542, at 51-57. 
1021 Communication from the United States, Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and 
Improvement (TN/RL/W/78, 19 March 2003), at 5. 
1022 Draft Consolidated Chair Text, above n 643. 
1023 Direct taxes cover, by virtue of footnote 59 of the SCM Agreement, ‘taxes on wages, profits, 
interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property’.  
At the time of the Working Party Report on BTAs (1970s), it was still debated whether taxes on 
property and social security charges could be rebated.  Yet, the SCM Agreement clarifies that both are 
excluded from adjustment upon exportation.   
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subsidy.1024  Nonetheless, this prohibition does not intent to limit a Member from taking 
measures ‘to avoid the double taxation of income earned by a taxpayer of that Member in a 
"foreign" State’.1025,1026  The US invoked this exception formulated in footnote 59 as a defense 
with regard to the ETI measure.  The Appellate Body indeed clarified that this constitutes an 
‘affirmative defense’ that may justify a prohibited export subsidy and that the burden of proof 
is on the party invoking the exception.1027  Yet, the US failed to meet this burden because the 
ETI exemption improperly combined domestic-source income and foreign-source income.1028  
The Appellate Body hereby ensured that if the measure would have been ‘confined to those 
aspects which grant a tax exemption for "foreign-source income", it would fall within 
footnote 59’.1029  
 
Turning to indirect taxes, the conditions to apply border tax adjustments (BTAs) on the export 
side are specified in items (g) and (h) of the Illustrative List.  Item (g) sets out the general 
rule: ‘the exemption or remission, with respect to the production and distribution of exported 
products, of indirect taxes’ is considered a prohibited export subsidy only if it is ‘in excess of 
those levied with respect to the production and distribution of like products when sold for 
domestic consumption’.  Implementing the destination principle, this provision only prohibits 
excessive adjustment of indirect taxes on exported goods.  Indirect taxes form the residual 
category of taxes under the SCM Agreement, covering ‘sales, excise, turnover, value added, 
franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other 
                                                 
1024 A deferral is not an export subsidy where, for example, appropriate interest charges are collected. 
See footnote 59 of the SCM Agreement; Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 97.  Also considered 
a prohibited export subsidy is ‘the allowance of special deductions directly related to exports or export 
performance, over and above those granted in respect to production for domestic consumption, in the 
calculation of the base on which direct taxes are charged’ (item f, emphasis added). 
1025 See Annex I(e), footnote 59 of the SCM Agreement, in fine as interpreted by the Appellate Body in 
US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), paras 137-138.  In particular, the Appellate Body clarified that double 
taxation occurs ‘when the same income, in the hands of the same taxpayer, is liable to tax in different 
States’.  Next, foreign-source income ‘refers to income generated by activities of a non-resident 
taxpayer in a ‘foreign’ State which have such links with that State so that the income could properly be 
subject to tax in that State’.  Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), paras 137 and 145. 
1026 In footnote 59, WTO Members also ‘reaffirm the principle that prices for goods in transactions 
between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under their or under the same control should for tax 
purposes be the prices which would be charged between independent enterprises acting at arm's 
length’.  See also Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, paras 98-100.    
1027 The US argued that the burden was on the complaining party but this was rejected by the Appellate 
Body. Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), paras 124, 126, 127, 133, 134. 
1028 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), paras 184-186. The Panel had reached the 
same conclusion but seemed to put more emphasis on the purpose of the measure, namely, the 
avoidance of double taxation. Panel Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), paras 8.94–8.108. See 
Hudec, above n 693, at 201. 
1029 Reading some flexibility into footnote 59, the Appellate Body recognized that ‘avoiding double 
taxation is not an exact science and we recognize that Members must have a degree of flexibility in 
tackling double taxation’.  But this flexibility is not interpreted so widely as to allow WTO Members 
‘to adopt allocation rules that systematically result in a tax exemption for income that has no link with a 
"foreign" State’.  Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para 185. 
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than direct taxes and import charges’.1030  Evidently, not only sales taxes, collected on the 
point of final sale, but also value-added taxes (VAT), which are collected on every stage of 
production and distribution on the value added, could be adjusted upon exportation within the 
limits set out under item (g).1031  Under a system of BTAs upon exportation, no VAT is thus 
charged on exported products and the exporter could deduct the VAT paid on its inputs, 
implying that there is no residual VAT reflected in the export price.  Observe that today 
almost 150 countries have set up a VAT system, including all OECD countries except for the 
US.1032 
Item (h), on the other hand, implements the destination principle with regard to a specific type 
of indirect taxes, namely ‘prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes’ (PSCI taxes).  These PSCI 
taxes may ‘be exempted, remitted or deferred on exported products’ even when no such 
adjustment is made when sold for domestic consumption, insofar they ‘are levied on inputs 
that are consumed in the production of the exported product (making normal allowance for 
waste)’.1033  The SCM Agreement hereby enlarged the scope of taxes that could be rebated 
under the Subsidies Code.  Inputs ‘consumed in the production process’ encompass, 
according to footnote 61 of the SCM Agreement, not only ‘inputs physically incorporated’1034 
but also ‘energy, fuels and oil used in the production process and catalysts which are 
consumed in the course of their use to obtain the exported product’.1035  It should be 
emphasized that the scope of item (h) is confined to prior stage indirect taxes, which are taxes 
levied on goods or services used directly or indirectly in making the product,1036, that are also 
cumulative in nature.  Such cumulative taxes are ‘multi-staged taxes levied where there is no 
mechanism for subsequent crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject to tax at one 
stage of production are used in a succeeding stage of production’.1037  The prototypical 
example of such PSCI tax is a cascade tax system.  Whereas under VAT systems only taxes 
on value-added are levied on each stage of production, cascade taxes are sales taxes levied on 
the actual output value on each stage of the production process.  Compared to VAT systems, 
                                                 
1030 Footnote 58 of the SCM Agreement (emphasis added).  Concerning machinery and stamp taxes, 
there was also disagreement in the Working Party on BTAs (1970) whether these could be adjusted 
(see also above n 1023).  Because these taxes are categorized under ‘indirect taxes’, they are eligible 
for adjustment upon exportation under the SCM Agreement.    
1031 Footnote 60 explicitly confirms that VAT is covered under item (h) and not under item (i).  By its 
terms, VAT would also be excluded from the scope of item (i) because it is not a cumulative tax (see 
below). 
1032 OECD, ‘Consumption Taxes: the Way of the Future?’, OECD Observer - Policy Brief (October 
2007), 1-7. 
1033 Emphasis added. 
1034 It is further clarified that inputs are physically incorporated ‘if such inputs are used in the 
production process and are physically present in the product exported’. Annex II, para 3 of the SCM 
Agreement. 
1035 Contrast item (h) juncto footnote 61 of the SCM Agreement with item (h) of the Subsidies Code. 
1036 Footnote 58 of the SCM Agreement. 
1037 Footnote 58 of the SCM Agreement. 
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such cascade systems therefore bear a double disadvantage.  They are not neutral on the 
length of the production process chain as each stage is taxed on the actual value.  Next, such 
systems do not allow, on the final stage before exportation, to accurately calculate the tax 
amount levied during various stages of production, generating the risk that rebates on exports 
would be in excess of taxes incurred.  For these reasons, OECD countries – but gradually 
developing countries as well – have replaced their cascade system by a VAT system.1038  
Some developing countries, however, still operate a cascade system because of a lack of 
administrative capacity to set up a more complex VAT system.  Overall, the progressive 
conversion of cascade systems has reduced the relevance of item (h) of the Illustrative 
List.1039   
By virtue of footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement, adjustments on indirect taxes in conformity 
with items (g) or (h) of the Illustrative List are neither countervailable nor actionable under 
the SCM Agreement.  Hence, these rebates are not only exempted from the prohibition on 
export subsidies but from the scope of the SCM Agreement as a whole.  In the concluding 
Part of this dissertation, the topical debate on whether carbon taxes could be rebated upon 
exportation by virtue of item (g) or (h) will be explored.1040   
 
4.1.1.2.2.2. Duty drawback systems 
Next to indirect taxes, the destination principle is equally applied with regard to import 
charges1041 on inputs.  This means that these could also be rebated upon exportation insofar 
they are consumed in the production of the exported product.1042  Consequently, by virtue of 
item (i), such a duty drawback system is only prohibited if it results in excess drawback of the 
import charges initially levied on the imported input.1043,1044  The justification for such rebates 
is similar as the one singled out for indirect taxes: import charges are borne by the product 
and most developed countries had such drawback system in place.  If the aim is to level the 
                                                 
1038 This explains why the EC already in the 1960s obliged its Member states to adopt a VAT system.   
1039 Take also into account that certain low-income WTO Members are exempted from the prohibition 
on export subsidies (see below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1.1.1).  Hence, they do not have to rely 
on item (h) in case they have a cascade tax system in place rebating taxes on exports.  On the other 
hand, conformity with item (h) juncto footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement would place their cascade 
taxes outside the reach of CVDs action and actionable subsidy claims. In this respect, item (h) might 
still be relevant for those developing countries benefiting from S&D treatment. 
1040 See below Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.2.3. 
1041 Footnote 58 of the SCM Agreement stipulates that import charges ‘mean tariffs, duties, and other 
fiscal charges not elsewhere enumerated in this note that are levied on imports’. 
1042 See also above n 716. 
1043 Again, ‘normal allowance for waste’ is treated as consumed in the production process.  The 
concepts of ‘waste’ and ‘normal’ are defined in respectively paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 of Annex II 
of the SCM Agreement.   
1044 See also Article VI:4 of the GATT.  The US already inscribed a duty drawback provision in 1789.  
See Hufbauer and Erb, above n 542, at 63.     
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playing field between exporters (i.e., trade neutrality), not only indirect taxes but also import 
charges should be rebated upon exports.  After all, import charges are in essence a 
combination of a consumption tax with a production subsidy.1045  Yet, because such drawback 
systems often went beyond ensuring a level playing field, excess drawbacks have been 
explicitly condemned as export subsidies since the 1960 Declaration.  This prohibition on 
excess drawbacks is thus currently incorporated in item (i) of the Illustrative List.   
To ease the administrative burden upon exporters, such an excess drawback is, nonetheless, 
allowed under item (i) if a firm uses a quantity of home market inputs as a substitute for 
imported inputs.1046  To prevent disguised subsidization, such substitution drawback systems 
have to respect three conditions by virtue of item (i): the quantity of domestic and imported 
inputs should be equal, domestic and imported inputs should have the same quality and 
characteristics, and the import and corresponding export operation should both occur within a 
reasonable period of time, not exceeding two years.  The (outdated)1047 idea behind such 
substitution drawback system is that exporters are not required to ensure that a particular 
amount of imported inputs is effectively used in the production of the exported product for 
which a drawback is requested.  Overall, however, the conditions imposed upon such 
substitution drawback system should guarantee that no drawback will occur in excess of 
levied import charges on inputs.  Annex III of the SCM Agreement spells out specific 
guidelines for the determination whether a substitution drawback system qualifies as an 
export subsidy under item (i) of the Illustrative List.  
Notably, drawback systems are also confined to inputs that are ‘consumed in the production 
of the exported products’ (item (i) juncto Annex II of the SCM Agreement), which covers 
‘inputs physically incorporated, energy, fuels and oil used in the production process and 
catalysts which are consumed in the course of their use to obtain the exported product’ 
(footnote 61 of the SCM Agreement).  Consequently, import charges on capital inputs could 
not be rebated since these are not physically incorporated in the processed products.  To 
remove this discrepancy, India has put forth a proposal to expand the scope of drawbacks to 
import duties paid on capital inputs.1048  Observing only some administrative difficulties in 
implementation, the IMF concurred that this proposal is indeed solid on economic grounds.  
                                                 
1045 See above Part I, Chapter 1.  See also Communication from the International Monetary Fund, 
Export Financing and Duty Drawbacks (WT/TF/COH/15, 14 February 2003), at 7-8. 
1046 This was already inscribed in the Subsidies Code.  The US adopted a domestic substitution 
provision in the 1930s.  See Hufbauer and Erb, above n 542, at 64. 
1047 Already in the beginning of the 1980s, Hufbauer and Erb questioned the legitimacy of domestic 
substitution systems because modern accounting methods made it much easier to separate inventories 
on domestic and imported inputs.  See Hufbauer and Erb, above n 542, at 64-65. 
1048 For the latest version of this proposal, see Submission by India, Verification System of Duty Rebate 
Schemes and Definition of Inputs Consumed under ASCM, Revision (TN/RL/GEN/153/Rev.1, 13 
March 2008).  The initial proposal can be found in Discussion paper submitted by India 
(G/SCM/W/430, 9 March 2001). 
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No economic rationale is available on why drawbacks systems should be restricted to inputs 
consumed in the production process.1049  After all, physical capital goods that are used up (i.e., 
depreciate) in the production process and other inputs such as computer software add as much 
to the final cost of the product as do inputs physically incorporated.1050  For two obvious 
reasons, developed countries are, however, not keen to agree with this proposed amendment.  
First, given that their import charges on capital goods are much lower, their exporters using 
such capital inputs compete on a better than level playing field with exporters from 
developing countries such as India.1051  Second, allowing duty drawbacks on capital inputs 
would ease the internal pressure by developing countries’ exporters upon their government to 
lower import charges on capital inputs.  Hence, developed countries tactically remarked that 
developing countries’ concern could simply be addressed through lowering import charges on 
capital goods.  India refuted this suggestion by pointing to the importance of tariff revenue for 
developing countries’ budgets.1052  Given the opposed interests of WTO Members, it comes as 
no surprise that the Draft Consolidated Chair Text does not make capital inputs eligible for 
drawback along the lines suggested by India.  Indeed, the latest draft circulating in the 
negotiations leaves the definition of ‘inputs consumed in the production process’ under 
footnote 61 of the SCM Agreement untouched.1053   
 
In addition to expanding the scope of inputs available for drawback, India has proposed to 
explicitly allow for a uniform drawback rate imposed upon exporters collectively, so that an 
individual rate for each and every exporter should no longer be calculated.1054  Especially for 
small exporters, the costs of keeping track of inputs eligible for drawback would be too high.  
Once more, the IMF agreed with the rationale of this proposal.1055  The requirements for an 
individual drawback rate might be onerous for developing countries, potentially leading to 
delays in calculating the drawback rate and thus hurting the competitive position of their 
                                                 
1049 Communication from the International Monetary Fund, Export Financing and Duty Drawbacks 
(WT/TF/COH/15, 14 February 2003), at 10-11. 
1050 Communication from the International Monetary Fund, Export Financing and Duty Drawbacks 
(WT/TF/COH/15, 14 February 2003), at 10. 
1051 Recall that LDCs and certain low-income countries benefit from S&D treatment regarding export 
subsidies (see below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1).  Rebating import charges upon capital inputs is 
thus not prohibited for these countries but still vulnerable to CVDs action and actionable subsidy 
claims.    
1052 Submission by India, Verification System of Duty Rebate Schemes and Definition of Inputs 
Consumed under ASCM, Revision (TN/RL/GEN/153/Rev.1, 13 March 2008), para 6; Discussion Paper 
Submitted by India (G/SCM/W/430, 9 March 2001), para 3.2.  
1053 Draft Consolidated Chair Text, above n 643. 
1054 Submission by India, Verification System of Duty Rebate Schemes and Definition of Inputs 
Consumed under ASCM, Revision (TN/RL/GEN/153/Rev.1, 13 March 2008); Discussion paper 
Submitted by India (G/SCM/W/430, 9 March 2001). 
1055 Communication from the International Monetary Fund, Export Financing and Duty Drawbacks 
(WT/TF/COH/15, 14 February 2003), at 8-9. 
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exporters.  Next to lowering the administrative burden, the IMF saw merit in the proposal for 
political-economy reasons because a collective rate would reduce the risk of rent-seeking 
behaviour by individual exporters.  The IMF therefore proposed a hybrid system.  An 
individual rate could be calculated for large exporters as they have to keep track of the 
necessary records for VAT purposes anyway, whereas for small exporters a uniform 
drawback rate should indeed be an option.  But again, India’s proposal for a collective 
drawback rate has not found its way to the Draft Consolidated Chair Text.1056  
 
4.1.1.2.3. The (potential) direct transfer of funds: Export credit support 
Finally, two items of the Illustrative List predominantly deal with official export credit 
support and in essence spell out a cost-to-government standard to determine whether such 
support is prohibited (item (j) and (k)).  Both items discipline different forms of export credit 
support: item (j) deals with so-called ‘pure cover support’ (i.e., export credit 
guarantees/insurance) and item (k) sets restrictions on ‘official financing support’ (e.g., direct 
export credits).  These items will be discussed in depth under Part III and are therefore only 
shortly introduced below. 
 
First, government guarantees1057 or insurance programmes covering potential default on 
credits extended to foreign buyers are considered prohibited export subsidies under item (j) if 
they are offered at premium rates inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and losses 
of the programmes.  The evaluation of such ‘pure cover support’ is thus made at an aggregate 
level and looks at the overall cost to the government: are premiums charged for government 
guarantees/insurance sufficient to cover the costs of the programme?1058  Notice that the same 
standard is prescribed under item (j) with regard to insurance/guarantee programmes against 
increases in the cost of exported products and exchange risk programmes. 
Second, item (k) prohibits governments to offer direct export credits if these are granted at 
rates below those the government in question actually has to pay for the funds so used or, 
alternatively, below those the government would have to pay if it borrowed similar funds on 
international capital markets.  Such direct export credits would only violate item (k) insofar 
                                                 
1056 Draft Consolidated Chair Text, above n 643. 
1057 The Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels clarified that ‘an instrument will guarantee an export 
credit if it covers default by a borrower in respect of an export credit provided to that borrower’.  Panel 
Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.213. 
1058 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para 93; Appellate 
Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 666 and 667.   
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they are ‘used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms’.1059 
Additionally, government payments of the cost incurred by exporters or financial institutions 
in obtaining credits likewise qualify as export subsidies under item (k).  Again, this only kicks 
in when these payments are used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit 
terms.  
Notwithstanding the benchmarks for export credit practices articulated under item (j) and 
paragraph 1 of item (k), some of these practices are not prohibited by virtue of paragraph 2 of 
item (k).  This paragraph carves out a safe haven for certain export credit conforming to the 
Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credit (OECD Arrangement).  To 
benefit from this safe haven, export credit support should be subject to the OECD 
Arrangement’s interest rate obligations and conform to its general disciplines.  Because export 
credit guarantees/insurances are currently not subject to the interest rate provisions, such 
support cannot rely on this exemption.  This means that this safe haven cannot be invoked to 
justify ‘pure cover’ export credit support violating item (j) and/or Article 1 juncto 3 of the 
SCM Agreement.  The exact scope of this safe haven is further delineated in Part III.   
 
4.1.1.3. Export subsidies not prohibited under the Illustrative List 
The previous discussion has shown that the Illustrative List elaborates a non-exhaustive list of 
export subsidies per se prohibited under the SCM Agreement.  Nonetheless, fiercely disputed 
before different panels is to what extent the Illustrative List could be used not to demonstrate 
that a subsidy is prohibited but, a contrario, to justify that a subsidy is not prohibited pursuant 
to Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.  Footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement only partly 
solves this question since it is open for different interpretations: ‘(m)easures referred to in 
Annex I as not constituting export subsidies shall not be prohibited under this or any other 
provision of this Agreement’.  On the one hand, one could adopt an expansive interpretation 
of ‘referring’ because the Illustrative List deals with certain specific types of subsidies (e.g., 
direct export credits) and therefore sets ‘a dispositive legal standard’ to determine whether 
these are prohibited or not.1060  This expansive reading endorsed by both Brazil (Brazil – 
Aircraft case) and Korea (Korea – Commercial Vessels case) would allow for an a contrario-
reading of all aspects of the Illustrative List.  For example, if the standard of item (k), para 1, 
would not be met (e.g., no cost to the government), a direct export credit would not be 
                                                 
1059 The Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels held, without any explanation, that the material clause 
also applies to the first aspect of item (k), paragraph 1.  Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, 
para 7.314. 
1060 This was argued by Brazil and the US.  See Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), 
para 6.38.  The US indicated (para 6.39) that the negotiating history supports a broad interpretation since 
a draft version (Cartland III) read as ‘(m)easures expressly referred (…)’ and the word ‘expressly’ was 
dropped in Cartland IV. 
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prohibited even if it would qualify as an export subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 juncto 
Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.  However, panels have systematically rejected such an 
a contrario defense for all items of the Illustrative List.  In their reading, the text of footnote 5 
requires an affirmative statement that a measure is not subject to the Article 3.1(a) prohibition, 
that it is not prohibited, or that it is allowed.1061  Only if such an affirmative statement is 
formulated under an item of the Illustrative List, could it be used to show, a contrario, that a 
subsidy is not prohibited. 
Because of the lack of such an affirmative statement, panels have, on the one hand, decided 
that item (j), dealing with pure cover support, and the first paragraph of item (k), dealing with 
official financing support, could not be used a contrario:1062 if export credit support does not 
meet all the criteria set by item (j) or (k, para 1), it could still constitute a prohibited export 
subsidy in case it is demonstrated to be a subsidy contingent upon export performance 
(Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement).  For example, an export credit guarantee under a 
programme that runs break-even, as prescribed under item (j), is prohibited pursuant to 
Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement if it is a subsidy in the meaning of Article 1 SCM 
Agreement and contingent upon exportation.  Until present, the Appellate Body has not yet 
revealed whether it would agree that an a contrario-reading of items (j) and (k), paragraph 1 
should indeed be rejected.1063  Through analyzing other arguments next to the text of footnote 
5 of the SCM Agreement, it will be revealed in Part III why the panels’ rejection of such an a 
contrario claim is indeed correct.1064  
On the other hand, panels have pointed to some items containing affirmative statements that a 
measure is not an export subsidy or that it is allowed.  Hence, these items could thus be relied 
upon to formulate an a contrario reasoning.  First of all, the safe haven for export credits in 
                                                 
1061 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras 6.36 and 6.38. 
1062 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras 6.36-6.37; Panel Report, Brazil – 
Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II ), paras 5.269-5.275; Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 
7.198.  
1063 The Appellate Body stated that if Brazil had discharged its burden to show that its financing 
programme did not secure a material advantage, it would ‘have been prepared to find that the payments 
made under the (financing programme) are justified under item (k) (paragraph 1) of the Illustrative 
List’ (emphasis added) and thus seems to accept an a contrario defense. Yet, the Appellate Body 
continued that ‘in making this observation, we wish to emphasize that we are not interpreting footnote 
5 of the SCM Agreement, and we do not opine on the scope of footnote 5, or on the meaning of any 
other items in the Illustrative List’.  The Panel in Brazil– Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II ) referred to 
this statement and acknowledged that ‘it could be understood in the manner suggested by Brazil’ but 
noted that ‘the Appellate Body’s statement does not form part of the legal basis for its disposition of the 
appeal, nor did the Appellate Body explain its statement’.  Pointing to the second part of the Appellate 
Body’s reasoning, the Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels also decided that the Appellate Body has 
not rejected the interpretation of previous panels.  See Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 
21.5 – Canada), paras 80-81; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 731; Panel Report, 
Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II ), footnote 214; Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, 
paras 7.193–7.207. 
1064 See below Part III, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3.1. 
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conformity with the interest rate provisions of the OECD Arrangement inscribed in the 
second paragraph of item (k) is such an affirmative statement.1065  Thus, if export credit 
support is covered under this safe haven, it shall not be prohibited under the SCM Agreement.  
Likewise, the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada) detected an affirmative 
statement in item (h), dealing with border tax adjustments on prior-stage cumulative indirect 
taxes, as well as in item (i), in the part dealing with substitution drawbacks systems.1066  
Again, such border tax adjustments or substitution drawbacks systems are therefore not 
prohibited under the SCM Agreement.  Lastly, the same Panel referred to affirmative 
statements in footnote 59, which offer exceptions to the principle prohibition on border tax 
adjustments on direct taxes and social welfare charges.1067  The first sentence indicates that 
the deferral specially related to exports of direct taxes or social welfare charges is not an 
export subsidy where, for example, appropriate interest charges are collected.  Next, the last 
sentence of footnote 59 sets out the exception of measures imposed to avoid double taxation 
of foreign-source income.  Although the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada) 
listed these provisions as examples, it is hard to detect other types of affirmative statements in 
the Illustrative List.  
In sum, this limited group of provisions could be used to demonstrate that a measure is not 
prohibited under the SCM Agreement.  However, are measures falling under one of these 
affirmative statements also shielded from a challenge on the basis of the actionable subsidy 
provisions (multilateral) and/or a countervailing duty response (unilateral)?  Here, a 
distinction has to be made.  On the one hand, the affirmative statements in items (h) and (i) 
should be read together with footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement.  Indeed, border tax 
adjustments and duty drawback systems in conformity with the Illustrative List are simply 
exempted from the subsidy definition and can, therefore, neither be challenged under the 
actionable subsidy provisions nor be countervailed.1068  On the other hand, with regard to the 
other affirmative statements, in particular the double income tax exemption (footnote 59) and 
the safe haven for export credit support (item (k), para 2), such multilateral and unilateral 
actions seem not ipso facto foreclosed.  Whereas this conclusion needs some further analysis  
as will be undertaken in Part III,1069 notice for now that this seems to be implied in the 
Appellate Body’s statement in US – FSC: 
 
Under footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement, where the Illustrative List indicates that a measure is 
not a prohibited export subsidy, that measure is not deemed, for that reason alone, not to be a 
                                                 
1065 See Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 6.36. 
1066 See Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 6.36, footnotes 35, 36. 
1067 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 6.36, footnote 34. 
1068 See also Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 93; Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – 
Canada), para 6.36, footnote 37. 
1069 See below Part III, Chapter 4, Section 4.4. 
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"subsidy". Rather, the measure is simply not prohibited under the Agreement. Other 
provisions of the SCM Agreement may, however, still apply to such a "subsidy".1070 
 
These ‘other provisions’ referred to by the Appellate Body include the provisions on 
actionable subsidies (Part III) as well as on the imposition of countervailing measures (Part 
V).1071  Hence, the Appellate Body left open the possibility that a double income tax 
exemption in conformity with footnote 59 could still be a ‘subsidy’ under Article 1 of the 
SCM Agreement and thus be actionable or countervailable if causing adverse effects or injury 
to the domestic industry.  Next, as discussed more in-depth in Part III of this study, export 
credit support justified under the safe haven might also still be actionable and countervailable.    
 
In sum, the affirmative statements singled out above could be used a contrario, namely to 
show that a measure is not prohibited under the SCM Agreement.  Border tax adjustments and 
duty drawback systems are simply excluded from the subsidy definition.1072  Other affirmative 
statements shield measures from the prohibited subsidy category but do not exclude that they 
might be actionable and/or countervailable.1073  Noteworthy, the Draft Consolidated Chair 
Text would amend the current footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement along the lines consistently 
interpreted by different panels.  The new text of this footnote would read in the relevant parts:  
 
Annex I shall not be used to establish by negative implication that a measure does not 
constitute an export subsidy within the meaning of that paragraph; provided, however, that 
measures explicitly referred to in Annex I as not constituting prohibited export subsidies shall 
not be prohibited under this or any other provision of this Agreement.  This footnote is 
without prejudice to the operation of footnote 1.1074 
 
This indeed confirms that the Illustrative List could in principle not be used a contrario.  Only 
measures explicitly referred to in the Illustrative List as not constituting prohibited export 
subsidies could be used a contrario.  Moreover, the clarification that this footnote is without 
prejudice to the operation of footnote 1 confirms that border tax adjustments and duty 
drawback systems in conformity with the Illustrative List are simply excluded from the scope 
of the SCM Agreement. 
 
                                                 
1070Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 93.  See also Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft 
(Article 22.6 – Brazil), para 3.39.    
1071 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 93.   
1072 Obviously, this conclusion also holds on the basis of footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement for border 
tax adjustments and duty drawback systems containing no affirmative statement (e.g., item (g)). 
1073 The same conclusion holds for agricultural export subsidies not prohibited under the Agreement on 
Agriculture (see below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3.1). 
1074 Draft Consolidated Chair Text, above n 643 (emphasis added). 
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4.1.2. Local content subsidies 
The other category of prohibited subsidies are local content subsidies, defined as subsidies 
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods (Article 3.1(b)).1075  In fact, this is 
the only form of domestic subsidies that is prohibited.1076  The US was one of the proponents 
during the Uruguay Round to include them in the category of prohibited subsidies, arguing 
that these subsidies ‘are as effective as any tariff in protecting domestic input supplying 
industries and distorting the flow of resources internationally’.1077  The citation reveals that 
this type of subsidy is conceptually different from other kinds of subsidies.  It does not focus 
on the receiver of the subsidy but on the domestic input-supplying industries.  In other words, 
what is targeted is trade distortion in the input industry market and not in the market of the 
industry receiving the beneficial financial contribution by the government.1078  These 
subsidies clearly violate the GATT’s national treatment provision (Article III:4) because the 
regulations at hand discriminate between the domestic and foreign input supplying industry.  
As confirmed by the Panel in Indonesia – Autos, the exception provided by Article III:8(b) of 
the GATT is not applicable because the discrimination exists between the domestic and 
foreign input industries and not between the subsidized industry and the foreign industry.1079  
Moreover, local content subsidies are covered by the Illustrative List of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement) that are inconsistent with Article 
III:4 of the GATT (as local content requirements).1080,1081  However, in contrast to the GATT 
                                                 
1075 For a discussion on the relationship between the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement, see 
P. Sauvé, Trade Rules Behind Borders: Essays on Services, Investment and the New Trade Agenda 
(London, Cameron May, 2003), 666 pp., at 313–318. 
1076 Local content subsidies might in addition be contingent on export performance and thus constitute 
export subsidies (Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement). As mentioned above, ‘contingency’ does not 
require that import substitution should be a sufficient condition to receive the subsidy. So, export 
performance can be an additional requirement. See, for example, the Canada – Autos case. 
1077 Stewart, above n 579, at 889. 
1078 For instance, such a subsidy would no longer be prohibited if the local content condition would be 
deleted.  Of course, such a subsidy could still be challenged as an actionable or export subsidy (see also 
above n 1076). 
1079 The GATT Panel in Italy – Agricultural Machinery stated that Article III:8 of the GATT was not 
applicable because the credit facilities were ‘granted to the purchasers of agricultural machinery and 
could not be considered as subsidies accorded to the producers of agricultural machinery’ (emphasis 
added). GATT Panel Report, Italy – Agricultural Machinery, para 14. According to the Panel in 
Indonesia – Autos: ‘the purpose of Article III:8(b) is to confirm that subsidies to producers do not 
violate Article III, so long as they do not have any component that introduces discrimination between 
imported and domestic products’.  See Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.43.  The World Trade 
Report 2006 also considered that local content subsidies are covered by Article III:4 of the GATT 
1994.  World Trade Report 2006, above n 574, at 192.   
1080 See Article 2 juncto paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement.  For the 
relationship between the TRIMs Agreement and SCM Agreement, see Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos,  
paras 14.49-14.55. The Panel concluded that measures challenged under both the TRIMs Agreement 
and the SCM Agreement must be reviewed under both. 
1081 This has to be nuanced insofar S&D treatment under the TRIMs Agreement is still in place (see 
below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1.2). 
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and the TRIMs Agreement, the SCM Agreement does not provide any ground for justification 
for local content subsidies and has specific and stricter dispute settlement provisions in 
place.1082 
 
4.2. ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES 
Actionable subsidies are defined by default in Part III of the SCM Agreement: if a specific 
subsidy within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement is not prohibited, it 
constitutes an actionable subsidy.1083  This means that such amber light subsidies can be 
subject to multilateral action if they cause ‘adverse effects’ to the interests of other WTO 
Members.1084  As the Panel in US – Upland Cotton has explained, ‘the focus on the trade 
effects of subsidization in Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994 on any other Member is carried 
into Part III of the SCM Agreement’.1085  The main onus upon the complaining Member is 
indeed to demonstrate such ‘adverse effects’ (Article 5 of the SCM Agreement).  This covers 
three situations: (a) injury to the domestic industry; (b) nullification or impairment of benefits 
accruing to other WTO Member(s); and (c) serious prejudice to the interests of another WTO 
Member.1086  The first two types of harm largely codify the rules and practice under the 
GATT regime.1087,1088  The ‘serious prejudice’ category, on the other hand, significantly 
expands the scope of domestic subsidies that could be challenged.    
 
4.2.1.  Injury to the domestic industry 
The term injury to the domestic industry is used in the same way as in the context of CVDs 
procedures.1089  It will be explained in the discussion on CVDs action that ‘injury’ covers 
                                                 
1082 See below Part II, Chapter 5.  A violation of Article III:4 of the GATT or Article 2 of the TRIMs 
can still be justified on the basis of the general exceptions (Article XX of the GATT and Article 3 of 
the TRIMs) or balance-of-payments exception (Articles XII and XVIII:B of the GATT and Article 4 of 
the TRIMs).  The question on the applicability of Article XX of the GATT to violations of the SCM 
Agreement is not yet settled in the case law but this option should be rejected in my view. 
1083 Even prohibited subsidies could in theory still be challenged as actionable subsidies.  See Panel 
Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.334.  
1084 In the words of the Appellate Body, ‘they are actionable to the extent they cause adverse effect’.  
Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 238. 
1085 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1405, footnote 1503.  See also Panel Report, Indonesia – 
Autos, para 14.200. 
1086 Article 5 of the SCM Agreement. 
1087 To be precise, only CVDs action could be undertaken to respond to injury to the domestic industry 
under the original GATT disciplines.  The substantive disciplines on domestic subsidies under the 
Subsidies Code were rather ineffective.    
1088 See also A. Hoda and R. Ahuja, ‘Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Need for 
Clarification and Improvement’, 39:6 Journal of World Trade 1009 (2005), 1009-1969, at 1060. 
1089 Article 5(a), footnote 11 of the SCM Agreement. See Part V and Article 15 of the SCM Agreement. 
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material injury as well as ‘a threat’ of material injury to a domestic industry.1090  Instead of 
undertaking a CVDs procedure (unilateral remedy), WTO Members can thus opt for the WTO 
dispute-settlement system (multilateral remedy) and demonstrate injury to their domestic 
industry.  In practice, WTO Members having CVDs procedures in place will more easily opt 
for the CVDs track to respond to adverse effect to their domestic industry.  This unilateral 
track is not only faster but the imposition of CVDs also generates income and could 
effectively undo the adverse effect to the domestic industry.  Removal of the adverse effects 
is, on the other hand, far less certain in case the time-consuming multilateral track is followed. 
 
4.2.2.  Nullification or impairment of benefits 
The concept of nullification or impairment of benefits is formulated in the same sense as in 
the GATT.1091  This concept is applied in non-violation complaints (NVCs) (Article 
XXIII:1(b) of the GATT) where three elements are established: (i) the use of a subsidy,1092 (ii) 
the existence of a benefit accruing under the applicable agreement such as tariff 
concessions,1093 and (iii) the nullification or impairment of a benefit (e.g., tariff concessions) 
as a result of the use of a subsidy (i.e., causation element).1094  Because the non-violation 
remedy should remain of ‘an exceptional nature’,1095 the standard for determining the element 
of causation (iii) is set high by the adjudicating bodies: ‘non-violation nullification or 
impairment would arise when the effect of a tariff concession is systematically offset or 
counteracted by a subsidy program’.1096 There is a double motivation behind NVCs. First, 
WTO Members have reasonable expectations that they can benefit from binding tariff 
concessions made by trade partners.1097 Second, these WTO Members have ‘paid’ for the 
binding by making tariff concessions themselves.  If trade partners offer tariff bindings for a 
product and would subsequently be allowed to subsidize so as to reduce market access for 
imports of the same product, the dynamism of reciprocal tariff concessions would be 
                                                 
1090 Article 15, footnote 45 of the SCM Agreement. ‘Injury’ shall be interpreted in accordance with 
Article 15 of the SCM Agreement. 
1091 Footnote 12 of the SCM Agreement.   
1092 Panel Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), paras 7.121-7.123.  
1093 Panel Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para 7.124.   
1094 Panel Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), paras 7.125-7.131.  All non-violation complaints 
in the GATT period concerned subsidies that were claimed to nullify a prior negotiated concession.  P. 
C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 506 pp., at 413.  For an 
interesting discussion of the first GATT case (Australia – Ammonium Sulphate, adopted 3 April 1950), 
see R. E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1975), 399 pp., at 144-153. 
1095 Panel Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para 7.127. 
1096 Panel Report, US – Offset Act, para 7.127 (emphasis added); GATT Panel Report, EEC – 
Oilseeds I, para 148. 
1097 GATT Panel Report, EEC – Oilseeds I, para 148.  According to Mavroidis, the non-violation 
complaint is an application of the good faith principle.  Mavroidis, above n 1094, at 412. 
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undermined.1098  As explained above, the NVC under the original GATT 1947 was precisely 
deemed useful to prevent domestic subsidies from eroding tariff concessions.1099  No other 
multilateral action could be undertaken under the original GATT framework against foreign 
subsidization.   
In conclusion, whereas the first type of adverse effect is that caused in the domestic market of 
other WTO Members, this second type tackles adverse effects to the export industry of other 
WTO Members in the market of the subsidizing country.  Yet, the latter is confined to the 
situation where benefits accruing under the GATT are nullified.  The ‘serious prejudice’ type 
of adverse effects, introduced in a rudimentary form in the Subsidies Code, expands the scope 
to effects occurring in third countries as well as in the subsidizing country even when no other 
benefits are nullified.1100 
 
4.2.3.  Serious prejudice 
Originally, the SCM Agreement provided for a rebuttable presumption1101 that ‘serious 
prejudice’ exists in the following cases: (a) the total ad valorem subsidization of a product 
exceeds 5 per cent; (b) the subsidy covers operating losses sustained by an industry; (c) the 
subsidy covers operating losses sustained by an enterprise, other than one time measures; or 
(d) direct debt forgiveness.1102  This provision facilitated the difficult demonstration of 
adverse effects.  Indeed, the complaining Member only had to demonstrate the existence of 
such a specific subsidy and could thus leave it upon the defending party to refute the trade 
effects. Yet, this so-called ‘dark amber’ category set out in Article 6.1 expired at the end of 
1999 because there was no consensus among WTO Members to continue its existence. From 
the perspective of WTO law, it is rather exceptional that a stricter discipline is subject to 
extinction.  However, the drafters of the SCM Agreement considered this stricter discipline 
(Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement), which reflected in a diluted form the quantitative 
approach suggested by the US, as a quid quo pro for the inclusion of non-actionable subsidies 
(Article 8 of the SCM Agreement), insisted upon by other negotiating countries.1103  Their 
future was thus bound together, and both expired after a period of five years because WTO 
Members did not extend their application.1104  As indicated above, the US proposed in the 
                                                 
1098 Matsushita, Schoenbaum, and Mavroidis, above n 721, at 279. 
1099 See above Part II, Chapter 1, Section 1.1. 
1100 A more effective way to challenge such types of adverse effects was mainly demanded by the US 
during the Uruguay Round.  See Submission by the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/40, 5 October 
1990).   
1101 Article 6.1 juncto 6.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
1102 Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
1103 Article 31 of the SCM Agreement. 
1104 See also Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.583.  See Hoda and Ahuja, above n 
1088, at 1061. 
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current Doha round to move all but one of these ‘dark amber’ subsidies to the category of 
prohibited subsidies.1105  To be sure, this proposal did apparently not find consensus among 
WTO Members.  The Draft Chair Negotiating Text would not even reintroduce their ‘dark 
amber’ status (i.e., presumption of serious prejudice).  Moreover, in light of the recent US 
bailouts in the car industry, it seems highly unlikely that the US could still seriously endorse 
its proposal dating from before the financial and economic crisis.  After all, some of its own 
interventions would simply have been prohibited if its proposal would have been in force.1106      
 
Today, it is thus always the task of the complaining party to demonstrate that the subsidy 
causes serious prejudice or a threat of serious prejudice.1107  Such serious prejudice is present 
pursuant to Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement if one of the following cases applies:1108 
 
(a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like product of another 
Member into the market of the subsidizing Member; 
(b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a like product of another 
Member from a third country market;1109 
(c) the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as 
compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or significant 
price suppression, price depression, or lost sales in the same market;1110 
(d) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of the subsidizing 
Member in a particular subsidized primary product or commodity as compared to the average 
share it had during the previous period of three years, and this increase follows a consistent 
trend over a period when subsidies have been granted.1111 
 
                                                 
1105 Communication from the United States, Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and 
Improvement (TN/RL/W/78, 19 March 2003); Paper from the United States, Expanding the Prohibited 
“red light” Subsidy Category (TN/RL/GEN/94, 16 January 2006); Proposal from the United States, 
Expanding the Prohibited “red light” Subsidy Category, Draft Text (TN/RL/GEN/146, 5 June 2007).  
Reflecting upon the US proposal, the EC expressed that it saw merit in revisiting the range of actions 
available to address the distorting effect of industrial subsidies.  See Submission by the European 
Communities, Subsidies (TN/RL/GEN/135, 24 April 2006).  Canada also endorsed the re-introduction 
of the presumption and the expansion of the list of Article 6.1.  See Communication from Canada 
(TN/RL/GEN/112/Rev.1, 17 May 2006); Communication from Canada (TN/RL/GEN/14, 15 
September 2004). 
1106 See also below Part IV, Chapter 5. 
1107 The rebuttable presumption shifted the burden of proof to the subsidizing party, which had to prove 
that the subsidization did not result in any of the effects described in Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement 
(see Article 6.2 of the SCM Agreement). 
1108 The wording ‘may’ in the opening sentence of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement suggests that this 
list is not exhaustive.  The Panel in US – Upland Cotton  therefore decided that it indeed also included 
a threat of serious prejudice (according to footnote 13 of the SCM Agreement) but left open whether 
also other situations could exist in which serious prejudice could be established.  Panel Report, US – 
Upland Cotton, para 7.1388 (see footnote 1489 for the negotiating history).  In light of the large variety 
of adverse trade effects summed under the four situations of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement, the list 
seems de facto closed once a threat of serious of prejudice is taken on board. 
1109 See also Article 6.4 of the SCM Agreement. 
1110 See also Article 6.5 of the SCM Agreement. 
1111 Emphasis added, original footnote deleted.  As the Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels 
interpreted, ‘the situations listed in Article 6.3(a)-(d) are serious prejudice in the sense of Article 5(c)’.  
Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.581 (emphasis in the original). 
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The case law has confirmed that ‘serious prejudice’ under Article 6.3, and by implication 
‘adverse effects’ under Article 5(c), is present if one of these four types is demonstrated, 
without the need of establishing any additional element.1112  The focus of these types of 
‘serious prejudice’ is on the trade effects of subsidization.1113  Subsidization could have 
effects on volume [items (a), (b), lost sales under (c), and (d)] as well as on prices [item (c)] 
that are adverse from the perspective of other WTO Members’ trade interests.1114  To 
formulate a successful ‘serious prejudice’ claim, the presence of one of the four listed 
volume/price situations should be demonstrated and, as the text explicitly prescribes, these 
should be ‘the effect of the subsidy’ (i.e., causation element).  Because of the use of the 
present tense in Article 6.3 (i.e., the effect of the subsidy is), the relevant period for this 
demonstration is the present period.1115  An important omission is that the SCM Agreement, 
again, does not clarify the required strength of the causal link.  Another unsettled element is 
whether the volume or price effect should/could be analyzed separately from the causation 
element.  The Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton has observed that, contrary to the CVDs 
context, no specific causation requirements (e.g., non-attribution requirement1116) and thus ‘no 
sequence of steps’1117 are spelled out for the serious prejudice analysis under either Article 
5(c) or 6.3 of the SCM Agreement.1118  This means that panels have ‘a certain degree of 
discretion in selecting an appropriate methodology’1119 for tackling the causation element.  In 
principle, panels are therefore free to opt for a bifurcated approach, in which they analyse 
both steps separately (as the Panel did in US – Upland Cotton), or to choose for a unitary 
approach (as the Panel did in US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil)) and analyse both 
steps together.1120  Regarding the required strength of the causal link, insights offered by the 
US – Upland Cotton dispute are discussed under the section addressing price 
suppression/depression.1121 
 
                                                 
1112 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.552-7.603. 
1113 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, footnote 1503.     
1114 The Panel in Korea – Commercial emphasized that the serious prejudice category has to do with 
the negative effects on trade interests of other WTO Members rather than with the condition of their 
domestic industry (as under the injury to domestic injury standard).  Panel Report, Korea – 
Commercial Vessels, paras 7.578-7.579.  
1115 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras 10.18, 10.265. 
1116 See below Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.3. 
1117 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 431. 
1118 To be precise, the Appellate Body has made this observation with regard to Article 6.3(c) but it 
seems equally applicable to the other items of Article 6.3. 
1119 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 436; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland 
Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 368. 
1120 The Appellate Body agreed with both approaches for the analysis of price suppression (Article 
6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement).  See Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 436-458; 
Appellate Body, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5), paras 368-370. 
1121 See below Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.3.2. 
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Instead of actual ‘serious prejudice’, a complaining Member could show a ‘threat of serious 
prejudice’.1122  Indeed, the Panel in US – Upland Cotton confirmed that such a threat of 
serious prejudice suffices to trigger the remedies available in Article 7 of the SCM 
Agreement.1123  At the same time, the Appellate Body emphasized that such a claim may 
relate to a different situation than a claim of serious prejudice: ‘a claim of present serious 
prejudice relates to the existence of prejudice in the past, and present, and that may continue 
in the future. By contrast, a claim of threat of serious prejudice relates to prejudice that does 
not yet exist, but is imminent such that it will materialize in the near future’.1124  Therefore, 
the Appellate Body concluded that ‘a threat of serious prejudice claim does not necessarily 
capture and provide a remedy with respect to the same scenario as a claim of present serious 
prejudice’.1125 
 
4.2.3.1. The origin and likeness of products under a serious prejudice claim 
Before discussing the specific types of serious prejudice, the following horizontal question 
has to be addressed: to which products should serious prejudice be caused?  The origin and 
likeness of products under a serious prejudice claim should be clarified. 
 
First, regarding the origin of products, the Panel in Indonesia – Autos stressed that a WTO 
Member cannot bring a claim that another WTO Member has suffered serious prejudice.  
Hence, products not originating in a complaining Member country cannot be the object of a 
claim of serious prejudice.  For instance, products made by a US company at its foreign plant 
cannot give rise to a US claim of serious prejudice.  Instead, serious prejudice must occur to 
products made within the territory of the complaining party.1126  After all, the Panel saw 
nothing in Article XVI GATT or Part III of the SCM Agreement that: 
 
(…) would suggest that the United States may claim that it has suffered adverse effects merely 
because it believes that the interests of US companies have been harmed where US products 
are not involved.1127 
 
Similarly, the Panel in US – Upland Cotton found that allegations of serious prejudice upon 
other WTO Members may be taken into account ‘to the extent these constitute evidentiary 
support of the effect of the subsidy borne by (the complaining Member)’ but that it could not 
                                                 
1122 See footnote 13 of the SCM Agreement.  
1123 See Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras 7.1494-7.1497. 
1124 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 244 (emphasis in fine 
added).  
1125 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 244. 
1126 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, paras 14.201–14.202.  
1127 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.201 (emphasis in the original). 
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base its decision ‘on any alleged serious prejudice caused to’ the other WTO Members.1128  A 
complaining Member can thus only challenge serious prejudice caused to products originating 
in its territory.  If this claim is successful, the implementation standard could imply that 
adverse effects to other WTO Members will be removed too.1129  Obviously, as Article 6.3 
plainly shows, such serious prejudice to products originating in the complaining Member’s 
country could very well occur in the subsidizing or third country markets.  Because these 
countries might be reluctant to provide relevant information, the SCM Agreement spells out a 
specific procedure to gather such information (Annex V), which is discussed in more detail 
below.1130  
 
Second, regarding the scope of products in a serious prejudice claim, it is explicitly stipulated 
for some types of serious prejudice that their effect should be caused to ‘a like product’ 
[Articles 6.3(a), 6.3(b), and 6.3(c)].1131  Concerning the substance of this like product test 
resting upon the shoulders of the complaining party, footnote 46 SCM Agreement1132 reveals 
that the term ‘like product’ should throughout the SCM Agreement be understood narrowly as 
‘identical, i.e. alike in all respects’ or, at least, as having ‘characteristics closely resembling’ 
the product under consideration.  In the only report so far confronted with this definition,1133 
the Panel in Indonesia – Autos held that the term ‘characteristics closely resembling’ is ‘on its 
face (…) quite narrow’ and ‘includes but is not limited to physical characteristics’.1134  
Nonetheless, physical characteristics were considered an important element especially 
because other criteria (e.g., end-use, consumer perception, substitutability, price, tariff 
classification) were viewed by the Panel as primarily based on physical characteristics.  
Therefore, the Panel in Korea – Commercial summarized that the Panel in Indonesia – Autos 
had found that the term ‘characteristics closely resembling’ should ‘be based principally on 
physical characteristics of the product’,1135 but this might somewhat overstate the Panel’s 
                                                 
1128 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 7.1414–7.1415. 
1129 See Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), paras 4.80-4.92.  See below Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3.2. 
1130 See below Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2. 
1131 Emphasis added. 
1132 Footnote 46 to Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement provides a similar definition of ‘like product’ as 
Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
1133 Noteworthy, the Panel was surprised to be the first panel confronted with this definition given that 
it was already inscribed in the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Agreement and later in the Tokyo 
Round Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Code and ‘that investigating authorities in anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty cases have been wrestling with the concept of "like product" for decades’.  See 
Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.171.   
1134 See Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.173.  
1135 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, footnote 289.   
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emphasis on physical characteristics.1136  In dismissing the EC’s argument that all passenger 
cars are ‘like’ the Indonesian subsidized car ‘Timor’, the Panel in Indonesia – Autos had 
observed that:  
 
It is evident that the differences, both physical and non-physical, between a Rolls Royce and a 
Timor are enormous, and that the degree of substitutability between them is very low. Viewed 
from the perspective of the SCM Agreement, it is almost inconceivable that a subsidy for 
Timors could displace or impede imports of Rolls Royces, or that any meaningful analysis of 
price undercutting could be performed between these two models. In short, we do not consider 
that a Rolls Royce can reasonably be considered to have "characteristics closely resembling" 
those of the Timor.1137 
 
With respect to the likeness test, the Panel finally agreed to use a market segmentation 
analysis adopted by the automotive industry itself.  This analysis was designed to identify sets 
of products which car consumers recognize as falling within competing categories and which 
classified cars on the basis of a combination of size and price/market position.1138   
Not all types of serious prejudice should explicitly pass this likeness test, however.  The Panel 
in Korea – Commercial Vessels concluded that this is only required regarding those types of 
serious prejudice in which an explicit reference is made to ‘a like product’ [i.e., Article 6.3(a), 
Article 6.3(b), and price undercutting under Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement].  Given the 
absence of such reference, no like product test should therefore be conducted when, for 
instance, price suppression/depression under Article 6.3(c) is invoked.1139  Here, the Panel 
viewed ‘the product issue ultimately as pertaining to the demonstration of causation, on the 
basis of such facts as may be relevant to the particular case’.1140  In theory, a complainant 
could thus attempt to demonstrate that subsidized products cause price depression/suppression 
to downstream products or even to totally unrelated products but the causality test will be 
much more difficult, or even impossible, to pass.1141  To pass the causality test, complainants 
might well be advised to confine the product category as much as possible to the products for 
which subsidization has been demonstrated (or even to those products for which the highest 
levels of subsidies have been demonstrated) as this narrows the relevant market and thus 
                                                 
1136 For instance, completely-knocked down (CKD) kits were considered ‘like’ to completely finished 
products because of similar end-use and tariff classification and identical components. Observe also 
that the Panel considered it relevant that the prefix ‘physical’ characteristics in one of the draft texts 
was finally deleted in the final Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Agreement (see above n 1133).  See 
Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, paras 14.173 (footnote 730), 14.196-14.197.  
1137 See Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.175 (emphasis added). 
1138 All types of cars in the same segment as the Timor were thus considered like.  Panel Report, 
Indonesia – Autos, para 14.178. 
1139  Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.553.  The Appellate Body has not yet revealed 
whether it would share the same view.  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, footnote 453. 
1140 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.559, 7.600. 
1141 See Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.600, footnote 296.  Apparently, according 
to this Panel, the fact that price suppression/depression should occur ‘in the same market’ would not 
preclude the demonstration of price suppression/depression to unrelated products.      
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increases the likelihood that the challenged subsidies have caused the alleged trade effects in 
this market.1142   
 
The necessity to effectively demonstrate trade effects under the actionable subsidy category 
forms the essential difference with the prohibited subsidy category.  Under the latter category, 
any subsidy is prohibited, regardless whether it is sufficiently large to cause trade distortion.  
Yet, under the actionable subsidy category, challenging subsidies in a limited number of 
transactions is much more complicated as it has to be established that these subsidies are 
sufficiently large collectively to cause the required level of trade effects in the market of the 
product in question (i.e., on price or volume).1143  In Korea – Commercial Vessels, for 
instance, the Panel had concurred that subsidies in a limited number of transactions could 
affect the price in those transactions but it found no evidence that the aggregate effect of the 
subsidized transactions caused trade effects (i.e., significant price suppression) for the entire 
product category.1144  Although the EC had thus successfully demonstrated the existence of 
specific subsidies under Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement, its actionable subsidy claim 
was rejected because it had failed to demonstrate trade effects for the entire product 
category.1145  In the following sections, the specific types of trade effects spelled out under the 
serious prejudice category are scrutinized (Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement).  A distinction 
is made between volume and price effects. 
 
4.2.3.2. Volume effects 
4.2.3.2.1. Impediment or displacement of trade to the market of the subsidizing Member 
or a third country 
Article 6.3(a) of the SCM Agreement implies that, even in the absence of any prior tariff 
commitment, WTO Members could cause adverse effects through subsidization if such 
                                                 
1142 See below n 1144. 
1143 Serious prejudice in the meaning of significant ‘lost sales’ under Article 6.3(c) might be seen as 
partly circumventing this difficulty but its scope is not clarified so far.  For unclear reasons, the EC in 
Korea – Commercial Vessels did not formulate an alternative claim on the basis of ‘lost sales’ (see 
below n 1168).    
1144 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.676-7.690.  The EC had separately formulated 
its serious prejudice claim in respect of different ship categories.  Hence, the Panel examined whether 
individual subsidized transactions in each category caused significant price suppression in the relevant 
ship category. Recall that the ‘like product’ test does not have to be passed in case of a ‘price 
suppression’ claim.  The EC was thus free to separate trade effects in different ship categories.  In 
doing so, the number of subsidized transactions which could be taken into account in each category 
diminished but the scope of each relevant market was likewise reduced.   
1145 For instance, the Panel concluded that ‘(w)hile we certainly accept the possibility that the 
subsidized financing affected the prices in the individual transactions, we find nothing in the evidence 
and arguments before us demonstrating that the aggregate effect of the subsidized transactions is 
significant price suppression for the entire product category of product/chemical tankers’.  Panel 
Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.688. 
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subsidization has the effect ‘to displace or impede the imports of another Member into the 
market of the subsidizing country’.1146  In addition to Article 5(b) of the SCM Agreement 
(nullification or impairment), it thus further opens the door to address injury caused by 
subsidization in the subsidizing country’s domestic market.  In turn, Article 6.3(b) of the 
SCM Agreement addresses a similar situation in which the effect of subsidization results in 
displacement or impeding of exports from a third country market.    
 
The Panel in Indonesia – Autos explained that ‘displacement relates to a situation where sales 
volume has declined, while impedance relates to a situation where sales which otherwise 
would have occurred were impeded’.1147  Importantly, these volume effects identified under 
Article 6.3 (a) and (b) of the SCM Agreement should not be ‘significant’ in order for ‘serious 
prejudice’ to be present.  This stands in contrast with the potential effect on prices (under 
Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement) caused by subsidization as only significant price 
effects are according to the text considered to amount to serious prejudice.  
 
Could the elements of ‘displacement’ or ‘impediment’ under Article 6.3 (a) and (b) be 
properly separated from the causation element (‘effect of the subsidy’)?  As the Appellate 
Body in US – Upland Cotton has explained, ‘it might be difficult to ascertain whether imports 
or exports are "displace[d]" or "impede[d]" under paragraphs (a) or (b) of Article 6.3 of the 
SCM Agreement without considering the effect of the challenged subsidy’.1148  Indeed, the 
ordinary meaning of the verbs ‘impede’ and ‘displace’ seems to imply the existence of a 
subject (the challenged subsidies) and an object (in this case, imports or exports in the 
subsidizing and third country markets, respectively).1149  Contrary to the Appellate Body’s 
statement, the SCM Agreement, however, allows that, with respect of Article 6.3(b) of the 
SCM Agreement, displacement or impediment might be demonstrated without taking into 
consideration the effect of the subsidy.  This follows from the operation of Article 6.4 of the 
SCM Agreement, which is discussed next. 
 
4.2.3.2.1.1. Impediment or displacement of trade to third country markets 
Article 6.3(b), dealing with subsidy effects on trading partners’ exports to third country 
markets, should be read together with Article 6.4 of the SCM Agreement.  This provision 
                                                 
1146 Article 6.3(a) of the SCM Agreement (emphasis added).  See also Hoda and Ahuja, above n 1088, 
at 1020. 
1147 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.218 (emphasis added). 
1148 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 433, footnote 521. 
1149 This paraphrases the Appellate Body’s reasoning in US – Upland Cotton with regard to price 
suppression.  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 433. 
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stipulates that, for the purpose of Article 6.3(b) – and thus not for the purpose of Article 
6.3(a)1150 – ‘displacement or impeding of exports shall include any case in which (…) it has 
been demonstrated that there has been a change in relative shares of the market to the 
disadvantage of the non-subsidized like product’.  This should be assessed ‘over an 
appropriately representative period sufficient to demonstrate clear trends in the development 
of the market for the product concerned, which, in normal circumstances, shall be at least one 
year’.1151  On substance, such ‘change in relative shares of the market’ includes any of the 
three following situations: ‘(a) there is an increase in the market share of the subsidized 
product; (b) the market share of the subsidized product remains constant in circumstances in 
which, in the absence of the subsidy, it would have declined; (c) the market share of the 
subsidized product declines, but at a slower rate than would have been the case in the absence 
of the subsidy’.1152  Hence, not only subsidies causing the expansion of market share but also 
those keeping market shares constant or slowing their decline could be challenged.  Under 
items (b) and (c) of Article 6.4 of the SCM Agreement, the effect of the subsidy is taken on 
board as it calls for a comparison of the evolution in actual market share of the subsidized 
product with the counterfactual situation (‘but for’ the subsidy).  Under these two items, a 
unitary approach seems to be implied given that the causation element (effect of the subsidy) 
is already presupposed in the identification of ‘displacement’ and ‘impeding’.  The text itself 
seems to point to a ‘but for’-approach: a comparison should be made between the actual 
market share evolutions with the counterfactual situation where no subsidy would have been 
offered.  On the other hand, and somewhat counterintuitive, an increase in the market share of 
the subsidized product (item (a)) seems sufficient to establish displacement/impediment 
regardless whether such increase is the effect of the subsidy.  In this case, a bifurcated 
approach thus seems to be called for.  The question whether the increase is the effect of the 
subsidy is analyzed separately.  Significantly, according to the Panel in Indonesia – Autos, the 
burden of proof regarding this second layer (i.e., effect of the subsidy) does not seem to rest 
on the complainant’s shoulders since a prima facie case of displacement or impediment would 
‘arguably’ be made ‘simply by demonstrating that the market share of a subsidized product 
has increased over an appropriately representative period’.1153  This interpretation would mean 
that, contrary to claims under all other items of Article 6.3 (and 6.41154) of the SCM 
                                                 
1150 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.210 
1151 Article 6.4 of the SCM Agreement. 
1152 Emphasis added. 
1153 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, paras 14.209, 14.215.  See also R. H. Steinberg and T. E. Josling, 
‘When the Peace Ends: the Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal 
Challenge’, 6:2 Journal of International Economic Law (2003), 369-417, at 387. 
1154 In its statement, the Panel refers to Article 6.4 of the SCM Agreement as such and not to Article 
6.4(a) in particular.  However, its example refers to the situation elaborated in Article 6.4(a) (i.e., 
increase in market share).  Moreover, as elaborated above, the text of items (b) and (c) as well as the 
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Agreement, a prima facie case of a claim under Article 6.3(b) juncto 6.4(a) of the SCM 
Agreement could be made by the complainant without having to establish that the effect on 
the market is caused by subsidization.1155  
 
4.2.3.2.1.2. Impediment or displacement of trade to the market of the subsidizing country 
The complainants in Indonesia – Autos could not rely upon Article 6.4 because their claim 
was based on Article 6.3(a).  They argued that subsidies granted to the Indonesian automotive 
industry impeded or displaced their imports of autos into the Indonesian market.  Hence, they 
had to demonstrate that the effect of the subsidy was displacement or impediment: i.e., ‘that 
some imports that would have occurred did not occur as a result of the subsidies’.1156  
Analyzing whether sales of like products of the complainants would have been higher in the 
subsidizing country ‘but for’ the subsidy,1157 the Panel concluded that both the EC and US 
failed to advance sufficient evidence to underpin their claim.1158  A declining market share 
was considered highly relevant but not decisive to show that ‘but for’ the subsidies sales 
would have been higher in absolute terms.1159  ‘In the usual case’, the Panel agreed that ‘a 
decline in market share in a stable or growing market, corresponding in time with the 
introduction of a subsidized product, might suggest that sales would have been higher but for 
the introduction of the subsidized product’.1160 Yet, because Indonesia made a convincing 
argument that the subsidy itself could have caused a rapid expansion of the market, leading to 
a higher market share for the subsidized domestic product (and thus lower market share for 
EC products), even a dramatic drop in the EC’s market share was considered insufficient to 
demonstrate that it also lost sales in absolute terms.1161  In sum, the Panel in Indonesia – 
Autos decided that impediment or displacement in the subsidizing market is only present 
under Article 6.3(a) if complainants’ sales in absolute terms would have been higher in the 
absence of the subsidies, even though a relative loss might be relevant to show an absolute 
loss.  In contrast, by virtue of Article 6.3(b) juncto 6.4 of the SCM Agreement, a prima facie 
                                                                                                                                            
Appellate Body’s statement in US – Upland Cotton clearly show that the phrase ‘effect of the subsidy’ 
by definition calls for a unitary approach.  Therefore, if one would accept the Panel’s reasoning, this 
should be confined to Article 6.4(a) of the SCM Agreement. 
1155 Indeed, this could also a contrario be derived from the Panel’s observation that in case the analysis 
of Article 6.4 is not applicable, ‘complainants must demonstrate that "the effect of the subsidy " is to 
displace or impede imports’.  Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, paras 14.209, 14.215 (emphasis in the 
original). 
1156 A declining market share may be relevant but is not decisive.  Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, 
paras 14.209, 14.215 
1157 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.218 
1158 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, paras 14.222, 14.229, 14.235, 14.236 
1159 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.211. 
1160 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.219. 
1161 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.222.  Only the EC’s claim with regard to price 
undercutting was accepted (see below Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.3.1). 
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case of displacement or impediment in third country markets would be established if 
complainants would have lost sales in relative terms (i.e., market share) as a result of the 
subsidy to domestic producers.1162  This conclusion illustrates an important difference 
between Article 6.3(a) and 6.3(b) of the SCM Agreement as interpreted in the case law. 
 
4.2.3.2.1.3. Circumstances in which no displacement or impediment of trade would arise  
A number of situations are listed in Article 6.7 of the SCM Agreement in which serious 
prejudice in the form of displacement or impediment under both Article 6.3(a) and (b) shall 
not be considered to arise.1163  These are, according to the Panel in Korea – Commercial 
Vessels, ‘concerned with alternative reasons (including, for example, prohibition or restriction 
on exports, and situations of force majeure affecting production, qualities, quantities or prices 
of the product available for export) for declines in the overall volume and/or market share of 
the complaining Member’.1164  Hence, this provision would somewhat resemble the non-
attribution requirement in CVDs procedures.1165  A decline in volume or market share should 
not be attributed to subsidization if it is caused by one of the six listed alternative reasons.1166  
But contrary to the CVDs context, the complaining Member seems not required to 
demonstrate that these alternatives are not present.  According to the Panel in US – Upland 
Cotton, this provision ‘allows a subsidizing Member to raise a defence to a 
displacement/impedance claim where "imports from the complaining Member" or "exports 
from the complaining Member" are affected by such factors (…)’.1167 
 
                                                 
1162 The Panel reasoned that:  
‘If Article 6.4 of the SCM Agreement applied in this dispute, this showing of a change in 
relative market shares to the disadvantage of the non-subsidized like product might well have 
been sufficient to establish the European Communities' prima facie case of displacement or 
impedance.  In the absence of that article, however, it is not enough for the European 
Communities to demonstrate a decline in relative market share; rather, the European 
Communities must demonstrate that (…) some imports that would have occurred did not occur 
as a result of the subsidies. While declining market share may be relevant to establishing such a 
situation, we consider that we must proceed further with the analysis and look at actual sales 
figures for the products in question’. 
Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.215.     
1163 This seems to indicate that ‘displacement or impediment’ does not exist if it is not the effect of the 
subsidy but of something else.   
1164 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.586. 
1165 See below Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.3. 
1166 Remarkably, the text of Article 6.5 of the SCM Agreement simply stipulates that ‘displacement or 
impediment resulting in serious prejudice shall not arise (…) where any of the following circumstances 
exist during the relevant period’ (emphasis added).  On its face, the simple existence of one of the listed 
circumstances (and thus not even that it has caused the volume or market share effect) would thus be 
sufficient for dismissing serious prejudice even if subsidization could be a necessary and/or sufficient 
condition to cause the mandated level of decline in market shares or volume.    
1167 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, footnote 1503 (emphasis added).  See also Steinberg and 
Josling, above n 1153, at 410. 
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4.2.3.2.2. Significant lost sales in the same market 
One of the elements listed under Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement refers to a volume 
effect.  Serious prejudice would arise if the subsidy leads to significant ‘lost sales in the same 
market’.  The scope of this form of serious prejudice has not yet been clarified in the case 
law.1168,1169  The ordinary meaning of ‘lost sales’ in conjunction with the causality test (‘effect 
of the subsidy’) seems to call for the rather demanding demonstration that producers 
originating in the complaining Member would have acquired those sales ‘but for’ the 
subsidies.1170  Moreover, the loss in sales should be ‘significant’, which has been interpreted 
in a broad manner in the context of other items of Article 6.3(c) as ‘important, notable or 
consequential’.  The concept of ‘the same market’ is also given an expansive meaning under 
Article 6.3(c) given that the case law did not read any geographical restriction in this phrase.  
Hence, this could refer not only to national markets but also to the world market as a whole.   
 
4.2.3.2.3. Increase in the world market share of primary product or commodity 
Article 6.4(d) of the SCM Agreement addresses a situation whereby subsidies to a primary 
product or commodity have the effect of ‘an increase in the world market share of the 
subsidizing Member’.  The scope of this provision is thus explicitly confined to subsidies to 
primary products or commodities.1171  The increase in the world market share should be the 
‘effect of the subsidy’.  The Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton acknowledged that this 
causality requirement could be determined separately from the assessment whether an 
increase had effectively occurred (i.e., bifurcated test).1172  The interpretation of this causality 
requirement is clarified in the case law discussed below under the section on price 
suppression/depression.1173 
 
                                                 
1168 In Korea – Commercial Vessels, the EC provided examples of sales that it alleged were lost to 
Korean shipyards.  Yet, the EC did not formulate a claim of lost sales but advanced these examples in 
the context of its price suppression claim.  See Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.664. 
1169 The causality requirement (i.e., ‘effect of the subsidy’) is also clarified in the context of the other 
items of Article 6.3(c) (see below Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.3.2). 
1170 Note that in the context of CVDs investigations, one of the elements that should be examined is the 
effect of the subsidized imports on the decline in sales of the domestic industry (Article 15.4 of the 
SCM Agreement).  
1171 Footnote 17 indicates that Article 6.4(d) applies ‘(u)nless other multilaterally agreed specific rules 
apply to the trade in the product or commodity in question’.  Both parties in US – Upland Cotton 
seemed to agree that this does certainly not refer to the Agreement on Agriculture.  See also Panel 
Report, US – Upland Cotton, footnote 1508.  For the definition of ‘primary product’, inspiration might 
be found in Ad Article XVI, Section B, para 2 of GATT 1994.   
1172 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, footnote 521.  See also Panel Report, US – Upland 
Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras 10.263-10.264. 
1173 See below Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.3.2. 
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Regarding the increase in the world market share, two elements have to be established.1174  
The subsidizing Member’s share should have increased compared to its average share ‘during 
the previous period of three years’ and this increase should follow ‘a consistent trend over a 
period when subsidies have been granted’.  This increase has to be observed in ‘the world 
market’, which, according to the Panel in US – Upland Cotton, refers to the subsidizing 
Member’s share in world production and not to its share in world exports.  This implies that 
the portion of subsidized products not exported is also taken into consideration.1175,1176  In 
sum, Article 6.4(d) ‘calls for an examination of the portion of the world's supply that is 
satisfied by the subsidizing Member's producers’.1177  In the compliance procedure, the Panel 
rejected Brazil’s claim under Article 6.4(d) because the data did not reveal an increase in the 
US share of world production (FY 2006) as compared to the average US share in the previous 
three years (FY 2002-2005).1178   
 
These demanding conditions to show an increase in the subsidizing Member’s world market 
share clearly limit the usefulness of this type of serious prejudice.  For instance, a subsidy 
programme boosting the subsidizing Member’s world market share at the time of introduction 
and sustaining this market share in subsequent years would not seem to violate Article 
6.3(d).1179  Generally speaking, only subsidy programmes increasing a Member’s share in 
world production year by year would be captured under Article 6.4(d).  In challenging subsidy 
programmes to primary products or commodities, complaining Members might therefore 
more easily achieve success in their claims formulated under other types of serious prejudice 
spelled out in Article 6.3.1180   
 
                                                 
1174 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 10.261. 
1175 Because it was based on an alleged increase in the US share in exports for cotton, Brazil’s claim 
under Article 6.4(d) failed.  The Appellate Body exercised judicial economy on Brazil’s appeal 
regarding the Panel’s interpretation of Article 6.4(d).  See Appellate Body Report, US – Upland 
Cotton, para 507. 
1176 The Panel defined ‘world market share’ as ‘the share of the world market supplied by the 
subsidizing Member’ (para 7.1463).  The Panel thus also rejected the US interpretation that the ‘world 
market share’ should be defined by reference to consumption (i.e., the portion of world consumption of 
US cotton satisfied by US upland cotton).  Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 7.1424-7.1464. 
1177 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1434. 
1178 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 10.266.  This finding was not 
appealed.  See Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), footnote 692. 
1179 Indeed, an increase during the most recent year should be demonstrated as compared to the average 
share in three previous years and this increase should follow a consistent trend over the time period of 
the subsidy programme.  Hence, the comparison is not made with regard to the pre-subsidy period.  For 
example, in the US – Upland Cotton case, the US market share in FY2006 was compared to its average 
market share in previous subsidized years (FY2002-FY2005). 
1180 Whereas Brazil failed to challenge the US subsidies for upland cotton under Article 6.4(d), its 
claim under price suppression/depression (Article 6.3(c)) was successful (see below Part II, Chapter 6, 
Section 6.1.2). 
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4.2.3.3. Price effects 
4.2.3.3.1. Significant price undercutting 
The first type of ‘serious prejudice’ related to price effects refers to significant price 
undercutting caused by the subsidized product as compared with the price of a like product of 
another Member in the same market (Article 6.3(c)).  Such price undercutting could also 
occur in the domestic market of the subsidizing country.1181   
Regarding the demonstration of such price undercutting, Article 6.5 clarifies that this includes 
any case in which it has been demonstrated ‘through a comparison of prices of the subsidized 
product with prices of a non-subsidized like product supplied to the same market’ and that 
such comparison ‘shall be made at the same level of trade and at comparable times, due 
account being taken of any other factor affecting price comparability’.1182  Alternatively, and 
only ‘if such a direct comparison is not possible, the existence of price undercutting may be 
demonstrated on the basis of export unit values’.1183  Similar to other items of Article 6.3(c), 
serious prejudice is only present if such price undercutting is ‘significant’.  This qualifier was, 
according to the Panel in Indonesia-Autos, ‘presumably (…) intended to ensure that margins 
of undercutting so small that they could not meaningfully affect suppliers of the imported 
product whose price was being undercut are not considered to give rise to serious 
prejudice’.1184  In the Panel’s reading in Korea – Commercial Vessel, this means that ‘the term 
"significant" as a de minimis concept intended to screen out very small, unimportant price 
effects that might be caused by subsidies but that would have no real impact in the 
market’.1185  Apparently, one can identify a tendency in the case law to not put the burden for 
passing the ‘significance’ test too high. 
 
In examining the presence of such price undercutting, the Panel in Indonesia – Autos found 
that the price difference between the EC’s imported cars and domestic like cars was 
significant even when differences in quality were taken into account.1186,1187  Because 
                                                 
1181 See Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, paras 14.241-14.256 
1182 For example, the Panel in Indonesia – Autos observed that transaction prices of complety-knocked 
down (CKD) cars and retail prices of completely finished cars would presumably not be ‘at the same 
level of trade’.  Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.244. 
1183 Article 6.5 of the SCM Agreement. 
1184 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.254. 
1185 According to this Panel, this low-threshold interpretation is similar to the interpretation given in the 
US – Upland Cotton case, in which the Panel referred to ‘important, notable or consequential’.  Panel 
Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.570-7.571. 
1186 Because Indonesia was considered a developing country, the preliminary analysis under Article 
27.8 juncto 6.1 of the SCM Agreement had to be undertaken (see below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 
6.1.2). 
1187 The Panel took into account differences in physical characteristics (e.g., size, engine, tyre, safety 
features (ABS, airbags), and extra features (e.g., alarm system)) because ‘(w)hile these differences are 
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Indonesia conceded that its subsidies were responsible for the significant price undercutting as 
compared to EC’s imported like cars, the Panel concluded that Indonesia’s car subsidy 
programme caused ‘serious prejudice’ in the sense of Article 5(c) of the SCM Agreement.   
  
4.2.3.3.2. Significant price suppression or depression  
The case law has revealed that price suppression occurs when ‘prices (…) either are 
prevented or inhibited from rising (i.e., they do not increase when they otherwise would have) 
or they do actually increase, but the increase is less than it otherwise would have been’.1188  
Price depression, on the other hand, covers ‘the situation where prices are pressed down, or 
reduced’.1189  The comparison has to be made with the price of products ‘in the same market’, 
which could be defined either narrowly or broadly (e.g., world market) depending on the facts 
of the case.1190   
 
The Appellate Body acknowledged that situations of price suppression and depression could 
overlap but emphasized that both concepts are distinct, also on a conceptual level.  It correctly 
reasoned in US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil) that price suppression ‘presupposes a 
comparison of an observable factual situation (prices) with a counterfactual situation (what 
prices would have been) where one has to determine whether, in the absence of the subsidies 
(or some other controlling phenomenon), prices would have increased or would have 
increased more than they actually did’.1191  Price depression, by contrast, does no presuppose 
such comparison as it could be ‘directly observed, in that falling prices are observable’.1192  
To be sure, also in case of price depression, comparison with a counterfactual situation will be 
required to establish the causation element: ‘the determination of whether such falling prices 
are the effect of the subsidies will require consideration of what prices would have been 
                                                                                                                                            
not sufficient to render the three models unlike, they must clearly affect price comparability to some 
extent’. On the other hand, the Panel found no significant non-physical characteristics (e.g., brand 
image) for which due allowance had to be made.  Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, paras 14.246, 
14.253. 
1188 The term price covers ‘the amount of money set for sale’ of the product in question or the ‘value or 
worth’ of that product.  Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1277 and footnote 1388; Appellate 
Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 423; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 350. 
1189 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1277 and footnote 1388; Appellate Body Report, US – 
Upland Cotton, para 423; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 
350. 
1190 See, for example, Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.565, 7.566. 
1191 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 351 (emphasis added). 
1192 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 351.  This seems to differ 
from the Panel’s holding in Korea – Commercial Vessels that the counterfactual situation should be 
analyzed also for the identification of ‘price depression’.  Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, 
para 7.537. 
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absent the subsidies’.1193  Indeed, ‘counterfactual analysis is an inescapable part of analysing 
the effect of a subsidy under Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement’.1194 
 
Although it had allowed a bifurcated approach,1195 the Appellate Body in the US – Upland 
Cotton compliance procedure endorsed the Panel’s unitary approach to decide on the claim of 
price suppression.  Here, no distinction was made between the assessment of price 
suppression and causation.1196  Such a unitary approach seems to fit to the Appellate Body’s 
reasoning that the determination of price suppression is indeed counterfactual in nature.1197  
The Appellate Body also concurred that this counterfactual nature calls for a ‘but for’ test.1198  
Indeed, ‘the Panel had to determine whether the world price of upland cotton would have 
been higher in the absence of the subsidies (that is, but for the subsidies)’.1199  Even though 
the Panel had conducted such an analysis, the Appellate Body criticized that it did not clearly 
articulate the causation standard implicated in its approach.1200  In particular, the question was 
addressed to what extent the Panel’s ‘but for’ test effectively filtered out other factors that 
could have attributed to price suppression.  In this respect, the Appellate Body elaborated 
upon the causation standard:  
 
A subsidy may be necessary, but not sufficient, to bring about price suppression. Understood 
in this way, the "but for" test may be too undemanding. By contrast, the "but for" test would 
be too rigorous if it required the subsidy to be the only cause of the price suppression. Instead, 
the "but for" test should determine that price suppression is the effect of the subsidy and that 
there is a "genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect".1201 
 
This statement reveals in a rather cryptic way some elements of the required causal link 
between the subsidy and price suppression.  A necessary condition (sine qua non) seems not 
sufficient, but the ‘only cause’ seems not necessary.  Instead, the Appellate Body reiterated 
the causation standard which it had articulated in the context of other WTO Agreements, 
namely the general (and vague) standard of a ‘genuine and substantial relationship of cause 
                                                 
1193 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 351. 
1194 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 351 (emphasis added). 
1195 The original Panel and Appellate Body reports were criticized by Sapir and Trachtman for 
confusing price suppression and price reduction since they conducted a bifurcated test for price 
suppression.  See A. Sapir and J. Trachtman, ‘Subsidization, Price Suppression, and Expertise: 
Causation and Precision in Upland Cotton’, 7:1 World Trade Review (2008), 183-209. 
1196 The same unitary approach was adopted by the Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.612. 
1197 Indeed, the Appellate Body observed that ‘(b)ecause of the counterfactual nature of price 
suppression, it is difficult to separate price suppression from its causes. Hence, the Panel's "unitary" 
analysis", (…), has a sound conceptual foundation’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton 
(Brazil – Article 21.5), para 354.  See also Sapir and Trachtman, above n 1195, at 183-209. 
1198 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 370-371; Panel Report, 
US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 10.46-10.48; Panel Report, Korea – Commercial 
Vessels, paras 7.537-7.612. 
1199 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 370. 
1200 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 374. 
1201 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 374. 
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and effect’.1202  This implies that panels should ensure that the effects of other factors on the 
price do not dilute such ‘genuine and substantial link’.  At the same time, panels are given 
some discretion in choosing the methodology to make this assessment.1203  
 
Importantly, Article 6.3(c) stipulates that the degree of price suppression or depression should 
be significant, which the Appellate Body has, in line with the Panel in US – Upland Cotton, 
understood as ‘important, notable or consequential’.1204,1205  Obviously, ‘what needs to be 
significant is the degree of price suppression (or depression), not necessarily the degree of 
each factor used as an indicator for establishing its existence’.1206  Moreover, the Panel in US 
– Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5) agreed with the original panel that this degree of 
significance may ‘vary from case to case, depending upon the factual circumstances’.1207  
With regard to the upland cotton market, for instance, the required degree of significance was 
not set too high because:  
 
(…) for a basic and widely traded commodity, such as upland cotton, a relatively small 
decrease or suppression of prices could be significant because, for example, profit margins 
may ordinarily be narrow, product homogeneity means that sales are price sensitive or because 
of the sheer size of the market in terms of the amount of revenue involved in large volumes 
traded on the markets experiencing the price suppression.1208 
 
In sum, the Panel in US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5) assessed whether, but for the 
cotton subsidies, the world market price for upland cotton would have increased significantly, 
                                                 
1202 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 374 (see also para 372); 
Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 438; Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, 
para 69. 
1203 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 370, 375; Appellate 
Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 376-379.  See below Part II, Chapter 4, 
Section 4.2.3.3.2.4. 
1204 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 426; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland 
Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 416; Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 7.1326-7.1328; 
Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.570. 
1205 One might wonder whether subsidies should be sufficient on their own (sufficient condition) to 
cause significant price suppression/depression.  In the context of the Safeguards Agreement, in which 
the ‘genuine and substantial link’ standard was developed, the Appellate Body decided that the 
causation standard does not require that ‘increased imports on their own must be capable of causing 
serious injury’ (Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, paras 67-70 (emphasis in the original)).  
Nonetheless, panels and the Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton correctly seem to hold that the 
relevant question under Article 6.3(c) is whether the subsidies on their own were sufficient to 
significantly suppress prices.  See, for example, Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 
21.5), para 10.49; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 360-366. 
1206 The Appellate Body continued that each factor does not ‘necessarily have to be capable of 
demonstrating, to the same extent, significant price suppression’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland 
Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 416 (emphasis added). 
1207 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 10.50. 
1208 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 7.1328-7.1329 (emphasis added).  This is also cited by 
the Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 10.50. 
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or would have increased by significantly more than was in fact the case.1209  As the Appellate 
Body explained, such price suppressing effect would result from additional, ‘marginal’, 
production induced by subsidization.1210  To conduct the ‘but for’ analysis, capturing 
simultaneously the price suppression and causal relationship elements, a number of different 
relevant factors were considered collectively.  First, a group of factors revealed whether it was 
likely that the subsidy, through creating marginal production, could have a significant price 
suppressing effect.  Second, trend analysis was used to detect if there was a correlation 
between subsidy levels and price evolutions.  Third and finally, economic modeling (i.e., 
quantitative analysis) was suggested so as to effectively estimate if prices were suppressed as 
a result of subsidization.  Several economists have rightly argued that the causality 
requirement in Article 6.3(c) cannot be established without such quantitative analysis.  These 
three elements discussed in the US – Upland Cotton compliance procedure are elaborated in 
more detail below.  This case law offers important guidance on how price suppression will 
have to be demonstrated in future cases.   
 
4.2.3.3.2.1. Factors related to the subsidy and its production stimulating effect 
A number of elements were advanced that made it plausible that US subsidies for upland 
cotton (i.e., marketing loan and countercyclical payments) could significantly suppress prices 
on the world market as a result of inducing additional production.  First, the large US share in 
world production and exports of upland cotton implied that the US exerted ‘a substantial 
proportionate influence’ on the world market for upland cotton.1211  Indeed, only subsidies by 
so-called ‘large countries’ (i.e., which affect supply and demand; Part I1212) could stimulate 
production in a way that it affects the world market price and thus cause adverse effects upon 
producers of other WTO Members.   
Second, the nature (i.e., ‘structure, design, and operation’) as well as magnitude of the subsidy 
were also deemed relevant factors to an analysis of whether the effect of the subsidy is price 
suppression.  The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that the marketing and 
countercyclical payments affect US production as a result of their mandatory and price-
contingent nature and their revenue-stabilizing effect.1213  Exact quantification of the subsidy 
level is not required in an analysis under Article 6.3(c) but the magnitude of the subsidy level 
                                                 
1209 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 10.49. 
1210 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 355. 
1211 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 10.54-10.58.  Panel Report, US – 
Upland Cotton, para 7.1348. 
1212 As explained in Part I (Chapter 1, Section 1.1), the relevant question is whether the country is large 
in the production of the product in question. 
1213 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 10.59-10.111; Panel Report, US – 
Upland Cotton, paras 7.1289, 7.1349; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 
21.5), para 362. 
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is an important element in this analysis, though it certainly is not the only relevant one.1214  
Obviously, ‘(a) large subsidy that is closely linked to prices of the relevant product is likely to 
have a greater impact on prices than a small subsidy that is less closely linked to prices’.1215   
Third, the significant gap between total production costs of US upland cotton producers and 
their market revenue suggested that the subsidies were an important factor affecting the 
economic viability of US cotton production.1216  The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel 
that total production costs include the opportunity cost of production factors.  Moreover, the 
calculation of production costs is based on total costs and not merely on variable costs 
because the time period of the subsidy programme called for a medium to long-term 
analysis.1217,1218 
 
4.2.3.3.2.2. Trend analysis 
One of the factors underpinning the original Panel’s finding in US – Upland Cotton of a 
causal relationship was the ‘discernible temporal coincidence’ of suppressed world market 
prices and the price-contingent subsidies.  Over the same period that the challenged subsidies 
were granted (1998-2002), there was a marked increase in US exports (in relative and 
absolute terms) and drop in the world price.  The Appellate Body correctly underscored that 
mere correlation is not sufficient to demonstrate causation.  Indeed, the price trend might very 
well be explained (i.e., caused) in full or part by other factors.  Equating correlation to 
causation would lead to so-called Type II errors: accepting the hypothesis of causality when it 
is actually false.  Nonetheless, because ‘one would normally expect a discernible correlation 
between significantly suppressed prices and the challenged subsidies if the effect of these 
subsidies is significant price suppression’, such trend analysis is deemed in the Appellate 
Body’s view as an ‘important factor in any analysis’ of whether the effect of a subsidy is 
significant price suppression under Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement. 
On the compliance level, the Panel failed to observe a similar ‘discernible temporal 
coincidence’ between US subsidies and suppressed prices.  US production and exports had 
                                                 
1214 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 461. 
1215 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 461. 
1216 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 10.147-10.196; Panel Report, US – 
Upland Cotton, paras 7.1353-7.1354. 
1217 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 10.167-10.176.; Appellate Body 
Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 423, 427-428; Appellate Body Report, US – 
Upland Cotton, para 453.  The Appellate Body also agreed that it was reasonable for the Panel to 
exclude off-farm income from US upland cotton producers’ income.  Appellate Body Report, US – 
Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 431. 
1218 The Appellate Body highlighted that such calculation of production costs was consistent with its 
approach taken in the compliance procedures in Canada – Dairy (see below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 
6.2.1.2.1.1.2).  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 423, 427-
428. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – US and New Zealand), para 87; Appellate 
Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – US and New Zealand II), paras 102-104. 
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increased over the relevant period (i.e., 2002-2005 period) but only in absolute not in relative 
terms and no broad decline in cotton prices but merely ‘intermittent peaks and troughs’ could 
be detected.1219  Nonetheless, the Panel rightly concluded that the absence of a general decline 
in prices over this period of subsidization does not necessarily imply that there is no price 
suppression.  Indeed, prices could still have been higher ‘but for’ the subsidies.1220  
Apparently, the absence of such correlation was therefore also not considered as a relevant 
counterargument that no price suppression existed.1221  
The Appellate Body’s observation in the original procedure that one ‘would normally expect 
a discernible correlation between significantly suppressed prices and the challenged subsidies’ 
might overlook the simple fact that price suppression cannot be excluded on the basis of a 
table showing price evolutions.  Indeed, price trends give no information on whether prices 
would still have been higher in the absence of subsidies unless price levels could be compared 
before and after subsidies were introduced.  Attaching too much importance to the absence of 
a correlation between subsidy levels and price trends would lead to so-called Type I errors: 
rejecting the hypothesis of causation where this should have been accepted.  The compliance 
Panel seemed to understand this point as it apparently even considered the absence of such 
correlation as not relevant.  
In sum, the presence of a ‘discernible temporal coincidence’ between a decline in world 
market prices and subsidies is considered a relevant though not a sufficient factor to 
demonstrate causation. Conversely, the absence of such a coincidence is insufficient to 
exclude a finding of causation and might not even be considered relevant in the overall 
determination thereof.  In short, a (negative) correlation between subsidy and price levels is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to a finding of causation. 
 
4.2.3.3.2.3. Economic modeling 
Whereas all previous factors could make it plausible that the subsidy, by stimulating 
production, did cause significant price suppression, they do not test whether this effectively 
happened.  Indeed, only economic analysis could effectively estimate the existence and 
degree of any price suppression caused by the subsidies.     
One such an instrument is an economic simulation model, which was introduced by Brazil 
before the compliance Panel in US – Upland Cotton to simulate the effect of US subsidies on 
the world market for cotton.  The model, a two-country (US and rest of the world) demand 
                                                 
1219 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 10.141. 
1220 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 10.146.  This was not appealed by 
the US. 
1221 The Panel only listed it as one of the arguments advanced by Brazil that was less persuasive.  See 
Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 10.251. 
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and supply log-linear displacement model, simulates a counterfactual situation: how much 
would world prices, and production and imports/exports in the US and the rest of the world 
change (in percentage) in case the subsidies would be removed?1222  Because the Arbitrator in 
US – Upland Cotton relied upon this model to quantify the effect of a withdrawal of US 
subsidies, this model is explained in more detail below.1223  Under the serious prejudice 
analysis of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement, Brazil advanced the model to quantify (by 
estimation) the price suppressing effect of the US subsidies.  The US formulated a double 
criticism on this model before the compliance panel.  First, it questioned the very structure of 
the model itself without, however, suggesting its own alternative model.  Second, the US 
questioned the value of the parameters included by Brazil in its model (e.g., demand and 
supply elasticities) and proposed its own set of parameter values.  After presenting both 
parties’ arguments, the Panel noted ‘the advantage of the modeling approach that Brazil has 
chosen to adopt’ but, at the same time, remained ‘mindful of the criticism by the United States 
that (it) "has no foundation within economic circles"’.1224  Moreover, regarding the parameters 
included in the model, the Panel explicitly refrained from taking position on which parameter 
values were appropriate.  The Panel simply concluded that under all simulations run by the 
parties (thus also with the US parameter values) price suppression was the outcome.1225  
Hence, the Appellate Body correctly analyzed that the Panel did not take a position on the 
appropriateness of the model and the suggested parameters.  Yet, it only concluded that the 
Panel could therefore ‘have gone further in its evaluation and comparative analysis’ but 
decided that it did not commit an error of law.1226  In my opinion, the Appellate Body’s 
conclusion could have been stronger.  After all, how could the model support the Panel’s 
conclusion of price suppression without any prior determination that it is indeed based on 
solid economic grounds?1227  Moreover, what about the US argument that when the simulation 
is run with US parameter values, a price suppression effect of approximately 1 per cent would 
be found (compared to approximately 8.5 per cent when Brazil’s values were included), 
which could be proof that price suppression is insignificant.  The Panel’s conclusion that 
‘price suppression’ would be the outcome in all simulations neglects this important argument.  
Interestingly, even though it acknowledged that the Panel did indeed not take position on the 
                                                 
1222 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 10.199. 
1223 See below Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3.2.2. 
1224 Without taking position, the Panel simply concluded that ‘the model needs to earn the confidence 
of this Panel’ because it was submitted for the first time to this dispute. 
1225 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 10.222.  The Panel also listed the 
economic modeling argument by Brazil as less persuasive.  Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil 
– Article 21.5), para 10.251.   
1226 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 358, 434. 
1227 The weakness in the US argumentation was that the US did not propose an alternative model and 
also suggested alternative parameters to be used in the model proposed by Brazil. 
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significance of the results, the Appellate Body at the same time reached itself the conclusion 
that: 
 
The range of price effects resulting from the simulations would fall within the Panel's view of 
what constitutes "significant" price suppression in the specific context of the world price of 
upland cotton.1228 
 
Recalling that the Panel did not set the required degree of significance too high with regard to 
upland cotton (see above), the Appellate Body thus suggested that a price suppression of 
approximately 1 per cent would have been considered significant by the Panel.  Only if the 
Panel would effectively have reached this conclusion would it be excused, in my opinion, 
from taking position on which set of parameter values was appropriate.    
 
Thus, the Appellate Body did ultimately not find an error of law in the Panel’s assessment.  
Yet, the weight it attached to economic modeling seems to suggest that the Appellate Body 
will take a stricter stance on panels’ evaluation thereof in future cases.1229  Indeed, it 
emphasized that an analysis of price suppression ‘would normally include a quantitative 
component’.1230  Acknowledging that quantification of the subsidy effect is inherently 
difficult because the price increase absent the subsidy cannot be directly observed, the 
Appellate Body referred to the use of economic modeling or other quantitative techniques to 
estimate ‘whether there are higher levels of production resulting from the subsidies and, in 
turn, the price effects of that production’.1231  Because of the counterfactual nature of the 
analysis, ‘modeling exercises are likely to be an important tool that a panel should 
scrutinize’.1232  The complexity of such models and their parameters could not be an excuse 
for panels ‘to remain agnostic about them’.1233  As the initial trier of facts under a serious 
prejudice case, the panel should reach conclusions on the probative value it accords to 
economic simulations or models presented to it.1234   
 
In the literature as well, several economists have stressed that economic analysis should be 
part of the serious prejudice determination since other relevant factors (e.g., trend analysis) 
cannot establish a causal relationship.  Economic simulating models seem to be the prime 
                                                 
1228 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 365, 435. 
1229 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 358, 434.  Davey and 
Sapir point to the evolution made by the Appellate Body since the original procedure.  See W. J. Davey 
and A. Sapir, ‘United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton Recourse to Article 21.5 by Brazil, 
WT/DS267/AB/RW (2 June 2008)’, 9:1 World Trade Review (2010), 1-19. 
1230 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 356. 
1231 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 356. 
1232 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 357 (emphasis added). 
1233 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 357. 
1234 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 357. 
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quantitative tool given that econometric models (e.g., regression analysis), which establish 
statistically the relationship between two or more variables (e.g., subsidy and price) and are 
used in trade remedy cases, cannot be used under the serious prejudice analysis since, as 
Trachtman and Sapir point to, there is a lack of sufficient observations of the independent 
variable (i.e., subsidy).1235,1236  At the same time, economists have emphasized that economic 
simulating models should be approached with caution.  They refer to the structure as well as 
to the parameters used in such modeling.  Regarding the structure of the model, Sapir and 
Trachtman were critical about the so-called ‘calibration model’ relied upon in the US – 
Upland Cotton case because the assumptions underlying the model were not tested.  In 
contrast to econometric models, which use statistical techniques to test their validity, 
‘economic simulating models’ simply assume an equilibrium process that links the variables 
in a specific way.1237,1238  For instance, Vandenbussche indicates that the model used in the US 
– Upland Cotton case assumes a competitive market structure in upland cotton, in which 
prices are determined by interaction between world demand and supply, and assumes that 
upland cotton is a homogeneous type of product.  Nonetheless, she also underlines that such 
assumptions could be tested.1239  Likewise, Sapir and Trachtman finally conclude that one 
should not overestimate the fact that economic simulating models are not estimated as it is 
possible to test the robustness of the model’s prediction.1240  The parameter values (e.g., 
elasticities) included in the models are based on economic studies and thus seem reliable.  The 
fact that different economic studies might differ widely on the value of these parameters, as 
shown in the Upland Cotton case, might again suggest that these studies should be examined 
critically.  If panels accept the structure of the model and the used parameters, economic 
                                                 
1235 See Sapir and Trachtman, above n 1195, at 201-205. 
1236 On the other hand, Steinberg and Josling do not exclude the use of regression analysis in the 
context of Article 6.3(a), (b) and 6.4 of the SCM Agreement.  They tackled the problem of the lack of 
sufficient observations by pooling time series and cross-section data (i.e., aggregating ten potential 
claims).  Because price is affected by a large number of independent variables, modeling was used in 
the application of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement.  See Steinberg and Josling, above n 1153, at 
397-400.  As Sapir points to, pooling of data is certainly not a precise tool to be used in a specific claim 
but its appropriateness depends on how far the specific claim is from the average of the other claims.   
1237 Sapir and Trachtman, above n 1195, at 202.  To be precise, Trachtman and Sapir contrast 
‘calibration models’ (as the one used by Brazil in the US – Upland Cotton case) with ‘estimated 
econometric models’.  Yet, ‘estimated econometric models’ face the same hurdles regarding data 
requirements as regression analysis as they are precisely estimated using regression analysis and seem 
therefore not an option for the serious prejudice analysis either.  Hence, economic models used under 
the serious prejudice analysis will be ‘calibrated models’.    
1238 ‘General equilibrium’ models, which include conceptually the entire economy and ‘partial 
equilibrium’ models, which separate part of such reality, are distinguished.  See Steinberg and Josling, 
above n 1153, at 392.  
1239 H. Vandenbussche, ‘Comment – Upland Cotton Case’, 7:1 World Trade Review (2008), 211-217, at 
212-215. 
1240 Sapir and Trachtman, above n 1195, at 183-209; see also Steinberg and Josling, above n 1153, at 
393 
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simulating models can be very useful to quantify, by estimation, the effect of the subsidy on 
the world price.1241    
Because of the importance – but also potential pitfalls – of economic simulation models, 
panels should make better use of the input of economic experts.  One option advanced by 
Sapir and Trachtman is to set up ‘expert review groups’ on the basis of Article 13.2 of the 
DSU.1242  Panels might be well advised to explore this suggestion as the Appellate Body has 
underscored the import of economic modeling exercises for the serious prejudice analysis and 
warned that panels should not remain agnostic about them.  Such an economic expert group is 
not only helpful for panels to construct their own economic model and parameters – which the 
Appellate Body does not seem to require – but also to reach a conclusion on the probative 
value they have to accord to economic models and parameters presented by the parties.   
 
4.2.3.3.2.4. Collective assessment and non-attribution 
On the basis of all three previous discussed elements collectively, the Panel in the compliance 
procedure reached the conclusion that US cotton subsidies caused significant price 
suppression.1243  This conclusion was mainly derived from those factors related to the subsidy 
and its production stimulating effect since the outcome of the trend analysis and economic 
modeling exercise was considered less persuasive.1244  Although panels are not required to 
make a determination of ‘significance’ regarding each factor individually,1245 the Appellate 
Body nonetheless faulted the compliance Panel for not giving ‘a clearer explanation’ of how 
the examined factors supported its finding that price suppression was indeed significant.1246   
To reach such an affirmative conclusion of price suppression, should panels, like investigating 
authorities in case of trade remedies, also conduct a non-attribution analysis?  Put otherwise, 
should panels explicitly rule out that other factors causing price suppression are not attributed 
to subsidies?  In the context of CVDs investigations, investigating authorities should 
explicitly determine that any known factors other than subsidized imports which at the same 
time are injuring the domestic industry are not attributed to subsidized imports (Article 15.5 
                                                 
1241 Sapir and Trachtman, above n 1195, at 204. 
1242 The option to establish a Permanent Group of Experts (Article 24 of the SCM Agreement) is not 
available under the current rules as it is limited to prohibited subsidy cases (below n 1284).  See 
Trachtman and Sapir, at 205-207; Vandenbussche, above n 1239, at 216-217. 
1243 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 10.244-10.257.   
1244 In this respect, notice that the Appellate Body had acknowledged that ‘(a)ll else being equal, the 
marginal production attributable to the subsidy would be expected to have an effect on world prices, 
particularly if the subsidy is provided in a country with a meaningful share of world output’.  Appellate 
Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 355. 
1245 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 418. 
1246 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 361. 
PART II CHAPTER 4 – DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES 
 
 
 238
of the SCM Agreement).1247  The absence of such a specific non-attribution requirement in 
Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement gives panels, according to the Appellate Body, ‘a certain 
degree of discretion in selecting an appropriate methodology for determining whether the 
"effect" of a subsidy is significant price suppression under Article 6.3(c)’.1248  At the same 
time, the Appellate Body concurred with the original Panel in US – Upland Cotton that ‘it is 
necessary to ensure that the effects of other factors on prices are not improperly attributed to 
the challenged subsidies’ since Article 6.3(c) requires that the effect of the subsidy is 
significant price suppression.1249  At the compliance level, the Appellate Body reiterated this 
balanced view on the need to conduct a non-attribution analysis in relation to the required 
strength of the causation element: 
 
Article 6.3(c) requires the Panel to have ensured that the effects of other factors on prices did 
not dilute the "genuine and substantial" link between the subsidies and the price suppression, 
Article 6.3(c) leaves some discretion to panels in choosing the methodology used for this 
assessment.1250 
 
‘In light of this flexibility’, the Appellate Body somewhat cryptically continued, ‘it would not 
have been improper for the Panel to have assessed the effect of other factors as part of its 
counterfactual analysis, rather than conducting a separate analysis of non-attribution’.1251  
This conclusion might be somewhat surprising given that the compliance Panel had simply 
not undertaken any non-attribution analysis at all.  Whereas the original Panel had made such 
an analysis as part of its bifurcated approach, the compliance Panel decided that it was not 
necessary in light of its unitary approach ‘to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of factors 
affecting the world market price for upland cotton’.1252  Turning to the US argument on 
China’s significant role in the market for upland cotton, which was the only factor raised by 
the US in the context of the non-attribution requirement, the Panel had found that its influence 
on demand and supply does ‘not change the fact that, with a share of world exports of around 
40 per cent, the United States is capable of exerting a substantial proportionate influence on 
the world market’.1253  In essence, the Panel thus argued that the price suppressing effect of 
US subsidies would not be neutralized by other factors such as China’s role in the cotton 
                                                 
1247 See also Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 436.  See below Part II, Chapter 5, 
Section 5.2.2.3. 
1248 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 436; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland 
Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 370. 
1249 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 437.  The non-attribution requirements spelled 
out in Part V ‘must not be automatically transposed into Part III of the SCM Agreement’ but may, 
nevertheless, ‘suggest ways of assessing whether the effect of a subsidy is significant price suppression 
rather than it being the effect of other factors’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 438. 
1250 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 375. 
1251 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 375. 
1252 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 10.243. 
1253 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 10.243. 
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market.  In light of the Panel’s unitary approach, this conclusion is defensible from a 
conceptual viewpoint since other factors are already implicitly taken into account under the 
relevant subsidy related factors.  For instance, China’s more dominant role on supply and 
demand would be reflected in the US share on the world cotton market, in the relevant 
parameters of the economic modeling exercise (e.g., demand and supply elasticity), and in the 
trend analysis (e.g., price trend).  However, by reading a non-attribution assessment into the 
Panel’s analysis – which was thus rather a dismissal that such an assessment had to be made – 
the Appellate Body seems to suggest that non-attribution of other factors suggested by the 
parties should be explicitly addressed under a unitary approach.  This could also be derived 
from the fact that the Appellate Body itself looked into the substance of the US argument and 
found that the US had failed to underpin its argument that this would have caused price 
suppression.  The increase in imports and consumption of upland cotton in China would 
rather have put upward pressure on the price.1254  In sum, panels do not have to meet the 
demanding non-attribution condition spelled out in the context of trade remedies but future 
panels might have to devote more attention to a non-attribution assessment even if they 
conduct a unitary assessment.  
 
Recognizing that some divergence might be justified since CVDs-investigating authorities 
could be biased, Davey and Sapir have, nonetheless, criticized the stark difference between 
the demanding non-attribution requirement imposed upon CVDs-investigating authorities and 
this more flexible stance towards panels.1255  However, three further observations seem 
relevant to nuance this stark difference.  First, the Appellate Body’s flexible stance regarding 
this panel report might be partly inspired on the basis of the weakness of the substance of the 
US argumentation.  Second, the Appellate Body’s reasoning also seems to suggest that future 
panels will have to conduct a proper non-attribution assessment regardless of whether they 
undertake a bifurcated or unitary approach.  Third and finally, the more demanding non-
attribution requirement upon CVDs-investigating authorities seems somewhat tempered by a 
less demanding causality requirement.  After all, in the context of CVDs, the investigating 
authority could determine the impact of ‘subsidized imports’ upon the domestic industry, 
whereas ‘serious prejudice’ should be the ‘effect of the subsidy’.  This implies that regression 
analysis quantifying the effect of subsidized imports (and non-attributing other factors) could 
be relied upon in a CVDs procedure in order to meet the causality requirement.1256  In 
contrast, it was illustrated that quantification of the subsidy effect in a ‘serious prejudice’ 
                                                 
1254 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), para 378. 
1255 Davey and Sapir, above n 1229, at 14-15. 
1256 This could likewise be used in a multilateral claim on the basis of Article 5(a) of the SCM 
Agreement. 
PART II CHAPTER 4 – DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES 
 
 
 240
claim will have to rely on a demanding economic modeling exercise, which is considered an 
important tool to meet the causality requirement.  
 
4.3. NON-ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES 
Under the original SCM Agreement, an actionable subsidy claim as explained in the previous 
section could not be undertaken against a limited group of subsidies.  This group of green 
light subsidies could also not be countervailed.  During the Uruguay Round, the US had taken 
the most defensive position on the scope of subsidies that would be given green light as their 
purported legitimate objective could easily be circumvented by firms as well as governments.  
Because of ‘the fungible nature of money’, firms receiving, for example, research and 
development (R&D) subsidies could simply reallocate resources normally used for R&D to 
another purpose.1257  Moreover, ‘identifying non-actionable subsidies is inherently a 
dangerous task’ because governments could simply rename prohibited or actionable subsidies 
as green light subsidies.1258  This negative stance altered with regard to R&D subsidies when 
the Clinton Administration came to power (1993).1259  Other negotiating countries were 
generally more open to the inclusion of green light subsidies so as to place such subsidies 
outside the scope of CVDs action.  Ultimately, three subsidy categories were, under strict 
conditions, considered non-actionable but their green light status extinguished at the end of 
the 1999.1260,1261  A short introduction of their previous green light status seems useful, not 
only because WTO Members might reconsider their re-inclusion in the Doha Round but in the 
purpose of the normative assessment conducted in Part IV as well.   
                                                 
1257 See Submission by the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, 22 November 1989). 
1258 Despite these reservations, the US had proposed a list of subsidies that could be considered non-
actionable.  See Submission by the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, 22 November 1989). 
1259 The US even successfully pushed for widening the scope of R&D subsidies as foreseen in the 
Dunkel Draft, which in the view of the Clinton administration ‘tied (their) hands when it came to 
investing in research and development’.  One of the concerns raised in US Congress was that US 
public-private ‘technology partnerships’ would be targeted by CVDs action.  Strategic trade theory (see 
above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.1) also provided new arguments for such subsidies.  See Kleinfeld 
and Kaye, above n 610, at 51-52; J. Odell and B. Eichengreen, ‘The United States, the ITO, and the 
WTO: Exit Options, Agent Slack, and Presidential Leadership’, in A. O. Krueger (ed), The WTO as an 
International Organization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 181-209, at 203; L. W. 
Nowicky, ‘Alternative Approaches to International Competiveness: Does the Clinton Administration 
Need French Lessons?’, in M. E. Kreinnin (ed), Contemporary Issues in Commercial Policy (Oxford: 
Pergamon, 1995), 191-202, at 193; H. A. Hazard, ‘Microeconomic Initiatives to Promote Technology 
and Industry in the United States’, in M. E. Kreinnin (ed), Contemporary Issues in Commercial Policy 
(Oxford: Pergamon, 1995), 185-190. 
1260 Previous drafts had listed more types of green light subsidies but the EC finally agreed to the US 
demand to reduce the list in exchange for less demanding language under Article 6.1 of the SCM 
Agreement.  See Stewart, above n 579, at 911. 
1261 Politically, these were mainly created on the demand of the EC (focusing on R&D, environment), 
Canada (focusing on assistance to disadvantaged regions), and Mexico (which successfully pushed for 
environmental subsidies in the last days of negotiations).  Stewart, above n 579, at 907; Collins-
Williams and Salember, above n 626, 10–11.  Regarding the shift in US stance on R&D subsidies, see 
above n 1259. 
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First, certain subsidies for R&D conducted by firms or by higher education or research 
establishments on a contract basis with firms were non-actionable, although this was limited 
to a certain level and to certain types.1262  Second, non-actionable was likewise assistance to 
disadvantaged regions if the geographical region was clearly defined and the determination 
was based on neutral and objective criteria.1263  The third category covered a limited type of 
environmental subsidy, namely assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new 
environmental requirements.1264  In principle, covered subsidies could not be challenged or 
countervailed, regardless of their generated trade effects.1265  
The SCM Agreement provided for a notification requirement for such non-actionable 
subsidies, but no single formal notification was made over the entire period that this non-
actionable subsidy category was in place.1266  In fact, Members had to notify the SCM 
Committee all subsidy programmes they wanted to classify as non-actionable, and these 
notifications had to be made in advance of the implementation of the subsidy programme.1267  
When another Member disputed the non-actionable nature of a subsidy, it could start a review 
procedure that could end in binding arbitration.1268  If a subsidy was not notified, it could in 
principle not benefit from non-actionability and became thus actionable and countervailable if 
it caused adverse effects or injury, respectively.1269  However – and this was the weak spot of 
the notification procedure – such subsidies were still non-actionable if it was found during a 
countervailing or multilateral proceeding that they conformed to the standards of one of the 
three categories.1270   
The category of green light subsidies was thus extinguished at the end of 1999 because there 
was no consensus among WTO Members to continue its application.  As mentioned, the 
discussion was linked to the extension of Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement.  Several 
developing countries, such as Brazil and India, were not in favor of the extension in its 
existing form because the categories overly reflected the interest of developed countries.  The 
EC and Canada, in contrast, favored a continuation of the category of non-actionable 
                                                 
1262 See Article 8.2(a) of the SCM Agreement. Excluded from the SCM Agreement were subsidies for 
‘fundamental research’ independently conducted by higher education or research establishments 
(footnote 26 of the SCM Agreement). 
1263 Article 8.2(b) of the SCM Agreement. See also Matsushita, Schoenbaum, and Mavroidis, above n 
721, at 283. 
1264 Article 8.2(c) of the SCM Agreement. See also Matsushita, Schoenbaum, and Mavroidis, above n 
721, at 284. 
1265 See below (Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3.3) on the multilateral remedy to respond to non-
actionable subsidies. 
1266 Background Note by the Secretariat, Notification Requirements under the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (G/SCM/W/546, 28 April 2009), para 16. 
1267 See Article 24.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
1268 See Articles 8.3-8.5 of the SCM Agreement. 
1269 See footnote 35 of the SCM Agreement. 
1270 See footnote 35, in fine of the SCM Agreement. 
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subsidies, whereas the US articulated its ‘mixed views on the provisions’.  In general, there 
seemed not even a consensus present among either developed countries or developing 
countries.1271  Therefore, it seems unlikely that WTO Members in the current Doha Round 
will reinstall this category in its present form.  Nonetheless, Part IV of this study will discuss 
in detail whether their re-inclusion seems warranted.1272 
 
 
                                                 
1271 See Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 1-2 November 1999 (G/SCM/M/24, 26 April 2000); 
Minutes of the Special Meeting Held on 20 December 1999 (G/SCM/M/22, 17 February 2000). 
1272 See below Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1. 
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5. REMEDIES 
In addressing the remedies to subsidies, three situations, each indicating a different effect of a 
subsidy, should be carefully distinguished.1273  First, subsidies of country A can increase the 
export of product X into the importing country, country B, causing harm to the domestic 
producers of product X in country B.  Second, subsidies of country A can increase the export 
of product X into a third country, country C, causing harm to the export to country C of 
product X from country B producers.  Third, country A can subsidize domestic producers of 
product X to restrain the imports of product X in its domestic market, whereby the subsidy 
has the effect of an import barrier.   
How can country B respond to these subsidies?  Only in the first situation can country B 
impose CVDs to offset the price effect of the subsidy.  Hereby, the subsidy of country A 
could, evidently, remain in force. In situations 2 and 3, country B cannot respond with CVDs 
because the harm it wishes to neutralize is not the importation of the subsidized product X.  
Of course, in situation 2, country B may request country C to impose CVDs, but this country 
might in fact welcome the subsidization of product X because it improves its overall 
welfare.1274  So, how should country B respond in situations 2 and 3 if it wishes to protect the 
interests of its exporters of product X?  From an economic viewpoint, country B can respond 
with an equivalent subsidy to its own producers of product X to neutralize the competitive 
disadvantage in countries A and C,1275 but this subsidy will also be prohibited, as an export 
subsidy, or actionable under the SCM Agreement.  Consequently, the only option for country 
B is to have recourse to the WTO-adjudicating bodies.  If a Panel concludes that the subsidy 
of country A is prohibited/actionable, country A will have to withdraw the subsidy 
(prohibited) or at least remove the adverse effects of it (actionable).1276 Only if country A does 
not take these steps might country B be authorized to adopt countermeasures. 
As a result, the SCM Agreement provides two remedies to take action against prohibited and 
actionable subsidies granted by other WTO Members, which will be discussed in depth in this 
Chapter.  First, in all three situations, country B can follow the multilateral approach and 
bring the case before the WTO-adjudicating bodies.  Second, subject to a set of procedural 
and substantive requirements, country B can unilaterally impose CVDs to offset the effects of 
                                                 
1273 See Jackson, above n 588, 280; Trebilcock and Howse, above n 894, at 263. 
1274 As explained above, Article VI:6(b),(c) of the GATT offers a limited option for Country C, whose 
own domestic industry is not injured by subsidized imports (e.g., lack of domestic industry), to impose 
CVDs so as to protect the interests in its territory of exporters from a trading partner (in this case, 
Country B) (see above n 555, 562).  Apparently, this option is never used.  See Steinberg and Josling, 
above n 1153, at 381, footnote 36. 
1275 Trebilcock and Howse, above n 894, at 263. 
1276 Withdrawal is also a possible remedy for actionable subsidies. 
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the subsidy in its domestic market (situation 1).  The SCM Agreement clarifies the delineation 
between both options: 
 
However, with regard to the effects of a particular subsidy in the domestic market of the 
importing Member, only one form of relief (either a countervailing duty, if the requirements of 
Part V are met, or a countermeasure under Articles 4 or 7) shall be available.1277 
 
Country B therefore can, but also should, choose between the unilateral or multilateral option 
to respond to the injury caused in its domestic market (situation 1).  Yet, the SCM Agreement 
does not prohibit it pursuing the unilateral approach to offset the negative effects in its 
domestic market (situation 1), alongside the multilateral approach to address the negative 
effects of the same subsidy in its export markets (situations 2 and 3).1278 
 
5.1. MULTILATERAL REMEDIES: WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
WTO Members confronted with prohibited and actionable subsidies imposed by other WTO 
Members may take recourse to the WTO dispute-settlement system. The SCM Agreement 
stipulates specific dispute-settlement procedure rules for prohibited subsidies1279 and for 
actionable subsidies,1280 which are ‘specific or additional’ to the rules of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU).1281  The deadlines, implementation standards, and potential 
remedies in case of non-compliance are more stringent with regard to prohibited subsidies 
vis-à-vis actionable subsidies.     
 
5.1.1. Time frame  
The SCM Agreement provides for an accelerated procedure available to WTO Members 
confronted with prohibited and actionable subsidies.1282  If consultations fail within 30 days 
under the prohibited subsidy procedure, the complaining Member may then refer the matter to 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).  Regarding actionable subsidies, the standard term of 60 
days applies, but the term for the panel’s composition is shorter.1283  The time limits for the 
panel procedure are under both procedures substantially shorter than under the standard 
procedure of the DSU,1284 and those for the Appellate Body procedure are shorter with regard 
                                                 
1277 Article 10, footnote 35 of the SCM Agreement. 
1278 Matsushita, Schoenbaum, and Mavroidis, above n 721, 336. 
1279 Article 4 of the SCM Agreement. 
1280 Article 7 of the SCM Agreement. 
1281 The specific procedure is thus a lex specialis.  In other words, the DSU is still relevant insofar this 
is not modified by the specific procedure (see Appendix 2 DSU and Article 30 of the SCM 
Agreement). 
1282 See also Article 4.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
1283 Article 7.4 of the SCM Agreement. Compare with Articles 4.7, 6, and 8 of the DSU. 
1284 See Articles 4.6 and 7.5 of the SCM Agreement.  Compare with Articles 12, 15, and 16 of the 
DSU. Under the prohibited subsidy procedure, the Panel may request assistance of the Permanent 
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to prohibited subsidies.1285  Moreover, the time period for the DSB to decide upon the 
adoption of the panel and Appellate Body reports is shorter under the SCM procedures.1286  
Last, if the subsidizing Member has not conformed to the DSB’s ruling and recommendations 
within the time period indicated by the Panel (prohibited subsidies1287) or within six months 
(actionable subsidies), the affected Member will have the right to request authorization to 
adopt countermeasures.1288 
 
5.1.2. Information gathering 
In case a complaining Member aims at formulating a ‘serious prejudice’ claim involving 
actionable subsidies (Part III), it could rely on a specific procedure to collect information 
elaborated in Annex V of the SCM Agreement.  This Annex reflects the awareness among 
drafters that gathering exact information on volume and/or price effects in the subsidizing 
country and/or third countries might be notoriously difficult.  Indeed, the subsidizing 
Member, whose subsidies are challenged, might be reluctant to cooperate and third countries 
might also not be very keen to provide information on price and/or volume effects of 
subsidized imports given that such subsidized imports could very well be welfare improving 
from their perspective.1289  To obtain such information, the complaining party could request 
the Dispute Settlement Body to initiate the Annex V procedure.1290  If so, a representative will 
be designated by the Dispute Settlement Body to facilitate the information gathering 
process.1291  This information-gathering process has to be completed within 60 days, after 
which the information obtained is submitted to the panel.  During this process, the 
complaining party could request the subsidizing country for relevant information (e.g., 
through questionnaires).  This could cover information needed to analyze the adverse effects 
caused by the subsidized product, to establish the existence and amount of subsidization, and 
                                                                                                                                            
Group of Experts (PGE), composed of five experts elected by the SCM Committee, with regard to 
whether the measure in question is a prohibited subsidy.  Although reference to the PGE is optional, the 
determination of the PGE is binding upon the Panel (see Articles 24.3 and 4.5 of the SCM Agreement).  
This might be the reason why so far no panel has requested the determination of the PGE.  See Clarke 
and Horlick, above n 587, at 726; J. Kazeki, ‘Permanent Group of Experts under the SCM Agreement’, 
43:5 Journal of World Trade (2009), 1031-1045, at 1033-1034, 1041. 
1285 See Articles 4.9, 7.7 of the SCM Agreement.  Compare with Article 17.5 of the DSU. 
1286 Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the SCM Agreement and Articles 7.6 and 7.7 of the SCM Agreement. 
Compare with Articles 16.4 and 17.14 of the DSU. 
1287 The measure will have to be withdrawn without delay (see below Part II, Chapter 5, Section 
5.1.3.1.1). 
1288 Articles 4.10 and 7.9 of the SCM Agreement.  Compare with the ‘reasonable period’ stipulated by 
Articles 21.3 and 22.2 of the DSU. 
1289 This holds when these countries are net-importing countries. 
1290 Annex V also foresees in the general obligation upon every Member to cooperate in the 
development of evidence when an actionable subsidy claim is formulated (Article 7 of the SCM 
Agreement).  See paragraph 1 of Annex V.    
1291 Paragraph 2 juncto 4 of Annex V of the SCM Agreement. 
PART II CHAPTER 5 – REMEDIES 
 
 
 246
to get insight in the value of total sales of the subsidized firms.1292,1293  Next, third country 
Members are, pursuant to Article 6.6 of the SCM Agreement, obliged to make available to the 
parties to a dispute and the panel ‘all relevant information that can be obtained as to the 
changes in market shares of the parties to the dispute as well as concerning prices of the 
products involved’.  Paragraph 3 of Annex V of the SCM Agreement further specifies this 
requirement and hereby aims at striking a balance between the need for parties in the dispute 
to obtain such information and the burden this could impose on third countries.  For example, 
information could be obtained through questionnaires but may not impose an unreasonable 
burden on third countries.1294  In case the subsidizing and/or third-country Member fail to 
cooperate, the claim of ‘serious prejudice’ will be decided on the basis of available 
evidence1295 and the panel should ‘draw adverse inferences’ from such failure when making 
its determination.1296 
 
This procedure stipulated in Annex V of the SCM Agreement could be used to gather 
information in case a ‘serious prejudice’-claim is formulated under Part III of the SCM 
Agreement.1297  In contrast, no such specific procedure is established to facilitate a prohibited 
subsidy claim (Part II of the SCM Agreement).  Nonetheless, the absence of such procedure 
does not seem to hamper information gathering in case a prohibited subsidy claim is 
introduced.1298  First, the Appellate Body has held that the panels’ authority to draw adverse 
inferences from non-cooperation, which is only explicitly provided under Annex V for 
                                                 
1292 Paragraph 2 of Annex V of the SCM Agreement. 
1293 Such a representative was designated in Korea – Commercial Vessels and Indonesia – Autos.  See 
Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, Attachment 1.  The representative in Korea – Commercial 
Vessels decided on several procedural questions raised under the Annex V procedure. 
1294 For further details, see paragraph 3 of Annex V of the SCM Agreement.  
1295 It is further specified that the panel could complete the record as necessary relying on best 
information otherwise available.  Paragraph 6 of Annex V of the SCM Agreement. 
1296 Such adverse inferences should be drawn from instances of non-cooperation by any party involved 
in the information-gathering process.  Paragraph 7 of Annex V of the SCM Agreement 
1297 See also Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 201.  It could be debated whether it also 
applies to other types of adverse effects (i.e., Article 5 (a) (injury to the domestic industry) and Article 
5 (b) (nullification and impairment)).  The title of Annex V specifically refers to cases of serious 
prejudice (‘Procedures for developing information concerning serious prejudice’) and the Appellate 
Body has observed that Annex V ‘deals with procedures for developing information about "serious 
prejudice" in cases involving actionable subsidies (…)’ (Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, 
para 201).  On the other hand, the text of paragraph 2 of Annex V refers in general terms to cases 
where matters are referred to the Dispute Settlement Body ‘under paragraph 4 of Article 7’.  Anyway, a 
complaining Member could also simply open the procedure of Annex V by bringing an additional 
claim of serious prejudice and use this information for its other claims of adverse effects.    
1298 The reason why no such specific procedure is elaborated regarding prohibited subsidies might be 
that no adverse effects should be demonstrated in case of prohibited subsidies.  Yet, the information 
gathering procedure could still be relevant, for example, to demonstrate the presence of a ‘subsidy’ 
under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. 
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actionable subsidies, a fortiori applies to claims of prohibited subsidies.1299  Second, the Panel 
in Korea – Commercial Vessels considered that it could seek the very same information 
relevant for a prohibited subsidy claim (e.g., existence of subsidy) on the basis of Article 13.1 
of the DSU (i.e., right to seek information).  Because the information would thus be obtained 
anyway, the same Panel decided that information gathered under the Annex V procedure 
could also be used by the complaining Member for supporting its claim under Part II 
(prohibited subsidy).1300   
 
5.1.3. Implementation standard and remedies in case of non-implementation  
The SCM Agreement contains specific legal implementation obligations and remedies in case 
a successful subsidy claim has been formulated.  On both aspects, the SCM Agreement 
differentiates between prohibited and actionable subsidy violations. 
 
5.1.3.1. Prohibited subsidies 
5.1.3.1.1. Implementation 
If the measure is found to be a prohibited subsidy, the subsidizing Member has to ‘withdraw 
the subsidy without delay’.1301  In particular, the panel has to specify the time period within 
which the measure must be withdrawn. The subsidizing Member is thus not given ‘a 
reasonable period of time’ to bring its measure in conformity with WTO rules, as is the case 
under the DSU.  Moreover, the subsidizing Member has no other options than to withdraw the 
subsidy, whereas the DSU leaves it upon the losing party to determine how to bring its 
measure into compliance with WTO law.1302   
Obviously, such compliance cannot be achieved by simply replacing the original subsidy with 
another subsidy found to be prohibited.1303  Yet, a highly sensitive issue is whether the term 
‘withdraw’ may encompass repayments of previously granted prohibited subsidies.  The Panel 
in Australia – Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5 – US), a case involving a one-time, non-
recurring prohibited subsidy from Australia to a private company, adopted such an extensive 
interpretation and required that the subsidy had to be repaid in full by the private company.1304  
                                                 
1299 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 202; Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, 
para 7.162. 
1300 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.3-7.5.  
1301 Article 4.6 of the SCM Agreement. 
1302 Compare Article 19.1 of the DSU and Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement. 
1303 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC II), para 83.  See also below n 1357. 
1304 Panel Report, Australia – Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5 – US).  For a critical appraisal of this 
Panel Report, see G. Goh and A. Ziegler, ‘Retrospective Remedies in the WTO After Automotive 
Leather’, 6:3 Journal of International Economic Law (2003), 545–564. 
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A central motivation of the Panel was to uphold the effectiveness of the multilateral remedy if 
a one-time prohibited subsidy is provided: 
 
If we were to accept the conclusion that ‘withdraw the subsidy’ does not encompass 
repayment, then that recommendation, far from providing a remedy for violations of Article 
3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, would grant full absolution to Members who grant export 
subsidies that are fully disbursed to the recipient before a recommendation to withdraw the 
subsidy is issued in dispute settlement, and for which the export contingency is entirely in the 
past.1305 
 
Indeed, otherwise WTO Members could easily circumvent the stringent disciplines on 
prohibited subsidies by providing non-recurring subsidies. However, it is argued that this 
interpretation constitutes a departure from the general principle that WTO law only provides 
for prospective remedies, as Article 19.1 of the DSU is generally interpreted.1306 Moreover, 
the obligation to repay past subsidies might pose constitutional and democratic problems in 
some legal systems of WTO Members.1307  Lastly, Waincymer remarks that it is extremely 
unlikely that negotiators during the Uruguay Round would have intended to have this niche 
area of retroactive remedies.1308  It therefore comes as no surprise that many WTO Members 
criticized this interpretation of the Panel.1309  In the Doha Round, Australia proposed 
clarifying the concept of ‘withdrawal’ and, interestingly, its most recent contribution would 
allow for repayment of the ongoing benefit since the adoption of the panel report.1310  Yet, no 
amendment along these lines is inscribed in the latest Draft Consolidated Chair Text.1311 
 
5.1.3.1.2. Remedy in case of non-implementation 
If the recommendation of the DSB to withdraw the subsidy is not followed within an 
indicated time frame, the injured party may request to take appropriate countermeasures 
(Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement).1312  In contrast, the DSU uses the concept of 
                                                 
1305 Panel Report, Australia – Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5 – US), para 6.38.  See also Panel 
Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, para 7.170. 
1306 Article 19.1 of the DSU requires a Panel or the Appellate Body to ‘recommend that the Member 
concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement’ (emphasis added). This provision 
does not explicitly state that only prospective remedies are covered. 
1307 See Goh and Ziegler, above n 1304, at 555–559. 
1308 See J. Waincymer, WTO Litigation – Procedural Aspects of Formal Dispute Settlement (London: 
Cameron May, 2002), 935 pp., at 644–645. 
1309 This criticism was expressed in the DSB meeting adopting the Panel Report. See also Goh and 
Ziegler, above n 1304, at 547–548. 
1310 See Communication from Australia, Subsidies: Withdrawal of a subsidy (TN/RL/GEN/115/Rev.1, 
24 January 2007). 
1311 Draft Consolidated Chair Text, above n 643. 
1312 The complaining party could request the DSB to authorize the adoption of ‘appropriate’ 
countermeasures but the defending could refer the matter to arbitration, for example, if it disagrees that 
the proposed level is appropriate (Article 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement juncto Article 22.6 of 
the DSU).  The party objecting to the proposed countermeasures (i.e., defending party) bears the initial 
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equivalence (see Article 22.4 of the DSU) and Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement on remedies 
in the context of actionable subsidies uses the concept of ‘commensurate with (...) the adverse 
effects’.  In a footnote, the SCM Agreement clarifies, seemingly superfluously, that it is not 
meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate.1313  It does, however, not indicate 
whether the amount of countermeasures should be based on the amount of the subsidy or on 
the amount of the injury to the complaining party (i.e., trade effect).  Whereas the Arbitrators 
in the first three cases confronted with this question opted for the ‘amount of the subsidy’-
approach, the Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton explicitly changed track towards a ‘trade 
effect’-approach. 
 
Indeed, in the first arbitration dealing with this issue, the Arbitrator1314 in Brazil – Aircraft had 
decided that an amount of countermeasures that corresponds to the total amount of the 
subsidy is appropriate when dealing with a prohibited export subsidy.1315  To reach this 
finding, it stressed the different purpose with respect to countermeasures under the DSU: 
 
The purpose of Article 4 is to achieve the withdrawal of the prohibited subsidy. In this respect, 
we consider that the requirement to withdraw a prohibited subsidy is of a different nature than 
removal of the specific nullification or impairment caused to a Member by the measure. The 
former aims at removing a measure which is presumed under the WTO Agreement to cause 
negative trade effects, irrespective of who suffers those trade effects and to what extent. The 
latter aims at eliminating the effects of a measure on the trade of a given Member.1316 
 
So, the different nature of prohibited subsidies, as prohibited per se by the SCM Agreement 
and not conditioned upon a ‘trade effects’-test, would legitimize countermeasures based on 
the full subsidy amount and not confined to the actual injury caused to the complaining party. 
Otherwise, if the injury is substantially lower than the subsidy, ‘a countermeasure (…) will 
have less or no inducement effect and the subsidizing country may not withdraw the measure 
at issue’.1317  At the same time, the Arbitrator recognized that ‘given that export subsidies 
usually operate with a multiplying effect (a given amount allows a company to make a 
number of sales, thus gaining a foothold in a given market with the possibility to expand and 
gain market shares)’, a calculation based on trade effects could very well produce higher 
                                                                                                                                            
burden to establish a prima facie case or presumption that the countermeasures are not appropriate.  
See Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), paras 2.8-2.9.  
1313 Article 4.10, footnote 9 (and 10) of the SCM Agreement.  See also Decision by the Arbitrators, 
Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), para 3.51.  The Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton found 
support in this footnote for its trade effect approach, whereas the Arbitrator in US – FSC found support 
that countermeasures should not be limited to trade effects (see below n 1332).   
1314 See Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement. 
1315 Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), para 3.60.  
1316 Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), para 3.48 (footnotes deleted; 
emphasis in the original). 
1317 Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), para 3.54.  The Arbitrators 
also rejected the claim that such an amount of countermeasures would be punitive (para 3.55). 
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figures than one based exclusively on the subsidy amount.1318  Likewise, the Arbitrators in US 
– FSC and Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees based countermeasures on the amount of 
the subsidy. 1319 Interestingly, the Arbitrator in US – FSC addressed a number of complex 
issues raised by this interpretation. What if there are multiple complainants, each seeking to 
take countermeasures in an amount equal to the value of the subsidy?  Or, what if another 
WTO Member, subsequent to the challenge by the EC of the FSC measures, aimed to 
challenge the same measure? In the case of multiple complainants, the Arbitrator said that 
‘this would certainly have been taken into account’ in the determination of the 
appropriateness of the countermeasures, and thus implicitly indicated that an amount equal to 
the value of the subsidy for each WTO Member would be considered inappropriate.  With 
regard to the second hypothetical situation, the Arbitrator realized that the ‘allocation issue 
would arise’ and cited the EC’s statement indicating that it would ‘voluntarily agree to 
remove some of its countermeasures so as to provide more scope for another WTO Member 
to be authorized to do the same’.1320  In concluding, the Arbitrator in US – FSC emphasized 
that its finding did not affect the right of other complainants to subsequently request 
countermeasures.1321 
 
In line with this case law, both parties in US – Upland Cotton had taken recourse to the 
‘amount of the subsidy’-approach.  Nonetheless, the Arbitrator shifted towards the ‘trade 
effect’ upon the complainant as basis to calculate the level of countermeasures.1322  The 
Arbitrator reached this conclusion on the basis of the legal requirement that countermeasures 
should be ‘appropriate’.1323  In its view, this would suggest that ‘there should be a degree of 
relationship between the level of countermeasures and the trade-distorting impact of the 
measure on the complaining Member’ and, even though this is not entirely impossible, ‘in 
most cases, the trade-distorting impact of the subsidy on one or several other Members would 
                                                 
1318 The Arbitrator seemed to suggest that this would be so in the case at hand.  Decision by the 
Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), para 3.54.  
1319 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), paras 5.41, 5.49, 6.33 (footnote 84), and 
6.35; Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 – Canada), 
para 3.52. 
1320 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), para 6.29. 
1321 Yet, the Arbitrator indirectly included a message for a potential future Arbitrator: ‘(…) it need only 
be stated that there is, in our view, no reason to presume that an arbitrator who might be required to 
address such a complaint in future would not take into account all the relevant factors in determining 
what might, at the time it is ruling, constitute ‘appropriate countermeasures’ in such future case’. 
Hereby, the Arbitrator referred to its findings in para 6.29, including to the EC’s statement cited in that 
paragraph.  Decision by the Arbitrator, US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), para 6.63. 
1322 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), paras 
4.121-4.138, 4.173-4.181. 
1323 Further, this was also based on footnote 9, which stipulates that countermeasures should not be 
‘disproportionate’ (see below n 1332).  Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – 
US) (prohibited subsidies), paras 4.135, 4.136. 
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not necessarily bear any particular relationship to the amount of the subsidy’.1324  Even if ‘the 
subsidy amount’-approach might seem attractive from a calculation perspective, the difficulty 
to measure trade effects upon the complaining Member should not withhold future arbitrators 
to undertake this exercise.1325  Arbitrators should not reach a precise quantification of the 
actual trade effect but have the flexibility to accept approximations they feel to be within the 
bounds of what is appropriate in the case at hand.1326   
 
The Arbitrator was well aware that previous arbitrators had taken a different approach, but, at 
the same time, noticed that they did not exclude trade effects as a relevant consideration.1327  
Indeed, the Arbitrators in US – FSC and Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees did not 
preclude that the level of countermeasures calculated on the basis of the subsidy amount could 
be modified upward in case adverse trade effects upon the complainant would be higher.1328  
As indicated above, they recognized that the injury to the complainant might very well be 
higher than the subsidy amount in certain cases.1329  Yet, these previous Arbitrators 
fundamentally differed from the Arbitrator’s position in US – Upland Cotton in their 
conclusion that countermeasures should not be constrained to trade effects in case the subsidy 
amount turns out to be larger.  They found no such limitation in Article 4 of the SCM 
Agreement and considered that such approach could undermine the inducement effect of 
countermeasures.1330  By reading into Article 4.9 (‘appropriate’)1331 and its footnote (‘not be 
                                                 
1324Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), paras 
4.135-4.136 (emphasis added).  It could thus not be assumed that the ‘amount of the subsidy’ is an 
accurate proxy for the trade effect of a measure (para 4.135).  The Arbitrator cited the Arbitrator in US 
– FSC: ‘the proxy approach proposed by the United States is based on no particular economic rationale.  
It simply assumes a one-to-one correspondence of dollar of subsidy to dollar of trade impact.  This is 
manifestly arbitrary’.  Decision by the Arbitrator, US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), para 6.39; Decision by 
the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), para 4.169; Decision by 
the Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), footnote 53.  As explained below, the 
Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton, nonetheless, used the amount of the subsidy as a proxy for part of 
the trade effect (i.e., the price effect of the export subsidies).  
1325 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), paras 
4.134, 4.137. 
1326 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), para 
4.137. 
1327 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), para 
4.133. 
1328 ‘The expression "appropriate countermeasures", in our view, would entitle the complaining 
Member to countermeasures which would at least counter the injurious effect of the persisting illegal 
measure on it’. See Decision by the Arbitrator, US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), para 5.21; Decision by the 
Arbitrator, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 – Canada), paras 3.63, 3.114-3.116.  
See also Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), 
footnote 182. 
1329 Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), para 3.54; Decision by the 
Arbitrator, US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), footnotes 84, 88. 
1330 ‘(…) (I)t does not require trade effects to be the effective standard by which the appropriateness of 
countermeasures should be ascertained. Nor can the relevant provisions be interpreted to limit the 
assessment to this standard’.  See Decision by the Arbitrator, US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), para 5.41 
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disproportionate’)1332 an obligation to relate countermeasures to the trade-distorting impact 
upon the complainant, the Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton foreclosed an upward adaption of 
the level of countermeasures when the trade effect upon the complainant turns out to be lower 
than the subsidy amount.  To paraphrase previous case law, such an interpretation does in my 
view ‘effectively read the specific language’ of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement ‘out of the 
text’.1333  Indeed, it largely equates the level of ‘appropriate’ countermeasures in the context 
of prohibited subsidies to the level explicitly foreseen in the context of actionable subsidy 
claims.  The latter refers to countermeasures ‘commensurate with the degree and nature of the 
adverse effects’.1334  This difference in wording should be given meaning an sich.  Moreover, 
the dissimilarity in wording suggests that in case ‘negotiators have intended to limit 
countermeasures to the effect caused by the subsidy on a Member's trade, they have used 
different terms than "appropriate countermeasures"’.1335  In contrast, the only difference 
between the level of countermeasures in the context of prohibited subsidies and those in the 
context of actionable subsidies (or other WTO contexts) is, in the reading of the Arbitrator in 
US – Upland Cotton, that arbitrators would have somewhat more flexibility to calculate the 
trade effect when confronted with prohibited subsidies.1336  Hence, they might more easily 
adopt assumptions that would overestimate the trade effect upon the complainant.  
Apparently, any difference between both sets of countermeasures would simply result from 
the inaccuracy of the economic modeling exercise to calculate the trade effect upon the 
complainant.  It seems highly doubtful that this was the differentiation intended by 
                                                                                                                                            
(emphasis in the original).  The concern of eroding the inducement effect was expressed by Decision 
by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), para 3.54. 
1331 The same reference is made in Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement. 
1332 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), para 
4.135.  Footnotes 9 reads that ‘(t)his expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are 
disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited’ 
(emphasis added).  The latter part could be understood in two opposing ways.  On the one hand, it 
could mean that countermeasures should not be disproportionate simply because they are prohibited in 
nature.  In this reading, apparently adopted by the Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton (see above n 
1323), footnote 9 would rather limit the amount of countermeasures that one might consider 
appropriate on the basis of the text of Article 4.10 itself.  On the other hand, according to the Arbitrator 
in US – FSC, it means that, in determining whether countermeasures are disproportionate, it should be 
taken into account that these are prohibited and have to be withdrawn.  In this reading, footnote 9 
would rather underscore the difference with countermeasures in the context of actionable subsidies.  
Decision by the Arbitrator, US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), paras 5.15-5.27, 5.30, 5.43, 5.62. 
1333 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), para 5.62. 
1334 Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.  As indicated below, the Arbitrator in some instances accepted 
assumptions that would likely overestimate the real trade effect upon the complainant because it was 
dealing with countermeasures in the context of prohibited subsidies.  Yet, the same Arbitrator also 
adopted such ‘overestimating’ assumptions in the context of actionable subsidies (see below Part II, 
Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3.2.2).   
1335 Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), para 3.49; see also Decision 
by the Arbitrator, US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), paras 5.32, 5.48. 
1336 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), paras 
4.22, 4.107, 4.119; Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) 
(actionable subsidies), para 4.55. 
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negotiators.  Lastly, a higher level of countermeasures in case of prohibited subsidies also 
corresponds to the general stricter stance on these subsidies under the SCM Agreement.  It 
relates the level of countermeasures to the gravity of the wrongful act.1337  For all these 
reasons, the previous case law seems to be on more solid grounds in their conclusion that 
countermeasures should not be limited to the trade effect upon the complainant.  Nonetheless, 
the ‘trade effect’-approach endorsed by the Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton merits some 
further scrutiny as future arbitrators will likely align themselves to this new approach. 
 
In implementing this ‘trade effect’-approach, the Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton explained 
that, similar to any export subsidy, the subsidized export credit support could be expected to 
affect both the volume of trade and the price at which trade takes place.1338  By stimulating 
additional US exports and inflating the price in target markets, such ‘illegally subsidized 
competition’ generates ‘adverse effects upon producers and exporters in the rest of the 
world’.1339  They will lose sales to US subsidized competitors in the target markets (i.e., 
volume effect) and will have to sell their remaining sales at the depressed price in these 
markets (i.e., price effect).  Here, the Arbitrator clarified that the economic damage upon the 
complainant will not be based on the welfare effects caused by the export subsidies (i.e., how 
much does it make the complainant worse off in welfare terms) but on their allocation effects 
(i.e., the potential amount and value of trade affected by the export subsidy).1340   
To calculate the volume effect, the displacement of both domestic production and third 
country exports was measured on the basis of the additional US exports that were generated 
by the subsidy programme.  Equating displacement with additional exports assumed that US 
export subsidies did not create additional demand.1341  Turning to the price effect, the 
Arbitrator decided to take the subsidy amount (i.e., the interest rate subsidy1342) as a proxy of 
                                                 
1337 For a detailed elaboration of this argument, see Decision by the Arbitrator, US – FSC (Article 22.6 – 
US), paras 5.22-5.24, 5.39-5.41, 5.61. 
1338 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), para 
4.183. 
1339 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), para 
4.183. 
1340 The Arbitrator justified this focus by pointing to the fact that countermeasures will be in the form 
of the suspension of an amount of trade and that ‘trade effects arise in response to the reallocation of 
resources’ induced by export subsidies.  Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – 
US) (prohibited subsidies), footnote 212. 
1341 The Arbitrator considered that such additional demand would likely be relatively small but 
acknowledged that to the extent it occurs, the measurement of additionality would overestimate the 
displacement.  See Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited 
subsidies), para 4.191.  
1342 The subsidy amount of the export credit guarantees was calculated on the basis of the Ohlin model 
(Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), paras 
4.209, 4.232, 4.233).  For more information on this model, see also OECD, An Analysis of Officially 
Supported Export Credits in Agriculture (COM/AGR/TD/WP(2000)91/FINAL, 2001), 62 pp., at 34-
36. 
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the global revenue loss due to the price effect.  Here, it was well aware that this was only a 
rude proxy, which would very likely overestimate the actual loss.1343  Because the Arbitrator 
decided that countermeasures should be equivalent to the trade-distorting impact upon the 
complainant (i.e., Brazil), the figures of both the volume and price effect were apportioned to 
Brazil’s market share.1344  Adding the price effect and volume effect upon Brazil, the 
Arbitrator reached a level of nearly $150 million.   
To reach this conclusion, the Arbitrator in essence relied upon the calculations made by Brazil 
for its claim based on the subsidy amount.  Brazil had argued that the subsidized export credit 
support conferred a double benefit: an interest rate subsidy (IRS), affording foreign importers 
discounted financing, and ‘additionality benefits’, affording US exporters greater export 
quantities than under market conditions (additionality).1345  Rightly refuting that these could 
be considered as distinct benefits,1346 the Arbitrator tactfully used both elements for its trade 
effect calculation: the IRS as proxy for the price effect and additionality as measurement of 
the volume effect.  By subsequently apportioning these trade effects to the market share of the 
complainant, the final level of countermeasures was substantially lower than the calculation 
based on the full subsidy amount.  To fit the subsidy amount calculations into its trade effect 
approach, the Arbitrator was well aware that it had to adopt a set of rather unrealistic 
assumptions.  In this regard, it emphasized the latitude in calculating the appropriate level of 
countermeasures because non-implementation of a prohibited subsidy finding was at stake.1347   
 
In concluding, it should be highlighted that all arbitrators agreed that the purpose of 
countermeasures under Article 4 of the SCM Agreement is, as under the DSU,1348 to induce 
                                                 
1343 The set of assumptions was: (i) 100 per cent pass-through of the interest rate subsidy; (2) the export 
guarantee programme has no effect on the world market price (but only on domestic prices in the target 
markets); (3) the GSM-supported sales substitute on a one-to-one basis for either domestic production 
or unsubsidized imports; and (4) the supply curve of other supplies and the demand curve are perfectly 
inelastic and not responsive to price.  Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – 
US) (prohibited subsidies), paras 4.196-4.198. 
1344 To be precise, no apportionment was made for the trade-distorting impact on Brazil’s domestic 
market because it was assumed that all adverse effects occurred to domestic producers (and not to 
importers).  Only the adverse effects in third markets were thus apportioned using Brazil’s share of 
world trade. 
1345 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), paras 
4.139-4.147. 
1346 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), paras 
4.147-4.148, footnote 199.  In my view, the benefits presented by Brazil are indeed two sides of the 
same coin: the IRS to foreign importers generates the additional sales for US exporters.  For the trade 
effect approach adopted by the Arbitrator, both could very well be used as proxies for different types of 
adverse effects upon foreign competitors (i.e., price effect and volume effect) if a set of assumptions is 
accepted.   
1347 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), paras 
4.192, 4.198, 4.201. 
1348 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Suspension, para. 309; Report by the Arbitrator, EC – 
Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), para 6.3. 
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compliance.1349  Hence, the objective of countermeasures is not to compensate the 
complainant for non-compliance but, instead, to induce the subsidizing Member to withdraw 
the condemned export subsidies.1350  Noteworthy, the Arbitrator in Canada – Aircraft Credits 
and Guarantees specified that its purpose is not to induce the complainant to deter the 
payment of prohibited subsidies in the future, and thus beyond those that were found 
prohibited by the panels and Appellate Body (deterrent argument).1351  Although the 
Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton accepted that ‘inducing compliance’ is indeed the purpose 
of countermeasures under Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, it stressed that this purpose 
should not have an impact on the level of countermeasures that may be permissible.1352  The 
Arbitrator did not share the concern that the purpose of inducing compliance would be 
undermined if countermeasures are confined to trade effects in case these are substantially 
lower than the amount of subsidies.1353   
The new approach adopted in the case law implies that the WTO dispute settlement system 
will present a less forceful and effective instrument for developing countries to challenge 
prohibited export subsidies.  Given their relatively low share in trade, the level of 
countermeasures might be insufficient to induce compliance upon the complainant in case 
they challenge prohibited export or local content subsidies.  Surely, this is similar to the level 
of countermeasures in case of non-implementation of other types of WTO obligations.  Yet, 
the ‘subsidy amount’-approach had the unique advantage that the level of countermeasures, 
and thus the inducement effect, did not depend on the market share of the complainant.1354  
This might be another argument why the ‘subsidy amount’-approach should not have been 
rejected.  
 
                                                 
1349 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), paras 5.52, 5.57; Decision by the 
Arbitrator, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 – Canada), paras 3.47-3.48; 
Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), paras 3.44, 3.54, 3.57 and 3.58. 
1350 For instance, the US unsuccessfully argued before the Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton that the 
purpose of countermeasures was to ‘rebalance rights and obligations’.  Decision by the Arbitrator, US – 
Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), para 4.108  
1351 Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, paras 3.108-3.113.     
1352 The Arbitrator observed that inducing compliance ‘appears rather to be the common purpose of 
retaliation measures in the WTO dispute settlement system (...)’.  In those other contexts, 
countermeasures are also not above the level of trade effects.  Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland 
Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), para 4.112.  See also Decision by the Arbitrator, US – 
FSC (Article 22.6 – US), para 5.60.  In contrast, the Arbitrator in in Canada – Aircraft Credits and 
Guarantees had increased (by 20 per cent) the level of countermeasures calculated on the basis of the 
amount of the subsidy in order to induce compliance because Canada had indicated that it did not intend 
to withdraw the export subsidy.  Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, 
paras 3.121-3.122.  
1353 Compare with Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), para 3.54. 
1354 At least insofar the trade effect upon the complainant was not higher than the amount of the 
subsidy. 
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5.1.3.2. Actionable subsidies 
5.1.3.2.1. Implementation 
The legal obligations upon the subsidizing country regarding actionable subsidies are 
somewhat less stringent.  Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement allows the respondent to choose 
among two implementation options.  It ‘shall take appropriate steps to remove the adverse 
effects or shall withdraw the subsidy’.1355  The subsidizing country is therefore not required to 
withdraw the subsidy as long as it removes its adverse effects, which should be done within 
six months from the date when the DSB adopts the panel or Appellate Body report.  
Implementation will thus normally require some positive action by the respondent Member so 
as to withdraw the subsidy or remove its adverse effects.1356  But such action is according to 
the Appellate Body not limited to subsidies granted in the past, and which formed the panel’s 
basis to reach the conclusion of serious prejudice.  In case of recurring annual payments, 
implementation extends to subsidies maintained after the time period examined by the panel, 
as long as they continue to have adverse effects.1357  A mere change in legal basis on which 
such subsidies are provided does not imply compliance.1358  
 
5.1.3.2.2. Remedy in case of non-implementation 
In case of non-compliance, the complainant could request authorization to take 
countermeasures ‘commensurate with the degree and the nature of the adverse effects’ 
(Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement).  Hence, the level of countermeasures can certainly not 
be based on the subsidy level.  In essence, this conforms to the new ‘trade effect’-approach 
regarding prohibited subsidies endorsed by the Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton.1359   
The level of countermeasures should correspond1360 to the degree (quantitative element) and 
nature (qualitative element; i.e., the specific type of adverse effects) of the adverse effects as 
                                                 
1355 Emphasis added.  See also Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), 
para 236. 
1356 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 237. 
1357 This interpretation is based on the wording ‘maintaining’ in Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement and 
on the argument that implementation could easily be circumvented by replacing old subsidies with new 
ones if only past subsidies would be covered. Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 
21.5 – Brazil), para 238.  The Appellate Body also drew a parallel with the withdrawal of prohibited 
subsidies as well as with CVDs investigations.  In the latter case, even though CVD determination is 
based on ‘the injury determined to exist in the past, the remedial measures are prospective’.  Appellate 
Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras 238-239. 
1358 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), paras 3.18-3.20. 
1359 The only difference between both sets of countermeasures seems that arbitrators would have more 
flexibility to round up in case of prohibited subsidies.  Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton 
(Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable subsidies), para 4.55. 
1360 Exact or precise equality is not required.  Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 
22.6 – United States) (actionable subsidies), para 4.39. 
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they present themselves in the case at hand.1361  Applied to the US – Upland Cotton case, the 
level of countermeasures was assessed in relation to the findings of significant price 
suppression (Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement).  In this regard, the Arbitrator held that 
not only the portion of price suppression resulting from subsidization that renders it 
‘significant’ is hereby captured but the entirety of price suppression.1362  The same Arbitrator 
also emphasized that only the impact upon the complaining Member and not upon the rest of 
the world should be considered.1363   
In sum, the level of countermeasure has to correspond to the adverse effects caused to the 
complaining WTO Member.  This implies that arbitrators cannot avoid quantification of the 
adverse effect caused by subsidization, which should be done sufficiently precise that 
corresponding countermeasures could be decided on.1364  To calculate the adverse effects 
upon Brazil of challenged US domestic cotton subsidies (i.e., marketing loans and 
countercyclical payments), the Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton simulated a counterfactual 
situation involving the permanent removal of these subsidies.  This would give an indication 
of what the world price and output levels would have been in case subsidies would have been 
removed and the compliance rulings would have been implemented.  A similar counterfactual 
analysis based on economic modeling has been suggested by several economists to properly 
conduct the causality determination under the ‘serious prejudice’-test (Article 6.3 of the SCM 
Agreement).1365  As explained above, the Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 
– Brazil) has likewise emphasized the relevance of such economic modeling to decide on a 
                                                 
1361 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), paras 4.40-4.48.  The clear difference in the wording with Article 4.10 of the SCM 
Agreement (prohibited subsidies) confirmed to the Arbitrators that ‘the terms of Article 7.9 (…) are 
intended to closely tailor, in all cases, the countermeasures to the legal basis for the underlying 
findings’. Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), paras 4.55. 
1362 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), paras 4.98-4.107.  The Arbitrator drew a correct parallel with the imposition of CVDS, 
which can only be imposed if subsidization is above a de minimis level (is below) but a positive 
determination thereof does not affect the level of CVDs that can subsequently be imposed.  Decision by 
the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable subsidies), para 4.107. 
1363 See also Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), paras 4.80-4.92. 
1364 As the US observed, this task is more demanding to the Arbitrator than at the panel and Appellate 
Body level: ‘the Arbitrator is asked to attach a number to the alleged significant price suppression 
caused by marketing loan and countercyclical payments.  Before, the question of significant price 
suppression could be answered in one word: either “yes” or “no”.  But the question for the Arbitrator is 
different, and more challenging’.  United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton (WT/DS267) – 
Arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 7.10 of the SCM Agreement, Oral Statement of 
the United States (3 March 2009), para 10. 
1365 See Vandenbussche, above n 1239, at 211-217; Steinberg and Josling, above n 1153, at 391-392 
and 402-408  It fits to the ‘but for’ interpretation of the causation standard under Article 6.3 of the 
SCM Agreement.  Sapir and Trachtman questioned the use of such calibrated models, but, at the same 
time, did not want to over-estimate the fact that these models are not tested. See Sapir and Trachtman, 
above n 1195, at 183-209, at 201-205. 
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‘serious prejudice’-claim.1366  For this reason as well, the Arbitrator’s quantification 
conducted in US – Upland Cotton deserves some further discussion. 
  
FIGURE 3: ADVERSE EFFECTS ON PRODUCERS IN THE REST OF THE WORLD1367 
 
Figure 3 was advanced by Brazil as a graphically illustration of the adverse effects caused by 
the challenged US domestic cotton subsidies on producers in the rest of the world.1368  The 
supply curve of a cotton producing country in the rest of the world is depicted and the US is 
considered a ‘large country’ in the production of cotton since changes in its output levels 
affect the world price of cotton (significant price suppression on the world market).  With the 
US domestic subsidies in place (i.e., the actual situation), the world price is at P and Q is the 
quantity produced by the cotton producing country in question.  Without the US subsidies 
(i.e., the counterfactual situation), the world price would be higher (P’; Figure 3), which 
would induce the producing country in question to produce more cotton (Q’; Figure 3).  On 
this basis, Brazil disentangled two types of adverse effects caused by the suppression of the 
cotton world market price, namely a so-called ‘sales value effect’ (A; Figure 3) and ‘reduced 
production effect’ (B + C; Figure 3).  In this respect, the Arbitrator accurately observed that 
the sum of both effects is larger than the total negative effect on producer welfare in the rest 
of the world.1369  Indeed, the loss in ‘producer surplus’ in the actual situation (i.e., subsidy 
situation) is represented by the sum of the areas A and B.  Area A represents the loss of 
selling the actual level of cotton (Q; Figure 3) at a suppressed price (P; Figure 3) and area B 
represents the loss of not producing an additional quantity of cotton (Q’ - Q; Figure 3).  Area 
C, on the other hand, represents the opportunity cost of the resources that would be needed to 
produce such additional quantity of cotton (Q’ - Q; Figure 3).  In the actual situation (i.e., 
                                                 
1366 See above Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.2.2.3.  
1367 This figure was presented by Brazil in the Arbitration procedure and included in the final report.  
Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable subsidies), 
para 4.128. 
1368 These covered marketing loans and countercyclical payments. 
1369 See above Part I, Chapter 1. 
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subsidy situation), these resources are employed elsewhere in the economy and therefore do 
not represent a cost to the rest of the world.  Hence, the adverse effects calculated by Brazil 
were larger than the loss in producer welfare.  Importantly, the Arbitrator accepted that 
adverse effects may have a wider meaning than producer surplus and found support thereto in 
the text of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement, in particular in its reference to ‘lost 
sales’.1370  Notice that the effect on consumer welfare is not considered relevant at all since 
the focus of Part III on actionable subsidies is confined to adverse effects on foreign 
producers.  Under the perfect market assumption, the overall benefit to foreign consumers’ 
welfare resulting from the suppressed cotton price would be larger than the loss upon foreign 
producers’ welfare (A + B; Figure 3).  This could also be seen in Figure 4, in which the 
information of Figure 3 is integrated in the right hand side.1371 
                                                 
1370 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), para 4.129.  Yet, the ‘lost sales’ concept rather seems to be an alternative type of adverse 
effects under Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement.   
1371 The change in welfare to the rest of the world is the sum of the changes in consumer surplus (+a*, 
+b*,+d*,+e*,+f*; Figure 4) and producer surplus (-a*,-b*; Figure 4) and is thus positive (+d*,+e*,+f*; 
Figure 4).  Observe that areas c* and d* in Figure 4 (which are depicted as area C in Figure 3) are not 
part of the producer welfare calculus.   
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Turning to the effective calculation of the adverse effects (+A, +B, +C in Figure 3; +a*, 
+b*,+c*,+d* in Figure 4), the Arbitrator agreed with the use of a demand and supply log-
linear displacement model proposed by Brazil.  This would quantify percentage changes (e.g., 
in the world market price) from an initial baseline equilibrium in which all cotton subsidies 
are in place.  Both parties, however, fundamentally disagreed on the value of key parameters 
to be used in the model.1372  Evidently, Brazil defended parameters that maximized the 
adverse effect resulting from US subsidization (+A, +B, +C in Figure 3; +a*, +b*,+c*,+d* in 
Figure 4), whereas the US took the opposite view.  Their difference in arguments could be 
illustrated on the basis of Figure 4, which disentangles the effect of the removal of US 
subsidization on the US market and the rest of the world.  EUS represents the actual US export 
curve of cotton (with the initial world equilibrium price PW and output QTRADE) and E’US 
represents the counterfactual situation in which US domestic subsidies are removed.  The 
removal of challenged US domestic cotton subsidies would thus shift the US supply curve 
upward (from SUS to S’US ), generating also a shift in the US export supply curve (from EUS to 
E’US ).  Hence, a new equilibrium would emerge with a higher world market price (P’W) and 
lower trade level between the US and the rest of the world (Q’TRADE). 
     
A preliminary question was the choice of the reference period to conduct this counterfactual 
analysis.  Obviously, this was not a trivial question given that not only the level of subsidies 
but also their impact could, as the Arbitrator recognized, very well vary over time depending 
on economic or other factors.  Brazil, on the one hand, proposed marketing year (MY) 2005 
as this marked the end of the implementation period, whereas the US suggested that average 
prices of the last three years (MY 2005-2007) would be more representative.  Both parties had 
a clear interest in suggesting their respective reference period because the cotton price was 
much higher in the MY 2006 and 2007 than in MY 2005, which implied inter alia that 
countercyclical payments were lower in the latter two years.  The Arbitrator agreed with 
Brazil that the end of the implementation period is in ‘principle legitimate’, certainly in this 
case because the price in MY 2005 corresponded to the prices covered by the findings of the 
panels.1373  Hence, MY 2005 was taken as reference period, even though it should be noted 
that the objective according to the Arbitrator is to fix an amount of countermeasures that 
corresponds to ‘the actual continued adverse effects of the measure’ in the future.1374  In 
                                                 
1372 The Arbitrator observed that the US also employed the same model but only disagreed on the used 
parameters and that the compliance panel had used the simulations of the model to support its finding.  
See Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), paras 4.130-4.134. 
1373 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), para 4.118. 
1374 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), para 4.117. 
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principle, countermeasures should therefore not correspond to the level of adverse effects 
under the past period covered by the panel proceedings.          
With regard to the parameters to be included in the model, Brazil proposed numbers that 
maximized the adverse effects of subsidization in MY 2005, whereas the US adduced 
arguments for the opposite.  A pivotal element was the value of the different supply and 
demand elasticities, which indicate the responsiveness of respectively production and demand 
to a change in price.  The higher the elasticity, the greater the percentage increase (decrease) 
in cotton supply (demand) for a given increase in the world price of cotton.  The Arbitrator 
accorded with Brazil to use short-term elasticities – which are relatively more inelastic – as 
this recognized that consumers as well as producers in the rest of the world would incur 
adjustment costs when subsidies would be removed.1375  As it would take time for consumers 
and producers to fully adjust to the removal of subsidies and these adjustment costs were 
partly due to subsidization itself (e.g., the low world price induced low investment levels), the 
use of short-term elasticities was considered appropriate.1376  Next, the Arbitrator also agreed 
with all Brazil’s suggested elasticities, which were relatively (i.e., compared to the US 
figures) inelastic for US demand (DUS; Figure 4), the ‘rest of the world’-demand (DROW; 
Figure 4), supply in the rest of the world (SROW; Figure 4) but elastic for US supply (SUS; 
Figure 4).1377  Hence, in case of removal of US domestic subsidies, the market would, in 
relative terms, respond as follows: US producers would largely cut back their level of 
production due to the lower price they receive (P’W < PW + S; Figure 4), whereas total demand 
as well as supply in the rest of the world subsidies would in the short run only moderately 
react to the higher world market price (P’W; Figure 4) by, respectively, decreasing 
consumption and increasing production.  The Arbitrator had found support in the economic 
research for Brazil’s proposed elasticities, though it admitted that ‘this is not by any means 
overwhelming’.1378  Next to elasticities, another important parameter was the coupling factor, 
                                                 
1375 The Arbitrator defined the long-run and short-run as follows:  
‘The long-run essentially refers to a situation where all adjustments by producers, consumers, 
and owners of factors of production to the given change have been completed and the market has 
settled down to a (long-run) equilibrium. The short-run refers to a situation, which could be one 
of (short-run) equilibrium, where the process of adjustment by producers, consumers and owners 
of factors of production has not been fully completed. This less than complete adjustment in the 
economy may be the result of certain rigidities in the market or simply that it takes time for 
producers to re-allocate resources’.   
Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable subsidies), 
para 4.144. 
1376 See Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), paras 4.144-4.147. 
1377 This is illustrated in Figure 4 by depicting relatively steep curves for DUS, DROW and SROW and a 
relatively flat curve for SUS.  The proposed elasticities of respectively Brazil and the US were: DUS (-
0.20, -0.82); DROW (-0.20,-0.39); SROW (0.20, 0.33); SUS (0,80, 0.21). 
1378 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), para 4.162. 
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which refers to the production stimulation effect that a subsidy has relative to revenue from 
the market.1379  Although the Arbitrator acknowledged that there was ‘hardly any econometric 
evidence’ estimating the coupling factor for countercyclical cotton payments, it again 
accorded with Brazil’s suggested coupling factor.1380  Finally, it was considered relevant that 
farmers’ production decisions are based on expectations on the cotton price at the end of the 
year.1381  Given that subsidy amounts also varied with the cotton price, expectations on cotton 
prices triggered expectations on the level of subsidies that would be received.  Because 
statistical analysis showed that forecasts based on future cotton prices, as suggested by the 
US, were more accurate than those based on lagged prices, as proposed by Brazil, the 
Arbitrator opted for the inclusion of future cotton prices in the model.1382  
On the basis of these parameters (i.e., elasticities, coupling factor, price expectations), the 
Arbitrator rerun the log-linear displacement model and found that the world price would have 
been higher by 9.38% in the counterfactual ‘no-subsidy’-situation.  Furthermore, total adverse 
effects of those subsidies in MY 2005 on the rest of the world (+A, +B, +C in Figure 3; +a*, 
+b*,+c*,+d* in Figure 4) were estimated on $2.905 billion.1383  Given that Brazil’s share of 
cotton production in the rest of the world was 5.1% in MY 2005, the level of countermeasures 
considered commensurate with the degree and nature of adverse effects upon Brazil was 
determined on $147.3 million.1384 
 
This Arbitrator’s decision in US – Upland Cotton offers an interesting example on how 
economic models could be used to quantify the trade effects of subsidization.  This enabled 
                                                 
1379 Countercyclical payments were decoupled from actual production levels.  Instead, such payments 
were based on historical base area and historical programme yield.  Contrary to the other type of 
domestic subsidies (i.e., marketing loans), one extra dollar of subsidies in the form of countercyclical 
payments therefore generated a lower production incentive than a dollar rise in the market price, 
implying that its coupling factor is lower than one. 
1380 Brazil proposed a coupling factor of 0.4, which was evidently higher than the figure suggested by 
the US (0.25).  A relatively high coupling factor would graphically be reflected in a large upward shift 
in the US supply curve (from SUS to S’US; Figure 4) in case of removal of the cotton subsidies.  
Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable subsidies), 
paras 4.164-4.178. 
1381 Cotton production decisions are made in the beginning of the calendar year but marketing only 
starts at the end of the year. 
1382 The Arbitrator requested the parties to provide the root mean square error (RMSE) of their 
forecasts, and this was lower if future prices were used.  Another reason for accepting expectations 
about future prices was that the one-year lagged prices are not known at the moment farmers make 
their production decision.  See Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United 
States) (actionable subsidies), paras 4.186-4192. 
1383 This consisted of a sales value effect (+A in Figure 3; +a* in Figure 4) of $2.384 billion and 
reduced production effects (+B, +C in Figure 3; +b*,+c*,+d* in Figure 4) of $521.5 million.  See 
Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable subsidies), 
para 4.193. 
1384 See Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), para. 4.195.  Recall that the Arbitrator had decided that only the amount of adverse effects 
upon the complaining party should be taken into consideration for determining the level of 
countermeasures. 
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the Arbitrator to figure out that the price suppressing effect of US cotton subsidies amounted 
to nearly 10 per cent.  As mentioned above, several scholars have called for the use of such 
economic modeling to establish the causation element under the ‘serious prejudice’ threshold 
of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement.1385  In light of this plea, two relevant aspects of the 
Arbitrator’s decision should be highlighted in conclusion.   
First, the model used by the Arbitrator is what is called by economists a ‘calibrated model’, in 
which specific assumptions are made about the equilibrium process that links these variables 
in a specific way, without empirically testing their validity.1386  Although the basic 
characteristics of the model could therefore be questioned, the Arbitrator was confident to rely 
on the demand and supply log-linear displacement model proposed by Brazil because the US 
had likewise employed this model (with its own set of parameters) and the compliance panel 
had used simulations of the model to support its findings.1387   
Second, the parameter choice (e.g., elasticities, coupling factor, price expectations) included 
in the model was, as illustrated above, subject to strong disagreement among the parties.  
Importantly, the economic studies on which both relied widely varied in their calculations of 
these parameters.  For example, the adverse effects upon Brazil on the basis of US 
calculations in the same model were five times smaller than the Arbitrator’s figure ($30.4 
million instead of $147.5).  Overall, the Arbitrator relied on Brazil’s values, not so much 
because economic studies were on average in line with those values, but because the use in 
some studies of these values implied that they were not inappropriate.1388  Although the 
Arbitrator held that there was less flexibility to calculate countermeasures under actionable 
subsidy than prohibited subsidy claims,1389 the parameters proposed by the complaining 
member were still accepted as long as it was not demonstrated that they were inappropriate or 
inadequate.  On the other hand, the burden of making a prima facie case under Article 6.3 of 
the SCM Agreement rests on the complaining Member.  This suggests that less leeway will be 
given to the parameters proposed by the complaining party.  At the same time, the standard 
under Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement only requires that price suppression is ‘significant’, 
which might very well be the case also on the basis of the defendant’s parameters.  For 
                                                 
1385 See above n 1365. 
1386 For this reason, Sapir and Trachtman have questioned the results of the calibrated model presented 
to the compliance panel because such model assumes that there is a positive relationship between US 
subsidies and the world cotton price.  Sapir and Trachtman, above n 1195, at 204-205. 
1387 See Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 10.222; Decision by the 
Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable subsidies), paras 4.132-
4.133. 
1388 For example, the Arbitrator determined that the coupling factor as proposed by Brazil ‘is within the 
range found in the relevant literature and is not inappropriate’.  See Decision by the Arbitrator, US – 
Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable subsidies), paras 4.119, 4.147, 4.163, 4.178. 
1389 Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – United States) (actionable 
subsidies), para 4.55. 
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instance, the Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil) considered that 
the range of price effects resulting from all simulations would fall within the Panel’s view of 
what constitutes significant price suppression.1390   
 
5.1.3.3. Non-actionable subsidies 
Although non-actionable subsidies were allowed until the end of the 1999s, the SCM 
Agreement provided a limited multilateral remedy to other WTO Members to challenge such 
green light subsidies if they caused ‘serious adverse effects’ to their domestic industry.1391  
Hence, the burden of proof upon the complaining party was higher than in the case of 
actionable subsidies (referring to ‘adverse effects’).  If consultations failed, it was up to the 
SCM Committee, and thus not a panel, to decide on whether this burden was met.1392  The 
SCM Committee could ‘recommend’ modifying the programme in such a way as to remove 
these effects.  If the recommendations were not followed within six months, the SCM 
Committee could authorize countermeasures ‘commensurate with the nature and degree of the 
effects determined to exist’.1393   
 
5.2. UNILATERAL REMEDIES: COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
Instead of following the multilateral avenue described above, a WTO Member is allowed to 
opt for the unilateral approach and to levy countervailing duties (CVDs) on imported products 
for the purpose of offsetting specific subsidies bestowed on the manufacture, production or 
export of those goods.1394  Yet, the SCM Agreement also disciplines this unilateral avenue.  
CVDs may only be imposed pursuant to an investigation in accordance with the procedural 
and substantive obligations stipulated in Part V of the SCM Agreement.  Hence, Part V of the 
SCM Agreement aims ‘at striking a balance between the right to impose countervailing duties 
to offset subsidization that is causing injury, and the obligations that Members must respect in 
order to do so’.1395  To correctly impose CVDs measures, the CVDs investigation has to be 
conducted in conformity to the specific procedural disciplines and should reach a positive 
determination of three substantive elements: (1) the existence of a specific subsidy, (2) injury 
                                                 
1390 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Brazil – Article 21.5), paras 365, 435.  See above 
Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.2.2.3. 
1391 Article 9.1 of the SCM Agreement (emphasis added). 
1392 Article 9.3 of the SCM Agreement. 
1393 Article 9.4 of the SCM Agreement. 
1394 See Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para 73; Panel Report, US – Countervailing 
Measures on Certain EC Products, para 7.41. See Articles 10 (footnote 36), 19.1 of the SCM 
Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT.  The Panel in US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC 
Products underlined that CVDs are thus not designed ‘to counteract all market distortions or resource 
misallocations which might have been caused by subsidization’.  Panel Report, US – Countervailing 
Measures on Certain EC Products, paras 7.42, 7.80. 
1395 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para 74. 
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to the domestic industry producing the like product, and (3) a causal link between the 
subsidized import and the injury.  The specific procedural obligations set out in the SCM 
Agreement are examined first. 
 
5.2.1. Procedural requirements 
The basic thrust of the procedural disciplines is to ensure that the CVDs investigation is 
conducted in an objective manner, in which equal opportunity is given to different 
stakeholders to present their opposing interests.  This requirement of ‘due process’ is 
explicitly stipulated with regard to the injury determination.  Indeed, by virtue of Article 15.1 
of the SCM Agreement, the investigating authority has to make an ‘objective examination’ of 
the matter.  The Panel in EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips clarified that this 
standard ‘requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of (subsidized) imports be 
investigated in an unbiased manner, without favoring the interests of any interested party, or 
group of interested parties, in the investigation’.1396  A key question is, however, which 
stakeholders are formally recognized as interested parties.  Surely, not only private parties but 
foreign governments as well are involved in the investigation as subsidization is in essence a 
governmental act.  Before going into these ‘due process’ requirements regarding other WTO 
Members and private interested parties, the disciplines on the initiation and duration of CVDs 
investigations are spelled out. 
 
5.2.1.1. Initiation and duration 
An investigation can be initiated either by or on behalf of the domestic industry or by the 
authorities of their own accord.1397  It is made ‘by or on behalf of the domestic industry’, if the 
petition is supported by domestic producers whose collective output accounts for more than 
50 per cent of total production of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic 
industry that expressed its view, either for or against.  If, however, domestic producers 
supporting the petition account for less than 25 per cent of total domestic production of the 
like product, national authorities may not initiate an investigation.1398  Thus, to prevent that 
the CVDs procedure is captured by the interests of some producers, a sufficient number of 
                                                 
1396 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.274.  The Panel paraphrased 
the Appellate Body in US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para 193.  
1397 Articles 11.2 and 11.6 of the SCM Agreement. 
1398 Article 11.4 of the SCM Agreement (similar to Article 5.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement).  The 
rationale of the domestic producers that elect to support an investigation is considered irrelevant.  See 
Appellate Body Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), paras 283 and 291.  
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domestic producers must have expressed support for the application.1399 Only ‘in special 
circumstances’ can the authorities decide to initiate an investigation without an application by 
or on behalf the domestic industry.1400 
The written application by the domestic industry should contain sufficient evidence of the 
existence of the three substantive elements: a subsidy, injury, and a causal link injury.1401 The 
authorities have to review the accuracy and adequacy of this evidence to determine whether 
the evidence is sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation. In parallel, the 
investigation can be initiated ex officio only if the authorities have sufficient evidence on the 
three substantive elements, whereby ‘sufficient’ means there is probable cause for an 
investigation.1402 As a consequence, an application to investigate should be rejected and an 
investigation should be terminated as soon as the authorities are satisfied that there is not 
sufficient evidence of either subsidization or injury. It should be terminated (i) when the 
amount of the subsidy is de minimis, which is the case if it is less than 1 per cent ad valorem, 
or (ii) where the volume of the subsidized imports or the injury is ‘negligible’, but this 
concept is not defined.1403  Note already that this threshold is higher in case CVDs are 
initiated against developing countries.1404  If an investigation is launched, it should normally 
be concluded within one year.  In ‘special circumstances’, however, it should only be 
concluded within 18 months after its initiation (Article 11.11 of the SCM Agreement).  As the 
Panel in Mexico – Olive Oil rightly explained, Article 11.11 is ‘clear and unequivocal’ and 
leaves no room ‘to prolong an investigation beyond 18 months for any reason, including 
requests from interested parties’.1405  Within this well-defined period, the investigating 
authority that considers imposing CVDs has to demonstrate the existence of a subsidy causing 
injury to its domestic industry.1406 
 
5.2.1.2. Consultation of alleged subsidizing WTO Member  
The pivotal difference between anti-dumping procedures and CVDs procedures is that the 
former strictly targets private behaviour, whereas the latter also inevitably has to scrutinize 
foreign governments’ conduct as part of the subsidy analysis.  This makes CVDs action much 
more sensitive politically and partly explains why this instrument is used far less frequently 
                                                 
1399 The definition of ‘like product’ is pivotal to apply the thresholds set by Article 11.4 of the SCM 
Agreement. Footnote 46 of the SCM Agreement defines the concept of ‘like product’ in the context of 
the SCM Agreement (see also below Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.2.4). 
1400 Article 11.6 of the SCM Agreement. 
1401 Article 11.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
1402 Matsushita, Schoenbaum, and Mavroidis, above n 721, at 289. 
1403 Article 11.9 of the SCM Agreement.   
1404 Article 27.10 of the SCM Agreement.  See below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.3. 
1405 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, paras 7.120-7.123. 
1406 Article 19.1 of the SCM Agreement.  See below Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2. 
PART II CHAPTER 5 – REMEDIES 
 
 
 
 
268 
 
 
than anti-dumping duties.1407  Likewise, it explains the main difference between both sets of 
procedures: ‘due process’ requirements in CVDs procedures with regard to foreign 
governments are more extensive.  The consultation requirement is, for instance, specific to the 
CVDs investigation. 
By virtue of this requirement, WTO Members the products of which may be subject to the 
investigation should be invited for consultation by the investigating authority as soon as 
possible after an application is accepted and before the formal initiation of the 
investigation.1408  Moreover, throughout the period of investigation, those WTO Members 
shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to continue consultations with a view to clarifying 
the situation and to arriving at a mutually agreed solution.1409 At the same time, this obligation 
to ‘afford reasonable opportunity for consultation’ is not intended to prevent the investigating 
authority from proceeding ‘expeditiously’ with the various steps of the procedure.1410  Next to 
this consultation requirement, the targeted WTO Members are also involved in the gathering 
of evidence, which is discussed in the following section.   
 
5.2.1.3. Gathering of evidence  
5.2.1.3.1. Due process rights in the gathering of evidence 
Article 12 of the SCM Agreement provides for specific ‘due process’ rights on the gathering 
of evidence, in particular for interested WTO Members as well as ‘interested parties’.1411 
First, both should be given the opportunity to present all evidence that they consider 
relevant.1412  To prepare their case, they should also be provided timely opportunities to see 
all relevant non-confidential information used in the investigating.1413  Second, before the 
final determination, the investigating authorities have to inform them of the essential facts that 
form the basis for their decision whether to apply definitive measures.  This disclosure should 
take place ‘in sufficient time’ for these parties to defend their interest. 1414   
 
 
                                                 
1407 See Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters, above n 721, at 375. 
1408 Article 13.1 of the SCM Agreement.  The term ‘initiated’ means ‘procedural action by which a 
Member formally commences an investigation as provided in Article 11’ (footnote 37 of the SCM 
Agreement).  Hence, the date of initiation is according to the Panel in Mexico – Olive Oil based ‘on the 
internal law of the importing Member’.  Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, paras 7.22-7.31. 
1409 Article 13.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
1410 Article 13.3 of the SCM Agreement. 
1411 Article 12 of the SCM Agreement. See also Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Rice, para 292; Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para 138. 
1412 For details, see Article 12.1 of the SCM Agreement.  This could, upon justification, also be done 
orally, though this should subsequently be reduced to written submissions.  Article 12.2 of the SCM 
Agreement.  
1413 Articles 12.1.2, 12.3 and 12.4 of the SCM Agreement. 
1414 Article 12.8 of the SCM Agreement. 
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According to Article 12.9 of the SCM Agreement, ‘interested parties’ include at least: 
 
(i) the exporter, foreign producer or importer of the product subject to the investigation (…);  
(ii) the domestic producer of the like product in the importing Member (…).1415  
 
However, this list does ‘not preclude Members from allowing domestic or foreign parties 
other than those mentioned above to be included as interested parties’ (Article 12.9 of the 
SCM Agreement).  To be recognized as interested party under this residual category, no 
formal request by the party in question is required according to the Appellate Body in Japan – 
DRAMs (Korea).1416  What is more, a party could be designated as ‘interested party’ even if 
this is not in its own interest but in the interest of the investigating authority.1417   Although an 
investigating authority does not ‘enjoy an unfettered discretion’, it needs in the Appellate 
Body’s view:  
 
(…) to have some discretion to include as interested parties entities that are relevant for 
carrying out an objective investigation and for obtaining information or evidence relevant to 
the investigation at hand. Nonetheless, in designating entities as interested parties, an 
investigating authority must be mindful of the burden that such designation may entail for 
other interested parties.1418 
 
Hence, Japan’s investigating authority was allowed to designate a number of private creditors 
of Hynix as ‘interested party’ even if they had not expressed any interest in the outcome of 
the investigating.  After all, information in their hands was considered relevant to determine 
whether they were entrusted or directed by the Korean government to provide credit to Hynix 
(i.e., the subsidy determination).   
 
The two listed types of ‘interested parties’ (i.e., foreign and domestic producers),1419 with 
their opposing interests, are thus put on an equal footing in the gathering of evidence.  On the 
other hand, domestic consumers (i.e., industrial users of the investigated product or 
representative consumer organizations when the product is sold at retail level) are not 
explicitly mentioned as interested parties.  This reflects the bias toward producer welfare in 
the SCM Agreement.  Obviously, domestic consumers share the same interest as foreign 
                                                 
1415 See Article 12.9 of the SCM Agreement. 
1416 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), paras 239-240. 
1417 After all, the Appellate Body read the term ‘allowing’ in Article 12.9 of the SCM Ageeement as 
connoting to ‘the power or authority given to a Member to include other parties as interested parties, 
rather than a restriction on such power of inclusion to those parties that make a request’ (Appellate 
Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 240).  Yet, it has been suggested by scholars (e.g., 
Benitah) that the term ‘allowing’ connotes to the right given to parties to be included as interested party 
by the investigating authority rather than to the power given to investigating authority to include them.  
Moreover, the ordinary meaning of ‘interested party’ seems to connote to an interest on the part of the 
party itself and not on the part of the investigating authority. 
1418 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 242. 
1419 Exporters and importers of the product under investigation share the same interest as foreign 
producers and are likewise listed. 
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producers since they benefit from the depressed/suppressed price and would be hurt by the 
imposition of CVDs.1420  Under the SCM Agreement, industrial users and representative 
consumer organizations should only be given the opportunity to provide relevant information 
(Article 12.10 of the SCM Agreement; see below).  In additional, WTO Members are free to 
give them the status of ‘interested party’ in an investigation (Article 12.9 of the SCM 
Agreement).   
 
5.2.1.3.2. Evidentiary standard 
According to Article 12.2 of the SCM Agreement, any decision of the investigating authority 
should be based on information and arguments on its written record that were available to 
interested Members and interested parties (except for confidential information).  Unless 
otherwise specified in the SCM Agreement, any decision of the investigating authority should 
therefore only ‘be based on’ on evidence on the agency’s record and no particular higher 
standard should be adhered to.1421  For instance, the investigating authority does not have to 
offer ‘positive evidence’ of government entrustment/direction under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of 
the SCM Agreement.1422  In contrast, such a specific standard of ‘positive evidence’ is 
explicitly prescribed for findings of specificity as well as injury by virtue of Articles 2.4 and 
15.1 of the SCM Agreement, respectively.1423     
 
To verify the accuracy of the supplied information or to gather evidence, the investigating 
authority may carry out investigations in the territory of the WTO Member under 
investigation or in other Members if this is notified in good time and those Members do not 
object to the investigation.1424  Similarly, investigations may be carried on the premises of a 
firm (or its records) if the firm so agrees and the WTO Member is notified and does not 
object.  Even though the WTO Member and firms under investigation are in principle free to 
block such on the spot investigations, failure to participate may incur the negative 
consequence that the investigating authority could ground its decision on the ‘facts 
available’.1425    
Indeed, if an interested Member or interested party does not provide necessary information or 
significantly impedes the investigation, investigating authorities are allowed to make 
                                                 
1420 See above Part I, Chapter 1. 
1421 Article 12 of the SCM Agreement.  Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMS, para 138. 
1422 See, for example, Panel Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 7.81. 
1423 Concerning the specificity element, see above Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3. 
1424 Article 12.6 of the SCM Agreement.  See also Panel Report, US – Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMS, para 7.404. 
1425 Insofar they are interested Member or interested party.  See also Panel Report, US – Countervailing 
Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 7.406. 
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determinations on the basis of the facts that are available.1426  Intended to ensure that such 
cooperation failure ‘does not hinder an agency's investigation’, this provision permits an 
‘investigating authority, under certain circumstances, to fill in gaps in the information 
necessary to arrive at a conclusion as to subsidization (…) and injury’.1427  An investigating 
authority could thus take resort to the facts available to fill in gaps in case of a lack of 
cooperation of an interested Member or interested party.1428  At the same time, the Appellate 
Body emphasized that such a determination on ‘the facts available’ does not permit the 
investigating authority to ‘use any information in whatever way it chooses’.1429  First, it must 
take into account all substantiated facts provided by an interested party, even if those facts 
may not correspond to the complete requested information.  Second, ‘facts available’ are 
generally limited to those that may ‘reasonably replace the information that an interested 
party failed to provide’, which in certain circumstances may include information from 
secondary sources.1430  For instance, the Panel in EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM 
Chips had agreed with the EC’s use of press reports as secondary source of information for its 
subsidy determination because of a lack of cooperation on the part of Korea.  Importantly, 
non-cooperation thus only makes it possible to rely on other facts that are available and ‘by 
itself does not suffice to justify a conclusion which is negative to the interested party that 
failed to cooperate with the investigating authority’.1431  The determination still has to be 
made on ‘the basis of the available facts, and not on mere speculation’.1432 
 
This right upon the investigating authority to base a determination on the ‘facts available’ 
explains why Japan included private creditors of Hynix as ‘interested parties’ in its 
investigation and why this was challenged by Korea in Japan – DRAMs (Korea).  After all, 
the status of ‘interested party’ not only gives this party the right to present evidence but, in 
turn, gives the investigating authority a right to base its determination on the ‘facts available’ 
when this ‘interested party’ fails to participate in the investigation.  Article 12.7 of the SCM 
Agreement only allows such determination in case an ‘interested Member’ or ‘interested 
party’ fails to participate.  In most cases, the relevant information to make a determination of 
                                                 
1426 Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement. 
1427 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, paras 291, 293; see also Panel 
Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.61; Panel Report, Japan – DRAMs 
(Korea), para 7.392. 
1428 This is of course also the case when information is deliberately withheld.  See Panel Report, EC – 
Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.254. 
1429 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, paras 292-294; see also Panel 
Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 7.406; Panel Report, EC – 
Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.245. 
1430 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para 294. 
1431 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.61. 
1432 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.61 (emphasis in the original). 
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the substantive elements (e.g., subsidy and injury) could be obtained from those actors listed 
as ‘interested parties’ in Article 12.9 of the SCM Agreement (e.g., foreign producer, 
subsidizing Member, domestic producer).  However, in case of indirect subsidization, 
essential information is in the hands of those private bodies alleged to be entrusted/directed by 
the government and these actors are not explicitly listed as interested party.  Hence, if they 
could not be designated as ‘interested party’ by the investigating authority, their failure to 
provide this essential information could not lead to a determination on the basis of other facts 
that are available.1433,1434  Thus, by (overly1435) stretching the interpretation of the term 
‘interested party’, the Panel and Appellate Body in Japan – DRAMs (Korea) prevented that 
private actors having relevant information but not listed as interested parties could block a 
CVDs investigation.  Investigating authorities are thus well advised to formally designate 
such actors the status of ‘interested party’ under Article 12.9 of the SCM Agreement.  
 
5.2.2. Substantive requirements 
To impose CVDs, an investigation along the lines of the procedural requirements set out 
above has to arrive at a determination of the existence of a specific subsidy causing injury or 
threat thereof to the domestic industry.1436  In particular, the right to impose CVDs is thus 
conditioned on the demonstrated existence of three substantive elements, which are discussed 
in turn: ‘subsidization, injury, and a causal link between the two’.1437   
      
5.2.2.1. Specific subsidy 
As to this first element, we could refer to the discussion on the definition of a specific subsidy 
under Chapter 3.  The investigating authority should show the existence of a financial 
contribution (or income/price support) by another WTO Member that confers a benefit to a 
specific recipient.1438 Regarding the ‘specificity’ test, it should be remembered that this has to 
be demonstrated on the basis of ‘positive evidence’.   
                                                 
1433 The Panel clearly expressed this concern:  
‘the scope of the right of investigating authorities to include parties as "interested parties" in 
investigations must be interpreted with a view to ensuring that investigating authorities are able 
to obtain the "necessary information" needed to arrive at a determination’ and ‘this consideration 
carries considerable weight in cases involving entrustment or direction, where the relevant 
information may be held only by the third parties who have been allegedly been entrusted or 
directed’.   
Panel Report, Japam – DRAMs (Korea), para 7.392 and footnote 581. 
1434 Such failure to cooperate is not unlikely given that these private parties often do not have a direct 
interest in the investigation. 
1435 See above n 1417. 
1436 Articles 10, 11.2, and 19.1 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI of the GATT. 
1437 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para 73. 
1438 Regarding the specificity requirement, see Article 1.2 of the SCM Agreement, which explicitly 
refers to Part V of the SCM Agreement dealing with CVDs action. 
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The Panel in Japan – DRAMs (Korea) explained that the private market test under Article 
1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement (i.e., benefit-determination) could be operationalized by CVDs-
investigating authorities in a double way.1439  An investigating authority could gather 
evidence of the terms that the market would have offered and compare these with the terms of 
the financial contribution at issue.  Alternatively, or additionally, an investigating authority 
might rely on evidence of whether or not the financial contribution was provided on the basis 
of non-commercial considerations.  Under both approaches, it would be revealed whether the 
financial contribution was made at commercially reasonable terms.  In case the outcome of 
both types of evidence would conflict, the CVDs-investigating authority would need to 
compare their probative value.1440   
Because the level of CVDs cannot be above the subsidy level, a CVDs-investigating authority 
should not only demonstrate the existence of a benefit but likewise has to quantify its 
level.1441,1442  To this end, Article 14 of the SCM Agreement sets guidelines for calculating the 
subsidy amount in terms of the benefit to the recipient.1443  The Appellate Body distinguished 
three requirements in the chapeau of Article 14 of the SCM Agreement: (1) ‘any method 
used’ for the calculation should be provided for in the national legislation or implementing 
regulations; (2) the application of that method in each particular case has to be transparent and 
adequately explained; and (3) ‘any such method’ shall be consistent with the guidelines 
contained in paragraphs (a)-(d).1444,1445  Analyzing the procedural requirements, the Appellate 
Body concluded that Article 14 leaves WTO Members ‘some latitude’ as to the method it 
chooses to calculate the benefit amount.1446  It is not required that the method used in a 
particular case is set out in detail but only that it can be ‘derived from, or is discernable from, 
the national legislation or implementing regulations’.1447  On substance, paragraphs (a)-(d) of 
                                                 
1439 Panel Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 7.276. 
1440 Panel Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 2.276, footnote 475. 
1441 Recall that such exact quantification is not necessary in a multilateral ‘serious prejudice’ claim.  In 
a multilateral claim, quantification will only be conducted when countermeasures are calculated as a 
result of non-implementation.  See also Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 464. 
1442 This might also mandate a ‘pass-through’ analysis in case the subsidy is given to upstream 
producers but CVDs are imposed on imported downstream products (see above Part II, Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.2.1). 
1443 As explained above, Article 14 of the SCM Agreement is also considered useful context for 
demonstrating the existence of a benefit under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement (see above Part II, 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2). 
1444 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 190. 
1445 These paragraphs specify guidelines in case the subsidy takes the form of, respectively, (a) the 
government provision of equity capital, (b) a government loan, (c) a government loan guarantee, or (d) 
the provision of goods and services or purchase of goods by the government.  The Panel in Japan – 
DRAMs (Korea) indicated that ‘the Article 14 guidelines do not cover all eventualities’.  See Panel 
Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 7.275. 
1446 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 191. 
1447 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 192. 
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Article 14 of the SCM Agreement define a benefit by reference to the terms the recipient 
would receive on the market to obtain the financial contribution at stake.  
Obviously, not only domestic subsidies but also export subsidies can be countervailed but, 
again, only if causation of injury to the domestic industry is established.  Instead of 
demonstrating the subsidy and benefit element on the basis of Article 1 of the SCM 
Agreement, CVDs-investigating authorities might alternatively opt for the Illustrative List.  
Even export subsidies that are explicitly deemed not ‘prohibited’ according to the Illustrative 
List or on the basis of S&D treatment could still be countervailed.  Recall that, if it is 
demonstrated that subsidies are export subsidies (either under Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM 
Agreement or the Illustrative List), they are deemed specific under Article 2.3 of the SCM 
Agreement.1448  Whereas non-actionable subsidies were not fully safe for multilateral action, 
they could certainly not be countervailed even if they were not notified.1449  Because this 
category was extinguished, all specific subsidies in the meaning of Article 1 and 2 of the 
SCM Agreement can be countervailed if they cause injury to the domestic industry.  The 
injury standard is explored in the next section. 
 
5.2.2.2. Injury or threat of injury 
The SCM Agreement elaborates upon the injury provisions of Article VI of the GATT. Injury 
refers to ‘material injury’ or ‘threat of material injury’ to the domestic industry but these 
notions are not defined in more detail.1450  The Appellate Body in US – Lamb stressed that the 
‘material injury’-standard in the SCM Agreement (and Anti-Dumping Agreement) is certainly 
lower than the ‘serious injury’-standard for safeguard measures because CVDs (and anti-
dumping measures) counteract unfair trade actions.1451 
 
How should such (threat of) material injury be established?  Article 15.1 of the SCM 
Agreement is the starting point for this analysis.  This overarching provision ‘sets forth a 
Member's fundamental, substantive obligation with respect to the determination of injury’1452 
and informs the more specific obligations set out in the other provisions of Article 15.1453  
Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement stipulates that the demonstration of material injury 
should: 
 
                                                 
1448 Such demonstration of ‘export contingency’, which is strictly speaking not needed as a condition 
for imposing CVDs, facilitates the demonstration of specificity.  
1449 Article 10, footnote 35 of the SCM Agreement. 
1450 Alternatively, it could likewise refer to ‘material retardation of the establishment of a domestic 
injury’.  See footnote 45 of the SCM Agreement 
1451 Appellate Body Report, US – Lamb, para 124. 
1452 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.263. 
1453 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.263. 
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(…) be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the 
volume of the subsidized imports and the effect of the subsidized imports on prices in the 
domestic market for like products and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on the 
domestic producers of such products.1454  
 
The substantive requirements of the injury demonstration are thus based on a two-pronged 
approach related to: (a) the volume/price effect and (b) the impact on domestic producers.  
Before addressing these substantive requirements, the procedural obligations reflected in the 
‘positive evidence’ and ‘objective examination’ concepts should be explained.  Both concepts 
are used as steppingstone by the case law to elaborate upon some specific procedural 
disciplines lacking in the SCM Agreement. 
 
 5.2.2.2.1. Positive evidence and objective examination 
The term positive evidence refers according to the Appellate Body to ‘the quality of the 
evidence that authorities may rely upon in making a determination’ and requires that such 
evidence must be of an ‘an affirmative, objective and verifiable character, and that it must be 
credible’.1455  Whereas the term positive evidence ‘focuses on the facts underpinning and 
justifying the injury determination’, the term objective examination is concerned ‘with the 
investigative process itself’.  Hence, the latter relates to the way in which the evidence is 
gathered.1456  The qualification ‘objective’ means that this process should conform to the ‘the 
basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness’, implying in particular that it should 
be conducted in ‘an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, 
or group of interested parties, in the investigation’.1457  This means that ‘the identification, 
investigation and evaluation of the relevant factors must be even-handed’.1458 
 
Panels and the Appellate Body have relied on these general terms to set certain limits on the 
discretion of investigating authorities to select the period of investigation.  Such explicit 
disciplines are lacking in both the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement.  This 
                                                 
1454 Footnotes deleted, emphasis added.  
1455 This is spelled out by the Appellate Body in US – Hot Rolled Steel in the context of Anti-Dumping 
(Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement) and applied by several panels in the context of CVDs 
(Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement).  Appellate Body Report, US – Hot Rolled Steel, para 192; Panel 
Report, US – Mexico Olive Oil, para 7.264; Panel Report, Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes, para 7.214; 
Panel Report, EC – DRAMS Countervailing Measures, para 7.272; Panel Report, US – Countervailing 
Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 7.215; Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI, para 7.28. 
1456 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot Rolled Steel, para 192. 
1457 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot Rolled Steel, para 192.  Again, this interpretation is applied by 
several panels in the context of CVDs.  Panel Report, US – Mexico Olive Oil, para 7.265; Panel Report, 
Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes, para 7.214; Panel Report, EC – DRAMS Countervailing Measures, 
para 7.273; Panel Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 7.216; Panel 
Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI, para 7.28. 
1458 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot Rolled Steel, para 192; Panel Report, Mexico – Steel Pipes and 
Tubes, para 7.214. 
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selection is, nonetheless, important as it determines the data that will be used for assessing 
subsidization, injury, and their causal relationship.1459  Acknowledging that the SCM 
Agreement indeed sets no express requirement regarding this selection, the Panel in Mexico – 
Olive Oil found that the ‘positive evidence’ and ‘objective examination’ obligations imply 
that an investigating authority’s discretion on this matter is subject to ‘certain constraints’.1460  
Two types of constraints have been spelled out in the case law.  First, the same Panel decided 
that a truncated injury analysis period (i.e., parts of successive years instead of the continuous 
period of years) could be acceptable but only if a substantive rationale could be 
articulated.1461,1462  After all, data relating to full year periods would in general give a more 
accurate picture of the state of the domestic industry.1463  Second, in the context of anti-
dumping, the Appellate Body has established that the use of a remote investigation period is 
not a per se violation of the ‘positive evidence’ standard but, again, a valid rationale seems to 
be required explaining why more recent data could not be used.1464  Because the conditions to 
impose an anti-dumping duty are to be assessed with respect to the current situation, the 
determination of whether such current injury exists should be ‘based on data that provide 
indications of the situation prevailing when the investigation takes place’.1465  Historical data 
could be used but ‘more recent data is likely to provide better indications about current 
injury’.1466  This case law could be likewise transposed to the CVDs context.  In sum, by 
relying on the vague standards of ‘positive evidence’ and ‘objective examination’, panels and 
the Appellate Body have put some constraints on investigating authorities’ discretion to 
choose the period of investigation.  Such contract completion might be criticized as a form of 
‘judicial activism’1467 but this is, in my opinion, justified because it acknowledges that the 
choice of the investigation period might indeed be done in a way undermining the quality and 
objectiveness of the data.  In the cases at hand, there seemed to be sufficient elements present 
                                                 
1459 See also Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.266. 
1460 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.267. 
1461 The Panel found inspiration in the Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Rice, para 183; Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, paras 7.80-7.82. 
1462 For example, in Mexico – Olive Oil, Mexico had used data from nine month periods in successive 
years and could not give a reasonable explanation why it did not use full year data (see also below n 
1468).  Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, paras 7.288-7.289.  
1463 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para 183; Panel Report, Mexico 
– Olive Oil, para 7.288. 
1464 There was a 15-month gap between the end of the period of investigation and the initiation of the 
investigation as well as a gap of almost three years between the end of the period of investigation and 
the imposition of final anti-dumping duties.  This temporal aspect was not on itself a violation but 
several other elements showed that Mexico offered no valid justification why more recent data had not 
been used.  Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para 167.   
1465 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para 165. 
1466 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para 166. 
1467 For a discussion on this debate, see WorldTradeLaw.net Dispute Settlement Commentary on Panel 
Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, at 18-19.  
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which diluted not only the quality of the evidence but even questioned the ‘good faith’-
intentions on the part of the investigating authorities to make an unbiased examination.1468 
 
The Appellate Body in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice also observed that no type 
of methodology is prescribed for an investigating authority conducting an injury analysis.  As 
a result, such a methodology could rest on assumptions but the ‘positive evidence’-standard 
nonetheless mandates that such ‘assumptions should be derived as reasonable inferences from 
a credible basis of facts, and should be sufficiently explained so that their objectivity and 
credibility can be verified’.1469  Hence, the Appellate Body decided in the anti-dumping 
context that ‘an investigating authority that uses a methodology premised on unsubstantiated 
assumptions does not conduct an examination based on positive evidence’.1470  This occurs, 
for instance, if the investigating authority fails to explain why it would be appropriate to use 
assumptions in its analysis.  Again, this case law is relevant in the context of CVDs 
investigations.  In the following sections, the ‘injury’-test to be conducted in a CVDs 
investigation is explored. 
 
5.2.2.2.2. Volume and/or price effect 
An injury determination should involve an objective examination of the volume of subsidized 
imports and the effect of such subsidized imports on prices.  Regarding the volume effect, the 
investigating authority has to consider whether there has been a significant increase in 
‘subsidized imports’, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the 
importing Member.  In this analysis, only those imports qualify for which a de minimis 
margin of subsidization has been found.1471  Regarding the price effect of the subsidized 
imports, it has to be determined whether there has been significant price undercutting or 
significant price depression/suppression.1472  Because ‘no one or several of these factors can 
necessarily give decisive guidance’ (Article 15.2 of the SCM Agreement), the Panel in EC – 
Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips found that, even in absence of a significant 
increase in subsidized imports (volume effect), CVDs could be imposed as long as the price 
                                                 
1468 In Mexico – Olive Oil, Mexico had precisely excluded those months when the seasonal, agricultural 
domestic industry was actually producing the product under investigation.  In Mexico – Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Rice, the investigating authority had accepted the period of investigation proposed by the 
petitioner, knowing that the petitioner proposed that period because it allegedly represented the period 
of highest import penetration.  Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, paras 7.288-7.289; Appellate Body 
Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para 181. 
1469 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para 204. 
1470 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para 204. 
1471 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.298, footnote 227. 
1472 The determination can be based on one or more of these factors (Article 15.2 of the SCM 
Agreement). 
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effect is present.1473  In contrast to safeguard investigations, there is ‘no generalized 
requirement to establish a temporal correlation between increased imports and injury in the 
context of a countervail investigation’.1474  The absence of such a temporal correlation 
‘certainly raises a flag, but it is not an absolute barrier to a finding of injury’.1475   
A novelty introduced in the SCM Agreement upon US demand is the allowance to cumulate 
the effects of subsidized imports from more than one Member, all subject to CVDs 
investigations.  This gives the right to add up subsidy effects which, on their own, might be 
insufficient to generate the required level of trade distortion (i.e., volume and/or price effect) 
and injury.  Such a cumulative assessment could be conducted if two conditions are 
fulfilled.1476  First, the subsidy amount related to imports from each country is above the 1 per 
cent de minimis level and the volume is not negligible.1477  Second, such an assessment should 
be appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between the imported products and the 
conditions of competition between the imported products and the like domestic product.1478   
 
5.2.2.2.3. Impact of volume and/or price effect on the state of the domestic industry 
What can be the impact upon domestic industry of these volume and/or price effects?  To this 
end, the investigating authority has to evaluate all relevant economic factors and indices 
having a bearing on the state of the industry.  Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement includes an 
elaborated but non-exhaustive list of relevant factors, none of which could necessarily give 
decisive guidance: 
 
(…) actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on 
investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; actual and potential 
negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital 
or investments and, in the case of agriculture, whether there has been an increased burden on 
government support programmes. 
 
The Panel in EC – DRAMS Countervailing Measures held that all these factors should 
definitely be evaluated to assess the state of the domestic industry.1479  Even if some 
                                                 
1473 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.399, footnote 277. 
1474 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.399, footnote 277; Panel 
Report, US - Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 7.320, footnote 283. 
1475 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.399, footnote 277. 
1476 Article 15.3 of the SCM Agreement.  There was no agreement on whether the Subsidies Code 
allowed such cumulative assessment.  Balassa considered such an assessment as justified from an 
economic viewpoint because the combined effect of foreign subsidies is what matters for the domestic 
industry.  See B. Balassa, ‘Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Economic Considerations’, in B. 
Balassa (ed), Subsidies and Countervailing Measures – Critical Issues for the Uruguay Round 
(Washington: The World Bank, 1989), 28-45, at 38. 
1477 In case of CVDs action against developing countries, higher de minimis subsidy and volume 
thresholds apply (Article 27.10 of the SCM Agreement; see below Part I, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.3). 
1478 Article 15.3 of the SCM Agreement. 
1479 Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement.  See Panel Report, EC – DRAMS Countervailing Measures, 
para 7.356. 
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individual factors show a positive development for the domestic industry, an overall 
assessment could lead to the conclusion of material injury.1480  
  
5.2.2.2.4. Definition of domestic industry 
The material injury should be caused upon the ‘domestic industry’.  This domestic industry is 
defined as ‘the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose 
collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic 
production of those products’.1481  Yet, some domestic producers could be excluded from this 
definition, namely those that are related to exporters or importers, or are themselves importers 
of the allegedly subsidized product or a like product from other countries.1482  As these 
producers likely benefit from the subsidized imports as a result of such relationship, they 
clearly do not share the same interest as the rest of the domestic industry and are in all 
probability not injured. 
In principle, it should thus be shown that injury is caused upon ‘the domestic producers as a 
whole of the like products’.  As elaborated upon above, the concept of ‘like product’ covers 
products that are ‘identical, i.e. alike in all respects’ or, at least, as having ‘characteristics 
closely resembling’.  Even the latter concept is, according to the Panel in Indonesia – Autos, 
‘on its face (…) quite narrow’ and ‘includes but is not limited to physical characteristics’.1483  
Relevantly, the Panel in Mexico – Olive Oil decided that ‘domestic producers’ does not 
exclude those producers that at the time of application and/or during the period of the injury 
investigation did not actually produce the like product.  The Panel convincingly explained that 
deciding otherwise would be absurd and contrary to the intention of the drafters as it ‘could 
lead to the result that an industry may be so badly injured by subsidized imports as to be 
forced to cease production for some period, but would be disqualified from obtaining the very 
remedy aimed at addressing such injury’.1484  Despite the lack of production during the period 
of investigation, the enterprise in question (Fortuna) was still considered a ‘producer’ in the 
meaning of Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement because ‘the essential nature of its business’ 
was still the production, distribution, and sale of the like product (i.e., olive oil).1485 
Two further important observations have to be made on the delineation of the domestic 
industry with regard to the injury determination.  First, as Mavroidis et al accurately 
emphasize, CVDs action could only be undertaken when injury is suffered by the domestic 
                                                 
1480 Panel Report, EC – DRAMS Countervailing Measures, para 7.372. 
1481 Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement (emphasis added). 
1482 Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement.  For the definition of ‘related’, see footnote 48 of the SCM 
Agreement. 
1483 See footnote 46 of the SCM Agreement; Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.173. 
1484 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.203.    
1485 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.213 
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producers of the like product that is imported.1486  For instance, if wine is the subsidized 
imported product, CVDs could only be imposed in case domestic wine producers are harmed.  
If these domestic wine producers are able to withstand competition form imported subsidized 
wine by negotiating a lower price from domestic input (e.g., grape) producers, no CVDs 
action could be undertaken to offset this indirect effect on the input producers because grapes 
are not like products to wine. This conclusion equally holds if the subsidy is originally given 
to the upstream industry (i.e., grape producers) in the subsidizing country, which is ‘passed 
through’ to the downstream industry exporting the processed product (i.e., wine 
producers).1487  In sum, CVDs could only be imposed if it is shown that the traded product is 
subsidized (which might require a pass-through analysis)1488 and if this subsidized traded 
product causes harm to ‘like products’ in the importing country.   
Second, it is required that the domestic producers as a whole producing the like product, or a 
major proportion of them, are injured.1489  Hence, CVDs-investigating authorities could not 
simply single out those domestic producers that have been harmed, and exclude others also 
producing the like product that apparently have not been injured.  Material injury should be 
established on the level of the entire domestic industry, with the caveat that those domestic 
producers collectively having a ‘major proportion’ of total domestic production might 
suffice.1490  Yet, this principle should be further qualified in a twofold way.  First, as noted, 
domestic producers related to producers of the subsidized product could be excluded from the 
‘domestic industry’.  Second, the SCM Agreement allows, ‘in exceptional circumstances’, to 
divide the territory of a Member into two or more competitive markets and to treat producers 
within each market as a separate industry.  Such segmentation is only allowed if industries are 
sufficiently separate, which is the case if:  
 
(a) the producers within such market sell all or almost all of their production of the product in 
question in that market, and  
(b) the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the 
product in question located elsewhere in the territory 
 
In such circumstances, injury may be found to exist in a market segment even where a major 
proportion of the total domestic industry is not injured.  Yet, two further conditions have to be 
                                                 
1486 See Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters, above n 729, at 371-372. 
1487 See Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters, above n 729, at 372. 
1488 This results from the obligation that CVDs cannot be imposed above the subsidy level.  See above 
Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.1. 
1489 This was established by the Appellate Body in the anti-dumping context but seems likewise 
applicable in the CVDs context given parallel provisions in the SCM Agreement (Article 16.1 of the 
SCM Agreement; see also Articles 15.1, 15.2, 15.4, 15.5, 15.6, 15.7 of the SCM Agreement).  
Obviously, this does not exclude that ‘a sectoral analysis may be highly pertinent, from an economic 
perspective, in assessing the state of an industry as a whole’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled 
Steel, paras 189-190, 195.  See also Panel Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup, para 7.147. 
1490 Of course, it could be the case that only one single enterprise constitutes the entire domestic 
industry.  See, for example, Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.248. 
PART II CHAPTER 5 – REMEDIES 
 
 
 
 
281 
 
 
fulfilled: (i) there is a concentration of subsidized imports in such an isolated market and (ii) 
the subsidized imports are causing injury to the producers of all or almost all of the 
production within such market.1491  In principle, CVDs should then only be levied on the 
imported products consigned for final consumption to that area. 1492 
 
5.2.2.2.5. Threat of injury 
The concept of ‘injury’ encompasses threat of material injury.  This means that CVDs can be 
imposed to offset subsidies that merely cause a threat to injury to a domestic industry.1493  The 
determination of such a threat of material injury should be based on facts and not merely on 
allegation, conjecture, or remote possibility and the application of CVDs should be considered 
and decided with ‘special care’.1494  Moreover, the change in circumstances that would trigger 
the subsidy to cause injury must be ‘clearly foreseen and imminent’.  To be sure, this does not 
require, according to the Panel in US – Softwood Lumber VI, to identify a single or ‘specific 
event that would change such that a situation of no injury will become a situation of injury in 
the future’.1495  The change in circumstances could likewise consist of ‘a series of events, or 
developments in the situation of the industry, and/or concerning (…) the subsidized imports’ 
that would lead to the prediction that injury would incur imminently.1496  In making a 
determination of a threat of material injury, the SCM Agreement once more specifies a non-
exhaustive list of factors that should certainly be considered: 
 
(i) nature of the subsidy or subsidies in question and the trade effects likely to arise therefrom; 
(ii) a significant rate of increase of subsidized imports into the domestic market indicating the 
likelihood of substantially increased importation; 
(iii) sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, capacity of the 
exporter indicating the likelihood of substantially increased subsidized exports to the 
importing Member's market, taking into account the availability of other export markets to 
absorb any additional exports; 
(iv) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or 
suppressing effect on domestic prices, and would likely increase demand for further imports; 
and 
(v) inventories of the product being investigated.1497 
 
Again, none of these factors is decisive on its own but ‘the totality of the factors considered 
must lead to the conclusion that further subsidized exports are imminent and that, unless 
protective action is undertaken, material injury would occur’.1498 
                                                 
1491 Article 16.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
1492 An exception is made in case constitutional laws of the CVDs-imposing country do not allow 
CVDs on such a basis.  See Article 16.3 of the SCM Agreement. 
1493 Articles 15.7 and 15.8 of the SCM Agreement.  See also Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood 
Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras 96-99. 
1494 Article 15.8 of the SCM Agreement. 
1495 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI, para 7.60 
1496 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI, paras 7.53-7.60. 
1497 Article 15.7 of the SCM Agreement (emphasis added). 
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5.2.2.3. Causation 
As a final step, it must be demonstrated that ‘the subsidized imports are, through the effects of 
the subsidies, causing injury’ (Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement).1499  This requirement is 
split in two complementary parts.  First of all, the investigating authority should demonstrate 
a causal link based on an examination of all relevant evidence (causal relationship 
requirement). In US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada), the Appellate Body held 
that the investigating authority must demonstrate that further subsidized imports would cause 
injury.1500  Second, the investigating authority has to explicitly filter out ‘any known factors’ 
causing injury at the same time and the injury caused by these other factors should not be 
attributed to the subsidized import (non-attribution requirement).1501  Factors which may be 
relevant in this respect include:   
 
(…) the volumes and prices of non-subsidized imports of the product in question, contraction 
in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and 
competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and the 
export performance and productivity of the domestic industry.1502 
 
The Panel in Mexico – Olive Oil distinguished two basic components in this non-attribution 
requirement.1503  First, an investigating authority is obliged to list those factors known to it 
either as a result of its own investigation or because they were raised by the interested parties.  
Second, an investigating authority is required ‘to analyze each of these factors separately and 
to explain the nature and extent of the injurious effects of these other factors, separating and 
distinguishing them from the injurious effects of the subsidized imports’.1504  If the facts of 
the case so warrant, an investigating authority is to consider in addition the collective impact 
of the ‘other known factors’.  
Turning back the causal relationship requirement, an important unsettled question in the 
CVDs context is whether investigating authorities are required to demonstrate that, once these 
other known factors are separated, subsidized imports are sufficient on their own to cause a 
level of material injury.1505  In the safeguards context, the Appellate Body has made the 
contestable interpretation that there is no obligation to show that ‘increased imports on their 
own must be capable of causing serious injury’ but only that increased imports bear a 
                                                                                                                                            
1498 Article 15.7 of the SCM Agreement. 
1499 Articles 15.5 and 19.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
1500 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 132. 
1501 Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement. 
1502 Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement. 
1503 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.305. 
1504 Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.305. 
1505 See also Clarke and Horlick, above n 587, at 745. 
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‘genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect’ with serious injury.1506  However, it 
has not yet been clarified whether this more flexible but vague causation standard is also 
applicable in the context of CVDs procedures.  This would imply that subsidized imports 
would only have to bear a ‘genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect’ to 
material injury, instead of being sufficient on their own to cause material injury.1507    
In CVDs and anti-dumping trade remedy cases, investigating authorities often rely on 
regression analysis to test whether subsidized (or dumped) imports cause (material) injury.1508  
In general, such models seek to statistically establish the relationship between a dependent 
variable, whereby a proxy for injury to the domestic industry is used (e.g., the price of the 
domestically produced good, employment, output), and a set of independent variables, which 
include next to a proxy for the effect of the subsidized imports (e.g., price, volume or profit 
margin) also other control variables that may affect the domestic industry (e.g., prices of 
substitute, input, and downstream goods; general economic conditions).1509  By controlling for 
these other variables, their effect on the domestic industry is not attributed to subsidized 
imports, as required by the non-attribution requirement.1510 The regression analysis thus 
allows establishing whether, controlling for these other variables, there is a positive, negative 
or no relationship (i.e., correlation) between the conditions in the domestic industry and the 
price, volume or profit margin of subsidized (or dumped) imports as well as to quantify any 
                                                 
1506 Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, paras 67, 69, 70; Appellate Body Report, US – Lamb, 
paras 168-170. 
1507 Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement bears some similarity with Article 4.2(b) of the Safeguards 
Agreement, which might suggest that the Appellate Body would reach the same interpretation under 
the SCM Agreement.  The former, for example, refers to ‘causal relationship’, whereas the SCM 
Agreement refers to ‘causal link’.  On the other hand, the opening sentence of Article 15.5 of the SCM 
Agreement explicitly stipulates that ‘(i)t must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, (…), 
causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement’ (emphasis added).  This clearly suggests that 
subsidized imports should be sufficient to cause material injury. Moreover, the object and purpose of 
CVDs provisions is, according to the Panel in Mexico – Olive Oil, ‘to provide for application of trade 
remedies where subsidized imports cause material injury’ (Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 
7.202, emphasis added).  Hence, the object and purpose of CVDs action is not to allow such action in 
case they are only responsible for a ‘sub-material’ part of the demonstrated ‘material’ injury to the 
domestic industry. 
1508 The case law has also underscored the relevance of a quantitative analysis.  The Panel in EC – 
Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, for instance, concluded that, instead of making qualitative 
assertions, an investigating authority ‘must make a better effort to quantify the impact of other known 
factors, relative to subsidized imports, preferably using elementary economic constructs or models’ 
(para 7.405). 
1509 J. J. Fetzer, ‘Inference for Econometric Modeling in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and 
Safeguard Investigations’, 8:4 Journal of World Trade (2008), 545-557, at 547-548. 
1510 Hence, regression models allow detecting (and thus rejecting) ‘spurious correlations’, whereby the 
effect on domestic prices is not caused by subsidized imports but by other factors.  At the same time, 
they also allow revealing (and thus accepting) ‘spurious correlations’, whereby the real effect of the 
subsidized imports on domestic prices was hidden by other factors.  See Steinberg and Josling, above n 
1153, at 390-392.     
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such relationship.1511  Strictly speaking, only (the degree of) correlation could be detected and 
not causation.  One specific regression model often used in trade remedy cases to partly 
counter this problem is the ‘Granger-causality’ model.  A variable x (e.g., volumes or prices 
of subsidized imports) is considered to ‘granger-cause’ another variable y (e.g., domestic 
prices), if past values of x (e.g., volumes or prices of imports) provide information for 
predicting current and future values of y (e.g., domestic prices).1512  To be sure, ‘granger-
causality’ does not detect causality in the meaning of ‘necessary condition’ but rather 
corresponds to causality as ‘constant conjunction’.1513  Moreover, the data requirements to 
conduct econometric estimation, and certainly to run the ‘Granger-causality’ model, are 
demanding.1514      
Importantly, these econometric models test whether subsidized imports – and not subsidies as 
such – cause injury to the domestic industry.  Indeed, prices/volumes of subsidized imports 
and not subsidies are included as independent variables.  As they are mostly only observed on 
an annual basis, ‘subsidies’ can simply not be included as independent variable because the 
data requirements would not be fulfilled.1515  Hence, the estimated outcomes only detect 
whether and to what extent the volume and/or price of subsidized imports, holding other 
factors constant, are correlated with – or Granger-cause – injury to the domestic industry 
proxies.  In contrast, econometric models do not reveal whether such volume and/or price 
effects are the effect of subsidization.  ‘Subsidized imports’ are included in the model on the 
basis of a preliminary determination that foreign importing producers are subsidized.  Such 
‘bifurcation’ between the injury test and the subsidy test could easily lead to false positive or 
higher than justified CVDs determinations (so-called Type 2 errors).1516  Even if foreign 
producers are subsidized, the surge in their imports into the investigating country could very 
well be (partly) explained by other factors than subsidization (e.g. increase in 
competitiveness) but this is not detected under the bifurcated test as employed in practice.  
Consider, for the example, the US CVDs investigations, whereby such bifurcation is 
                                                 
1511 WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2005 – Exploring the links between trade, standards and the 
WTO (Geneva: WTO Publications, 2005), 333 pp., at 200-201. 
1512 The addition to a regression of past values of x improves the prediction (e.g., statistically 
significant reduction in the mean square error) of future values of y.  See World Trade Report 2005, 
above n 1511, at 201. 
1513 According to the World Trade Report 2005, causality as ‘constant conjunction’ is Hume’s 
characterization.  World Trade Report 2005, above n 1511, at 201. 
1514 Relying on time series data, the models require that sufficient observations can be made at regular 
intervals during such reference period.  In order to rely on granger-causality in trade remedy cases, data 
must be available on a monthly or quarterly basis.  World Trade Report 2005, above n 1511, at 201; 
Sapir and Trachtman, above n 1195, at 201. 
1515 Sapir and Trachtman, above n 1195, at 201. 
1516 R. Diamond, ‘Privatization and the Definition of Subsidy: A Critical Study of Appellate Body 
Texturalism’, 11:3 Journal of International Economic Law (2008), 1-30, at 26. 
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institutionalized.1517  USDOC determines whether subsidizion as defined in the SCM 
Agreement (or Agreement on Agriculture) is taking place, and if so, determines the subsidy 
amount.  Yet, it hereby does not consider whether subsidization has had an effect on output 
levels.1518  Subsequently, the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) 
determines whether such ‘subsidized imports’ (threaten to) materially injure the US domestic 
industry.1519  Correlation (or Granger causality) between subsidized imports and injury 
proxies is tested on the basis of econometric modeling and the effective occurrence of volume 
expanding or price suppressing effects could also be easily observed on the basis of import 
data.  The ‘missing link’ in the investigation is that any volume or price effect of subsidized 
imports is simply assumed to be the effect of subsidization.  This could lead to a false positive 
finding, for example, in case a subsidized foreign producer would have also expanded its 
output levels in the absence of subsidization (e.g., build a new plant because of a rise in 
competiveness).  Obviously, this might generate higher import levels into the investigating 
country that are in fact not the effect of subsidization. 
Although the legal text unequivocally prescribes that it must be demonstrated that the 
‘subsidized imports are, through the effects of subsidies, causing injury’,1520 the case law has 
systematically read out this obligation from Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement.  It suffices, 
by reliance for instance on regression analysis, to demonstrate that subsidized imports cause 
injury.  Thus, an additional demonstration that the injury is caused by the effects of the 
subsidy is not requisite.  In Japan – DRAMs (Korea), Korea had advocated such an additional 
examination precisely because ‘the increase in the volume of subsidized imports or the price 
at which they are sold on the importing Member's market may not have been caused by the 
subsidies received by the exporting company’.1521  For instance, Korea correctly suggested 
that increased volumes of imports could be due to other factors than the subsidy such as better 
quality, design, innovation, or customer preference.1522  However, the Appellate Body failed 
                                                 
1517 Diamond, above n 1516, at 26; A. O. Sykes, ‘The Economics of “Injury” in Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Cases’, in J. S. Bhandari and A. O. Sykes (eds), Economic Dimensions in 
International Law – Comparative and Empirical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 83-125. 
1518 See Diamond, above n 1516, at 26. 
1519 If both USDOC and USITC reach affirmative final determinations on their individual questions, 
USDOC will issue a CVDs order to offset the effect of the subsidy.   
1520 Emphasis added. 
1521 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 265. 
1522 Korea acknowledged that if the subsidy was in fact the impetus behind the superior quality, the 
injury to the domestic industry could be attributed to the subsidy.  See Appellate Body Report, Japan – 
DRAMs (Korea), para 266, footnote 472.  Hence, Korea did not aruge, like Crowley and Palmeter 
present it, that ‘if a subsidy improved product quality (…) there would be no basis for findings that the 
imports, that happened to be subsidized, had caused injury “through the effects of subsidies” ’.  This 
does not correspond to Korea’s argumentation in paragraph 82, to which these authors refer.  M. A. 
Crowley and D. Palmeter, ‘Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from 
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to read an obligation for such an additional examination1523 in Article 15.5 of the SCM 
Agreement.1524,1525  In the Appellate Body’s view, the non-attribution requirement already 
addresses ‘adequately the concern that the injurious effects of any known factors other than 
subsidized imports are not attributed to the subsidized imports’ because this requirement 
‘ensures that injuries that may have been caused by other known factors are not attributed to 
the subsidized imports’.1526  However, in my opinion, this does not give in to the concern 
raised by Korea.  After all, the non-attribution requirement does not seem to detach those 
factors attached to the ‘subsidized imports’ that do not result from subsidization (e.g., quality, 
innovation).  Note in conclusion that Korea’s reasoning that the causality requirement in 
CVDs procedures should be interpreted similarly as under Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement 
(serious prejudice claims) was explicitly refuted by the Appellate Body.  Here, the Appellate 
Body referred to ‘the difference between the text, context, rationale, and object of the 
provisions in Part III and Part V of the SCM Agreement’.1527  Apparently, whereas ‘serious 
prejudice’ should be the effect of the subsidy (Article 6.3), material injury to the domestic 
industry should only be the effect of the ‘subsidized imports’.1528 
  
In conclusion, the causation requirement as interpreted in the case law does not seem to filter 
out only those subsidies that are effectively causing material injury.  First, if the causation 
standard of the safeguards context would be transposed to the CVDs context, the required 
level of ‘material’ injury might be partly caused by other factors.  Second, the demonstrated 
causal link between ‘subsidized imports’ and injury does not ensure that such injury has in 
fact been caused by subsidization.   
 
5.2.3. Imposition of countervailing duties 
Prior to the discussion on the imposition of (provisional or final) CVDs measures, an 
alternative should be pointed out.  This alternative refers to voluntary undertakings under 
                                                                                                                                            
Korea (DS 336 and Corr.1, adopted 17 December 2007)’, 8:1 World Trade Review (2009), 259-272, at 
270. 
1523 Such an additional examination suggested by Korea would, according to the Appellate Body, 
require an inquiry into two matters: (i) the use to which the subsidies were put by the exporting 
company; (ii) whether, absent the subsidies, the product would have been exported in the same 
volumes or at the same prices.  Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 266. 
1524 The Appellate Body referred to footnote 47 of the SCM Agreement which is footnoted to the term 
‘effect’ in Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement and reads: ‘As set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4’ 
(volume/price effect and the impact on the domestic industry).  Appellate Body Report, Japan – 
DRAMs (Korea), paras 263-266. 
1525 For the same reason, the Appellate Body’s finding was criticized by Crowley and Palmeter.  See 
Crowley and Palmeter, above n 1522, at 263-264, 269-270. 
1526 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 267 (emphasis in the original). 
1527 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 272. 
1528 The latter could also be relied upon in an actionable subsidy claim before the WTO dispute 
settlement system by virtue of Article 5(a) of the SCM Agreement. 
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which (a) the exporting Member agrees to eliminate or limit the subsidy1529 or takes other 
measures concerning its effect or (b) the exporter agrees to revise its price so that the 
investigating authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the subsidy is eliminated.1530  
Indeed, such undertakings provide an equal protection for producers in the importing country.  
Of course, the national welfare effects are different given that CVDs are collected by the 
importing Member, whereas these economic benefits in case of undertakings flow to the 
exporting Member (a) or the exporters (b).1531  The importing investigating Member does not 
have to accept the undertaking if its acceptance is considered impractical (e.g., if the number 
of exporters is too great) or for other reasons such as general policy.1532  Moreover, it can 
accept an undertaking only after a preliminary affirmative determination of a subsidy causing 
injury.  The investigation will nevertheless continue if either the exporting Member or the 
importing Member so desires.  If this final determination is negative, the undertaking shall 
lapse except when this determination results from the undertaking itself.  If it is positive, the 
undertaking shall continue.1533 
Before the termination of an investigation, a WTO Member is allowed to impose provisional 
CVDs (in the form of cash deposits or bonds1534) if three conditions are fulfilled.1535  First, an 
investigation has been initiated at least 60 days before and interested Members and interested 
parties have been given adequate opportunity to submit information and make comments 
(procedural requirement).  Second, a preliminary affirmative determination has been made on 
the three substantive elements (subsidy, injury, and causal relation).  Third, the authorities 
judge provisional CVDs necessary to prevent injury being caused during the investigation.  If 
a final determination is made about a subsidy causing injury, a WTO Member is allowed to 
impose definitive CVDs unless the subsidy is withdrawn.1536,1537   
The level of (provisional or definitive) CVDs imposed by the importing Member may not 
exceed the amount of the subsidy (Article 19.4 of the SCM Agreement).1538  It is merely 
‘desirable’ that the duty should be less than the amount of the subsidy if such lesser duty 
                                                 
1529 If a subsidy is withdrawn, a Member cannot impose CVDs (see Article 19.1 of the SCM 
Agreement). 
1530 The exporting Member should agree with undertakings from exporters (Article 18.2 of the SCM 
Agreement). 
1531 In all situations, the negative effect on consumers in the importing country is the same because of 
the higher price.   
1532 Article 18.3 of the SCM Agreement. 
1533 Article 18.4 of the SCM Agreement.  See Article 21.5 of the SCM Agreement for the duration of 
accepted undertakings. 
1534 Article 17.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
1535 Article 17.1 of the SCM Agreement.   
1536 Article 19.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
1537 The term ‘countervailing duty’ is defined in footnote 36 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of 
the GATT 1994. 
1538 For provisional CVDs, see Article 17.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
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would be adequate to remove the injury (‘lesser duty’-rule).1539 So, the level of CVDs can 
exceed the injury caused to the domestic industry, depending on the autonomous decision of 
the CVDs-investigating authority.  
The obligation to not impose CVDs above the subsidy level (Article 19.4 of the SCM 
Agreement) implies, in the view of the Panel as well as the Appellate Body in Japan – 
DRAMs (Korea), that CVDs may only be imposed if there is present subsidization at the time 
of duty imposition.1540  This requirement to establish present subsidization does not mean that 
investigating authorities are prevented from establishing the existence of subsidization (and 
injury and causing) by reference to data taken from a past period of investigation.1541 
Nonetheless, the Panel held that, in the case of non-recurring subsidies, ‘if the review of the 
period of investigation indicates that the subsidy will no longer exist at the time of imposition, 
the existence of subsidization during the period of investigation will not suffice to 
demonstrate current subsidization at the time of imposition’.1542  In other words, investigating 
authorities will have to establish that the CVDs are imposed on products that are still 
benefiting from the non-recurring subsidy. One such method, adopted by Japan in this case, is 
to allocate (spread out) the amount of the benefit conferred by the non-recurring subsidy over 
the useful life of the product.  The useful life of the subsidized production facilities in this 
case was determined by Japan as five years (2001–2005).  The Panel did not question this 
‘useful life’ approach in general or the determination by Japan but concluded that this five-
year allocation period is a finding that the benefit will expire after a period of five years and 
that Japan thus failed to demonstrate subsidization at the time of the imposition of CVDs 
(year 2006).1543 In the Negotiating Group on Rules, proposals have been formulated to 
introduce rules on how subsidy benefits should be allocated.1544 
Finally, recall that Members are allowed to perform an investigation on an aggregate basis.1545  
As clarified by the Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV, CVDs have to be imposed on 
all sources found to be subsidized, although no prior investigation of all individual exporters 
                                                 
1539 Articles 17.5 and 19.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
1540 Panel Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 7.355; Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs 
(Korea), para 210. 
1541 Indeed, the Panel recognized that investigating authorities have no choice because of the procedural 
requirements to establish the existence of subsidization (and injury) on the basis of past investigation 
periods.  Panel Report, Japan – DRAMS Countervailing Duties, para 7.356; Appellate Body Report, 
Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 209. 
1542 Emphasis added.  See Panel Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 7.357. 
1543 Panel Report, Japan – DRAMS Countervailing Duties, para 7.360.  See also above Part II, Chapter 
3, Section 3.2.2.1. 
1544 See, for example, Communication from the United States, Allocation and Expensing of Subsidy 
Benefits (TN/RL/GEN/130, April 24, 2006); Paper from Brazil, Allocation of Subsidy Benefits 
(TN/RL/W/192, November 23, 2005). 
1545 Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. 
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is required.1546  An exporter who faces CVDs but was not investigated (for reasons other than 
a refusal to cooperate) is entitled to an expedited review so that an individual CVDs rate (or 
no rate at all) is established.1547  Such a CVDs investigation on an aggregate basis is thus, as 
Horn and Mavroidis have correctly argued, by definition imprecise as it could lead to CVDs 
on individual products which do not amount to the actual level of subsidization.  According to 
the same authors, this has the effect to shift the burden of proof from the CVDs-investigating 
authorities towards individual exporters, who have to show that they have not (or to a lesser 
extent) benefited from subsidization.1548  Yet, the case law does not seem to place the burden 
on the exporter requesting an expedited review to show that he has not been subsidized.1549 
 
5.2.4. Duration of countervailing duties 
A first question with regard to the duration of CVDs is their starting point.  In general, 
provisional and definitive CVDs can only be imposed upon products that enter the country 
following the imposition of such measures.  Only in ‘critical circumstances’1550 may definitive 
CVDs be assessed retroactively.  This is limited to goods imported for consumption not more 
than 90 days prior to the application of provisional CVDs.1551  In contrast, provisional CVDs 
can never be applied retroactively.1552   
What if there is a discrepancy between the level of provisional and definitive CVDs?1553  If 
the definitive CVD is higher, the difference shall not be collected, whereas if the definitive 
duty is lower than the cash deposit or bond, the difference must be reimbursed or the bond 
released in an expeditious manner.1554  On the other hand, if a final determination is negative, 
provisional measures have to be undone: cash deposits should be refunded and bonds released 
in an expeditious manner (Article 20.5 of the SCM Agreement).  The same applies in case a 
                                                 
1546 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 152.  Such an aggregate investigation 
might result in a lower maximum CVDs level because the subsidy amount will have to be spread out 
over a larger amount of products.  See Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 164, 
footnote 196. 
1547 Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. 
1548 Horn and Mavroidis, above n 819, at 715. 
1549 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 164. 
1550 Regarding the specific conditions, see Article 20.6 of the SCM Agreement. 
1551 Article 20.6 of the SCM Agreement. 
1552 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber III, paras 7.93-7.94. 
1553 Articles 20.2-20.4 of the SCM Agreement.  Strictly speaking, definitive CVDs replace provisional 
CVDs and are thus applied retroactively in case of a positive final determination.  This is therefore 
considered as a second exception on the general rule of the non-retroactive application of CVDs (see 
Article 20.2 of the SCM Agreement; Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber III, paras 7.93-7.94).  To be 
sure, if no provisional CVDs had been in place, definitive CVDs cannot be imposed retroactively under 
this exception.  
1554 Article 20.3 of the SCM Agreement. 
PART II CHAPTER 5 – REMEDIES 
 
 
 
 
290 
 
 
final determination only finds a threat of injury, unless where the provisional measures 
exactly prevented that a determination of injury was made.1555 
The application of provisional CVDs should be limited to as short a period as possible and 
may not exceed four months. Definitive CVDs may remain in force to the extent necessary to 
counteract the subsidization but may in principle not exceed five years.1556  The SCM 
Agreement provides two review mechanisms that have an impact on the duration of definitive 
CVDs.  
 
5.2.4.1. Administrative review 
An administrative review should be conducted when initiated either by the investigating 
authority itself ‘where warranted’ or, after a reasonable period of time after the imposition, 
upon request of any interested party that submits positive information substantiating the need 
for a review.1557  In particular, the following elements could be requested to review or could 
be reviewed ex officio: (1) whether the continued imposition of CVDs is necessary to offset 
the subsidy, and/or (2) whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were 
removed. If the investigating authorities determine that the imposition of CVDs is no longer 
warranted, it must be terminated immediately. In contrast, if the outcome is a positive 
determination and the review covered injury as well as subsidization, the five-year period 
restarts.1558  
 
5.2.4.2. Sunset review 
To extend the imposition of CVDs beyond the (original or restarted) five years, a sunset 
review must be initiated before the end of this period by the investigating authority itself or on 
behalf of the domestic industry.  CVDs could continue if the investigating authorities show 
that revocation of the duty is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of the injury to the 
domestic industry.  The sunset review should thus only be initiated before the end of the five-
year period and should ‘normally’ be concluded within 12 months.  During this review, CVDs 
may remain in place.1559  Hence, the SCM Agreement contains an important loophole to 
extend the imposition of CVDs beyond five years without, however, giving much guidance on 
the exact standard of review.  Again, panels and the Appellate Body have been called upon to 
complete the contract in this respect.  In particular, they had to decide on whether the 
                                                 
1555 Article 20.2 juncto Article 20.4 of the SCM Agreement. 
1556 Articles 21.1 and 21.3 of the SCM Agreement. 
1557 Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
1558 Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement. 
1559 Articles 21.3 and 21.4 of the SCM Agreement.  Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para 
117, footnote 96. 
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procedural standards elaborated for the initial investigation mutatis mutandis apply for the 
sunset review.  Yet, the EC unsuccessfully pleaded for such a parallel application in US – 
Carbon Steel to reinforce the procedural requirements upon the US sunset review procedure. 
Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement spells out two ways to initiate a sunset review: 
‘authorities (…) on their own initiative or upon a duly substantiated request made by or on 
behalf of the domestic industry’.1560  The EC advocated in US – Carbon Steel that the 
evidentiary standards specified in Article 11.6 of the SCM Agreement for authorities to 
initiate an investigation on their own initiative also applies to the initiation of a sunset review 
on their own initiative.  Based on a contextual analysis, the Appellate Body disagreed 
however.  This means that the automatic self-initiation of sunset reviews by investigating 
authorities is not prohibited.1561  
With regard to the substantive threshold for initiating a sunset review process, the SCM 
Agreement also does not clarify whether the de minimis standard of Article 11.9 of the SCM 
Agreement (1 per cent threshold) is applicable under the sunset review.  Again, the Appellate 
Body in US – Carbon Steel did not transpose this standard to sunset reviews.  Hence, CVDs 
could continue even if the level of subsidies has fallen below the de minimis level subsequent 
to the initial investigation.1562  At the same time, in case the level of subsidization is very low 
at the time of the review, the Appellate Body stressed that ‘there must be persuasive evidence 
that revocation of the duty would nevertheless lead to injury to the domestic industry’.1563 
 
To continue the imposition of CVDs, such sunset review should lead to an ‘an affirmative 
determination’1564 that ‘the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or 
recurrence of subsidization and injury’ (Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement).  The focus of 
the review determination is therefore on what ‘would happen if an existing countervailing 
duty were to be removed’.1565  This is, as the Panel in US – Carbon Steel emphasized, ‘an 
inherently prospective analysis’ but it must have an adequate basis in facts.1566  In particular, a 
determination of likelihood must rest ‘on the evaluation of the evidence that it has gathered 
during the original investigation, the intervening reviews and finally the sunset review’.1567  
Mavroidis has rightly questioned whether such a test could effectively be workable.  After all, 
correctly assessing the likelihood that subsidization would recur in case of removal of duties 
                                                 
1560 As emphasized by the Appellate Body, the phrase ‘duly substantiated’ only qualifies the initiation 
on behalf of the domestic industry.  Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para 103. 
1561 Appellate Body, US – Carbon Steel, paras 116 and 118. 
1562 The Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel on this element.  Appellate Body, US – Carbon Steel, 
para 92. 
1563 Appellate Body, US – Carbon Steel, para 87. 
1564 Appellate Body, US – Carbon Steel, para 63. 
1565 Appellate Body, US – Carbon Steel, para 87. 
1566 Panel Report, US – Carbon Steel, paras 8.94-8.96. 
1567 Panel Report, US – Carbon Steel, paras 8.94-8.95.  
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would require insights in the future political leverage of the targeted industry in the 
(previously) subsidizing country.  Because such a substantive test would be too demanding or 
even speculative, WTO-adjudicating bodies might rather adopt a pro-deference stance toward 
sunset reviews.1568  
 
5.2.5. Standard of review 
In case a CVDs determination is subsequently challenged before a panel, what is the panel’s 
standard of review?  In essence, the Appellate Body has warned that ‘a panel may not conduct 
a de novo review of the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the competent 
authorities’.1569  Instead, ‘it is the explanation given by the competent authority for its 
determination that alone enables panels to determine whether there has been compliance’.1570  
In short, panels should act ‘as reviewer of agency action, rather than as initial trier of fact’.1571 
Panels therefore systematically reject to make a de novo review when CVDs determinations 
are challenged.  They will not take the place of the investigating authority and make their own 
assessment on whether, given the available evidence, CVDs could legitimately be 
imposed.1572  For instance, as explained above, the Panel in US – Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMS suggested that US DOC could have simply considered 100 per cent 
government-owned banks as ‘public bodies’.1573  Yet, because it was precluded from making 
a de novo review, the Panel only reviewed (and rejected) the US DOC’s determination that 
private bodies were directed/entrusted by the Korean government.1574  As a result, the Panel 
found that US DOC’s determination was inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM 
Agreement, even though it suggested that the determination would have been WTO-consistent 
under another inference from the available factual findings.   
Instead of making a de novo review, panels have to examine, by virtue of the obligation to 
make an ‘objective assessment’ (Article 11 of the DSU), whether the investigating authority 
provided ‘a reasoned and adequate explanation’ as to: (i) how the evidence on the record 
supported its factual findings; and (ii) how those factual findings supported its legal 
                                                 
1568 Mavroidis, above n 1094, at 365. 
1569 Appellate Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards, para 299. 
1570 Appellate Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards, para 303 (emphasis in the original); Appellate Body 
Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), para 121; Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI 
(Article 21.5 – Canada), para 93; Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on 
DRAMS, paras 183-184, 188.   
1571 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 188 (emphasis in 
the original). 
1572 See, for example, Panel Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 7.53. 
1573 See above Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2. 
1574 Panel Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, paras 7.3, 7.8, 7.62, 7.190, 
footnote 202.  See also Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.137. 
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assessment.1575  Above, ‘such explanation should be discernible from the published 
determination itself’.1576  Where the investigating authority draws its conclusion from the 
totality of evidence, panels should assess whether individual pieces of evidence, which are on 
their own insufficient to make an inference, are adequate to reach that conclusion when 
viewed together.1577  In deciding in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS on the 
basis of a single piece, the Panel had undertaken a de novo review of the evidence before the 
agency.1578  Logically, the Appellate Body hereby specified that errors in an investigating 
authority's examination of individual pieces of evidence ‘undoubtedly would affect an 
examination of the totality of the evidence, as these pieces would constitute the evidence the 
Panel would consider as a whole (…)’.1579  At the same time, the Appellate Body in Japan – 
DRAMs (Korea) has emphasized that panels should not shield behind the prohibition to make 
a de novo review to effectively decide on whether such a flawed piece of evidence indeed 
leads to the rejection of the legal assessment.  Japan’s investigating authority had reached its 
legal assessment on the basis of the totality of evidence and did not consider the flawed 
factual finding (in this case commercial unreasonableness) as indispensable to this end.  
Therefore, the Panel should have examined whether the remaining factual findings (in this 
case government’s intent and involvement in the restructuring process) could together be 
sufficient to infer the advanced legal determination (in this case entrustment or direction).1580  
Contrary to what the Panel had decided, this would not amount to a de novo review.1581  After 
all, the Appellate Body reasoned that it ‘is unreasonable to expect’ the investigating authority 
to engage upon an enquiry as to whether other evidence would, by itself, sustain its finding.  
Indeed, ‘it cannot be expected to proceed on the basis that certain aspects of its reasoning 
would later be found to be faulty’.1582 
In sum, when an investigating authority has made a legal determination on the basis of a 
variety of factual findings, an assessment on the basis of a single piece of evidence would 
                                                 
1575 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 186. 
1576 Indeed, ‘a Member may not seek to defend its agency's decision on the basis of evidence not 
contained in the record of the investigation’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMS, paras 161-165, 186. 
1577 In the words of the Appellate Body: 
‘when an investigating authority relies on the totality of circumstantial evidence, this imposes 
upon a panel the obligation to consider, in the context of the totality of the evidence, how the 
interaction of certain pieces of evidence may justify certain inferences that could not have been 
justified by a review of the individual pieces of evidence in isolation’. 
Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 157 (emphasis in the 
original). 
1578 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 188. 
1579 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 154; Appellate 
Body Report, Japan - DRAMs (Korea), para 134. 
1580 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), paras 131-139. 
1581 Panel Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 7.253. 
1582 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 133. 
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amount to a de novo review.  On the other hand, the rejection of one of these findings should 
not preclude panels to decide on whether the remaining factual findings viewed in their 
totality suffice to reach the legal determination.1583  Obviously, on a substantive level, those 
panels could still reach the conclusion that the remaining factual findings are insufficient to 
infer that assessment.1584  In my view, the Appellate Body correctly concluded that this is not 
a de novo review because the remaining factual findings are made by the investigating 
authority and the panel is also not asked to alter the legal basis advanced by the investigating 
authority.1585   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1583 This conclusion holds unless this piece of evidence is considered by the authority as indispensable 
for its determination. 
1584 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), paras 135-137. 
1585 In essence, this is parallel to, for example, the Panel’s conclusion in EC - Countervailing Measures 
on DRAM Chips whereby the Panel rejected part of the evidence advanced by the EC but still agreed 
that the remaining factors (in this case commercial unreasonableness and government’s 
shareholdership) sufficed to infer government direction.  See Panel Report, EC – Countervailing 
Measures on DRAM Chips, paras 7.130-7.131. 
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6. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
The previous chapters in this Part discussed the general disciplines on subsidization and the 
imposition of CVDs set out under the SCM Agreement. However, these disciplines are not 
horizontally applicable to all countries or all goods. In this final chapter of Part II, the focus 
turns to the differential treatment for developing countries and agricultural goods.  To some 
extent, both special regimes might be contrasted with each other, as the first was established 
on the demand of developing countries whereas the second was created on the demand of 
developed countries with a vulnerable agricultural industry.  Of course, as amply illustrated in 
the historical overview,1586 the division of interests toward agriculture does not fully 
correspond to the division between developed and developing countries.  Whereas developed 
agriculture exporters such as Canada and Australia are firm proponents of liberalizing 
agriculture, net food-importing developing countries will be hurt by reduced subsidization in 
agriculture. 
 
6.1. RATIONE PERSONAE: SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Article 27 of the SCM Agreement elaborates special and differential (S&D) treatment 
provisions for developing countries. As if it were a preamble, it declares that ‘Members 
recognize that subsidies may play an important role in economic development programmes of 
developing countries’.1587  The compliance Panel in Brazil – Aircraft read this as a reflection 
of the overarching concern recognized in the preamble to the WTO Agreement that: 
 
(…) there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and 
especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.1588 
 
Nonetheless, the gradual extension of subsidy disciplines, in particular on export subsidies, is 
one of the main novelties of the SCM Agreement resulting mainly from US insistence during 
the Uruguay Round.  In this section, we look into detail in the flexibility currently given to 
developing countries on subsidies as well as on CVDs. 
  
 
                                                 
1586 See Figure 1 above Part II, Chapter 1, Section 1.5. 
1587 Article 27.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
1588 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), footnote 49. 
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6.1.1. Special and differential treatment on prohibited subsidies 
6.1.1.1. Export subsidies 
6.1.1.1.1. Least-developed countries and low-income countries listed in Annex VII 
By virtue of Article 27.2(a) juncto Annex VII of the SCM Agreement, the disciplines on 
export subsidies contained in Article 3.1(a) do, in principle, not apply for two groups of 
developing countries: (i) least-developed countries (LDCs) designated as such by the United 
Nations1589 and (ii) other low-income countries listed in Annex VII(b) until their gross 
national product (GNP) per capita has reached $1,000 per annum.  The Doha Ministerial 
Conference decided to raise this threshold to $1,000 in constant 1990 dollars for three 
consecutive years.1590  Regarding this second group, it should be emphasized that not all 
developing countries below this threshold could thus benefit from this S&D treatment but 
only those explicitly listed in Annex VII(b).1591  All original WTO Members at the time of 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round with per capita income below the $1,000 were listed (with 
the omission of Honduras, which was added by a technical rectification).1592  On the other 
hand, none of the acceding countries were superadded afterwards.  Probably, countries 
deliberately opted for a closed list during the Uruguay Round so as to prevent that some of the 
later acceding countries, such as China, would be able to automatically benefit from this S&D 
treatment.1593  As the following remark during Vietnam’s accession negotiations painfully 
illustrates, not all acceding developing countries are apparently aware that they will not 
benefit from this exception if this is not negotiated: 
 
We understand that Vietnam considers that because it is a developing country with per capita 
GNP below US$1,000 it would be able to maintain export subsidies (...).  This provision in the 
SCM is specific to developing countries referred to in Annex VII of the SCM.  It is not a self-
nominated or expanding list of countries.  While we are prepared to consider some flexibility 
                                                 
1589 Annex VII(a) of the SCM Agreement.  Out of 49 designated LDCs, 32 are currently WTO 
Member: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia. 
1590 Moreover, Ministers agreed that the country in question will be re-included when its GNP per 
capita falls to less than $1,000. See Ministerial Conference, Implementation Related Issues and 
Concerns (WT/MIN(01)/17, 14 November 2001), paras 10.1 and 10.4. 
1591 As well as Honduras (see below n 1592). 
1592 By omission, the Annex VII(b) list in the latest draft of the SCM Agreement was not amended at 
the time Honduras became member before the final conclusion of the Uruguay Round.  After years of 
requests by Honduras, the General Council finally allowed the Director-General to rectify this error in 
2000.  See General Council, Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, Decision of 15 December 
2000 (WT/L/384, 19 December 2000); General Council, Minutes of Meeting (WT/GC/M/62, 28 
February 2001), para 36. 
1593 To be sure, China’s GNP per capita is currently higher than the $1,000 threshold but this could not 
have been foreseen at the time the Uruguay Round was concluded.   
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on how Vietnam phases out its prohibited export subsidies, Vietnam has no right to recourse 
under these provisions to continue to provide prohibited subsidies following its accession.1594  
 
Indeed, even though Vietnam’s GNP per capita is currently still below the $1,000 dollar 
threshold, it does, similar to all non-original WTO Members,1595 not benefit from this S&D 
treatment on export subsidies.1596  In contrast, all low-income developing countries being 
original WTO Members can rely upon this flexibility until their GNP per capita reaches 
$1,000 in constant 1990 dollars for three consecutive years, as reflected in the most recent 
available data.1597  Table 1 lists all these low-income counties and reveals that only three of 
them have graduated so far (i.e., Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Morocco).  
Together with all LDCs,1598 these countries listed in Table 1 that did not graduate (e.g., Egypt, 
India, Indonesia) are thus exempted from the prohibition on export subsidies.  The Ministers 
in Doha indeed emphasized (with regard to LDCs) that they ‘have flexibility to finance their 
exporters, consistent with their development needs’.1599  As elaborated below, two caveats are 
in place, however.  First, this right to offer export subsidies extinguishes for products that 
have reached export competiveness.  Second, export subsidies are not prohibited but could 
still be subject to an actionable subsidy claim and CVDs action.1600  
 
 2005 2006 2007 
Bolivia 771 798 841 
Cameroon 936 933 954 
Congo 834 -- 871 
Cote d'Ivoire 719 704 704 
Dominican Republic 1338 1459 1568 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 863 907 953 
                                                 
1594 Accession of Vietnam, Additional Questions and Replies (WT/ACC/VNM/29, 30 October 2003), at 
37.  Vietnam finally acceded in 2007. 
1595 Other non-original WTO Members with GNP per capita of less than $1,000 in 1990 dollars include: 
Albania (2000), Armenia (2003), China (2001), Georgia (2000), Kyrgyz Republic (1998), FYR of 
Macedonia (2003), Moldova (2001), Mongolia (1997), Tonga (2007), Ukraine (2008). Hence, none of 
these countries can benefit from S&D treatment on export subsidies.  See S. Creskoff and P. 
Walkenhorst, ‘Implications of WTO Disciplines for Special Economic Zones in Developing 
Countries’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (2009), 42 pp., at 24. 
1596 Even in current US$, Vietnam’s GNI per capita is below the $1,000 threshold on the basis of the 
latest available data ($870 for 2008) (on the use of GNI instead of GNP, see below n 1602).  See also, 
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam (WT/ACC/VNM/48, 27 October 2006), para 
288. 
1597 The methodology for making this calculation is spelled out in the Chairman’s Report on the 
Implementation-related Issues Referred to the Committee at the Request of the Chairman of the 
General Council on 2 August and 15 October 2001 in the 15 December 2000 Decision of the General 
Council (G/SCM/38, 26 October 2003), Appendix 2. 
1598 To be sure, also those LDCs that are non-original WTO Members benefit from this exception 
because Annex VII(a) is not a closed list: it exempts all LDCs ‘designated as such by the United 
Nations which are Members of the WTO’.  
1599 Ministerial Conference, Implementation Related Issues and Concerns (WT/MIN(01)/17, 14 
November 2001), para 10.5.   
1600 Article 27.7 of the SCM Agreement.  See below on the scope of such actionable subsidy claims 
(Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.2). 
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Ghana 536 557 580 
Guatemala 1060 1078 1150 
Guyana 782 846 830 
Honduras 739 791 856 
India 668 721 780 
Indonesia 870 897 947 
Kenya 385 392 410 
Morocco 1176 1323 1344 
Nicaragua 570 575 590 
Nigeria 334 338 370 
Pakistan 517 570 586 
Philippines 975 999 1053 
Senegal 850 837 862 
Sri Lanka 821 885 916 
Zimbabwe 422 -- -- 
TABLE 1: ANNEX VII(B) MEMBERS, GNI PER CAPITA AT CONSTANT 1990 DOLLARS, 2005-20071601,1602 
 
6.1.1.1.2. Small trading developing countries 
All other developing countries were given eight years to phase out export subsidies (2003) but 
could request the SCM Committee, considering all their relevant economic, financial, and 
development needs, to extend this period (Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement).  The SCM 
Committee had to annually review the necessity of maintaining the export subsidies for which 
extension was granted.  If the SCM Committee made a negative determination, the export 
subsidy had to be phased out within two years from the end of the last authorized period.1603  
A major disadvantage of this system was that the year-to-year extensions generated large 
uncertainty to developing countries’ governments and their business community involved.1604  
Here again, the Doha Ministerial Conference (2001) provided some more flexibility without, 
however, extending the eight-year period in general.  Only certain small trading developing 
                                                 
1601 In full: Note by the Secretariat, Annex VII(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, Updating GNP per Capita for Members Liisted in Annex VII(b) as Foreseen in Paragraph 
10.1 of the Doha Ministerial Decision and in Accordance with the Methodology in G/SCM/38 
(G/SCM/110/Add.6, 17 July 2009). 
1602 On the use of GNI (Gross National Income) instead of GNP (Gross National Product), the WTO 
Secretariat clarified that: 
‘The World Bank data series formerly identified as Gross National Product ("GNP") is now 
published as Gross National Income ("GNI").  This change reflects the implementation of the 
System of National Accounts 1993 ("SNA 93").  Although the underlying concepts are different 
(GNP being a measure of product, and GNI being a measure of income), the values calculated 
are the same’.   
Seet, Note by the Secretariat, Annex VII(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, Updating GNP per Capita for Members Listed in Annex VII(b) as Foreseen in Paragraph 
10.1 of the Doha Ministerial Decision and in Accordance with the Methodology in G/SCM/38 
(G/SCM/110/Add.6, 17 July 2009), footnote 1. 
1603 Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement. 
1604 See R. A. Torres, ‘Free Zones and the World Trade Organization Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures’, 2:5 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2007), 217-223, at 221. 
PART II CHAPTER 6 – DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
 
 
 
 
299 
 
 
countries were granted,1605 without a substantive review,1606 annual extensions to 2007 for 
export subsidy programmes in force in 2001 that provided full or partial exemptions from 
import duties and internal taxes.1607  Nevertheless, the level of subsidies still benefiting from 
this transitional period may not be raised (standstill obligation).1608  This procedure was 
extended by the General Council in July 2007.1609  Until the end of 2013, the SCM Committee 
shall continue these authorizations, subject only to an annual review of the transparency and 
standstill requirements.  Consequently, their remaining export subsidies should be phased out 
no later than 31 December 2015.  
In sum, this transitional flexibility to grant export subsidies currently only applies to certain 
small trading developing countries and only with respect to their listed programmes.  These 
programmes relate to exemptions from import duties and internal taxes and are often 
implemented in export processing zones (EPZs).1610,1611  Surely, this flexibility is relevant 
because such programmes mostly exempt firms located in EPZs from direct taxes and import 
duties on capital inputs.1612  Hence, these measures go beyond the scope for such exemptions 
that would be allowed by virtue of footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement juncto the Illustrative 
List (items (e) and (i)).1613  
The SCM Committee only annually reviews the transparency requirement and whether these 
programmes are not modified so as to make them more favourable (in terms of their scope, 
coverage, and intensity of benefits) than they were in September 2001 (standstill 
                                                 
1605 This was open to developing countries whose share of world merchandise export trade was not 
greater than 0.10 per cent and whose gross national income (GNI) for the year 2000 was less than or 
equal to $20 billion.  For the list of countries benefiting from this S&D treatment, see below n 1610.  
The Ministers instructed the SCM Committee to avoid different treatment for countries in similar 
circumstances.  It must thus take into account relative competitiveness in relation to other developing 
countries that requested extension. 
1606 The annual review merely verifies transparency and standstill requirements (see below). 
1607 SCM Committee, Procedures for Extensions under Article 27.4 for Certain Developing Country 
Members (G/SCM/39, November 20, 2001). 
1608 Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement. See Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, paras 7.58–7.67. 
1609 General Council, Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(WT/L/691, 31 July 2007). 
1610 These countries are (with the reference to their programmes eligible for continuation of extensions): 
Antigua & Barbuda (G/SCM/50/Add.7-51/Add.7); Barbados (G/SCM/52/Add.7-56/Add.7); Belize 
(G/SCM/57/Add.7-60/Add.7); Costa Rica (G/SCM/61/Add.7-62/Add.7); Dominica 
(G/SCM/63/Add.7); Dominican Republic (G/SCM/64/Add.7); El Salvador (G/SCM/65/Add.7);  
Fiji (G/SCM/66/Add.7-68/Add.7); Grenada (G/SCM/69/Add.7-71/Add.7); Guatemala 
(G/SCM/72/Add.7-74/Add.7); Jamaica (G/SCM/75/Add.7-78/Add.7); Jordan (G/SCM/79/Add.7); 
Mauritius (G/SCM/83/Add.7); Panama (G/SCM/84/Add.7-85/Add.7); Papua New Guinea 
(G/SCM/86/Add.7); St. Lucia (G/SCM/87/Add.7-89/Add.7); St. Kitts and Nevis (G/SCM/90/Add.7); 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (G/SCM/91/Add.7) and Uruguay (G/SCM/92/Add.7).  
1611 See also Creskoff and Walkenhorst, above n 1595, at 23; Torres, above n 1604, at 221-222. 
1612 The obligation to export is often imposed to operate in such EPZs, which implies that such 
subsidies are contingent upon exportation.   
1613 See above Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1.2.2. 
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obligation).1614  Yet, the same two caveats as with regard to Annex VII developing countries 
apply: extinction in case of export competitiveness and the possibility for actionable subsidy 
claims1615 or CVDs responses by other WTO Members. 
Before going into the first caveat, notice that four low-income countries listed under Annex 
VII(b) (i.e., Bolivia, Honduras, Kenya, and Sri Lanka)1616 have preserved their right to 
similarly benefit from this transitional S&D treatment in case they would graduate before 
2015.1617  Hence, this means that those countries that have so far graduated under Annex 
VII(b) (i.e., Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Morocco) as well as non-original developing 
countries that acceded after the Doha Ministerial (2001) (e.g., Vietnam1618) cannot benefit 
from this transitional flexibility.  From an equity point of view, this could be criticized given 
that these countries’ GNI per capita might still be lower than (or similar to) the GNI per capita 
in ‘small trading developing countries’.  Politically, however, other WTO Members were only 
willing to extend the Article 27.4 flexibility to those countries that have an insignificant 
impact on trade, and thus a low potential to hurt their trading interests.1619  Clearly, not all 
developing countries that are listed in Annex VII (e.g., India) or that recently acceded (e.g., 
Vietnam) have a small impact on trade.    
    
6.1.1.1.3. Export competitiveness 
The flexibility to offer export subsidies for these two groups of developing countries 
extinguishes for products that have reached export competitiveness. In that case, those export 
subsidies offered by the first group of developing countries (‘Annex VII developing 
countries’) have to be phased out within eight years.1620  With regard to the second group of 
                                                 
1614 For the procedure, see above n 1609, 1607. References to the SCM Committee decisions on 
continuing the extension of the transition period for the year 2010 can be found in Report (2009) of the 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (G/L/906, 26 October 2009), para 20, footnote 
5. 
1615 Article 27.7 of the SCM Agreement. 
1616 See G/SCM/N/74/BOL & Suppl.1, G/SCM/N/74/HND, G/SCM/N/74/KEN, and 
G/SCM/N/74/LKA. 
1617 The date set for the standstill obligation refers to the year in which these Members’ GNP per capita 
will reach the level $1,000 dollar in constant 1990 dollars.  See General Council, Article 27.4 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (WT/L/691, 31 July 2007), para 4. 
1618 Again, other WTO Members explained this to Vietnam during accession negotiations: ‘(…) we do 
not consider that the provisions of Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement available to developing 
countries, or the fast-track procedures under Article 27.4 for developing countries with a small share of 
world export trade agreed at the Doha Ministerial meeting, are available to Vietnam.  Given that 
Vietnam will be acceding to the WTO after the completion of the implementation period for phasing 
out export subsidies for developing countries, we consider that Vietnam must phase out its export 
subsidy schemes upon accession’.  Accession of Vietnam, Additional Questions and Replies 
(WT/ACC/VNM/29, 30 October 2003), at 37. 
1619 Recall also that the export competitiveness extinction is applicable in case such a country would, 
nonetheless, gain some relative importance in a trading sector.  Moreover, the CVDs response also 
remains available to other countries (see below).  
1620 Article 27.5 of the SCM Agreement. 
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developing countries (‘small trading developing countries’), export subsidies even have to be 
phased within two years after the establishment of export competitiveness.   
According to Article 27.6 of the SCM Agreement, export competitiveness in a product exists 
‘if a developing country Member's exports of that product have reached a share of at least 
3.25 per cent in world trade of that product for two consecutive calendar years’.  The focus is 
therefore on the country’s share in trade, not on its share in total production.1621  Yet, such 
export competitiveness is only established, and the extinction period thus only kicks off, if 
this is either (a) notified by the developing country Member itself or (b) computed by the 
WTO Secretariat at the request of any other Member.1622  As might be expected, the first track 
is never used because countries lack the incentive to notify such export competiveness 
themselves.  This implies that the determination of export competitiveness de facto depends 
upon other Members’ requests to the WTO Secretariat.  With regard to ‘Annex VII 
developing countries’,1623 only two such requests have been formulated so far.  These were 
formulated by the US in 2003 and 2010 regarding India’s export competitiveness on textile 
and apparel exports.1624 
Before discussing the outcome of the 2010 WTO Secretariat computation, it should be 
highlighted that these computations have revealed interpretative difficulties regarding the 
exact coverage of the concepts ‘world trade’ and ‘product’ under Article 27.6 of the SCM 
Agreement.  Both elements are explained in sequence. 
First, does the concept of ‘world trade’ include trade between countries of the European 
Union (i.e., intra-EU(27) trade)?  Because Article 27.6 contains ‘no guidance’ on this issue, 
the WTO Secretariat made calculations on the basis of excluding as well as including intra-
EU(27) trade.  Obviously, the required share in world exports is less easily met in case intra-
EU trade is included.  Therefore, developing countries support calculations made on this 
basis.1625  This view should, in my opinion, be endorsed because the ordinary meaning of 
‘world trade’ does not exclude trade between countries belonging to a customs union.  This 
interpretation also preserves the recognized ‘important role’ of subsidies for developing 
                                                 
1621 Hence, it excludes production for domestic consumption.  See Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, 
para 7.1441. 
1622 Article 27.6 of the SCM Agreement.  The Secretariat only makes calculations according to the 
request of the WTO Member and does not interpret the results.  
1623 With regard to Article 27.4 countries, two requests and calculations have been made.  See Note 
from the Secretariat (G/SCM/46, 7 August 2002) (on exports by Colombia, at the request of Ecuador); 
Note from the Secretariat (G/SCM/48, 16 October 2002) (on exports by Thailand, at the request of 
Ecuador and Peru). 
1624 These calculations can be found in G/SCM/132/Add.1, 23 March 2010; G/SCM/103/Add.1, 12 
March 2003. 
1625 See, for instance, the results depicted in Table 2 included at the end of this Section.  See, for 
example, Replies of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe to Questions Raised Concerning the Proposal Contained in 
Document G/SCM/W/431/Rev.1 of 20 March 2001 (G/SCM/W/443, 17 May 2001), at 2.   
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countries (Article 27.1 of the SCM Agreement).1626  After all, this object and purpose of S&D 
treatment in the framework of the SCM Agreement would be undermined if a developing 
country could, without increasing its own share in world exports, reach export 
competitiveness on the basis of the formation or extension of a customs union.    
Second, the text of Article 27.6 of the SCM Agreement is ambiguous on whether products 
should be defined at either the section level or the heading level of the Harmonized System 
(HS) Nomenclature.  With regard to the 2010 computation, the US therefore requested that 
this was undertaken at both the section level (i.e., Section XI of the HS Nomenclature on 
‘Textiles and Textile Articles’) and the heading level (i.e., at the four digit-tariff level).1627  
The uncertainty flows from the definition of a ‘product’ in Article 27.6 as this refers to ‘a 
section heading’ of the HS Nomenclature, though the HS itself only contains ‘sections’ (group 
of chapters) or ‘headings’ (4-digit tariff level).1628  Because they will more likely reach export 
competitiveness in a product defined at (the 4-digit) heading level than at the much broader 
section level,1629 developing countries have generally pleaded for a product definition at the 
section level but no consensus has so far emerged in the SCM Committee.1630  On the basis of 
contacts with participating delegates in the Uruguay Round, Hoda and Ahuja reveal that 
negotiators had in mind ‘sections’ and not ‘headings’.1631  Moreover, these authors likewise 
doubt whether it is feasible to operate export promotion schemes on a four-digit heading 
level, and thus to implement a prohibition on export subsidies if export competitiveness is 
defined at that level.1632  After all, most exporters trade in products covering a number of 
different headings and it would be impractible to withdraw subsidies only for those in which 
export competitiveness has been demonstrated.  On the other hand, the authentic French and 
Spanish texts of Article 27.6 refer to ‘positions’ and ‘partidas’ respectively, which correspond 
to four-digit ‘headings’ instead of ‘sections’.  According to Article 33(3) of the Vienna 
Convention, ‘(t)he terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each 
                                                 
1626 Recall that in US – Softwood Lumber IV, the Appellate Body confirmed that the SCM Agreement 
aims to strengthen GATT disciplines on the use of both subsidies and CVDs, ‘while, recognizing at the 
same time, the right of Members to impose such measures under certain conditions’ (see above n 559).  
Article 27.1 of the SCM Agreement seems to emphasize this right with regard to developing countries. 
1627 No request at the section level was made in the 2003 calculations. 
1628 The HS classification consists of 21 ‘sections’, subdivided into 98 ‘chapters’, and further 
subdivided into four-digit ‘headings’ and six-digit ‘HS codes’.  Tariff lines are defined at the six-digit 
level (or at further subdivisions).   
1629 See also Creskoff and Walkenhorst, above n 1595, footnote 56.  
1630 Replies of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe to Questions Raised Concerning the Proposal Contained in Document 
G/SCM/W/431/Rev.1 of 20 March 2001 (G/SCM/W/443, 17 May 2001). 
1631 Hoda and Ahuja, above n 1088, at 1028.  This is also mentioned by Replies of Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe to 
Questions Raised Concerning the Proposal Contained in Document G/SCM/W/431/Rev.1 of 20 March 
2001 (G/SCM/W/443, 17 May 2001). 
1632 Hoda and Ahuja, above n 1088, at 1028.   
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authentic text’.  The Appellate Body has confirmed that this customary rule of treaty 
interpretation implies that ‘the treaty interpreter should seek the meaning that gives effect, 
simultaneously, to all the terms of the treaty, as they are used in each authentic language’.1633 
At first sight, this rule of treaty interpretation might rather point to products defined at the 
four-digit heading level because this seems the only ‘simultaneous’ ordinary meaning as used 
in each authentic language.  Upon further scrutiny, it might, however, be questioned whether 
the ordinary meaning of ‘a section heading’ in the English text could indeed refer to a 
‘heading’ in the meaning of the HS Nomenclature.1634  Instead, the wording ‘heading’ could 
very well have been used in a generic, non-HS Nomenclature specific way in the phrase 
‘section heading’.1635  In contrast to the other authentic texts, the English text might therefore 
rather refer to ‘a section’ under the HS nomenclature.  Such discrepancy between different 
authentic texts would leave the meaning of a product ambiguous, in which case recourse to 
preparatory work as supplementary mean of interpretation should be taken (Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention).  This leads back to the interpretation of a product at the section level 
since this apparently was the drafters’ intention. 1636      
 
Turning to the 2010 calculations made by the WTO Secretariat, India’s export 
competitiveness was found not only on a large number of textile and apparel products at 
heading level but also at section level.  The results at the section level are depicted in Table 2.  
 
HS code  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
India’s share 
in world 
including 
EU(27) trade 
 
2.9% 
 
2.9% 
 
3.4% 
 
3.4% 
 
3.4% 
 
3.6% 
 
Section 
XI 
 Textiles 
and 
textile 
articles 
India’s share 
in world 
excluding 
EU(27) trade 
 
3.8% 
 
3.9% 
 
4.3% 
 
4.4% 
 
4.3% 
 
4.5% 
TABLE 2: INDIA’S SHARE IN WORLD TRADE IN ‘TEXTILES AND TEXTILE ARTICLES’, INCLUDING AND 
EXCLUDING EU(27) TRADE1637 
 
                                                 
1633 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 59.  See also Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), footnote 153; Panel Report, China – Auto Parts, para 7.165.  
1634 Indeed, to which element would the prefix ‘section’ exactly refer?  Recall that sections in the HS 
Nomenclature are subdivided in ‘chapters’, which are only then subdivided into ‘headings’. 
1635 Note in the margin that the WTO website also uses the phrase ‘section heading’ to refer to a 
‘section’ of the HS Nomenclature.   
Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_statindex_e.htm. 
1636 The ‘object and purpose’ to preserve subsidies as a development tool might also rather point to a 
product defined at the section level given that export competitiveness is less easily reached and phasing 
out export subsidies is more feasible if export competitiveness is reached.      
1637 This table is based on the computation by the WTO Secretariat (G/SCM/132/Add.1, 23 March 
2010). 
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Table 2 indeed shows that, even when including intra-EU(27) trade, India has reached the 
required share of 3.25% for two consecutive calendar years (2005, 2006).  If the section level 
is appropriate to define a ‘product’, India will have to gradually phase out its export subsidies 
on all textiles and textile articles over a period of eight years.  This result illustrates the 
downside, from a developing country’s perspective, of defining products at the section level.  
Although export competitiveness is indeed less readily present at this more aggregate level, it 
implies that all export subsidies on products under the broad section level will have to be 
phased out once such export competitiveness has been reached.  Hence, export subsidies on 
those products for which export competitiveness not yet exists at the four-digit heading level 
will also fall under this prohibition.1638 
This computation reveals a final interpretative difficulty under Article 27.6 (juncto 27.51639) of 
the SCM Agreement.  What is the exact starting point of the 8-years (or 2-years in case of 
small trading countries) extinction period?  Export competitiveness was reached at the end of 
2006 (on the basis of intra-EU(27) trade), whereas the WTO Secretariat computation was 
made in (March) 2010.1640  Hence, should India phase out its export subsidies on textiles by 
the end of 2013 or by March 2017?  The Doha Ministerial conference clarified that, with 
regard to LDCs1641, the 8-years period ‘begins from the date export competitiveness exists 
within the meaning of Article 27.6’.1642  But this interpretation offers not much guidance.  
According to Article 27.6, export competitiveness ‘exists’ if the required share is reached.  On 
the other hand, the same provision likewise stipulates that export competitiveness ‘shall exist’ 
on the basis of a notification or WTO Secretariat computation.1643  The latter would suggest 
that export competitiveness would only exist once it has been established by a notification or 
WTO Secretariat computation.  In my view, this moment should be considered the starting 
point of the extinction period.  After all, deciding otherwise could imply that a developing 
country should have phased out export subsidies (long) before the computation has been 
                                                 
1638 The calculations reveal that no export competitiveness, for example, exists for the product ‘ties, 
bow ties and cravats’ (HS code 6215).  Yet, any existing export subsidy for this product will have to be 
phased out if export competitiveness is defined at the section level.  India might thus now rather defend 
that such competitiveness should be defined at the four-digit product level. 
1639 This refers to a developing country which ‘has reached export competitiveness’. 
1640 If the four-digit heading level would be relevant, export competitiveness for some products was 
already demonstrated under the 2003 calculations.  In that case, the relevant question would be whether 
the starting point would be 2003 or the potential prior date when this export competitiveness was 
reached in the figures. 
1641 This also seems applicable with regard to other developing countries (e.g., India) because it 
interprets the current provisions rather than to give additional flexibility. 
1642 Ministerial Conference, Implementation Related Issues and Concerns (WT/MIN(01)/17, 14 
November 2001), para 10.5 
1643 Emphasis added. 
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made, in which case it would thus forego the right to only gradually phase out these export 
subsidies.1644,1645  
 
Next to the lack of clarity in the interpretation of the existing disciplines, developing countries 
have pointed to two fundamental flaws in the definition of export competitiveness as spelled 
in the current version of Article 27.6.1646  First, the two year period to define export 
competitiveness is considered too short to neutralize increased market shares simply resulting 
from temporal, short-term fluctuations in the market.1647  To ensure that export 
competititiveness is not just reached because of temporary volatility of the market, a number 
of developing countries proposed to replace the current definition by a system of moving 
average.1648  Export competitiveness in a certain year (Y5) would be calculated as an average 
of the share in exports over the last five years (Y1 + Y2 + Y3 + Y4 + Y5 / 5).  Export 
competitiveness would be present only if such export shares would pass the 3.25 threshold for 
two consecutive years (e.g., Y5 and Y6).1649  Second, a number of developing countries have 
criticized that the phase-out period starts without the option for re-inclusion if their exports 
would fall back under the 3.25% threshold.1650  Here, some developing countries formally 
endorsed the ‘stop-the-clock’ mechanism initially suggested by the EC.  If export 
competitiveness would be lost during the phase-out period, the clock would be stopped and 
                                                 
1644 On the other hand, others might object that developing countries have an obligation to notify export 
competitiveness once it has been reached (and are thus – or should be – well aware thereof).  Hence, in 
the absence of such notification, they should not complain when a computation by the WTO Secretariat 
is only made years later on the demand of another WTO Member. 
1645 This interpretation again gives weight to the recognition of subsidies as ‘important’ development 
tool (Article 27.1 of the SCM Agreement).  Moreover, it would not make calculations of export 
competetiveness for previous years irrelevant (e.g., calculations in case of India were made for the 
period 1998-2008).  After all, export competitiveness could be established on the basis of two previous 
consecutive years, in which case the extinction period would also start (at the moment of computation) 
even if the share of exports would fall back below the threshold in later years (see below). 
1646 For the initial discussion paper, see Discussion Paper Submitted by Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe 
(G/SCM/W/431/Rev.1, 20 March 2001).  For the formal proposal in the Rules negotiations, see 
Submission by Egypt; India; Kenya; and Pakistan, Improvement and Clarification in Articles 27.5 and 
27.6 of the ASCM Regarding Export Competitiveness (TN/RL/GEN/136, 16 May 2006). 
1647 Developing countries referred to ‘the volatility of the international market (i.e., international 
financial crisis, raise of the prices of petroleum, etc.) and the vulnerability of the developing countries 
to external influences, such as natural disasters’.  Discussion Paper Submitted by Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe 
(G/SCM/W/431/Rev.1, 20 March 2001), para 3. 
1648 Submission by Egypt; India; Kenya; and Pakistan, Improvement and Clarification in Articles 27.5 
and 27.6 of the ASCM Regarding Export Competitiveness (TN/RL/GEN/136, 16 May 2006).  The 
initial suggestion was to extend the period to five consecutive years.  See, for example, Minutes of the 
Special Meeting Held on 27 July 2001 (G/SCM/M/31, 5 February 2002), para 10. 
1649 The moving average share in Y6 equals Y2 + Y3 + Y4 + Y5 + Y6 / 5. 
1650 They referred, for instance, to the financial crisis in East Asian countries in the end of the 1999s.  
See, for example, Discussion Paper Submitted by Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe (G/SCM/W/431/Rev.1, 20 March 
2001), para 4;  Third Submission by India to the Negotiating group on Rules (Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures) (TN/RL/W/120, 16 June 2003), para 10. 
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only re-start after export competitiveness is reached again.  If export competitiveness would 
be lost after the phase-out period, export subsidies could be re-introduced until export 
competitiveness would be established for a second time, in which case a phase-out period of 
two years would start to run. 
Whereas some developed countries seem to endorse the thrust of these proposals1651, many 
other delegates have voiced their disagreement, with the US apparently taking the most 
defensive side.1652  One might assume that developing countries not benefiting of S&D 
treatment on export subsidies would likewise not be keen to support more flexibility on export 
competitiveness, certainly because they might compete at a similar level of the product 
ladder.  
In sum, WTO Members not only disagree on the interpretation of the current text (e.g., 
‘product’ definition) but likewise on whether more flexibility should be inscribed.  The 
functioning of the ‘export competitiveness’-concept is even among the most controversial 
issues in the rules negotiations on the SCM Agreement.1653  Instead of proposing a new draft 
text, the Chairman in the latest Draft Consolidated Chair Text could merely reproduce this 
divergence of views:   
 
Many delegations support in principle clarifying the provisions on the determination of export 
competitiveness in a product, but views differ considerably as to the best way to do this, 
including changing the period and/or methodology for calculating share of world trade in a 
product, or clarifying the definition of a "product" for this purpose.  Views also differ widely 
as to whether reintroduction of export subsidies should be allowed if export competitiveness is 
lost after having been reached, and if so on what basis and for how long.1654 
 
6.1.1.2. Local content subsidies  
Developing countries are no longer benefiting from S&D treatment with regard to local 
content subsidies since the transitional period stipulated under Article 27.3 of the SCM 
Agreement has expired.   
In principle, flexibility for local content subsidies would be anyway less meaningful because 
Article III:4 of the GATT and the TRIMs Agreement seem to outlaw these subsidies.  Yet, the 
TRIMs Agreement still offers limited S&D treatment on trade-related investment measures, 
                                                 
1651 See, for instance, Comments of Switzerland (G/SCM/W/450, 29 May 2001). 
1652 See, for example, Replies of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe to Questions Raised Concerning the Proposal Contained 
in Document G/SCM/W/431/Rev.1 of 20 March 2001 (G/SCM/W/443, 17 May 2001); Replies of Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zimbabwe to Questions from the United States (G/SCM/W/448, 22 May 2001). 
1653 See also Negotiating Group on Rules, Working Document from the Chairman, Annex B – Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (TN/RL/W/232; 28 May 2008), at B-8. 
1654 Draft Consolidated Chair Text, above n 643. 
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such as local-content requirements.1655  In general, developing countries that have notified 
their measures inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement after the entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement1656 could still uphold these if the transitional period is extended by the Council for 
Trade in Goods.1657  Regarding LDCs, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration even allowed 
to maintain, at least until the end of 2012, existing notified measures that deviate from the 
TRIMs Agreement as well as to introduce new measures, to which the Council for Trade in 
Goods would give ‘positive consideration’.1658   
However, developing countries are not allowed to make the receipt of a subsidy conditional 
upon a local content requirement, even if such an investment measure would still benefit from 
S&D treatment under the TRIMs Agreement.  Indeed, the Panel in Indonesia – Autos 
concluded that the obligations under both agreements apply cumulatively.1659  Examining the 
relationship between the TRIMs Agreement and Articles 3.1 juncto 27.3 of the SCM 
Agreement, the Panel in Indonesia – Autos held: 
 
To respond to an argument raised by Indonesia in the context of its discussion of the 
relationship between Article III of GATT and the SCM Agreement, we do not consider that 
the application of the TRIMs Agreement to this dispute would reduce the SCM Agreement, 
and Article 27.3 thereof, to “inutility”. On the contrary, with Article 27.3 of the SCM 
Agreement, those subsidy measures of developing countries that are contingent on compliance 
with TRIMs (in the form of local content requirement) and that are permitted during the 
transition period provided under Article 5 of the TRIMs Agreement, are not prohibited by 
Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, for the transition period specified in Article 27.3 of the 
SCM Agreement.1660 
 
Given that the transition period under the SCM Agreement has lapsed by now, the scope of 
the remaining S&D treatment in place under the TRIMs Agreement is somewhat reduced.1661  
                                                 
1655 See Article 5 of the TRIMs Agreement (Article 4 is less relevant for our discussion).  Regarding 
disciplines on local content requirements, see Article 2 juncto Annex, para 1 of the TRIMs Agreement.  
1656 Or after accession. 
1657 It takes into account the individual development, financial and trade needs of the Member in 
question (Article 5.1 juncto 5.3 of the TRIMs).  For a list of notifications, see Draft (2009) of the 
Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures (G/L/900, 21 October 2009), Annex I. 
1658 Again, taking into account the individual financial, trade, and development needs of the Member in 
question.  The duration of these measures will not exceed five years, renewable subject to review and 
decision by the Council for Trade in Goods.  Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 
22 December 2005), Annex F. 
1659 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, paras 14.47-14.55.  
1660 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.54 (emphasis added).  On the link between Article III 
GATT and the SCM Agreement, see also paras 14.97-14.101.   
1661 This corresponds somewhat to the situation under the Dunkel Draft circulating in the Uruguay 
Round.  S&D treatment was stipulated under the TRIMs Agreement, whereas no corresponding S&D 
treatment was installed under this draft of the SCM Agreement.  According to the US in Indonesia – 
Autos, Article 27.3 exactly aimed to remedy this situation.  Yet, it lapsed before the extended S&D 
treatment under the TRIMs Agreement.  See Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, paras 5.338-5.339. 
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Local content requirements installed by developing countries benefiting from such S&D 
treatment could not be conditioned on subsidies.1662 
 
6.1.2. Special and differential treatment on actionable subsidies 
Within the limits set out in this section, actionable subsidy claims could in principle be 
articulated against all specific subsidies offered by a developing country Member.1663  Yet, at 
the end of this section, it will be examined whether this S&D treatment on actionable 
subsidies is also available with regard to export subsidies that are not prohibited by virtue of 
S&D treatment set out above.1664   
 
This S&D treatment on actionable subsidies is in principle available to all ‘developing 
country’ Members, which is a self-selected status that could be challenged by other WTO 
Members.1665  However, an exception has to be made with regard to China.  When it acceded 
to the WTO, China committed not to rely on the S&D treatment on actionable subsidies 
(Articles 27.8, 27.9 and 27.13 of the SCM Agreement).1666  Since it is likewise excluded from 
S&D treatment on prohibited subsidies, China’s multilateral disciplines on subsidies 
correspond to those of developed countries.  China only explicitly preserved its right to 
benefit from S&D treatment for developing countries regarding CVDs, which is examined in 
the following section.1667 
 
What is the scope of developing countries’ S&D treatment on actionable subsidies?  By virtue 
of Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement, not all three forms of adverse effects singled out 
under Article 5 of the SCM Agreement can be invoked against subsidies offered by 
developing countries.  ‘In the usual case’,1668 other Members can only proceed against injury 
to their domestic industry as well as against nullification or impairment of tariff concessions 
                                                 
1662 Notice that the Panel in Indonesia – Autos observed that ‘under the TRIMs Agreement, the 
advantage made conditional on meeting a local content requirement may include a wide variety of 
incentives and advantages, other than subsidies’.  Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.51. 
1663 Recall that the Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels also left open the possibility that even 
prohibited subsidies could be challenged as an ‘actionable subsidy’. 
1664 Article 27.7 of the SCM Agreement.  See also Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.169. 
1665 Note that there was no disagreement among the parties in Indonesia – Autos that Indonesia was a 
developing country entitled to S&D treatment under Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement.  Likewise, all 
parties in Brazil – Aircraft agreed that Brazil was a developing country within the meaning of the SCM 
Agreement.  See Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.157; Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 
7.38. 
1666 See Report of the Working Party Report on the Accession of China (WT/ACC/CHN/49), para 171.  
See also Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 29 October 2008 (G/SCM/M/66, 14 April 2009), 
paras 98-99. 
1667 Yet, not all countries (e.g., US) consider China as a developing country under their CVDs 
procedures (see below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.3).   
1668 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 14.156. 
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or other GATT obligations undertaken by the subsidizing developing country.1669  In essence, 
this corresponds to the two first types of adverse effects set out under Article 5 of the SCM 
Agreement (paragraphs (a) and (b)).1670   
Complaints on the basis of serious prejudice (Article 5(c) of the SCM Agreement), which is 
the broadest form of adverse effects, are less evident and might even be impossible today 
according to some authors.  To understand this discussion, Article 27.8 and Article 27.9 have 
to be read together.  By virtue of Article 27.8, the presumption of serious prejudice 
formulated in Article 6(1) of the SCM Agreement could not be invoked against developing 
countries, but WTO Members can nevertheless demonstrate by positive evidence1671 that 
serious prejudice is caused in those four cases.1672  Further, Article 27.9 clarifies that other 
cases of serious prejudice caused by subsidizing developing countries can surely not be 
challenged: 
 
Regarding actionable subsidies granted or maintained by a developing country Member other 
than those referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 6, action may not be authorized or taken under 
Article 7 unless (nullification or impairment of GATT obligations or injury to the domestic 
industry).1673 
 
As the presumption in Article 6.1 expired at the end of 1999, the S&D treatment on this 
presumption articulated in Article 27.8 no longer has legal implications.  More important 
nowadays is, however, the question whether the four cases of subsidies opening the door to a 
serious prejudice claim have likewise disappeared as a result of the expiration of Article 6.1.  
Surprisingly, this issue was left undiscussed by WTO Members at the time the debate on the 
extension of Article 6.1 was undertaken (1999).  The literature has been divided on this 
question.  
On the one hand, Hoda and Ahuja hold that the expiration of Article 6.1 has indeed the legal 
consequence that action against developing countries on the basis of the four cases of serious 
prejudice is excluded.  Hence, developing countries may not be subject to a claim that their 
subsidies have caused serious prejudice.1674  These authors’ argument is that, with the 
expiration of Article 6.1,1675 ‘the list of measures in respect of which serious prejudice applied 
earlier to developing country Members (Article 27.9) has also disappeared’.1676  In one of the 
scarce references in the WTO negotiations regarding this issue, Canada listed Article 27.9 as 
                                                 
1669 Such nullification or impairment has to impede or displace imports of a like product of another 
Member into the market of the subsidizing developing country Member. 
1670 See above Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.2. 
1671 In accordance with paragraphs 3 through 8 of Article 6 of the SCM Agreement. 
1672 Article 27.8 of the SCM Agreement. 
1673 Emphasis added. 
1674 Hoda and Ahuja, above n 1088, at1029; see also Torres, above n 1604, at 219, footnote 19. 
1675 Indeed, according to Article 31 of the SCM Agreement, Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement as such 
has expired. 
1676 Hoda and Ahuja, above n 1088, at 1029. 
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one of the provisions that was ‘affected by the lapsing of Article 6.1’.1677  This would suggest 
that it implicitly endorsed this first interpretation.  
On the other hand, Clarke and Horlick hold that the expiration of the presumption did likely 
not alter the four cases upon which serious prejudice can be based.1678  They explain that 
‘since the presumption of serious prejudice arising in Article 6.1 never applied to developing 
countries, it could be argued that the definitional aspect of Article 6.1 still applies, in order to 
raise a serious prejudice complaint against a developing country Member’.1679  They seem to 
argue that a claim of serious prejudice in case of developing countries is not based on Article 
6.1 of the SCM Agreement but on Article 27.9 (and 27.8) of the SCM Agreement and that this 
provision only refers to the four cases of serious prejudice under Article 6.1 of the SCM 
Agreement.  By referring to Article 6.1, Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement would 
incorporate those four cases of serious prejudice but would not be dependent upon its 
application.  The fact that Articles 27.8 and 27.9 were not advanced by either developing or 
developed countries as a relevant element in the debate on the expiration of Articles 6.1 and 8 
of the SCM Agreement might tentatively suggest that WTO Members endorsed this reading.  
This interpretation would mean that, in addition to injury to the domestic industry and 
nullification or impairment, adverse effects could still be shown on the basis of ‘serious 
prejudice’ if one of the four situations spelled out in Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement is 
present:  
 
(a) the total ad valorem subsidization of a product exceeding 5 per cent; 
(b) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an industry; 
(c) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an enterprise, other than one-time 
measures which are non-recurrent and cannot be repeated for that enterprise and which are 
given merely to provide time for the development of long-term solutions and to avoid acute 
social problems; 
(d) direct forgiveness of debt, i.e. forgiveness of government-held debt, and grants to cover 
debt repayment.1680 
 
Once a complainant has demonstrated the existence of one of these four types of subsidies, it 
will subsequently have to advance positive evidence that these subsidies cause serious 
                                                 
1677 After all, the lapse of Article 6.1 would have no legal implications for the operation of Article 27.9 
of the SCM Agreement if the alternative interpretation is endorsed.  See Communication from Canada 
(TN/RL/GEN/112/Rev.1, 17 May 2006). 
1678 See Clarke and Horlick, above n 587, at 728–729.  Along the same lines, see F. Piérola, ‘Article 6 
SCMA’, in R. Wolfrum, P-T. Stoll, and M. Koebele (eds), WTO: Trade Remedies (Heidelberg: Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 2008), 498-536, at 509.  Luengo 
even argued that all types of ‘serious prejudice’ are now challengeable with regard to developing 
countries.  Yet, this interpretation seems certainly incorrect in light of Article 27.9 of the SCM 
Agreement.  See Luengo, above n 771, at 203. 
1679 See Clarke and Horlick, above n 587, at 728–729 
1680 Footnotes omitted.  Footnote 14 to Article 6.1(a) indicates that the total ad valorem subsidization 
shall be calculated in accordance with Annex IV of the SCM Agreement, which indicates that the 
subsidy amount shall be based on the cost to the government.  See also Note from the Informal Group 
of Experts – Revisions (G/SCM/W/415/Rev.2, 15 May 1998). 
PART II CHAPTER 6 – DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
 
 
 
 
311 
 
 
prejudice by generating the price/volume effects set out in Article 6.3 of the SCM 
Agreement.1681  This two-steps approach was applied by the Panel in Indonesia – Autos, 
dating from before the expiration of Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement.  Having revealed that 
parties agreed that an ad valorem subsidy exceeding 5 per cent was offered (Article 6.1(a) of 
the SCM Agreement), the Panel examined whether the complainants demonstrated that these 
subsidies caused ‘serious prejudice’ in the meaning of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement.1682  
Noteworthy, the Panel underlined that the ‘developing country’-status does not impose a 
higher burden of proof upon complainants to show such ‘serious prejudice’ under the second 
step.1683   
Although both interpretations are thus plausible, I would expect that a panel confronted with 
this inquiry would foreclose such serious prejudice claim since the expiration of Article 6.1 of 
the SCM Agreement and would rather opt for the restrictive reading of Article 27.9 of the 
SCM Agreement as suggested by Hoda and Ahuja.1684 
 
So as to stimulate privatization programmes, direct forgiveness of debts and subsidies to 
cover social costs when ‘granted within and directly linked to’ privatization can never be 
challenged as actionable subsidies (Article 27.13 of the SCM Agreement).1685  To benefit 
from this exception, these subsidies should be granted for a limited time period and notified to 
the SCM Committee, and the programme should result in eventual privatization of the 
                                                 
1681 Or a threat of serious prejudice.  See above Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3. 
1682 The Panel rejected the claim of displacement or impediment in the subsidizing market (Article 
6.3(a) of the SCM Agreement) but accepted the claim of price undercutting (Article 6.3(c) of the SCM 
Agreement) (see above Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.3). 
1683 The Panel held that the term ‘positive evidence’ in Article 27.8 is followed by ‘in accordance with 
the provisions of paragraphs 3 through 8 of Article 6’.  The term ‘positive evidence’ refers to the 
difference with the ‘presumption’ of serious prejudice upon developed countries. See Panel Report, 
Indonesia – Autos, para 14.169.  
1684 First, the text of Article 31 of the SCM Agreement refers to the temporary application of ‘(t) 
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 6 and the provisions of Article 8’ (emphasis added).  Hence, it not 
merely refers to the presumption elaborated in Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement.  Second, the text of 
Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement refers to ‘actionable subsidies (…) referred to in paragraph 1 of 
Article 6’ and, therefore, seems dependent upon the existence of this provision.  The alternative reading 
suggested by Horlick and Clarke is possible but would be more difficult to align to the wording of this 
text.  Third, the restrictive interpretation articulated by Hoda and Ahuja would mean that the extinction 
of Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement not only relaxed disciplines on domestic subsidies for developed 
countries (as the presumption of serious prejudice under Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement collapsed) 
but likewise for developing countries.  This is justified given that the status of Article 6.1 of the SCM 
Agreement was, at least in political terms, bound to the status of the green light category.  In a sense, 
the collapse of Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement should thus compensate both developed and 
developing countries for more restrictive disciplines on green light subsidies.  Fourth and finally, a 
restrictive reading might find contextual support in Article 27.1 of the SCM Agreement, which 
underscores the important role that subsidies may play in economic development programmes of 
developing countries. 
1685 Hence, pre-privatization subsidies that are not ‘granted within and directly linked’ to privatization 
fall outside the scope of this provision.  See Panel Report, US – Lead and Bismuth II, footnote 86.   
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enterprise concerned.1686  Until present, only one such privatization programme has been 
notified, namely by Brazil in 1996 concerning the privatization of state companies in a 
number of different industries.1687  To be sure, such privatization programmes are only 
shielded from actionable subsidy claims and not from the imposition of CVDs or from 
prohibited subsidy claims.  The latter implies that export subsidies and local content subsidies 
cannot be justified on this basis.1688 
 
Before concluding, the inquiry has to be solved whether the S&D treatment on actionable 
subsidies as sketched out in this section is also available regarding challenges against export 
subsidies that are not prohibited by virtue of S&D treatment.1689  According to most authors, 
this is not the case.  Such export subsidies can be challenged on the basis of the actionable 
subsidy disciplines similarly as with regard to developed countries.  This means that ‘serious 
prejudice’ can be demonstrated simply on the basis of Article 6.3 of the SCM 
Agreement.1690,1691  Likely, their interpretation is based on the text of Article 27.7 of the SCM 
Agreement, which refers to the remedies for actionable subsidies singled out under Article 7: 
 
The provisions of Article 4 shall not apply to a developing country Member in the case of 
export subsidies which are in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 2 through 5. The 
relevant provisions in such a case shall be those of Article 7.1692 
 
On the other hand, Article 27.7 might be read together with the relevant parts of Article 27.9 
of the SCM Agreement, which spells out S&D treatment on actionable subsidies:  
 
Regarding actionable subsidies granted or maintained by a developing country Member other 
than those referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 6, action may not be authorized or taken under 
Article 7 unless (nullification or impairment or injury to the domestic industry).1693 
 
Putting both provisions together, the unsettled query is whether claims against non-
prohibited1694 ‘export subsidies’ under Article 7 are limited to those situations spelled under 
                                                 
1686 Article 27.13 of the SCM Agreement.  
1687 This included the petrochemical industry and infrastructure (e.g., electrical power plants, 
transportation service, and communication systems).  In some cases, the government undertook prior 
financial streamlining of the state enterprises involved (e.g., underwriting of debt) but Brazil also 
emphasized that it considered that no subsidization was in fact involved in these operations.  See 
Communication from Brazil, Notification on Privatization Programmes pursuant to Article 27.13 of the 
Agreement (G/SCM/N/13/BRA, 12 March 1996). 
1688 This was also confirmed by the Panel in US – Lead and Bismuth II (para 6.76). 
1689 See above Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1.1. 
1690 Hoda and Ahuja, above n 1088, at 1028, 1058, 1059.  This also seems the position of Benitah, 
above n 893, at 39. 
1691 Interestingly, also Brazil seemed to adopt this position before the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft.  
Because it benefited (at that time) from S&D treatment on export subsidies, Brazil claimed that Canada 
had to pursue the remedies set out in Article 7 of the SCM Agreement.  Brazil did not explicitly limit 
these remedies to the trade impacts challengeable under Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement.  Panel 
Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 4.156 
1692 Emphasis added. 
1693 Emphasis added. 
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Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement.1695  A careful reading of Indonesia – Autos reveals that 
the Panel cautiously circumvented this issue with respect to local content subsidies offered by 
Indonesia.  Note that S&D treatment on such local content subsidies was still in place at that 
time (Article 27.3 of the SCM Agreement).  Somewhat counterintuitive, both complainants 
(EC and US) considered that Indonesia as developing country could only be subject to a 
serious prejudice claim in case its local content subsidies were covered by one of the 
situations under Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement.1696  For instance, the EC read Article 27.9 
as mandating that ‘where a subsidy is granted by a developing country Member, “serious 
prejudice” can only be invoked if the subsidy in question falls within one of the categories 
“referred to” in Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement’.1697  Indonesia, on the other hand, claimed 
that, by virtue of Article 27.7,1698 a ‘serious prejudice’ claim could in addition be directly 
formulated under Article 5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement if export subsidies or local content 
subsidies are offered.  The Panel accepted that non-prohibited local content subsidies could 
certainly be considered ‘actionable subsidies’ in the meaning of Article 27.9 of the SCM 
Agreement, in which case the burden of Article 6.1 has to be passed.1699  Nonetheless, the 
Panel explicitly left undecided whether a ‘serious prejudice’-claim could, as argued by 
Indonesia, also be directly based on Articles 5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement in case subsidies 
qualify as local content or export subsidies.1700   
In light of the Panel’s conclusion in Korea – Commercial Vessels that even export subsidy 
could be challenged as an actionable subsidy,1701 one might suggest that the term ‘actionable 
subsidies’ in Article 27.9 includes ‘export subsidies’.  Depending on the reading of Article 
27.9 juncto 6.1 of the SCM Agreement, this interpretation would either exclude ‘serious 
prejudice’-claims against permitted export subsidies or limit the relevant ‘serious prejudice’-
provisions to those four situations spelled out in Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement.  
However, if one would take the negotiating history into consideration, he would rather concur 
with those scholars holding that claims against export subsidies benefiting from S&D 
treatment are likely not constrained by Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement.  First, the 
corresponding provision under the Subsidies Code referred to ‘any subsidy, other than an 
export subsidy’.1702  The replacement by ‘actionable subsidies’ in the current text seems to 
                                                                                                                                            
1694 These are not prohibited by virtue of S&D treatment. 
1695 Recall that the ‘serious prejudice’ claims might no longer be possible today. 
1696 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, paras 8.53, 8.90. 
1697 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 8.53 (emphasis added). 
1698 According to Indonesia, Article 27.7 also covered local content subsidies, even though its text 
explicitly refers to ‘export subsidies’. 
1699 This panel report dates from before the expiration of Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement.  Panel 
Report, Indonesia – Autos, paras 14.156-14.162. 
1700 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, footnote 724. 
1701 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.334. 
1702 See Article 14:7 of the Subsidies Code. 
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aim at implementing the new traffic light approach rather than at substantively modifying its 
scope and seems therefore not intended to cover ‘export subsidies’.  Second, developing 
countries signatories already agreed under the Subsidies Code that their export subsidies 
would not be used in a manner which caused serious prejudice to other signatories of the 
Subsidies Code.1703  Given that one of the prime aspirations of developed countries was to 
strengthen these disciplines during the Uruguay Round, it seems unlikely that the negotiators 
intended to limit this obligation under the SCM Agreement.1704  Therefore, it seems probable 
that, by virtue of Article 27.7 of the SCM Agreement, export subsidies benefiting from S&D 
treatment are actionable under Article 5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement and do not benefit from 
the S&D treatment on actionable subsidies set out in this section.   
 
6.1.3. Special and differential treatment on countervailing duties  
The S&D treatment provisions described in the previous sections do not restrict the use of 
CVDs against developing countries but merely have an impact on the use of multilateral 
remedies.  Indeed, the limited exemptions regarding disciplines on prohibited and actionable 
subsidies do not exclude that Members impose CVDs to offset subsidies from developing 
countries causing injury to their domestic industry.  Only Article 27.10 of the SCM 
Agreement provides for S&D treatment by raising the de minimis standard in case CVDs 
action is considered against products originating from developing countries.  These CVDs 
investigations should be terminated if the overall level of subsidies is less than 2 per cent ad 
valorem (in contrast to 1 per cent otherwise by virtue of Article 11.9 of the SCM 
Agreement)1705 or if the volume of subsidized imports is less than 4 per cent of the total 
imports.  Yet, the four per cent volume exception (i.e., de minimis volume threshold) does not 
apply if imports from developing countries whose individual shares are less than 4 per cent 
collectively account for more than 9 per cent of total imports.1706  Similar to the general de 
minimis subsidy benchmark formulated under Article 11.9, this S&D treatment is, according 
                                                 
1703 Article 14 of the Subsidies Code. 
1704 On the other hand, one might object that those developing countries still benefiting from an 
exception on export subsidies were often not party to the plurilateral Subsidies Code and that the 
possibility to challenge such export subsidies was much more difficult under the Subsidies Code.  
1705 Article 27.11 of the SCM Agreement provided for a 3 per cent de minimis threshold for (i) Annex 
VII developing countries and (ii) other developing countries (Article 27.2(b)) that had phased out their 
export subsidies before the eight years phase out period.  Yet, it was explicitly stipulated that ‘this 
provision shall expire eight years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement’.  
Nonetheless, Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters suggest that Annex VII developing countries could 
still benefit from this exception because the eight years period seems linked to the other developing 
countries’ phase out period for export subsidies.  In my view, however, the text of Article 27.11 leaves 
no room for such an interpretation as it clearly stipulates that it expires in 2003.  See Mavroidis, 
Messerlin, above n 729, at 374, footnote 3. 
1706 Article 27.10 of the SCM Agreement. 
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to the Appellate Body in US – Carbon Steel, only applicable in the original CVDs 
‘investigation’ and not in sunset reviews.1707 
Clarke and Horlick explain that this S&D treatment is intended to prevent developing 
countries from a costly defense in case their exports merely represent a marginal share of the 
market.  Yet, regarding the de minimis volume threshold, they correctly criticize the ‘9 per 
cent collective share of total imports’-exception because developing countries could 
obviously not control for the exports of other countries.1708  Moreover, given their large 
number in the WTO, developing countries might collectively rather easily pass the 9 per cent 
of total imports threshold (e.g., 5 countries having a share of 2 per cent each).1709   
In principle, all ‘developing countries’ benefit from this S&D treatment when trading partners 
aim at imposing CVDs on their subsidized imports.  Because CVDs are imposed unilaterally, 
the initial decision to assign the status of ‘developing country’ under Article 27.10 is however 
made by the importing country.  For instance, the US does not recognize China and Vietnam 
as developing countries in its CVDs investigations,1710 which could be challenged by both 
countries before the WTO dispute settlement system.  Recall that Vietnam and China even 
seem more vulnerable to CVDs (and anti-dumping) actions than all other countries.  As 
explained, CVDs-investigating authorities could easier rely on foreign prices as relevant 
benchmark in calculating the benefit amount.1711  
 
In the beginning of the Doha Round, India had proposed a double extension of the S&D 
treatment set out in Article 27.10 of the SCM Agreement.1712  First, it suggested adding the 
obligation that CVDs could be imposed against imports of developing countries only to that 
amount by which the subsidy exceeds the de minimis subsidy level.  Second, the de minimis 
volume threshold should be increased from 4 per cent to 7 per cent.  The latter proposal would 
have the advantage that exporters are not required to expend resources for participating in the 
CVDs investigation.  Moreover, both proposals would result in fewer impositions (or lower 
levels) of CVDs against developing countries and thus recognize the importance of 
subsidization as a development tool.  Yet, the absence of further discussions on these 
proposals after 2003 as well as the fact that the latest Draft Negotiating Text does not include 
any amendment on Article 27.10 seems to show that there is not much support to modify 
Article 27.10 along these lines.    
                                                 
1707 See Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para 82. 
1708 Clarke and Horlick, above n 587, at 729.    
1709 On the other hand, WTO Members might be reluctant to start such costly and complicated CVDs 
procedure against a large number of countries.     
1710 Gantz, above n 828, at 7. 
1711 See above Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.2. 
1712 See Submission by India (TN/RM/W/4, 25 April 2002); India’s Replies to Questions from the 
United States on its Submissions (TN/RL/W/4 and TN/RL/W/26) (TN/RL/W/99, 3 May 2003). 
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Despite the S&D treatment regarding the imposition of CVDs on imports from developing 
countries, Table 3 illustrates that the majority of CVDs actions have targeted their imports 
since the birth of the WTO.1713,1714 
 
Exporting country subject to CVDs 
action 
CVDs initiations CVDs measures 
India 46 28 
China 29 17 
European Communities 10 9 
Italy 13 9 
Brazil 7 8 
Korea 17 8 
Indonesia 11 7 
France 7 6 
Argentina 7 4 
South Africa 6 4 
TABLE 3: TOP 10 EXPORTING COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO CVDS MEASURES AND CVDS INITIATIONS OVER 
THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY 1995 – 30 JUNE 20091715,1716 
 
One third of all CVDs measures imposed to date are installed on imports from India and 
China, but also other larger developing countries are regularly subject to CVDs actions.1717  
Because China only recently became submitted to CVDs investigations given its non-market 
economy status, it is expected that it will soon replace India as the main target of CVDs 
action.  As an indication, over the period 2008-June 2009, no less than sixteen CVDs 
investigations were launched against China, compared to only two against India.1718  So far, 
                                                 
1713 Note that these figures might be incomplete as they are based on notifications by WTO Members.  
WTO Members are obliged to submit information on the following CVDs actions: (1) initiations; (2) 
preliminary determinations/provisional measures; (3) final determinations/definitive measures.  See 
Article 25.11 of the SCM Agreement and the procedure spelled out in G/SCM/3/Rev.1 (2 November 
2009).   
1714 The World Trade Report 2009 calculated that developing countries were the subject of 66% of all 
CVDs initiations and 61% of all CVDs measures.  See WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2009 – 
Trade Policy Commitments and Contingency Measures (Geneva: WTO Publications, 2009), 171 pp., at 
140. 
1715 WTO Secretariat statistics based on notifications by WTO Members.  Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_init_exp_country_e.pdf. 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_meas_exp_country_e.pdf.  
1716 The reason why, in case of Brazil, the number of CVDs measures is higher than the initiated 
number is that no notifications were made for CVDs initiations launched before 1995 resulting in 
CVDs measures imposed after 1 January 1995.   
1717 Most CVDs actions were taken against their exports falling under Section XV of the Harmonized 
System (‘Base metals and articles of base metals’).  Other Indian products often targeted are covered 
under Sections VI and VII (‘Products of the chemical or allied industries’; ‘Plastics and articles thereof; 
rubber and articles thereof’).  Regarding the sectoral pattern of contingency measures, see also World 
Trade Report 2009, above n 1714, at 136-137. 
1718 WTO statistics: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_init_rep_member_e.pdf. 
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all definitive CVDs measures against China were imposed by the US and Canada.1719  The US 
and EC are mainly responsible for the high level of CVDs actions against India.1720   
 
Table 4 lists all WTO Members that have imposed at least one CVDs measure over the period 
1995 - June 2009.1721  Note that the substantive and detailed procedural requirements to 
undertake CVDs action are not relaxed with regard to developing countries.  Obviously, this 
resource-intensive trade remedy tool is less useful to these countries than it is to developed 
countries.1722 
 
Importing country undertaking 
CVDs action 
CVDs initiations CVDs measures 
United States 94 57 
European Communities 48 23 
Canada 23 15 
Mexico 2 8 
Brazil 3 7 
Argentina 3 4 
South Africa 13 4 
New Zealand 6 4 
Peru 4 3 
Australia 10 2 
Chile 6 2 
Costa Rica 1 1 
Japan 1 1 
Turkey 1 1 
Venezuela 2 1 
TABLE 4: IMPORTING COUNTRIES THAT HAVE IMPOSED CVDS MEASURES OVER THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY 
1995 – 30 JUNE 20091723,1724  
 
As this Table shows, the large majority of all CVDs actions are taken by three developed 
countries, with the US taking the lion’s share, followed by the EC and Canada.  Several other 
WTO Members, including some developing countries, have likewise imposed CVDs, but not 
to a significant extent.  Take into account that almost all CVDs measures by Brazil (5 out of 
7) and Mexico (7 out of 8) were already imposed in 1995.  In the first half of 2009, China 
(against US imports) as well as India (against Chinese imports) initiated their first CVDs 
                                                 
1719 Australia, South-Africa, and India have already launched at least one CVDs investigation against 
imports from China. 
1720 India’s imports have also been subject to CVDs measures by countries like Canada, South Africa, 
and Brazil. 
1721 More countries have already initiated CVDs.   
1722 In case of tariff overhang, countries could respond by raising their applied level of tariffs up to their 
bound level but this should be done on an MFN basis. 
1723 WTO Secretariat statistics based on notifications by WTO Members.  Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_init_rep_member_e.pdf.  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_meas_rep_member_e.pdf.  
1724 For the explanation why the level of CVDs measures imposed by Brazil and Mexico is higher than 
the initiated number, see above n 1716. 
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investigation.  Overall, the 2009 World Trade Report calculated that developed countries 
account for 86% of all CVDs measures.1725 
 
6.1.4. Conclusion  
Table 5 summarizes the policy space presently given to developing countries to subsidize 
non-agricultural products.   
 
 Annex VII countries Small trading countries 
(certain programmes) 
Other developing 
countries 
Export subsidies - prohibited only if export 
competitiveness: phase-out 
of 8 years 
- actionable under Articles 5 
and 6 
- countervailable if above de 
minimis 
 
- prohibited only if export 
competitiveness: phase-
out of 2 years 
- actionable under 
Articles 5 and 6 
- countervailable if above 
de minimis 
- prohibited 
 
 
- actionable under 
Articles 5 and 6 
- countervailable if 
above de minimis 
Local content 
subsidies 
- prohibited 
- actionable under Articles 5 and 6 
- countervailable if above de minimis 
 
All other 
subsidies1726 
- actionable if     a)  injury to the domestic industry 
                            b) nullification or impairment GATT obligations 
                            [c) serious prejudice under Article 6.3 if one of the four   
                                cases of subsidization under Article 6.1]1727 
                    unless privatization programme                                                             
- countervailable if above de minimis 
TABLE 5: S&D TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES UNDER THE SCM AGREEMENT 
 
The discussion in this section has illustrated that this S&D treatment does certainly not give 
them carte blanche but likewise that some of its basic aspects are still surprisingly unclear.  
Two main features – raising two unanswered questions – should be recalled in particular.  
First, only a limited number of developing countries presently benefits from an exception on 
the prohibition on export subsidies.  Yet, it seems that actionable subsidy claims against their 
export subsidies can be based on the broad ‘serious prejudice’-category (Article 5 and 6 of the 
SCM Agreement).  Second, developing countries benefit from substantive S&D treatment on 
domestic subsidies (except for local content subsidies).  In the usual case, their domestic 
subsidies are only challengeable if they cause injury to the importing country’s domestic 
industry or nullify/impair GATT commitments that would normally benefit exports to the 
subsidizing country.  Yet, an unsettled question is whether, in case subsidies fall under one of 
the types of Article 6.1, they would be vulnerable to a ‘serious prejudice’-claim (Article 6.3 of 
                                                 
1725 World Trade Report 2009, above n 1714, at 140. 
1726 An exception has to be made for China for which ‘other subsidies’ are simply actionable under 
Articles 5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement. 
1727 This is put between brackets because it is not clear whether this option is still available since the 
expiration of Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement.  Arguably, this claim could no longer be formulated. 
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the SCM Agreement).  If so, developing countries’ subsidies exceeding 5 per cent of the value 
of the product or covering operating losses would be challengeable similar as in case of 
subsidization by developed countries.  On the other hand, in the somewhat more likely case 
that the expiration of Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement would have foreclosed such ‘serious 
prejudice’-claims, adverse effects occurring in third countries or in the subsidizing country in 
absence of nullification or impairment could not be challenged.  Lastly, it should be kept in 
mind that CVDs against all types of subsidies by developing countries are allowed, subject 
merely to a somewhat higher de minimis threshold. 
    
6.2. RATIONE MATERIAE: AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 
Trade liberalization of agricultural products has always deserved a separate treatment when 
discussing international disciplines.  During the GATT area, the differential treatment was 
apparent in the text of the GATT 1947 and in the Subsidies Code.1728  When disciplining 
export subsidies as part of the 1954-1955 Review Session, the GATT reserved a separate 
position for subsidies on the export of primary goods.  They were permitted as long as they 
did not lead to ‘more than an equitable share of world export trade’ for the subsidizing 
country.1729  The Subsidies Code did not fundamentally alter this more flexible stance.  
During the Uruguay Round, the Cairns group pushed for trade liberalization in this field and 
this call was supported by the US.  Combined with the rise of agricultural disputes and the 
heavy financial burden of subsidization in the EC and US, this formed the impetus for 
concluding an Agreement on Agriculture aiming to achieve greater liberalization of trade in 
agriculture.1730  The preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture likewise expresses the 
concerns of Members opposing to further trade liberalization.  Indeed, it refers to non-trade 
such as food security, environmental protection, and the negative effects on LDCs and net 
food-importing developing countries of further liberalization.  Overall, the Agreement on 
Agriculture reflects recognition ‘that the long-term objective of substantial progressive 
                                                 
1728 See above Part II, Chapter 1. 
1729 This exception was considered the ‘Achilles heel’ of the GATT to constrain subsidy programmes. 
A difficult legal question was the correct interpretation of ‘equitable share’. Another difficulty was the 
proof of the causal relationship between the grant of a subsidy and the acquisition of more than an 
equitable share of world trade. The Subsidies Code did not overcome these legal problems (see Article 
10.2 of the Subsidies Code; see also above n 566). See T. Josling and S. Tangermann, ‘Production and 
Export Subsidies in Agriculture: Lessons from GATT and WTO Disputes Involving the US and the 
EC’, in E-U. Petersmann and M.A. Pollack (eds), Transatlantic Economic Disputes – the EU, the US, 
and the WTO (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 207-232, at 215; J. McMahon, The WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture – a Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 333 pp., at 90. 
1730 For the coverage of the Agreement on Agriculture, see the definition of agricultural products in 
Annex 1 Agreement on Agriculture. 
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reductions in support and protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing 
process’.1731 
The conclusion of the Agreement on Agriculture was therefore considered a starting point for 
liberalizing trade in agriculture.  The framework for further liberalization consists of three 
main pillars.  The first pillar on market access requires WTO Members to convert nontariff 
barriers1732 into ordinary customs duties (tariffication) and to subsequently bind and reduce 
the latter (progressive liberalization).1733  The other two pillars deal with subsidies and will be 
introduced below.  The second pillar consists of commitments and general disciplines on 
domestic support,1734 and the third pillar covers the same with regard to export subsidies.1735  
In this discussion, the interplay between this set of disciplines under the Agreement on 
Agriculture and the SCM Agreement also deserves special attention.  The expiration of the 
peace clause partly removed the distinction between disciplines on agricultural and industrial 
subsidies. 
 
6.2.1. Export competition 
6.2.1.1. Order of analysis 
A preliminary question is under which multilateral trade agreement agricultural export 
subsidies have to be scrutinized and, if more than one agreement is applicable, under which it 
has to be analyzed first.   
Two provisions are relevant in this respect.  First, the Agreement on Agriculture applies to 
agricultural products as defined in Annex 11736 and, pursuant to Article 21.1, ‘the provisions 
of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO 
Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement’.1737  This provision thus 
expressly provides for the application of the SCM Agreement and the GATT to agricultural 
products1738 but, at the same time, implies according to the Appellate Body that these other 
agreements apply ‘except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture contains specific 
                                                 
1731 Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1732 See footnote 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture for a non-exhaustive list of such measures. 
1733 See Part III of the Agreement on Agriculture. See exceptions provided by Article 5 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture and Annex V. Developed countries committed themselves in the Uruguay 
Round to an average reduction of 36 per cent over 6 years, whereas developing countries had to reduce 
their tariffs by 24 per cent over 10 years. LDCs were only required to tariffy and bind their tariffs but 
did not have to make any reduction commitment. See McMahon, above n 1729, at 30. 
1734 Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Part IV of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1735 Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Part V of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1736 Article 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.   
1737 Emphasis added. 
1738 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.257. 
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provisions dealing specifically with the same matter’.1739  Second, Article 3.1 of the SCM 
Agreement prohibits export subsidies and local content subsidies ‘except as provided in the 
Agreement on Agriculture’, which indicates according to the Appellate Body that the WTO-
consistency of agricultural export subsidies should be scrutinized, in the first place, under the 
Agreement on Agriculture.1740 
Referring to both provisions, panels have analyzed agricultural export subsidy claims first 
under the Agreement on Agriculture.1741  Nonetheless, as the Appellate Body highlighted, the 
SCM Agreement already offers guidance in interpreting the relevant provisions of the 
Agreement on Agriculture.1742  Once the analysis under the Agreement on Agriculture is 
conducted, the question on the applicability of the SCM Agreement emerges.  The scope for 
such additional scrutiny under the SCM Agreement is addressed in the final section (see 
below Section 6.2.3.1).    
  
6.2.1.2. Disciplines on agricultural export subsidies 
‘The fundamental general provision of the Agreement on Agriculture concerning export 
subsidies’1743 is Article 8.  This stipulates that ‘(e)ach Member undertakes not to provide 
export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with this Agreement and with the commitments 
as specified in that Member's Schedule’.1744  Contrary to the SCM Agreement, agricultural 
export subsidies are thus not principally prohibited under the Agreement on Agriculture.  In 
disciplining agricultural export subsidies, the Agreement on Agriculture draws a distinction 
between listed types of export subsidies, which are pursuant to the chapeau of Article 9.1 
‘subject to reduction commitments’, and other types of export subsidies, which are subject to 
                                                 
1739 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 532; Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, 
para 155; Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para 186. 
1740 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para 123. 
1741 Panel Report, Canada – Dairy, paras 7.18-7.23; Panel Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 
7.101; Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, above n 1738, paras 7.251-7.262.  But as the Panel in US – 
Upland Cotton (para 7.263) correctly observed, this order of analysis was not followed by the Panel 
and Appellate Body in the US – FSC dispute because that dispute did not primarily concern agricultural 
products.   
1742 In the words of the Appellate Body: ‘(a)lthough an export subsidy granted to agricultural products 
must be examined, in the first place, under the Agreement on Agriculture, we find it appropriate, as has 
the Appellate Body in previous disputes, to rely on the SCM Agreement for guidance in interpreting 
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture’. Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 571.  
See also Panel Report, Canada – Dairy, para 7.23.  The Panel cited the Appellate Body’s statement in 
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut: ‘(W)ith respect to subsidies on agricultural products (…) (t)he Agreement 
on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement reflect the latest statement of WTO Members as to their rights 
and obligations concerning agricultural subsidies’.  
1743 Panel Report, Canada – Dairy, para 7.27. 
1744 The Appellate Body emphasized that compliance with both the Agreement on Agriculture and the 
commitments as specified in a Member’s schedule is prescribed under Article 8 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  This is only possible if those commitments are in conformity with the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras 216 and 220. 
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the anti-circumvention requirement of Article 10.1.  Next, Article 10.1 also makes ‘non-
commercial transactions’ (e.g., food aid support) subject to the anti-circumvention provision.    
 
The concept of ‘export subsidies’ under the Agreement on Agriculture refers, pursuant to 
Article 1(e), to ‘subsidies contingent upon export performance, including the export subsidies 
listed in Article 9 (…)’.   
The term ‘export contingency’ is thus defined similar as under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM 
Agreement.  This means that the case law developed on this concept under the SCM 
Agreement can be transposed to the Agreement on Agriculture.1745   
The ‘subsidy’-concept is, however, not further defined under the Agreement on Agriculture.  
In contrast, as covered above, Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement defines a subsidy on the 
basis of two constitutive elements: (a) a financial contribution by a government or any form 
of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of the GATT (b) that confers a benefit.  
Because this is the only provision in the WTO Agreements defining subsidies, the Panel in US 
– FSC held that it is ‘highly relevant context for the interpretation of the word “subsidy” 
within the meaning of the Agreement on Agriculture’.1746  On the other hand, the same Panel 
did ‘not say that the definition in the SCM Agreement (…) is directly applicable to the 
Agreement on Agriculture’ given that Article 1 of the SCM Agreement explicitly refers to 
‘for the purpose of this Agreement’.  Hence, it did not a priori preclude that a subsidy is 
defined differently under the Agreement on Agriculture.1747  But generally speaking and 
‘subject to any provision of the Agreement on Agriculture under which the contrary is to be 
inferred’,1748 a subsidy within the meaning of the SCM Agreement is considered a subsidy 
within the meaning of the Agreement on Agriculture.1749  Likewise finding inspiration in 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body in Canada – Dairy explained 
that a subsidy in the Agreement on Agriculture ‘involves a transfer of economic resources 
from the grantor to the recipient for less than full consideration’.1750  Subsequent Appellate 
Body reports have relied on these ‘definitional elements of a subsidy in the context of the 
                                                 
1745 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 7.150; Appellate Body, US – Upland Cotton, paras 571-
584. 
1746 Panel Report, US – FSC, para 7.150 
1747 Panel Report, US – FSC, para 7.150 (see also footnote 702).  Reviewing the listed types of export 
subsidies, Desta holds that these would normally also be covered under the broad definition of Article 1 
of the SCM Agreement.  Desta, above n 632, at 224. 
1748 The Panel referred, for instance, to the list of subsidies in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
1749 Panel Report, US – FSC, para 7.150. 
1750 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy, para 87.  The Appellate Body thus seems somewhat more 
restraint to take the subsidy definition of the SCM Agreement into consideration as context for 
interpreting provisions which do not explicitly use the wording ‘subsidy’.  For example, in deciding on 
whether ‘payments’ in Article 9(c) include payments in kind, the Appellate Body only referred to 
contextual support in the Agreement on Agriculture and not to Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.  
Appellate Body, Canada – Dairy, paras 107-112.  
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Agreement on Agriculture’.1751  The Appellate Body thus reformulated the benefit and 
financial contribution elements of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.1752  Observe that the 
Appellate Body’s definition refers to a ‘grantor’ in general and not to ‘the government’ in 
particular.  This suggests that the nexus to the government could be looser under the 
Agreement on Agriculture than under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement.1753  This will 
be illustrated in the following discussion on the treatment of those export subsidies listed in 
Article 9.1.  Next, the scope and disciplines on non-listed types of export subsidies will be 
clarified. 
 
6.2.1.2.1. Listed types of export subsidies 
6.2.1.2.1.1. Scope 
Article 9.1 lists six types agricultural export subsidies, which can be summarized as follows: 
(a) direct subsidies to agricultural producers1754 contingent upon export performance; (b) the 
sale or disposal for export of non-commercial stocks of agricultural products at a lower price 
than for buyers in the domestic market; (c) payments on the export of an agricultural product 
financed by virtue of governmental action; (d) subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing 
exports of agricultural products; (e) the more favourable provision of internal transport and 
freight charges on export shipments than on domestic shipments; and (f) subsidies on 
agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in exported products.   
 
Before analyzing those items further clarified in the case law, note that the Appellate Body 
has confirmed that that this list of practices ‘by definition, involve export subsidies’ under the 
Agreement on Agriculture.1755  This reasoning generates two implications.  First, somewhat 
parallel to the Illustrative List under the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body correctly reads 
the listed types of export subsidies in Article 9.1 as per se export subsidies in the meaning of 
                                                 
1751 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 615, footnote 913.  The Appellate Body in US – 
FSC applied this definition but in its examination largely referred to its analysis conducted under 
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement (Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, paras 136-139).  The Appellate 
Body in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS (footnote 212) also referred to this 
description in its analysis under the SCM Agreement. 
1752 The phrase ‘economic resources’ might also encompass income or price support in the meaning of 
Article XVI of the GATT. 
1753 Appellate Body, Canada – Dairy, para 87.  Noticing that the Panel only referred to the ‘benefit’ 
element under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body remarked that ‘the Panel failed 
entirely to make any mention of the other integral aspect of a ‘subsidy’ under Article 1.1 of the SCM 
Agreement, namely the need for a ‘financial contribution’’ (para 90).   
1754 Or to a firm or industry of an agricultural product; or a cooperative or other association of such 
producers; or to a marketing board. 
1755 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 269. 
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Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture.1756  Hence, complainants can directly jump to 
one of these items listed in Article 9, without the need for a separate demonstration of an 
‘export subsidy’ in the meaning of Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Second, in 
the words of the Panel in US – FSC, ‘a measure which is listed as an export subsidy in Article 
9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture is an export subsidy for the purposes of the Agreement 
on Agriculture independently of the definition of subsidy in the SCM Agreement’.1757  Thus, a 
measure falling within the description of one of the items of Article 9 is deemed to be an 
export subsidy, regardless whether it conforms to the definitional elements set forth in either 
Article 1 juncto 3 or the Illustrative List of the SCM Agreement.  To be sure, this does not 
mean that these SCM Agreement provisions are not relied upon as contextual support for 
interpreting Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.   
 
6.2.1.2.1.1.1. Direct subsidies to agricultural producers contingent upon export performance 
Export subsidies under Article 9.1(a) exist if four conditions are present: (i) the provision by 
governments or their agencies of (ii) direct subsidies, including payments-in-kind, (ii) to a 
firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural product, to a cooperative or other 
association of such producers, or to a marketing board, (iv) contingent on export 
performance.1758   
Regarding the first condition, the Appellate Body in Canada – Dairy found that the essence of 
‘governments’ is that they ‘enjoy the effective power to "regulate", "control" or "supervise" 
individuals, or otherwise "restrain" their conduct, through the exercise of lawful authority’.1759  
Consequently, a government agency was defined as an entity which exercises powers vested 
in it by a government for the purpose of performing such functions of a governmental 
character.1760  Hence, two constitutive elements should be present: power is delegated (source) 
enabling a function of a governmental character to be exercised.  Applied to the facts of the 
case, the Canadian milk marketing boards were considered ‘government agencies’ because 
they acted on the basis of delegated powers vested in them by federal and provincial 
                                                 
1756 ‘Article 9.1 sets forth a list of practices that, by definition, involve export subsidies. In other words, 
a measure falling within Article 9.1 is deemed to be an export subsidy within the meaning of Article 
1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture’.  Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 
269. 
1757 Panel Report, US – FSC, footnote 702.  This view was implicitly endorsed by the Appellate Body 
in Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II) in its interpretation of the scope of Article 
9(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture (see below).   
1758 See also Panel Report, Canada – Dairy, para 7.38. 
1759 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy, para 97. 
1760  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy, para 97. 
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governments and this enabled them to regulate a particular sector of the economy (i.e., the 
dairy sector).1761   
Next, such governments or government agencies should provide ‘subsidies, including 
payments-in-kind’.  Here, the Appellate Body developed the ‘subsidy’-definition as ‘a transfer 
of economic resources from the grantor to the recipient for less than full consideration’.1762  
The Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s view that all payments-in-kind ipso facto qualify 
under this definition.1763  Regarding such ‘a transfer of economic resources, in a form other 
than money’,1764 it should likewise be demonstrated that it is provided at beneficial terms to 
the recipient.1765   
The potential recipient of this subsidy is defined in a broad way under Article 9.1(a).  It could 
be made not only to individual producers but also to a cooperative of such producers, or to a 
marketing board.  Finally, regarding the ‘export contingency’ condition, the discussion 
already mentioned that this is applied similar to the case law developed under the SCM 
Agreement.1766 
 
6.2.1.2.1.1.2. Payments on the export of an agricultural product financed by virtue of 
governmental action 
An export subsidy in the meaning of Article 9.1(c) is present if two conditions are fulfilled: (i) 
‘payments on the export of an agricultural product’ (ii) that are ‘financed by virtue of 
governmental action’.1767   
 
To grasp the case law’s wide interpretation of this form of export subsidies, some essential 
facts of the Canada – Dairy and EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar disputes have to be 
introduced.1768  First, in order to comply with the DSB recommendations of the original 
procedures in Canada – Dairy, Canada had introduced a new category of milk for export 
processing (i.e., Commercial Export Milk) which was exempted from price regulation 
applicable to other types of milk.  At the first and second compliance level, complainants (US 
and New Zealand) advocated that the supply of CEM by Canadian milk producers to dairy 
                                                 
1761 This conclusion held even given that they enjoyed a high degree of discretion in the exercise of 
their power and exercised this power in the interest of particular traders, namely producers.  Appellate 
Body Report, Canada – Dairy, paras 97-102. 
1762 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy, para 87. 
1763 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy, para 87. 
1764 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy, paras 87, 107. 
1765 The Panel had concluded that all payments-in-kind are by definition at beneficial terms and thus 
‘direct subsidies’.  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy, paras 84-92. 
1766 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 7.150; Appellate Body, US – Upland Cotton, paras 571-
584.  See above Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.  
1767 See also Panel Report, Canada – Dairy, para 7.89. 
1768 To be sure, only those aspects relevant for our discussion below are spelled out. 
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processors (used as input for exports of processed dairy products) qualified as an export 
subsidy under Article 9.1(c).  In EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, the EC had established two 
categories of production quotas, one for ‘A sugar’ and the other for ‘B sugar’, which 
constituted the maximum quantities eligible for domestic price support and direct export 
subsidies.  Sugar produced in excess of A and B quota levels, labeled ‘C sugar’, was not 
eligible for domestic price support or direct export subsidies and had to be exported.  Parties 
disagreed on whether exports of C sugar were nonetheless benefiting from an export subsidy 
in the meaning of Article 9.1(c).1769  Observe at this point that in both cases the alleged 
payments were not made by the respective governments but by independent producers. 
 
Regarding the first condition, a ‘payment’ is interpreted in a broad sense as a transfer of 
economic resources, which could be either in form of money or in any other form such as the 
provision of goods/services or revenue foregone.1770  As the Appellate Body in Canada – 
Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US) stressed, such transfers qualify as ‘payments’ 
only if they are made at beneficial terms.  In this case, the Appellate Body had to decide 
whether the sale of Commercial Export Milk (CEM) by producers, which were independent 
economic operators, involved a ‘payment’ to processors for exports.  The provision of milk is 
a payment-in-kind that would be covered if sold at beneficial terms.  Concerning the 
appropriate benchmark for this benefit analysis, the Appellate Body rejected the domestic 
market price for milk because this price was an administered price fixed by the Canadian 
government.1771  The world market price was likewise refuted for the obvious reason that it 
was possible that the reason why CEM could be sold at world market prices was ‘precisely 
because sales of CEM involve subsidies that make it competitive’.1772  Because the 
benchmark should be ‘objective and based on the value of the milk to the producer’, the 
Appellate Body turned to the average total cost of production.1773  The Appellate Body 
deemed this benchmark appropriate because it ‘focuses upon the motivations of the 
independent economic operator who is making the alleged "payments" – here the producer – 
and not upon any government intervention in the marketplace’.1774  If producers were selling 
milk at below production costs, they were making a payment to processors.  In this respect, 
the Appellate Body further specified that this should be calculated on the basis of the 
                                                 
1769 There was no disagreement that A and B sugar was benefiting from export subsidies. 
1770 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy, paras 107-114. 
1771 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para 81. 
1772 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), paras 83-84. 
1773 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para 86. 
1774 Interestingly, the cost-to-government standard in items (j) and (k) of the Illustrative List was relied 
upon as useful context supporting the cost of production as benchmark.  Appellate Body Report, 
Canada  - Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), paras 92-93. 
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producers’ average total costs of production and not on their marginal costs.1775  Furthermore, 
this is an industry-wide average production cost, rather than an individual producer’s cost of 
production.1776  Lastly, it includes selling costs (e.g., transport, marketing, and administrative 
costs) and non-monetary costs (e.g., the costs of family labor/management and of owner's 
equity) since the latter involve an economic opportunity cost.1777  In sum, a payment is made 
at beneficial terms if it does not cover the average industry-wide total cost of production.  
Applied to the facts of the case in the second compliance procedure, the Appellate Body 
found that the supply of CEM by producers to processors involved ‘a payment’ because CEM 
was sold below the average total cost of production and thus transferred economic resources 
from producers to processors. 
Turning to EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, two types of alleged ‘payments’ to sugar C 
producers were scrutinized.  The Panel relied upon the average cost of production as 
benchmark spelled out in the Canada – Dairy findings.  First, the Panel agreed that the sale of 
C beet (i.e., the main input for C sugar) to C sugar producers below the total average cost of 
production of C beet was indeed a ‘payment’ to C sugar producers.1778  Second, the Panel and 
Appellate Body also agreed that there was a ‘payment’ in the form of cross-subsidization 
resulting from the profits made on sales of A and B sugar used to cover the fixed costs of the 
production/export of C sugar.  The fact that this transfer was made by the sugar producer to 
itself was no obstacle because a ‘payment’ does not necessarily require the presence of two 
distinct legal entities (i.e., grantor and recipient).1779 
 
To qualify as an export subsidy, such a payment has to be ‘on the export’.  This aspect was 
not much disputed in the compliance procedures of Canada – Dairy.  CEM was defined as 
milk that must be exported, implying that any payment in relation thereto was on the 
                                                 
1775 The average total production cost includes all fixed and variable costs, divided by the total number 
of units produced.  The marginal production cost refers to the additional cost of producing one extra 
unit and thus excludes fixed costs.  The Appellate Body recognized that ‘a producer may very well 
decide to sell goods or services if the sales price covers its marginal costs’, but ‘the producer will make 
losses on such sales unless all of the remaining costs associated with making these sales, essentially the 
fixed costs, are financed through some other source, such as through highly profitable sales of the 
product in another market’.  In the long-term, the producers should be able to also recoup fixed costs to 
avoid making losses.  Moreover, the Appellate Body assumed that ‘(i)n the ordinary course of business, 
an economic operator chooses to invest, produce and sell, not only to recover the total cost of 
production, but also in the hope of making profits’.  Therefore, the higher average total cost of 
production was considered appropriate as benchmark.  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy 
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), paras 94-95. 
1776 Because ‘(t)he question is not whether one or more individual milk producers, efficient or not, are 
selling CEM at a price above or below their individual costs of production. The issue is whether 
Canada, on a national basis, has respected its (…) commitment levels’.  Appellate Body Report, 
Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), paras 91-98. 
1777 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), paras 99-116. 
1778 Panel Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras 7.254-7.270 
1779 Panel Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras 7.294-7.314; Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras 257-271. 
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export.1780  Likewise, regarding cross-subsidization of C sugar by the profits made on sales of 
A/B sugar, the Panel and Appellate Body in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar concluded that 
this payment was made ‘on the export’ because C sugar had to be exported.1781  The EC’s 
concern that this interpretation blurred the distinction between disciplines on domestic 
support and those on export subsidies was not accepted.1782  In addition, the Panel dwelled 
upon the interpretation of ‘on the export’ for its finding that the sale of C beet to C sugar 
producers was also made ‘on the export’.  In this respect, the Panel held that such a payment 
should not be ‘contingent’ on exports1783 but should merely be ‘in connection’ with 
exports.1784  The Panel reasoned that:  
 
When identifying whether a payment is on the export as defined under Article 9.1(c) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, once a payment is identified, the focus is on whether this payment 
is made on the export, and not on whether the source of the payment is dependent or 
contingent on export production.1785 
 
Because this aspect of the panel report was not appealed, the Appellate Body did explicitly 
refrain from taking position on whether it would agree with this wide interpretation.1786 
 
Finally, to be labeled an export subsidy under Article 9.1(c), such payments on the export 
should be ‘financed by virtue of government action’.  Payments made or funded by private 
parties could, according to the Appellate Body, fall within its scope as long as the government 
plays a ‘sufficiently important part’ in this process.  A tight nexus has to exist between the 
government action and the financing of payments.1787  This nexus is not present if a regulatory 
framework would be set up ‘merely enabling a third person to make and finance 
‘payments’’.1788  On the other hand, the required nexus is not so demanding that it only 
                                                 
1780 Panel Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para 9.78; Panel Report, 
Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para 5.23 (this element was not appealed). 
1781 The fact that they did not have to produce C sugar did not undermine this conclusion because C 
sugar ‘once produced, must be exported’. Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, 
paras 275-276. 
1782 The Appellate Body recalled that ‘if domestic support could be used, without limit, to provide 
support for exports, it would undermine the benefits intended to accrue through a WTO Member's 
export subsidy commitments’.  Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 280; 
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para 91. 
1783 This is the standard under Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
1784 Panel Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 2.275. 
1785 Panel Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 2.273. 
1786 In doing so, the Appellate Body seemed to hint that it would not easily agree with this reasoning.  
Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 274. 
1787 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), paras 128 and 133.  
See also Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras 237-239; Panel Report, EC - 
Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 7.289. 
1788 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 237; Appellate Body Report, 
Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para 115.  
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captures situations where the government mandates or directs that payments be made.1789  The 
Appellate Body even explicitly contrasted the broad scope of this ‘unusual form of 
subsidy’1790 with Article 1.1.(a)(iv) of the SCM Agreement and some items of the Illustrative 
List.  Under the SCM Agreement, ‘some kind of government mandate, direction, or control is 
an element of a subsidy provided through a third party’.1791  In Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – 
New Zealand and US II), the Appellate Body found that producers’ payments (i.e., selling CEM 
at beneficial terms) were made by virtue of government action because the government played 
a sufficient important part in this process.  This conclusion was reached even though the 
Appellate Body acknowledged that producers were ‘entirely free to produce milk for sale as 
CEM, and it is for them to agree the price, volume, and timing of the sale with the buyers’.1792  
Producers were able to sell CEM below production cost as a result of their participation in the 
domestic market, which was virtually controlled by the government through price fixing of 
domestic milk (rendering it highly remunerative), quotas on supply, and tariffs.  In this way, 
the regulation of the domestic market had become an instrument for granting export 
subsidies.1793  Although the government did not direct or mandate producers to sell at 
beneficial terms, producers’ payments qualified as ‘export subsidies’ in the meaning of 
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture.  In EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, the Panel 
and Appellate Body also found sufficient elements for a ‘tight nexus’ between the EC’s 
governmental action and the financing of payments to producers of C sugar.1794 
In conclusion, the case law has developed an expansive interpretation of the type of export 
subsidies listed in Article 9.3(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Its scope is clearly broader 
than export subsidies defined under Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement.1795  The 
concept of ‘payment’ seems to be interpreted in a way that it de facto covers both the 
‘financial contribution’ and ‘benefit’ elements of the subsidy definition in Article 1 of the 
SCM Agreement, with the particularity that both aspects could also focus on the same private 
person.1796,1797  This particularity is linked to the main difference between both sets of 
                                                 
1789 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), paras 128 and 133; 
Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 235.        
1790 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para 87. 
1791 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), footnote 113. The 
Appellate Body also opined that ‘Article 9.1(c) (…) contemplates that ‘payments’ may be made and 
funded by private parties, without the type of governmental involvement ordinarily associated with a 
subsidy’ (para 87). 
1792 The only obligations imposed upon producers were to not divert CEM to the domestic market and 
to pre-commit to sell CEM.  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and 
US II), para 88. 
1793 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), paras 122-154. 
1794 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras 237-239. 
1795 With the important nuancing that the subsidy element might be covered under ‘income or price 
support’ (Article 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement). 
1796 Importantly, it does not cover the element ‘by the government’ of the subsidy definition (see 
below). 
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definitions.  Under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, the financial contribution is made, or at 
least mandated/directed, by the government and the benefit analysis turns to recipient.  Under 
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture, on the other hand, the payment should merely 
have a sufficient tight nexus to the government.  Hence, the payment could be made by a 
private person (to itself) even if it is not mandated/directed by the government.  In case 
domestic prices are distorted (e.g., administered prices) – which is not exceptional in the 
context of agriculture – the (full) cost of production is considered appropriate as benchmark to 
conduct the benefit analysis.  Finally, the Panel in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar has 
permitted a looser link to exports under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
Payments should not be ‘conditional’ upon exports but only ‘in connection with exports’, 
though the Appellate Body has not yet approved this interpretation.1798   
 
6.2.1.2.1.1.3. Subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural products 
The Appellate Body in US – FSC has clarified the scope of ‘subsidies to reduce the costs of 
marketing exports of agricultural products’ (Article 9.1(d) of the Agreement on Agriculture). 
The text itself stipulates that these costs include handling, upgrading, and other processing 
costs, as well as the cost of international transport and freight.  On the other hand, widely 
available export promotion and advisory services are explicitly excluded from its scope.  
Examining this list, the Appellate Body considered that marketing costs are confined to ‘types 
of costs that are incurred as part of and during the process of selling a product’.1799  
Consequently, such costs do not include general business costs, such as administrative 
overhead and debt financing costs, or income tax exemptions.  Therefore, the FSC tax 
exemption challenged in US – FSC did not qualify as an export subsidy in the meaning of 
Article 9.1(d) of the Agreement on Agriculture.1800  The scope of this listed type of export 
subsidy is of particular importance to developing countries.  As explained in the following 
section, these countries benefit from S&D treatment on subsidies to reduce the costs of 
marketing exports. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1797 To be precise, a financial contribution could also be made by the government to itself (i.e., to a 
government-owned enterprise) under article 1 of the SCM Agreement (see above n 673).  
1798 Somehow, such a more flexible approach regarding the link to exportation seems to be again a 
consequence of the looser nexus to the government.  Under the SCM Agreement, it can be scrutinized 
whether exportation was a condition to receive the financial contribution by the government. Under 
Article 9.1(c), however, the payment could be made by private parties, which will strictly speaking not 
make such a payment at beneficial terms conditional upon exportation.  The export stimulating effect is 
rather derived from the structure of the entire governmental framework. 
1799 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, paras 129-131 (emphasis in the original). 
1800 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, paras 131-132.  The Panel had reached the opposite conclusion.  
See Panel Report, US – FSC, para 7.159. 
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6.2.1.2.1.2. Disciplines  
The list in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture lays, by virtue of Article 3.3 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, ‘the foundation for the core rules of the Agreement relating to 
export subsidies’.1801  Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture reads: 
  
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2(b) and 4 of Article 9, a Member shall not provide 
export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 in respect of the agricultural products or 
groups of products specified in Section II of Part IV of its Schedule in excess of the budgetary 
outlay and quantity commitment levels specified therein and shall not provide such subsidies 
in respect of any agricultural product not specified in that Section of its Schedule.1802 
 
This provision draws an important distinction between scheduled (i.e., specified) and 
unscheduled (i.e., unspecified) agricultural products.  WTO Members were entitled in the 
Uruguay Round1803 to specify in their Schedules agricultural products that were benefiting 
from listed types of export subsidies during the 1986-1990 base period and these were made 
subject to reduction commitments.  Considering such scheduled agricultural products, the 
listed types of export subsidies are prohibited only to the extent they are in excess of the 
reduction commitment level of the Member in question.  These reduction commitments made 
during the Uruguay Round were disaggregated at the product level1804 and expressed in terms 
of both a budgetary outlay commitment and export quantity commitment.1805  Developed 
WTO Members committed themselves to reducing their level of export subsidies by the year 
2000 by 36 per cent in value terms and by 21 per cent in volume terms from a 1986–1990 
base period.1806  Developing countries had to reduce their level of support by 24 per cent in 
value terms and 14 per cent in volume terms over ten years, and LDCs did not have to make 
any reduction commitment.1807  But these reduction commitments were only meaningful with 
                                                 
1801 Panel Report, Canada – Dairy, para 7.28. 
1802 Emphasis added.   
1803 Or at the moment of accession if they acceded later. 
1804 Twenty-two product groupings were specified: wheat and wheat flour, coarse grains, rice, oilseeds, 
vegetable oils, oilcakes, sugar, butter and butter oil, skim milk powder, cheese, other milk products, 
bovine meat, pig meat, poultry meat, sheep meat, live animals, eggs, wine, fruit and vegetables, 
tobacco, cotton.  But reduction commitments could also be specified at a more disaggregate level.  See 
Note by Chairman of the Market Access Group, Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding 
Commitments under the Reform Program (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993) (Modalities 
Paper).  The tariff lines for the corresponding product or group of products at which reduction 
commitments have been made can be found in the Note by the Secretariat, Export Subsidy 
Commitments (TN/AG/S/8/Rev.1, 2 February 2005. 
1805 The ‘budgetary outlay commitment’ prescribes the annual maximum level of expenditure for such 
export subsidies to the product in question.  The ‘export quantity commitment’ prescribes the annual 
maximum level of the product in question that could benefit from such export subsidies.  Exact 
definitions can be found in Article 9.2(a)(i) of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Both budgetary outlay 
and quantity commitments have to be expressed in a Member’s Schedule.  See Appellate Body Report, 
EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras 193-200.  
1806 During the implementation period, some more flexibility was provided for under Article 9.2(b) of 
the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1807 See Article 9.2(b)(iv) of the Agreement on Agriculture; Modalities Paper, above n 1804, paras 15-
16.  The reduction commitments are also specified in Members’ Schedules and an integral part of 
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respect to a Member that had effectively scheduled an agricultural product in the first place.  
Indeed, with regard to unscheduled agricultural products, listed types of export subsidies are 
prohibited as such.1808  Hence, those countries that did not have any of the listed types of 
export subsidies in place during the Uruguay Round – like all LDCs or countries like India 
and Korea – were in principle not allowed to introduce them afterwards.1809  Overall, only 25 
WTO Members have specified one or more agricultural products in their Schedule.1810  
Making abstraction from Article 9.4, only these Members have a ‘limited authorization’1811 to 
provide the listed types of export subsidies for agricultural products insofar the product (or 
product grouping) in question is included in its Schedule and up to the budgetary outlay and 
export volume level committed.  The final bound export subsidy commitment level1812 for a 
scheduled product in a Member’s Schedule indicates the maximum level of expenditure for 
listed subsidies that this Member is entitled to offer annually to the product (or product 
grouping) in question as well as the maximum volume of that product (or product grouping) 
that could annually benefit from such subsidies.1813  In case these levels are reached, ‘the 
                                                                                                                                            
GATT 1994 (Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture).  It should be highlighted that the Modalities 
Paper is ‘not an agreement among WTO Members’ (Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on 
Sugar, para 199) and ‘the Agreement on Agriculture makes no reference to’ it (Appellate Body Report, 
EC – Bananas III, para 157).  Above, the Modalities Paper also stipulates that it shall ‘not be used as a 
basis for dispute settlement proceedings’. 
1808 Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1809 This observation, which makes abstraction of Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture, is often 
insufficiently acknowledged.  For example, the 2006 World Trade Report generally stated that ‘least-
developed have been exempted from making any trade liberalization commitments’. World Trade 
Report 2006, above n 574, at 194. 
1810 Counting the EC as one, which refers to the EC-15.  There is still disagreement among WTO 
Members on how the export subsidy commitments should be rearranged in light of the EC’s 
enlargement to 27 countries (ICTSD, ‘Farm Subsidies: Exporters Quiz EU’, 14:10 Bridges Weekly 
Trade News Digest (17 March 2010)).  These countries are: Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, European Communities (EC-15), Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, 
Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, South Africa, 
Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Turkey, US, Uruguay, Venezuela.  In particular, these reduction 
commitments are specified in Section II of Part IV of their Schedule.  In addition, some countries (e.g., 
Costa Rica and Panama) have commitments in Section III of Part IV of their Schedule, which requires 
them to eliminate or reduce certain incentive schemes applying to non-traditional agricultural products.  
In total, the 25 WTO Members listed above made 428 export subsidy reduction commitments, of which 
421 are product-specific with both budgetary outlay and volume commitments, two apply to ‘all 
agricultural products’, and five to ‘incorporated products’.  As mentioned above, these product-specific 
commitments are not always made at the product grouping level but have also been made at a more 
disaggregate level.  For example, Bulgaria specified 28 reduction commitments in the product grouping 
‘fruit and vegetables’.  Note by the Secretariat, Export Subsidy Commitments (TN/AG/S/8/Rev.1, 2 
February 2005) 
1811 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 151. 
1812 The implementation period ended in 2000 and 2004 for developed countries and developing 
countries, respectively. 
1813 Article 9.2(b)(iv) of the Agreement on Agriculture.  The final bound levels of commitments (at 5-
38) and the corresponding tariff lines at which these commitments have been made (at 39-97) can be 
found in TN/AG/S/8/Rev.1 (2 February 2005).    
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limited authorization to provide export subsidies as listed in Article 9.1 is transformed, 
effectively, into a prohibition against the provision of those subsidies’.1814 
Hence, several scholars in the field and even the 2003 World Trade Report concluded that all 
countries which did not have export subsidies in place during the base period are prohibited 
from introducing them afterwards.1815  Although this general conclusion holds for developed 
countries, it seems to fail to acknowledge the substantial flexibility1816 given to developing 
countries on the basis of Article 9.4.  This provision reads:   
 
During the implementation period, developing country Members shall not be required to 
undertake commitments in respect of the export subsidies listed in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of 
paragraph 1 above, provided that these are not applied in a manner that would circumvent 
reduction commitments.1817 
 
This provision would normally have lapsed at the end of the 10-years implementation period.  
However, its application was extended at the Cancun Ministerial Conference (2003) as well as 
at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference (2005).  The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 
stipulated that ‘(d)eveloping country Members will continue to benefit from (this provision) 
for five years after the end-date for elimination of all forms of export subsidies’.1818  As long 
as no final date for the elimination of export subsidies is agreed upon, the time horizon of 
Article 9.4 is open ended.  
As a result, ‘developing countries’ are, subject to the condition of anti-circumvention, not 
required to undertake ‘commitments’ in respect of two of the listed types of export subsidies: 
subsidies to reduce the cost of marketing agricultural exports (item (d)) and the more 
favourable provision of internal transport and freight charges on export shipments (item (e)).  
However, the exact scope of this S&D treatment is not well defined.  The interpretation 
                                                 
1814 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 152. 
1815 McMahon seems to fail to acknowledge that Article 9.4 has been extended and, on this basis, seems 
to reach the general conclusion that countries which did not have export subsidies in place during the 
Uruguay Round are not allowed to introduce them (see McMahon, above n 1729, at 96, footnote 24 and 
143).  See also, M. G. Desta, ‘The Bumpy Ride Towards the Establishment of a Fair and Market-
oriented Agricultural Trading System at the WTO: Reflections Following Cancun’, 8 Drake Journal of 
Agricultural Law (Fall 2003), 489-537, at 515-516; M. G. Desta, ‘Legal Issues in International 
Agricultural Trade, The Evolution of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture from its Uruguay Origins to 
its Post-Hong Kong Directions’, FAO Legal Papers Online No. 55 (July 2006), 31 pp., at 19.  In one 
publication Desta considered that Article 9.4 is an exception but only a ‘minor’ one.  See M. G. Desta, 
‘The Integration of Agriculture in WTO Disciplines’, in B. O’Conner (ed), Agriculture in WTO Law 
(London: Cameron May, 2005), 17-41, at 23, footnote 18.  See also WTO Secretariat, World Trade 
Report 2003 (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2003), 242 pp., at 181. 
1816 This conclusion holds if a broad reading of Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture is adopted.  
1817 Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture (emphasis added).  As cited above, Article 3.3 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture explicitly refers to this exception.  Contrary to Article 9.4, Article 9.2(b) has 
lapsed. 
1818 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, para 6.  Hence, the latest Revised Draft Modalities for 
Agriculture would set the end date at 2021 (five years after the end-date for the elimination of export 
subsidies for developing countries).  See Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, above n 652, para 
164.  In contrast, the Cancun Ministerial Declaration only extended its application until the end of 
phasing out all forms of export subsidies.  Cancun Ministerial Declaration, Annex A, para 3.19.   
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difficulties seem to revolve around the concept of ‘commitments’ in the opening clause of 
Article 9.4, which could be read in a twofold way.  A narrow and broad reading could be 
distinguished. 
 
On the one hand, ‘commitments’ in Article 9.4 could refer to reduction commitments upon 
scheduled agricultural products.  Under such a narrow reading, this S&D provision would 
only be meaningful with respect to developing countries having effectively scheduled an 
agricultural product in the first place.  These developing countries would in principle be 
allowed to postpone their reduction commitment (24 per cent in value terms and 14 per cent 
in volume terms) but the value and amount of subsidies exceeding their final bound level 
should take the form of marketing or transport export subsidies.1819  In contrast, non-
scheduled agricultural products could not benefit from marketing/transport export subsidies.  
Developing countries that have not scheduled any agricultural product could not introduce 
marketing/transport export subsidies under this narrow reading.  This reading was adopted in 
a communication by a group of developing countries.  They considered that the flexibility of 
Article 9.4 was not useful to them because they did not have any scheduled agricultural 
product.1820  Such a narrow reading might find some contextual support in the ‘anti-
circumvention’ condition spelled out in Article 9.4:  marketing/transport export subsidies 
could not be applied ‘in a manner that would circumvent reduction commitments’.  This 
condition is per definition only meaningful with respect to agricultural products for which 
reduction commitments have been made.  Nonetheless, even with regard to scheduled 
agricultural products, the substance of this condition is far from evident.  Drafters might have 
had in mind the situation whereby a developing country fulfils its reduction commitment by 
simply transforming other listed types of export subsidies into marketing/transport export 
subsidies and thus ‘evades, finds a way around’ around its reduction commitments.1821  Yet, 
operationalizing this anti-circumvention condition along these lines without erasing the 
                                                 
1819 Because this provision gives flexibility on reduction commitments, the amount should not exceed 
their level of support indicated in their schedule (i.e., pre-commitment level). 
1820 ‘With respect to export subsidies, pursuant to Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
(Agreement on Agriculture), developing countries are not required to undertake reduction 
commitments on some export subsidies.  Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of 
Moldova have already bound their export subsidies at zero, and are deprived from using such flexibility 
provided to developing countries’ (emphasis added).  Communication from Armenia, Georgia, the 
Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Moldova (TN/AG/GEN/10, 29 June 2005), para 17; see also 
Minutes of Meeting, Held in the Centre William Rappard on 21 and 28 July 2005 (TN/C/M/19, 15 
September 2005), para 479. 
1821 This is the dictionary meaning of ‘circumvention’ relied upon by the Appellate Body for the 
interpretation of Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  See Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, 
para 148. 
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essence of this exception1822 would bring Article 9.4 close to a standstill provision.1823  Such 
an interpretation would overly curtail the scope of Article 9.4 since it would preclude 
developing countries from introducing new marketing/transport export subsidies for 
scheduled agricultural products above final bound levels of commitment.  This would treat 
new marketing/transport export subsidies similar to other listed types of subsidies and thus 
cancel out their S&D status.   
 
Most (developing) countries, however, read Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture in a 
broader way.  They give meaning to the fact that the wording ‘commitments’ in the opening 
phrase of this provision is not qualified by the prefix ‘reduction’.  Therefore, this term has to 
refer to commitments not only on scheduled agricultural products (i.e., subject to reduction 
commitment) but also on unscheduled agricultural products (i.e., subject to the commitment 
not to offer listed export subsidies).  This broad reading, which also finds support in the 
notification requirement procedure,1824 would entitle all developing countries (except for 
China)1825 to offer marketing/transport export subsidies (i) on scheduled products above the 
final commitment level and on (ii) unscheduled products.1826  Hence, countries that have not 
scheduled any agricultural product would still be free to offer these two types of export 
subsidies.1827  For example, trade policy reviews and notifications reveal that several of these 
                                                 
1822 Surely, the anti-circumvention provision could not be interpreted as strictly as under Article 10.1 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture because this would erase the essence of the exception itself.  As 
elaborated below, circumvention exists under Article 10.1 if non-listed types of export subsidies are 
offered above reduction commitment levels.  But Article 9.4 precisely entitles developing countries to 
make no commitments on marketing/transport export subsidies during the implementation period.    
1823 Marketing/transport export subsidies in place during the Uruguay Round could be upheld even if 
the total level of listed export subsidies is above the reduction commitment.  In contrast, reducing other 
types of listed subsidies and introducing new marketing/transport export subsidies would come close to 
‘circumvention’. 
1824 For those WTO Members ‘with no base or annual commitment levels shown in Section II of Part 
IV of their Schedule, an annual notification following the end of the year in question should be made 
no later than 30 days following the period in the form of a statement confirming that no export 
subsidies exist or, in the case of developing country Members using exempt export subsidies (Article 
9:1(d) and (e)), in the form of Supporting Table ES:2’ (emphasis added). Committee on Agriculture, 
Notification Requirements and Formats (G/AG/2, 30 June 1995), at 24; Notification Requirements and 
Formats under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (PC/IPL/12, 2 December 1994), at 28; Committee 
on Agriculture, Special Session, Export Subsidy Commitments, Note by the Secretariat, Revision 
(TN/AG/S/8/Rev.1, 2 February 2005), at 10-14.    
1825 China explicitly committed not to maintain or introduce any export subsidy upon agricultural 
products.  Report of the Working Party Report on the Accession of China (WT/ACC/CHN/49), para 
241.  
1826 Hoekman and Messerlin also seem to share this interpretation.  See B. Hoekman and P. Messerlin, 
‘Removing the exception of agricultural export subsidies’, in K. Anderson and W. Martin, Agricultural 
Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2006), 195-219, 
at 197.   
1827 The situation is also different under the broad reading with respect to scheduled agricultural 
products given that these could even be offered above the level specified in a Member’s schedule (pre-
commitment level).  Compare to above n 1819. 
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developing countries have offered both types of export subsidies by relying on Article 9.4.1828  
These countries’ advocacy to prolong application of Article 9.4 also reveals their convinction 
that they can benefit from this provision.  Moreover, when acceding to the WTO, Algeria, 
Cambodia, and Tonga did not schedule agricultural products but they all explicitly referred to 
their right to take recourse to Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture.1829  This broad 
reading could likewise find contextual support in the anti-circumvention condition.  Indeed, 
the reference to ‘reduction commitments’ might indicate that the previous reference in the 
same provision to ‘commitments’ as such was not unintended and should be given 
meaning.1830  Overall, the arguments underpinning this broad reading seem to be convincing.  
Yet, operationalizing the anti-circumvention condition imposed under Article 9.4 is even 
more difficult than under the narrow reading.  After all, this condition is by its terms only 
meaningful for agricultural products subject to reduction commitments (i.e., scheduled 
agricultural products).  Hence, developing countries having no scheduled agricultural 
products could not be restrained by this anti-circumvention condition when introducing 
marketing and transport export subsidies.  Simultaneously imposing the anti-circumvention 
                                                 
1828 Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, Republic of Korea, Revision 
(WT/TPR/S/204/Rev.1, 4 December 2008), at 38; Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, 
Report by the Secretariat, Pakistan, Revision (WT/TPR/S/193/Rev.1, 20 May 2008), at 81-82; Trade 
Policy Review Body, Barbados, Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/101, 10 June 2002), at 50.  With 
regard to Korea, see also Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 26 September 2007, Note by the 
Secretariat (G/AG/R/49, 19 November 2007), at 10-11.  Notifications referring to the use of Article 9.4 
include: Committee on Agriculture, Notification, Republic of Korea,  Export Subsidy 
(G/AG/N/KOR/36, 27 February 2007); Notification, Morocco, Export Subsidies (G/AG/N/MAR/33, 7 
January 2005); Notification, India, Export subsidies (G/AG/N/IND/3, 1 March 2002).  In addition, four 
developing countries (Korea, Morocco, Pakistan and Tunisia) – none of which had scheduled 
agricultural products – notified the use of export subsidies under this provision in 1998.  Note by the 
Secretariat, Information on the Utilization of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions, 
(WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4, 7 February 2002).  All notifications during the 1995-2001 period 
are listed in Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Export Subsidy Commitments, Note by the 
Secretariat, Revision (TN/AG/S/8/Rev.1, 2 February 2005), at 10-14.  
1829 See Working Party on the Accession of Tonga, Draft Report of the Working Party on the Accession 
of the Kingdom of Tonga to the World Trade Organization, Revision (WT/ACC/SPEC/TON/4/Rev.1, 
23 October 2003), at 31; Working Party on the Accession of Cambodia, Draft Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of Cambodia, Revision (WT/ACC/SPEC/KHM/4/Rev.1, 19 June 2003), at 47; 
Working Party on the Accession of Algeria, Accession of Algeria, Additional Questions and Replies, 
Addendum (WT/ACC/DZA/15/Add.2, 18 April 2004), at 10; see also, Working Party on the Accession 
of Viet Nam, Accession of Viet Nam,  Additional Questions and Replies (WT/ACC/VNM/29, 30 
October 2003), at 37. 
1830 Somewhat parallel, the Appellate Body has interpreted the term ‘export subsidy commitments’ in 
Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture as covering both scheduled and unscheduled products.  
Two arguments used by the Appellate Body can be transposed to the analysis under Article 9.4.  First, 
the Appellate Body found support for its interpretation in the ordinary meaning of ‘commitment’ which 
generally connoted ‘engagements’ or ‘obligations’.  Second, the Appellate Body observed the 
distinction in Article 10 between ‘export subsidy commitments’ (paragraph 1) and ‘reduction 
commitments’ (paragraph 3).  The latter only applies to scheduled agricultural products.  Hence, the 
absence of the prefix ‘reduction’ is given meaning in the jurisprudence.  See Appellate Body Report, 
US – FSC, paras 144-147; Panel, US – FSC, paras 7.138-7.140.  The Panel in particularly stated (para 
7.140) that ‘(w)e cannot assume that this distinction between two provisions in such close proximity 
within the same Article was inadvertent’.     
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condition upon scheduled agricultural products, along the lines elaborated above, seems to be 
somewhat paradoxical.  It would mean that countries that in principle have more leeway to 
offer listed export subsidies would be more constrained in offering marketing/transport export 
subsidies than developing countries having no scheduled products.  In sum, giving substance 
to the anti-circumvention condition, which by definition only disciplines scheduled products, 
is even thornier under the broad reading of Article 9.4 than under the narrow reading.1831   
 
6.2.1.2.1.3. Conclusion and Doha Round negotiations 
WTO Members are in principle only entitled to offer listed types of export subsidies to 
scheduled agricultural products and this up to their final reduction commitment level as 
agreed upon in the Uruguay Round.  As a consequence, unscheduled agricultural products 
could not benefit from listed types of export subsidies.  However, some more flexibility is 
given to developing countries with regard to transport and marketing export subsidies.  Under 
the narrow reading, such export subsidies could be given by developing countries to 
scheduled agricultural export subsidies above their final reduction commitment level.  For the 
reasons set out above, I would endorse the broad reading suggested by most Members, 
implying that all developing countries (except for China) are free to offer these types of 
export subsidies with respect to scheduled as well as unscheduled agricultural products.  Only 
the anti-circumvention condition would impose some restraint but the exact meaning of this 
condition is far from evident.   
 
In the latest Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, developed WTO Members having 
scheduled export subsidy entitlements agreed to eliminate these by the end of 2013, whereas 
developing WTO Members agreed to eliminate these by the end of 2016.1832  Partly on 
demand of the Cotton-4, which is a West African coalition seeking liberalization in cotton,1833 
listed export subsidies for cotton would be prohibited without any phasing-out period for 
developed countries and developing countries would receive one year to implement this 
prohibition. Furthermore, in line with the Hong Ministerial Declaration, developing country 
Members ‘shall continue to benefit from the provisions of Article 9.4 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture until the end of 2021, i.e., five years after the end-date for elimination of all forms 
of export subsidies’.1834  This formulation likewise suggests that all developing countries 
(except for China) benefit from S&D treatment under Article 9.4.  Under Part III of this 
                                                 
1831 As mentioned above, this is exactly the argument why the anti-circumvention condition might also 
be read as contextual support in favour of the narrow reading.    
1832 Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, above n 652, paras 162-163. 
1833 Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali. 
1834 Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, above n 652, para 164.  See above n 649. 
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dissertation, more insights will be given on why the EC finally agreed with this 2013 phase-
out deadline.  Likewise, it will be illustrated that this agreed deadline is conditional upon the 
elaboration of ‘parallel’ disciplines on non-listed types of export subsidies (e.g., export credit 
support, food aid).  Obviously, the implementation of this agreed deadline in the negotiations 
is dependent on the final conclusion of the Doha Round.  In the next section, the disciplines 
on non-listed types of export subsidies are elaborated.   
 
6.2.1.2.2. Non-listed types of export subsidies 
6.2.1.2.2.1. Scope  
Those ‘export subsidies not listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9’ are subject to the anti-
circumvention discipline of Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.1835  As mentioned 
above, the term ‘export subsidies’ is defined in Article 1(e) as ‘subsidies contingent upon 
export performance, including the export subsidies listed in Article 9 of this Agreement’.  The 
use of the word ‘including’ suggests in the Appellate Body’s reading that the term ‘export 
subsidies’ should be interpreted broadly.1836  Again, the definition of a subsidy as formulated 
by the Appellate Body is relied upon.  So, ‘subsidies’ refer to transfers of economic resources 
from the grantor to the recipient for less than full consideration.  Contextual support is further 
found in Article 1 juncto 3 and/or the Illustrative List of the SCM Agreement.1837  In addition 
to these provisions of the SCM Agreement, it could be argued that the list of deemed export 
subsidies under Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture could likewise offer useful 
contextual guidance on some definitional aspects.  Relevantly, this might point to another 
interpretation of ‘export subsidies’ under Article 10.1.  Indeed, the debate articulated above 
on the required nexus to the government of a payment made by a private actor in Canada – 
Dairy clearly illustrates that the choice among these provisions as contextual support could be 
relevant.1838  It was explained that the strength of the nexus under Article 9.1(c) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture could be looser than under the relevant provisions of the SCM 
Agreement.  The Appellate Body’s definition of ‘subsidies’, which does not explicitly refer to 
‘by the government’ but to the general concept of ‘grantor’, leaves it open to define ‘export 
subsidies’ under Article 10.1 in such a broad way. 
The case law has further revealed that all such ‘export subsidies’ within the meaning of the 
Agreement on Agriculture that are not included in the list of Article 9.1 are subject to the non-
circumvention discipline.  As will be elaborated in the case study under Part III, subsidized 
                                                 
1835 Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture (emphasis added).   
1836 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 615. 
1837 For example, the Appellate Body in US – FSC found contextual support in Article 1 of the SCM 
Agreement.  
1838 See above Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.2.1.1.2 and Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1.2.1. 
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export credit support is also subject to this discipline, even though Article 10.2 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture devotes a specific paragraph to this type of export subsidies.  
Revenue foregone by the government contingent upon exportation is another example of a 
non-listed type of export subsidies covered under Article 10.1.  Indeed, the Appellate Body in 
US –FSC found that the US income tax exemption for FSCs qualified as an ‘export subsidy’ in 
the meaning of Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.1839 
All these non-listed types of export subsidies are only inconsistent with Article 10.1 if 
‘applied in a manner which results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export 
subsidy commitments’.1840  In the following section, the case law’s interpretation of this ‘anti-
circumvention’ obligation imposed under Article 10.1 is explained. 
 
6.2.1.2.2.2. Disciplines 
6.2.1.2.2.2.1. Actual circumvention 
According to the Appellate Body, Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture is ‘designed 
to prevent Members from circumventing or "evading" their "export subsidy 
commitments"’.1841 But the provision itself does not illuminate how this standard of ‘anti-
circumvention’ should exactly be understood.  Recall that listed types of export subsidies 
could be offered up to the level of reduction commitments for scheduled products but are 
flatly prohibited for non-scheduled products.1842  When are these export subsidy commitments 
circumvented by the provision of non-listed types of export subsidies to such scheduled or 
non-scheduled agricultural products? 
The literature was divided on how this question had to be answered.  On the one hand, some 
authors, such as Desta, considered that the standard of anti-circumvention imposed on non-
listed export subsidies should certainly be lower than the standard imposed on listed types of 
export subsidies.  After all, its purpose is ‘only to protect the commitments on those 
exhaustively listed export subsidies from being evaded by the use of non-listed subsidies’.1843  
Although acknowledging opposing textual arguments (e.g., Article 10.3), Desta argued that 
such circumvention should not be deemed present if non-listed export subsidies are given 
                                                 
1839 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, paras 133-142.  Notice that it was not examined (because this 
was not claimed) whether this measure could have been covered under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement 
on Agriculture.  Interestingly, the Appellate Body referred to its interpretation in Canada – Dairy that 
‘revenue foregone’ could be covered as ‘payment’ under Article 9.1(c) to underpin its decision that an 
export subsidy under Article 10.1 of the SCM Agreement could also include ‘revenue foregone’. 
Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 138. 
1840 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 626. 
1841 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 148. 
1842 Abstraction is made of the exception for developing countries under Article 9.4 (see below Part II, 
Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.2.2.2.3). 
1843 Desta, above n 632, at 263. 
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above commitment levels because this would put non-listed subsidies on the same footing as 
listed ones.  Moreover, if such reading would have been the drafters’ purpose, they would 
have been much more explicit in Article 10.1.  Therefore, Desta concluded that the provision 
of non-listed export subsidies in excess of commitment levels should only create a rebuttable 
presumption of circumvention.1844  On the other hand, Brosch, who was part of the 
negotiating team of the US during the Uruguay Round, considered Article 10.1 as a ‘catch-
all’-provision.  It would cover export subsidy schemes not anticipated by the negotiators 
during the Uruguay Round.  Hence, this reading would support the view to put non-listed 
types of export subsidies on an equal footing with listed ones.1845   
The Panel in Canada – Milk followed the interpretation advanced by Brosch as it considered 
‘one example’ of such (threat of) circumvention a situation where non-listed types of 
subsidies are given to scheduled products in excess of the reduction commitment level.1846  
The Panel observed that all parties agreed with this interpretation.  The Panel also found 
contextual support in Article 10.3 which, as elaborated below, shifts the burden of proof to the 
respondent to demonstrate that no ‘export subsidy, whether listed in Article 9 or not’1847 is 
given in respect of the quantity the Member has exported in excess of its reduction 
commitment level.  Taking a somewhat more flexible stance advocated by Desta, the Panel in 
the second compliance of Canada – Milk seemed to hold that the provision of non-listed 
export subsidies in excess of the reduction commitment level only makes a prima facie case 
of (threat of) circumvention, which can still be rebutted by the respondent.1848  Yet, at the time 
of this second compliance panel, the Appellate Body in US – FSC had already dealt with this 
legal question in a way more in line with the original panel.  Indeed, to paraphrase the 
Appellate Body’s parallel reasoning as regards scheduled products: ‘(m)embers would have 
                                                 
1844 Desta, above n 632, at 260-267; Desta, ‘Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade, The 
Evolution of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture from its Uruguay Origins to its Post-Hong Kong 
Directions’, above n 1815, at 19. 
1845 But Brosch even goes further and labels non-listed export subsidies as prohibited as such, even if 
offered below commitment levels.  Yet, the latter restrictive view, disciplining non-listed export 
subsidies far more stricter as listed once, certainly contradicts with the text of Article 10.1 which only 
prescribes that such types of subsidies could not be used to ‘circumvent’ export subsidy commitments 
and not that they are prohibited as such.  Unsurprisingly, this view is not followed in the case law. 
1846 Panel Report, Canada – Dairy, paras 7.122 and 7.20.  The reference to ‘one example’ indicates that 
the Panel left open the possibility that (threat of) circumvention by non-listed types of export subsidies 
could occur even when the reduction commitment level is not surpassed.  This could also be inferred 
from the Panel’s statement that ‘a Member may use export subsidies not listed in Article 9.1 within the 
limits of its scheduled reduction commitments. However, as stipulated by Article 10.1, such subsidies 
may not be applied so as to circumvent these and other export subsidy commitments under the 
Agreement on Agriculture’.  Hence, the ‘circumvention’ discipline would even be more stringent than 
the reduction commitment standard.  Panel Report, Canada – Dairy, para 7.29.  
1847 Emphasis added. 
1848 The Panel’s interpretation seems to result from an erroneous reading of Article 10.3 as the latter 
only shifts the burden of proof on the respondent with respect to the export subsidy element and not 
with respect to the anti-circumvention standard.  Panel Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New 
Zealand and US II), paras 5.166-5.173. 
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found "a way round", a way to "evade", their commitments under Articles 3.3 and 9.1, if they 
could transfer, through (non-listed types of export subsidies), the very same economic 
resources that they were, (…), prohibited from providing through other methods under the 
first clause of Article 3.3 and under 9.1’ when the specific reduction commitment levels have 
been reached.1849,1850  Hence, the Appellate Body seemed to hold that circumvention is 
present, and not merely assumed, when non-listed types of export subsidies are offered to 
scheduled products above their reduction commitment levels or to unscheduled products tout 
court.  At the same time, the Appellate Body seemed to hold that no circumvention could be 
present in case Members do not offer non-listed export subsidies to scheduled products above 
their reduction commitment levels.1851  This interpretation was applied and confirmed by the 
panels in the US – Upland Cotton procedures.  As a result, non-listed export subsidies are thus 
disciplined similarly under the ‘anti-circumvention’ standard of Article 10.1 than listed ones 
under Articles 3.3 juncto 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Non-listed types of export 
subsidies are flatly prohibited for unscheduled products.  Such subsidies are added to listed 
types of export subsidies for the determination of whether scheduled products are subsidized 
above quantity/budgetary outlay reduction commitments. 
 
6.2.1.2.2.2.2. Threat of circumvention 
Actual circumvention of export subsidy commitments is not even required to find an Article 
10.1 violation.  Indeed, the text of Article 101 indicates that the application of an export 
subsidy in a manner which only threatens circumvention is sufficient.1852  If ‘actual’ 
circumvention is found with respect to an agricultural product, panels are allowed to exercise 
judicial economy on the additional claim of ‘threat’ of circumvention.1853  Hence, the claim 
that non-listed types of subsidies threaten to lead to circumvention of export subsidy 
commitments is merely scrutinized for those agricultural products for which actual 
                                                 
1849 The phrase ‘at that time’ refers to the situation when the specific reduction commitment levels have 
been reached.  Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 152. 
1850 Similarly, the Appellate Body reasoned as regards to non-scheduled products, that ‘Members would 
certainly have "found a way round", a way to "evade"’ the prohibition on providing listed types of 
export subsidies to non-schedules products ‘if they could transfer, through (non-listed types of export 
subsidies), the very same economic resources that they are prohibited from providing in other forms 
under Articles 3.3 and 9.1’.  Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 150.   
1851 This could also be revealed from the Appellate Body’s general statement in Canada – Dairy (Article 
21.5 – New Zealand and US II) that ‘(p)ursuant to Article 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, a Member 
is entitled to grant export subsidies within the limits of the reduction commitment specified in its 
Schedule’ (Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para 70).  
This differs from the Panel’s holding in the original procedure which left open the possibility that 
circumvention could be present even if the reduction commitment levels are not reached.  See above n 
1846. 
1852 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, paras 148-154. 
1853 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 715-719; Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, 
para 7.882 (footnote 1061).  According to the Panel, subsidies that result in actual circumvention ipso 
facto threaten to result in circumvention.   
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circumvention could not be demonstrated.  Such a threat of circumvention was, in the Panel’s 
interpretation in US – Upland Cotton, only present if the subsidy programme created the 
unconditional legal entitlement to receive them.1854  However, the Appellate Body rejected the 
Panel’s narrow interpretation which seems, as the Appellate Body also hinted at, to be 
inspired by the mandatory/discretionary distinction.1855,1856  According to the Appellate Body, 
‘the ordinary meaning of the term "threaten" refers to a likelihood of something happening’ 
and ‘does not connote a sense of certainty’.1857  Therefore, ‘threaten to lead to circumvention’ 
is present in case ‘the export subsidies are applied in a manner that is "likely to" lead to 
circumvention of a WTO Member's export subsidy commitments’.1858  On the one hand, 
contrary to the Panel, the Appellate Body ‘did not foreclose (…) the possibility that a measure 
that does not create a "legal entitlement" or that has a "discretionary element" could be found 
to "threaten[] to lead to circumvention" (…)’.1859  On the other hand, a threat of circumvention 
is not interpreted as broadly as to mandate ‘precautionary steps to ensure that circumvention 
of (…) export subsidy reduction commitments never happens’.1860  The standard of 
‘likelihood’ is situated somewhere in between both extremes and should – unsurprisingly – be 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis.1861  A pivotal element to reveal the likelihood of 
circumvention in the future seems whether the product in question has previously benefited 
from the challenged non-listed type of export subsidy.1862    
Hence, a threat of circumvention could exist even if its current legal system does not mandate 
the Member in question to offer such WTO inconsistent subsidies in the future.  In developing 
its broad interpretation, the Appellate Body observed that its interpretation of the term ‘threat’ 
is consistent with its approach under the Agreement on Safeguards and the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement where it defined a threat as something that ‘has not yet occurred, but remains a 
future event whose actual materialization cannot, in fact, be assured with certainty’.1863  
However, the Appellate Body seems to overlook that threat of circumvention elaborated in 
Article 10.1 has another quality than the threat of injury that could be countervailed (or which 
could be responded by imposing anti-dumping duties or safeguard duties).1864  Contrary to the 
threat referred to in Article 10.1, in the latter case subsidization (dumping/increased imports) 
                                                 
1854 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.883. 
1855 The Panel erroneously generalized the Appellate Body’s reference to ‘legal entitlement’ in US – 
FSC.  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 706-710.   
1856 The application of the mandatory/discretionary distinction is explained below in Part III, Chapter 4, 
Section 4.1. 
1857 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 704 (emphasis in the original). 
1858 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 704 (emphasis added).   
1859 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 709. 
1860 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 713. 
1861 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 704 (footnote 1082). 
1862 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 713-714. 
1863 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 705. 
1864 See also above Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.2.5. 
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actually takes place and there is only uncertainty on whether it will cause the required level of 
injury.  On the other hand, one might argue that the Appellate Body’s interpretation 
acknowledges that a threat of future subsidization might affect actual behaviour of foreign 
producers, even though the current regulatory framework does not mandate such future 
subsidization. 
 
6.2.1.2.2.2.3. Conclusion 
The case law has largely neutralized the distinction often stressed in the literature between 
disciplines on listed and non-listed types of export subsidies.  The standard of actual anti-
circumvention imposed on non-listed export subsidies under Article 10.1 is exactly the same 
as the (reduction) commitment standard imposed on listed export subsidies under Articles 3.3 
juncto 9.1.  Although Article 10.1 might have been drafted differently if this interpretation 
was indeed in the mind of the drafters,1865 this interpretation spells out a clear-cut standard for 
which Article 10.3 offers contextual support.  Moreover, this reading was not contested by 
any of the WTO Members involved in the above-mentioned cases (including the main export 
subsidizers the EC and the US).1866  Hence, WTO Members are not allowed to grant ‘any 
subsidy whatsoever to exports of unscheduled products’ 1867 and of scheduled products above 
their reduction commitment level.  What is more, non-listed export subsidies are even 
disciplined more stringently as listed ones given that a likelihood of such circumvention 
(‘threat of circumvention’) caused by such non-listed subsidy suffices to find an inconsistency 
with Article 10.1 of the Agreement.1868   
 
Yet, should this general conclusion not be nuanced with respect to developing countries?  
Under the broad interpretation of Article 9.4, these countries are free to offer marketing and 
transport export subsidies.  How does their right to offer these two listed types of subsidies to 
(un)scheduled products influence the determination of (threat of) circumvention of export 
subsidy commitments?  Put otherwise, how can they circumvent export subsidy commitments 
                                                 
1865 The Modalities Paper also stipulated that ‘(t)he export subsidies listed in Annex 7 (listed types of 
export subsidies) shall be subject to budgetary outlay and quantity commitments’(Modalities Paper, 
above n 1804, para 11, emphasis added).  Notice that the Appellate Body seems to attach little relevance 
to this Modalities Paper (see Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 199). 
1866 See, for example, Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.921. 
1867 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), footnote 782.  According to the Panel, 
this is stipulated under Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Agreement.  However, the text of article 3.3 
only deals with listed types of export subsidies on (un-)scheduled products.  The general obligation on 
listed as well as non-listed types of export subsidies is Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture.     
1868 Foreclosing this conclusion might have been the reason why the original Panel read ‘threat of 
circumvention’ in a narrow way.  This reading was indeed in line with the mandatory/discretionary 
distinction.  
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by using non-listed types of export subsidies if they are allowed, without clear limitation,1869 
to offer two types of listed export subsidies?  Two opposite readings could again be 
articulated.  If one read article 10.1 as implicitly imposing a lower standard on non-listed 
export subsidies, the argument could be advanced that, next to the two listed types of export 
subsidies (marketing/transport export subsidies), developing countries are a fortiori free to 
offer non-listed types of export subsidies to scheduled and unscheduled products.  However, 
the opposite reading seems more plausible in light of the case law’s reading of Article 10.1 
given that it disciplines non-listed export subsidies even more strictly than listed ones.1870  
This interpretation, which would also give substance to Article 10.1 regarding developing 
countries, would discipline non-listed export subsidies similar to listed ones that are not 
covered under Article 9.4.  Hence, listed as well as non-listed subsidies for unscheduled 
products are prohibited except for marketing/transport export subsidies.  For the 
determination of whether scheduled products respect reduction commitments and the anti-
circumvention obligation, listed and non-listed export subsidies are added up1871 but 
marketing and transport export subsidies should be subtracted again.  This reading implies 
that developing countries having no scheduled agricultural products could also not offer any 
non-listed types of export subsidies for agricultural products and that a threat thereof would 
even be sufficient to find a WTO inconsistency.   
 
6.2.1.2.3. Non-commercial transactions: Food aid 
Next to non-listed types of export subsidies, ‘non-commercial transactions’ could not be used 
by WTO Members to circumvent export subsidy commitments (Article 10.1 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture).  In principle, such ‘non-commercial transactions’, a concept not further 
defined in the Agreement, seem subject to the same anti-circumvention standard as non-listed 
types of export subsidies.  However, a specific regime applies to international food aid 
transactions.   
 
The Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton has confirmed that food aid transactions are 
covered by Article 10.1 under the concept of ‘non-commercial transactions’ and emphasized 
that WTO Members ‘are free to grant as much food aid as they wish, provided that they do so 
consistently with Articles 10.1 and 10.4’.1872  To be sure, the disciplines imposed under 
                                                 
1869 Recall that Article 9.4 is also subject to an ‘anti-circumvention’ obligation. 
1870 Otherwise, developing countries would also be free to provide all other types of non-listed export 
subsidies (e.g., tax exemptions contingent upon exportation). 
1871 Alternatively, the quantities of the product in question benefiting from such export subsidies are 
added up. 
1872 The Appellate Body agreed with Brazil that ‘"Article 10.4 provides an example of specific 
disciplines that have been agreed upon for a particular type of measure and that complement the general 
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Article 10.1 and 10.4 are not treated as separate and complementary by the Appellate Body.  
The obligation of non-circumvention under Article 10.1 seems to be determined on the basis 
of the disciplines set out in Article 10.4 with respect to international food aid: ‘article 10.4 
provides specific disciplines that may be relied on to determine whether international food aid 
is being "used to circumvent" a WTO Member's export subsidy commitments’.1873 Hence, the 
Appellate Body brings food aid transactions under the scope of Article 10.1 (as ‘non-
commercial transactions’) but the obligation of ‘non-circumvention’ is interpreted in light of 
Article 10.4 of the Agreement on Agreement. 
 
As a result, the relevant disciplines imposed on international food aid transactions1874 are 
spelled out under Article 10.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture: 
 
Members donors of international food aid shall ensure: 
(a) that the provision of international food aid is not tied directly or indirectly to commercial 
exports of agricultural products to recipient countries; 
(b) that international food aid transactions, including bilateral food aid which is monetized, 
shall be carried out in accordance with the FAO "Principles of Surplus Disposal and 
Consultative Obligations", including, where appropriate, the system of Usual Marketing 
Requirements (UMRs); and 
(c) that such aid shall be provided to the extent possible in fully grant form or on terms no less 
concessional than those provided for in Article IV of the Food Aid Convention 1986. 
 
Regarding the scope of Article 10.4, observe that the concept of ‘food aid’ is not explicitly 
defined in the Agreement on Agriculture.  In general terms, food aid refers to commodities 
provided by international donors on concessional (i.e., below market) terms.1875  In fact, 
Article 10.4(c) spells out the required level of concessionality to label a particular transaction 
as ‘food aid’ under the Agreement on Agriculture: aid shall be provided only ‘to the extent 
possible’ in fully grant form and, at minimum, on terms no less concessional than those 
                                                                                                                                            
export subsidy rules" but, like Article 10.2, it does not "establish any exceptions for the measures that 
(it) covers"’ (para 619; emphasis added).  Hence, the Appellate Body does not formally consider 
Article 10.4 as a lex specialis regarding food aid transactions that would exempt it from the general rule 
of Article 10.1.  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 619.      
1873 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 619.     
1874 The concept of ‘food aid’ is used in this section to refer to ‘international food aid’.  Hence, it 
excludes food aid given by a WTO Member to its own citizens, which are disciplined under domestic 
support provisions (see below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2.1). 
1875 Three types of food aid are distinguished by the World Food Programme: (i) programme food aid: 
‘food aid provided on a government-to-government basis. It is not targeted at specific beneficiary 
groups. It is sold on the open market and can be provided either as a grant or as a loan’. It often takes 
the form of subsidized exports credits given to the recipient country; (ii) project food aid: ‘food aid 
provided to support various type of projects such as agricultural, nutritional and development. It is 
usually freely distributed to targeted beneficiary groups. However it can also be sold on the open 
market. Project food aid is provided on a grant basis and is channeled bilaterally, multilaterally or 
through NGOs’. (iii) emergency food aid: ‘food aid provided to victims of natural or man-made 
disasters on a short-term basis. It is freely distributed to targeted beneficiary groups and is usually 
provided on a grant basis. It is channeled multilaterally, through NGOs or, sometimes, bilaterally’.  See 
World Food Programme, Food Aid Information System, Glossary and Abbreviations (available at: 
http://www.wfp.org/fais/quantity-reporting/glossary).   
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provided for in Article IV of the Food Aid Convention 1986.   The threshold question on the 
level of concessionality to qualify as a non-commercial, food aid transaction is thus solved by 
reference to Article IV of the 1986 version of the Food Aid Convention (FAC), which 
stipulates that: 
 
Food aid under this Convention may be supplied on any of the following terms: 
(a) gifts of grain 
(b) gifts or grants of cash to be used to purchase grains for the recipient country; 
(c) sales of grains for the currency of the recipient country, which is not transferable and is not 
convertible into currency or goods and services for use by the donor member; 
(d) sales of grain on credit, with payment to be made in reasonable annual amounts over 
periods of 20 years or more and with interest at rates which are below commercial rates 
prevailing in world markets. 
(e) on the understanding that such aid shall be supplied to the maximum extent possible by 
way of gifts, especially in the case of least-developed countries, low per capita income 
countries and other developing countries in serious economic difficulties. 
 
Accordingly, food aid could be provided in the form of actual food (also called ‘direct 
transfers’ or in-kind food aid) or in the form of cash to be exchanged for food.  The required 
level of concessionality is strengthened under the 1999 amendment of the FAC.1876  Instead of 
simply urging that aid shall to the extent possible take the form of gifts (Article IV(e) FAC 
1986)), the FAC 1999 specifies that: 
 
(…) (b)With respect only to food aid counted against a member’s commitment, all food aid 
provided to least-developed countries shall be made in the form of grants. (c) Food aid under 
this Convention provided in the form of grants shall represent not less than 80 per cent of a 
member’s contribution and, to the extent possible, members will seek progressively to exceed 
this percentage.1877 
 
However, given that Article 10.4(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture explicitly refers to the 
1986 version, the obligation to provide food aid to LDCs in grant form seems not to be 
enforceable under the WTO.1878 
 
The other two obligations listed in Article 10.4 [(a), (b)], which were taken word for word 
from the FAC 19951879, aim to ensure that such non-commercial food aid transactions do not 
distort commercial food transactions.  First, international food aid should not be ‘tied’ directly 
or indirectly to commercial exports of agricultural products (Article 10.4(a)).  In such ‘tied 
food aid’-transactions, donor countries would require the recipient countries to accept 
commercial food transactions from the donor country as a condition for receiving the food 
                                                 
1876 The scope of eligible products is also no longer restricted to grains (see Article IV FAC 1999). 
1877 Article IX(c),(d) FAC 1999 (emphasis added). 
1878 Note that the FAC would normally have been renegotiated in 2002 but negotiations have been put 
on hold pending the Doha negotiations.  See Report by the Committee on Agriculture to the General 
Council (G/AG/16/Add.1, 13 June 2006), para 5; S. Murphy and K. McAfee, ‘US Food Aid: Time to 
Get It Right’, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (July 2005), 38 pp., at 15.   
1879 See M. G. Desta, ‘Food Security and International Trade Law: An Appraisal of the World Trade 
Organization Approach’, 35:3 Journal of World Trade (2001), 449-468, at 462. 
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aid.  However, as Desta highlights, this obligation does not prohibit donor countries to tie 
food aid transactions to non-agricultural transactions.1880  For instance, the inefficient practice 
to tie food aid transactions to services from the donor country used for delivering such food 
aid is not disciplined.  Hence, only one form of ‘tied food aid’-transactions (i.e., tied to 
commercial food transactions) is disciplined under Article 10.4(a).  Second, food aid 
transactions should in principle not replace commercial transactions but only satisfy 
additional consumption (i.e., consumption which would not have taken place in the absence of 
the food aid transaction).  To this end, food aid has to respect the FAO Principles of Surplus 
Disposal (developed in 1954), which is ‘a code of international conduct that encourages the 
constructive use of surplus disposal of agricultural commodities, while at the same time 
safeguarding the interest of commercial exporters and local producers’.1881,1882  Next to 
notification requirements, these FAO Principles have put in place the system of ‘Usual 
Marketing Requirements’ (UMRs), which WTO Members only ‘where appropriate’ have to 
respect by virtue of Article 10.4(b).  UMRs refer to the requirement upon the recipient 
importing country in a food aid agreement to maintain a normal level of commercial imports 
from the donor or other countries in addition to the level of food aid.  Their rationale is to 
ensure the principle of additional consumption, but they only safeguard the commercial 
interests of donor or other exporting countries and not those of local producers.1883    
 
As long as WTO Members respect these rather undemanding obligations set out under Article 
10.4 of the Agreement on Agreement,1884 they are free to grant as much food aid as they wish.  
In the current Doha Round, most WTO Members, led by the EC and the Cairns Group, have 
urged for new disciplines to effectively ensure that food aid transactions could not be used to 
circumvent export subsidy commitments, whereby they essentially target US food aid 
practices.  The EC, in particular, has conditioned its agreement on the elimination of direct 
export subsidies (i.e., listed export subsidies) on tighter disciplines on food aid.1885  The EC 
even proposed that in-kind food aid should be in fully grant form and should ultimately be 
                                                 
1880 Desta, above n 1879, at 462. 
1881 See FAO, ‘Food Aid in the Context of International and Domestic Markets and the Doha Round’, 
FAO Trade Policy Technical Notes on Issues Related to the WTO Negotiations on Agriculture – No. 8, 
9 pp., at 1. 
1882 FAO, Reporting Procedures and Consultative Obligations under the FAO Principles of Surplus 
Disposal, A Guide for Members of the FAO Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal (Rome, 
2001). 
1883 See also FAO, above n 1881, at 2. For a criticism on the UMRs, see Desta, above n 1879, at 464-
465. 
1884 According to Murphy and McAfee, these obligations ‘had no impact on WTO Members’ food aid 
practices’.  Murphy and McAfee, above n 1878, at 16. 
1885 See also below Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2.2. 
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replaced by food aid in cash form.1886  As the only major donor primarily relying on this form 
of food aid, the US does not want to rule out in-kind food aid.  Moreover, the US firmly 
opposes a prohibition on its practice of ‘monetization’ of such in-kind food aid.  Other WTO 
Members have criticized this US practice whereby in-kind food is sold (i.e., monetized) by 
NGOs in the recipient country to fund their development projects.1887  Originally intended to 
merely cover NGOs’ costs for handling food aid (e.g., storage costs), monetization has since 
the 1990s been used more widely to finance ongoing development projects.1888  By increasing 
the supply in the recipient country, monetization is evidently market distorting for local 
production and commercial imports.  Above, it fails to target that part of the population 
lacking the purchasing power to buy food and thus most in need of food aid.1889  
 
The latest Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture (December 2008) plainly reflects a 
compromise between these opposing interests but would, if adopted, definitively strengthen 
the disciplines on food aid in a substantive way.1890  First, food aid will be defined more 
narrowly: it will have to be in fully grant form, not be tied to agricultural products as well as 
other goods or services from the donor country, and will in principle not be open for re-
exportation.  Such food aid that is in cash form and untied will be allowed as such, as it is by 
definition non trade-distorting.1891  In-kind food aid will not have to be phased out.  Yet, 
disciplines on such food aid will draw a useful distinction between food aid in case of 
emergency situations (safe box) and in non-emergency situations.  In-kind food aid will be 
allowed in case an emergency situation is declared1892 and a need assessment is made 
coordinated under the United Nations or the Red Cross.  Such a safe box should be welcomed 
because food aid in emergency situations not only responds to genuine food security concerns 
in the recipient country, but will likely not replace commercial imports and local production 
(principle of additional consumption).  In all other situations, three conditions will have to be 
                                                 
1886 See also ICTSD, ‘AG: Disagreements Still Remain On Export Competition’, 10:17 Bridges Weekly 
Trade News Digest (17 May 2006),  
1887 See, for example, discussions on this US practice in the following WTO documents: G/AG/R/35, 
26 August 2003; G/AG/R/38, 28 May 2004; G/AG/R/39, 16 July 2004; G/AG/R/40, 26 October 2004.   
1888 The US itself estimated that approximately 22 per cent, 14 per cent and 17 per cent of its total food 
aid was monetized in the fiscal years 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively.  Yet, it emphasized that this 
food aid was in conformity with Article 10.4(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture.  See Note by the 
Secretariat, Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 12 March 2009 (G/AG/R/54, 25 May 2009), para 
21. 
1889 Murphy and McAfee, above n 1878, at 29. 
1890 See Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, above n 652, Annex L.  Annex L would replace the 
current Article 10.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1891 In case of food aid in cash form, ‘untied’ also means that the agricultural products bought with the 
cash should not be sourced from the donor country.  Hence, it could by definition not circumvent 
export subsidy commitments as no incentive is given to source products from the donor country. 
1892 This could be declared by either the recipient country or the UN Secretary General.  Alternatively, 
other countries, regional or international governmental organization, the Red Cross, and non-
governmental humanitarian organizations could make an emergency appeal. 
PART II CHAPTER 6 – DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
 
 
 
 
349 
 
 
fulfilled: in-kind food aid must be based on a targeted assessment of need, provided to redress 
food deficit situations which give rise to chronic hunger, and be provided consistently with 
the objective of preventing, or at the very least minimizing, commercial displacement.  
Regarding the practice of ‘monetization’ of in-kind food aid, the US was successful to prevent 
a total prohibition in the draft text.  Under the safe box (emergency situations), it shall only be 
accepted for food aid to LDCs where there is a demonstrable need to do so for the sole 
purpose of transport and delivery.  More fundamentally, in non-emergency situations, 
‘monetization’ would be allowed as means to meet direct nutrition requirements of LDCs or 
net food-importing developing countries.  This would be the case if it is necessary to fund (i) 
‘the internal transportation and delivery of the food aid’ or (ii) ‘the procurement of 
agricultural inputs to low-income or resource-poor producers’.  The second option would 
open the door for ‘monetization’ beyond what it is needed to cover the costs for handling food 
aid. 
 
The rationale of the disciplines in Article 10.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture is to preserve 
the commercial interests of other exporting countries and local producers in the recipient 
countries.  Indeed, the importance of the availability of food aid for reaching food security in 
recipient countries is not reflected in Article 10.4.  Nonetheless, countries were well aware 
during the Uruguay Round that cuts in domestic support and export subsidies would likely 
lead to an increase in prices on the world market (at least in the short run), and thus negatively 
affect net-food importing countries.1893  Above, as food aid often takes the form of surplus 
disposal in donor countries, cuts in these countries’ levels of domestic support could also lead 
to lower levels of food aid.1894  To respond to these concerns, Ministers adopted at the end of 
the Uruguay Round the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of 
the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries 
(NFIDC Decision).1895  With regard to food aid to these countries, the NFIDC Decision 
commits Members to some general, non-substantive obligations: (i) to review the level of 
food aid under the FAC and initiate negotiations in the appropriate forum to establish a 
sufficient level of food aid; (ii) to adopt guidelines so that an increasing part of basic foodstuff 
is provided to LDCs and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries (NFDIC) on terms 
similar to those elaborated in Article 10.4(c); and (iii) ‘to give full consideration’ to requests 
                                                 
1893 See also the final paragraph of the Preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1894 Desta, above n 1879, at 452. 
1895 See also Article 16 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  LDCs are designated as such by the United 
Nations (Economic and Social Council). A developing country qualifies as a ‘net-food importing 
developing country’ (NFDIC) if it was a net importer of basic foodstuffs in any three years of the most 
recent five-year period for which data are available and notified the Committee on Agriculture of its 
decision to be listed as NFDIC for the purposes of the Decision (G/AG/3, 24 November 1995).  For the 
list of countries currently qualifying as NFDIC, see G/AG/5/Rev.8, 22 March 2005. 
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for the provision of technical and financial assistance to these countries to improve their 
agricultural productivity and infrastructure.1896  The first part of this Decision was 
implemented outside the WTO by renegotiating the FAC (1997-1999).  Parties to the FAC 
agreed to increase their minimum annual levels of food aid commitments.1897,1898  Further 
renegotiations of the FAC 1999 have, however, been put on hold pending the Doha 
negotiations.1899  If the latest draft on agriculture would be adopted as part of a Doha deal, a 
non-mandatory commitment to ensure an adequate level of food aid would be inscribed under 
the WTO.  Indeed, Annex L of this draft opens with:   
 
Members reaffirm their commitment to maintain an adequate level of international food aid 
(…), to take account of the interests of food aid recipients and to ensure that the disciplines 
contained hereafter do not unintentionally impede the delivery of food aid provided to deal 
with emergency situations.1900 
 
Hence, the new text explicitly recognizes – but does not prevent – the potential perverse effect 
that stricter disciplines on food aid might lead to lower levels of such more genuine food aid.  
This effect seems not improbable given that the largest food aid donor, namely the US, will 
have to make the largest amendments to its food aid regime.  The new regime would become 
far less beneficial to its own (non-)agriculture producers and service providers.1901  Such 
potential perverse effect explains why, for instance, the ACP Group partly sides with the US 
on opposing stringent food aid disciplines in the negotiations.1902  In sum, under the WTO, 
Members will thus remain free to grant as much food aid as they want as long as they respect 
the applicable disciplines under the Agreement on Agriculture, but they might equally opt to 
grant no food aid at all. 
 
                                                 
1896 As Desta observed, the NFDIC Decision does neither create any concrete, enforceable rights for 
LDCs or NFIDCs, nor any specific obligations upon other WTO Members.  For an in-depth discussion 
on the implementation, see Desta, above n 1879, at 455-457.  See also McMahon, above n 1729, at 
176-181.   
1897 The minimum aggregate amount is around 5.5 million tons in wheat equivalent.  The actual level of 
food aid provided by FAC parties was well above this minimum level in recent years (e.g., period July 
2008-June 2009: 7.5 million tons). 
1898 See Preamble and Part II of the FAC 1999.  Parties to the FAC are: Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
European Union and its member States, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the US. 
1899 In the meantime, parties to the FAC extended the FAC 1999.  The most recent extension came into 
effect on 1 July 2009.  See also Report by the Committee on Agriculture to the General Council 
(G/AG/16/Add.1, 13 June 2006), para 5; Murphy and McAfee, above n 1878, at 15. 
1900 See Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, above n 652, Annex L. 
1901 Other large food aid donors generally conform already to this new set of disciplines.  For the 
amount of food aid given by FAC parties over the period July 2008 – June 2009, see Food Aid 
Operations, Report on Operations by Member of the Food Aid Convention, Prepared for the Food Aid 
Committee by the Secretariat of the International Grains Council (February 2010), 201 pp. (available 
at: http://www.foodaidconvention.org/Pdf/annual_reports/faoperations_0809.pdf). 
1902 See, for example, Minutes of the Meeting (TN/C/M/27, 30 October 2007), at 67. 
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6.2.1.3. Burden of proof 
As a general rule, ‘the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or 
defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence’.1903  Nonetheless, 
Article 10.3 provides a special rule for proof of certain export subsidies under the Agreement 
on Agriculture.1904  It reads: 
 
Any Member which claims that any quantity exported in excess of a reduction commitment 
level is not subsidized must establish that no export subsidy, whether listed in Article 9 or not, 
has been granted in respect of the quantity of exports in question. 
 
Elaborating upon its purpose, the Appellate Body has clarified that this provision ‘pursues the 
aim of preventing circumvention of export subsidy commitments by providing special rules 
on the reversal of burden of proof where a Member exports an agricultural product in 
quantities that exceed its reduction commitment level’.1905  Turning to its content, the 
Appellate Body continued that ‘in such a situation a WTO Member is treated as if it has 
granted WTO inconsistent export subsidies for the excess quantities, unless the Member 
presents adequate evidence to "establish" the contrary’.1906 
As a consequence, the reversal of the burden of proof, applicable in the original as well as 
compliance procedures,1907 is triggered merely by exceeding the quantity reduction 
commitments.1908  As a result, Article 10.3 ‘cleaves the complaining Member's claim in 
two’.1909  In line with the general rule on the burden of proof, the complaining party has to 
prove, in the first place, that a quantity of an agricultural product is exported by the 
respondent in excess of its reduction commitment.  If demonstrated, the burden right away 
shifts to the complainant who has to establish that no export subsidy has been granted to this 
excess quantity.  So, the complainant is not required to make a prima facie case of export 
subsidization regarding this excess quantity.1910     
                                                 
1903 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, at 14; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland 
Cotton, para 644.  The Appellate Body has clarified that ‘(a) complaining party will satisfy its burden 
when it establishes a prima facie case by putting forward adequate legal arguments and evidence. (…) 
Once the complaining party has established a prima facie case, it is then for the responding party to 
rebut it’.  Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System (Article 21.5 – Argentina), para 134. 
1904 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy, para 69. 
1905 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 616.  ‘This reversal of the usual rules obliges the 
responding Member to bear the consequences of any doubts concerning the evidence of export 
subsidization. Article 10.3 thus acts as an incentive to Members to ensure that they are in a position to 
demonstrate compliance with their quantity commitments under Article 3.3’.  Appellate Body Report, 
Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para 74.    
1906 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 616 (emphasis in the original). 
1907 Panel Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para 6.4. 
1908 Panel Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para 6.5; Panel Report, US – 
FSC, paras 7.136 and 7.161.   
1909 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para 71. 
1910 ‘In practice, the complaining Member may wish to present evidence to rebut any evidence 
presented by the responding Member. However, the complaining Member is not required to lead in the 
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Four specifications should be made regarding the exact scope of Article 10.3.  First, the text 
of this provision explicitly stipulates that it applies with respect to claims regarding listed as 
well as non-listed types of export subsidies.  Accordingly, the specific burden of proof is 
applicable with regard to claims formulated under Article 9.1 (listed types) as well as under 
Article 10.1 (non-listed types).1911   
Second, the text indicates that such a claim should relate to export quantity reduction 
commitments that are alleged to be exceeded and not to budgetary outlay commitments.1912   
Third, differing from the Panel’s intepretation in US – Upland Cotton, the Appellate Body 
concluded that its scope is confined to those agricultural products that are effectively 
scheduled and for which, as stipulated in Article 10.3, reduction commitments are therefore 
made.1913  Bringing non-scheduled export subsidies within its scope would lead to ‘an extreme 
result’ as it would imply that ‘any export of an unscheduled product is presumed to be 
subsidized’.1914  But what if an export subsidy programme similarly operates with respect to 
both scheduled and unscheduled agricultural products and both are challenged at the same 
time, as happened in the US – Upland Cotton case?1915  Concerning unscheduled products, the 
burden of proof for demonstrating that the export credit guarantees constituted export 
subsidies rested upon Brazil pursuant to the general rule, whereas, for scheduled products, the 
non-existence of export subsidization of the same type of guarantees had to be demonstrated 
by the US pursuant to the specific rule of Article 10.3.1916  Acknowledging this difference, the 
compliance Panel in US – Upland Cotton decided that it would first proceed as if Brazil bore 
the burden of proof with respect to the subsidization element (i.e., as if Article 10.3 did not 
exist).  Only if Brazil had failed to demonstrate this element, which was not the case,1917 the 
Panel would have applied Article 10.3 to the claims regarding scheduled products and thus 
                                                                                                                                            
presentation of evidence to panels, and it might well succeed in its claim even if it presents no evidence 
(…)’.  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), paras 72-76. 
1911 As a result, Article 10.3 is relied upon as contextual support for the interpretation of 
‘circumvention’ under Article 10.1 (see above Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.2.2.2).   
1912 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), footnote 635. 
1913 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 652, 681, footnote 1035.  
1914 The Appellate Body thus reversed the Panel’s opposite interpretation.  Appellate Body Report, US 
– Upland Cotton, paras 650-652.  Given the fact that both ‘export subsidies for both unscheduled 
agricultural products and industrial products are completely prohibited under the Agreement on 
Agriculture and under the SCM Agreement, respectively’, the Panel’s interpretation would imply that 
the burden of proof with regard to the same issue would apply differently under both agreements: ‘it 
would be on the respondent under the Agreement on Agriculture, while it would be on the complainant 
under the SCM Agreement’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 652. 
1915 For example, as the Appellate Body in the compliance procedure observed, ‘(t)he new fee structure 
applies to export credit guarantees provided to all eligible commodities under the revised GSM 102 
programme; individual guarantees are issued under the same terms and conditions and no distinction is 
made on a commodity-specific basis’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – 
Brazil), para 203. 
1916 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, footnote 1035. 
1917 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), footnote 765. 
PART II CHAPTER 6 – DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
 
 
 
 
353 
 
 
required the US to establish that no export subsidies were given with respect to the excess 
quantities of these scheduled products.1918 
Fourth and finally, Article 10.3 only applies with regard to claims of export subsidization 
brought under the Agreement on Agriculture and not on alternative claims formulated under 
the SCM Agreement.1919  Given that the claim on export subsidization is first addressed under 
the Agreement on Agriculture but also taken into consideration that the SCM Agreement’s 
subsidy standards are hereby often relied upon (e.g., item (j)), the shift to the general rule on 
the burden of proof for the alternative claim under the SCM Agreement might not always be 
relevant.1920  Applied to the US – Upland Cotton case, once the US had failed to demonstrate 
that the standard of item (j) of the Illustrative List was met with respect to scheduled products 
for the purpose of the claim under Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agreement, it was not 
very difficult for Brazil to subsequently demonstrate a direct violation of item (j) with regard 
to its claim under the SCM Agreement.1921          
In sum, Article 10.3 operates where a claim is formulated under the Agreement on 
Agriculture that an export quantity commitment is violated by the provision of listed or non-
listed export subsidies to scheduled agricultural products.  Once the complainant has 
demonstrated that an excess quantity of a scheduled agricultural product has been exported, 
the respondent has to establish that this excess quantity has not benefited from export 
subsidies. 
 
6.2.2. Domestic support 
The Agreement on Agriculture establishes a rather complicated framework to reduce 
domestic support for agricultural products.  Domestic support measures are basically 
categorized in three different boxes, depending on their trade-distortive potential.  First, some 
types of support are deemed not or only minimal trade-distorting, and are therefore allowed 
without limits (i.e., green box support).  Second, some support linked to production could also 
be offered if it is made in the framework of a production-limiting programme (i.e., blue box 
                                                 
1918 Insofar Brazil had demonstrated the existence of such quantity in excess of the US reduction 
commitments.  Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), above n 1912, para 14.47.  
This order of analysis seems to have been implicitly approved by the Appellate Body.  See Appellate 
Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 321. 
1919 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 647-649.    
1920 This shift of the burden of proof might in certain cases still be relevant given that the subsidy 
definition is not always similar under both Agreements (e.g., list of Article 9.1 might deviate from the 
subsidy definition under SCM Agreement).   
1921 This result is mitigated if claims are formulated with respect to export subsidization of scheduled as 
well as unscheduled agricultural products.  The order of analysis as specified by the compliance Panel 
in US – Upland Cotton would imply that the burden of proof is placed upon the complaining party also 
for the analysis under the Agreement on Agriculture.  Hence, no shift in the burden of proof should 
take place regarding the analysis under the SCM Agreement.  See Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 14.154. 
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support).  Third, all other types of domestic support are in principle subject to reduction 
commitments because of their trade-distorting effect (i.e., amber box sensu lato).  In addition 
to these three general boxes, two other boxes should be distinguished.  First of all, all 
countries are allowed to offer a certain de minimis level of amber box support (i.e., de minimis 
box).  Next, S&D treatment (so-called ‘S&D box’) is given to developing countries regarding 
some types of domestic support.  Both boxes are equally exempted from reduction 
commitments.1922   
 
6.2.2.1. Green box domestic support 
Domestic support measures situated under the green box ‘shall meet the fundamental 
requirement that they have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on 
production’.1923 To meet this requirement, the Agreement on Agriculture stipulates general 
and policy-specific criteria in Annex 2.  
Two general obligations are established.  The support must be provided through a publicly 
funded government programme (including government revenue foregone) not involving 
transfers from consumers.  Moreover, it must not have the effect of providing price support to 
producers.  In addition to these general obligations, the support programme must fit into the 
list of programmes provided by the Agreement on Agriculture and meet the policy-specific 
criteria in question.1924  In broad terms, the list covers general service programmes, food 
security related expenditures, and decoupled direct payments to producers.   
First, service programmes are government expenditures in relation to programmes which 
provide services or benefits to agriculture or the rural community.  Examples thereof are 
research and training services or marketing and promotion services.1925   
Second, food security expenditures relate to public stockholding for food security purposes as 
well as domestic food aid.1926    
Third, direct payments to producers could also fall under the green box if such payments are 
decoupled (i.e., delinked) from various aspects of production decisions.1927  Here, two 
different sets of policy-specific disciplines could be distinguished depending on the type of 
                                                 
1922 The amber box sensu stricto could be defined as all support not covered by any of the four other 
boxes.  Hence, it refers to all support subject to reduction commitments (see below Part II, Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2.2.4). 
1923 See Annex 2, para 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1924 See Annex 2, paras 2-13 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1925 For the specific criteria and the full list, see Annex 2, para 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.   
1926 Annex 2, paras 3-4 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
1927 Annex 2, paras 5-13. See also the specific criteria that should be fulfilled. See Appellate Body 
Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 321. 
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decoupled payments.  On the one hand, decoupled income support1928 and all non-listed types 
of direct payments must be decoupled from type or volume of production, domestic or 
international prices, and factors of production employed.  Additionally, it must not require 
any production to receive the payment.1929  These requirements thus aim at neutrality with 
regard to production decisions.1930  The Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton concurred 
with the Panel that a domestic support programme that includes a negative requirement not to 
produce certain crops is also not decoupled from production.1931  After all, ‘a partial exclusion 
of some crops from payments has the potential to channel production towards the production 
of crops that remain eligible for payments’.1932  On the other hand, specific criteria are 
stipulated for each listed type of decoupled direct payments.  These payments include income 
insurance and income safety-net programmes, payments for relief of natural disasters, 
structural adjustment assistance provided through retirement programmes or investment aid, 
and payments under environmental and regional assistance programmes.1933  
If the general as well as policy-specific criteria are fulfilled, these domestic support measures 
qualify under the green box, implying that they are not subject to reduction commitments and 
may even be increased. 
Notice, however, that the assumption that support measures fulfilling these ‘green box’ 
criteria are not, or only minimal, trade-distorting does not necessarily hold in practice.1934  
Indeed, as economists have pointed to, support measures that are not formally linked to (i.e., 
decoupled from) production decisions could still affect such decisions and thus boost 
production.1935  For instance, such support could reduce fix costs, implying fewer exits by 
farmers, as well as make farmers less risk-averse, implying more production in a market 
characterized by uncertainty.1936  Hence, the justification for such support could not be 
                                                 
1928 For the definition of ‘decoupled income support’, see Annex 2, para 6(a) of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
1929 Annex 2, paras 5 and 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1930 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 325. 
1931 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 325.  
1932 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 329. 
1933 Annex 2, paras 7-13 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1934 Here, trade-distortive is used in the meaning of generating production above the free trade level and 
thus regardless whether it is intended to correct market failures. 
1935 They indicate that the term ‘decoupling’ under the Agreement on Agriculture is defined in terms of 
policy design, whereas it is defined in terms of policy effect under the OECD (i.e., it results in a level 
of production and trade equal to what would have occurred if the policy were not in place).   
Decoupling in terms of policy design does not ensure decoupling in terms of policy effect.  See H. de 
Gorter, M. Ingco, and L. Ignacio, ‘Domestic Support: Economics and Policy Instruments’, in M. Ingco 
and J. Nash (eds), Agriculture and the WTO: Creating a Trading System for Development (Washington 
DC: World Bank, 2004), 119-147, at 140-142.   
1936 The condition to keep the land in agricultural use could also prevent the conversion of this land into 
nonagricultural use.  Likewise, the expectations of future payments (e.g., the existence of a system of 
payments for relief in case of natural disasters) might affect current output production decisions.  As a 
final example, decoupled income support could affect investment decisions (and thus production 
levels) in case input market function imperfect (e.g., capital or labor market). 
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exclusively grounded on the assumption of no-trade effects but has to rely on specific market 
failures, income redistribution, or multifunctionality arguments.1937 
 
6.2.2.2. Blue box domestic support 
Some support that is linked to production could be offered without limitation insofar it is part 
of production-limiting programmes.1938  These payments must also be based on a fixed 
acreage and yields or on 85 per cent or less of the base level of production.  In case of 
livestock payments, it must be based on a fixed number of head.1939  This ‘blue box’ 
exemption resulted from a compromise between the EC and the US during the Uruguay 
Round.1940  Payments are directly linked to acreage or animal numbers but under a 
programme that limits production by imposing production controls in the form of quotas or 
acreage constraints (e.g., land set-asides).1941  Contrary to green box measures, production is 
thus still required but the support does not directly relate to actual output levels.  Hence, it is 
generally acknowledged that these subsidies are trade-distorting1942 but the assumption is that 
output levels would fall over time and so would the demand for trade protection. Therefore, 
some Members, in particular the EC, consider blue box subsidies as a necessary first step to 
converting distorting subsidies into green box subsidies, whereas others, however, aim to 
limit or to abandon this category.   There exist currently no limits on providing blue box 
                                                 
1937 This raises the question whether such support is the optimal policy to reach such objectives. 
1938 This condition is not further defined. 
1939 Article 6.5(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1940 In the so-called Blair House Agreements, the US gave into the EC’s insistence to create such a 
‘blue box’ upon the condition that its principal domestic support instrument (i.e., deficiency payments) 
was likewise covered.  Soon after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the US formally converted 
these ‘blue box’ subsidies into ‘green box’ subsidies.  In 2002, the new US Farm Bill created a new 
type of support, namely countercyclical payments.  Yet, these payments cannot benefit from the 
existing ‘blue box’ exemption because they are not made under a production-limiting programme, even 
though they meet the other conditions of the ‘blue box’.  This explains why the US proposed to 
redefine the ‘blue box’ criteria in the Doha Round. In recent years, the EC is also moving away from 
‘blue box’ towards ‘green box’ measures (see below Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2.5).  See 
McMahon, above n 1729, at 86; S. F. Olsen, ‘The Negotiation of the Agreement on Agriculture’, in B. 
O’Conner (ed), Agriculture in WTO Law (London: Cameron May, 2005), 43-82, at 76-77; F. Delcros, 
‘The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization’, 36:2 Journal of World Trade 
(2002), 219-253, at 239. 
1941 See de Gorter, Ingco, and Ignacio, above n 1935, at 130. 
1942 Interestingly, de Gorter et al explained in 2005 how the EC blue box subsidies had the potential to 
distort trade.  For instance, individual farmers still had an incentive to increase acreage to maximize 
their share of the regional payments because acreage payments were based on a fixed regional base.  
Likewise, in case of acreage constraints, production could still be distorted since farmers used inputs 
more intensively.  Regarding headage payments for cattle, these were also not production-reducing 
because the number of animals eligible was not limited to numbers on farms prior to the installment of 
the payments in 1992.  Hence, farmers had an incentive to expand their stock and to keep their level 
consistent with the maximum number eligible for payments.  In case blue box payments are based on 
inframarginal levels of inputs (i.e., below the level that would be used in the case of no payments), they 
could still have the same trade-distorting potential as decoupled payments (green box measures) (see 
above n ).  See de Gorter, Ingco, and Ignacio, above n 1935, at 131-132, 140, 144.  For an overview of 
the current EC blue box measures, see G/AG/N/EEC/58, 24 February 2009. 
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subsidies.  All WTO Members could offer such support, thought it is in practice mostly 
deployed by developed countries.1943  
 
6.2.2.3. S&D box domestic support 
Developing countries are not obliged to reduce direct or indirect measures of assistance to 
encourage agricultural and rural development.  In particular, three forms of assistance are 
included in this S&D box: (i) investment assistance generally available to agriculture; (ii) 
input subsidies generally available to low income or resource-poor producers; and (iii) 
support to producers to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops.1944  
Among all developing countries, India has been the main user of exempted S&D box support.  
This is not unexpected given that India has, contrary to some other large developing countries 
(e.g., Brazil, Argentina), no right to offer amber box subsidies above the de minimis level.1945   
 
6.2.2.4. Amber box domestic support 
All other subsidies are placed in the amber box sensu lato and are in principle subject to 
reduction commitments.  Nonetheless, a limited amount of such trade-distortive subsidies that 
would normally be subject to reduction commitments can be provided (i.e., de minimis 
box).1946  In case of product-specific subsidies, support up to 5 per cent of the value of 
production of the product in question can be given.  In case of non-product-specific subsidies, 
support up to 5 per cent of the value of total agricultural production can be provided.  These 
de minimis thresholds are raised to 10 per cent for developing countries, except for China 
which committed to a de minimis level of 8.5 per cent.1947   
In conclusion, exempted domestic support measures are (i) green box subsidies; (ii) blue box 
subsidies; (iii) de minimis box subsidies; (iv) S&D box subsidies in case of developing 
countries.   All domestic support that is not exempted is considered subject to reduction 
commitments (i.e., amber box sensu stricto).1948  This leftover category captures product-
specific subsidies as well as non-product-specific subsidies. Included product-specific 
subsidies are market price support, non-exempt direct payments, and other non-exempt 
                                                 
1943 For a list of all nine Members (counting the EC-15 as one) that have made at least one blue box 
notification between 1995 and 2003, see Note by the Secretariat, Blue Box Support (TN/AG/S/14, 28 
January 2005).   
1944 Article 6.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1945 See M. Gopinath, D. Laborde, Implications for India of the May 2008 Draft Agricultural 
Modalities (Geneva: ICTSD, July 2008), 21 pp.; A. Nassar, C. Cabral da Costa, and L. Chiodi, 
Implications for Brazil of the July 2008 Draft Agricultural Modalities (Geneva: ICTSD, 2008), 33 pp., 
at 9.  
1946 The amber box sensu lato equals the amber box sensu stricto added with the de minimis box. 
1947 Article 6.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Report of the Working Party Report on the Accession 
of China (WT/ACC/CHN/49), para 235. 
1948 Article 6.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
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policies such as input subsidies or marketing cost reduction measures.1949  For example, 
market price support covers the gap between the price that should be received by producers 
and the lower world market price and thus obviously has an impact on production decisions. 
To apply reduction commitments, the exact amount of non-exempted subsidies should be 
quantified first.  To this end, the concept of Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) refers 
to the annual support in monetary terms provided for non-exempted product-specific and non-
product-specific support.1950  For each basic agricultural product, a specific AMS is 
established and all non-product-specific support is totaled into one non-product-specific 
AMS.  Subsequently, the sum of all these AMS1951 delivers the Total AMS.  This is one single 
figure representing the full amount of domestic subsidies subject to reduction commitments 
(with the Current Total AMS of year X indicating the Total AMS for year X).  Importantly, 
reduction commitments undertaken during the Uruguay Round were made at this aggregate 
level.  So, in contrast to export subsidies, commitments were not made at the product level, 
which implies that Members can maintain (and even increase) high levels of support to 
sensitive agricultural products.  The reduction commitments were calculated on the basis of 
the Base Total AMS, representing the average amount of non-exempted support1952 from 1986 
through 1988.1953  All Members with non-exempted subsidies during this period had to 
undertake reduction commitments.1954  The developed countries had to reduce their Base 
Total AMS by 20 per cent over six years, whereas developing countries committed to a 
reduction of 13.3 per cent over ten years and LDCs were exempted from commitments.1955  
Yet, because of the high level of the Base Total AMS,1956 the level of support for 1995 
                                                 
1949 Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1950Article 1(a) and Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  If the calculation of the AMS is 
impracticable, an ‘Equivalent Measurement of Support’ is used (Article 1(d) and Annex 4 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture). 
1951 And all the ‘Equivalent Measurement of Support’ if this is used. 
1952 However, some exempted subsidies, such as blue box subsidies, were taken into account in the 
calculation of the Base Total AMS, whereas they were excluded from the Current Total AMS.  The 
Agreement on Agriculture was not clear on this point: Article 1(a), on the calculation of the AMS, only 
excludes green box measures, whereas Article 6, on the subsidies subject to reductions, also excludes 
the other types of exempted subsidies (‘set out in this article’).  Including blue box subsidies clearly 
increased the Base Total AMS, implying that Members started from a higher benchmark. 
1953 Yet, upon insistence of the EC, ‘credit (was) allowed in respect of actions undertaken since the year 
1986’ (emphasis added).  If the amount of subsidies diminished over the period from 1986 through 
1988, Members could thus use the higher 1986 amount of subsidies to calculate the Base Total AMS. 
The aim, again, was to set the amount of the Base Total AMS as high as possible.  See Modalities 
Paper, above n 1804, para VIII. 
1954 Thirty Members (counting the EC as one) were in this situation. 
1955 Modalities Paper, above n 1804, paras VII, XV, and XVI.  The reductions had to be implemented 
progressively, implying that a developed country had to reduce its level of AMS each year of the 
implementation period with roughly 3.3 per cent (‘Annual Bound Commitment Level’).  The Current 
Total AMS in a certain year could not exceed the corresponding Annual Bound Commitment Level.  
At the end of the 6-year period, the Base Total AMS was thus reduced by 20 per cent, resulting in the 
Final Bound Commitment Level. 
1956 See above n 1952 and 1953. 
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(Current Total AMS of 1995) of some developed countries was already close to, or even less 
than, their final commitment level for 2000 (Final Bound Commitment Level).1957  Needless 
to say, the reduction commitments on domestic support resulting from the Uruguay Round 
were not far-reaching for the major subsidizing countries.  This Final Bound Commitment 
Level, which had to be implemented by 2000 for developed countries and by 2004 for 
developing countries, still serves as the ceiling for non-exempted domestic support.  Indeed, 
no new reduction commitments have been agreed upon until present.1958  On the other hand, 
all WTO Members that do not have non-exempted domestic support (e.g., India, China) have 
to remain within the de minimis levels of amber box support sensu lato.1959   
 
6.2.2.5. Conclusion and Doha Round negotiations 
Under the present framework, all WTO Members are allowed to provide green box, blue box, 
and a de minimis level of amber box subsidies (i.e., de minimis box).  In addition, developing 
countries are free to offer support falling under the S&D box.  Finally, the largest subsidizing 
Members (around thirty1960), namely those that had non-exempted subsidies in place, are 
allowed to offer an additional level of amber box subsidies (i.e., amber box sensu stricto) 
corresponding to their Final Bound Total AMS.1961     
Compared to these commitments made in the Uruguay Round, the limits set on such spending 
in the latest draft agreement tabled under the Doha negotiations are much more 
substantive.1962  First, Members would commit to a reduction in the level of Overall Trade-
Distortive Domestic Support (OTDS), composed of amber box sensu stricto (Final Bound 
Total AMS), blue box subsidies, and de minimis box spending.  Reductions commitments 
would be undertaken on the basis of a tiered formula, whereby the largest cuts will have to be 
                                                 
1957 For example, the EC and the US were already below their final bound level in 1995.  Yet, the US 
increased its level of support in the subsequent years but notified these in a way that it was still in 
conformity with the reduction commitments.  However, the US – Upland Cotton case has shown that 
this classification was not fully appropriate (e.g., some support was not accepted as green box support).  
See also S. Murphy and S. Suppan, ‘The 2008 Farm Bill and the Doha Agenda’, IATP Commentary (25 
June 2008). 
1958 Yet, this might have to be nuanced because the levels are set in nominal terms and inflation may 
thus make these ceilings more constraining over time. 
1959 Article 7.2(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
1960 Counting the EC-15 as one. 
1961 For instance, the EC-15 (revised) Final Bound Total AMS is €67.2 billion and the US Final Bound 
Total AMS is $19.1 billion. 
1962 For an assessment of the implications of (one of the latest) draft proposals on the main subsidizing 
countries see: S. Jean, T. Josling, and D. Laborde, Implications for the European Union of the May 
2008 Draft Agricultural Modalities (Geneva: ICTSD, June 2008), 30 pp.; D. Blandford, D. Laborde, 
and W. Martin, Implications for the United States of the May 2008 Draft Agricultural Modalities 
(Geneva: ICTSD, June 2008), 25 pp.; K. Yamashita, Implications for Japan of the July 2008 Draft 
Agricultural Modalities (Geneva: ICTSD, June 2008), 24 pp.. 
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made by those countries having the highest levels of OTDS.1963  These reductions would be 
gradually implemented over five years.  Developing countries would have to make lower cuts 
(two-third) over a longer implementation period (8 years).  Moreover, exempted from 
reductions in OTDS are developing countries that have no Final Bound Total AMS and some 
recently-acceded members.  Next, a similar tiered formula will be applied for specific 
reductions in Members’ Final Bound Total AMS.  Contrary to the current disciplines, also 
product-specific AMS levels will be set.  Lastly, two other novelties are specific reductions on 
the (non-)product-specific de minimis box spending as well as on blue box payments.  Here, 
an overall blue-box as well as product-specific blue box ceiling would be defined based on 
the percentage of the value of production.  Regarding each of these reduction commitments, 
more flexibility would be offered to developing countries (S&D treatment) as well as to 
recently-acceded members.  No reductions will have to be made on green box and S&D box 
support.1964  In sum, next to further reduction commitments on total levels of amber box 
support, the Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture would thus introduce product-specific 
reductions as well as reductions on trade-distortive subsidies in boxes that are currently 
exempted (de minimis box, blue box).1965 
Reductions in blue box payments might become more acceptable to its principle user as the 
EC is converting its blue box support into green box support.  To be sure, the drop in blue box 
support is more than compensated by an increase in green box support, resulting in a total 
level of notified support not seen since the last decade.1966  The same trend is observable in 
the US, which soon after the Uruguay Round cancelled its blue box support but also steadily 
increased its green box support.  As part of the 2002 Farm Bill, the US introduced 
countercyclical payments (i.e., support to counter price drops), though the US – Upland 
Cotton ruling rejected their qualification as green box measures.1967  Because such payments 
are not made as part of a production-limiting programme, they likwewise do not qualify as 
blue box measures and accordingly fall under the amber box.  Hence, a specific demand of the 
US in the Doha negotiations was a modification of the ‘blue box’ conditions so that these 
                                                 
1963 The exact percentages are: 80 per cent (Base OTDS above $60 billion); 70 per cent (Base OTDS 
between $60 billion - $10 billion), 55 per cent (Base OTDS below $10 billion).  
1964 Modifications are also made to the green box measures (e.g., enlarging the types of support by 
developing countries that would fit in the green box). 
1965 Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, above n 652. 
1966 Notified blue box has dropped from €13.4 billion in the 2005/2006 marketing year to €5.7 billion in 
the 2006/2007 marketing year, while green box support has increased over the same period from €40.3 
billion to €56.5 billion.  The total level of notified support in 2006/2007 reached €90.7 billion.  See 
Notification (G/AG/N/EEC/64, 4 February 2010); ICTSD, ‘Total EU Farm Subsidies Grow Despite 
Drop in Production-Linked Payments’, 14:5 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest (10 February 2010).  
1967 See above n 1380, 1931, 1932. 
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countercyclical payments would be eligible.1968  As a result, direct payments would under the 
new draft qualify as blue box measures not only if they are made under a production-limiting 
programme but also if no production is required at all.1969,1970  At the same time, the overall 
and product-specific ceilings upon such support should prevent that this leads to a substantive 
increase of support under the expanded blue box.  Although the general shift towards green 
box measures should be welcomed, the fact that such massive support might still distort trade 
flows is a growing concern for larger developing countries.  Such green box would remain 
unlimited if the Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture would be adopted.1971  On the other 
hand, as will be argued in the next section, all trade-distortive agricultural support, regardless 
of its status under the Agreement on Agriculture, could be challenged under the SCM 
Agreement since the expiration of the peace clause.  Notice in this respect that the Revised 
Draft Modalities for Agriculture does not foresee in the re-installation of the peace clause.  
 
6.2.3. Relationship between the SCM Agreement and Agreement on Agriculture 
Our discussion has clearly demonstrated that the Agreement on Agriculture is more lenient 
vis-à-vis export subsidies and domestic subsidies than the SCM Agreement. However, an 
important issue is to what extent agricultural subsidies are exempted from the stricter 
disciplines imposed under the SCM Agreement.  The Agreement on Agriculture articulates in 
Article 21 that ‘the provision of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in 
Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement (e.g., the SCM Agreement) shall apply subject to the 
provisions of this Agreement’.1972 This provision should be read together with the peace 
clause (Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture).  This provision temporarily limited the 
applicability of the SCM Agreement for certain Agreement on Agriculture-conforming 
subsidies.  Export subsidies in conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture disciplines 
could not be considered prohibited or actionable subsidies but could be countervailed, 
although ‘due restraint’ had to be shown in initiating CVDs-investigations.  Regarding 
                                                 
1968 This was agreed as part of the The Doha Work Programme – Decision Adopted by the General 
Council on 1 August 2004 (WT/L/579, 2 August 2004).  See Blandford, Laborde, and Martin, above n 
1962, at 5. 
1969 This was accepted as part of the 2004 July Framework Decision.  The only US concession obtained 
by the G-20 in return at that time was the 2.5 ceiling set upon overall blue box support.  R. Aggarwal, 
‘Dynamics of Agriculture Negotiations in the World Trade Organization’, 39:4 Journal of World Trade 
(2005), 741-761, at 755. 
1970 Under the 2008 Farm Bill, farmers can choose between the countercyclical payment (CCP) 
program or the newly introduced Average Crop Revenue Election program (ACRE), which is an 
income insurance program protecting farmers against both low yields and price drops.  The US has not 
yet decided how it would notify ACRE under the current rules.  Since the payments would be linked to 
current instead of historical yields under ACRE, Blandford et at tentatively suggest that they would 
also likely not fit into the new blue box once the Doha round is concluded.  Blandford, Laborde, and 
Martin, above n 1962. 
1971 The conditions to fall in the green box would be somewhat modified (see above n 1964).  
1972 Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
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domestic subsidies, green box subsidies could not be considered actionable subsidies and 
could not be countervailed.  All other domestic support measures in conformity with the 
Agreement on Agriculture were countervailable subject to the exercise of due restraint and 
could not be considered actionable subsidies if the support granted to a specific commodity 
was not in excess of the support provided during 1992.  However, this peace clause expired at 
the end of 2003, raising the question whether the applicability of the relevant SCM 
Agreement disciplines has enlarged since then.  This section consecutively examines whether 
disciplines in Part II (prohibited subsidies), Part III (actionable subsidies), and Part V (CVDs) 
of the SCM Agreement are currently applicable to agricultural subsidies. 
 
6.2.3.1 Are agricultural export subsidies and local content subsidies prohibited under the 
SCM Agreement? 
Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement spells out a general prohibition on local content subsidies 
as well as export subsidies.  In the US – Upland Cotton dispute, the question of its 
applicability regarding agricultural products raised regarding both sets of subsidies.   
First, it had to be decided whether subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic agricultural 
goods that are consistent with the domestic support provisions of the Agreement on 
Agriculture are nonetheless prohibited under 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.  Obviously, this 
issue is highly relevant as a positive answer would imply that a measure compatible with the 
Agreement on Agriculture would be prohibited under the SCM Agreement.   
Second, Brazil claimed that export credit support already found by the Panel to be 
inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture was, in addition, inconsistent with the 
prohibition on export subsidies (3.1(a)) of the SCM Agreement.1973  The relevance of such an 
additional claim lies in the stricter implementation obligations which result from a violation 
of the SCM Agreement’s prohibited subsidies provisions.  In particular, as the Appellate 
Body in US – Sugar explained, Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement mandates the panel to 
make an additional recommendation to ‘withdraw the subsidy without delay’ and this will 
become a recommendation or ruling of the DSB.1974  The presence of this specific remedy 
explains why the Appellate Body instructed panels to not exercise judicial economy on claims 
under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement even when another WTO-violation would have 
already been found.1975  Important to keep in mind, Brazil’s claim under Article 3.1(a) was 
confined to export credit support found inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture.  
                                                 
1973 See below Part III, Chapter 5, Section 5.2. 
1974 Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement is a special rule superseding the general rule established in 
Article 19.1 of the DSU (Article 1.2 of the DSU stipulates the ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’ 
maxim).  See Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras 329-335.  
1975 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 335.  This is, however, not always 
obeyed.  Panel Report, China – Auto Parts, para 7.635. 
PART II CHAPTER 6 – DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
 
 
 
 
363 
 
 
Hence, Brazil did not claim that the level of export subsidies in conformity with the 
Agreement on Agriculture (i.e., to scheduled products below Member’s commitment level) 
was inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.  
The relationship between the Agreement on Agriculture and Article 3.1 of the SCM 
Agreement is governed by the introductory phrase of Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement and 
Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.   
First, Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement stipulates that ‘(e)xcept as provided in the 
Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies (export subsidies and import substitution 
subsidies), (…), shall be prohibited’.1976  Consequently, the Agreement on Agriculture 
prevails over Article 3 of the SCM Agreement in the Appellate Body’s reading ‘but only to 
the extent that the former contains an exception’.1977   
Second, as introduced above, Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture stipulates that 
other agreements on trade in goods ‘shall apply subject to the provisions’ of the Agreement 
on Agriculture.  According to the panel in US – Upland Cotton, this implies that the 
Agreement on Agriculture takes precedence ‘in the event, and to the extent, of any 
conflict’.1978  In particular, the Panel distinguished three situations of such a conflict where the 
Agreement on Agriculture would thus prevail, namely in case (i) an explicit carve-out or 
exemption from the disciplines in  the SCM Agreement existed in the text of the Agreement 
on Agriculture; (ii) it would be impossible for a Member to comply with its obligations under 
the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement simultaneously; (iii) there is an 
explicit authorization in the text of the Agreement on Agriculture that would authorize a 
measure that, in the absence of such an express authorization, would be prohibited by the 
SCM Agreement.1979  Hence, the situation articulated in Article 3.1(a) is also covered under 
Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture ((i) and (iii)).  Although explicitly agreeing with 
these examples, the Appellate Body concluded that other situations could be covered by 
Article 21.1 as well given that this provision should be interpreted more broadly as excluding 
other agreements in case the Agreement on Agriculture ‘contains specific provisions dealing 
specifically with the same matter’.1980    
Applying both provisions to the query on the applicability of the prohibition on local content 
subsidies, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel’s conclusion that this prohibition is 
applicable to agricultural subsidies.  After all, there is no provision in the Agreement on 
                                                 
1976 Emphasis added. 
1977 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 530. 
1978 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1036 (emphasis added). 
1979 The Panel formulated these as examples (para 7.1038) but seemed to consider this as an exhaustive 
list (para 7.1039).  
1980 The Appellate Body referred to this standard articulated in EC – Bananas III, para 155 (as well as 
Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para 186).  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland 
Cotton, para 532 (emphasis added). 
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Agriculture that ‘deal(s) specifically with the same matter as Article 3.1(b) of the SCM 
Agreement, that is, subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods’.1981  
Accordingly, user marketing payments provided to domestic users of US upland cotton were 
prohibited under the SCM Agreement since they qualified as local content subsidies in the 
meaning of Article 1 juncto 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.1982  Concerning the claim of the 
applicability of the prohibition on export subsidies (3.1(a)), the Panel in US – Upland Cotton 
concluded that agricultural export subsidies inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture 
are not exempted from the applicability of Article 3.1(a) by virtue of its opening clause juncto 
the peace clause.1983  Even though the Appellate Body concurred, a consistent application of 
its own broad reading of Article 21.1 Agreement on Agriculture would have foreclosed the 
applicability of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.1984  Indeed, the Agreement on 
Agriculture does have provisions ‘dealing specifically with the same matter’, namely those 
elaborated above disciplining export subsidies (and even export credit support in particular).  
The Panel’s more limited reading of Article 21.1, in which only conflicting provisions are 
exempted, seems more in line with the Appellate Body’s own conclusion that agricultural 
export subsidies inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture could subsequently be 
scrutinized under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.1985   
Next, the original as well as compliance Panel in US – Upland Cotton found that the 
challenged agricultural export subsidies (i.e., subsidized export credit guarantees) qualified as 
export subsidies in the meaning of the SCM Agreement.1986  As a result, they concluded – and 
the Appellate Body agreed – that, to the extent that these export credit guarantees were 
                                                 
1981 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 546.  The US had pointed to paragraph 7 of 
Annex 3 and 6.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Notice that the peace clause did not shield subsidies 
away from Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. 
1982 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1088; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 
552. 
1983 The peace clause was still applicable at the time of the original dispute.  Panel Report, US – Upland 
Cotton, para 7.947.  The Panel only cited Article 3.1(a) (and not Article 21.1) but also referred to its 
general discussion on this relationship under the part on local content subsides which included a 
discussion on Article 21.1 Agreement on Agriculture. 
1984 According to the Appellate Body in US – Sugar, one of the ‘complex issues’ of an additional 
analysis of agricultural export subsidies under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement is ‘whether the 
Agreement on Agriculture contains "specific provisions dealing specifically with the same matter"’.  
Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 339 and footnote 537. 
1985 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 583-584 (footnote 858), 629-630, 674, 732. 
1986 The Panel applied the same ‘export subsidy’-standard upon which it had indirectly relied under the 
Agreement on Agriculture (i.e., item (j) of Illustrative List) (see below Part III, Chapter 5, Section 
5.1.1).  Recall that the ‘export subsidy’-definition might be different under both agreements.  So, not all 
export subsidies under the Agreement on Agriculture are ipso facto ‘export subsidies’ under the SCM 
Agreement (e.g., the ‘unusual’ type of agricultural export subsidy listed in Article 9.1(c) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture).  The difficult assessment whether an export subsidy was also present under 
the SCM Agreement might explain the option of the Panel in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar to 
exercise judicial economy on the claim under Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement, after having found an 
export subsidy in the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture.  As explained, the 
Appellate Body considered this false judicial economy.  Panel Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, 
paras 7.381-7.384; Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 335. 
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inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture, they were also inconsistent with Article 
3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.  Although this was not accurately formulated at the original 
level, the compliance Panel rightly confined its findings under the SCM Agreement to the part 
of the export subsidy programme inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture.1987  
Consequently, the US had to withdraw these export subsidies only to the extent that they were 
inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture (i.e., exceeded its commitment levels).1988 
Nonetheless, the Panel at the compliance level explicitly left open whether, now that the 
peace clause had lapsed, ‘there may be a violation of Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM 
Agreement in respect of all exports (i.e., even those that conform to the disciplines of the 
Agreement on Agriculture)’.1989  Answering this question affirmatively, as the Cairns group 
and some US negotiators have suggested,1990 would imply that agricultural export subsidies 
not exceeding a Member’s commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture1991, and thus in 
conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture, would nonetheless be prohibited by virtue of 
Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement.1992  The pivotal issue here is whether the introductory 
phrase of Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement and/or Article 21.1 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture shields such agricultural export subsidies from the applicability of Article 3.1 of 
the SCM Agreement even after the explicit exception stipulated in the peace clause (Article 13 
of the Agreement on Agriculture) has lapsed.1993   
Whereas the case law did not offer a decisive answer as of yet, some elements suggest that 
WTO-adjudicating bodies will still exempt such agricultural export subsidies from the 
prohibition of Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement.  First, albeit dating from before the 
expiration of the peace clause, the Appellate Body in Canada – Milk/Dairy Article 21.5 
concluded that the WTO-consistency of an export subsidy should be examined, in the first 
place, under the Agreement on Agriculture and, importantly, it based this conclusion on the 
introductory phrase of Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement.  This conclusion was merely 
                                                 
1987 See below Part III, Chapter 5, Section 5.2. 
1988 This was also taken into account by the Arbitrator for the calculation of the appropriate amount of 
countermeasures.  Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited 
subsidies), para 4.207.  See above Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3.2.2. 
1989 This claim was not formulated by Brazil.  Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – 
Brazil), footnote 785. 
1990 Implicit in their reasoning is that the phrase ‘except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture’ 
merely refers to the peace clause.  According to the Cairns Group, agricultural export subsidies are no 
longer saved from scrutiny under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement since the expiration of the peace 
clause.  See Cairns Group Negotiating Proposal, Export Competition (G/AG/NG/W/11, 16 June 2000).  
The US negotiators position could likely be explained in light of the much higher level of direct export 
subsidies provided by the EC.  See Steinberg and Josling, above n 1153, at 377. 
1991 This could relate to listed or non-listed export subsidies to agricultural products within Members’ 
reduction commitments or, in case of developing countries, to marketing and transport export subsidies. 
1992 Of course, this only holds insofar they qualify as export subsidies within the meaning of the SCM 
Agreement.  
1993 Article 13(c)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
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‘borne out’, in other words, confirmed/supported by – and not dependent on – the peace 
clause.1994  Second, the Panel in US – Upland Cotton observed that the quantitative limits 
imposed by the export subsidy disciplines of the Agreement on Agriculture ‘may be 
considered less stringent than the outright prohibition on export subsidies found in Article 
3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement (but) these less stringent obligations are explicitly spelled out in 
the text of the Agreement, with further guidance provided in Articles 13 and 21 of the 
Agreement’.1995  The indication that the text of the Agreement on Agriculture ‘explicitly 
spells out’ more flexible rules seems to fit surprisingly well with the same Panel’s 
interpretation that, by virtue of Article 21.1, the Agreement on Agriculture would prevail in a 
situation where ‘there is an explicit authorization in the text of the Agreement on Agriculture 
that would authorize a measure that, in the absence of such an express authorization, would be 
prohibited by the SCM Agreement’.1996  Although the Panel did not indicate which 
provision(s) it exactly had in mind, a prime candidate may be Article 8 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, which stipulates that Members undertake ‘not to provide export subsidies 
otherwise than in conformity with’ the Agreement on Agriculture.1997  This provision indeed 
seems to serve as an ‘explicit authorization’ for agricultural export subsidies under Article 
21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture and an (implicit) ‘exception’ under the introductory 
clause of Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement from the prohibition on export subsidies.1998  
Most authors tend to agree with the conclusion that, even after the expiration of the peace 
clause, agricultural export subsidies in conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture are not 
prohibited under the SCM Agreement.1999  We now turn to the issue whether such export 
                                                 
1994 ‘The relationship between the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement is defined, in 
part, by Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement, which states that certain subsidies are “prohibited” except 
as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture. This clause, therefore, indicates that the WTO 
consistency of an export subsidy for agricultural products has to be examined, in the first place, under 
the Agreement on Agriculture. This is borne out by Article 13 (c) (ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture 
(…)’ (emphasis added). Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), 
paras 123–124. 
1995 This was contrasted with the absence of any indication of the drafters’ intention to exempt 
agricultural subsidies from the local content subsidy prohibition.  Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, 
para 7.1074 and footnote 1216 (emphasis added).  Again, Article 13 Agreement on Agriculture is only 
considered further ‘guidance’.   
1996 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1038 (emphasis added). 
1997 Emphasis added. 
1998 The argument that the broad formulation in the introductory phrase of Article 3.1 does not 
exclusively refer to the peace clause also finds contextual support in Article 5 of the SCM Agreement 
as this provision’s reference is explicitly confined to the peace clause (see also below). 
1999 See, for example, Desta, above n 632, at 294; Steinberg and Josling, above n 1153, at 377, H. N. 
Siuves, ‘The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies – the Outlook Post-Cancun’, 
31:1 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2004), 25-42, at 31-33.  McNiel has taken the opposite 
view without, however, underpinning its argumentation.  D. McNiel, ‘Furthering the Reforms of 
Agricultural Policies in the Millennium Round’, 9:41 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade (2000), 41-
86, at 72. 
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subsidies as well as domestic subsidies in conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture 
could nonetheless be challenged as an ‘actionable subsidy’ (Part III of the SCM Agreement).   
 
6.2.3.2. Are agricultural subsidies actionable under the SCM Agreement? 
6.2.3.2.1. Agricultural domestic subsidies 
Although some authors2000 and diplomats seem to hold the opposite view2001, there are strong 
arguments that agricultural domestic subsidies in conformity with the Agreement on 
Agriculture are challengeable under Part III of the SCM Agreement since the expiration of the 
peace clause.2002  First, in contrast to the introductory clause of Article 3 of the SCM 
Agreement (prohibited subsidies), Part III of the SCM Agreement explicitly exempts from its 
scope ‘subsidies on agricultural products as provided in Article 13 (peace clause) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture’.  By its terms, the exemption depends on the existence of the 
peace clause.2003  This difference in reference to the Agreement on Agriculture should be 
given meaning.  Second, the opposite reading that domestic subsidies could even in the 
absence of the peace clause still not be challengeable, would go against the principle of 
effective treaty interpretation.  It would have rendered the meaning of whole clauses to 
‘inutility’ (e.g., peace clause, Article 6.9 of the SCM Agreement, the opening clause of 
Article 5 of the SCM Agreement).2004  Third and related to the previous argument, domestic 
                                                 
2000 Desta, for instance, reasoned that: 
‘(…) as long as countries do not respect their (Agreement on Agriculture) obligations, the Peace 
Clause affords them absolutely no protection whatsoever.  Moreover, to the extent countries 
respect their obligations under the (Agreement on Agriculture), their measures remain secure 
from challenges based on other agreements.  And, in my view, this is true regardless whether the 
Peace Clause expires.  The only exception to this is the protection provided by the Peace Clause 
against claims of non-violation nullification and impairment.  Apart from this, I am of the view 
that the role of the Peace Clause has always been more political rather than legal and, strictly 
speaking, the expiry of the Peace Clause could not make much legal difference’.   
Desta, ‘The Integration of Agriculture in WTO Disciplines’, above n 1815, at 40. 
2001 Reference is in particular made to US and EC diplomats.  As Chambovey explains (but does not 
necessarily seem to share), this interpretation would be partly based on the lex specialis principle.  The 
more specific Agreement on Agriculture would prevail on the more general SCM Agreement (and 
GATT 1994).  The object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture is ‘to create a distinct legal 
regime, tailor made for agricultural products, and the general rule (the SCM Agreement) simply does 
not suit the particular conditions of agriculture’. D. Chambovey, ‘How the Expiry of the Peace Clause 
(Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in 
the WTO Framework’, 36:2 Journal of World Trade 305 (2002), 305-352, at 309-311; Steinberg and 
Josling, above n 1153, at 375.  
2002 Notice that the peace clause did not shield agricultural domestic subsidies not in conformity with 
the Agreement on Agriculture from a challenge under the SCM Agreement. 
2003 Article 6.9 of the SCM Agreement stipulates that the provision on ‘serious prejudice’ ‘does not 
apply to subsidies maintained on agricultural products as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture’ (emphasis added). 
2004 To recall the words of the Appellate Body, ‘(a)n interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would 
result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.  Appellate Body 
Report, US – Gasoline, at 23.  Desta’s reasoning of Desta that the meaning of the peace clause is rather 
political than legal would be hard to reconcile with this principle (see above n 2000). 
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support not covered under the green box (but in conformity with the Agreement on 
Agriculture under one of the other boxes) was only under certain specific conditions 
exempted from challenges under Part III of the SCM Agreement by virtue of the peace clause.  
Indeed, such support to a specific commodity was not exempted if granted ‘in excess of that 
decided during the 1992 marketing year’.2005  If such non-green box support would still be 
exempted, what about the application of this condition now that the peace clause has 
expired?2006  Fourth, in absence of the peace clause, only Article 21.1 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture could be advanced as legal basis to exempt agricultural domestic subsidies from 
the actionable subsidy claims under the SCM Agreement.  Yet, domestic support disciplines 
under the Agreement on Agriculture do not ‘deal specially with the same matter’.2007  The 
Agreement on Agriculture sets general, non-product-specific reduction commitments on 
domestic support based on their alleged trade-distortive effect (by putting support into 
different boxes), whereas Part III of the SCM Agreement offers the opportunity to challenge 
specific subsidies in case they cause adverse effects.2008,2009  Given that actionable subsidy 
claims depend on the demonstration of adverse effects, the provisions and negotiations under 
the Agreement on Agriculture regarding domestic support reduction would not be rendered to 
‘inutility’ in case the SCM Agreement is applied.  These could be seen as different tracks to 
cut back agricultural domestic subsidies.  Fifth and finally, panels and the Appellate Body in 
the US – Upland Cotton seem to have implicitly confirmed that agricultural domestic 
subsidies are challengeable under Part III of the SCM Agreement.  When the peace clause 
was still applicable (i.e., original level), they exclusively relied on this clause to determine 
whether an actionable subsidy claim could be formulated under the SCM Agreement.  For 
instance, the Appellate Body, after citing the relevant part of the peace clause, interpreted 
that:  
 
                                                 
2005 Article 13(b)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
2006 Would this lead to the illogical conclusion that such support is now exempted as such, and thus that 
‘peace clause’ period would have been more stringent than the post-peace clause period. 
2007 Recall also that Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which according to the Appellate 
Body would thus preclude the application of other provisions dealing ‘specially with the same matter’, 
does not preclude scrutinizing export subsidies not in conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture 
under the export subsidy disciplines of the SCM Agreement. 
2008 Nielsen also rejects that conditions on green box subsidies (Annex II) and Part III of the SCM 
Agreement deal with the same matter simply because they would both address the effects of subsidies 
(in case of green box subsidies, the conditions aim at ensuring that they are not, or minimally, trade-
distorting).  She underscores that the provisions in Part III of the SCM Agreement are much more 
elaborated.  Nielsen therefore concludes that panels and the Appellate Body would likely decide that 
Part III of the SCM Agreement would be applicable to green box measures.  L. Nielsen, ‘Green Farm 
Subsidies Sponsoring Eco Labeling: Is the Separation of Market Access and Subsidies Regulation in 
WTO Law Sustainable?’, 43:6 Journal of World Trade (2009),1193-1222, at 1219.    
2009 The different implementation standards under the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM 
Agreement (i.e., Article 7 of the SCM Agreement on ‘actionable’ subsidy claims) might also suggest 
that they do not specifically deal with the same matter.   
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Accordingly, domestic support that conforms fully to the provisions of Annex 2—that is 
"green box" support, which is exempt from the domestic support reduction obligations of the 
Agreement on Agriculture—is also exempt, during the implementation period, from actions 
based on Article XVI of GATT 1994 and the actionable subsidies provisions of Part III of the 
SCM Agreement.2010 
 
Because the domestic support challenged by Brazil did not meet the conditions of the peace 
clause, it was already actionable under Articles 5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement.2011  
Moreover, at the compliance level, when the peace clause had lapsed, the domestic support 
challenged by Brazil was directly scrutinized by the Panel under Articles 5 and 6 of the SCM 
Agreement.2012  In sum, now that the peace clause has lapsed, there seems to be no ground to 
exempt domestic agricultural support from scrutiny under the SCM Agreement.  Of course, to 
be successful, it must be demonstrated that such support is a specific subsidy causing adverse 
effects in the meaning of the SCM Agreement.2013 
 
6.2.3.2.2. Agricultural export subsidies 
We previously concluded that agricultural export subsidies in conformity with the Agreement 
on Agriculture would arguably not be prohibited under the SCM Agreement.  Solid 
arguments could be advanced to infer that such support is nonetheless actionable under Part 
III of the SCM Agreement.2014  First, assuming that agricultural domestic subsidies would 
indeed be challengeable as actionable subsidy, it would contradict the central approach taken 
in the GATT/WTO to discipline export subsidies more stringently than domestic subsidies if 
it is decided to exempt, at the same time, agricultural export subsidies from such potential 
scrutiny.  Second, the only provision that could potentially be invoked to exempt agricultural 
export support from such challenge under Part III of the SCM Agreement is again Article 21.1 
of the Agreement on Agriculture. But even in its broad reading offered by the Appellate 
Body, Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture does not shield agricultural export 
subsidies from an actionable subsidy claim given that no provision in the Agreement on 
Agriculture ‘deals specifically with the same matter’, namely with the demonstration of 
adverse effects of export subsidies to other Members.  Third and finally, considering 
                                                 
2010 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 316 (original footnote, which specified the 
implementation period, deleted; emphasis added).  See also Appellate Body Report, US – Upland 
Cotton, para 394; Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.608; Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, 
para 7.68. 
2011 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 7.608, 7.1107; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland 
Cotton, para 394.   
2012 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 10.4.  The compliance panel was 
well aware that the peace clause had lapsed (see above n 1989). 
2013 See, for example, Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 7.1109-7.110. 
2014 For the same reasons, agricultural export subsidies not in conformity with the Agreement on 
Agriculture could not only be challenged as prohibited subsidy under the SCM Agreement but also as 
actionable subsidy under Part III.  This is parallel to the treatment of non-agricultural export subsidies 
(see Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.334). 
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agricultural export subsidies under certain circumstances consistent with the Agreement on 
Agriculture (e.g., if fulfilling export subsidy commitments; see above) but, at the same time, 
scrutinizing their trade effects under the ‘actionable’ subsidy category, is parallel to the 
treatment of certain non-agricultural export subsidies that are not prohibited by virtue of the 
Illustrative List.  Indeed, some non-agricultural export subsidies are not prohibited on the 
basis of an exception spelled out in the Illustrative List, but these export subsidies are still 
actionable under Article 5 of the SCM Agreement.2015  In fact, there is no conflict between 
considering certain (non-)agricultural subsidies as not prohibited at face value but mandating, 
at the same time, that their adverse effects, if demonstrated, should be taken away.  The 
export subsidy commitment provisions under the Agreement on Agriculture can thus perfectly 
be applied alongside the actionable subsidy provisions of the SCM Agreement.2016   
In sum, agricultural export subsidies conforming to the Agreement on Agriculture are 
challengeable under the SCM Agreement.  Of course, such a claim will only be successful if it 
could be demonstrated that such agricultural export subsidies fall within the subsidy definition 
of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement and cause adverse effects (Article 5 of the SCM 
Agreement). 
 
6.2.3.3. Are agricultural subsidies countervailable? 
The peace clause no more than partially narrowed this unilateral venue.  CVDs action was 
only foreclosed for ‘green box’ support, whereas all other types of domestic support could be 
countervailed subject to the additional procedural requirement to exercise ‘due restraint’.2017  
With the end of the peace clause, these limitations also expired.2018  Indeed, no element in 
either the SCM Agreement or Agreement on Agriculture points in the opposite direction.  
Since CVDs action is not spelled out under the Agreement on Agriculture, there is no 
provision ‘specifically dealing with the same matter’ in this agreement.  Accordingly, Article 
21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture does not exempt agricultural subsidies from CVDs 
action.  The Panel in Mexico – Olive Oil confirmed that CVDs could indeed be installed on 
agricultural imports.2019   
                                                 
2015 See above Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1.3.  Observe also that the peace clause explicitly exempted 
agricultural export subsidies from Article 5 of the SCM Agreement (Article 13(c)(ii) of the Agreement 
on Agriculture).  Members were thus well aware that export subsidies could potentially be challenged 
under the actionable subsidy category. 
2016 See also Steinberg and Josling, above n 1153, at 377–378; Siuves, above n 1999, at 32–34.  
2017 Regarding the interpretation of this term, see Panel Report, Mexico – Olive Oil, para 7.67.   
2018 This could also be an extra argument why actionable subsidy claims, at least those under Article 
5(a) of the SCM Agreement, should also be allowed because this is the multilateral variant to respond 
to subsidies causing injury to the domestic industry. 
2019 Because the peace clause was still in place at the moment the challenged CVDs investigation was 
launched, the Panel scrutinized whether Mexico had exercised ‘due restraint’.  The Panel did not 
explicitly decide that it had to scrutinize this obligation.  Because Mexico had conducted its 
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6.2.3.4. Conclusion 
This concluding section summarizes the applicability of the SCM Agreement regarding 
agricultural subsidies.  Three types of agricultural subsidies have been distinguished: export 
subsidies, local content subsidies, and other domestic subsidies. 
First, regarding agricultural export subsidies, a distinction is made on the application of the 
SCM Agreement depending on whether they conform to the Agreement on Agriculture.  On 
the one hand, export subsidies in conformity with the disciplines elaborated under the 
Agreement on Agriculture seem also exempted from the SCM Agreement’s prohibition on 
export subsidies.  This holds for export subsidies to scheduled products within reduction 
commitments and for marketing or transport export subsidies offered by developing 
countries.2020  Yet, these export subsidies could be challenged under the actionable subsidy 
provisions of the SCM Agreement and be vulnerable to CVDs action.  On the one hand, 
export subsidies inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture are likewise prohibited under 
the SCM Agreement.  All export subsidies for unscheduled agricultural products and for 
scheduled agricultural products above reduction commitments are inconsistent with the 
Agreement on Agriculture.  These export subsidies are in addition prohibited under Article 
3.1 of the SCM Agreement insofar they are captured under the export subsidy definition of 
the SCM Agreement (Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement or the Illustrative List).2021  
Accordingly, these export subsidies should, to the extent they are inconsistent with the 
Agreement on Agriculture, be withdrawn without delay pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM 
Agreement.2022   
Second, the Appellate Body confirmed in US – Upland Cotton that subsidies contingent upon 
the use of domestic agricultural products are prohibited under Article 3.1 of the SCM 
Agreement, regardless whether such support conforms to the Agreement on Agriculture.   
Third, domestic agricultural support, regardless in which box it is located under the 
Agreement on Agriculture, seems actionable as well as countervailable under the SCM 
                                                                                                                                            
investigation as if Article 13(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture was applicable, it proceeded ‘on the 
basis of the same assumption, arguendo, for the purposes of this dispute’.  Panel Report, Mexico – 
Olive Oil, para 7.59.   
2020 This is based on Article 27.7 of the SCM Agreement in case of an actionable subsidy claim against 
developing countries benefiting from S&D treatment on export subsidies under the SCM Agreement. 
2021 An exception should arguably be made for non-listed types of export subsides that merely cause a 
‘threat of circumvention’ (Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture).   
2022 Only export subsidies offered by developing countries benefiting from S&D treatment on the 
prohibition of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement are exempted from the application of this provision 
(see above Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1). Given that these developing countries do not have 
scheduled agricultural products, they are not allowed to offer agricultural export subsidies (except for 
Article 9.4 export subsidies) under the Agreement on Agriculture.  Because such support is thus 
inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture regardless of its adverse trade effects, the potential 
additional claim that such support is actionable pursuant to Article 27.7 of the SCM Agreement seems 
not relevant in practice. 
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Agreement.  In case the multilateral track is used, it has to be demonstrated that such support 
measures qualify as specific subsidies under Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement as well 
as that they cause adverse effects.  If the unilateral track is pursued, the CVDs-investigating 
authority has to show that specific subsidies cause injury to its domestic industry.2023   
 
                                                 
2023 Recall also the S&D treatment provisions on actionable subsidy claims and CVDs actions against 
developing countries (Article 27.9 and 27.10 of the SCM Agreement). 
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INTRODUCTION 
WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy has summed up a threefold role of the WTO in the field 
of trade finance: encouraging liberalization of this type of financial services, being a regulator 
of export credit support under the SCM Agreement, and serving as a forum to discuss WTO-
compatible ways of providing support to developing countries.  Regarding government 
involvement in trade financing, the WTO thus acts as a regulator as well as an advocate of 
official support for export credits.  Under the Aid-for-Trade umbrella, initiatives to scale up 
WTO-compatible trade finance instruments in developing countries are indeed high on the 
agenda and WTO Members are called to deliver more export credit support for trade to WTO 
Members that need it most.2024   
Soon after the outbreak of the financial crisis, Lamy also urged governments to support their 
export credit agencies and international financial institutions in filling the gap in trade 
financing caused by ‘one of the most severe financial crises in modern history’.2025  This call 
was responded to in April 2009 by the G-20 of developed and emerging developing countries, 
who promised ‘to ensure availability of at least $250 billion over the next two years to 
support trade finance through export credit and investment agencies and through the 
Multilateral Development Banks’.2026  This pledge was welcomed by OECD members and a 
number of other countries, as well as by international institutions such as the WTO, the IMF, 
and the World Bank.  At the same time, these governments and international institutions 
emphasized ‘that any measures be in place until market conditions recover and should be 
consistent with their respective international obligations (…)’.2027  Yet, it will be 
demonstrated that reconciling both aspects is far from evident in light of existing WTO 
obligations.  
To this end, this Part will review and evaluate the policy space the WTO effectively grants its 
Members to support export credits for industrial and agricultural goods as well as for services.   
 
Before systematically assessing export credit support under the WTO framework, the concept 
of ‘export credit (support)’ and the economic rationale for such support are introduced 
(Chapter 1).  Further, the origins of the current obligations are traced (Chapter 2).  Given that 
an exception exists for export credit practices to non-agricultural products that are in 
conformity with the interest rate provisions of the OECD Arrangement on Officially 
                                                 
2024 M. Auboin, ‘Boosting Trade Finance in Developing Countries: What Link with the WTO?’, WTO 
Staff Working Paper (November 2007), 21 pp., at 2. 
2025 WTO, Lamy warns trade finance situation “deteriorating” (12 November 2008).  Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/gc_dg_stat_12nov08_e.htm. 
2026 G-20, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform (2 April 2009).   
2027 OECD, Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, Statement: The Global Financial 
Crisis and Export Credits (TAD/ECG(2009)3, 23 April 2009).   
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Supported Export Credits (OECD Arrangement), a preliminary overview of the latest version 
of this arrangement is considered useful (Chapter 3).2028  This leads to the parallel legal 
assessment of present WTO disciplines on industrial (Chapter 4) and agricultural products 
(Chapter 5).  Here, the relevant regulatory framework for industrial goods is delineated in the 
SCM Agreement and should be complemented with the Agreement on Agriculture in case of 
export credit support for agricultural products.  This legal framework is further clarified – one 
might even argue ‘completed’ – by several panels and the Appellate Body.  To close the legal 
analysis, it is briefly examined whether the GATS imposes relevant restrictions on those 
aspects of export credit support affecting trade in services (Chapter 6).  Following this legal 
analysis, the discussion turns to the proposals tabled in the Doha Round regarding export 
credit support disciplines on industrial and agricultural products (Chapter 7).  Finally, a 
normative assessment of WTO members’ policy space for trade financing will be conducted 
(Chapter 8). 
 
 
    
                                                 
2028 As the US – Upland Cotton case has shown, these disciplines might also be relevant for determining 
whether export credit support for agricultural products is made at subsidized terms.  Therefore, the 
OECD Arrangement is discussed before focusing on existing WTO disciplines on non-agricultural and 
agricultural products, respectively.   
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1.  EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT  
1.1. DEFINITION 
International trade transactions bear risks and require financing.  Between 80 and 90 per cent 
of these transactions therefore rely on some sort of credit, guarantee, or insurance which 
provide finance or risk cover.2029  Hence, trade finance – an umbrella term covering all sorts 
of financial instruments or services enabling or facilitating export and import transactions2030 
– is considered ‘the lifeblood of trade’ and export credits take an important share thereof. 2031     
 
However, neither the WTO agreements nor the OECD Arrangement defines export credits, 
which seem to bear somewhat ‘different meanings in different contexts’.2032  In the context of 
the SCM Agreement, the Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels defined them as credits 
provided to foreign buyers.2033  Parallel, an instrument will only constitute an export credit 
guarantee (or insurance) under the SCM Agreement if it guarantees (or insures) an export 
credit and thus covers default by a foreign buyer in respect of an export credit provided to that 
foreign buyer.2034  In contrast, loans provided to the exporter, rather than to the foreign buyer, 
are not considered export credits under the SCM Agreement.2035,2036   
 
Accordingly, export credits are credits provided to the foreign buyer.  Depending on who 
provides such credit, it can take two forms.  First, the credit can be extended directly by an 
                                                 
2029 See Auboin, above n 2024, at 1. 
2030 There is also no agreed definition of the concept of ‘trade finance’.  For an overview of trade finance 
instruments, see M. Auboin and M. Meier-Ewert, Improving the Availability of Trade Finance during 
Financial Crises (Geneva: WTO Publications, 2003), 18 pp., at 2-3. 
2031 See Auboin, above n 2024, at 1; M. Auboin, ‘Restoring Trade Finance During a Period of Financial 
Crisis: Stock-taking of Recent Initiatives’, WTO Staff Working Paper (December 2009), 24 pp., at 4.   
2032 See J-Y. Wang, M. Mansilla, Y. Kikuchi, and S. Choudhury, Officially Supported Export Credits in a 
Changing World (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2005), 55 pp., at 44. 
2033 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.316-7.323.  The OECD Export Credits 
Secretariat considers insurance and guarantees as export credits, whereas the Panel seems to restrict this 
concept to credits provided to the foreign buyer (see also below n 2042).  The reasoning of the Panel is in 
line with the separate treatment of ‘export credit guarantee or insurance programmes’ and ‘export credits’ 
in the Illustrative List and fits the distinction between ‘export credit’ and ‘export credit support’.  OECD, 
Export Credits Secretariat, The Export Credits Arrangement 1978-2008, Achievements and Challenges 
Continued! (Paris: OECD, April 2008).   
2034 The Panel referred to an instrument that ‘covers default by a borrower in respect of an export credit 
provided to that borrower’ (emphasis added).  Borrowers could be interpreted as foreign buyers given 
that the same Panel held that export credits are loans provided to foreign buyers. Panel Report, Korea – 
Commercial Vessels, para 7.213.   
2035 Yet, they might be considered as support for export credits if they effectively support the loan to the 
foreign borrower (see below).  Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para  7.324.  
2036 The so-called pre-shipment credits, which are credits to the exporter to purchase raw materials and 
other inputs, were thus not considered export credits in the meaning of the SCM Agreement.  Panel 
Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.324-7.329. 
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exporter to a foreign buyer in the form of deferral of payment (supplier credit).2037  The 
exporter might (re)finance this export credit by a loan from its bank or export credit agency.  
Second, export credits might be provided by an exporter's bank or other financial institutions 
(or export credit agency) as loans to the buyer (or his bank) by which the buyer can pay the 
exporter (buyer credit).  Export credits thus enable a foreign buyer to defer payment to the 
exporter or financial institution.2038  Based on their maturity, export credits are often 
categorized into short-term (maximum one year), medium-term (between one and five years), 
and long-term credits (more than five years).2039  The short-term credits are usually extended 
for consumer goods, spare parts and raw materials whereas the other maturities are in place 
for capital goods and large projects.2040  Obviously, the terms of a loan agreement a foreign 
buyer can obtain forms an important factor in its choice among different exporters.   
 
This is where an export credit agency (ECA) comes into play, by providing support to its 
exporters in the export credits the latter can arrange for foreign buyers.  As illuminated by the 
scope of the OECD Arrangement, such ‘official support’ for export credits might take two 
forms.  First, under ‘pure cover support’, which is the most common type of support, ECAs 
offer insurance or guarantees for export credits extended by the exporter or a financial 
institution to a foreign buyer (or its bank).2041  Because under pure cover support ECAs only 
‘guarantee or insure’ export credits that are offered by exporters or financial institutions, 
ECAs themselves are not extending the export credit.2042  Second, some ECAs also offer 
‘official financing support’ in the form of export credits (direct credit) by directly extending 
loans to foreign buyers to purchase specific products/services originating from the ECAs 
country.  Other types of ‘official financing support’ consist of interest rate support for export 
credits and refinancing of export credits extended by exporters or financial institutions. 20432044  
Export credit support for agricultural goods usually takes the form of pure cover support for 
short-term export credits, whereas such official support for non-agricultural products is 
mostly medium or long-term in nature.  Some ECAs only offer medium- and long-term pure 
                                                 
2037 The Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels decided that ‘deferral’ should be understood as post-
shipment deferral of payment.  Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.326. 
2038  See Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above n 2032, at 5. 
2039 See Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above n 2032, at 5. 
2040 See Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above n 2032, at 5. 
2041 Article 5 of the OECD Arrangement; Item (i) of ‘Annex XI – List of definitions’ of the OECD 
Arrangement.  
2042 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.213-7.215. 
2043 Interest rate support broadly relates to ‘official support for (…) the interest rate to be paid in 
connection with export credits’.  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 5.132; 
See also item f of ‘Annex XI – List of definitions’ of the OECD Arrangement.   
2044 In case of refinancing, the ECA refinances the export credits offered by their exporters or financial 
institutions.  Strictly speaking, an export credit is thus confined to loans provided to foreign buyers, but 
support for such export credits might take the form of loans to exporters or financial institutions. 
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cover support, whereas others provide all types of export credit support (e.g., direct financing 
support) and cover all types of maturities.2045  In the medium- and long-term segment, pure 
cover support has clearly been dominant over the last decade.2046 
 
1.2. RATIONALES FOR AND PROVISION OF EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT TO NON-
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
By providing these forms of support, ECAs aim at improving the financing package which 
exporters can offer to a potential foreign buyer and hereby improve their chances of securing 
the contract.  The effect of an export credit on importers’ decision is determined on the basis 
of the subsidy rate of this credit, capturing its cost-reducing effect.2047  Hence, a common 
objective of ECAs is the promotion of national exports.2048  For example, the mission of the 
US Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) is ‘turning export opportunities into actual sales that 
help US companies of all sizes to create and maintain jobs in the US’.2049  The trade-distorting 
potential of such support is thus apparent.  As the Panel in Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – 
Brazil) observed, ‘among the various forms of export subsidies, subsidized export credits 
arguably have the most immediate and thus greatest potential to distort trade flows’.2050  In the 
absence of market failures, export credit support at subsidized terms could in principle not be 
justified as it distorts trade and therefore depresses world welfare. 
 
Nonetheless, promotion of national exports by export credit support is generally legitimized 
by ECAs on two grounds.2051  First, it is deemed essential to counter export credit support by 
other governments and thus to allow national exporters to compete on an equal footing with 
foreign exporters (self-defence instrument).2052  This explains, for instance, why the US Ex-
Im Bank annually presents the US Congress a report on the competitiveness of its support vis-
                                                 
2045 See Export-Import Bank of the United States, Report to the US Congress on Export Credit 
Competition and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (June 2009), 139 pp., at 93. 
2046 It accounted for over 80% of G-7 ECAs’ medium- and long-term activity.  Since the outbreak of the 
financial and economic crisis, the call for direct credit has increased again.  Export-Import Bank of the 
United States, above n 2045, at 94-95. 
2047 Formally, the subsidy rate is the per cent by which the export credit reduces the present value of the 
trade commodity.   
 2048 Moser et al have demonstrated that ECAs indeed have an export-promoting effect.  See C. Moser, T. 
Nestmann, and M. Wedow, ‘Political Risk and Export Promotion: Evidence from Germany’, 31:6 World 
Economy (2008), 781-803. 
2049 See Export-Import Bank of the US, ‘Annual Report 2007 – Mission Statement’.  Available at: 
http://www.exim.gov/about/reports/ar/ar2007/Index_IR.html. 
2050 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.137 
2051 J. E. Ray, Managing Official Export Credits – The Quest for a Global Approach (Washington DC: 
Institute for International Economics, 1995) 322 pp., at 8; D. C. Zehner, ‘An Assessment of Two 
Economic Rationales for Export Credit Agencies’, Chazen Web Journal of International Business 
(Spring 2003), 1-11; Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above n 2032, at 20. 
2052 Pursuant to the US Ex-Im Bank’s Mission Statement: ‘Ex-Im Bank also helps US exporters remain 
competitive by countering the export financing provided by foreign governments (…)’.   
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à-vis other ECAs of G-7 countries.2053  Obviously, this rationale on itself would suggest that 
countries would better cooperate to impede such export support competition.  Second, it is 
legitimized by reference to market failures in the private trade finance sector.2054  Many 
ECAs, such as the US Ex-Im Bank, are for that matter explicitly prohibited to compete with 
the private sector.2055  As a result, ECAs offer support for export transactions that would not 
or not at affordable prices be offered by the private sector, because the private capital market 
lacks sufficient information to properly assess the risks of the transaction (asymmetry of 
information).2056  By relying, for example, on official bilateral channels, governments would 
be better placed to gather information needed to assess transaction risks (in particular country 
risk).2057  The large size of the transaction might also hamper private sector trade finance.2058  
This information/capacity market failure argument assumes that private financial institutions 
only lack sufficient information and capacity to offer trade finance without government 
support.  The trade finance conditions set by ECAs could be considered commercially sound 
but the private finance market fails to seize this opportunity.2059  If an ECA purely operates on 
the basis of this rationale, its functioning should not entail any cost to the government.  Partly, 
this can be ensured by the requirement to be self-sustaining imposed on many ECAs.2060   
This information/capacity-market failure argument situated in the capital market should be 
distinguished from other, often implicit, rationales for official export credits which 
correspond to general arguments in favour of export-promoting instruments.  First, as 
explained in Part I, an ECA might offer support because of positive spillovers deemed to be 
attached to exports (e.g., technology spillovers, or reputation in foreign markets) or such 
                                                 
2053 See, for example, Export-Import Bank of the United States, above n 2045, at 13-14. 
2054 According to the US Ex-Im Bank’s Mission Statement, it ‘assumes the credit and country risks that 
the private sector is unable or unwilling to accept’.  See, for example, K.W. Dam, The GATT – Law and 
International Economic Organization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 480 pp., at 139. 
2055 See, for example, Export-Import Bank of the United States, above n 2045, at 13-14. 
2056 Among the potential risks are those linked to the importer (i.e., buyer risk).  More often, risks linked 
to the country of importation form obstacles to private sector involvement (i.e., country risk). See M. 
Stephens, The Changing Role of Export Credit Agencies (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 
1999), 156 pp., at 14; Auboin and Meier-Ewert, above n 2030, at 3; Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and 
Choudhury, above n 2032, at 5.  
2057 Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above n 2032, at 21 and 22.  Several economists question 
the validity of this argument in practice.  See Ray, above n 2051, at 12-13; WTO Secretariat, World 
Trade Report 2006 – Exploring the Links Between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO (Geneva: WTO 
Publications, 2006), 223 pp., at 74; Zehner, above n 2051, at 5-8.  
2058 ECAs might also be better placed to pursue claims.  Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above 
n 2032, at 5; Zehner, above n 2051, at 7-8.   
2059 It might be possible that ECAs’ functioning precisely inhibits the private sector from further 
developing. 
2060 As ECAs do not have to pay taxes and make profit, their risk-absorbing capacity is higher than 
private actors even when they have to operating break-even.  Hence, a more developed financial system 
would not necessarily finance the same trade transactions as those supported by ECAs operating break-
even.     
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support might be used as a carrot-and-stick instrument.2061,2062  Second, because export credit 
support ensures financing to importers, ECAs in developed countries also find legitimacy in 
financing trade to developing countries and enhancing trade in general.  Obviously, foreign 
buyers benefit from export credits at terms not available on the commercial market.  These 
rationales outside the capital market might, from the export-promoting country’s perspective, 
justify official support even if this would not be commercially sound.2063,2064       
 
Next to simple political-economy reasons (i.e., responding to lobbying efforts of exporters), 
these different rationales explain why today virtually all developed countries and many 
developing countries have government support programmes for export credits in place.  By 
1970, most major OECD countries had created an ECA.  Developing countries also actively 
started to set up ECAs as an export promotion tool over the past 30 years.2065  Nonetheless, 
the private sector is increasingly occupying aspects of the trade finance market, certainly in 
the short-term credit segment.2066,2067  Nonetheless, an IMF study as well as discussions in the 
                                                 
2061 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3.  In oligopolistic markets (e.g., aircraft), in which firms 
behave as Cournot competitors and governments act first, subsidized export credits could also be used as 
profit-shifting instruments (from foreign to domestic firms).  According to Carmichael, however, it is 
more realistic to assume that firms compete on price (i.e., Bertrand competitors) and act first in the field 
of export credit support.  In this case, the inflated subsidy level is merely a response to a firm’s rent-
seeking behaviour reacting to an inflated stated price.  See C. M. Carmichael, ‘The Control of Export 
Credit Subsidies and its Welfare Consequences’, 23:1/2 Journal of International Economics (1987), 1-
19.   
2062 From a normative viewpoint, this could legitimize export credit support in developing countries as 
market failures often hamper the expansion of the exporting sector (see above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 
2.4). 
2063 A fully informed/developed private sector would also be unwilling to cover the risk of (or finance) 
this trade transaction at the same premium rate (interest rate).  It correctly assesses the risks but does not 
internalize the alleged positive external effects of the trade transaction.  In contrast, official export credit 
support ‘internalizes’ these effects.  Such support might thus entail costs to the governments and bear the 
risk of competing with the private sector by overriding less favourable private offers.  Of course, the 
question should be addressed if the government is indeed driven (instead of captured by interest groups) 
ánd able (benefits are greater than costs) to internalize these effects.  Its support might also be cancelled 
out by similar support given by other countries to their exporters.   
2064 Notice that only if this argument would be present to justify export credit support (e.g., welfare-
improving effect on net-importing countries), it could not be justified in simple welfare terms from the 
perspective of the subsidizing country.  It would then be seen as a kind of development instrument, which 
incurs a welfare cost upon the subsidizing country.  From a normative viewpoint, other types of 
development support would be superior. 
2065 M. Stephens and D. Smallridge, ‘A Study on the Activities of IFIs in the Area of Export Credit 
Insurance and Export Finance’, Inter-American Development Bank, Occasional Paper No. 16 (2002), 53 
pp., at 5; Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above n 2032, at 5. 
2066 In most industrial countries, ECAs are already replaced by the private sector as the main provider of 
short-term credits (maximum repayment of 1-year).  ECAs are also facing increased competition in the 
medium- and long-term credit markets even though they still have a dominant position in these markets.  
The growth of the private trade finance market explains why official support for export credit by ECAs in 
industrial countries has been on the decline.  In contrast, such official support is growing in large 
emerging markets (e.g., China, India).  Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above n 2032, at 10, 
11, 16.  Yet, in response to the financial crisis, ECAs have again increased their short-term export credit 
support. 
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WTO show that government support for trade finance could still be justified in two broad 
areas.2068   
First, ECAs could fill gaps where the private capital market is still unwilling or unable to 
provide financing.  These gaps are still present in medium- and long-term markets, 
predominantly in developing countries because of the underdevelopment of their capital 
markets.  Discussions under the Aid-for-Trade programme have also revealed that there still 
is a lack of trade finance to low-income countries, hindering their integration into world 
trade.2069  WTO Members and international institutions were called upon to spur trade finance 
support and help developing efficient trade finance institutions in these countries.  Because of 
their intense dialogue with the WTO, ECAs of developed countries are considered ‘natural 
partners’ to participate in the Aid-for-Trade initiative and to provide technical assistance in 
setting up ECAs in developing countries.2070,2071   In response to the financial crisis, several 
developing countries have requested such assistance to set up ECAs (e.g., Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Costa Rica).2072  Further, to help bridging the gap in trade financing in emerging 
markets, international as well as regional financial institutions have developed specific 
instruments in this field.  For instance, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is 
part of the World Bank Group2073, as well as three Regional Development Banks2074 have set 
up so-called ‘Trade Finance Facilitating Programmes’ (TFFPs).  Under these programmes, 
they provide guarantees to international or regional banks (so-called ‘confirming banks’) 
covering both the commercial and political risk of international trade related credit 
transactions emanating from local banks (so-called ‘issuing banks’).2075  By absorbing the risk 
on non-payment of the local banks (i.e., ‘issuing bank’), the Global TFFP set up by the IFC 
                                                                                                                                            
2067 Several ECAs and private providers of export credits and investment insurance are members of the 
Berne Union (founded in 1934, currently 51 Members), which functions as a forum to discuss and 
formulate good practices in the sector. 
2068 Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above n 2032, at 21-22.    
2069 Technological innovations in handling trade finance in developed markets even bear the risk of 
further marginalization.  Auboin, above n 2024, at 2; Auboin, above n 2031, at 22-23; see also Note by 
the Secretariat, Expert Group Meeting on Trade Finance – 25 April 2008 (WT/WGTDF/W/38, 14 July 
2008) and Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance, Report of the Meeting of 10 July 2008 
(WT/WGTDF/M/16, 17 July 2008). 
2070 Auboin, above n 2024, at 16 
2071 Somewhat ironically, ECAs seem to perceive this partnership as a helpful tool to correct their 
traditional negative image of subsidizing national goods and violating international subsidy rules.  
Auboin, above n 2024, at 16 (footnote 34). 
2072 Auboin, above n 2031, at 22. 
2073 Within the World Bank Group, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) also offers 
guarantees covering political risks for investments in developing countries.  These political risks cover 
currency inconvertibility and transfer restrictions, expropriation, war and civil disturbance, and breach of 
contract by the host country.  In principle, the applicant for the guarantee must be a national of a country 
other than the country where the investment is made.  MIGA offers coverage for up to 15 years (or 20 
years if justified by the project)    
2074 These banks are the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
2075 The issuing bank bears the risk related to the local producer. 
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thus facilitates import and export transactions to/from all emerging markets.  Likewise, the 
three Regional TFFPs support trade transactions to/from emerging countries within their 
particular region.2076,2077  Another example of a multilateral institution active in the trade 
finance field is ‘The African Trade Insurance Agency’ (ATI).  Created in 2001 by a number 
of African countries with support of the World Bank, ATI offers inter alia export credit 
insurance covering both commercial and political risks.2078 
Second, official export credit support might be particularly justified in times of financial 
crisis.  The Asian financial crisis at end of the 1990s had already demonstrated that ECAs 
could be important in times when private banks collectively cut trade credit lines to emerging 
market economies and this regardless of the risks involved (so-called ‘herd behavior’).2079  
The fact that even companies with good credit ratings could not get access to financing 
indicated the presence of a capital market failure, which justified the intervention of ECAs.2080  
In general, such capital market failure could result, inter alia, from overshooting (irrational 
component), a lack of information during a financial crisis to distinguish between risks, 
and/or a lack of capacity to finance all creditworthy transactions. Moreover, official export 
credit support during a financial crisis is also legitimized on the basis of the recovering – or 
so-called ‘shock-absorbing’ – role of trade.2081  Private finance actors do not take into account 
the negative externalities of cutting trade credit.2082  The global financial crisis that hit the 
world in 2008 caused a sharp deterioration of trade financing, especially to emerging and low-
income market economies, which resulted from a shortage of liquidity as well as a from a re-
assessment of risks.   
The capital market failure in combination with the shock-absorbing role of trade might thus 
legitimize the promise of the G-20 in April 2009 to increase governmental support for trade 
                                                 
2076 Hence, it covers trade transactions to, from, and within (i) all emerging markets (IFC); (ii) countries 
in central and eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (EBRD); (iii) countries in 
the Latin American and Caribbean region (IBD); and (iv) Asian countries qualifying as developing 
countries under the ADB classification (ADB).  The issuing banks are thus located in these countries. 
2077 The Regional Development Banks also have other trade finance programmes in place.  The EBRD 
and ADB, for instance, also directly provide credit facilities to banks in their regional emerging markets 
for lending to exporters and importers.   
2078 See http://www.ati-aca.org/.  To be sure, despite these efforts by the ATI and the IFC of which 
almost half of its guaranteed transactions were for banks in Africa, demand for funds and guarantees still 
outweighs supply in Africa. See Auboin, above n 2031, at 13.    
2079 Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above n 2032, at 22 and 25; WTO, Working Group on 
Trade, Debt and Finance, Note by the Secretariat, Improving the Availability of Trade Financing: Report 
of Preliminary Work (WT/WGTDF/W/23, 25 March 2004), paras 20-28; Auboin, above n 2031, at 8. 
2080 WTO, Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance, above n 2079, paras. 18 and 20-28.  ECAs in 
non-crisis countries could play a signalling role by providing sufficient trade finance (for short-term and 
investment) to countries enduring a financial crisis. Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above n 
2032, at 22 and 25; Auboin and Meier-Ewert, above n 2030, at 10. 
2081 In the words of Lamy, the Asian financial crisis has demonstrated that ‘access to trade finance at 
affordable rates must be maintained in such critical times to ensure that international trade can continue 
to play its shock-absorbing role’.  He warned that, if the gap in trade financing is not filled, ‘we run the 
risk of further exacerbating [the] downward spiral’ of the world economy. WTO, above n 2025.   
2082 See WTO, above n 2025. 
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financing.  In implementing this pledge, the IFC and all regional development banks doubled 
their capacity under their trade facilitation programmes2083 and ECAs have also ‘stepped in 
essentially with programmes for short-term lending of working capital and credit guarantees 
aimed at SMEs (small- and medium enterprises)’.2084  Nonetheless, in spring 2010 Lamy 
warned before the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee that any recovery 
of the trade finance market might not benefit low-income countries:   
 
(D)espite the improvement in core markets — i.e. the financing of north-north and trans-
pacific trade — at the periphery markets are still in dire conditions. The confusion of country 
and counterparty risk is leaving low income countries on the side of the road, and, in current 
bank restructuring, trade financing is not necessarily a priority relative to more remunerative, 
short-term market activities. The risk of a permanent withdrawal by international banks from 
low-income markets is real at a time when regulatory change may not make it easier to do 
business.2085  
 
Therefore, he urged addressing this risk ‘if we want low-income countries not to be overly 
constrained in benefiting from the global recovery’.2086  This again demonstrates that the 
WTO Director-General is one of the driving forces pushing for government intervention to 
close the gap in short-term trade financing.  For ECAs, the fact that they were among those 
assigned to fulfil this task came as a surprise.  This is illustrated in the 2009 US Ex-Im Bank 
report to US Congress: ‘The WTO, contrary to its otherwise negative stance regarding the use 
of export credit subsidies, supported the notion that ECAs had a clear role to play, particularly 
in the area of trade (short term) finance’.2087  To be sure, it is the WTO Secretariat, and the 
WTO Director-General in particular, who support the ECAs’ complementary role in tackling 
the financial crisis.2088  As our discussion will illustrate, existing WTO disciplines seem far 
less supportive to this end.    
                                                 
2083 The ceiling of the IFC’s Global TFFPs increased from $1.5 billion to $3 billion.  In addition, a new 
‘Global Trade Liquidity Program’ was launched in May 2009, resulting from a joint initiative between 
governments, international and regional financial institutions, and the private sector to support trade 
financing to importers and exporters in developing countries. 
2084 Auboin continued:  
‘For certain countries, the commitment is very large or unlimited in amount (Germany, Japan).  In 
other cases, very large lines of credit have been granted to secure supplies with key trading 
partners (the USA with Korea and China). In other cases, cooperation is developing to support 
regional trade, in particular chain-supply operations (establishment of an Asia-Pacific Trade 
Insurance Network to facilitate intra- and extra- regional flows)’. 
See Auboin, above n 2031, at 16-19; see also G-20, Progress Report on the Actions of the London and 
Washington G-20 Summits (5 September 2009); G-20, Progress Report on the Economic and Financial 
Actions of the London, Washington and Pittsburgh G20 Summits (7 November 2009).  
2085 WTO, News, Lamy at IMF/World Bank underlines trade’s role in anchoring economic recovery (24-
25 April 2010), available at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl154_e.htm.  
2086 WTO, above n 2025. 
2087 Export-Import Bank of the United States, above n 2045, at 88. 
2088 On the role played by the WTO Secretariat and the WTO Director-General, see J. Pauwelyn and A. 
Berman, ‘Emergency Action by the WTO Director-General: Global Administrative Law and the WTO's 
Initial Response to the 2008-09 Financial Crisis’, 6:2 International Organizations Law Review (2009), 
499-512. 
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1.3. RATIONALES FOR AND PROVISION OF EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT TO AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS 
Trade finance for agricultural products is mostly short-term in nature.  Hence, export credit 
support for such transactions is less evidently justified on the basis of capital market failures 
given that these occur primarily in medium- and long-term markets.  Instead, such support is 
generally considered justified by its proponents on the basis of the positive impact upon net 
food-importing countries.  Yet, even though such support could be welfare-improving for net 
food-importing countries (static perspective), it might likewise inhibit the development of 
local production (dynamic perspective).  Moreover, from the perspective of world welfare, the 
beneficial impact of export credit support upon developing importing countries cannot justify 
subsidized export credit support from a normative perspective given that its welfare effect on 
the world as a whole is negative: in welfare terms, the subsidizing exporting country and 
foreign competitors lose.  Indeed, as covered in Part I, export subsidies are welfare-depressing 
from a world welfare perspective in the absence of market failures.2089  Nonetheless, 
according to an OECD study, official support for agricultural products could be legitimate in 
the presence of serious liquidity constraints in the importer’s market.20902091  If a country faces 
systematic liquidity constraints2092 and agricultural imports are a high priority2093, export 
credit support could create additional global demand that otherwise would not have 
existed.2094  The resulting higher exports would not come at the expense of other exporters or 
local production in terms of their existing sales.2095  This argument could justify agricultural 
export credit support to importers in least-developed countries (LDCs) or net food-importing 
countries as it allows them to purchase vital amounts of foods which they otherwise would 
have been unable to import.2096  Rude and Gervais also formally demonstrate that rules 
                                                 
2089 See above Part I, Chapter 1. 
2090 OECD, An Analysis of Officially Supported Export Credits in Agriculture 
(COM/AGR/TD/WP(2000)91/FINAL, 2001), 62 pp. 
2091 Liquidity constraints occur ‘when an importer lacks sufficient foreign exchange to import desired 
foodstuffs and has difficulties in obtaining credit’ and are mostly explained on the basis of incomplete 
markets.  J. Rude and J-P. Gervais, ‘An Analysis of a Rules-based Approach to Disciplining Export 
Credits in Agriculture’, 21:3 International Economic Journal (2007), 441-463, at 445. 
2092 ‘Systematic’ means that liquidity constraints are widespread among importers and not just limited to 
some of them. 
2093 For example, if additional food is required to feed the population. 
2094 ‘Export credits may increase demand if, like an increase in income, they increase demand at any 
price’.  OECD, above n 2090, at 22. 
2095 ‘Additionality’ is restrictively defined as export credit policies causing an increase in demand at any 
price. But even in that case, the results are considered ambiguous because the development of future 
domestic production/imports or private trade financing might be hampered. OECD, above n 2090, at 22 
and 25. 
2096 OECD, above n 2090, at 22.  
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disciplining interest rate subsidies may not be appropriate in case of liquidity constraints 
because of this potential for additionality and benefits for all exporting countries.2097   
 
The same OECD study also gives insights in the amount of agricultural export support offered 
in the second half of the 1990s by countries participating in the OECD Arrangement.2098  
Even though the EC is by far the largest provider of export subsidies for agriculture, most 
agricultural export credit support was extended by the US (46 per cent of the total), followed 
by Australia, the EC, and Canada.2099  The support offered by the US was most trade-
distortive as well, as it contained the highest subsidy rate (almost 5 per cent). 2100  Moreover, 
the US accounted for most export credit on terms of more than one year.2101  The amount of 
the subsidy element of the support offered by the US, Canada, and Australia exceeded their 
level of export subsidy notifications in the WTO.2102  On the other hand, few emerging 
developing countries offered export credit support for agricultural products.2103  For reasons 
of food security and fiscal policies, agricultural exports are more often taxed than subsidized 
in developing countries.  Remarkably, agricultural export support is not only primarily 
extended by OECD countries but these countries were also the main recipients thereof.2104  
The very limited share of support channelled to net food-importing countries and LDCs 
reveals that the above-mentioned justification for export credit support might not hold in 
                                                 
2097 An export credit at subsidized rates can relax the liquidity constraints of importers and thus increase 
their demand.  If this demand-inducing effect (putting upward pressure on the price) outweighs 
exporters’ supply-inducing effect (putting downward pressure on the price), the price increases, even if 
more of the good is traded.  On the other hand, in Rude and Gervais model, rules on minimum premium 
rates are always appropriate, as insurance subsidies unambiguously have the potential to distort markets.  
Apparently, differential treatment in case LDCs and net food-importing countries are recipients with 
respect to minimum premium rules cannot be justified on the basis of liquidity constraints.  However, the 
different outcome with regard to interest rate rules and premium rate rules emerges from the model’s 
assumption that premiums at subsidized rates only affect the exporter’s cost and is not passed through in 
any way in a discounted interest rate.  As a result, minimum premium rates only affect the supply side 
and not import demand in their model.  Yet, as Rude and Gervais also acknowledge, ‘a credit guarantee 
allows the home country exporters to charge a lower interest rate because the risk associated with the 
transaction is lower’.  However, this indirect effect on the interest rate is not reflected in their model.  
Rude and Gervais, above n 2091, at 441- 463.  
2098 To be precise, the survey covered export credit support offered by the Participants to the OECD 
Arrangement over the period 1995-1998. According to information provided to the WTO Secretariat, the 
average annual amount (period 1995-1998; in US$ million) of agricultural products supported by official 
export credits were 3297 (US), 905 (Canada) and 885 (EC).  See Background Paper by the Secretariat, 
Members' Usage of Domestic Support Categories, Export Subsidies and Export Credits – Revision 
(G/AG/NG/S/12/Rev.1, 12 March 2001), at 44. 
2099 These four countries accounted for almost all export credit support (99 per cent). 
2100 The premium rates were considered insufficient to cover long-term operating costs. See OECD, 
above n 2090, at 15. 
2101 In total, 45 per cent of export credits were on terms of more than 1 year and the US accounted for 97 
per cent thereof.  OECD, above n 2090, at 16. 
2102 OECD, above n 2090, at 31. 
2103 OECD, Agricultural Policies in Emerging  and Transition Economies – 2000 
 (COM/AGR/APM/TD/WP(2000)43/FINAL, June 2000), 153 pp., at 44. 
2104 See also OECD, above n 2103, at 49. 
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practice.2105  Overall, the subsidy rate as well as the importance of export credit support in 
total trade of agricultural products was reported to be not very large.  Nevertheless, the OECD 
study called for strengthening disciplines on agricultural export credit support, because such 
support could be trade-distortive in individual cases and its current levels might increase in 
the future.  Interestingly, the OECD study assumed that no such international disciplines were 
in place but, as the US – Upland Cotton case has revealed, this turned out to be incorrect.2106   
 
Unfortunately, a follow-up empirical study of a more recent date is lacking.  Yet, some 
insights on WTO Members’ export credit support for agricultural products might be drawn 
from the operation of the WTO’s dispute settlement system and the Trade Policy Review 
(TPR) mechanism.  First, the US substantially altered its export credit support for agricultural 
products in response to the US – Upland Cotton rulings discussed below.  Under the 2008 
Farm Bill, only one export credit guarantee programme for agricultural products is still in 
force, operated by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC).  This programme, the so-called 
General Sales Manager 102 (GSM 102), guarantees the repayment of credit made available to 
finance commercial export sales of agricultural commodities on credit terms that do not 
exceed three years.2107,2108  In order to conform to the US – Upland Cotton compliance 
rulings, the 1% (of the value of the guaranteed transaction) statutory cap on the premium 
charged to the exporter  has been removed.2109  The level of export credit guarantees that the 
CCC must make available annually under the GSM 102 programme should be minimum $5.5 
billion and the available credit subsidy, referring to the available budget authority for the cost 
of the programme, is set at $40 million annually.2110   
Second, in Canada’s 2007 Trade Policy Review (TPR), the functioning of its export credit 
programmes for agricultural products was discussed.  These programmes are operated 
through Canada’s official ECA (‘Export Development Canada’ or EDC) and through the 
                                                 
2105 OECD, above n 2090, at 24-25. 
2106 OECD, above n 2090, at 8. 
2107 The minimum term of 90 days is deleted under the 2008 Farm Bill.  The 2008 Farm Bill gives 
funding authority for credit guarantees through FY2012. See, Farm Bill 2008 (H.R. 6124), at 470-473; 
See C. E. Hanrahan, ‘Agricultural Export Provisions of the 2008 Farm Bill’, CRS Report for Congress 
(June 2008), 5 pp., at 2-3.  
2108 The 2008 Farm Bill repealed the statutory authority of the CCC to extend pure cover support under 
the ‘Supplier Credit Program’ (SCGP), which offered very short-term guarantees (up to 180 days), as 
well as under long-term (3-10 years) guarantee programme ‘General Sales Manager 103’ (GSM 103).  
Both programmes (i.e., SCGP and GSM 103) were already suspended in 2005 (See Appellate Body 
Report, US –Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras 192 and 258).  The SCGP had incurred a large 
number of defaults ($227 million in total) and had been plagued by fraud.  See also WTO, Trade Policy 
Review Body, Trade Policy Review US – Minutes of Meeting – Addendum (WT/TPR/M/200/Add.1, 9 
September 2008), at 277.   
2109 Hanrahan, above n 2107, at 3; WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review US, above n 
2108, at 276. 
2110 See Hanrahan, above n 2107, at 3.  According to the manager’s statement accompanying the Bill, the 
credit subsidy of $40 million is expected to finance $4 billion annually.     
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‘Canadian Wheat Board’ (CWB), which is a state-owned enterprise that has the exclusive 
right to sell wheat and barley in Western Canada for export and domestic consumption.2111  
According to Canada, the relevant EDC programmes operate on commercial principles, 
charge premiums reflecting the transaction risk, and are benchmarked against the private 
sector.2112  Answering questions on official guarantees extended on credit offered by CWB to 
foreign buyers2113, Canada emphasized that ‘to date, there has been no WTO agreement on 
rules governing the extension of export credit or export credit guarantees’.2114  Yet, this 
response does not seem accurate in light of the US – Upland Cotton case.  
Third, some large emerging developing countries also started to set up export credit support 
facilities for agricultural products in line with the general trend of reducing their agricultural 
policy’s anti-export bias.2115,2116  For instance, in 2001 India created a specific agriculture 
division under its ECA (Exim Bank Agro).2117,2118  In China, the Export & Credit Insurance 
                                                 
2111 The operation of the CWB as state-trading enterprise was central in the case Canada – Wheat Exports 
and Grain Imports in which the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the CWB ‘export regime’ was 
not inconsistent with Article XVII of the GATT, as sales did not result in a violation of the GATT’s non-
discrimination principle nor were contrary to commercial considerations.  See, Panel Report, Canada – 
Wheat Exports and Grain Imports; Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports. 
2112 See WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review – Canada – Minutes of Meeting – 
Addendum (WT/TPR/M/179/Add.1, 22 June 2007), at 255. 
2113 These are extended under two government-guaranteed export credit programmes. First, the Credit 
Grain Sales Program (CGSP) guarantees export credits to foreign sovereign buyers with terms up to three 
year.  According to Canada’s 2007 TPR, however, this programme has not been used anymore for new 
credits since the 2001/2002 crop year.  Second, the Agri-Food Credit Facility (ACF) guarantees credits 
offered by CWB to foreign private buyers, which (as there are no limits set out by law or regulation) in 
practice  have terms up to one year and for which no premium at all is charged.  Canada indicates that 
most CWB sales are made on a cash basis. Yet, in some cases, the government offers export credit 
guarantees to the CWB, allowing it to make credit sales to creditworthy buyers.  Canada’s 2007 TPR 
reveals that credit sales under the ACF amounted to between 3% and 4% of total sales during 2002/3 and 
2003/4.  According to CWB, these ‘small amounts of export credit’ are offered ‘to compete with other 
exporting countries providing such support’.  If the CWB sells on credit, it charges an interest rate to 
foreign buyers, while at the same time borrowing credit to pay the Canadian exporter.  Given that the 
CWB is able to borrow at a lower interest rate than the interest rate charged to foreign buyers as CWB’s 
debt is guaranteed by the government, it is able to generate a positive interest spread.  See Canadian 
Wheat Board, ‘Position on Trade’ (available at http://www.cwb.ca/public/en/hot/trade/position/); WTO, 
Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, Canada 
(WT/TPR/S/179/Rev.1, 4 June 2007), at 97-98; WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, above n 2112, at 255; 
CWB, ‘Annual Report  CWB – Annual Report – 2008/2009’, at 63, 73, 83. 
2114 Trade Policy Review Body, above n 2112, at 209. 
2115 On the general trend to reduce the anti-export bias, see K. Anderson, ‘Distorted Agricultural 
Development and Economic Development: Asia’s Experience’, The World Economy (2009), 351-384, at 
362-365. 
2116 In 2000, the OECD observed that few emerging economies offered agricultural export credit support. 
OECD, above n 2103, at 44.  
2117 See http://www.eximbankindia.in/sme.asp and http://www.eximbankagro.com/  
2118 The Agro and Food Processing sector accounted for 5% of the exposure of the Indian Exim Bank in 
2006.  WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review – India – Minutes of Meeting – 
Addendum (WT/TPR/M/182/Add.1, 20 July 2007), at 292. 
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Corporation (SINOSURE), set up in 2001 after its WTO accession2119, has introduced special 
export insurance for agricultural products.   
 
Overall, export credit support for agricultural products does not seem not be used as widely as 
export credit support for industrial products are.  Yet, both the fact that some programmes are 
challenged before the WTO and the discussions in the TPR framework reveal concerns about 
their trade-distortive potential.  We now turn to the historical context explaining why 
countries have agreed upon international disciplines restricting their freedom to offer export 
credit support for industrial as well as for agricultural goods. 
 
                                                 
2119 It merged the export credit insurance arm of the China Export and Import Bank and the People’s 
Insurance Company of China.   
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2.  RATIONALE FOR DISCIPLINING EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT: HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The need for multilateral disciplines on export credit support can generally be explained on 
the basis of simple game theory principles.  Competition among ECAs to offer their exporters 
the best support has severe budget implications and, by canceling out each others’ offers, 
could result in a zero-sum operation whereby no one wins market share.2120  However, given 
that no country can unilaterally decide to stop subsidizing export credits without its exporters 
losing sales (prisoner’s dilemma), an important incentive for drafting multilateral disciplines 
comes into existence.2121  To this end, two parallel though related tracks were developed for 
disciplining export credit support for non-agricultural products, one within the OEEC/OECD 
and another within the GATT/WTO, each having their own compliance mechanism in place.  
In the case of agricultural products, political-economy reasons and lower levels of support 
might explain why disciplines on export credit support for these goods were only discussed 
much later.            
 
2.1. EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
In the early postwar period, governments became active in providing export credit support.  
Initial discussions for disciplining such support took place in the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC).2122  Already in 1955, the OEEC succeeded to adopt an initial 
list of prohibited measures that were considered to artificially aid exporters.2123  At that time, 
no substantive disciplines in the GATT regulated the use of export subsidies.  Only in 1960, 
Contracting Parties could agree on a declaration that elaborated a non-exhaustive list of 
prohibited export subsidies on non-primary goods (1960 Declaration).2124  As mentioned in 
Part II, this list was based on the one drafted in the OEEC, which was transferred to the 
GATT when the OEEC transformed into the OECD in 1960.2125  Among the practices 
considered as prohibited export subsidies were: 
   
                                                 
2120 Of course, export credit support often has a trade-creating effect.  Governments would support 
disciplines ‘when the subsidization required to maintain competitiveness outstripped their institutional 
capacity to pay’.  A. M. Moravcsik, ‘Disciplining Trade Finance: the OECD Export Credit 
Arrangement’, 43:1 International Organization (1989), 173-205, at 193-194.        
2121 See also A. I. Mendelowitz, ‘The New World of Government-Supported International Finance’, in G. 
C. Hufbauer and R. M. Rodriguez (eds), The Ex-Im Bank in the 21st Century – A New Approach? 
(Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2001), 159-190, at 161. 
2122 The first serious calls for disciplines were made by France and the UK in the 1950s when US exports, 
backed by low-interest and long-term credits of the US Ex-Im Bank, threatened their dominant position 
in their increasingly unprotected colonial markets.  See Moravcsik, above n 2120, at 179. 
2123 This list was further expanded in 1958. 
2124 See above Part II, Chapter 1.2. 
2125  This was done upon request of France.  See Subsidies – Action by the Contracting Parties under 
Article XVI:4 (L/1260, 1 August 1960); Contracting Parties, Seventeenth Session, Subsidies – Action 
under Article XVI:4 (W.17/3, 2 November 1960).       
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(f) in respect of government export credit guarantees, the charging of premiums at rates which 
are manifestly inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the credit 
insurance institutions; (g) the grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by 
governments) of export credits at rates below those which they to pay in order to obtain the 
funds so employed; (h) the government bearing all or part of the costs incurred by exporters in 
obtaining credit.2126 
 
The list thus referred to the cost to the government in deciding whether export credit support 
was prohibited.2127  Despite the fact that this standard was considered far too high and, as a 
result, ‘almost universally ignored’, no GATT complaint was brought, partly because the 
time-consuming dispute settlement procedure was inadequate to respond to fastly negotiated 
trade finance transactions.2128       
 
Consequently, the OECD resumed the topic of export credit support in the early 1960s, but no 
substantive disciplines emerged in the following decade mainly due to US objections.  Being 
well aware of its low domestic interest rates, the US proclaimed that ‘credit terms were an 
element of competition, comparable to cheaper labor or higher productivity’. 2129  However, 
the first oil crisis turned the US into the main advocate for stricter disciplines.2130  In 1978, 
negotiations finally resulted in the ‘Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported 
Export Credits’ (OECD Arrangement).2131  This OECD Arrangement is not a formal treaty 
but a so-called ‘gentlemen’s agreement among its Participants’ of indefinite duration.2132  It is 
also not an OECD act, though the OECD Secretariat provides administrative support and 
monitors its implementation.2133  Accordingly, the OECD Arrangement is a flexible, non-
legally binding instrument in the hands of its Participants who can modify it without having to 
follow the OECD decision-making procedures or ratification process.2134  In contrast to the 
GATT’s institutional design, the OECD offered a neutral forum, which explains, pursuant to 
                                                 
2126 See Contracting Parties, Seventeenth Session, Report of the Working Party on Subsidies (L/1381, 
November 1960), para 5.   
2127 Except for item (h), which referred to the cost to the exporter. 
2128 Moravcsik, above n 2120, at 179; G. C. Hufbauer and J. S. Erb, Subsidies in International Trade 
(Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1984), 283 pp., at 68. 
2129 Cited in Moravcsik, above n 2120, at 196.  The Working Party on Export Credits and Credit 
Guarantees (ECG) was set up in 1963.  Today, all OECD Members, except for Iceland, are Members of 
the ECG.  The EC is not a Member of the OECD but a Participant to the OECD Arrangement and also 
participates in the meetings.  The WTO acts as an observer.     
2130 France made the opposite move.  The US feared that the balance-of-payment consequences of the oil 
crisis could end in an export credit war.  Moravcsik, above n 2120, at 180 and 201.   
2131 The first steps to an agreement were not made in the OECD but in the IMF/World Bank annual 
meeting in 1973.  Subsequent negotiations in the IMF, OECD, and G-5 summits resulted in a secret, non-
binding Consensus in 1976, which was formalized two years later under the OECD.   
2132 Article 2 of the January 2010 version of the OECD Arrangement (see below n 2153). 
2133 Articles 2, 9 of the January 2010 version of the OECD Arrangement (see below n 2153).  Interaction 
and information exchange exists between the Participants to the Arrangement and the ECG.  See Export 
Credits Secretariat, above n 2033.  
2134 Entrance is upon invitation of Participants (Article 3 of the current OECD Arrangement).  See also J. 
Koven Levit, ‘The Dynamics of International Trade Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credits’, 45 Harvard International Law Journal (2004), 65-148, at 114-118. 
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Moravcsik, why it became the institutional home of export credit disciplines.2135  The original 
OECD Arrangement spelled out disciplines for export credits with a repayment term of 
minimum two years that were supported by ECAs for sales of non-primary products and 
services.  Minimum interest rates for official financing support (7 to 8 per cent) and 
maximum repayment terms were prescribed.  However, no minimum premium rates were 
drafted.2136  Export credits supported by pure cover were subject to the substantive disciplines 
except for the minimum interest rates.  In other words, an important loophole – used by 
several countries – was that ECAs could offer guarantees/insurance to export credits provided 
by private parties at interest rates below the prescribed threshold.2137  In addition, Participants 
were allowed to offer the same level of support than other Participants did in case the latter 
deviated (or applied an exception) from the disciplines set under the Arrangement (so-called 
‘matching’).  Contrary to GATT’s mandatory dispute settlement system, the enforcing 
mechanism of this gentlemen’s agreement is based on the threat of such matching.  
 
During the same period the OECD Arrangement was drafted, GATT contracting parties were 
negotiating stricter disciplines on the use of non-tariff barriers in the Tokyo Round.  As 
elaborated in Part II of this study, the plurilateral Subsidies Code resulting from this round 
principally prohibited the use of export subsidies on non-primary goods (except for 
developing countries) and included a non-exhaustive list which built on the 1960 
Declaration.2138  Concerning export credit support , however, the Subsidies Code inscribed 
more flexibility than under the 1960 Declaration.  The basic principles on export credit 
support were formulated in line with the 1960 Declaration.  Item (j), dealing with export 
credit guarantees/insurance, prescribed that premium rates could not be manifestly inadequate 
to cover the cost to the government.2139 Next, item (k) described the conditions under which 
official financing support was prohibited (para 1).  Yet, the Subsidies Code also built in an 
exception for export credit practices in accordance with the interest rate provisions of the 
OECD Arrangement (item (k), para 2).  Such a ‘safe haven’ was necessary as the standard 
imposed under paragraph 1 of item (k) (and (j)) was much more demanding than the 
obligations imposed under the recently drafted OECD Arrangement.2140  Next to disciplines 
                                                 
2135 The OECD contributed ‘simply a location for treasury and credit agency officials to continue what 
they were already doing’.  Moravcsik, above n 2120, at 198. 
2136 Some other sectors next to agriculture were also excluded at that time.  
2137 See also Moravcsik, above n 2120, at 182.   
2138 Articles 8, 9, 14 and the Annex of the Subsidies Code.  See above Part II, Chapter 1, Section 1.3.   
2139 Item (j) elaborated upon item (f) of the 1960 Declaration 
2140 See Hufbauer and Erb, above n 2128, at 70.  Notice that this safe haven was inscribed as an exception 
to item (k) and not as an exception to item (j).  Hence, one might wonder whether the safe haven was 
only intended to provide an exception to item (k), first paragraph, or also to the standard set in item (j) 
for pure cover support.  Next to the fact that the safe haven was inscribed in item k, other elements might 
also suggest that the safe haven was not intended to cover item (j) violations.  First, contrary to today, 
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on export and domestic subsidies, the Subsidies Code elaborated obligations on the use of 
CVDs.2141  Because drafters had failed to agree on a general ‘subsidy’ definition, it was 
unclear which trade-distortive government measures could be countervailed.  Contracting 
Parties disputed whether the Illustrative List of prohibited ‘export subsidies’ also defined – 
and thus restricted – the concept of ‘subsidy’ for CVDs purposes.2142  For instance, could 
products benefiting from export credits conforming to the OECD Arrangement be 
countervailed if such credits were offered at a cost to the government?2143  The EC argued that 
these should not be considered as subsidies and therefore could not be countervailed, but the 
US and several other countries held the opposite view.2144   
 
With the launch of the Uruguay Round (1986), Contracting Parties also tabled negotiations on 
disciplines on subsidies and CVD disciplines.  The US proposed a number of amendments to 
items (j) and (k) in order to strengthen these disciplines.2145  At the same time, it was 
questioned whether it could still be left to OECD Arrangement Participants to define the 
conditions under which export credit support could be provided.2146  The application of the 
                                                                                                                                            
direct credits were at that time much more common than pure cover support.  Therefore, the focus was 
oriented on disciplining (and providing an exception for) official financing support.  Second, the standard 
in item (j) for pure cover support relates to the level of premium, whereas the original OECD 
Arrangement did not impose any minimum premium obligations.  Put otherwise, in case the safe haven 
applied to item (j) violations, pure cover support at premiums incurring a cost would have been justified 
under the safe haven, simply because the repayment terms would have been respected.  Third, if the 
drafters would have intended to justify item (j) violations, they would probably not have referred to 
‘interest rate provisions’ in the safe haven as pure cover support was (and still is) not subject to these 
provisions.  Finally, the Knaepen package (1999) exactly introduced disciplines on minimum premium 
rates with the objective to comply with the standard set by item (j).  On the other hand, the safe haven’s 
phrase ‘export credit practice’ might indicate that it was intended to cover all types of export credit 
practices, including pure cover support (item (j)).  On this basis, the case law considers that the safe 
haven could potentially be invoked as an exception to a pure cover support programme violating item (j) 
(see below). 
2141 Articles 1-6 of the Subsidies Code. 
2142 See J. H. Jackson, ‘Perspectives on CVDs’, 21 Law & Policy in International Business (1990), 739-
761, at 747; G. C. Hufbauer, J. S. Erb, and H. P. Starr, ‘The GATT Codes and the Unconditional Most-
Favored-Nation Principle’, 21 Law & Policy in International Business. (1980), 59-93, at 72-73. 
2143 See K. Adamantopoulos, ‘Subsidies in External Trade Law of the EEC: Towards a Stricter Legal 
Discipline’, 15:6 European Law Review (1990), 427-459, at 452. 
2144 According to Adamantopoulos as well, the latter reading seems correct, above n 2143, at 435.  See 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Minutes of the Meeting Held on 27 October 1982 
(SCM/M/13, 6 January 1983), paras 19 and 25.  Parallel arguments were expressed on the notification 
requirement.  See Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Minutes of the Meeting Held on 
29 April 1982 (SCM/M/11, 7 July 1982), paras 48-56; Minutes of the Meeting Held on 26 April 1989 
(SCM/M/43, 22 June 1989), para 24; Communication from the Delegation of the US to the Delegation of 
the EC, Notification of Subsidies pursuant to Article 7:3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties (SCM/28 and SCM/29, 9 July 1982). 
2145 Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, Submission by the US, Elements of the 
Framework for Negotiations (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, 22 November 1989), at 3-4. 
2146 Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the Secretariat, Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/4, 28 April 1987), at 80-81, 85-86; Preparatory 
Committee, Note by the Secretariat, Subsidies (PREP.COM(86)W/17, 28 April 1986), paras 5, 10; 
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Subsidies Code also showed that parties who did not participate to the OECD Arrangement 
had difficulties in obtaining information on (revised versions of) the OECD Arrangement.2147  
On the other hand, other countries pointed to its success in limiting the ‘credit race’ among 
developed countries.2148  In the end, the SCM Agreement largely copied items (j) and (k) of 
the Subsidies Code.  Indeed, the current text still refers to the cost-to-government standard 
and stipulates in paragraph 2 of item (k) of the Illustrative List a safe haven for OECD 
Arrangement-conforming export credit practices.2149  In addition, the SCM Agreement 
included a ‘subsidy’ definition.  Contrary to the EC’s position, this definition clarifies that 
OECD Arrangement-conforming export credit support can still qualify as a ‘subsidy’ if it 
confers a benefit.     
 
At the time the SCM Agreement entered into force (1995), the original OECD Arrangement 
had already undergone several modifications.  Yet again, this mainly resulted from US 
pressure to bring disciplines closer to market principles.2150  An important new step towards 
stronger disciplines on pure cover support was made through the Knaepen Package (1999).  It 
introduced minimum premium rates and aimed at ensuring that the standard set by item (j) of 
the Illustrative List would be met.2151  A dispute between Brazil and Canada on export credits 
in the regional aircraft sector was brought before the WTO in 1997/1998.  Here, 
interpretations made by the panels and Appellate Body not only induced new proposals in the 
Doha negotiations, but also prompted Participants to revise the OECD Arrangement in 2003. 
In addition, Participants and Brazil negotiated a new Sector Understanding on Civil Aircraft 
(2007).2152  All modifications were finally incorporated into a new text that entered into force 
on 1 January 2008.  Further minor revisions led to the current version of the OECD 
Arrangement (January 2010), on which the following discussion will be based.2153,2154  
                                                                                                                                            
Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Submission by India, Elements of the 
Framework for the Negotiations (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/33, 30 November 1989), para 5.    
2147 See, for example, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measure, Minutes on the Meeting 
Held on 28-30 October 1981 (SCM/M/9, 22 December 1981), at 9-10. 
2148 Preparatory Committee, Note by the Secretariat, Subsidies (PREP.COM(86)W/17, 28 April 1986), 
para 5. 
2149 The only significant modification was the deletion of the qualification ‘manifestly’ in item (j). 
2150 For example, the Commercial Interest Rate Reference (CIRR), sector understandings for previously 
excluded sectors, and disciplines on tied aid were drafted. 
2151 See OECD Trade Directorate, Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits – Premium and 
Related Conditions: Explanation of the Premium Rules of the Arrangement on Officially Supported 
Export Credits (Knaepen Package) (TD/PG(2004)10/FINAL, 6 July 2004), at 2 (footnote 2); Panel 
Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 14.94. 
2152 By participating in this specific Sector Understanding, Brazil became the first non-OECD country 
Participant in the OECD Arrangement. 
2153 Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits – January 2010 Revision (TAD/PG(2010)2, 28 
January 2010).    
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Participants to this OECD Arrangement are: Australia, Canada, the EC (which includes all 27 
Member States), Japan, Korea, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the US.2155  At the 
beginning of 2010, an important new step for further strengthening the OECD Arrangement 
was also announced.  For the first time since the Knaepen Package, new disciplines to be 
implemented by September 2011 will substantially strengthen the rules on minimum premium 
rates.2156  Relevantly, the impetus for this revision was the sharp increase in demand for the 
support of ECAs in response to the financial and economic crisis.  This resurgence 
‘emphasised the need to ensure that a level playing field is maintained for exporters 
competing with official export credit support for overseas sales’.2157 
 
2.2. EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
Serious negotiations on disciplining export credit support for agricultural products only 
emerged during the Uruguay Round (1986-1995).  In response to the US and Cairns group 
demand to phase-out direct export subsidies, the EC advocated for more disciplines on the use 
of ‘indirect’ forms of export subsidies such as export credit support.  Here, the EC particularly 
targeted the US, because it had extensive export credit support programmes in place in which 
exports were indirectly subsidized.2158  Therefore, the EC proposed that the OECD 
Arrangement would be extended to agricultural products and be made applicable in the GATT 
framework in order to all exporting countries to be bound.2159  This call for stricter disciplines 
on export credit support was not only supported by the Cairns group but apparently by the US 
as well, at least on paper.  After all, the US formally proposed that export credit support for 
agricultural products would be subject to the same disciplines as those elaborated for non-
agricultural support (Illustrative List).2160  Part V of the Agreement on Agriculture reflects the 
                                                                                                                                            
2154 Noteworthy, the January 2009 version provided a temporary relaxation (until 31 January 2010) on the 
share of participation of export credit support in intra-OECD project finance transactions (50% instead of 
35%).  This aimed at contributing to the stimulus plans in OECD countries. 
2155 Brazil is Participant to the Sector Understanding for Civil Aircraft, which is annexed to the OECD 
Arrangement. 
2156 See below n 2173. 
2157 OECD Export Credit Division, New Measures to Expand the Risk Pricing Disciplines of the 
Arrangement on Officially Supported Export credits (10 February 2010). 
2158 Next to food aid policies, Stewart pointed inter alia to the US credit guarantees scheme, which ‘in 
intent if not in form’ is ‘similar to the export subsidies offered by the EC and other countries’.  T. P. 
Stewart (ed), The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History (1986–1992) – Volume 1 (Deventer: 
Kluwer, 1993), 1382 pp., at 145. 
2159 Negotiating Group on Agriculture, Submission by the European Communities, Improving the GATT 
Rules and Disciplines (MTN.GNG/NG5/W/106, 26 September 1989).  According to the EC, this would 
imply inter alia that the repayment term for exports of agricultural products would not exceed 180 days 
and that official support to the interest rate would not be provided.  Note by the Secretariat, Clarification 
and Elaboration of Elements of Detailed Proposals Submitted Pursuant to the Mid-term Review Decision 
(MTN.GNG/NG5/W/161, 4 April 1990), at 77. 
2160 The Cairns Group called for phasing-out all subsidized export credits.  Note by the Secretariat, above 
n 2159, at 66 and 71. 
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final bargain on export subsidies and identifies six types of export subsidies that are subjected 
to reduction commitments (Article 9 of the Agreement on Agriculture).2161  However, export 
credit support is not included in this list.  Only Article 10.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
expressly refers to export credit practices and instructs WTO Members ‘to work toward the 
development of internationally agreed disciplines’.  In 1997, this negotiating mandate was 
picked up by the OECD Arrangement Participants (and Argentina). 2162  Yet, these 
negotiations under the auspices of the OECD broke down in 2000 and were passed on to the 
WTO, where they are now continued in the Doha Round negotiations.   The latest negotiation 
results are elaborated in the Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture (December 2008).  This 
would add an annex (Annex J) on agricultural export credit support to the Agreement on 
Agriculture.2163  Before taking a closer look at this text and its negotiating history, the existing 
disciplines on agricultural as well as non-agricultural export credit support are scrutinized.  
Note already that the 2001 OECD study as well as certain scholars assumed that, pursuant to 
Article 10.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, no international disciplines on agricultural 
products were in place at the time the Doha negotiations started.2164  Although in US – Upland 
Cotton this interpretation was fiercely advocated by the US, the Panel and Appellate Body 
disagreed.  Undeniably, the outcome of this case has fundamentally altered the dynamics of 
the negotiations on agricultural export credit support in the Doha Round.    
                                                 
2161 See above Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.2.1. 
2162 Technical discussions already started in 1995.  Export Credits Secretariat, above n 2033.  The final 
negotiating draft circulated was: The Chairman’s Revised Proposal for a Sector Understanding on 
Export Credits for Agricultural Products (TD/CONSENSUS(2000)25/REV4, 9 July 2002).  See also 
Background Paper by the Secretariat, Export Credits and Related Facilities (G/AG/NG/S/13, 26 June 
2000), para. 43. 
2163 See Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, 6 December 2008). 
2164 OECD, above n 2090, at 8.  According to Beierle as well, the US managed to avoid WTO disciplines 
on export credits in the Uruguay Round.  T. C. Beierle, ‘Agricultural Trade Liberalization – Uruguay, 
Doha, and Beyond’, 36:6 Journal of World Trade (2002), 1089-1110, at 1097; S. F. Olsen, ‘The 
Negotiation of the Agreement on Agriculture’, in B. O’Conner (ed), Agriculture in WTO Law (London: 
Cameron May, 2005), 43-82, at 78.  On the other hand, the WTO Secretariat considered that agricultural 
export credit support was subject to disciplines in case offered at subsidized terms.  Background Paper by 
the Secretariat, above n 2162, para 44. 
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3. MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE OECD ARRANGEMENT 
The OECD Arrangement ‘seeks to foster a level playing field for official support (…) in order 
to encourage competition among exporters based on quality and price of goods and services 
exported rather than on the most favourable officially supported financial terms and 
conditions’.2165  To this end, disciplines are developed on official support provided by or on 
behalf of a government for exports of goods (except for agricultural and military products) 
and/or services that have a repayment period of two or more years.2166  As indicated, two 
types of official support are distinguished: export credit guarantee or insurance (pure cover 
support) and official financing support (direct credit, refinancing, and interest rate support).  
 
Three broad sets of substantive conditions can be distinguished.2167  First, all forms of 
officially supported export credits are subject to repayment requirements.2168  For instance, 
governments may only provide pure cover support for privately extended export credits that 
respect these repayment requirements.  Second, Participants offering official financing 
support for fixed rate loans (e.g., by providing direct credits or interest rate support 
mechanisms) have to apply the relevant Commercial Interest Reference Rate (CIRR) as 
minimum interest rate.2169  In contrast, Participants are thus allowed to provide pure cover 
support to export credits extended by private actors with interest rates below the CIRR.2170  
CIRRs should represent final commercial lending interest rates in the domestic market of the 
currency concerned and closely correspond to the rate for first-class domestic borrowers.2171  
Therefore, the interest rate should be fixed at minimum the CIRR level applicable at the time 
of authorization.  Third, since the Knaepen Package (1999), Participants are obliged to charge 
premium to cover the risk of non-payment of export credits (credit risk).  This premium 
                                                 
2165 Article 1 of the OECD Arrangement. 
2166 The OECD Arrangement elaborates on disciplines on tied aid as well, but these are not discussed in 
this Part. 
2167 Specific sector understandings are elaborated for ships, nuclear power plants, civil aircraft, and 
renewable energies, and water projects. 
2168 For example, minimum down payment, maximum repayment terms, or frequency of repayment 
(Articles 10-14 of the OECD Arrangement). Repayment terms depend on the country of destination. 
2169 Article 19(a) of the OECD Arrangement. 
2170 In this respect, the Appellate Body’s holding in Brazil – Aircraft that ‘(t)he OECD Arrangement 
establishes minimum interest rate guidelines for export credits supported by its participants ("officially-
supported export credits")’ is overly broad.  After all, export credits receiving pure cover support are not 
subject to the minimum interest rate provisions.  Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 181.  In 
contrast, the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada) correctly interpreted the scope of the 
OECD Arrangement. Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), footnote 68.   
2171 Articles 19-22 of the OECD Arrangement.  Each Participant is allowed to establish a CIRR for its 
national currency, set at 100 basis points above the relevant government bond yields (depending on the 
maturity).  Other Participants have to use this CIRR in case they decide to finance in that currency.  A 
(non-)Participant may request for a CIRR to be established for the currency of a non-Participant.  
Therefore, the relevant CIRR does not depend on the country providing the export credit support, but 
corresponds to the currency and maturity of the operation.   
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should be risk-based and may not be inadequate to cover long-term operating costs and 
losses.2172  In particular, Participants are obliged to charge no less than the Minimum 
Premium Rates (MPRs), which are defined as minimum rates for country credit risk, 
irrespective of whether the buyer/borrower is a private or public entity.  Hence, MPRs form 
the floor rates that must be respected whenever country risk (i.e., sovereign risk) and/or 
buyer/borrower risk (i.e., non-sovereign risk) is covered, even though MPRs are currently 
only based on the country credit risk.2173  In order to establish MPRs, countries are classified 
into one of eight Country Risk Categories, based on the likelihood that it will service its 
external debt.2174  Premiums do not only apply to pure cover support but also have to be 
charged in addition to the interest rate (CIRR) in case of official financial support covering 
country and/or buyer risk.2175    
                                                 
2172 If both conditions are fulfilled, premium rates should normally converge over time.  The specific 
rules on premiums, including the MPRs, do not apply to several transactions covered under sectoral 
understandings (e.g., ships).  Article 23 of the OECD Arrangement; OECD Trade Directorate, above n 
2151, at 3. 
2173 Country credit risk relates to the likelihood of whether a country will service its external debt and 
consists of five elements spelled out in Article 25 of the OECD Arrangement (e.g., general moratorium 
by the buyer’s government, political events arising outside the country of the notifying Member).  Types 
of credit risk not listed in Article 25 of the OECD Arrangement are considered part of the buyer/borrower 
risk.  If official support only covers country credit risk, the MPR is reduced by 10% (Article 24(g) of the 
OECD Arrangement).  On the other hand, if buyer/borrower risk is also covered, the MPR represents the 
floor rate, even though it does not reflect the risk related to the buyer/borrower that the export credit will 
not be repaid. Hence, official support covering both country risk and buyer/borrower risk merely has to 
respect the MPR, subject to the general obligation to cover long-term operating costs and losses.  To 
counter competition among ECAs on the fee level for covering buyer/borrower risk, OECD Participants 
recently agreed that a premium for buyer risk will be added on top of the premium for country risk when 
buyer risk is covered.  Moreover, they agreed to revise the MPRs.  Both modifications will be 
implemented by September 2011. 
2174 Because countries in category ‘zero’ (high income) are considered to have a negligible country risk, 
no MPRs exist but governments are not allowed to ‘charge premium rates which undercut available 
private market pricing’.  On the other hand, the highest risk countries (category 7) ‘shall, in principle, be 
subject to premium rates in excess of the MPRs established for that country’.  Yet, it is left to the 
Participants to determine this surplus, again subjected to the general obligation to cover long-term 
operating costs. See Article 24 of the OECD Arrangement; OECD Trade Directorate, above n 2151, at 3.  
2175 In case of interest rate support, this might not always be required in practice, because repayment risks 
are often not covered when interest rate support is offered.  As such support was not explicitly listed 
among the other types of support in the provision requiring MPRs, the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 
21.5 – Canada II) concluded that interest rate support falls outside the category for which a premium is 
to be charged insofar it is not given in conjunction with pure cover support.  The Panel observed that 
there is no need to charge a premium since, by extending interest rate support, governments do not 
assume credit risk.  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 5.171.  Under the 
current version of the OECD Arrangement, the types of export credit support for which MPRs have to be 
charged are no longer listed, as it more broadly requires OECD Participants to ‘charge premium, in 
addition to interest charges, to cover the risk of non-repayment of export credits’ (Article 23 OECD 
Arrangement).  Although the textual basis for excluding interest rate support is thus deleted, it is still the 
case that no MPRs have to be charged in case governments do not assume repayment risks when 
providing such support.  
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If a Participant applies an exception to these obligations, this has to be notified and other 
Participants are allowed to match this offer.2176  This ‘notice and match’ principle probably 
explains part of the success of the OECD Arrangement in limiting the export credit support 
contest among its Participants.2177 The OECD Arrangement’s compliance mechanism thus 
works on the basis of a tit-for-tat strategy.2178  Cooperative behavior is achieved without legal 
enforcement mechanism, but could equally not be reached without the OECD Arrangement.  
Next to the lack of knowledge on what the rules of the game should look like, there would 
indeed be no transparency on the offers made by other ECAs without this ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement’. 
 
The OECD Arrangement also explains why pure cover support has become the dominant 
form of export credit support over the years.2179  Because the level of market interest rates on 
a floating rate basis has typically undercut the CIRR level over the last decade, fixed rate 
official financing support was not an attractive trade finance instrument.  In contrast, pure 
cover support (i.e., guarantees or insurance) to export credits extended by private actors could 
result in interest rates well below CIRR levels without violating the OECD Arrangement.2180 
Yet, according to a report of the US Ex-Im Bank, the deterioration of the trade financing 
market resulting from the financial and economic crisis might revive exporters’ interest in 
official financing support. First, commercial banks have been reluctant to offer export credits 
even with ECAs pure cover backing.  Second, those exporters still able to borrow on the 
private market might also opt for secure fixed rate official financing support at CIRR levels 
that are relatively low because of expansionary monetary policies.2181       
                                                 
2176 Other Participants also have this right to match in case another Participant deviates from the OECD 
Arrangement.  Likewise, financial conditions offered by non-Participants could be matched. Articles 18 
and 40-45 of the OECD Arrangement.     
2177 See Mendelowitz, above n 2121, at 162. 
2178 An ECA will follow the strategy of offering OECD Arrangement-conform support as long as other 
ECAs also follow this strategy.  As soon as another ECA (‘initiating Participant’) offers support at more 
flexible terms, other ECAs are allowed to match this offer, which will cancel out the competitive 
advantage of the initial support.   
2179 The US Ex-Im Bank also refers to lower administrative costs and balance sheet treatment of pure 
cover support.  See Export-Import Bank of the United States, above n 2045, at 94. 
2180 The OECD Arrangement does not ensure that this interest rate benefit is compensated by the 
premium charged for such support, given that the minimum premium levels set under the OECD 
Arrangement when covering buyer/borrower risk are certainly better than those available on the market 
(see above n 2175). 
2181 This call for official financing support might put ECAs who only have medium- and long-term pure 
cover support programmes in place at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other ECAs.  See Export-Import Bank of 
the United States, above n 2045, at 19-24, 94-95. 
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4.  DISCIPLINES ON EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS  
4.1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE CLAIM MADE AGAINST EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT: ‘AS SUCH’ 
VERSUS ‘AS APPLIED’ CLAIMS 
Before entering into the analysis of disciplines on export credit support under the SCM 
Agreement, it should be clarified what type of support measure could exactly be challenged 
and how such a claim should be formulated.  In this respect, scholars have observed that 
panels in the context of the SCM Agreement applied the ‘controversial’2182 
mandatory/discretionary distinction that was developed in the GATT jurisprudence.2183  
Mandatory measures are measures which would require the government to act in a WTO-
inconsistent way, whereas discretionary measures leave the government the possibility to 
apply these measures in a WTO-consistent manner.  Discretionary measures can therefore not 
be challenged as such.  Only their application (as applied) could be found WTO-inconsistent.  
In contrast, an as such challenge of a measure has to establish that the measure on ‘its face’, 
regardless of its application, requires the government to act in a WTO-inconsistent 
manner.2184  Hence, the mandatory/discretionary distinction sets a high standard for 
challenging measures of general application.  The rationale underlying this distinction is that 
the executive branch should be presumed to act in good faith in the sense that it will apply 
discretionary measures in a WTO-consistent manner.  Nonetheless, a close look at the case 
law on export credit support will show that panels did not apply the mandatory/discretionary 
principle systematically.  This overview will equally introduce the most relevant cases which 
dealt with export credit support on non-agricultural products.   
 
First of all, the mandatory/discretionary distinction was at the core of the discussion in the 
trade dispute between Brazil and Canada on export credit support given to their domestic 
regional aircraft industry (Embraer and Bombardier, respectively) that resulted in mutual 
claims before the WTO.  In Canada – Aircraft, Brazil challenged debt financing and loan 
guarantees provided by the Export Development Corporation (EDC) under its Corporate 
                                                 
2182 Panel Report, US – Customs Bond Directive, para 7.208.  The Panel also gives an indication of the 
stance of the panels and the Appellate Body on this principle anno 2008 (paras 7.198-7.214).  
2183 See GATT Panel Report, US – Tobacco, para 118. See A. Green, M. Trebilcock, and V. Milat, ‘The 
Enduring Problem of WTO Export Subsidies Rules’, Draft Working Paper (April 2007), 61 pp., at 27-31.  
For a somewhat outdated discussion on the application of this distinction under the WTO, see S. 
Bhuiyan, ‘Mandatory and Discretionary Legislation: The Continued Relevance of the Distinction under 
the WTO’, 5:3 Journal of International Economic Law (2002), 571-604; K. Kiat Sim, ‘Rethinking the 
mandatory/discretionary legislation distinction in WTO jurisprudence’, 2:1 World Trade Review (2003), 
33-62. 
2184 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 7.83; Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees,  
para 7.83.  By definition, the discretionary/mandatory distinction can only be applied to measures of 
general application, such as legislation setting up an ECA or elaborating an export credit support 
programme, contrasting measures of individual application, such as a specific export credit support 
transaction. 
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Account.2185 Under the debt financing component, EDC provided loans directly to buyers of 
Canadian regional aircrafts (‘direct credit’).  The loan guarantees to buyers of Canadian 
regional aircrafts are a type of ‘pure cover’ export credit support.  Other challenges relevant 
to the export credit discussion were support extended to the civil aircraft industry by the 
Canada Account, also part of EDC, as well as funds provided to the civil aircraft industry by 
the Technology Partnerships Canada (TPC).2186 
In challenging this export credit support, Brazil formulated, first of all, a claim against EDC 
as such because its mandate of ‘supporting and developing, directly or indirectly, Canada’s 
export trade’ requires EDC to offer Canadian exporters funding schemes at below market 
terms.  Yet, the Panel disagreed because ‘a mandate to support and develop Canada's export 
trade does not amount to a mandate to grant subsidies, since such support and development 
could be provided in a broad variety of ways’.2187  On the other hand, the Panel agreed with 
Brazil that Canada’s export credit support as applied in the regional aircraft sector was 
inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.2188   
Could Canada simply withdraw these particular export subsidies in order to bring its measure 
into compliance with the requirement to withdraw the subsidy without delay (Article 4.7 
SCM Agreement), given that the application of these programmes in the context of regional 
aircrafts were found a prohibited subsidy?  Remarkably, the Panel’s compliance proceedings 
(Canada–Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil)) set a much higher standard for Canada to conform to.  
Indeed, the proceedings examined whether Canada’s implementation measure (i.e., the Policy 
Guideline) ‘ensures’ that prohibited subsidies ceased to exist under the Canada Account.2189  
In its assessment of the Canada Account, which is ‘by definition forward-looking’, the Panel 
examined whether ‘the Policy Guideline is sufficient to ensure that in future this programme, 
as it will be applied, will not provide prohibited export subsidies to the regional aircraft 
                                                 
2185 EDC also offered residual value guarantees to lessors as well as equity financing, but the evaluation 
of these claims is not relevant for the export credit discussion.   
2186 Other measures challenged by Brazil in this case are not elaborated because they do not relate to 
export credit support. See Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, above n 2184, para 2.2 
2187 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, above n 2184, para 9.127.  In addition, a separated as such claim 
was also made against the Canada Account programme.  Yet, the Panel rejected this claim as well, 
because it did not mandate export subsidies but constituted discretionary legislation.  In the words of 
Brazil, the Canada Account funds are ‘used to support export transactions which the federal government 
deems to be in the national interest but which, for reasons of size or risk, the Export Development 
Corporation (EDC) cannot support through regular export credits’.  Canada indicated that the Canada 
Account is part of the EDC.  Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, above n 2184, paras 9.211-9.213. 
2188 In contrast, the Panel concluded that Brazil failed to make a prima facie case against the EDC as 
applied (EDC debt financing, EDC loan guarantees, EDC residual value guarantees, and EDC equity 
financing).  Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, above n 2184, paras 9.131 – 9.203. 
2189 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil),,para 5.65.  The Panel argued that both parties 
agreed with this standard.  The same standard was elaborated for the revised TPC programme (paras 
5.09-5.12). 
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industry’.2190  This Panel apparently elaborated exactly the opposite standard to review 
Canada’s implementation than the one usually applied to other as such claims: the Canada 
Account programme complies with the original ruling only if it cannot be applied in a WTO-
inconsistent manner, whereas measures of general application can traditionally only be 
challenged if they cannot be applied in a WTO-consistent way.  This line of (inductive) 
reasoning means that a WTO Member could challenge an export credit programme as applied 
in specific transactions and that, in order to bring this measure into compliance, the violating 
Member would have to ensure in its legislation that its programme could not be applied in a 
WTO inconsistent manner in the future.  The implementation of an as applied finding would 
mandate a revised programme that, as such, could never be applied in a WTO-inconsistent 
manner.  Yet, until now, this demanding implementation standard for prohibited subsidies 
was not confirmed by other panels nor by the Appellate Body.  To the contrary, the Appellate 
Body in the appeal compliance proceedings warned that the ‘ensure in the future’-standard 
‘should be viewed with caution’ because ‘if taken too literally, (it) might be read to mean that 
the Panel was seeking a strict guarantee or absolute assurance as to the future application of 
the revised TPC programme’.2191  This standard, the Appellate Body continued, ‘would be 
very difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy since no one can predict how unknown 
administrators would apply, in the unknowable future, even the most conscientiously crafted 
compliance measure’.2192      
In its counterclaim (Brazil – Aircraft), Canada challenged payments for the export of regional 
aircrafts made by the Programa de Financiamento às Exportações (PROEX), an export 
financing programme administered by a committee within the Brazilian government.2193  
Under the 'Interest Equalization' component, PROEX granted the lending financial institution 
an equalization payment to cover, at most, the difference between the interest charges 
contracted with the buyer and the cost to the financing party of raising the required funds.2194  
Such interest rate support was requested to PROEX by the Brazilian manufacturer of regional 
aircrafts (in casu, ‘Embraer’, which was the only one) prior to the formal agreement with the 
                                                 
2190 Emphasis added.  Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.66.  The simple 
absence of new Canada Account transactions to the regional aircraft since adoption of the original Panel 
report proved thus insufficient to reach a conclusion  (see para 5.66).  Hence, this was an as such claim 
par excellence. 
2191 Emphasis in the original.  Only the Panel’s holding on the TPC Programme (and not on the Canada 
Account) was appealed.  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 38. 
2192 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 38.  
2193 See factual background, Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, paras 2.1-2.6.  Day-to-day transactions under 
PROEX were performed by the ‘Banco do Brazil’. 
2194 The payments are made in the form of non-interest bearing National Treasury Bonds that can only be 
redeemed in Brazil, in Brazilian currency at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment.  In case 
the lending bank is outside of Brazil, it may appoint a Brazilian bank as its agent to receive the semi-
annual payments on its behalf.  PROEX also had a ‘direct financing’ component, under which PROEX 
lent a portion of the fund required for the transaction.  Yet, this component was not directly challenged 
by Canada.  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, paras 2.2 and 3.2. 
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buyer.  Hence, this support was part of the financing package that Embraer was able to offer 
to potential foreign buyers.  PROEX interest equalization payments to the lending bank 
started after the aircraft was exported and paid for by the purchaser.  Therefore, the interest 
rate support, a form of direct official financing, enabled the lending bank to charge a lower 
interest rate on the buyer’s loan by which the exporter was paid (‘buyer credit’).2195 
The Panel, however, observed some lack of clarity on the precise measure being challenged.  
On the one hand, Canada did not bring a claim against the interest rate equalization 
component of the PROEX programme ‘per se’.  On the other hand, Canada’s claim included 
but was not restricted to individual payments and, in the Panel’s view, instead referred ‘more 
generally (to) the practice involving PROEX payments relating to exported Brazilian regional 
aircraft (which we will hereafter refer to as "PROEX payments")’.2196  Therefore, the Panel 
considered that it had ‘to go beyond an examination of individual PROEX payments that have 
been identified and look more generally at the nature and operation of the PROEX interest 
rate equalization scheme which governs the payment of the alleged export subsidies’.2197  
Implicitly and apparently unnoticed by later panels and observers, the Panel seemed to have 
avoided the strict mandatory/discretionary distinction.  It examined the nature and operation 
of the PROEX interest rate equalization scheme with respect to regional aircrafts to determine 
whether this practice was WTO-consistent.  In contrast to traditional as such claims, it was 
not examined whether the scheme ‘an sich’ mandated the provision of WTO-inconsistent 
export subsidies.2198  Hereto, the operation of the scheme in individual cases related to 
regional aircrafts (resulting in an undefined ‘practice’) was considered relevant.2199  In 
contrast to as applied claims, the examination of the Panel was not restricted to individual 
payments identified by Canada.2200  Its findings generally stated that ‘payments on exports of 
                                                 
2195 See Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), footnote 141. 
2196 Emphasis added.  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 7.2.  The Panel observed and emphasized that 
Canada held that ‘all PROEX payments, to the extent they relate to exported Brazilian regional aircraft, 
including payments to be made in the future pursuant to the PROEX interest rate equalization scheme, 
are prohibited subsidies’ (emphasis in the original).  Strictly speaking, this allegation could only be 
proven if the PROEX interest rate equalization scheme mandated the payment of prohibited subsidies 
(i.e., if it left no option under the scheme to make future payments WTO-consistent).  However, the 
Panel did not articulate the strict mandatory/discretionary principle.    
2197 Emphasis added.  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 7.2. 
2198 The Panel did not articulate that Canada had to make a prima facie case that the scheme mandated 
(regardless of individual applications) the provision of WTO-inconsistent subsidies.  To be sure, the 
Panel seemed to consider that subsidization as well as an application inconsistent with item (k), para 1 
Illustrative List, was inherent in (and thus mandatory under) the scheme (see below) (Panel Report, 
Brazil – Aircraft, para 7.34, in fine).   
2199 For example, Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 7.36.   
2200 In the words of the Panel, ‘the payments subject to challenge in this dispute include, but are not 
limited to, PROEX payments made or to be made with respect to the transactions identified (by 
Canada)’. Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 7.3. 
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regional aircraft under the PROEX interest rate equalization scheme are export subsidies 
inconsistent with Article 3 of the SCM Agreement’.2201   
In order to comply with this ruling, Brazil specified in its legislation a minimum interest rate 
(the US Treasury Bond 10-year rate, plus an additional spread of 0.2%) for export credits 
supported by interest equalization payments (PROEX II), which was again challenged by 
Canada.2202  Brazil conceded that these payments were export subsidies, but argued that 
payments resulting in the minimum interest rate where not used to secure material advantage 
and were therefore justified on the basis of para 1 of item (k) of the Illustrative List.  
However, the Panel and the Appellate Body considered the minimum interest rate not to be an 
appropriate market benchmark and therefore not in accordance with para 1 of item (k).2203  
Again, the mandatory/discretionary distinction was not addressed (and was not raised by 
Brazil), though strictly speaking Brazil’s legislation did not mandate the provision of interest 
equalization payments that resulted in the minimum interest rate and thus did not seem to as 
such violate the SCM Agreement.2204    
On the other hand, the Panel in the second compliance proceedings (Brazil – Aircraft (Article 
21.5 – Canada II)) rigorously applied the mandatory/discretionary distinction in its 
examination of PROEX III, by which Brazil attempted to comply with the first compliance 
proceedings but which was once more challenged by Canada.2205  The Panel also clarified that 
the mandatory/discretionary distinction is applicable in the context of an affirmative defence 
under the second paragraph of item (k)2206 and found that Canada only articulated an as such 
claim against PROEX III (insofar it related to regional aircrafts), as PROEX III was not yet 
applied in practice.  Taking into account that Brazil based its affirmative defence on 
paragraph 2 of item (k), the relevant question was thus whether PROEX III required the 
Brazilian executive branch to provide (i) export subsidies (ii) that were inconsistent with the 
interest rate provisions of the OECD Arrangement.  Similar to PROEX II, PROEX III also set 
a minimum interest rate for export credits supported by interest equalization payments, which 
now referred to the CIRR, and considered financing terms practiced in the international 
                                                 
2201 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 8.2. 
2202 The legislation specified that in ‘the financing of aircraft exports for regional aviation markets, 
equalisation rates shall be established on a case by case basis and at levels that may be differential, 
preferably based on the US Treasury Bond 10-year rate, plus an additional spread of 0.2% per annum, to 
be reviewed periodically in accordance with market practices’.  See Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft 
(Article 21.5 – Canada), para 6.19. 
2203 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 6.104; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – 
Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 76.  As will be elaborated below, the Panel and Appellate Body 
reached this conclusion on somewhat different grounds. 
2204 The parties and the Panel did not disagree that these were minimum interest rates (which is also 
apparent from the legislation, see above n 2202).  Hence, Brazil could have argued the legislation did not 
mandate support up to level of this minimum interest rate.   
2205 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), paras 5.51-5.55. 
2206 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), paras 5.162-5.168. 
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market as well.  Although it observed that the application of these benchmarks would not 
preclude (even to the contrary, it would most likely confer2207) a benefit on the exporter of 
regional aircrafts, the Panel concluded that PROEX III was not an export subsidy because it 
gave the executive branch discretion not to confer such benefit.2208  Refraining from 
exercising judicial economy, the Panel additionally found that PROEX III did allow Brazil to 
act in conformity with the interest rates provisions of the 1998 OECD Arrangement.2209  
Consequently, Canada’s claim that PROEX III violated Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement 
was not upheld.  In applying the mandatory/discretionary standard, this Panel gave much 
more leeway to the implementing WTO Member than the Panel in Canada–Aircraft (Article 
21.5 – Brazil) which adopted the ‘ensure in the future’-standard.2210  Interestingly, the Panel 
also acknowledged that another Panel (US – Section 301 Trade Act) had recently concluded 
that even discretionary legislation could violate certain WTO obligations.  However, it did not 
similarly lower the threshold to challenge legislation since, in contrast to the relevant 
provision in US – Section 301 Trade Act,2211 Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement does not 
prohibit legislation ‘that would permit, but not require, the grant of prohibited subsidies’.2212   
                                                 
2207 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 5.93. 
2208 The financial contribution and export contingency elements of PROEX III payments were not 
disputed.  The Panel elaborated on the high threshold for an as such claim: ‘a conclusion that PROEX III 
could be applied in a manner which confers a benefit, or even that it was intended to be and most likely 
would be applied in such a manner, would not be a sufficient basis to conclude that PROEX III as such is 
mandatory legislation susceptible of inconsistency with Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement’ (emphasis 
in the original).  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), paras 5.85 and 5.97.  
Arguably, discretion to apply the export credit programme in a WTO-compatible way was also available 
under PROEX II (e.g., application on a case-by-case basis) but, as mentioned, the Panel did not specify 
this high threshold in the first compliance proceedings.  The fact that the minimum interest rate was 
higher under PROEX III and referred to the CIRR (in line with the safe haven) probably inspired the 
Panel in the second compliance proceedings to articulate the higher threshold for challenging measures 
of general application.  ‘Even if Canada were correct that BCB Resolution 2799 did not require that net 
interest rates supported by PROEX III be at or above the CIRR, it certainly envisions that they will be. 
Thus, we cannot say that PROEX III does not allow compliance with (the minimum interest rate 
provision of the OECD Arrangement)’.  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 
5.184 (emphasis in the original). 
2209 Put otherwise, PROEX III did not require Brazil to act in a manner that is not consistent with the 
1998 OECD Arrangement. See Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), paras 5.168 
and 5.250.  Statements by Brazil referred to by Canada which indicated that PROEX III would be applied 
inconsistent with the ‘safe haven’ could not alter this conclusion because they do not legally commit 
Brazil to apply PROEX III in a WTO inconsistent manner.  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 
– Canada II), para 5.231. 
2210 Three elements explained this different approach: (i) Parties did not agree to use this ‘ensure in the 
future’-standard; (ii) the Appellate Body expressed some ‘discomfort’ with this standard; and (iii) in 
contrast to the case before the Panel, the Panel in Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil) was reviewing 
a subsidy programme as applied and not a subsidy programme as such. Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft 
(Article 21.5 – Canada II), footnote 130.  However, some doubts might be expressed on the third element 
given that the Panel in the Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil) case was indeed reviewing the 
implementation of an as applied inconsistency but examined the programme as such. 
2211 This provision was Article 23 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which in itself 
prohibits some legislative discretion.  This Panel explicitly noticed that its reasoning did ‘not imply a 
reversal of the classical test in the pre-existing jurisprudence that only legislation mandating a WTO 
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In Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, Brazil again challenged similar export credits 
offered by Canada to its regional aircraft industry.2213  In particular, Brazil formulated a 
similar as such claim against EDC Corporate and Canada Accounts because they ‘are 
established and operate as [ECAs] that have as the raison d’être of their existence the 
provision of export subsidies’.2214  ECAs have a competitive advantage over the private sector 
(e.g., because ECAs do not pay taxes), enabling them to offer more favourable terms than the 
private sector.  Moreover, there would be no need for the EDC if it did not offer support on 
more favourable terms than the market.  Applying the mandatory/discretionary distinction, the 
Panel, however, disagreed since the fact that ECAs may have a competitive advantage ‘that 
allows them to undercut private sector competitors does not mean that they are necessarily 
required to do so’.2215  Accordingly, the Panel rejected the as such claim as the EDC does not 
– by virtue of being an ECA – mandates subsidization.2216  An ECA is thus not in itself – as 
such – inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.2217  Again, the relaxation elaborated in US – 
Section 301 Trade Act was not adopted, because a different legal issue was at stake (i.e., 
Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU) and neither party requested to follow this 
approach.2218  In addition, this Panel specified that as applied claims should be limited to 
specific transactions undertaken under a programme, because findings regarding a 
programme ‘as applied’ would undermine the utility of the mandatory/discretionary 
distinction.2219  Pivotal in the Panel’s explanation was that an as applied claim against a 
programme could only be upheld if all specific transactions under that programme would be 
WTO-inconsistent (no inductive reasoning).2220  The Panel thus also disagreed with the 
reasoning developed by the Panel in Canada–Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil) that an as applied 
                                                                                                                                            
inconsistency or precluding WTO consistency, could, as such, violate WTO provisions’.  Panel Report, 
US – Section 301 Trade Act, para 7.54. 
2212 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 5.54.  
2213 The Panel disagreed with Canada that this was an implementation question related to the first Canada 
– Aircraft dispute because, according to the Panel, Brazil did not request the Panel to review the 
implementation, different transactions were at issue which resulted in current violations, and the legal 
framework had changed under which the Canada Account operated.  Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft 
Credits and Guarantees, paras 7.15-7.19.  
2214 Including predecessor programmes.  Response of Brazil to Question 29 of the Panel, as cited by the 
Panel in Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees,  para 7.71. 
2215 Emphasis in the original.  Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, paras 7.76-7.85.   
2216 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, paras 7.83 and 7.84 
2217 Even if the Panel would have upheld that ECAs mandate subsidization, the Panel would still have 
had to reject the as such claim because ECAs certainly do not mandate subsidization inconsistent with 
the SCM Agreement given the ‘safe haven’ provided in item (k) of the Illustrative List and the other 
exceptions (for developing countries and agricultural export credits).   
2218 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, footnote 36. 
2219 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, paras 7.15-7.19.  
2220 An additional as applied determination of the programme would therefore have no added value since 
the obligations for implementation would not extend beyond those specific transactions.  In contrast, it 
would be inappropriate for a Panel to determine that a programme as applied is inconsistent on the basis 
that certain – but not all – specific transactions under the programme are inconsistent because the 
implications for implementation would be extended beyond those specific inconsistent transactions.   
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finding would imply that a Member should ensure against future exercises of discretion in 
violation of the SCM Agreement.2221  In sum, the Panel in Canada – Aircraft Credits and 
Guarantees emphasized the distinction between as such and as applied claims: general 
measures (e.g., programmes) can only be challenged as such and should thus mandate WTO-
inconsistent implementation, in contrast to as applied claims that can only be made on the 
level of individual transactions.  In this respect, one specific relaxation seemed to be accepted 
on the strict mandatory/discretionary distinction, namely in cases ‘where a Member's 
discretionary legislation has functionally become mandatory as a result of that Member 
exercising its discretion under that legislation in such a manner that it has become legally 
bound to continue to exercise its discretion in that manner in the future’.2222    
 
Next to the Brazil versus Canada dispute on export credits for regional aircrafts, the Panel 
decision in Korea – Commercial Vessels sheds light on the provisions related to export credits 
in the SCM Agreement.  In this case, the EC challenged, inter alia, pre-shipment loans (PSL) 
and advance payment refund guarantees (APRG) offered by the Export-Import Bank of Korea 
(KEXIM) to Korean shipyards.  The EC formulated as such claims against KEXIM’s legal 
regime, the PSL programme as well as the APRG programmes, and as applied claims against 
individual transactions under both programmes.  In reviewing the as such claims, the Panel 
once more applied the mandatory/discretionary distinction even though, at that time, the 
Appellate Body in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review2223 had already questioned 
two different aspects of this ‘analytical tool’.2224  First, the Appellate Body had concluded that 
there was ‘no reason for concluding that, in principle, non-mandatory measures cannot be 
challenged 'as such'’ but this statement related, as the Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels 
correctly observed, to a jurisdictional matter.2225  Hereby, the Appellate Body expressed that 
Panels are not ‘obliged, as a preliminary jurisdictional matter, to examine whether the 
challenged measure is mandatory’, which is ‘relevant, if at all, only as part of the panel's 
assessment of whether the measure is, as such, inconsistent with particular obligations’.2226  
Second, on the latter aspect, the Appellate Body, refraining from undertaking a 
‘comprehensive examination of this distinction’ 2227 nevertheless observed that the ‘import of 
                                                 
2221 The Panel hereby also noticed the doubts expressed by the Appellate Body in Canada – Aircraft 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil) on this ‘ensure in the future’-standard. 
2222 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, footnote 93. 
2223 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para 93.   
2224 This Panel, again, cited the Appellate Body’s doubts with the ‘ensure in the future’-standard 
elaborated by the Panel in Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil). Panel Report, Korea – Commercial 
Vessels, para 7.95. 
2225 Emphasis added. Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para 88. 
2226 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para 89. 
2227 Previous panels acknowledged that the Appellate Body did not generally express its opinion on the 
relevance of this distinction so far, but nonetheless found implicit support in several Appellate Body 
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the "mandatory/discretionary distinction" may vary from case to case’ and therefore cautioned 
against ‘the application of this distinction in a mechanistic fashion’.2228  Yet, the Panel in 
Korea – Commercial Vessels reasoned that the Appellate Body still applied the traditional 
mandatory/discretionary distinction.2229  On the other hand, the Appellate Body in US – 
Zeroing (EC), relied on this particular statement in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset 
Review to support its view that the Panel was not required to apply the 
mandatory/discretionary distinction in analyzing as such claims under the relevant provisions 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it took into account all of the evidence placed 
before it and sought verification of its accuracy.2230   
In conclusion, the approach taken so far by panels on the mandatory/discretionary distinction 
in reviewing claims under SCM Agreement in general, and on export credits in particular, is 
far from uniform.  The Appellate Body’s holdings made in the context of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review and US – Zeroing (EC) might 
give some relevant guidance to future panels. The Appellate Body rightly seemed to criticise 
that the traditional mandatory/discretionary theory blurs the distinction between a preliminary 
jurisdictional question (what can be challenged?) and the substantive scrutiny of the measure 
in light of WTO obligations (is the measure WTO-consistent?).2231  So, the Appellate Body 
made a helpful distinction between a jurisdictional and substantive question.   
First, the jurisdictional question examines what type of measures can be challenged as such.  
The Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC) clarified that the complaining party bringing an as 
such claim ‘must clearly establish (…) at least that the alleged "rule or norm" is attributable to 
the responding Member; its precise content; and (…) that it does have general and prospective 
                                                                                                                                            
holdings (see, for example, Panel Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para 7.114, 
footnote 95).  In particular, the Appellate Body’s reasoning in US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset 
Reviews seemed to be supportive of this distinction: ‘By definition, an ‘as such’ claim challenges laws, 
regulations, or other instruments of a Member that have general and prospective application, asserting 
that a Member's conduct – not only in a particular instance that has occurred, but in future situations as 
well – will necessarily be inconsistent with that Member's WTO obligations’ (emphasis added).  
Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para 172.  
2228 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para 93.   
2229 The Panel emphasized that the Appellate Body explicitly confirmed the rationale behind this 
distinction by stating that ‘where discretionary authority is vested in the executive branch of a WTO 
Member, it cannot be assumed that the WTO Member will fail to implement its obligations under the 
WTO Agreement in good faith’. Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.62-7.63. 
2230 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), paras 213-214. 
2231 See Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para 93.  Indeed, under 
the traditional mandatory/discretionary distinction, general measures can thus be challenged as such or 
as applied, but the as such claim will only be upheld if the measure cannot be applied in a WTO-
consistent way.  This distinction thus already requires a scrutiny of the measure under the relevant WTO 
provisions: mandatory measures are measures which cannot be applied WTO-consistent (even though 
they might give discretion to the government but none of the options is WTO-consistent).  A measure is 
labelled ‘mandatory’ after scrutiny of the measure (regardless of its actual application) under the relevant 
WTO provision.  Mandatory measures are thus by definition WTO inconsistent.   
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application’.2232  The complaining party should put forward sufficient evidence on these three 
elements, which may ‘include proof of the systematic application of the challenged "rule or 
norm"’.2233  Importantly, the Appellate Body thus seems to uphold the relevance of the 
distinction between as such and as applied claims.  It recalled the seriousness of the former 
claim because, as it had stated in US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, ‘(i)n 
essence, complaining parties bringing as such challenges seek to prevent Members ex ante 
from engaging in certain conduct.  The implications of such challenges are obviously more 
far-reaching than as applied claims’.2234  Apparently, the Appellate Body recognized that the 
implementation of grounded as applied claims do not extend beyond the transactions found to 
be violated.2235  Indeed, the importance of the distinction of as applied and as such claims 
seems to rest on their different obligations for implementation.  In this sense, the Panel in 
Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees seemed correct when it argued that as applied 
claims should focus on individual transactions (applications) and, consequently, not on the 
programme as applied because the latter analysis would be redundant if all individual 
applications of that programme are WTO-inconsistent and inappropriate in case some – but 
not all – applications thereof are WTO-inconsistent.  In general, an ECA or export credit 
programme can thus be challenged as such as it would meet the three conditions set by the 
Appellate Body.  An analysis on the general application of an export credit programme in a 
specific sector cannot be made as applied, but has to made on the level of specific 
transactions.  On the other hand, such a general application of an export credit programme in 
a specific sector could be considered a rule or norm that can be challenged as such if it is 
considered a systematic application.  A systematic application might indicate that this 
practice, which should have a precise content and would be attributable to the government, 
does have general and prospective application.2236  But it should be emphasized that the 
Appellate Body warned that this is a ‘high threshold’ to meet.  Hence, the Appellate Body 
leaves limited scope for an inductive reasoning in which a finding is made on an aggregate 
level based on individual applications. 
Second, once an as such claim against a measure of general and prospective application is 
accepted, the substantive question on whether this measure as such violates the WTO 
                                                 
2232 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para 198. 
2233 Emphasis added.  Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para 198.  
2234 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para 189. 
2235 See also Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 – 
Canada), para 3.110. 
2236 Disregarding the fact that the Panel blurred the jurisdictional and substantive question, this seems 
somewhat in the line with (but clearly less strict than) the abovementioned reservation made by the Panel 
in Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees on the case ‘where a Member's discretionary legislation has 
functionally become mandatory as a result of that Member exercising its discretion under that legislation 
in such a manner that it has become legally bound to continue to exercise its discretion in that manner in 
the future’ (see above n 2222). 
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Agreement should be addressed.  Unfortunately, the Appellate Body is less clear on the 
standard for finding a violation.  Under the traditional mandatory/discretionary distinction, an 
as such claim would only be upheld if it mandates WTO-inconsistent applications. As 
mentioned above, the Appellate Body held that this distinction may vary from case to case 
and therefore cautioned against its application in ‘a mechanistic fashion’.  By calling for a 
case by case analysis, the Appellate Body seems to indicate that it would not set the standard 
for as such claims as high as under the traditional approach in each and every case but, at the 
same time, leaves open the possibility that it would apply this standard in some cases.  Yet, 
this call for ‘a case by case’ analysis provides little guidance on future panels on how to avoid 
an application in such a mechanistic fashion.     
Reading together these substantive and jurisdictional questions, the following analysis could 
be proposed in scrutinizing a measure under the export subsidy prohibition in the SCM 
Agreement.  First, an as such claim can be advanced against a measure that does not derive its 
general and prospective aspects from its application but from its formulation and its hierarchy 
in norms (e.g., written law).  For example, the legal framework spelling out how an ECA or 
export credit programme will operate and will be applied by the executive branch (e.g., law 
prescribing that export credits might be based on the CIRR but leaving the final decision to 
the executive branch).2237  Here, the traditional mandatory/discretionary test could be applied: 
a violation would only be found if this legal framework, regardless of its actual application, 
mandates the provision of prohibited export subsidies.  Second, if this legal framework is 
systematically applied in a certain manner, this might be considered a measure of general and 
prospective application (‘practice’) that could be challenged as such (e.g., exports credits are 
systematically provided on a CIRR basis).  The question is then whether this practice is in 
accordance with WTO obligations (e.g., are export credits based on the CIRR in conformity 
prohibited export subsidies?).  By definition, the mandatory/discretionary rule, which looks at 
how the measure will be applied, is not relevant here because a ‘practice’ is a systematic 
application in itself.  A legal framework that is discretionary but that is systematically applied 
in a WTO-inconsistent manner could no longer be applied in this way.  This could be 
considered a careful relaxation of the traditional mandatory/discretionary distinction without 
touching upon its rationale, namely that WTO Members are presumed to implement their 
laws in a WTO-consistent way.  Indeed, in case of a systematic WTO-inconsistent 
application, the presumption of good faith is not confirmed.  Third, if there is no systematic 
application, only an as applied claim can be advanced against individual applications of the 
legal framework.  The application in an individual transaction is then examined in light of 
WTO obligations (e.g., a specific export credit provided on the CIRR level).  In sum, the 
                                                 
2237 See also Panel Report, US – Customs Bond Directive paras 7.212-7.213.  In order to reveal the exact 
meaning of the law in question, evidence on the consistent application could be advanced. 
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more general the claim brought and considered is, the more difficult it will be to upheld it in 
the end but also the higher the obligations for implementation are.2238  We now turn to the 
substantive disciplines on export credit support under the SCM Agreement. 
 
4.2. IS EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT A SPECIFIC SUBSIDY UNDER THE SCM AGREEMENT? 
By virtue of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, a subsidy is deemed to exist if two distinctive 
elements are present: (i) a financial contribution by a government2239 (ii) that confers a 
benefit2240.  In order to be subject to the disciplines of the SCM Agreement, this subsidy must 
also be specific (Article 2).2241  Alternatively, complainants are allowed to jump directly to 
the Illustrative List (items (j) or (k)) to demonstrate that export credit support is made at 
subsidized terms.    
 
4.2.1. Financial contribution by the government 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement elaborates an exhaustive list of three different types 
of financial contributions, including ‘a government practice [involving] a direct transfer of 
funds (e.g., grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds, or liabilities 
(e.g., loan guarantees)’.2242  Obviously, export credit support in its different forms falls under 
this first type of financial contribution: direct financing support is a direct transfer of funds 
(e.g., loans or grants) and pure cover support is a potential direct transfer of funds as these are 
only transferred in case the export credit is not repaid because of a covered risk.2243       
 
                                                 
2238 An as applied violation of an individual transaction would strictly speaking require the withdrawal of 
the subsidy in question, but not of other subsidies not considered.  An as such violation of a practice 
would mandate the withdrawal of all subsidies provided under this practice, even if they are not 
challenged individually, as well as to adapt the WTO-inconsistent practice.  Yet, it does not require 
adapting the legal framework.  The latter is also required in case of an as such claim against the legal 
framework.  Under the latter claim, if the legal framework is made discretionary but its application 
(practice or individually) remains unchanged (and thus WTO-inconsistent), the implementation 
obligations should not be considered fulfilled.  In contrast, a new discretionary legal framework without 
any new practice should be presumed to be applied in a WTO-consistent way (‘good faith’ rationale), but 
this presumption should be challengeable (e.g., leaving the executive branch the opportunity to set the 
conditions for export credits but describing as guideline that their objective should be to undercut market 
interest rates). 
2239 Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement.  Article 1.1(a)(2) is not relevant for our discussion. 
2240 Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. 
2241 Article 1.2 of the SCM Agreement.   
2242 Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement is not a type of financial contribution since it deals with 
the way, namely indirectly, that governments provide one of the different forms of financial 
contributions.  See also WTO Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, paras 8.69 and 8.73. 
2243 Except in case of direct credits, the financial contribution by the government is not the export credit, 
which is extended by the exporter or a private financial institution, but the support to this export credit. 
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Furthermore, these financial contributions fall within the scope of the SCM Agreement if 
provided ‘by the government or any public body within the territory of a Member’.2244  The 
Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels considered a public body as one which is ‘controlled by 
the government’, whereby government ownership of 100 per cent is seen as ‘highly relevant 
to and often determinative of government control’.2245  Additionally, a financial contribution 
can also be made indirectly by a government through payments to a funding mechanism or 
when it entrusts or directs a private body to carry out such financial contribution.2246 The 
Appellate Body explained that ‘entrustment’ occurs where a government gives responsibility 
to a private body, while ‘direction’ refers to situations where the government exercises its 
authority over a private body.2247  In light of this broad formulation, export credit support 
provided by ECAs, in all their different institutional models, could be subject to the 
obligations in the SCM Agreement.2248  First, export credit support by ECAs that are 
themselves government departments/facilities (as in most OECD countries) are clearly made 
by the government.  Second, other ECAs, mainly in Asia, are modeled as state-owned 
corporations/agencies which can be considered as public bodies. For example, the Export-
Import Bank of Korea (KEXIM) was a ‘public body’ because it was 100 per cent 
government-owned and the government appointed leading positions and controlled its 
operational framework.  The fact that Korea itself described KEXIM as ‘an export credit 
agency’ also supported the Panel’s conclusion.2249  Third, in some countries export credit 
support is extended by private financial institutions which act as agents of the government 
(e.g., Coface in France, Atradius in the Netherlands) and thus seem to be ‘entrusted’ by the 
government to offer export credit support.2250  On the other hand, export credit support 
extended by private financial institutions without any governmental entrustment or direction 
falls outside the scope of the SCM Agreement.2251   
However, an unanswered question is whether export credit support offered by multilateral 
institutions as a form of development assistance could fall within its scope.  Noticing this 
legal uncertainty, the WTO Secretariat observed that the SCM Agreement is generally drafted 
to address situations where a WTO Member is subsidizing its own goods and that it is ‘not 
entirely clear whether or not the Agreement applies where the subsidizing entity is not within 
                                                 
2244 Article 1.1(a)(1), para 1 of the SCM Agreement. 
2245 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.50-7.56 and 7.352–7.356. It also took other 
factors into account (e.g., importance of the mandate of government-appointed officials). 
2246 Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement. Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para 8.25.    
2247 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 116. 
2248 These institutional models are listed in Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above n 2032, at 6. 
2249 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.50-7.56. 
2250 Governments have an exclusive arrangement with a private financial institution. 
2251 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 107. 
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the territory of the Member whose goods are allegedly being subsidized’.2252  Indeed, in case 
of trade financing by multilateral institutions, support is in essence given by more developed 
countries to importers/exporters of emerging developing countries.22532254  The reference in 
Article 1.1(a)(1) to ‘any public body within the territory of a Member’ might support a 
narrow reading and ‘many Members appeared to be of the view that development aid 
provided by multilateral development institutions lay outside the scope of the SCM 
Agreement, or in any event that it would not be proper to take action under the Agreement in 
this context’.2255,2256  This would imply that a certain type of export credit support could be 
considered prohibited or allowed depending on whether it is the national government or 
multilateral organization that offers the export credit support.2257   
Before turning to the benefit element, it should be stressed that ECAs provide export credit 
support.  This support only takes the form of an export credit when ‘direct credits’ are 
provided.  In all other cases of export credit support, ‘the financial contribution by the 
government’ is not the export credit in and of itself, because this is extended by the exporter 
or a private financial institution.  Here, the government only supports such export credits by 
offering, for instance, guarantees or interest rate support. 
 
4.2.2. Benefit element 
In the determination of the second constitutive element of a subsidy, the analysis shifts 
towards the recipient of the financial contribution.2258  Yet, the case law on export credit 
practices reveals that the benefit to the direct recipient of the financial contribution is not 
always the appropriate focus.  As mentioned above, the financial contribution challenged in 
                                                 
2252 General Council, Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance, Note by the Secretariat, Expert 
Group Meeting on Trade Financing (WT/GC/W/527 and WT/WGTDF/W/22, 16 March 2004), para 21.  
See also Auboin and Meier-Ewert, above n 2030, at 12.   
2253 Horlick also concludes that assistance by multilateral lending institutions falls outside the scope of 
the SCM Agreement.  See G. N. Horlick, ‘The WTO and climate change ‘incentives’’, in in T. Cottier, 
O. Nartova, and S. Z. Bigdali, International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 193-196, at 194.  Obviously, export credit support by 
ECAs also benefits foreign importers in developing countries (see above) but the pivotal difference, in 
terms of trade-distorting effects as well, is that such export credit support by multilateral institutions for 
exports to emerging markets is neutral regarding the exporter’s country of origin. 
2254 The African Trade Insurance Initiative is somewhat particular as it is set up by a group of African 
countries to support trade transactions from/to its own member countries.  Yet, the initiative is also 
supported by multilateral donors (e.g., USAID, African Development Bank) and these participating 
countries also benefit from S&D treatment on export subsidies under the SCM Agreement.  See above 
Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1.1. 
2255 General Council, above n 2252, para 21. 
2256 Obviously, challenging such support would also require a demonstration that the act of the 
international institution is attributable to a WTO Member. 
2257 As will be argued in the concluding chapter of this Part (Part III, Chapter 8), this differentiation is 
also defendable from an economic perspective (see also above n 2253) 
2258 Contextual guidance can be found in Article 14 of the SCM Agreement, which explicitly refers to the 
‘benefit to the recipient’.  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, paras 154-158.  See also Panel 
Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 9.112. 
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Brazil – Aircraft consisted of interest rate support given by the Brazil under the PROEX 
programme to financial institutions that provided export credit to foreign buyers of Brazilian 
regional aircrafts (Embraer).  As the Panel in the second compliance proceedings rightly 
observed, this financial contribution is made to the lender, namely the financial institution.  
Because such interest rate support takes the form of a grant, it obviously confers a benefit to 
the financial institution.  Yet, Canada had to establish that this benefit ‘is passed through in 
some way to producers of regional aircraft’.2259  Furthermore, the argument that PROEX III 
bestows a benefit by providing (foreign) regional aircraft purchasers with a greater choice of 
lenders to handle a particular transaction did likewise not in and of itself demonstrate that a 
benefit was given to (Brazilian) regional aircraft producers.2260  Hence, the relevant question 
was whether the export credit support was beneficial to the Brazilian exporter and not 
whether it was beneficial to the recipient of this financial contribution (i.e., financial 
institution)2261 or to the foreign purchaser receiving an officially supported export credit.2262  
Except for some forms (e.g., insurance to exporter), export credit support is not provided to 
the exporter directly but, instead, to a financial institution (e.g., guarantee to financial 
institution) or to the foreign buyer (e.g., direct export credit to foreign buyer).2263  To be sure, 
the benefit to the exporter can be induced from the benefit to the purchaser because 
‘beneficial’ export credit support to the latter improves the financial package that an exporter 
can offer and thus increases its chances of securing the contract.2264  Therefore, the same 
Panel in Brazil – Aircraft concluded that beneficial export credits to purchasers ‘at a 
minimum, represent a prima facie case’ that export credit support confers a benefit on the 
producers.2265  In deciding on the benefit-element, the case law has therefore examined 
whether the export credit support improved the financial package that an importer could 
obtain to finance its purchase.  Yet, under what conditions does export credit support confer a 
benefit?        
 
                                                 
2259 Emphasis added.  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), footnote 41.   
2260 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), footnote 41.  
2261 Noteworthy, the Panel observed that the financial contribution to the providers of financial services 
would not fall within the scope of the SCM Agreement because this is an agreement on trade in goods.   
2262 In Canada – Aircraft, Brazil also argued that EDC’s financial contributions were beneficial to 
Canadian exporters (Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, paras 9.183 and 9.247).  The Panel in Brazil – 
Aircraft forgot the ‘benefit’-element in its analysis, though it was not disputed among the parties.  See 
Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, paras 7.13-7.14. 
2263 In order to determine the level of countermeasures, the Arbitrators in Brazil – Aircraft also calculated 
the amount of subsidies provided by PROEX to the Brazilian aircraft producers.  See Decision by the 
Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil). 
2264 For example, Panel Report, (Brazil – Aircraft), para 7.34.      
2265 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), footnote 42; Panel Report, Canada – 
Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, footnote 187.   
PART III CHAPTER 4 – EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
 
 415
It was in Canada – Aircraft that the Appellate Body developed the so-called ‘private market 
test’: is the recipient better off than it would otherwise have been, absent the financial 
contribution?2266  The cost to the government is not directly relevant since the benefit analysis 
focalizes on the recipient.2267  Hence, the fact that the operation of an ECA is self-sustaining, 
as prescribed by law for some ECAs, should not explicitly be taken into account for the 
determination of the benefit element.2268   
However, does the marketplace ‘but for’ the export credit support refer to a purely 
commercially market absent of other governments’ export credit support?  Or instead, should 
export credit support not be considered beneficial to the foreign buyer if other governments 
offered the same level of support?  The Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II) 
rightly followed the first option as the marketplace referred to must be a ‘"commercial 
market", i.e. a market undistorted by government intervention’ because other governments’ 
export credit support might be made at subsidized rates as well.2269  Export credit support at 
below commercial market rates is thus beneficial even though it merely matches offers by 
other ECAs.     
                                                 
2266 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 157.     
2267 See, for example, Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 9.115 and Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
Aircraft, para 160.  Nonetheless, the same Panel did, indirectly, look at the cost to the government by 
agreeing with Canada that the comparison of an ECA’s net interest margin (NIM) with those of 
commercial banks is relevant in the benefit analysis.  The NIM represents the difference between the 
gross interest income and gross interest expense on all interest-bearing assets (= net interest income), 
divided by the value of all interest-bearing assets.  The cost to the government in raising funds is thus 
reflected in the NIM.  Apparently, the cost to the government might thus still be relevant as evidence that 
a benefit is conferred upon the recipient, though it is certainly not a necessary condition.  Panel Report, 
Canada – Aircraft, paras 9.168-9.174.  However, one could question the relevance of an ECAs financial 
performance relative to commercial banks as this looks at the provider and not at the recipient.  On the 
one hand, an ECA might have a bad financial performance, not because it would offer export credit 
support at below market rates but due to other factors (e.g., high costs of raising funds, bad 
management).  On the other hand, an ECA with a comparable financial performance to commercial 
banks (i.e. high NIM) might still systematically offer export credit support at below market rates and thus 
confer a benefit on its recipients.  Recall that the economic rationale for ECAs is based on the 
information/capacity market failure argument, meaning that the trade finance conditions set by ECAs 
could be considered commercially sound but the private finance market fails to seize this opportunity. An 
ECA that exploits its surplus information and capacity could operate commercially sound but at the same 
time offer export credit support at conditions that the private sector is not able to undertake.  ECAs might 
also block the market entrance of private players for certain export credit instruments. Moreover, some 
ECAs of developed countries might have a better credit rating (and thus lower borrowing costs) than 
various commercial banks, because they are covered by the government. 
2268 As explained above, by applying the mandatory/discretionary distinction to an as such claim, the 
Panel in Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees seemed to recognize that the nature of an ECA does 
not establish whether a benefit is conferred.  The fact that it enjoys advantages vis-à-vis private players 
(e.g., they do not pay taxes) does not show that this ECA is ‘required to pass on those advantages to its 
clients’.  Similarly, ECAs statutory goal to spur exports does not mandate the conferral of a benefit.  
Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, paras 7.77-7.79.    
2269 See Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 5.29.  See also, summary of the 
Panel’s reasoning by the Panel in US – Softwood Lumber IV (para 7.55), in which the Panel adequately 
distinguished this statement from the question it was confronted with.  Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft 
Credits and Guarantees, paras 7.145-7.150.  This reasoning seems correct, equally because the focus of 
the benefit element should be on the exporter.      
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Several panels and the Appellate Body have already applied the private market test to 
different forms of export credit support.  First, export credit guarantees, a form of pure cover 
support, are compared with a comparable guarantee available at the commercial market.  If 
the fee charged by the government is lower than the market fee, a benefit would be 
conferred.2270  Finding contextual support in Article 14(c) of the SCM Agreement, panels also 
spelled out a second option for the benefit analysis which looks at the impact of the export 
credit guarantee on the export credit.  It confers a benefit if the difference between the amount 
paid on a loan guaranteed by the government and the amount that would have to be paid on a 
commercial loan without government guarantee is not offset by the fee that has to be paid for 
the government guarantee.2271  The case law also consistently held that item (j) of the 
Illustrative List, which delineates a cost-to-government standard, is not relevant for the 
benefit analysis since the Illustrative List deals with the question whether a prohibited export 
subsidy exists, and not whether a benefit exists.2272  Second, concerning types of official 
financing support, the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II) decided that, if 
interest rate support is given to the financial institution providing export credits, it should be 
shown that the supported export credit is extended at more favourable terms than those 
available on the commercial market to the purchaser.2273  Furthermore, when official 
financing support takes the form of direct credits to the purchaser, the terms of this export 
credit are compared with commercial export credits.  A benefit would be conferred if, absent 
the export credit by the government, the purchaser would not be able to obtain a loan at the 
same terms on the commercial market.2274  For the same reasons as with regard to item (j), 
paragraph 1 of item (k) of the Illustrative List can also not be relied upon as contextual 
support for demonstrating the presence of a benefit.2275   
Yet, might the OECD Arrangement be used for demonstrating/refuting that an export credit is 
supported at below market terms?  The Panel in Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees 
held that the fact that the repayment term exceeds the maximum term authorised under the 
OECD Arrangement does not constitute positive evidence that a benefit is conferred.2276 On 
                                                 
2270 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.189.  
2271  The Panel in Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees deemed it ‘safe to assume’ that this would be 
the case if the fees are not market-based.  Hence, it considered the standard similar under both options.  
Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.190; Panel Report, Canada – 
Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, paras 7.397-7.398.  
2272 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.191. 
2273 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), paras 5.27-5.28: ‘There would be no need 
for complex benefit analysis if PROEX III payments were made directly to producers or to purchasers of 
Brazilian regional aircraft’. 
2274 This is in line with the standard for calculating the benefit of a loan elaborated in Article 14(b) of the 
SCM Agreement, which again provides relevant context.  Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 9.113.  
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, paras 155-156. 
2275 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 9.117.   
2276 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, paras 7.232-7.236.      
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the other hand, the same Panel was more willing to take the CIRR into account because this 
could serve as a rough proxy for commercial interest rates.2277  An interest rate below the 
CIRR establishes a prima facie case that a benefit is bestowed.2278  This finding could thus be 
rebutted because the CIRR is a constructed interest rate at a particular moment in time and 
might lag behind the market rate.  Hence, financing below CIRR level is not necessarily 
extended at better-than-market terms.  Conversely, as the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 
21.5 – Canada II) held, an interest rate at or above the CIRR does not establish that it does 
not confer a benefit, as CIRR corresponds to commercial interest rates for first-class 
borrowers.2279 Consequently, the prescription that an export credit programme should be 
based on the CIRR does not demonstrate the absence of a benefit.  To the contrary, an as such 
claim against an export credit programme prescribing the application of the CIRR would be 
accepted with respect to the benefit element because such programme requires to confer a 
benefit in some situations (namely to less creditworthy borrowers).2280        
 
In conclusion, export credit support is deemed beneficial if it confers upon the foreign buyer 
an export credit at terms unavailable on the commercial market.  Interestingly, export credit 
support that is commonly deemed legitimate might very well confer a benefit in the meaning 
developed in the case law.  First, export credit support is considered necessary to match 
support given by other ECAs (self-defence instrument), but such support is beneficial because 
it is not available on the commercial market at similar terms.2281  Second, export credit 
support is generally legitimized on the basis of an information/capacity market failure in the 
private market.  Here again, export credit support provided by ECAs is beneficial if it aims at 
correcting such market failures because private investors are, due to their limited 
information/capacity, unwilling or unable to provide export credits at the same terms.  Even if 
such an ECA is operating on commercial principles, its support would be beneficial as such 
support would not be offered on the commercial market.  Third, in times of financial crises, 
ECAs are incited to support those transactions that the private sector is no longer willing or 
able to finance at affordable rates.  When filling this gap in private trade financing, 
governments are thus subsidizing in the meaning of the SCM Agreement.  Put otherwise, 
                                                 
2277 The OECD Arrangement indicates that CIRRs should ‘represent final commercial lending interest 
rates’ and ‘closely correspond to the rate for first-class domestic borrowers’ (Panel Report, Canada – 
Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, para 7.241).  The Panel cited Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 
21.5 – Canada II), para 5.35.  
2278  Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, para 7.241.    
2279 Because CIRR corresponds to commercial interest rates for ‘first-class’ borrowers, it is thus 
‘certainly not a precise market proxy for rates which borrowers of lesser creditworthiness could obtain in 
the market’ (at least, if an export credit programme is not limited to first-class borrowers).  Panel Report, 
Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 5.36.   
2280 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), paras 5.36-5.37. 
2281 If the commercial market provided export credits at similar terms, there would be no need for 
matching.  
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ECAs only serve their legitimate purpose of complementing the private market if they provide 
subsidies as defined in the SCM Agreement.2282  Of course, it should always be explicitly 
demonstrated that ECAs as such or as applied offer support at better-than-market terms.    
 
In the next section, we look at the question whether such subsidized export credit support 
could qualify as an export subsidy under the SCM Agreement, whereby it should be recalled 
that export subsidies are deemed to be specific.2283   
   
4.3. IS SUBSIDIZED EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT A PROHIBITED EXPORT SUBSIDY UNDER THE 
SCM AGREEMENT?    
4.3.1. Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement 
Complaining Members have two options to demonstrate that a subsidy is an export subsidy 
within the meaning of the SCM Agreement.  First, it can be demonstrated on the basis of 
Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement.  Concerning the export contingency element, 
observe that export credit support is, by its very nature, contingent upon exportation as it 
supports loans (or is a loan in itself) extended to foreign buyers and will thus generally be ‘de 
jure’ contingent upon exportation.2284  If there is no disagreement that a financial contribution 
conferring a benefit could be considered as export credit support, the – often thorny – 
demonstration of ‘export contingency’ is therefore easily fulfilled and not disputed.2285  
Instead of demonstrating the subsidy element as explained in the previous section, the 
complaining Member can directly rely on items (j) or (k) of the Illustrative List to show that 
export credit support constitutes an export subsidy.   
Hence, if export credit support is deemed an export subsidy, on the basis of either Article 1 
juncto Article 3.1(a) or the Illustrative List, it is prohibited pursuant to Article 3 unless an 
exception applies.  Next to illustrations of export subsidies, the Illustrative List also contains 
exceptions to the principle prohibition on export subsidies.  With respect to export credit 
support, such an exception can be found in paragraph 2 of item (k), which refers to the OECD 
                                                 
2282 The subsidy definition does not take the objective of the government intervention into account.  By 
definition, the private market test detects government interventions that aim at correcting market failures.   
2283 As explained, export subsidies that are not prohibited because of an exception (e.g., OECD 
Arrangement) are also deemed specific.  Implicitly, this seems to be confirmed by the Panel in Korea – 
Commercial Vessels (para. 7.514): ‘we consider that Article 2.3 applies in respect of the entirety of the 
SCM Agreement. Thus, a subsidy that is specific under Article 2.3 (as a result of export contingency) is 
specific for the purpose of both Part II (prohibited export subsidy) and Part III (actionable subsidy) 
claims’ (emphasis added).   
2284 See, for example, Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, footnote 951.  De jure export conditionality 
should be ‘demonstrated on the basis of the words of the relevant legislation, regulation or other legal 
instrument’.  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 167. 
2285 Obviously, the only relevant question under Article 3.1(a) is whether a beneficial financial 
contribution is contingent upon exportation and not whether it constitutes export credit support.       
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Arrangement.  Additionally, some developing countries still benefit from S&D treatment on 
export subsidies.   
   
4.3.2. Export credit support as an export subsidy pursuant to items (j) and (k) of the 
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies 
4.3.2.1. Item (j) of the Illustrative List  
Item (j) of the Illustrative List reads in the relevant parts:  
 
The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) of export 
credit guarantee or insurance programmes, (…), at premium rates which are inadequate to 
cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes.2286 
 
The Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels defined an export credit guarantee in a narrow 
sense as a guarantee which covers default by a foreign buyer in respect of an export credit 
provided to that foreign buyer.2287  Item (j) considers export credit guarantee (or insurance) 
programmes as prohibited export subsidies if they are offered at premium rates inadequate to 
cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programme.2288  Hence, item (j) applies a 
cost-to-government standard rather than the benefit-to-recipient standard developed under 
Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.2289  Moreover, the evaluation is made at an aggregate 
level and looks at the overall cost to the government.2290  If a cost-to-government standard is 
applied to guarantees/insurance, a determination can indeed not be made on a transaction 
basis because the individual cost-to-government varies depending on whether or not the risk 
occurs.  The application of this standard might have important implications because it means, 
according to the Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels, that ‘if a complaining party 
establishes that another Member's export guarantee programme fails overall to cover its long-
term operating costs and losses, that is sufficient for a finding that the programme as a whole 
constitutes a prohibited export subsidy’.2291   
The question on how this cost-to-government test should be passed is explored in more detail 
in the discussion on export credit support for agricultural products since this test was central 
in the US – Upland Cotton case.  Obviously, the jurisprudence developed in this case is also 
relevant for challenging pure cover support for non-agricultural products under item (j). 
 
                                                 
2286 Emphasis added.   
2287 A guarantee for a loan made in the context of an export transaction is insufficient to label it as an 
export credit guarantee.  Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.213. 
2288 Recall that the qualification ‘manifestly’ was deleted in the Uruguay Round.   
2289 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para 7.191. 
2290 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para 93. 
2291 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.204 (emphasis added).  See also Panel Report, US 
– Upland Cotton, para 8.1(d)(i).   
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4.3.2.2. Item (k), paragraph 1 of the Illustrative List 
Item (k), para 1 of the Illustrative List reads in the relevant parts:  
 
The grant by governments (...) of export credits at rates below those which they actually have 
to pay for the funds so employed (…), or the payment by them of all or part of the costs 
incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits, in so far as they are used to 
secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms. 
 
First of all, this item deals with export credits provided by ECAs (direct credits).  Such a loan 
by an ECA to a foreign buyer contains a cost to the government if it is made at interest rates 
below the rate the government itself had or would have to pay for the funds.2292  Here again, a 
cost-to-government standard is inscribed but, contrary to item (j), this standard can be applied 
on an individual transaction basis.2293  Next, item (k) also targets ‘the payment (by the 
government) of all or parts of the costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in 
obtaining credits’.  Even though the panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada) decided 
otherwise, the term ‘payments’ seems to include interest rate support and might as well cover 
refinancing if an expansive interpretation would be accepted.2294  This standard does not refer 
to the cost to the government but to the cost to the exporter or financial institution.2295   
                                                 
2292 Loans to exporters, rather than to foreign buyers, are not considered ‘export credits’ under this 
provision.  See Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.328. 
2293 Indeed, the interest rate for an individual export credit extended by an ECA can be meaningfully 
compared with the cost to the government of raising the required funds thereto. 
2294 The Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada) concluded that payments that amount to interest 
rate support to lenders (exporters and financial institutions) fall outside this scope because credits refer to 
export credits and the costs involved are those relating to obtaining export credits, and not costs relating 
to providing them.  This reading of credits as export credits is simply impossible in light of a correct 
understanding of the latter term as defined by the Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels (see above n 
2292 and n 2033). As the plain text reads, the costs are those incurred by exporters or financial 
institutions in obtaining credits and, by definition, exporters or financial institutions cannot obtain 
exports credits because these are obtained by foreign buyers.  Moreover, the negotiating history suggests 
that the word ‘credits’ does not refer to ‘export credits’. The 1960 Declaration separately listed ‘the 
government bearing all or part of the costs incurred by exporters in obtaining credit”, which was 
integrated in a slightly modified form in item (k) in the Subsidies Code.  An early draft of this Code 
referred to ‘in obtaining credit’ but this was, for unclear reasons (maybe to align with the French and 
Spanish version or by mistake), revised to ‘in obtaining credits’.  Compare the following drafts: 
Subsidies/Countervailing Measures – Outline of an Arrangement (MTN/NTM/W/210, 19 December 
1978) and Subsidies/Countervailing Measures – Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles 
VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (MTN/NTM/W/220, 21 February 
1978).  Surprisingly in contradiction to its own interpretation, the same Panel seemed to endorse this 
view when it elaborated as an example of a payment under para 1 item (k) ‘(a) payment by Brazil that 
allowed a Brazilian financial institution to provide export credits to an overseas customer’.  Panel Report, 
Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras 6.44, 6.71- 6.72.  
2295 As Canada correctly argued in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 6.70: ‘a payment exists 
within the meaning of the first paragraph of item (k) where an exporter or financial institution obtains 
credits at an interest rate higher than the rate at which it would provide export credits to a buyer and 
incurs a cost as a result, and the government pays for all or part of this difference’.  In case of interest 
rate support, this would ipso facto incur a cost to the government but this is not necessarily so in case of 
refinancing since the government might have a lower cost of borrowing than the exporter or financial 
institution.  The material advantage clause (see below) precludes that all types of credit to exporters or 
financial institutions which are supported by government payments are prohibited export subsidies under 
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The Subsidies Code added to paragraph 1 of item (k) the phrase ‘in so far as they are used to 
secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms’.  However, the text does not 
reveal if this material advantage clause only applies to credits supported by government 
payments (e.g., interest rate support; second aspect item (k)) or to export credits provided by 
the government as well (direct credits; first aspect item (k)).2296  The Panel in Korea – 
Commercial Vessels decided, without any explanation, that the material clause also applies to 
direct credits and the Appellate Body seemed to share this interpretation.2297  Until today, 
panels and the Appellate Body have not been able to advance a convincing interpretation of 
this material advantage condition.2298  In examining whether interest rate support was used to 
secure a material advantage, the Appellate Body in Brazil – Aircraft rejected the Panel’s 
approach to conduct a private market test because this equated this test with the benefit 
analysis.2299  The Appellate Body held that ‘whether or not a government payment is used to 
secure a "material advantage", as opposed to an "advantage" that is not "material", may well 
depend on where the net interest rate applicable to the particular transaction at issue in that 
case stands in relation to the range of commercial rates available’.2300  The net interest rate is 
defined as the actual interest rate after deduction of the government payment.  When this 
interest rate is below the relevant CIRR, this is a positive indication that the government 
payment has been ‘used to secure a material advantage’.2301  If so, the defending party could 
still argue that an alternative ‘market benchmark’ other than the CIRR is appropriate, and that 
                                                                                                                                            
item (k), because only those used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms are 
covered.   
2296 Depending on the interpretation of the pronoun ‘they’, two readings could be advanced: (i) it could 
refer to export credits and payment and thus condition both aspects of item (k), para 1; or (ii) it could 
refer to credits under the second aspect and, as a result, be confined to this aspect.   
2297 In elaborating a hypothetical example, the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada) assumed 
that the material clause also applies to direct credits, but equally indicated the consequence if this would 
not be the case. Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), footnote 45; Panel Report, Korea 
– Commercial Vessels, para 7.314.  According to the Appellate Body, ‘the payment’ is considered an 
export subsidy if it fails the material advantage condition.  Because semantically ‘they’ cannot refer 
exclusively to ‘payment’ (above n 2296), the Appellate Body’s reading implies that the material 
advantage clause also applies to direct credits. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – 
Canada), para 61.  Brazil highlighted that one negotiator noted that this clause was intended to provide ‘a 
weak injury test in the event of a departure from the basic GATT (subsidy) standard’.  Appellate Body 
Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 20.  This was also confirmed by Hufbauer and Erb (above n 2128, at 70) 
and might suggest that the material advantage indeed covers both aspects of item (k), para 1.  This 
reading might also find support in the negotiating history, given that one of the drafts of the Subsidies 
Code referred to ‘in obtaining credit’ in the singular (see above n 2294) and already included the 
qualification ‘insofar as they are used (…)’.  See Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Group "Non-Tariff 
Measures", Sub-Group "Subsidies and Countervailing Duties", Subsidies/Countervailing Measures – 
Outline of an Arrangement (MTN/NTM/W/210, 19 December 1978).   
2298 Hufbauer and Erb held that that this included a weak injury test.  Hufbauer and Erb, above n 2128, at 
70. 
2299 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, paras 176-179.  
2300 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 182. 
2301 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 182. In case of direct credits, the actual interest rate is 
similar to the net interest rate. 
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the net interest rate is at or above this alternative market benchmark.2302  Applying this 
interpretation in the first compliance procedure, the Appellate Body distinguished two options 
to demonstrate that the subsidies under the revised PROEX were not ‘used to secure a 
material advantage’: 
(…) Brazil must prove either: that the net interest rates under the revised PROEX are at or 
above the relevant CIRR, (…); or, that an alternative "market benchmark", other than the 
CIRR, is appropriate, and that the net interest rates under the revised PROEX are at or above 
this alternative "market benchmark".2303 
 
Yet, it was left undecided whether conformity with the relevant CIRR is sufficient on itself, as 
this Appellate Body’s statement seems to suggest, or whether related disciplines of the OECD 
Arrangement (e.g., repayment terms) should in addition be respected to conform with the 
material advantage clause.  Considering it would be ‘implausible to assume that the Appellate 
Body meant to "import" into the "material advantage" clause the CIRR alone’, the Panel in 
the second compliance procedure rightly decided that those rules of the OECD Arrangement 
operating to support or reinforce the CIRR should equally be respected.  Deciding otherwise 
would deprive the material advantage clause from any meaningful effect.  After all, this 
would mean that any export credit support with interest rates at CIRR level would be in 
conformity with paragraph 1 of item (k), irrespectively of all the other terms and conditions 
(e.g., repayment term of 100 years).2304  The Panel was well aware that its interpretation 
equated the standard under the material advantage clause with the conditions set under safe 
haven (paragraph 2 of item (k)) and thus that it made the safe haven redundant for justifying 
violations of the first paragraph of item (k).  However, the Panel subtly – but correctly – 
observed that this was ‘an unavoidable implication of the Appellate Body's adoption of the 
CIRR as an appropriate benchmark for determining the existence of a material advantage’.2305  
 
                                                 
2302 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras 67 and 74. 
2303 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 67. 
2304 In the words of the Panel, it would mean that ‘Members could, for instance, support export credits 
with net interest rates at CIRR level, repayment terms of 100 years, no cash payment requirement and 
with the principal sum to be repaid at the very end of the credit term’ without violating paragraph 1 of 
item (k). Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), paras 5.242-5.243.  What is more, if 
the Appellate Body would accept an a contrario interpretation of the first paragraph of item (k), an 
interpretation of the ‘material advantage’ clause solely on the basis of the CIRR would also introduce 
much more flexibility for official financing support as the OECD Arrangement exception mandates not 
only conformity with CIRR but with all the relevant interest rate provisions of the OECD Arrangement 
(see below).  The Panel also seemed to allude to this argument.  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 
21.5 – Canada II), para 5.271. 
2305 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 5.251. 
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4.3.3. The relationship between Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement and the 
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies 
The text of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement leaves no doubt that the Illustrative List 
only offers examples of export subsidies.  Clearly, export subsidies falling outside the 
Illustrative List’s scope are prohibited by virtue of Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement.  
Equally undisputed is the fact that a subsidy falling within the scope of the Illustrative List is 
deemed to be a prohibited export subsidy unless an exception applies.  Yet, two elements on 
the relationship between Article 3.1(a) and the Illustrative List (item (j) and (k)) merit some 
further reflection.   
First, when could the Illustrative List be relied upon to demonstrate that export credit support 
is not prohibited?  Second, the case law reads the items of the Illustrative List as per se export 
subsidies under the SCM Agreement.  Hence, these items could be used to circumvent the 
‘export contingency’ test of Article 3.1(a) SCM Agreement as well as the ‘subsidy’ test under 
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.2306  Is it relevant for the disciplines on export credit support 
that items (j) and (k) of the Illustrative List are considered such per se export subsidies?    
 
4.3.3.1. Could item (j) and paragraph 1 of item (k) be used a contrario?  
As introduced in Part II, panels have systematically rejected that all items of the Illustrative 
List could be used a contrario so as to justify that an export subsidy in the meaning of Article 
1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement (or the Illustrative List) is not prohibited under the SCM 
Agreement.  By virtue of footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement, panels have only accepted such 
an a contrario reasoning for those items containing an affirmative statement that a measure is 
not subject to the Article 3.1(a) prohibition, that it is not prohibited, or that it is allowed.  
Concerning the relevant items on export credit support, panels detected such an affirmative 
statement in paragraph 2 of item (k), which refers to the OECD Arrangement.  Hence, they 
accepted that conformity with this safe haven implies that the export credit practice is not 
prohibited under the SCM Agreement.  The scope of this exception is explored in the next 
section.  On the other hand, item (j) and paragraph 1 of item (k) do not contain such an 
affirmative statement and can therefore not be used a contrario.  Next to pointing to textual 
support in footnote 5, the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada) advanced the 
following two arguments to underpin this conclusion. 
First, the Panel disagreed with Brazil that this interpretation would render items (j) and (k) 
ineffective.  These are still useful because it is possible to demonstrate that a measure falls 
within the scope of items (j) or (k) without ‘being required to demonstrate that Article 3, and 
                                                 
2306 See above Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1. 
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thus Article 1, was satisfied’ (per se export subsidies).2307  Second, the Panel also rejected that 
its narrow reading would disadvantage developing countries.  In contrast, it convincingly 
explained that a broad interpretation would allow developed countries to consistently offer 
export credit at terms more favourable than developing countries which is ‘at odds with one 
of the objects and purposes of the WTO Agreement generally and the SCM Agreement 
specifically’.2308 After all, the cost-to-government standard elaborated under these items 
systematically favour developed countries.2309  Given that the cost of borrowing is higher for 
developing countries, paragraph 1 of item (k) ‘would "permit" developed countries to provide 
export credits at an interest rate – the developed countries' own cost of funds – which 
developing countries would almost never be able to meet without falling afoul of the 
SCM Agreement’.2310  Next, in case of an export credit guarantee or insurance (item (j)), the 
financial terms of the export credit are based on the risk of the guarantor government and not 
of the borrower.  Because developing countries have a higher perceived risk than developed 
countries, a guarantee at similar cost-recovering premium rates would have less impact on the 
export credit’s financial terms if extended by developing countries.  Consequently, item (j) 
offers leeway to developed countries to support export credits at interest rates that would be 
consistently lower than those supported by developing countries.  Yet, under the narrow 
reading adopted by the Panel, ‘WTO Members are faced with a common set of rules in 
respect of export credit practices’.2311  Indeed, export credit support involving no cost to the 
government would still be prohibited by virtue of Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement if 
conferring a benefit to the recipient.  This benefit-to-recipient standard disregards differences 
in the cost to the government.  Hence, the Panel’s rejection of an a contrario reasoning under 
items (j) and paragraph 1 of (k) seems solid from a systemic point of view because it reduces 
the legal implications of the cost-to-government standard.  This standard is hard to reconcile 
with the benefit-to-recipient standard articulated under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.   
Although it several times had the opportunity, the Appellate Body until present has not 
articulated whether it would agree that an a contrario reading of these items should be 
dismissed.2312  It merely held that if the conditions of the first paragraph of item (k) would 
have been fulfilled, it ‘would have been prepared to find that the payments (…) are justified 
under item (k) of the Illustrative List’ but, at the same time, wished ‘to emphasize that (it was) 
                                                 
2307 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 6.42. 
2308 Recognizing S&D provisions (Article 27 of the SCM Agreement), the Panel held that this structural 
disadvantage would at least be the case as ‘of the date the export subsidy prohibition applies to any given 
developing country Member’.  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 6.47.   
2309 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras 6.58-6.59.    
2310 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 6.58.  
2311 Except for S&D treatment for developing countries (see below Part III, Chapter 4, Section 4.5).  
Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras 6.60 and 6.61. 
2312 See, for example, Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 730-731. 
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not interpreting footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement’.2313  Confronted with this ambiguous 
statement, the panels in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II) and Korea – Commercial 
Vessels aligned with the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada) and thus rejected an 
a contrario reading of item (j) and paragraph 1 of item (k).2314 
 
4.3.3.2. The relevance of item (j) and paragraph 1 of item (k) as per se export subsidies  
The case law reads the items of the Illustrative List as per se export subsidies.  This means 
that a complainant challenging export credit support could jump directly to items (j) or (k) 
without the obligation to demonstrate that such support is conferring a benefit upon the 
exporter.  Should complainants be advised to base their claim in first order on the Illustrative 
List or on Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement?   
First, item (k) does not seem to enlarge the subsidy definition of Article 1 since official 
financing support that is ‘used to secure a material advantage’ as understood by the Appellate 
Body would be ipso facto beneficial under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.  As item (k) 
also refers to individual official financing support transactions but requires an additional cost-
to-government (or exporter/financial institution) demonstration, complainants might more 
easily opt for Article 1 juncto Article 3 to demonstrate the existence of an export subsidy.2315  
Second, the standard in item (j) refers to the pure cover programme and if this programme 
runs at a loss, ‘the programme as a whole constitutes a prohibited export subsidy’.2316  
However, challenging such a pure cover programme under Articles 1 and 3 of the SCM 
Agreement seems more difficult in light of the mandatory/discretionary distinction adopted by 
most panels.  Recall its application by the Panel in Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees: 
programmes can only be challenged as such and should thus mandate WTO-inconsistent 
implementation (i.e., leaving no discretion to apply it in a WTO-consistent manner) in order 
to violate WTO disciplines, in contrast to as applied claims that can only be made on the level 
of individual transactions.2317  If this distinction is rigorously applied, challenging a pure 
cover programme can only pass the subsidy threshold of Article 1 if the programme ‘as such’ 
                                                 
2313 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 80 (emphasis added).  Observe 
that the Appellate Body stated that it would be justified under item (k) and not that it would be justified 
as such. 
2314 The Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II) acknowledged that ‘this statement could be 
understood (to allow an a contrario reading)’, but noted ‘the Appellate Body's statement does not form 
part of the legal basis for its disposition of the appeal, nor did the Appellate Body explain its statement’.  
The Panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels, on the other hand, emphasized the second part of the 
Appellate Body’s statement.  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), footnote 214; 
Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.195-7.207. 
2315 This is what Brazil and Canada did in Canada – Aircraft (and Canada – Aircraft Credits and 
Guarantees) and Brazil – Aircraft, respectively.   
2316 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.204 (emphasis added).  See also Panel Report, US 
– Upland Cotton, para 8.1 (d)(i).   
2317 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, para 7.131. Only one relaxation seemed to 
be accepted (see footnote 93).    
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mandates the conferral of a benefit, which is often not the case.  Alternatively, individual pure 
cover transactions (as applied) could be demonstrated to confer a benefit and thus in principle 
be prohibited, but implementation would not extend beyond these individual transactions.  
Somewhat qualifying this distinction, the Appellate Body also seems to allow the as such 
challenging of a programme’s systematic application.  Anyway, a claim under Article 1 of the 
SCM Agreement will always be confronted with the thorny (and conflicting) case law on as 
such and as applied claims.  On the other hand, as the Panel in US – Upland Cotton 
illustrated, the application of this controversial mandatory/discretionary distinction could be 
tactfully avoided under item (j):  
 
Brazil challenges these (export credit guarantee programmes) both "as such" and "as applied". 
Because of the analytical approach (…) based on the contextual guidance available under item 
(j) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in Annex I to the SCM Agreement, we do not 
view this distinction as a determinative one here. Item (j) refers to the provision by 
governments of export credit guarantee "programmes".2318 
 
Hence, challenging a pure cover programme is easier on the basis of item (j) than on the basis 
of Article 1 juncto Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. If the threshold of item (j) is fulfilled, 
the programme as a whole would be considered a prohibited subsidy, regardless of whether 
the programme as such or as applied also confers a benefit.  But what should be understood 
under the obligation to ‘withdraw the subsidy without delay’2319 if the subsidy element is 
demonstrated on the basis of the cost-to-government standard under item (j) and not on the 
basis of the benefit-to-recipient standard?2320  Could the defendant implement such finding by 
ensuring that its pure cover programme no longer runs at a cost to the government, even 
though it might still be beneficial as such or as applied under Article 1 of the SCM 
Agreement?  Precisely to prevent such an outcome, Brazil also formulated a separate claim 
under Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement in US – Upland Cotton.  As will be discussed 
below in more detail, however, judicial economy was exercised on this additional claim.  
Nonetheless, the Arbitrator in the same case decided that full compliance would only be 
present if no benefit upon recipients is conferred.  Hence, when challenging pure cover 
support, WTO Members might be advised to base their claim in first order on item (j), given 
that implementation would anyway encompass the benefit-to-recipient standard.  On the other 
hand, in the absence of explicit panel findings under Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM 
Agreement, there might be little guidance – and thus substantive leeway in practice – for the 
implementing country on to how it should achieve such full compliance. 
                                                 
2318 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.763. 
2319 Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement (emphasis added). 
2320 As elaborated above, panels have acknowledged that pure cover support programmes operating at no 
cost to the government could still be beneficial (see above n 2309). 
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4.3.4. Export credit practices which are not prohibited: The OECD Arrangement safe 
haven 
By its terms, export credit practices that fulfill the conditions of paragraph 2 of item (k) are 
not prohibited by the SCM Agreement.2321  So, this safe haven is an important exception to 
the principle prohibition of export subsidies stipulated in Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.   
The safe haven, included in the Subsidies Code, refers in indirect terms to the original OECD 
Arrangement.  Because the exception is extended to any ‘successor undertaking’, the Panel in 
Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II) held that the relevant version of the OECD 
Arrangement (including sector understandings) under the safe haven is the most recent one 
that has been adopted.2322   To be sure, the reference to a ‘successor undertaking’ does not 
give non-Participants to the OECD Arrangement the option to draft their own alternative 
undertaking as item (k) explicitly prescribes that such a successor undertaking should be 
adopted by the original Participants of the OECD Arrangement.2323  On the other hand, the 
safe haven is, by its own terms, not only available to Participants of the OECD Arrangement 
(currently 9 Participants, including the EC with 27 Member States) but to all WTO Members 
applying the interest rate provisions of the Arrangement in practice.2324  For example, Brazil 
as non-Participant successfully claimed before the panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – 
Canada II) that its revised PROEX was in accordance with the safe haven.2325   
The Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II) underscored the ‘unusual’ character 
of the safe haven and acknowledged the risk that, if the latest version is considered relevant, 
Participants to the OECD Arrangement ‘could conceivably abuse their de facto power to 
modify the scope of the safe haven in a way which benefits them but does not equally benefit 
the rest of the WTO membership’.2326  At the same time, the Panel acknowledged that the 
appropriate weight given to this consideration ‘is the task of the parties to a negotiation, not a 
dispute settlement panel’.2327  Nonetheless, by analyzing the safe haven from the angle of the 
SCM Agreement, panels have to some extent tied the hands of Participants in defining its 
scope and application.     
                                                 
2321 Item (k), para 2 juncto footnote 5. Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 180; Panel Report, 
Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 6.36.   
2322 Only if the new version is formally accepted by the Participants, could it be applied as benchmark.  
Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), paras 5.72-5.91.   
2323 The wording ‘successor’ also indicates that it should be linked to the OECD Arrangement.  
2324 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras 6.52 and 6.61.  The IMF seemed not to 
recognize that the safe haven is available to developing countries. Communication from the IMF, Export 
Financing and Duty Drawbacks (WT/TF/COH/15, 14 February 2003), para 12.      
2325 Before the original Panel, Brazil had not invoked this exception as it considered compliance with the 
OECD Arrangement as too expensive.  See Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 180.  Brazil 
recently became Participant to the Sectoral Understanding for Civil Aircraft, which is annexed to the 
OECD Arrangement. 
2326 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 5.87 (emphasis in the original). 
2327 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), paras 5.88- 5.89.  See also Panel Report, 
Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.132. 
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4.3.4.1. Potential and actual scope of the safe haven 
The safe haven applies to an ‘export credit practice’ and this ‘must be a relatively broad term’ 
in its ordinary meaning.2328  No practice associated with export credits could a priori be 
excluded from its scope.2329  As a result, the safe haven is in principle not restricted to direct 
credits (first part of item (k), para 1) but extends to other types of official financing support 
such as interest rate support (second part of item (k), para 1) and pure cover (item (j)).  Hence, 
it could potentially be invoked to justify an export credit guarantee programme incurring a 
cost to the government.2330         
Yet, the actual scope of the safe haven is more narrow than this potential scope since it is 
stipulated that export credit practices in conformity with ‘the interest rate provisions’ of the 
OECD Arrangement are not prohibited.  A precondition for an export credit practice to be in 
conformity with the interest rate provisions, is that it is subject to those provisions.2331  For 
various reasons elaborated in the next section, panels have adopted a narrow interpretation of 
the term ‘interest rate provisions’ by only including those provisions related to the CIRR.2332  
Accordingly, the potentially wide scope is narrowed to those export credit practices subject to 
minimum interest rate requirements under the most recent version of the OECD Arrangement.   
As a result, the actual scope of the safe haven is confined to those export credit practices 
which (a) are in the form of official financing support (i.e. direct credits/financing, 
refinancing, or interest rate support), (b) have repayment terms of at least two years, and (c) 
have fixed interest rates.2333  Export credit support not satisfying these three elements actually 
falls outside the scope of the safe haven.  Here, three main examples could be discerned.  
First, official export credit support with repayment terms below two years falls outside the 
scope of the OECD Arrangement and could a fortiori not be subject to its interest rate 
provisions.  Given that ECAs are more and more replaced by private actors as providers of 
short-term credits, this might in general not raise a serious concern.  Yet, such private flows 
of short-term credit often run dry in case of a financial crisis, especially to developing 
countries.  Hence, the SCM Agreement currently prohibits ECAs to fill this gap by offering 
                                                 
2328 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.80. 
2329 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.81. 
2330 Even though this might not have been intended when the safe haven was inscribed in the Subsidies 
Code (see above n 2140), extending its application to item (j) violations conforms to the view under the 
SCM Agreement that the Illustrative List does not deal with certain specific types of subsidies in an 
exclusive way.  The safe haven could potentially even be invoked to justify export credit practices that 
fall outside the prohibitions in items (j) and (k) but are prohibited on the basis of Article 3.1(a) of the 
SCM Agreement.  An example thereof is an export credit guarantee conferring a benefit to the exporter 
which is extended under a programme not involving a cost to the government.  See also Panel Report, 
Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), para 6.61. 
2331 Panel Report, Canada–Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.93. 
2332 The provision on CIRR is pivotal because it is ‘the only minimum interest rate system defined and 
thus regulated’ by the OECD Arrangement.  In contrast, provisions on minimum premiums are not 
‘interest rate provisions’.  Panel Report, Canada–Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras 5.83-5.92.   
2333 Panel Report, Canada–Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.106. 
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support for short term export credits.2334  Second, it did also come as a surprise to several 
Participants that official financing support at floating rates was not covered by the safe 
haven.2335  Such support could in the future be eligible if minimum interest rates would be 
negotiated.2336  Third, pure cover support falls outside the actual scope of the safe haven 
because it is not subject to the minimum interest rate provisions (the CIRR) but only to 
disciplines on minimum premiums (and repayment requirements).  The Panel correctly 
concluded that pure cover support would be in accordance with the OECD Arrangement in 
case it respects the disciplines on minimum premium rates (MPRs) (and repayment 
requirements) even if, as a result, the covered export credit would fall below the CIRR.  
Indeed, the approach taken under the Knaepen Package disciplines the premium rates for pure 
cover support directly, regardless of their effect on the interest rate of the export credit.  
According to the Panel, however, this is insufficient to bring pure cover support under the 
safe haven.  In conclusion, neither item (j) nor item (k), para 2, safeguards beneficial pure 
cover support that is in conformity with the OECD Arrangement from being prohibited under 
the SCM Agreement.  The safe haven could in the future extend to pure cover support but 
only if the covered export credits are made subject to minimum interest rates.2337   
 
In conclusion, the scope of the safe haven in theory lies in the hands of the OECD 
Arrangement Participants, certainly given the broad interpretation of an ‘export credit 
practice’ by the panels.  Yet, panels added one important caveat.  Such an export credit 
practice should not only be brought within the scope of the OECD Arrangement but also be 
made subject to its minimum interest rate requirements. 
 
4.3.4.2. Conformity with the safe haven 
Only official financing support with repayment terms of at least two years and with fixed 
interest rates is actually eligible for the safe haven.  Now, what are the conditions under 
which this support is in conformity with the safe haven? 
                                                 
2334 Except for those ECAs of low-income countries (see below Part III, Chapter 4, Section 4.5). 
2335 The Panel observed that Participants disagreed on whether such support is authorized under the 
OECD Arrangement (Panel Report, Canada–Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), footnote 90; see also, Wang, 
Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above n 2032, footnote 5.  Export credit support with floating rate 
loans was (and still is) subject to one of the interest rate provisions.  This prohibits the borrower during 
the life of a loan to switch between the CIRR and a short-term rate, depending on which is lower at a 
given time.  Given that this provision did not contain any minimum interest rule and implied that these 
transactions were not subject to the CIRR, floating rate loans were not covered by the safe haven (Panel 
Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), footnote 90, paras 5.88, 5.102-5.105). 
2336 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), footnote 91.  The Panel highlighted that this 
had been under discussion for some time among Participants.  Yet, the 2010 version of the OECD 
Arrangement also only stipulates a similar provision on floating rate loans in Article 22(a).   
2337 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.98 and footnote 85. 
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Essentially, even though the scope of the safe haven is restricted by the concept of ‘interest 
rate provisions’, conformity of export credit practices is not judged merely on the basis of this 
narrow cluster of provisions.2338  Indeed, conformity with the safe haven ‘must be judged on 
the basis not only of full conformity with the CIRR but in addition full adherence to the other 
rules of the Arrangement that operate to support or reinforce the minimum interest rate rule 
by limiting the generosity of the terms of official financing support’.2339  Consequently, 
official financing support is justified under the safe haven if it is in conformity with the CIRR 
as well as with, inter alia, the repayment requirement and minimum premium rate (MPR) 
provisions.2340   
In case a WTO Member ‘matches’ the export credit terms provided by other WTO Members, 
could such support be deemed in conformity with the interest provisions of the OECD 
Agreement and thus be justified under the safe haven?  Several Participants argued before 
different panels that this question should be answered positively in all cases because matching 
is allowed under the OECD Arrangement.  However, the Panel in Canada–Aircraft (Article 
21.5 – Brazil) disagreed since it read a distinction between ‘permitted exceptions’ and 
derogations in the OECD Arrangement – in particular in the provision on matching.2341  
Permitted exceptions ‘refer to certain variations in terms that are foreseen and permitted, 
subject to limits’, while derogations depart from the OECD Arrangement ‘in a way not 
foreseen and not permitted, even within limits, under the plain language of the 
Arrangement’.2342  Although the Panel recognized that matching of derogations is not 
prohibited under the OECD Arrangement, ‘this does not alter the fact that both the original 
derogation and the matching remain, by the Arrangement’s own terms out of conformity with 
the provisions of the Arrangement’.2343  Hence, matching could only be justified under the 
                                                 
2338 Because other factors also influence the generosity of export credit support (e.g., repayment term). 
This is also recognized in the OECD Arrangement, since it elaborates several other conditions to official 
financial support (see above).    
2339 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.114; Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft 
(Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 5.110. 
2340 If applicable, a sector understanding might add specific provisions.  An exception should be made in 
case of interest rate support because such support is not subject to the premium rate obligations.  For an 
elaborated list of covered provisions (under the 1998 version), see Panel Report, Canada  – Aircraft 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras 5.115 – 5.119 and Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), 
paras 5.111-5.112 and 5.135-5.205.  By linking minimum premium rate provisions to the aspect of 
‘conformity’ instead of considering these as ‘interest rate provisions’, panels precluded that pure cover 
support would be covered in the absence of minimum interest rate obligations and, at the same time, 
ensured that official financing support (except for interest rate support) is only justified if it conforms to 
the minimum premium rate requirements.   
2341 In the Panel’s reading, the provision on matching seemed to make a distinction between matching of 
credit terms that comply with the OECD Arrangement (thus relying on permitted exceptions) and 
matching of credit terms that do not comply (thus derogating from the Arrangement).   
2342 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.121. 
2343 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.125; Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft 
Credits and Guarantees, para 7.169. 
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safe haven if the matched export credit support does not derogate from the OECD 
Arrangement but, instead, makes use of a permitted exception.   
Next to the text of the OECD Arrangement, the Panel found support for this view in the 
context of item (k), para 2, as well as in the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement.  
Several of these arguments also underpin the Panel’s conclusion that pure cover support is 
currently not eligible for the safe haven.  First, a broad reading on matching and pure cover 
support would put all non-Participants at a systematic disadvantage.  In contrast to 
Participants, non-Participants do not have access to information on initial and matched offers 
derogating from the OECD Arrangement and thus bear a higher burden to match such 
offers.2344  Because no information is published on the minimum premium benchmarks, non-
Participants should even be presumed to be respecting the minimum premium rules.2345  
Second, a broad reading would particularly disadvantage developing countries and therefore 
be contrary to one of the key stated objectives of the WTO Agreement.2346  If pure cover 
support would be eligible for the safe haven without being subject to the interest rate 
provisions, a de facto more favourable treatment of developed countries would occur because 
of their lower cost of borrowing.2347  In addition, if matching of derogations would be 
accepted, developed countries would be allowed to match subsidized offers of developing 
countries that are not prohibited by virtue of S&D treatment.  Third, a broad reading would 
not fit with the general prohibition of export subsidies under the SCM Agreement.2348  
Allowing pure cover support under the safe haven could result in guaranteed/insured export 
credits well below the CIRR that would, nonetheless, be justified.  Parallel, allowing 
matching of derogations would justify export credits regardless of how generous the interest 
rate or other terms would be.  This would even mean that WTO Members could justify export 
credits that match initial offers of non-WTO Members and thus have ‘the unheard-of result of 
allowing WTO Members to opt out of WTO rules on the basis of the behaviour of non-WTO 
Members’.2349  In the view of Howse and Neven, this argument is entirely hypothetical 
because at present no non-WTO Member is Participant to the OECD Arrangement.  However, 
their reasoning overlooks the fact that matching of a derogation is allowed under the OECD 
                                                 
2344 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.134.  Even if non-Participants could 
match in case they do not receive the requested information, they are still disadvantaged since, contrary 
to Participants, they are not informed automatically of non-conforming offers.  Panel Report, Brazil – 
Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 5.117.     
2345 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), footnote 118 and 119.   
2346 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 5.135. 
2347 Developing countries would be unable to offer the same level of pure cover support without incurring 
a cost. 
2348 Export subsidies are prohibited because of their direct trade-distortive effects and, among the various 
forms of export subsidies, ‘subsidized export credits arguably have the most immediate and thus greatest 
potential to distort trade flows’.  Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 5.137.   
2349 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 5.138.   
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Arrangement not only against other Participants (which are indeed all WTO Members), but 
also against non-Participants (which might not be WTO Members).2350 
In subsequent cases (Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II) and Canada – Aircraft 
Credits and Guarantees), several OECD Participants voiced the concern that rejecting 
matching of derogations undercuts the fundamentals of the OECD Arrangement’s compliance 
mechanism.2351  Indeed, as explained above, adherence to this gentlemen’s agreement results 
from the threat that a non-conforming offer could be matched by other Participants.  But 
again, panels were not convinced that the OECD Arrangement’s leeway given to matching 
should imply that such matching is also allowed under the SCM Agreement.  After all, the 
SCM Agreement is a binding instrument that is enforceable through the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism and, as a result, is not dependent on recourse to matching in order to 
achieve compliance.2352  Consequently, from the perspective of the SCM Agreement, a (non-
)Participant confronted with non-conforming export credit support under the OECD 
Arrangement could not induce compliance by matching this offer, but has to launch a case 
before the WTO.2353   
In response to these panel reports, Participants to the OECD Arrangement exactly did what 
the Panel in Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil) warned about: change the OECD 
Arrangement as they see fit.2354  In particular, they attempted to modify the OECD 
Arrangement in such a way that future panels would accept matching of derogations.  The 
new provision on matching reads: 
                                                 
2350 Moreover, Howse and Neven criticize the Panel’s argument because, also in case of matching a 
permitted exception, the conduct of a WTO Member is determined by that of a non-WTO Member.  
Here, they acknowledge that permitted exceptions are defined and limited by the OECD Arrangement 
itself but notice that WTO membership is not a prerequisite for becoming a Participant.  Non-WTO 
Members might thus become Participant and be able to modify the OECD Arrangement and thus 
influence the rights of WTO Members.  As they acknowledge, however, it is at present very unlikely that 
non-WTO Members would become Participant.  Furthermore, modification requires consent of all 
Participants, all of which are today WTO Members.  See R. Howse and D. Neven, ‘Canada – Export 
Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft (WT/DS222/R; DSR 2002:III, 849; DSR 2003:III, 
1187): A Comment’, in H. Horn and P. Mavroidis (eds), The American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies 
on WTO Case Law – Legal and Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
391-401, at 400-401. 
2351 Interestingly, Goldstein and McGuire reveal that Canada might have known that matching Brazil’s 
offer would not be justified under the safe haven and deliberately pursued WTO non-compliance to force 
an ultimate solution.  A. Goldstein and S. McGuire, ‘The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy 
and the Brazil – Canada Export Subsidy Saga’, 27:4 The World Economy (2004), 541-566, at 545.  Panel 
Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), paras 5.113-5.118; Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft 
Credits and Guarantees, para 7.175.  Howse and Neven read the latter Panel report as suggesting that the 
Panel would allow matching of a derogation if it were understood as a permitted form of self-help under 
the WTO Agreement.  However, the Panel’s argumentation to reject matching of a derogation seems not 
be based on its (indeed erroneous) view that the WTO prohibits self-help in all cases (see para 7.170); 
Howse and Neven, above n 2350, at 399. 
2352 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), paras 5.114-5115; Panel Report, Canada – 
Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, paras 7.175-7.76. 
2353 Of course, this is only possible if both are also WTO Member.  
2354 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.132. See also Panel Report, Brazil – 
Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 5.87. 
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Taking into account a Participant’s international obligations and consistent with the purpose 
of the Arrangement, a Participant may match, (…), financial terms and conditions offered by a 
Participant or a non-Participant. Financial terms and conditions provided in accordance with 
this Article are considered to be in conformity with the provisions of Chapter I, II and, when 
applicable, Annexes I, II, III, IV and X.2355 
 
Obviously, the term ‘international obligations’ indirectly refers to the SCM Agreement.  
Further, the explicit inclusion that matching of any other offer is consistent with the purpose 
of the Arrangement as well as in conformity with its main provisions is a response to the 
opposite reading by WTO panels.  As a result, the textual basis in the OECD Arrangement for 
the panels’ reasoning was completely removed.  In addition, the new text of the OECD 
Arrangement enhances the information available to non-Participants.  Participants ‘undertake 
to share information with non-Participants on notifications’ and ‘shall, on the basis of 
reciprocity, reply to a request of a non-Participant in a competitive situation on the financial 
terms and conditions offered for its official support, as it would reply to a request from a 
Participant’.2356  However, it seems questionable that these modifications would change the 
view of future panels.  Panels stressed several times that they interpret this question from the 
standpoint of the SCM Agreement, not from the standpoint of the OECD Arrangement, and 
their arguments are still valid.2357 Furthermore, information to non-Participants on non-
conforming offers is substantially improved but they are still not placed on an equal footing 
with Participants.2358  Therefore, it seems highly doubtful that future panels would allow a 
reading which a previous panel considered ‘simply inconsistent with the overarching 
principles and purposes of the WTO Agreement and the SCM Agreement’.2359  
                                                 
2355 Article 18 of the OECD Arrangement (emphasis added). 
2356 Article 4 of the OECD Arrangement.  Before the final stage of competition, Participants are not 
obliged to share information with other Participants on the real terms and conditions offered, as this is 
seen as part of normal competition between financial institutions.  Only if Participants make use of a 
‘permitted exception’ under the OECD Arrangement, prior notification has to be given pursuant to 
Articles 44 and 45 of the OECD Arrangement.  In this case, the new article 4 of the OECD Arrangement 
thus enables non-Participants in competition for the export sale to be informed beforehand as well.       
2357 They emphasize that their view is based on the provisions of the SCM Agreement and on ‘the need to 
prevent the scope of the safe haven clause from being improperly enlarged’. Panel Report, Brazil – 
Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), paras 5.114-5.115; Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and 
Guarantees, para 7.176; Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.140.  Matching of 
derogations would still systematically disadvantage developing countries, would be contrary a narrow 
reading induced from the general prohibition of export subsidies, and would allow non-WTO Members 
to determine the behaviour of WTO Members.  
2358 Mavroidis, Messerlin and Wauters observe that non-Participants have access to information on the 
export credit terms offered but still not on the final terms actually agreed upon.  See P. C. Mavroidis, P. 
A. Messerlin, and J. M. Wauters, The Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in the WTO 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 606 pp. at 410.  Indeed, non-Participants do not have access to the 
database collecting final terms of support because this is ex post open to Participants only.  Admittedly, 
non-Participants would be less interested in these final terms as the contract is already concluded at that 
time.  Yet, access might still be useful in order to check whether the disciplines of the OECD 
Arrangement were indeed respected or to know at which terms the competing exporter and ECA won the 
contract. 
2359 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.140. 
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On the other hand, the revised OECD Arrangement together with a published Explanation on 
Premium Rules seems to give sufficient information to non-Participants on the calculation of 
minimum premium benchmarks.2360  Consequently, the presumption for non-Participants that 
their export credit support is in conformity with the minimum premium rate obligations would 
no longer hold.  But export credits benefiting from pure cover support are still not subject to 
minimum interest rates and would, as a result, still not be considered within the scope of the 
safe haven by future panels. 
 
4.4. HOW SAFE IS THE SAFE HAVEN: IS NON-PROHIBITED SUBSIDIZED EXPORT CREDIT 
SUPPORT COUNTERVAILABLE AND/OR ACTIONABLE?  
In case official financing support conforms to the interest rate provisions of the latest version 
of the OECD Arrangement, it is not prohibited under the SCM Agreement.2361  The text of 
both paragraph 2 of item (k) and footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement show that such export 
credit support is exempted from the prohibition on export subsidies.  In the Appellate Body’s 
words:    
 
Under footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement, where the Illustrative List indicates that a measure is 
not a prohibited export subsidy, that measure is not deemed, for that reason alone, not to be a 
"subsidy". Rather, the measure is simply not prohibited under the Agreement. Other 
provisions of the SCM Agreement may, however, still apply to such a "subsidy".2362 
 
This confirms that the subsidy-definition is legally distinct from the exceptions on prohibited 
export subsidies.  As elaborated above, conformity with the OECD Arrangement is legally 
irrelevant to the benefit analysis.  Even though the OECD Arrangement is substantially 
strengthened over time, conformity with this Arrangement will also de facto not ensure that 
no benefit is conferred upon the exporter.2363  For example, under the current version of the 
OECD Arrangement, the obligations on premium rates do not guarantee that the 
buyer/borrower risk will be fully reflected in premium rates if this type of risk is covered.2364  
                                                 
2360 The list of prevailing country risk classifications is published after each meeting on the OECD 
website.  OECD Trade Directorate, above n 2151, at 6.   
2361 With repayment terms of at least two years and with fixed interest rates. 
2362 Other parts of the cited paragraph reveal that those other provisions include the provisions on 
actionable subsidies (Part III of the SCM Agreement) as well as on the imposition of countervailing 
measures (Part V of the SCM Agreement).  Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 93 (emphasis in the 
original).  See also Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), para 3.39.    
2363 Of course, this should be determined on a case-by-case basis.  Depending on the market 
circumstances, it might be the case that export credit support in conformity with the minimum rules of 
the OECD Arrangement is also available at the private market or that the private market even offers 
better terms (see also above n 2278).  As introduced above, Participants agreed to strengthen this aspect 
of the OECD Arrangement by introducing a common framework for the pricing of buyer credit risk, 
which has to be implemented by September 2011 (see above n 2173). 
2364 As elaborated above (n 2173), official support covering country risk as well as buyer/borrower risk 
merely has to respect the MPR, even though this is only based on the country risk, and the general 
obligation to cover long-term costs.     
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But even if only country risk would be covered, it is highly questionable that the private 
market would provide such cover at the floor rate set in the OECD Arrangement.2365  Indeed, 
an IMF study holds that premium rates charged by ECAs are not directly comparable to 
private premium rates as the private sector often does simply not offer the type of cover 
available through ECAs.2366  Such support would, nonetheless, be considered a specific 
subsidy under the SCM Agreement (private market test).  The OECD Arrangement aims at 
leveling the playing field among ECAs, not directly between ECAs and the private sector.2367   
Hence, OECD Arrangement-conforming export credits by ECAs that are justified on the basis 
of the safe haven, might – de jure and de facto – still be a ‘subsidy’ within the meaning of 
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.    
 
Are such non-prohibited but subsidized export credits safe from any other unilateral or 
multilateral challenge, given that footnote 5 and paragraph 2 of item (k) only stipulate that 
they are not prohibited under the SCM Agreement?  As the Appellate Body observed, other 
provisions of the SCM Agreement may still apply to a ‘subsidy’ within the meaning of Article 
1 of the SCM Agreement.2368   
First, this observation reveals how subsidized export credits offered in accordance with the 
OECD Arrangement can, just as all other specific subsidies, be countervailed if they cause 
injury to a Member’s domestic industry.2369  As indicated, under the Subsidies Code, the EC 
disagreed that OECD-conforming export credits could still qualify as subsidies and thus be 
countervailed.  Apparently, the EC seems to stick to this view even though the SCM 
Agreement, by including a separate subsidy-definition, leaves no doubt that it is erroneous.2370   
                                                 
2365 As elaborated above (n 2173 and 2174), in case only country credit risk is covered, the MPR is 
reduced by 10%.  The OECD Arrangement stipulates that an amount in surplus to the MPR should be 
charged for the highest risk countries but leaves it up to Participants to define the exact amount as long as 
no cost to the government is incurred.  Moreover, in case of export credits for certain transactions 
covered by sectoral understandings, there are no disciplines on premium rates in place (e.g., ships). 
2366 Wang, Mansilla, Kikuchi, and Choudhury, above n 2032, at footnote 7. 
2367 To be sure, an indirect motivation for strengthening disciplines under the OECD Arrangement is to 
prevent crowding out (or inhibition) of the private trade finance sector. 
2368 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 93. 
2369 Articles 10 (footnote 36), 11.2 and 19.1 of the SCM Agreement.  Evidently, CVDs can only offset 
the injury in the domestic market and are an inefficient instrument to respond to export credits offered by 
other ECAs to foreign buyers in third countries.  CVDs are effective in case domestic producers have to 
compete for domestic sales with foreign producers backed with subsidized export credits. 
2370 In the Farmed Atlantic Salmon investigation, the CVD investigation had concluded that the 
programme was in accordance with the OECD Arrangement and thus justified under item (k), para 2 of 
the Illustrative List.  Because the programme did not incur a cost to the government, it was considered 
not countervailable.  This conclusion was not explicitly (or certainly not exclusively) derived from the 
fact that the programme was in accordance with the OECD Arrangement.  Evidently, WTO Members can 
adopt a narrower view on which subsidies they would countervail but under EC law, the Basic 
Regulation defines countervailable subsidies similar as under the SCM Agreement.  Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1891/97 of 26 September 1997 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of farmed 
Atlantic salmon originating in Norway, (1997) OJ L267/19, para 75.  Implicitly, the view that OECD-
conform export credits cannot be countervailed seemed to be endorsed in the Council Regulation (EC), 
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Second, a more difficult question is whether OECD Arrangement-conforming export credit 
support, though not prohibited, could still be challenged as ‘actionable subsidies’.2371  At first 
sight, this option might be rejected on the basis of footnote 5 since its text indicates that such 
export credit support ‘shall not be prohibited under this or any other provision of the 
Agreement’.2372  By its terms, not only Article 3.1(a) (juncto the Illustrative List) is thus 
considered to ‘prohibit’ subsidies, but other provisions of the SCM Agreement could have 
that potential as well.  The provisions on actionable subsidies are prime candidates to fall 
within this group, as they are, next to those on prohibited subsidies, the only other disciplines 
imposing restrictions on subsidization.2373  Moreover, the case law contains some statements 
suggesting a broad interpretation of footnote 5.  The Appellate Body held that if an exception 
under the Illustrative List is demonstrated, ‘a Member is entitled to adopt it’ and, according to 
the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), that it would be ‘permitted’.2374     
On the other hand, several strong arguments could be advanced that OECD Arrangement-
conforming official export credit support could still be actionable.  Article 5 of the SCM 
Agreement on actionable subsidies does certainly not exclude this option and this reading 
might find some confirmation in the negotiating history as well.2375  The Panel in Korea – 
Commercial Vessels also decided that:   
 
Nothing in the SCM Agreement precludes claims being brought under both Parts II and III in 
respect of the same measures. Thus, to the extent that a complaining Member is able to 
demonstrate that a measure is a prohibited export subsidy that causes adverse effects to the 
interests of other Member, we see no reason why simultaneous findings could not be made 
under both Articles 3 and 5 of the SCM Agreement in respect of that measure.2376 
 
                                                                                                                                            
No 1599/1999 of 12 July 1999 (…) terminating the proceeding concerning imports of stainless steel 
wires (…) originating in the Republic of Korea, (1999) OJ L/189, para 56. 
2371 Members could show that subsidized export credits, for example, cause injury to their domestic 
industry or displace/impede their exports to the subsidizing country or a third country (Article 5(a) and 
5(c) juncto 6.3 of the SCM Agreement).   
2372 Emphasis added.       
2373 If this would only have referred to local content subsidies, drafters arguably would have been more 
specific.  Additionally, an argument could be made that local content subsidies might even not be 
covered by this reference in footnote 5, since local content subsidy claim would scrutinize aspects of the 
measure different those examined under an export subsidy claim (see below n 2403).    
2374 The Appellate Body based its reasoning on the text of footnote 59 (on avoiding double taxation) but, 
in this way, also indirectly interpreted the scope of footnote 5.  The Appellate Body did not explicitly 
qualify its statement in such a way that the subsidy would only justified insofar it would cause adverse 
effects to the interest of other Members.  Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), paras 
132-133; Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras 6.33 and 6.41. 
2375 Article 5 of the SCM Agreement prescribes that ‘no Member should cause, through the use of any 
subsidy referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article, adverse effects to the interests of other Members’ 
(emphasis added).  The Subsidies Code also stated, in Article 8, that ‘(…) 2. Signatories agree not to use 
export subsidies in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 3. Signatories further 
agree that they shall seek to avoid causing, through the use of any subsidy [injury to the domestic 
industry, nullification or impairment of benefits and serious prejudice] (…)’ (emphasis added).   
2376 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para 7.334. 
PART III CHAPTER 4 – EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
 
 437
This Panel rejected that Part II and Part III exhaustively deal with specific types of subsidies, 
namely export/local content subsidies and all other types of specific subsidies.2377  Hence, 
export subsidies could be challenged under Part III on actionable subsidies and, in this 
respect, the analysis under the safe haven seems to be irrelevant.2378  Moreover, strictly 
speaking, subsidies causing adverse effects are not prohibited under the SCM Agreement as 
the implementing Member has the option to withdraw the subsidy itself or its adverse 
effects.2379  Indeed, the only types of ‘prohibited subsidies’ (Part II) are export subsidies and 
local content subsidies.  As a result, an interpretation opening the door to an actionable 
subsidy claim would not contradict footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement.  In addition, deciding 
otherwise would imply that some subsidies contingent upon exportation would be non-
actionable whereas all domestic subsidies are actionable if causing adverse effects.  This 
might be hard to reconcile with the stricter stance on export subsidies under the SCM 
Agreement.  It would also mean that injury caused by such subsidies to the domestic industry 
could be countervailed (unilateral option), but not be challenged before a panel (multilateral 
option).  Finally, the Appellate Body’s statement that ‘the measure is simply not prohibited 
under the Agreement’ and ‘other provisions of the SCM Agreement may, (…), still apply to 
such a "subsidy"’ is also supportive of the conclusion that exceptions under the Illustrative 
List might still fall within the category of actionable subsidies.2380  Overall, the case law thus 
seems to incline to the narrow reading of footnote 5, which would imply that export credit 
support in accordance with the safe haven could still be challenged as an ‘actionable subsidy’ 
and will have to be withdrawn, or at least its adverse effects will have to be taken away, in 
case it causes adverse effects to the interest of other WTO Members.  Whether or not this 
seriously curtails the safe haven depends on the additional burden of proof put on the 
shoulders of the complaining party to demonstrate that such support caused one of the listed 
types of ‘adverse effects’ in Article 5 of the SCM Agreement.2381     
                                                 
2377 Thus, the fact that specific procedures are in place to challenge ‘prohibited’ and ‘actionable’ 
subsidies does not imply that they exhaustively deal with specific types of subsidies.  This aspect might 
also find confirmation in the S&D treatment provisions (see above Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.2; 
below Part III, Chapter 4, Section 4.5).   
2378 Even Korea as defendant acknowledged that ‘(f)ootnote 5 provides that excepted measures under 
Annex I are not “prohibited subsides”; it does not use the broader term “non-actionable subsidies” as is 
found in Article 8.1.  Therefore, such subsidies could still be considered under Part III or Part V’.  See 
Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, Second Written Submission of Korea (Annex E2), para 21.   
2379 Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement. 
2380 As noted above (n 1070), these other provisions seem to include the provisions on actionable 
subsidies (Part III of the SCM Agreement).  Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 93 (emphasis in the 
original).  This reading is also adopted by G. Luengo, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and 
EC Law (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006), 586 pp., at 152; K. Adamantopoulos and V. 
Akritidis, ‘Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMA) – Article 3 SCMA’, in R. 
Wolfrum, P-T. Stoll and M. Köbele (eds), Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law: WTO – 
Trade Remedies (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 471-486, at 483. 
2381 For example, the complaining party could demonstrate ‘serious prejudice’ on the basis of the fact that 
the export credit support’s effect is ‘to displace or impede the exports of a like product of another 
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4.5. EXCEPTION ON THE EXPORT SUBSIDY PROHIBITION FOR SOME DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
The SCM Agreement recognizes that ‘subsidies may play an important role in economic 
development programmes of developing country Members’ and therefore gives flexibility to 
developing countries on subsidization.2382   
At present, an exception to the prohibition on export subsidies relevant for export credit 
support is in place for two types of developing countries listed in Annex VII of the SCM 
Agreement2383: (i) least-developed countries (LDCs)2384 and (ii) some other low-income 
countries recited in item (b) of Annex VII of the SCM Agreement until their GNP per capita 
has reached $1000 per annum.2385  Despite this exception, their export subsidies will have to 
be phased-out within 8 years for those products in which they have reached export 
competitiveness.2386  Moreover, their subsidized export credits can still be challenged as 
‘actionable subsidies’.2387  Alternatively, other WTO Members could opt for the unilateral 
response if confronted with injury to their domestic industry.2388  The only additional burden 
for imposing these CVDs against developing countries is that the de minimis standard is 
higher.2389   
Interestingly, the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft recognized that export subsidies, including 
subsidized export credits that were at stake in that case, could be consistent with development 
needs of developing countries: it ‘(…) might be interested in the possible technological spin-
off effects from the development and production of the product in question, or the need to 
establish a strong market presence and reputation in foreign markets as a stepping stone to 
                                                                                                                                            
Member from a third country market’ (Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement).  See above Part II, Chapter 4, 
Section 4.2.3.     
2382 Article 27.1 of the SCM Agreement. See above Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1.1. 
2383 The remaining S&D treatment for certain small trading developing countries (Article 27.4 of the 
SCM Agreement) is not applicable with regard to export credit support because they only benefit from 
S&D treatment on exemptions from import duties and internal taxes (see below n 2391). 
2384 Annex VII of the SCM Agreement. LDCs are designated by the United Nations.  
2385 The threshold is raised to $1000 in constant 1990 dollars for three consecutive years.  The country 
will be re-included when it falls back below $1000. See Ministerial Conference, Implementation – 
Related Issues and Concerns (WT/MIN(01)/17, 14 November 2001), paras 10.1 and 10.4.  Three 
countries have graduated so far (i.e., Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Morocco).  See Table 1 above 
Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1.1.1.  
2386 Article 27.5 of the SCM Agreement.  Such export competitiveness was established for India with 
respect to textiles (see above Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1.1.3). 
2387 Article 27.7 of the SCM Agreement.  This might be an additional argument why OECD-conforming 
export credit support of developed countries should still be actionable.  Otherwise, OECD-conforming 
official financing support of developed countries would be non-actionable while export credit support 
given by developing countries benefiting from S&D treatment is actionable under certain conditions 
without the option to invoke the OECD Arrangement.  Alternatively, if the extensive reading of footnote 
5 would be adopted, developing countries benefiting from S&D should be allowed to invoke the safe 
haven when confronted with a claim under ‘actionable subsidies’.      
2388 For the application of CVDs, no differentiation is made among developing countries. 
2389 Article 27.10 of the SCM Agreement. 
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introducing products with greater national value-added’.2390  Thus, in the Panel’s view, export 
credit support could be a useful development tool not only to correct information/capacity 
market failures in the capital market but also as an instrument for export promotion.  At 
present, however, the prohibition on export subsidies is applicable to all developing countries 
not listed in, or which graduated from, Annex VII.2391  The gradual prohibition of export 
subsidies for these countries is one of the main novelties of the SCM Agreement.2392  Similar 
as for developed countries, they have to justify subsidized export credit support on the basis 
of the interest rate provisions of the OECD Arrangement, even though they are not involved 
in its revisions as non-Participants.2393 
 
4.6. EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT AS LOCAL CONTENT SUBSIDY 
So far, our discussion has totally neglected one particular aspect of the export credit support 
transaction.  Under what conditions are exporters exactly eligible to receive export credit 
support and how much foreign support content could be supported?  Because this aspect of 
the export credit transaction is not disciplined under the OECD Arrangement, countries have 
different criteria addressing this issue in place.  The US Ex-Im Bank has elaborated the most 
restrictive foreign content policies among all G-7 countries.  Therefore, the following analysis 
will scrutinize whether this legal regime is actually in conformity with the US WTO 
obligations.2394   
To be eligible for medium- and long-term export credit support of the US Ex-Im Bank, goods 
and services must be shipped from the US to a foreign buyer.  All goods and services in the 
supply contract shipped from the US are eligible, even when they were in part (i.e., 
components) or in full produced abroad previously.  This means that to be eligible for such 
medium- and long-term financing, no minimum amount of domestic content is required.  
However, the total level of support for a supply contract will be the lesser of: (a) 85% of the 
value of all eligible goods and services in the US supply contract; or (b) 100% of the US 
content in all eligible goods and services in the US supply contract.  As a result, only US 
content in the supply contract will be supported: if no US content is included, no support will 
                                                 
2390 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 7.92. 
2391 They were subject to a standstill obligation during a phase-out period which lapsed in 2003 and no 
extensions were provided on export credit support.  See article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement and SCM 
Committee, Procedures for extensions under Article 27.4 for certain Developing Country Members 
(G/SCM/39, 20 November 2001); General Council, Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (WT/L/691, 31 July 2007).   
2392 Those offered by developed countries were already disciplined under the Subsidies Code. 
2393 Except for Brazil with respect to the Sector Understanding for Civil Aircraft. 
2394 This legal regime is described in Export-Import Bank of the US, Foreign Content Policy for Medium- 
and Long-Term Exports (available at: http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/foreign_medium-
long.cfm); Export-Import Bank of the United States, above n 2045, at 69-72. 
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be given and US content is supported up to 85% of all eligible goods and services. 2395  This 
overall ceiling reflects the OECD Arrangement’s obligation that official support should not 
exceed 85% of the supply contract.   
 
Suppose by way of example the financing of a telecommunications project with a $10.7 
million supply contract (see Table 1), involving $9 million US content and $1.7 million 
foreign content of which $1 million is shipped from the US.  The fraction of the supply 
contract eligible for export credit support is $10 million.  Given that the share of US content 
is above the 85% ceiling, $8.5 million is the total level that will be supported.2396   In case US 
content would only have been $7 million and foreign content shipped from the US $3 million, 
the total level of support would have been $7 million.  This illustrates that the level of support 
starts decreasing once the share of foreign content shipped from the US is higher than 15% 
(so-called 15% ‘foreign content allowance’).  Only for 15% of the eligible sales contract is 
the exporter indifferent between sourcing locally or importing.   
 
Goods/services in 
supply contract 
US content Foreign content  
shipped from the US 
Foreign content 
not shipped from 
the US 
Computers 4,000,000 500,000 0 
Antennas 3,00,000 0 600,000 
Transmitters 2,000,000 500,000 100,000 
Total 9,000,000 1,000,000 700,000 
US supply contract 10,700,000 
Eligible US supply 
contract 
10,000,000  
Level of support 8,500,000   
TABLE 1: HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF US SUPPLY CONTRACT2397 
 
However, are these conditions not in violation with the prohibition on local content subsidies 
spelled out in Article 3.1(b) SCM Agreement? 2398  As explained in this study’s Part II, local 
                                                 
2395 As an exception, US Ex-Im Bank could next to US content also offer local cost support up to 30% of 
the eligible US supply contract.  Local costs are ‘expenditures for goods and services in the buyer's 
country that are necessary either for executing the exporter's contract or for completing the project of 
which the exporter's contract forms a part’ (Annex XI, item (j) of the OECD Arrangement).  The OECD 
Arrangement allows such support for local cost up to 30% of the export contract value (Article 11 of the 
OECD Arrangement).  ‘Ancillary service fees’ could under certain conditions and limitations receive 
financing as well.  Contrary to local costs, these service providers do not necessarily have to originate in 
the buyer’s country.  Depending on the way these are structured, such fees are either considered part of 
US content or part of local cost.   
2396 Moreover, ‘local costs’ could be supported if, for example, a subsidiary of the US exporter is 
responsible for installing the telecommunication project in the buyer’s country.  A maximum of $1.5 
million local costs could be supported (see above n 2395) in addition to $8.5 million US content.  Yet, if 
the US exporter itself provides the service in the buyer’s country, this is considered as US content.  The 
threshold question is whether the service provider pays taxes under the US law: if this is the case, it is 
considered as US content.   
2397 This example is partly based on an example given by the Ex-Im Bank (above n 2394).  
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content subsidies are conceptually different from other subsidies as they target trade distortion 
in the input industry and not in the market of the industry receiving the subsidy.  Applied to 
export credit support, it should thus be demonstrated that it qualifies as a subsidy to the 
exporter in the meaning of the SCM Agreement (on the basis of Article 1 juncto 3 or the 
Illustrative List).  If this subsidy, which is deemed to be specific (Article 2.3 SCM 
Agreement), is ‘contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use 
of domestic over imported goods’, it would in principle be prohibited under the SCM 
Agreement.2399  The criteria set by the US Ex-Im Bank for medium and long-term credits are 
clearly ‘contingent’ upon the use of domestic goods given that no support would be given 
without domestic content and only domestic content is supported.2400  Indeed, only those parts 
and components (upstream industry) of the exported product (downstream industry) having 
US origin are supported.  Turning back to our example, the imported components (e.g., hard 
disks) used for assembling the computers in the US are ‘foreign content’, for which the 
foreign buyer of computers will thus not receive export credit support from the Ex-Im 
Bank.2401  Or, if the Ex-Im Bank would support an export sale of a Boeing airplane, only 
those parts and components (e.g., engines) produced in the US will be supported.  Thus, an 
exporter has a strong incentive to buy locally as only this amount will be eligible for export 
credit support in the end. 2402   
 
Hence, are such subsidized export credits provided by the US Ex-Im Bank prohibited on the 
basis of the Article 3.1(b), because they qualify as local content subsidies?  For those 
subsidized export credits not covered by the safe haven, the answer would be affirmative but 
the practical relevance might be low.  Indeed, such subsidized export credits (e.g., pure cover 
                                                                                                                                            
2398 Recall that the panel and Appellate Body also considered that local content subsidies to agricultural 
products are prohibited under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement (see above Part II, Chapter 6, Section 
6.2.3.1).  In theory, export credit support to agricultural products having similar local content conditions 
in place could be challenged similarly under the SCM Agreement but such support is mostly short-term 
in nature.  Moreover, such support could not be exempted on the basis of the safe haven as it falls outside 
the scope of the OECD Arrangement.  
2399 This encompasses de jure as well as de facto contingency. Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft, 
paras 135-143. 
2400 On the interpretation of ‘contingency’ under Article 3.1(a) and (b), see above Part II, Chapter 4, 
Section 4.1.   
2401 Hence, domestic assembly of the foreign inputs does not transform the foreign-originated input to 
domestic content. 
2402 This reasoning does not mean that export credit support (or other subsidies) given to domestic 
products is ipso facto contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods.  Such reasoning would 
be at odds with the SCM Agreement as this allows, under certain conditions, subsidization of domestic 
products.  Rules of origin determine under what conditions a product could be considered a ‘domestic’ 
product.  Yet, local content rules do not imply that only domestic inputs are supported.  Consider, for 
example, a subsidy given to Boeing.  This would not be considered a local content subsidy simply 
because a certain amount of local inputs has to be used in order to qualify as a US aircraft.  In contrast, a 
local content subsidy might exist if only those parts of a ‘US aircraft’ that are effectively produced 
domestically are subsidized.  The latter is the case under the US Ex-Im Bank criteria for medium- and 
long-term support.  
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support at below market terms) are already prohibited as an export subsidy.  On the other 
hand, subsidized export credits covered by the safe haven will, pursuant to footnote 5, not be 
‘prohibited (…) under any other provision of this Agreement’ and, as a result, shall probably 
not be prohibited as local content subsidies.2403  Nevertheless, as argued above, this footnote 
does not exempt those subsidies from scrutiny under the actionable subsidy category (or from 
CVDs action).  More important, the scope of footnote 5 is explicitly limited to ‘this 
Agreement’ and, for that reason, does not shield those non-prohibited subsidies from scrutiny 
under other WTO Agreements.  Consequently, OECD Arrangement-conform subsidized 
export credits could, if contingent upon the use of domestic goods, be challenged on the basis 
of Article III:4 of the GATT and the TRIMs Agreement.   
First, these subsidies seem to violate the GATT’s national treatment provision (Article III:4) 
because the regulations at hand discriminate between domestic and foreign input-supplying 
industry. The exception for subsidies to domestic producers (Article III:8(b) of the GATT) is 
not applicable since the discrimination exists between the domestic and foreign input 
industries and not between the subsidized industry and the foreign industry.2404  Domestic 
input producers are treated favorably, not because they receive a subsidy themselves but 
because the exporter receives a subsidy contingent upon the use of their inputs.   
Second, local content subsidies seem to be covered under the Illustrative List of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) that are inconsistent with Article 
III:4 of the GATT (as local content requirements).2405  The Ex-Im Bank justifies its eligibility 
and foreign content criteria by referring to its mandate ‘to maintain or increase US 
employment through the financing of US exports’.2406  Hence, these criteria for receiving 
official export credit support could be considered investment measures.2407  Such investment 
measures are inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT in case ‘compliance with which is 
necessary to obtain an advantage’ (e.g., export credit support) and which require ‘the 
purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source’ 
(e.g., eligible criteria).2408  In sum, even if OECD Arrangement-conform export credits are in 
                                                 
2403 The text of footnote 5 thus seems to exclude that such export credit support would be prohibited as a 
local content subsidy.  On the other hand, one might object that the focus of local content subsidies is on 
the discrimination between domestic and foreign inputs and conformity of the export transaction with the 
OECD Arrangement is not directly relevant in this respect.  It would only be relevant if OECD 
Arrangement-conforming export credit support would ipso facto be extended at commercial terms but 
this assumption is not fulfilled.  If that would be the case, there would be no subsidy given to the exporter 
and thus no extra incentive to buy local inputs instead of imported ones.   
2404 GATT Panel Report, Italy – Agricultural Machinery, para 14; Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para 
14.43. 
2405 See Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement juncto paragraph 1 of the Illustrative List of the TRIMs 
Agreement.  
2406 Export-Import Bank of the United States, above n 2045, at 69. 
2407 Article 1 of the TRIMs (no definition of investment is provided). 
2408 Paragraph 1 of the Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement. 
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accordance with the SCM Agreement, they could nonetheless be in violation with Article 
III:4 of the GATT and Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement if they have eligibility criteria in 
place that discriminate between local and foreign input industry.2409,2410 
 
Although these foreign content criteria thus seem WTO-inconsistent, the impetus for relaxing 
these requirements might rather come from within the US.  Indeed, the 2009 Report of the US 
Ex-Im Bank shows that ECAs of other G-7 countries are gradually implementing more 
flexible foreign content criteria (e.g., increasing maximum foreign content allowance).  
Hence, they shift from the ‘made in country X’ approach to the ‘made by country X’ 
approach.2411  It allows these ECAs to support foreign content (e.g., produced by foreign 
subsidiaries of domestic ‘champions’) so long as the overall transaction is considered 
beneficial to the ‘national interest’.2412  Hence, US exporters complained that they no longer 
competed on a level playing field with exporters of other G-7 countries as those exporters 
could receive support at similar financing terms but with less local content requirements in 
place.  As they are restricted from purchasing from the most efficient upstream producer to 
receive the same amount of support,  US exporters considered Ex-Im Bank’s foreign content 
policy ‘the biggest challenge’ for its competitiveness vis-à-vis other ECAs.2413   
This reveals an interesting friction between the interests of exporters (e.g., ‘national 
champions’) and the Ex-Im Bank’s mission to support US employment.  Similar to the 
dynamics of tariff negotiations, the trade distortion created by the government in the upstream 
                                                 
2409 Note that these provisions can in theory still be justified on the basis of the general exceptions 
(Article XX of the GATT and Article 3 of the TRIMs) or balance-of-payments exception (Articles XII 
and XVIII:B of the GATT and Article 4 of the TRIMs). 
2410 The same conclusion holds when such criteria would be installed for export credit support offered by 
developing countries.  First, there are currently no S&D treatment provisions on the prohibition of local 
content subsidies in force (Article 27.3 of the SCM Agreement).  As a result, a developing country 
(including LDCs) whose subsidized export credit system is challenged on the basis of the prohibition of 
local content subsidies (3.1(b)), will have to justify its support on the basis of the OECD Arrangement 
(footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement juncto para 2 of item (k) Illustrative List).  If successful, the 
subsidized export credit support is not prohibited under the SCM Agreement.  Yet, local content criteria 
can also be challenged under Article III.4 GATT and Article 2 TRIMs, with the exception for those 
LDCs still benefiting from relevant S&D treatment under TRIMs to introduce such type of support. 
2411 Export-Import Bank of the United States, above n 2045, at 69-72. 
2412 An interesting question is how the part of export credit support for products produced abroad (and 
not shipped from the ECAs’ country) would be disciplined under the SCM Agreement.  The basic thrust 
of the disciplines on export subsidies is to inhibit countries’ reflex to subsidize their exports produced 
domestically (‘made in country X’).  Apparently, some countries are more and more willing to support 
their ‘national champions’, even if they partly produce abroad, as long as it benefits their overall 
‘national interest’ (‘made by country X’).  Unless this ‘national interest’ merely covers these national 
champions’ interests and would thus result from their political-economy efforts, this assumes that the 
spillovers of the production remaining in the home country are deemed sufficiently high to offer such 
support (or such support might result from political-economy efforts).   
2413 Export-Import Bank of the United States, above n 2045, at 72.  The fact that, despite the stringent 
local content requirements, US exporters still opt for US Ex-Im Bank export credit support illustrates that 
this support is extended at better-than-market terms conditions.    
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industry (e.g., local content requirements) might thus shrink because of internal pressure from 
the domestic downstream industry.  
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5.  DISCIPLINES ON EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS  
In this section, the policy space given to WTO Members to offer export credit support for 
agricultural products is explored.  The scope of the present disciplines was delineated by the 
panels and Appellate Body in the US – Upland Cotton cases.  Before the US – Upland Cotton 
rulings, it was not even clear whether any substantive discipline was in place on such support.  
In this dispute, Brazil challenged the operation of the US export credit programmes with 
regard to upland cotton as well as to a number of other agricultural products, all of which 
qualified as ‘agricultural products’ under Annex I of the Agreement on Agriculture.2414  
Because Brazil formulated claims under both the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM 
Agreement, a preliminary question addressed the precise Agreement under which the 
programmes had to be analyzed first.   
By virtue of Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, other multilateral agreements on 
trade in goods ‘shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement’.2415  This provision 
thus provides for the application of the SCM Agreement2416 but likewise implies that the latter 
only applies ‘except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture contains specific 
provisions dealing specifically with the same matter’.2417  Furthermore, Article 3.1 of the 
SCM Agreement prohibits export subsidies ‘except as provided in the Agreement on 
Agriculture’, which according to the Appellate Body means that ‘the WTO-consistency of an 
export subsidy for agricultural products has to be examined, in the first place, under the 
Agreement on Agriculture’.2418   
As a result, the Panel in US – Upland Cotton first analyzed the claims on export credit 
support for agricultural products under the Agreement on Agriculture.2419  To be sure, the 
SCM Agreement already offered important guidance in interpreting the concept of an export 
subsidy under the Agreement on Agriculture.2420 Once the analysis under the Agreement on 
                                                 
2414 In the original procedure, Brazil challenged three such programmes: the GSM 102, the GSM 103, 
and the Supplier Credit Guarantee Programme (SCGP).  Because the latter two were repealed, the central 
claim before the compliance panel was whether the operation of the revised GSM 102 was still 
inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement.  
2415 Emphasis added. 
2416 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.257. 
2417 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 532; Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para 
155; Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para 186. 
2418 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para 123. 
2419 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 7.251-7.262.  See also Panel Report, Canada – Dairy, paras 
7.18-7.23; Panel Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 7.101.   
2420 In the words of the Appellate Body: ‘(a)lthough an export subsidy granted to agricultural products 
must be examined, in the first place, under the Agreement on Agriculture, we find it appropriate, as has 
the Appellate Body in previous disputes, to rely on the SCM Agreement for guidance in interpreting 
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture’. Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 571.  
See also Panel Report, Canada – Dairy, para 7.23.  The Panel cited the Appellate Body’s statement in 
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut: ‘with respect to subsidies on agricultural products … (t)he Agreement on 
Agriculture and the SCM Agreement reflect the latest statement of WTO Members as to their rights and 
obligations concerning agricultural subsidies’.  
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Agriculture was finished, the question on the applicability of the SCM Agreement to export 
credit support for agricultural products emerged.  The same order of analysis is adopted in our 
discussion. 
 
5.1. EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS UNDER THE AGREEMENT 
ON AGRICULTURE 
As explained in detail in Part II, the Agreement on Agriculture does not install a principle 
prohibition on export subsidies.  In disciplining agricultural export subsidies, the Agreement 
on Agriculture draws a distinction between listed types of export subsidies (Article 9 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture) on the one hand, and all other types of export subsidies (Article 
10 of the Agreement on Agriculture) on the other hand. 
 
Concerning the listed types of export subsidies in Article 9 of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
WTO Members having scheduled agricultural products are allowed to support these products 
with these listed forms of export subsidies, but only up to their reduction commitments.  
Hence, the six listed types of export subsidies could not be offered to unscheduled agricultural 
products and to scheduled agricultural products above reduction commitment levels.  This 
means that WTO Members that have not scheduled any agricultural product could in principle 
not offer listed-types of export subsidies at all.  Yet, an exception for developing countries is 
in place with regard to two types of export subsidies.  By virtue of Article 9.4 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, developing countries are allowed to grant marketing and transport 
export subsidies as long as these are not applied in a way that would circumvent their 
reduction commitments.2421 
 
Export credit support is, however, not among these listed types of export subsidies in Article 
9.  Only Article 10.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture explicitly deals with export credit 
support and stipulates an obligation on WTO Members to work toward the development of 
multilateral disciplines.  Since no such disciplines have been drafted so far, the pivotal 
question presented in the US – Upland Cotton case was whether export credit support is 
already subject to the general anti-circumvention obligation imposed on non-listed export 
subsidies (Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture).  In order to find a violation of 
Article 10.1, two elements have to be established: (a) the presence of ‘export subsidies not 
listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9’; (b) ‘applied in a manner which results in, or which 
threatens to lead to, circumvention of export subsidy commitments’.  Both elements are 
examined consecutively.  
                                                 
2421 On the scope and content of this exception, see above Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.2.1.2. 
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5.1.1. Scope: Export subsidies not listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture 
5.1.1.1. Is subsidized export credit support covered by Article 10.1 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture? 
Export credit support for agricultural support is only covered insofar it qualifies as an ‘export 
subsidy’ in the meaning of Article 10.1.  The following section discusses the determination of 
whether export credit support is effectively offered at subsidized terms.  Assuming that this 
condition is fulfilled, such support at face value seems to fall within the scope of Article 10.1 
as it is an export subsidy ‘not listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9’.2422  Nonetheless, the US 
argued before the original Panel and Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton that export credit 
support is not covered under the term ‘export subsidies’ of Article 10.1 since it would be 
exempted thereof by virtue of paragraph 2 of Article 10.2423  This provision reads: 
 
Members undertake to work toward the development of internationally agreed disciplines to 
govern the provision of export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes and, 
after agreement on such disciplines, to provide export credits, export credit guarantees or 
insurance programmes only in conformity therewith’. 
 
As disentangled by the Appellate Body, two types of obligations are imposed upon WTO 
Members with respect to export credit support under this paragraph: (i) working toward the 
development of internationally agreed disciplines to govern their provision; and (ii) after 
agreement on such disciplines, to provide them only in conformity therewith.2424   To date, no 
such disciplines have been agreed upon and no substantive obligations are thus currently in 
place by virtue of Article 10.2.  Yet, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that paragraph 
2 does not carve out export credit support from the scope of paragraph 1.  In a rare separate 
opinion, however, one Appellate Body Member adhered to the US view mainly because the 
fact that WTO Members chose to deal with export credit support under Article 10.2 ‘shows 
that this special treatment (…) must be given meaning and weight’.2425   Applying the 
customary rules of treaty interpretation, the Appellate Body offered the following arguments 
to underpin its conclusion.   
First, starting with the ordinary meaning, the Appellate Body stressed that paragraph 2 does 
not explicitly exclude export credit support from the disciplines in Article 10.1 whereas ‘it 
                                                 
2422 By its terms, only export subsidies not listed in Article 9 are covered by Article 10.1.  See, for 
example, Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para 142; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 
615. 
2423 The Appellate Body was ‘stuck by the fact’ that the Panel only addressed this argument of the US at 
the end of its analysis (i.e., after having analyzed whether export credit support was subsidized or not).  
Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 628.  
2424 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 607. 
2425 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 631-641.  Observe that several authors as well as 
the OECD Secretariat also shared the US view, whereas the WTO Secretariat seemed to have taken 
another position (see above n 2164).  See also, Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R/Add.1, 
Part 3, at D-29. 
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would be expected that an exception would have been clearly provided had this been the 
drafters' intention’.2426  The wording ‘development’ also suggests that future disciplines will 
be ‘an elaboration of the export subsidy disciplines that are currently applicable’, which 
means that the mandate of Article 10.2 will not be irrelevant if such support would also be 
disciplined under paragraph 1.2427  On the other hand, as the dissenting Appellate Body 
Member argued, the wording ‘to work toward the development’ might likewise suggest that 
no disciplines yet exist.2428  The dissenting Member saw some confirmation in the phrase that 
only ‘after agreement on such disciplines’ export credit support shall be provided in 
conformity therewith.2429 
Second, the Appellate Body found contextual support in Article 10.1 juncto Article 1(e) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture.  A plain reading of Article 10.1 would only exclude export 
subsidies listed in Article 9.1.  Moreover, the term ‘export subsidies’ is defined in Article 1(e) 
as ‘subsidies contingent upon export performance, including the export subsidies listed in 
Article 9’2430 and, according to the Appellate Body, ‘the use of the word "including" suggests 
that the term "export subsidies" should be interpreted broadly’.2431  One could object that the 
ordinary meaning of ‘including’ merely indicates that Article 9.1 is not an exhaustive list but 
not necessarily that the group of non-listed export subsidies should be interpreted broadly. 
Third, the Appellate Body referred to the object and purpose of Article 10 which is – as its 
title suggests – ‘the prevention of circumvention of export subsidy commitments’.2432  The US 
view would undermine this objective as it would imply that export credit support is currently 
‘subject to no disciplines at all’.2433  The dissenting Member equally disagreed on this point 
because Article 10.2 recognizes the trade-distorting potential of export credit support and is 
thus consistent with the anti-circumvention objective. 
Fourth, the Panel and Appellate Body also addressed how the negotiating history confirmed 
their reading, even though both considered it redundant to resort to this supplementary means 
of interpretation.2434  The fact that this was seen as redundant is surprising, not only in light of 
the ambiguity left by the general rules of interpretation but also because the Appellate Body 
                                                 
2426 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 609-610.   
2427 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 611 (emphasis added).        
2428 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 632-633 (emphasis added). 
2429 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 633. 
2430 Emphasis added. 
2431 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 615. 
2432 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 616. 
2433 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 617 (emphasis in the original).  At the time of the 
original US – Cotton case, the peace clause was still applicable.  Today, the argument might be advanced 
that subsidized export credit support could also be actionable under the SCM Agreement (see below) and 
would, therefore, not be ‘not disciplined at all’ if Article 10.1 would have been considered inapplicable.  
Arguably, this should have been anticipated by the Appellate Body (and claimed by the US).    
2434 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, above n 1739, para 623.   
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seemed to rely on the general rules of interpretation to sort out the drafters’ intention.2435  If 
revealing their intention is deemed essential, the preparatory work seems relevant par 
excellence.2436  In which direction does this preparatory work on Article 10.2 point?   
It undeniably shows that export credit support was explicitly on the negotiating table.2437  
Three relevant phases in the drafting process could be distinguished, in which each devoted a 
separate paragraph to export credit support under the general anti-circumvention article.  
First, a draft for discussion was circulated whereby ‘[f]or the purposes of this Article, whether 
[export credit support] constitute[s] export subsidies shall be determined on the basis of 
paragraphs (j) and (k) of Annex 1 to the [SCM Agreement]’ (phase 1).2438  Subsequently, this 
paragraph was omitted in the Dunkel Draft and a new paragraph was inserted: ‘Participants 
undertake not to provide export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes 
otherwise than in conformity with internationally agreed disciplines’ (phase 2).2439  This was 
in turn replaced by the current Article 10.2 whereby Members agreed to work toward the 
development of internationally agreed disciplines and, after agreement, to comply therewith 
(phase 3).  In the reading advocated by the US and the dissenting Appellate Body Member, a 
shift emerged from an initial proposal of disciplining export credit support by reference to the 
Illustrative List (phase 1) to a final agreement making such support only subject to future 
negotiations (phase 3).2440  However, the Panel read the omission of the provision referring to 
                                                 
2435 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 608, 609, 612, 617. 
2436 From a systemic point of view, one might argue that sorting out drafters’ intention should not be the 
purpose of the general rules of interpretation.  
2437 In July 1990, the DeZeeuw Text envisaged ‘concurrent negotiations to govern the use of export 
assistance, including "disciplines on export credits"’.  Next, the Chairman requested in a Note on Options 
in the Agriculture Negotiations of June 1991, ‘decisions by the principals on whether subsidized export 
credits and related practices ... would be subject to reduction commitments unless they meet appropriate 
criteria to be established …’.  In August 1991, an addendum was circulated by the new Chairman Dunkel 
which set out an Illustrative List of Export Subsidy Practices, including export credits provided by 
governments or their agencies on less than fully commercial terms and subsidized export credit 
guarantees or insurance programmes.  Note by the Chairman, Options in the Agriculture Negotiations, 
Addendum 10 (MTN.GNG/AG/W/1/Add.10, 2 August 1991). 
2438 Draft Text on Agriculture (unavailable in GATT archive). Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 
7.937. 
2439 Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(Dunkel Draft) (MTN.TNC/W/FA, 20 December 1991).   
2440 Yet, the US arguments on the correct reading of these drafts were no example of clarity.  Its position 
before the Panel seemed that the reference to the Illustrative List was transposed in indirect terms in 
phase 2 (under the concept of ‘internationally agreed disciplines’) but dropped in phase 3.  However, it 
seems unlikely that ‘internationally agreed disciplines’ include those elaborated in the Illustrative List.  
First, as Brazil also argued, drafters would arguably have been more specific if they aimed at referring to 
the Illustrative List.  Second, the Illustrative List is simply not ‘an internationally agreed discipline’ on 
export credit support for agricultural products but, at most, would be relied upon to reveal whether or not 
such support is subsidized.  Hence, the US argument that the reference to the Illustrative List was 
expressly dropped and replaced during the drafting process would be more plausible if this is situated 
between phase 1 and 2 (instead of between phase 2 and 3).  Indeed, the change from phase 2 to 3 seemed 
to reflect recognition among drafters that no internationally agreed disciplines were in place at that time.  
Apparently, the US seems to have altered its position along these lines on appeal.  See also J. A. 
McMahon, The WTO Agreement on Agriculture – A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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the Illustrative List (shift from phase 1 to 2) as reflecting a decision that this paragraph was 
considered ‘mere surplusage’ because export credit support was within the scope of 
disciplines on export subsidies according to the terms of the Agreement.2441  Although the 
negotiating history does not offer a clear-cut answer, at least two arguments cast doubt on the 
accuracy of the Panel’s reading.  First, contrary to the Panel’s suggestion, the negotiating 
history reveals that it was not evident that the standard for export credit support established 
under the Illustrative List could be transposed to the context of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.2442  Second, the provision referring to the Illustrative List was not merely omitted 
but was, in the same draft, also replaced by another provision dealing explicitly with export 
credit support.2443  This is given no meaning at all in the Panel’s interpretation but would just 
be the result of coincidence.  Without much underpinning, the Appellate Body read the 
drafting history as revealing that negotiators struggled with this issue and suggesting ‘that the 
disagreement between the negotiators related to which kinds of specific disciplines were to 
apply to such measures’ and not whether such disciplines had to be put in place.2444   
Other arguments advanced by the US further call into question whether the drafters meant to 
discipline export credit support under Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  The US 
advocated that it should be given meaning that Members explicitly chose not to include 
export credit support under the listed items of export subsidies subject to reduction 
commitments (Article 9.1).2445  But the Appellate Body explained that ‘(o)ne reason, for 
instance, may be that they considered that their (export credit support) programmes did not 
include a subsidy component, so that there was no need to subject them to export subsidy 
reduction commitments’.2446  Yet, this explanation lacks convincing since, as the Appellate 
Body itself had observed, Members were well aware of the potential trade-distorting impact 
of subsidized export credit support offered by their trading partners (in particular by the 
US).2447  Finally, the US also indicated that, if it would have known that export credit support 
                                                                                                                                            
2006), 333 pp., at 95; Olsen, above n 2164, at 78; Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, 
WT/DS267/R/Add.1, Part 3, at D-17 (para 32) and D-31 (footnote 56); United States, Appellant’s 
Submission (28 October 2004), paras 374-377. 
2441 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.940.   
2442 In previous texts, different standards were elaborated (e.g., addendum circulated by Dunkel (above n 
2437 )). 
2443 The Panel’s reasoning would be more plausible if the references to both the Illustrative List as well as 
to internationally agreed disciplines would have been stated in the same draft.  The dissenting Appellate 
Body Member (para 636) seemed to attach some weight to the fact that the former was deleted in the 
draft in which the latter was inserted.    
2444 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 623. 
2445 Brazil objected that Chairman Dunkel’s draft (see above n 2437) also included other items in its list, 
such as tax concessions on exports, which were also not carried over under Article 9.1 but which are, 
nonetheless, subject to the disciplines under Article 10.1     
2446 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 625 
2447 This recognition precisely underpins the Appellate Body’s reading that it was no option for drafters 
to not make export credit support subject to any discipline at all.  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland 
Cotton, para 623. 
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for agricultural products was indirectly made subject to reduction commitments (through 
Article 10.1), its base period export subsidy quantity (from which reduction commitments 
were calculated) would have been much larger.2448  This indeed seems to show that the US, by 
far the largest provider of such support, was not aware that such support was already 
disciplined.  Whereas the Appellate Body seems to have neglected this argument, the Panel 
found that it could not accept the opinion of ‘one Member’ as representing a shared 
interpretation among Members.2449 In this respect, the US also argued that export credit 
support was not subject to the notification requirements2450 but the Appellate Body simply 
observed that ‘whether WTO Members with export credit guarantee programmes have 
reported them in their export subsidy notifications is not determinative (…)’.2451  Although 
low legal value should indeed be attached to the notification requirements, they might 
nonetheless be useful to reveal drafters’ intentions.   
 
To summarise, the Panel and Appellate Body found that export credit support was not by 
virtue of Article 10.2 exempted from Article 10.1.  The Appellate Body’s main concern 
seemed to have been that deciding otherwise would mean that export credit support was 
currently not subject to any discipline at all, which could not have been the intention of the 
drafters.  An undiscussed element in favour of this interpretation was that the US also 
formally agreed during the Uruguay Round that export credit support should be 
disciplined.2452  Nonetheless, several arguments also cast doubt on whether the Appellate 
Body correctly revealed the drafters’ intention.  First of all, the negotiating record shows that 
the option to discipline export credit support by reference to the Illustrative List was tabled 
but replaced by another explicit provision only mandating future negotiations.  Moreover, the 
US as prime provider of such support was certainly not aware that its export credit support 
was subject to the anti-circumvention provision along the lines interpreted by the Appellate 
Body.  The absence of a reference in the notification requirements to export credit support 
indicates that other Members seemed to share this interpretation.  Last but not least, as 
                                                 
2448 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.941; United States, Appellant’s Submission, above n 2440, 
para 385. 
2449 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.942. 
2450 United States, Appellant’s Submission, above n 2440, para 348. 
2451 The Appellate Body observed disagreement on whether export credit support was subject to the 
notification requirements, but failed to mention which view was correct.  It seems that the US position, 
which was adopted by third-party Canada as well, was correct.  The table on notifications refers to (i) 
‘subsidized exports’ and (ii) food aid, and a supporting table specifies six listed types of export subsidies.  
So, while food aid is explicitly referred to, no reference is made to (subsidized) export credit support.  
Brazil’s argument that subsidized export credit support should, nonetheless, have been notified as 
‘subsidized exports’ seems not plausible, all the more because no Member notified these and because the 
lack thereof was not contested.  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 220, 625.  This also 
seemed the position of the WTO Secretariat.  See Background Paper by the Secretariat, above n 2162, 
para 41. 
2452 See above n 2062. 
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explained in more detail below, the Appellate Body’s interpretation implies that export credit 
support for agricultural products is even subject to stricter disciplines than listed types of 
export subsidies are.  It seems implausible that drafters had such an outcome in mind.   
Obviously, the dismissal that Article 10.2 exempts export credit support from the scope of 
Article 10.1 does not mean that export credit support ‘will necessarily constitute export 
subsidies for purposes of the Agreement on Agriculture’. Indeed, such support is ‘subject to 
the export subsidy disciplines in the Agreement on Agriculture only to the extent that (it 
includes) an export subsidy component’.2453  The question addressed in the following section 
is under what conditions export credit support would meet the definitional elements of an 
‘export subsidy’ in the meaning of Article 10.1. 
 
5.1.1.2. When is export credit support considered an export subsidy in the meaning of 
Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture? 
Most export credit support for agricultural products takes the form of export credit guarantees 
or insurance.  Such pure cover support was also challenged in the US – Upland Cotton 
dispute.  Whereas in the original procedure several different export credit guarantee 
programmes were challenged by Brazil2454, the compliance Panel had to review the operation 
of the one programme left over, namely the GSM 102 programme.  This programme 
guarantees the repayment of credits that do not exceed 3 years.    
 
How should it be determined whether such export credit support for agricultural products is 
extended at subsidized terms?  As accurately summarized and approved by the Appellate 
Body, given ‘the Agreement on Agriculture does not contain a comprehensive definition of 
the term "export subsidy", the Panel would refer to the SCM Agreement for contextual 
guidance (…) (i)n particular, the Panel said it would determine whether GSM 102 guarantees 
are "export subsidies" by applying the standard set out in item (j) of the Illustrative List’.2455  
Indeed, the Panel in the compliance procedure, in line with the original Panel, formally relied 
on item (j) as contextual support only, but de facto determined the export subsidy 
qualification on this basis.2456  Observing no disagreement among parties that an export credit 
guarantee programme meeting the elements of item (j) is a per se export subsidy, the Panel 
first applied this standard.2457  Only if the item (j) test would not be met, ‘a further contextual 
                                                 
2453 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 626. 
2454 See also above n 2108.   
2455 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 260 (emphasis added). 
2456 This seems to be criticized by Benitah.  M. Benitah, ‘US Agricultural Export Credits after the WTO 
Cotton Ruling: The Law of Unintended Consequences’, 6:2 The Estey Centre Journal of International 
Law and Trade Policy (2005), 107-114, at 111-112; McMahon, above n 2440, at 145. 
2457 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.763; Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 
647. 
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examination of the definitional elements contained in Articles 1 and 3 of the SCM 
Agreement’ would be undertaken.2458  Note that if official financing support to agricultural 
products would be challenged, complainants could likewise rely on item (k) of the Illustrative 
List for the examination of the ‘export subsidy’ element under Article 10.1 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture.  
 
5.1.1.2.1. Export subsidies as defined by item (j) of the Illustrative List 
As introduced above, item (j) considers pure cover support as an export subsidy if offered ‘at 
premium rates which are inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the 
(programme)’.  A ‘programme-wide analysis’2459 is called for, which compares the level of 
premiums with the overall long-term costs of the programme to the government.  Passing this 
cost-to-government test only requires ‘a finding on whether the premiums are insufficient 
(…) and not a finding of the precise difference between premiums and long-term operating 
costs and losses’.2460  This should be primarily demonstrated on the basis of quantitative 
evidence but could be supplemented with non-quantitative evidence.  
 
First, to the extent that relevant data are available, a quantitative evaluation of the financial 
performance of a programme should be undertaken revealing ‘the difference, if any, between 
the revenues derived from the premiums charged under the programme and its long-term 
operating costs and losses’.2461  To this end, ‘both retrospective data relating to a programme's 
historical performance and projections of its future performance’ could be advanced.2462  
Whereas the compliance Panel in US – Upland Cotton found support in the quantitative data 
that the revised programme still operated at a loss, the Appellate Body observed conflicting 
data on whether the programme was making a loss or not.2463  Apparently left unnoticed by 
                                                 
2458 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, above n 1738, para 7.803. 
2459 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.763. 
2460 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, above n 1739, paras 666-667. 
2461 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 278.   
2462 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 278.  The original Panel 
agreed with the parties that the 1992-2002 period was adequately ‘long-term’, but also indicated that 
older data and future projections could be relevant.  On the compliance level, historical data from the 
1992-2006 period were considered together with projections for 2006-2008. Generally speaking, ‘long-
term’ refers to ‘a period of sufficient duration as to ensure an objective examination which allows a 
thorough appraisal of the programme and which avoids attributing overdue significance to any unique or 
atypical experiences (…)’. Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.832. 
2463 The Panel had found support in the initial subsidy estimates for 2006 and 2007 which projected a net 
cost to the government.  However, the Appellate Body firmly criticized the Panel for dismissing the 
import of the US argument that re-estimates data over the 1992-2006 period projected a profit.  As re-
estimates take into account information on the historical performance (and estimated changes in future 
cash flows), they might be more reliable than initial estimates.  At the same time, the Appellate Body 
also observed that the Commodity Credit Corporation’s (CCC’s) Financial Statements estimated 
liabilities of $220 million with respect to post-1991 outstanding guarantees.  Hence, it was confronted 
with conflicting data, for which none of the parties could give a convincing explanation.   
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the Panel as well as the Appellate Body in the compliance procedure, the focus under item (j) 
should be on the adequacy of actual premiums charged.  Data on past performance should, 
therefore, be interpreted with caution as the fee structure under the challenged programme 
might have changed over time.2464  Indeed, the relevant question in the compliance procedure 
was whether the revised fee structure under the GSM 102 programme was adequate to cover 
long-term operating costs and losses.2465 
Supplementary to this quantitative analysis or in the absence of financial data, non-
quantitative evidence may be relevant.  First, the Appellate Body concurred with the Panel 
that this could include a comparison between the premiums under the programme and the 
minimum premium rates (MPRs) as set out in the OECD Arrangement, even though 
agricultural export credit support is not disciplined by the OECD Arrangement.2466  In 
particular, the magnitude of the difference (and not just any difference) between the 
premiums charged under the GSM-102 programme and MPRs provided an indication that 
premiums were set on a level inadequate to cover long-term costs.2467  Second, elements of 
the ‘structure, operation and design’ of the revised GSM-102 programme suggested that it 
operated at a loss.  In particular, the Panel found that the structure and design of the revised 
GSM-102 did not adequately ensure that GSM-102 fees were risk-based, because foreign 
obligor risk was not reflected in the fees2468 and the operation of the 1% fee cap prevented 
adjustment of fees to increased levels of risk (scaling).24692470  Although the Appellate Body 
                                                 
2464 On the one hand, historical data showing an overall profit are relevant insofar the new fee structure is 
more stringent than before.  Indeed, this a fortiori-reasoning seems to be made by the Appellate Body 
(see Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 299, emphasis added).  On 
the other hand, historical data showing an overall loss is not per se an indication of the inadequacy of 
actual premiums if the fee structure has been strengthened over time.  Although not explicitly recognized 
by the Appellate Body, these data an sich (e.g., CCC’s audited Financial Statements) should have been 
considered relevant only because it questioned the accuracy of re-estimates data.  Of course, projections 
for the future incorporating the new fee structure (i.e., estimates for 2006 and 2007) are clearly relevant. 
2465  The compliance Panel (para 14.79) and Appellate Body (para 321) focused on this particular 
question but did not explicitly relate their discussion on quantitative data to this element (except for the 
Appellate Body as elaborated above n 2464).   
2466 Yet, MPRs do not provide a legally binding benchmark under item (j) as this item, contrary to 
paragraph 2 of item (k), does not refer to the OECD Arrangement (see above).    
2467 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras 302-306; Panel Report, US 
– Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras 14.94 – 14.103. 
2468 The Panel agreed with Brazil that foreign obligor risk should not only be reflected via exposure limits 
(as was the case under the revised GSM-102) but also through fees.  Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras 14.113 – 14.115.  It might be relevant to recall that the MPRs under the 
OECD Arrangement do not take into consideration foreign buyer/borrower risks but only country risks.   
2469 As an indication, due to this fee cap, the revised GSM-102 fees increased much slower in response to 
increased risk than the rate of increase of fees charged under Ex-Im programmes.  Appellate Body 
Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 312. 
2470 Another qualitative element considered relevant by the Panel was that the CCC had access to funds 
from the US Treasury and benefited from the full faith and credit of the US government.  The Appellate 
Body agreed that this could be a factor but correctly emphasized that it is not a significant one for 
assessing the profitability of the programme under item (j) (Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 319).  Indeed, this reveals as such nothing about the adequacy of the 
premiums, but only makes it possible that a programme keeps operating at a loss. 
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had found that the quantitative data gave rise to opposite conclusions, this non-quantitative 
evidence provided a ‘sufficient evidentiary basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than 
not that the revised GSM 102 programme operates at a loss’.2471  As a result, the Appellate 
Body agreed with the compliance Panel’s conclusion that the revised GSM programme was 
still an ‘export subsidy’ in the meaning of item (j) and therefore also in the meaning of Article 
10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
 
5.1.1.2.2. Export subsidies as defined by Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement 
Brazil claimed that the US export credit programme was not only an ‘export subsidy’ under 
Article 10.1 in light of the standard set in item (j) but also in the meaning of Article 1 juncto 3 
of the SCM Agreement, in which the benefit-to-recipient element of Article 1.1(b) of the 
SCM Agreement forms the crux of the analysis.2472  As explained above challenging an export 
credit guarantee programme under Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement seems more 
difficult in light of the mandatory/discretionary distinction adopted by most panels.  But 
Brazil had a good reason for pursuing this supplementary claim.2473  Because of the different 
benchmarks, ‘a measure that no longer constitutes an export subsidy under item (j) may still 
constitute an export subsidy under Articles 1.1 and 3.1(a)’.2474  Indeed, a programme that runs 
break-even (item (j)) could still offer guarantees on terms not available on the commercial 
market or generate export credits at below market terms not compensated by the level of the 
fee (Article 1 juncto 14 of the SCM Agreement).2475  Yet, the Panel, as endorsed by the 
Appellate Body, exercised judicial economy on Brazil’s ‘argument’ under Article 1 juncto 3 
since it already found a violation of item (j).2476  As Brazil had rightly feared, the US held 
before the compliance Panel that it implemented the Dispute Settlement Body’s (DSB) 
recommendations by bringing its pure cover programme into accordance with the cost-to-
government standard in item (j).2477  Again, the compliance Panel exercised judicial economy 
on Brazil’s claim under Articles 1 and 3 of the SCM Agreement because the revised pure 
cover support programme was still found to be inconsistent with item (j).2478  
                                                 
2471 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 321. 
2472 See above Part III, Chapter 4, Section 4.2. 
2473 In fact, Brazil’s first-order argument was based on the Article 1 juncto Article 3 analysis. 
2474 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 726.  Brazil also requested the Panel to make such 
findings, in case the Appellate Body would disagree with its findings under item (j).  Panel Report, US – 
Upland Cotton, para 6.31. 
2475 See above n 2472. 
2476 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 6.31, 7.803; Appellate Body Report,  
2477 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), Annex A-2 (para 3).  The 2009 report of 
the Ex-Im Bank to US Congress also referred to the mandate of ‘WTO rulings to operate at break-even 
over the long term’.  See Export-Import Bank of the United States, above n 2045, at 13. 
2478 Brazil had formulated its first-order claim under Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement. Panel 
Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras 14.49-14.53. 
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This exercise of judicial economy fails to acknowledge that the subsidy determination under 
both options (benefit-to-recipient versus cost-to-government) could give rise to different 
implementation standards or, at least, would give different guidance on how to implement the 
DSB’s recommendations.2479  After all, the question was left open as to a correct 
understanding of the obligation to ‘withdraw the subsidy without delay’ if the subsidy element 
is only demonstrated on the basis of the cost-to-government standard under item (j).2480  
Ought the US implement the DSB’s recommendations if it ensures that its revised programme 
no longer runs at a cost to the government, even though it might still be beneficial as such or 
as applied under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement?  Significantly, the Arbitrator decided that 
this would not be considered full compliance.  Making its export credit support programme 
consistent with item (j) does ‘not necessarily ensure full withdrawal’ as it might still confer a 
benefit on the basis of the standard set forth in Article 14(c) of the SCM Agreement.2481  
Thus, the Arbitrator held the view that the standard of full compliance is only fulfilled if no 
benefit-to-recipient is offered, even if the panels’ analyses only focused on item (j) and thus 
lacked a finding that the more demanding benefit-to-recipient standard was also met.2482  
Accordingly, a subsidy determination under the cost-to-government approach does not give 
rise to a different implementation standard, even though the implementing country might have 
difficulties in figuring out how it should exactly ensure that no benefit to the recipient is 
offered without a determination thereof. 
    
It should be highlighted that the Panel would arguably have looked at Article 1 juncto Article 
3 of the SCM Agreement for contextual support in case the US export credit programme 
would not have been an ‘export subsidy’ in the meaning of item (j).  This seems to be implied 
in the Panel’s statement that if the item (j) test would not be met, it would be willing to 
proceed ‘to a further contextual examination of the definitional elements contained in Articles 
1 and 3 of the SCM Agreement’.2483  More fundamentally, it was explained that panels have 
systematically (and correctly) rejected item (j) could be used a contrario and thus could be 
                                                 
2479 Indeed, as Brazil argued, the Panel's failure "to examine Brazil's claim ... leaves open a dispute and 
creates uncertainty concerning the scope of the United States' obligations, and the consistency of its 
existing measures with those obligations’.  Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 727. 
2480 The compliance Panel did not clarify whether the US would have implemented the original DSB’s 
recommendations (based on the item (j) analysis) if the standard of item (j) would have been met under 
the revised programme, even though the programme or some individual transactions would still confer a 
benefit. 
2481 In the words of the Arbitrator:  
‘the mere fact that the GSM 102 is rendered consistent with item (j) does not exclude that the 
programme might nevertheless continue to confer a "benefit" on the basis of the standard set forth 
in Article 14(c). (…) Brazil would be entitled to continue to apply countermeasures until the full 
benefit of the GSM 102 programme has been withdrawn (…)’. 
Decision by the Arbitrator, US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), para 4.162. 
2482 Recall that the US objected that the benefit-to-recipient standard would be met. 
2483 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.803. 
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used to demonstrate that export credit support is not an ‘export subsidy’ under the SCM 
Agreement.  Hence, the US call for such an a contrario reading of item (j) articulated before 
the Panel in US – Upland Cotton would probably not have been accepted.2484  But recall that 
the Appellate Body has not yet revealed whether it would agree with this interpretation.2485   
 
To summarize, the panel and Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton have found that, despite 
the presence of Article 10.2, export credit support is also covered under the first paragraph of 
Article 10 if it is offered at subsidized terms.  This is determined by reference to the 
Illustrative List (items (j) or (k)) or Article 1 juncto Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. 
 
5.1.2. Disciplines: Circumvention or threat of circumvention  
Export credit support at subsidized terms is only inconsistent with Article 10.1 if ‘applied in a 
manner which results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export subsidy 
commitments’.  In line with the Appellate Body’s interpretation in US – FSC, the panels in 
US – Upland Cotton reasoned that circumvention would exist when subsidized export credit 
support by the US would result in export subsidies to scheduled products above its reduction 
commitment levels or to unscheduled products tout court.  Conversely, no circumvention 
would be present when such support would not result in export subsidies to scheduled 
products above reduction commitment levels.2486  Indeed, in the words of the compliance 
Panel:  
 
For unscheduled products, "circumvention" of the United States’ export subsidy commitments 
will occur if any export subsidies (in the form of GSM 102 export credit guarantees) are 
provided in respect of any quantity of exports of the product in question.  For scheduled 
products, "circumvention" will occur if the United States provides export subsidies to volumes 
of exports of the product at issue in excess of its "quantity" reduction commitments or of its 
"budgetary outlay".2487 
                                                 
2484 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.772.  Footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement stipulates that 
‘(m)easures referred to in Annex I as not constituting export subsidies shall not be prohibited under this 
or any other provision of this Agreement’. 
2485 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 731; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft 
(Article 21.5 – Canada)), para 80.  The latest draft circulating in the Negotiation Group on Rules would 
inscribe the reading adopted by the panels on the a contrario reading in a new footnote 6 of the SCM 
Agreement (replacing the current footnote 5).  Negotiating Group on Rules, New Draft Consolidated 
Chair Texts of the AD and SCM Agreements (TN/RL/W/236, 19 December 2008). 
2486 This could also be revealed from the Appellate Body’s general statement in Canada – Dairy (Article 
21.5 – New Zealand and US II) that ‘(p)ursuant to Article 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, a Member is 
entitled to grant export subsidies within the limits of the reduction commitment specified in its Schedule’  
(Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para 70).   
2487  Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 14.137.  As stated in a positive way 
by the original Panel in US – Upland Cotton: in general terms, these export subsidy provisions (i.e., 
Articles 9 and 10) ‘permit a limited number of Members to use export subsidies, as defined in that 
Agreement, within the limits of the budgetary outlay and/or quantitative commitments (…) and only with 
respect to the agricultural products described therein’.  Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.664 
(emphasis added).  The Panel continued (para 7.665) as regards to non-listed export subsidies that such 
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As a result, subsidized export credit support for unscheduled products (such as upland cotton) 
as well as for three scheduled products in excess of the US quantity commitments (i.e. rice, 
pig meat, poultry meat) were deemed inconsistent with the anti-circumvention obligation of 
Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture in the compliance procedure.2488  To arrive at 
this conclusion for scheduled products, Brazil had successfully demonstrated that the quantity 
of exports of these products benefiting from GSM-102 export credit guarantees were clearly 
above the respective US quantity commitments.  In fact, Brazil’s claim would have been 
accepted even if it had only demonstrated that the quantity of exports of these products 
benefiting from any type of export subsidy programme (listed export subsidies as well as non-
listed ones) was above the respective quantity commitments.  Even more, by virtue of the 
special rule on the burden of proof elaborated in Article 10.3 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, Brazil could simply have demonstrated that the level of exports of the scheduled 
products were above the respective commitment levels, which would have shifted the burden 
of proof to the US to demonstrate that the excess levels were not subject to any export subsidy 
whatsoever (listed or non-listed ones). 
 
In essence, non-listed export subsidies such as subsidized export credit support are thus 
disciplined similarly under the ‘anti-circumvention’ standard of Article 10.1 as listed ones are 
under Article 3.3 juncto 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  But even if no such ‘actual 
circumvention’ of export subsidy commitments would be found, a violation of Article 10.1 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture would be present if subsidized export support is applied in a 
manner which threatens such circumvention.2489  In the original procedure, Brazil had also 
formulated an additional claim that US export credit support caused such a threat of 
circumvention.  The Appellate Body concurred with the Panel that such an additional claim 
                                                                                                                                            
‘export subsidies in excess of commitment levels, in respect of scheduled or non-scheduled products, is 
subject to the anti-circumvention provisions of Article 10.1’ (emphasis added).  This confirms the 
Panel’s interpretation that no circumvention can be present up to the level of reduction commitment 
levels.  But, by stipulating that excess levels of export subsidies are merely subject to the anti-
circumvention provision, this statement also conflicts with the Appellate Body’s interpretation and its 
own application of the anti-circumvention standard.  For example, the Panel observed that parties agreed 
that Article 8 Agreement on Agriculture, which elaborates the general obligation on export competition 
commitments, ‘serves to prohibit the use of listed and non-listed export subsidies in excess of reduction 
commitment levels in the case of scheduled products and to prohibit the use of export subsidies otherwise 
than in conformity with reduction commitments and the provisions of the Agreement’ (para 7.921, first 
emphasis added).  See also Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 7.875, 7.879-7.881.  In the original 
procedure, the Appellate Body also confirmed its previous interpretation as regards to unscheduled 
products by stipulating in general terms that ‘(e)xport subsidies for both unscheduled agricultural 
products and industrial products are completely prohibited under the Agreement on Agriculture and 
under the SCM Agreement, respectively’ (para 652, emphasis added).   
2488 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras 14.139-14.150.  This anti-
circumvention analysis was not appealed.  See Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 
– Brazil), paras 269 and 323. 
2489 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, paras 148-154. 
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has to be examined only for those agricultural products for which the actual circumvention 
test was not passed, which was the case for scheduled agricultural products within reduction 
commitments and unscheduled agricultural products not supported under the export credit 
guarantee programmes.2490  Yet, as explored in detail in Part II, the Appellate Body disagreed 
with the Panel on the substance of the ‘threat of circumvention’ test.2491  The Panel had 
rejected Brazil’s claim because the operation of the export programmes did not necessarily 
require issuing guarantees to these agricultural products.2492  The Appellate Body rejected, 
however, this high threshold to find ‘threat of circumvention’.  It should not be shown that the 
export credit programmes generate the unconditional legal right to receive such support, but 
only that they are applied in a manner that would likely lead to circumvention of reduction 
commitments.2493  To be sure, this test should not be interpreted as widely that it would 
require WTO Members to take affirmative, precautionary steps to ensure that such 
circumvention does not occur.2494  Moreover, this standard is also not met in case it is only 
demonstrated that exports of the products in question are eligible for export credit guarantees 
and the subsidizing Member has provided export credit guarantees to exports of other 
unscheduled products or to exports of scheduled products in excess of its export subsidy 
reduction commitments.  The presence of both elements under the US export credit 
programmes was indeed insufficient to demonstrate a ‘threat of circumvention’, particularly 
because of the lack of evidence of past subsidization of those particular agricultural products 
under these programmes.2495  Although the Appellate Body thus widened the scope of ‘threat 
of circumvention’, it agreed with the Panel’s conclusion that such a threat was not 
demonstrated.2496 
 
In conclusion, the standard of actual anti-circumvention imposed upon subsidized export 
credit support under Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture is parallel to the 
(reduction) commitment standard imposed on listed export subsidies under Article 3.3 juncto 
9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  WTO Members are not allowed to grant ‘any subsidy 
whatsoever to exports of unscheduled products’2497 and of scheduled products above their 
                                                 
2490 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 715-719; Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, 
para 7.882 (footnote 1061).   
2491 See above Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.2.2.2.2. 
2492 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.895. 
2493 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 704-710.  
2494 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 707, 713. 
2495 Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 713-714.  
2496 Brazil did not formulate the argument of a ‘threat of circumvention’ at the compliance level. 
2497 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), footnote 782 (emphasis added).  
According to the Panel, this is stipulated under Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  However, 
the text of Article 3.3 only deals with listed types of export subsidies on (un-)scheduled products.  The 
general obligation on listed as well as non-listed types of export subsidies is Article 8 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture.     
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reduction commitment level.  What is more, non-listed export subsidies like subsidized export 
credit support are even disciplined more severely as a likelihood of such circumvention 
(‘threat of circumvention’) suffices to find an inconsistency with Article 10.1 of the 
Agreement.2498  As explained in Part II, this conclusion also seems to hold for developing 
countries, even if they are allowed to offer two types of listed export subsidies by virtue of 
Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  This means that countries having no scheduled 
agricultural products, such as India and China, could not offer any subsidized export credit 
support for agricultural products and that a threat thereof would even suffice to find a WTO 
inconsistency.  In case of China, there is no doubt that it could not offer such subsidized 
export credit support as it explicitly committed at the moment of accession not to maintain or 
introduce any export subsidy upon agricultural products.2499  In contrast, countries such as the 
EC, the US, and Canada are allowed to offer subsidized export credit to agricultural products 
up to their reduction commitment levels. 
  
Turning back to the US – Upland Cotton case, the panels in the original as well as compliance 
procedure thus found that the US offered subsidized export credit in violation of Article 10.1 
of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Next to an inconsistency with the Agreement on 
Agriculture, Brazil also claimed that this export credit support violated Article 3 of the SCM 
Agreement.  This claim is examined in the following section.   
 
5.2. EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS UNDER THE SCM 
AGREEMENT 
In US – Upland Cotton, Brazil’s claim under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement was 
confined to export credit support found inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture.  The 
relevance of such a claim lies in the stricter implementation obligations resulting from a 
violation of the SCM Agreement’s prohibited subsidies provisions.  In particular, Article 4.7 
of the SCM Agreement mandates the panel to make an additional recommendation to 
‘withdraw the subsidy without delay’ if a prohibited subsidy is found to exist under the SCM 
Agreement, which will become a recommendation or ruling of the DSB.2500  Moreover, the 
level of countermeasures in case of non-implementation might also be higher when based on 
Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement.  Yet, by shifting to a trade effects approach to calculate 
‘appropriate countermeasures’, the Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton largely neutralized this 
                                                 
2498 Foreclosing this conclusion might have been the reason why the original Panel read ‘threat of 
circumvention’ in a narrow way.  This interpretation would be in line with the mandatory/discretionary 
distinction. See above Part III, Chapter 4, Section 4.1. 
2499 Report of the Working Party Report on the Accession of China (WT/ACC/CHN/49), para 241. 
2500 Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement is a special rule superseding the general rule established in Article 
19.1 of the DSU (Article 1.2 of the DSU stipulates the ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’ maxim).  See 
Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras 329-335.  
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difference.  The only difference seems that arbitrators retain somewhat more leeway to opt for 
assumptions that are probably overestimating trade effects when confronted with prohibited 
subsidy violations under the SCM Agreement.2501   
The Panel in US – Upland Cotton considered that agricultural export subsidies inconsistent 
with the Agreement on Agriculture are not exempted from the applicability of Article 3.1(a) 
of the SCM Agreement.2502  Next, applying directly the same ‘export subsidy’ standard upon 
which it had indirectly relied under the Agreement on Agriculture (i.e., item (j)), the Panel 
concluded – and the Appellate Body agreed – that to the extent US export credit guarantees 
were inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture, they were also inconsistent with Article 
3.1(a).  Nonetheless, its conclusions and recommendations seemed to be formulated more 
broadly because the Panel in respect of unscheduled products supported under the programme 
and ‘in respect of one scheduled product (rice)’ concluded that the export credit guarantees 
‘constitute per se export subsidies prohibited by Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM 
Agreement’ which the US has to withdraw without delay.2503  Hence, was the US also 
required, by virtue of the application of the SCM Agreement, to withdraw export credit 
guarantees to the scheduled product (rice) below the level of reduction commitments and thus 
in conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture?  The Appellate Body in EC – Export 
Subsidies on Sugar seemed to have revealed this ambiguity in the US – Upland Cotton 
panel’s reasoning when questioning ‘whether, in the event the SCM Agreement applies, a 
panel could make a recommendation to withdraw the subsidy in whole, or whether that 
recommendation would apply to the subsidy only to the extent that it exceeds the responding 
Member's commitment levels’.2504  Parallel to the original Panel, the Panel in the US – Upland 
Cotton compliance procedure decided that ‘there is no question’ that, to the extent export 
credit guarantees were still inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture, they were 
inconsistent with the export subsidy prohibition of Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement.2505  
Apparently taking the Appellate Body’s holding in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar into 
consideration, the Panel specified in its conclusion that ‘the US also acts inconsistently with 
Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement by providing export subsidies to unscheduled 
products and by providing export subsidies to scheduled products in excess of the 
commitments of the US under the Agreement on Agriculture’.2506  Hence, the Panel applied 
                                                 
2501 See above, Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3.1.1. 
2502 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.947.  The Panel only cited Article 3.1(a) of the SCM 
Agreement but also referred to its general discussion on both Agreements’ relationship under the part on 
local content subsides which included a discussion on Article 21.1 Agreement on Agriculture.  Appellate 
Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, paras 583-584 (footnote 858), 629-630, 674, 732. 
2503 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 8.1(d)(i) and 8.3(b).  
2504 Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, para 537. 
2505 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 14.154. 
2506 The Panel continued that ‘(b)y acting inconsistently with Articles 10.1 and 8 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture and and Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement the US has failed (…)"to withdraw 
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the SCM Agreement to the subsidy only to the extent that it exceeded the US commitment 
levels and, by logical consequence, also explicitly confined its conclusions under the SCM 
Agreement to the part of the subsidy inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture.  As a 
result, the US only had to withdraw the subsidy to the extent that it was inconsistent with the 
Agreement on Agriculture (i.e., exceeds its commitment levels).2507 
Brazil did not formulate the claim that the level of export credit support in conformity with 
the Agreement on Agriculture (i.e., to scheduled products below US commitment level) was 
also inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.  Therefore, the Panel in the 
compliance procedure left undecided whether, now that the peace clause had lapsed, ‘there 
may be a violation of Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement in respect of all exports 
(i.e., even those that conform to the disciplines of the Agreement on Agriculture)’.2508  
Although neither the SCM Agreement nor the case law has offered a decisive answer as of 
yet, the discussion in Part II has argued why agricultural export subsidies in conformity with 
the Agreement on Agriculture should still be exempted from the prohibition on export 
subsidies under the SCM Agreement.  At the same time, this discussion advanced solid 
arguments not to exempt such agricultural export subsidies from potential ‘actionable 
subsidy’ claims and CVDs actions.  In this reading, subsidized export credit support to 
agricultural products in conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture would thus only be 
vulnerable to actionable subsidy and CVDs claims.2509  
To summarize, case law has clarified that subsidized export credit support for unscheduled 
products and for scheduled products above reduction commitments are inconsistent with 
Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture but are also prohibited under Article 3.1 of the 
SCM Agreement.2510  As a result, to the extent they are inconsistent with the Agreement on 
Agriculture, they should be withdrawn without delay pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM 
Agreement.  Only those developing countries benefiting from S&D treatment on the 
prohibition of Article 3.1(a) are exempted from the additional application of Article 3 of the 
                                                                                                                                            
the subsidy without delay"’.  Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 15.1(c) 
(emphasis added). 
2507 The Panel did not explicitly state this conclusion, but it can be inferred from its reasoning as 
previously quoted in the full text and in footnote 2506.  This was also taken into account by the 
Arbitrator when calculating the appropriate amount of countermeasures.  Decision by the Arbitators, US 
– Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) (prohibited subsidies), para 4.207. 
2508 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), footnote 785. 
2509 This is similar to the treatment of subsidized export credit support for non-agricultural products in 
conformity with the OECD Arrangement. 
2510 An exception should arguably be made for agricultural export credit support that merely is a ‘threat 
of circumvention’.  Without textual reference to such a ‘threat’ in the applicable SCM Agreement 
provisions and given the application of the mandatory/discretionary principle, it is far from evident that 
such a threat of circumvention would also be inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.   
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SCM Agreement to such agricultural export subsidies.2511  As these countries do not have 
scheduled agricultural products, any subsidized agricultural export support is inconsistent 
with the Agreement on Agriculture but not subject to the stricter implementation standard of 
the SCM Agreement.2512  On the other hand, subsidized export credit support for scheduled 
products within reduction commitments seems not prohibited but, nonetheless, actionable and 
countervailable under the SCM Agreement. 
Contrary to the regulatory framework for export credit support to non-agricultural products, 
WTO Members do thus not compete on a level playing field regarding agricultural export 
credit support.  Indeed, only those 25 WTO Members having scheduled agricultural products 
are allowed to provide export credit support at subsidized terms and this insofar their total 
level of export subsidies (listed or non-listed types) does not surpass their reduction 
commitment levels.  In contrast, countries having no scheduled products (e.g., India) are not 
allowed to offer subsidized export credit support at all. 
 
                                                 
2511 After all, LDCs and those low-income countries listed in paragraph (b) of Annex VII of the SCM 
Agreement are exempted from the prohibition on export subsidies pursuant to Article 27.2 of the SCM 
Agreement. 
2512 Because such support is already inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture without having to 
demonstrate adverse trade effects, the potential additional claim that these subsidies are actionable 
pursuant to Article 27.7 of the SCM Agreement seems not relevant in practice. 
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6. EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT IN LIGHT OF THE GATS  
This section examines whether there are disciplines in place on export credit support for 
services/service providers.  Surely, the disciplines of the OECD Arrangement are applicable 
to this transaction as this agreement explicitly covers export credit support for services.  But 
the analysis under the WTO framework is more complicated.  Before focalizing on export 
credit support disciplines, the general disciplines on subsidization under the GATS have to be 
introduced. 
As the SCM Agreement is an Annex 1A agreement on trade in goods, this Agreement only 
disciplines subsidies affecting trade in goods.2513  Indeed, measures affecting trade in services 
are exclusively disciplined under the GATS but, as shortly introduced in Part II, this 
agreement is rather flexible on subsidization.2514  Article XV of the GATS is the only 
provision explicitly dealing with subsidies, but it does not impose any substantive obligation 
upon WTO Members.  Next to the obligation to give ‘sympathetic consideration’ to requests 
of other WTO Members adversely affected by subsidization, this provision only stipulates 
that WTO Members have to launch negotiations to develop disciplines on trade-distorting 
subsidies.  In the course of these negotiations, Brazil has warned that the OECD Arrangement 
‘had had an unfortunate influence on the negotiations of the (SCM Agreement)’, which 
‘should be avoided in the negotiations of any services disciplines’.2515  Because negotiations 
on subsidy disciplines have been far from productive, it seems very unlikely that any specific 
substantive discipline will emerge if the Doha Round would be concluded.2516   
Despite the absence of specific disciplines on subsidization, it could be argued that the 
principles of non-discrimination could impose substantive obligations on subsidization under 
GATS.2517  First, pursuant to the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) provision, Members are not 
                                                 
2513 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, List of Annexes. 
2514 See above Part II, Chapter 1, Section 1.4. 
2515 See Report on the Working Party of GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 10 May 2001 
(S/WPGR/M/32, 17 May 2001), para 11. 
2516 Article XV of the GATS. See Annual Report of the Working Party on GATS Rules to the Council for 
Trade in Services (2009) (S/WPGR/19, 2 October 2009, para 5; R. Adlung, ‘Negotiations on Safeguards 
and Subsidies in Services: A Never-ending Story?’, 10:2 Journal of International Economic Law (2007), 
235-265; P. Poretti, ‘Waiting for Godot: Subsidy Disciplines in Services Trade’, in M. Panizzon, N. Pohl, 
and P. Sauvé (eds), The GATS and the Regulation of International Trade in Services (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 466-488. 
2517 The scope of the GATS encompasses subsidies given that the GATS applies to ‘measures by 
Members affecting trade in services’ (Article I:1 of the GATS).  See, for example, World Trade Report 
2006, above n 2057, at 195; G. Gauthier, E. O’Brien, and S. Spencer, ‘Déjà Vu, or New Beginning for 
Safeguards and Subsidies Rules in Services Trade?’, in P. Sauvé & R. Stern, Gats 2000 – New Directions 
in Services Trade Liberalization (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000), 165-183, at 177; M. 
Krajewski, ‘Public Services and Trade Liberalisation: Mapping the Legal Framework’, 6:2 Journal 
International Economic Law (2003), 341-367, 361; Adlung, above n 2516, at 240; Poretti, above n 2516, 
at 467-470.  Matsushita et al disagree and instead opine that subsidies are not covered by the national 
treatment provision of Article XVII GATS because for the subsidies negotiations (instructed by Article 
XV GATS) to have a mandate, subsidies must by definition be discriminatory.  M. Matsushita, T. J. 
Schoenbaum and P. C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization – Law, Practice and Policy, 2nd ed 
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allowed to discriminate among foreign services and service suppliers when offering 
subsidies.2518  Second, contrary to the GATT, the obligation of national treatment under the 
GATS does not explicitly exclude subsidies.2519  Since the GATS national treatment 
obligation is dependent on specific commitments, this does not as such curtail WTO 
Members’ right to subsidize their service sectors.  But if WTO Members make commitments 
on specific service sectors, they should explicitly reserve their right to subsidize in a 
discriminatory way.2520 Otherwise, they might have to provide like treatment to foreign 
service suppliers with respect to subsidies.  The 2001 Scheduling Guidelines also adopt this 
approach: ‘Article XVII applies to subsidies in the same way as it applies to all other 
measures. (…) Therefore, any subsidy which is a discriminatory measure within the meaning 
of Article XVII would have to be either scheduled as a limitation on national treatment or 
brought into conformity with that article’.2521  In order to grasp the reach of this obligation, 
two clarifications have to be made.  First, as the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines indicate, ‘a 
binding under Article XVII with respect to the granting of a subsidy does not require a 
Member to offer such a subsidy to a services supplier located in the territory of another 
Member’.2522  After all, there is no obligation in the GATS requiring a Member to take 
measures outside its territorial jurisdiction. Second, it should be recalled that the GATS 
disciplines trade in services by focusing on four modes of supply.  Obviously, the national 
treatment obligation only applies to subsidies affecting one of these modes of supply, and 
only insofar such a commitment is undertaken under a particular mode of supply.  Adlung 
observes that, from the perspective of the Scheduling member, the current disciplines on the 
different modes of supply do not extend to exports, but instead, focus exclusively on the 
                                                                                                                                            
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 889 pp., at 660-661.  One might object that the mandate for 
negotiations on the basis of Article XV GATS remains sufficiently open, given that subsidies are only 
disciplined by Article XVII insofar Members make specific commitments in this respect.  More 
fundamentally, the argument by Matsushita et al is simply flawed because even if subsidies are not 
discriminatory, they could well be trade-distorting.  Indeed, WTO Members might very well offer 
subsidies to domestic as well as to foreign service providers established within their territory alike (e.g., 
to attract foreign service suppliers) and thus conform to the national treatment obligation.  Yet, this might 
still be considered as trade-distorting from the perspective of foreign service providers established 
outside the territory of the subsidizing Member (as well as from the perspective of other WTO 
Members).  Indeed, as this discussion will illustrate, the national treatment obligation does not discipline 
subsidies affecting the competitive relationship between service providers established in different 
territories.  
2518 This applies insofar it affects one of the four modes of supply.  The MFN obligation is a general 
obligation (Article II.1 of the GATS), and thus not dependent on specific commitments.  At the end of 
the Uruguay Round (or at the moment of accession), Members could schedule exceptions to this 
obligation (Article II.2 of the GATS).  See Adlung, above n 2516, at 240 and 260.       
2519 Compare Article III:8(b) of the GATT and Article XVII of the GATS.   
2520 Some Members indeed made a horizontal reservation to uphold their right to subsidize in a 
discriminatory manner. 
2521 The 2001 Scheduling Guidelines are not binding, but the Appellate Body in US – Gambling decided 
that they could serve as supplementary means of interpretation when interpreting individual Schedules.  
See Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para 196.  
2522 See Scheduling Guidelines (S/L/92, 28 March 2001), para 16. 
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conditions governing cross-border imports: Mode 1 (cross-border trade): cross border 
imports; Mode 2 (consumption abroad): consumption of services in the territory of another 
Member; Mode 3 (commercial presence): services provided by foreign-established suppliers;  
Mode 4 (presence of natural persons) services provided by foreign natural persons.  At the 
same time, it should be highlighted that measures affecting exportation of services are not 
excluded under Mode 3 (and Mode 4).2523  Indeed, once a foreign service supplier is 
established, the GATS disciplines all measures affecting the supply of services by this 
supplier.  By inference, it seems not limited to measures affecting services provided by 
foreign service suppliers in the territory of the committing Member.  Adlung gives an 
example of the exemption of foreign-established companies2524 from an export promotion 
scheme, which would be incompatible with national treatment under Mode 3.2525   
In sum, a Member which made an unrestricted national treatment commitment under Mode 3 
for a particular service sector is not obliged to offer parallel subsidies to like service suppliers 
located outside its territory, but like foreign suppliers established within its territory should 
equally benefit from domestic/export subsidies as domestic service suppliers.2526  As a result, 
subsidized export credit support should not be offered at the same terms to foreign service 
providers outside a Member’s territory but should be made available to foreign service 
providers established domestically if such a commitment in a particular sector is made. In 
practice, this obligation will be mostly fulfilled as Members will often not have an incentive 
to discriminate against foreign service suppliers established domestically.  For employment or 
other economic reasons, they would rather offer incentives to foreign service suppliers so as 
to attract their establishment.2527  As one of the objectives of export credit support is creating 
domestic jobs, the eligibility for such support is mostly determined on the basis of the 
establishment of the service provider.  For instance, to be considered ‘US content’ and thus be 
eligible for export credit support, the service provider should be established in the US.2528  In 
contrast, the service provider does not qualify as ‘US content’ when the service is supplied by 
a provider established in the buyer’s country (e.g., subsidiary of the US firm).2529   
Contrary to the SCM Agreement, GATS thus puts no restrictions on export credit support 
offered to domestically established service providers.  Tackling export subsidies for services 
in the same way as under the SCM Agreement would entail a departure from the import-
                                                 
2523 In view of Adlung, reverse flows (e.g., outward foreign investment) are not captured as long as the 
respective policies have no follow-up effect on imports.  Adlung, above n 2516, at 240.   
2524 These are foreign companies that are established locally.  
2525 Adlung, above n 2516, footnote 12.   
2526 Unless it is justified on the basis of an exception (e.g., Article XIV of the GATS), which seems 
unlikely. 
2527 Adlung, above n 2516, at 248. 
2528 The service itself could be supplied from US territory or in the buyer’s country. 
2529 It can only be supported up to 30% as ‘local cost’ or, alternatively, as ‘ancillary service fees’ (see 
above n 2395, 2396 ). 
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oriented scope of current GATS disciplines.  Given that export credit support for service 
providers is becoming more and more prominent, this lack of disciplines might be worrisome.  
On the other hand, this concern should be tempered as OECD Participants have to respect the 
disciplines of the OECD Arrangement.   
In general, export credit support by G-7 ECAs for services takes two forms.  First, a marginal 
share is offered for ‘stand-alone services’ (i.e., services that are not part of a capital goods 
transaction) and is short-term in nature (e.g., consulting services, computer software systems).  
Second, the bulk of this support is extended to medium- and long-term services that are 
associated with capital goods exports and/or large projects (‘associated services’), such as 
telecommunication or energy (e.g., mining, oil, gas) services.2530  Because ‘stand-alone 
services’ only affect trade in services, they are exclusively disciplined under the GATS as 
elaborated above.  At most, Members having made a full national treatment commitment 
under Mode 3 in a certain sector will have to offer such support at similar terms to domestic 
and foreign service providers established within their territory, but the terms of such support 
are not disciplined at all.  This equally applies to OECD Participants because the OECD 
Arrangement leaves short-term export credit support untouched.  In contrast, export credit 
support for ‘associated services’ will be disciplined under the SCM Agreement insofar it 
affects trade in goods.  
Take the example of a US Ex-Im Bank long-term loan guarantee to a US 
engineering/construction company that secures a contract with the Ghanaian government for 
the construction of oil-storage tanks and pipelines.2531  The loan guarantee will cover, inter 
alia, the export sale and related local project costs.  The company’s vice president observed 
that ‘if Ex-Im bank hadn’t helped us win this contract, it would have gone to a Chinese 
competitor’.  Arguably, this support for the construction of infrastructure would generally be 
considered as export credit support for services (e.g., in Ex-Im Bank statistics).  But if China 
would challenge this export credit support before the WTO, disciplines under the SCM 
Agreement would arguably be relevant.  Indeed, the Appellate Body has confirmed in EC – 
Bananas III that the GATT 1994 and the GATS may overlap in application of measures that 
involve a service relating to a particular good or a service supplied in conjunction with a 
particular good.  Those aspects of the measure affecting trade in goods are scrutinized under 
                                                 
2530 Over the period 2006-2008, the US Ex-Im Bank’s support for both types of services more than 
doubled.  85% of all support given to associated services by the US Ex-Im Bank was for mining, oil and 
gas, and engineering and consulting services.  See Export-Import Bank of the United States, above n 
2045, at 45-46. 
2531 See Export-Import Bank of the United States, ‘Annual Report 2007, Featured Companies, American 
Tank & Vessl Inc.’.  Available at: 
http://www.exim.gov/about/reports/ar/ar2007/images/AT&V.pdf.   
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the GATT, whereas the GATS applies to aspects affecting the supply of the service.2532  The 
same line of reasoning seems to apply for the relationship between the SCM Agreement and 
the GATS.  Export credit support to the US construction firm is the kind of measure that 
affects trade in services as well as trade in goods.  First, if such export credit support is only 
available to US construction companies and not to foreign construction companies established 
in the US, the measure would affect the establishment of foreign construction companies in 
the US.  In that case, the US might have violated Article XVII of the GATS if it had made a 
national treatment commitment under Mode 3 for construction services without any 
restriction.2533  This shows that the GATS, contrary to the Agreements on trade in goods, 
gives investment protection as well.2534  Second, it is clear that the contract which is 
guaranteed affects not only trade in services but also trade in (capital) goods.  Indeed, the 
exportation of oil-storage tanks and pipelines (trade in goods) as well as the installation in 
Ghana (trade in services) is guaranteed.  As a result, the obligations under the SCM 
Agreement would nonetheless apply to the part of the transaction affecting trade in goods.  In 
sum, export credit support for ‘associated services’ is not exempted from scrutiny under the 
SCM Agreement insofar it affects trade in goods.  Medium- and long-term support for 
‘associated services’ offered by OECD Participants is also disciplined under the OECD 
Arrangement.  
 
Finally, observe that the GATS might also discipline other aspects of the export credit support 
transaction, namely those affecting the providers of export credit (support) services.  First, 
private financial institutions often operate as intermediary in the export credit support 
transaction.  For example, in Brazil – Aircraft, interest rate support (PROEX interest rate 
equalization payments) was granted to private banks which covered, at most, the difference 
between the interest charges contracted with the foreign buyer and the cost to the financing 
party of raising the required funds.  As the Panel in the second compliance proceedings 
observed, these payments could be considered subsidies in respect of financial services.2535  
The same conclusion holds for export credit guarantees or refinancing given by an ECA to 
private financial institutions to support export credits extended to foreign buyers.  Private 
financial institutions clearly benefit from such an intermediary role because it improves the 
loan conditions they can offer to potential borrowers.  Could foreign financial institutions 
                                                 
2532 Whether such measures are scrutinized ‘under the GATT 1994 or the GATS, or both, is a matter that 
can only be determined on a case-by-case basis’.  Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 221. 
2533 This is similar to the disciplines on ‘stand-alone services’. 
2534 Note that if export credit support would instead have been given to non-service sectors such as the 
car industry, foreign established producers could not make a similar claim under the GATT if they would 
have been excluded from export credit support.  Often, instruments outside the WTO (e.g., Bilateral 
Investment Treaties) oblige countries to give national treatment to foreign owned companies. 
2535 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), footnotes 41 and 68. 
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claim that the national treatment provision is violated in case they are excluded from acting as 
intermediary?  If the Member providing such export credit support made a full financial 
service commitment under Mode 3, a violation of the national treatment obligation would be 
present in case the foreign financial institution is established in the territory of the Member in 
question, unless it could be demonstrated that foreign and domestic service suppliers are not 
‘like’.2536  However, other foreign financial institutions could perfectly be excluded.2537  
Second, could the position of the ECA itself, which provides a service in the form of export 
credit support, be challenged under the GATS as well?  After all, private financial institutions 
might face unfair competition from ECAs in the trade finance market.  This is one of the 
rationales for disciplining export credit support by ECAs in order for them not to crowd out or 
inhibit the private sector by offering support at better-than-market terms.  Could foreign 
financial institutions established in another Member claim that this Member is violating its 
specific commitments because of the position of an ECA?2538  Bear in mind that in some 
countries an ECA is not a governmental or publicly owned agency but a private institution 
mandated by the government to offer officially supported export credits.  Yet, the Annex on 
Financial Services might exclude services provided by all different types of ECAs from the 
scope of the GATS as they might be considered ‘public entities’.2539  Moreover, even if the 
service supplied by ECAs would be covered, any substantive obligation would be dependent 
upon a specific commitment on national treatment (under Mode 3).  Even in case such a 
commitment has been made, the ‘likeness’-test and ‘less favourable treatment’-test of Article 
                                                 
2536 The exceptions under the GATS as well as the prudential carve out in the Annex on Financial 
Services (para 2(a)) could still be invoked.  
2537 Note that the PROEX interest equalization payments in Brazil – Aircraft were not restricted to 
Brazilian banks but open to all financial institutions.  Furthermore, no claims were made under the 
GATS.  See Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), para 7.34. 
2538 The relevant discipline would be Article VIII:1 GATS. Members have to ensure that monopolies and 
exclusive service suppliers do not act inconsistently with the MFN and specific commitments 
obligations. 
2539 Excluded from the scope of the GATS are ‘services supplied in the exercise of governmental 
authority’ (Article 1.3(c) of the GATS). The Annex on Financial Services specifies that this covers, inter 
alia, ‘other activities conducted by a public entity for the account or with the guarantee or using the 
financial resources of the Government’ (para 1(b)).  A public entity is further defined as: 
‘(i) a government, a central bank or a monetary authority, of a Member, or an entity owned or 
controlled by a Member, that is principally engaged in carrying out governmental functions or 
activities for governmental purposes, not including an entity principally engaged in supplying 
financial services on commercial terms;  or 
(ii) a private entity, performing functions normally performed by a central bank or monetary 
authority, when exercising those functions’. (para 5(c), emphasis added) 
Here, two elements could undermine the conclusion that ECAs are public entities and thus excluded from 
the scope of GATS.  First, a ‘public entity’ could be a private entity but only if it performs functions 
which are normally performed by a central bank or monetary authority.  Given that ECAs arguably do 
not perform such functions, a private entity offering export credit support would not be considered a 
public entity and would thus be covered under the GATS.  Second, if ECAs would principally offer 
export credit support on commercial terms, such support would not be prohibited but the ECA itself 
would not be considered a public entity but a ‘financial service supplier’ covered by the scope of GATS. 
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XVII GATS still have to be passed.2540  Without going into detail on the substance of both 
tests, notice that the fact that other domestic service suppliers are likewise excluded from 
offering official export credit support might question whether both aspects are met. 
                                                 
2540 Even if a violation is found, it could still be justified on the basis of Article XIV GATS or the Annex 
on Financial Services (i.e., the prudential carve-out) but these justification grounds seem not directly 
relevant at first sight. 
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7. NEGOTIATIONS ON EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT DISCIPLINES IN THE DOHA ROUND  
7.1. NEGOTIATIONS ON EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL GOODS IN THE 
DOHA ROUND 
Under the SCM Agreement, export credit support for industrial products is principally 
prohibited if it qualifies as an export subsidy under Article 1 juncto 3 or the Illustrative List 
(items (j) and (k)).  Only the safe haven (i.e., OECD Arrangement) or S&D treatment could 
turn such export subsidies into actionable (and countervailable) subsidies.   
 
In the Doha negotiations, views are strongly divergent on whether or not the per se export 
subsidy standards for export credit support under items (j) and (k), para 1 should be amended.  
Likewise, WTO Members disagree on whether the link with the OECD Arrangement should 
be modified (item (k), paragraph 2).  Remarkably, while at a certain moment in the 
negotiations some convergence seemed to emerge given that at least some textual 
amendments were included in the draft text (November 2007)2541, a step back is set in the 
latest circulating draft as it only reproduces the opposing views of Members on both aspects 
(December 2008).  Hence, both elements are now part of the so-called major ‘bracketed 
issues’ in the rules negotiations on which WTO Members still fundamentally disagree.   
 
7.1.1. The redrafting of the export subsidy standard under items (j) and (k) 
Regarding the per se export subsidy definitions in item (j) and the first paragraph of item (k), 
the Draft Consolidated Chair Text reveals that: 
 
[EXPORT CREDITS – MARKET BENCHMARKS: Delegations disagree regarding whether 
the texts of item (j) and the first paragraph of item (k) should be amended to replace the cost-
to-government benchmark with one based on benefit-to-recipient.  Those favoring such 
changes consider that the current provisions work to the disadvantage of developing Members 
and are inconsistent with the Agreement's general definition of "subsidy". Other delegations, 
however, consider that such changes would increase costs for developing country borrowers, 
and would reduce predictability for export credit agencies.].2542 
 
Apparently, all WTO Members seem to concur that the cost-to-government standard in items 
(k) and (j), originating from the 1960 Declaration, works indeed against the interest of 
developing countries, whereas the benefit-to-recipient standard under the Article 1 subsidy 
definition puts all countries on an equal footing.  After all, even the second group of 
delegations – most likely from developed countries – do not question this conclusion either.  
Their objections to amending both items merely refer to the predictability for their ECAs 
operation and to the traditional – but questionable – argument to legitimize export subsidies, 
                                                 
2541 See Negotiating Group on Rules, Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM Agreements 
(TN/RL/W/213, 30 November 2007). 
2542 Draft Consolidated Chair Text, above n 2485, at 73. 
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namely that it benefits importers in developing countries (just as those in developed 
countries). 
Nonetheless, the legal implications of this difference in subsidy standard should be nuanced 
in light of the case law’s rejection of an a contrario reading of both items of the Illustrative 
List.  As explained, wiping out the disadvantage to developing countries of the cost-to-
government standard was precisely one of the main reasons why panels have systematically 
rejected that conformity with this standard under the relevant item ((j) or (k)) would imply 
that such support is not prohibited under the SCM Agreement.  If such support would result in 
export credits extended at better-than-market terms to the importer (and thus benefit the 
exporter), it would still be prohibited on the basis of Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM 
Agreement.  As a result, WTO Members thus already compete on a level playing field with 
regard to export credit support despite the difference in standards in the current text.2543  
Although the Appellate Body has not yet confirmed whether it would concur, the latest Chair 
Consolidated Draft Text would codify the panels’ interpretation.  An a contrario reading 
would only be allowed for ‘measures explicitly referred to in Annex I as not constituting 
prohibited export subsidies’, which is not present in either item (j) or paragraph 1 of item 
(k).2544 
Although WTO Members are thus already confronted with a ‘common set of rules’2545, the 
call of  developing countries to replace the cost-to-government benchmark with one based on 
the benefit-to-recipient seems nonetheless valid, certainly with regard to item (j).  The 
mandatory/discretionary distinction makes it more difficult to challenge an export credit 
support programme on the basis of the benefit-to-recipient standard (Article 1 juncto Article 
3) than a similar challenge on the basis of item (j).  Arguably, redrafting item (k) along these 
lines, which was suggested in the draft of December 2007,2546,2547 would not generate 
significant legal implications.  This change would merely clarify that the ultimate standard is 
                                                 
2543 Except for S&D treatment for some developing countries. 
2544 See footnote 6 (which replaces the current footnote 5) of the Chair Consolidated Draft Text. 
2545 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras 6.60-6.61. 
2546 This draft inscribed a new paragraph 1 of item (k):  
‘The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by and/or acting under the authority 
of governments) of export credits at rates below those available to the recipient on international 
capital markets (absent any government guarantee or support), for funds of the same maturity and 
other credit terms and denominated in the same currency as the export credit’.   
Such an amendment would be nothing more than a codification of the case law on direct credits under the 
benefit element.  Therefore, if the other forms of official financing support would simply be deleted from 
the Illustrative List, this would have no legal implications.  The standard would be similar for direct 
credits (under the Illustrative List or under Articles 1 and 3 of the SCM Agreement) as for the other types 
of official financing support (under Articles 1 and 3 of the SCM Agreement).  See Negotiating Group on 
Rules, Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM Agreements (TN/RL/W/213, 30 November 
2007), at 76. 
2547 Note that during the Uruguay Round, the US precisely proposed to amend item (k) in a way 
reflecting the benefit-to-recipient standard.  See Submission by the United States, Elements of the 
Framework for Negotiations (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, 22 November 1989). 
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indeed the benefit-to-recipient standard.  To be sure, such clarification might be worth 
advancing an sich given that some developed countries (and their ECAs2548) do not seem to 
grasp the scope of the current disciplines.  Indeed, the argumentation of their delegates quoted 
above seems to be based on an erroneous reading of the existing as well as proposed rules.  
As long as an a contrario reasoning of item (j) and the first paragraph of item (k) is rejected 
(either by continuing the jurisprudence or on an explicit legal basis as foreseen in the same 
Draft), redrafting items (j) and (k) would neither increase the cost for developing country 
borrowers nor reduce the predictability for ECAs.  After all, even if items (j) and (k) would 
not be redrafted, ECAs will not only have to operate break-even, but should –just like under 
the current rules –ensure as well that they do not confer export credit support at below market 
terms by virtue of Article 1 juncto 3 of the Illustrative List.  Only the safe haven or S&D 
treatment could preclude that export credit support at subsidized terms is prohibited, though 
such support would still be vulnerable to an actionable subsidy claim and CVDs actions.  In 
sum, the substantive disciplines on export credit support would not change by replacing the 
cost-to-government standard under items (j) and (k) with the benefit-to-recipient standard. 
 
7.1.2. The redrafting of the safe haven in paragraph 2 of item (k) 
The task of rethinking the unusual character of the safe haven, which was implicitly assigned 
to WTO Members by the Panel in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II), has not yet 
resulted in a consensus either.  Recall that already during the Uruguay Round developing 
countries had questioned whether an exception could rest in the hands of developed countries.   
Even though stronger proposals had been advanced the draft tabled in December 2007 only 
added a footnote to item paragraph 2 of item (k).  This new footnote would have instructed 
Participants to notify the version of the OECD Arrangement in effect on the date of entry into 
force of the Doha Development Agreement and allowed the SCM Committee to ‘examine’ 
that version upon request.2549  Thereafter, any new successor undertaking would have to be 
notified and all WTO Members would again be allowed to request the SCM Committee to 
examine this new version.  In this examination, the SCM Committee would take into account 
‘the need to maintain effective multilateral disciplines on export credit practices and to 
preserve a balance of rights and obligations among Members’.  The new version would only 
                                                 
2548 The 2009 report of the Ex-Im Bank also merely refers to the OECD Arrangement as the international 
framework that has to be respected and to the ‘WTO rulings to operate at break-even over the long term’.  
See Export-Import Bank of the United States, above n 2045, at 13. 
2549 Negotiating Group on Rules, Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM Agreements 
(TN/RL/W/213, 30 November 2007), at 76-77.  See, for example, Paper from Brazil, Treatment of 
Government Support for Export Credits and Guarantees under the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (TN/RL/GEN/66, 11 October 2005).   
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become applicable once this examination has been completed.2550  The wording ‘examine’ 
seemed to suggest that the SCM Committee would not have to approve the new version 
before it would become applicable under the SCM Agreement, though this pivotal element 
was not yet clarified.   
In the Draft Consolidated Chair Text of December 2008, however, this textual proposal was 
deleted, likely because non-OECD Participants considered the fact that new versions were 
only subject to ‘examination’ by the SCM Agreement not sufficiently far-reaching.  Once 
more, only the divergence in opinions was described:    
 
[EXPORT CREDITS – SUCCESSOR UNDERTAKINGS: Views differ widely as to whether 
the second paragraph of item (k) should be amended such that any changes to the OECD 
Export Credit Arrangement would not automatically take effect for purposes of the SCM 
Agreement. At one end of the spectrum, some delegations consider that only amendments not 
objected to by any Member within a certain period should have legal effect under the second 
paragraph of item (k), while at the other end of the spectrum some delegations consider that 
Members should not have any basis on which effectively to veto decisions taken by 
Participants to the Arrangement.]2551 
 
The core of the disagreement among WTO Members is thus whether the safe haven could be 
left in the hands of OECD Participants, or whether other WTO Members could block the 
entry into force of a new version with respect to its application under the SCM Agreement.  
The discussion will return to this issue in the concluding normative section. 
 
7.2. NEGOTIATIONS ON EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IN THE 
DOHA ROUND 
7.2.1. Overview of the negotiation process  
Contrary to the regulatory framework on export credit support for industrial products, it was 
ambiguous until the US – Upland Cotton decision whether any substantive discipline was in 
place for such support to agricultural products.  This overview of the negotiation process on 
new disciplines for agricultural export credit support will amply demonstrate that negotiators 
were clearly unaware that such support is already indirectly subject to the reduction 
commitments on direct export subsidies.   
Article 10.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture obliged WTO Members to start working toward 
the development of internationally agreed disciplines on export credit support for agricultural 
products.  When WTO negotiations on the reform process of the Agreement on Agriculture 
were launched in early 2000, negotiations on disciplining export credit support were 
underway among OECD Participants within the OECD, with mainly the US on the defensive 
side.  But non-OECD Participants such as Argentina, Brazil, and India claimed that the WTO 
                                                 
2550 If no request for examination is made, the new version would become applicable. 
2551 Draft Consolidated Chair Text, above n 2485, at 74. 
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was the appropriate forum to negotiate and conclude such disciplines as this would enable 
participation of all stakeholders (users, recipients, and potentially affected countries).2552  
Other Cairns group members such as Canada and Australia also called to shift negotiations to 
the WTO.  The EC, for its part, was rather neutral on the exact forum but stressed the need for 
a more ‘level playing field in export competition’ in the WTO as ‘direct’ subsidies (listed in 
Article 9) were subject to reduction commitments, whereas export credit support was, in the 
EC’s view, not subject to any specific discipline given the Article 10.2 mandate had not yet 
materialised.2553  Although the US first emphasized that the OECD was the appropriate forum 
to tackle this issue, it finally realized that it could use any concession in this field to obtain 
reciprocal concessions of trading partners if the subject was transferred to the WTO.2554  As a 
result, negotiations in the OECD broke down2555 and were taken up in the WTO negotiations 
under the reform process and subsequently became part of the Doha Round negotiations, 
which aimed at ‘the reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export 
subsidies’.2556  
From the outset, strengthening disciplines on export credit support was a ‘widely shared 
objective’.2557  The US equally accepted that it was ‘on the table’ but advocated flexibility 
                                                 
2552 Proposal by Mercosur, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, India and Malaysia, Export Credits 
for Agricultural Products (G/AG/NG/W/139, G/AG/W/50, 21 March 2001).   
2553 See European Communities Proposal, Export Competition (15 September 2000), paras 5-6; Note by 
the European Communities, Export Credits (Brussels, 20 July 2001), paras 1-2; ICTSD, ‘Agriculture 
Negotiations at the WTO: Context Setting and Intelligence Report, February-April 2001’ (Geneva, May 
2001), at 5 and 16. 
2554 Submission from the United States, Proposal for Comprehensive Long-Term Agricultural Trade 
Reform (G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000), at 4.     
2555 The latest draft text circulated in the OECD: Chairman’s Revised Proposal for a Sector 
Understanding on Export Credits for Agricultural Products, 14-15 November 2000 
(TD/CONSENSUS(2000)25/REV4, 9 July 2002).  This draft text articulated a general repayment of 180 
days, but inscribed an exception for cereals, oilseeds, and cotton with repayment up to 18 months (+ 3 
months for export credit support to net-food importing countries).  However, Canada and the US failed to 
overcome their disagreement on this text before a mid-May 2001 ministerial meeting of the OECD, 
marking the end of the OECD negotiations.  Whereas the US signaled that it would have accepted these 
repayment terms, Canada was only willing to offer 12 months as maximum repayment term for the three 
products mentioned.  On the other hand, Canada was unwilling to accept the US request to make export 
credit support offered by state-trading enterprises subject to these disciplines.  Before these talks with 
Canada, the Bush administration also came under pressure from Democratic members of Congress not to 
agree with new disciplines in the OECD as the likelihood of reciprocity would be greater if the topic was 
integrated in the WTO negotiations.  Noteworthy, they recognized the risk that failure to agree would 
open the door for a challenge of the US export credit support in the WTO but did ‘not believe that risk 
justifies being forced into a bad agreement’.  ICTSD, above n 2553, at 5 and 24-25; ‘US – Canada Fight 
Prevents Agriculture Export Credit Deal’, 19:16 Inside US Trade (20 April 2001). 
2556 Doha Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001), para 13.   
2557 In particular, see also, in addition to n 2553, 2554, 2561, 2564, Cairns Group Negotiating Proposal, 
Export Competition (G/AG/NG/W/11, 16 June 2000), at 2;  Proposal by India in the Areas of (i) Food 
Security, (ii) Market Access, (iii) Domestic Support and (iv) Export Competition (G/AG/NG/W/102, 15 
January 2001), at 15-16; Negotiating Proposal by Japan on WTO Agricultural Negotiations 
(G/AG/NG/W/91, 21 December 2000), at 15 and 17; WTO: Negotiations on Agriculture, Proposal by 
Switzerland (G/AG/NG/W/94, 21 December 2000), at 7; WTO Negotiations on Agriculture, Proposal by 
Turkey (G/AG/NG/W/106, 5 February 2001) at 4; Comprehensive Proposal by the Arab Republic of 
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(e.g., on repayment terms),2558 stated that it would use any concession to push for stricter 
reduction commitments on direct subsidies, and emphasized that state trading enterprises 
(e.g., Canadian Wheat Board) should likewise be disciplined. 2559  Conversely, the EC (and the 
G-10) endorsed the principle of ‘full parallelism’, indicating that it would only agree on 
further reductions of direct subsidies (listed in Article 9) if export credit support and other 
types of indirect export subsidies would be similarly tackled.2560  The Cairns group also 
pushed for stringent disciplines as well, but their proposals leave out export credit support 
offered by state trading enterprises (STEs).2561  Furthermore, developing countries claimed 
that new disciplines should give adequate S&D treatment to their support.2562  Mindful of the 
Asian financial crisis, some Asian countries, together with the US and Cuba, also advocated 
that subsidized export credit support could be legitimate in case of currency reserve crises.2563  
Lastly, African countries endorsed the need for stricter disciplines but equally underlined the 
needs of net-food importing countries and LDCs as they would be hurt by more stringent 
disciplines on users of such support.2564  Crafting appropriate S&D treatment for these 
countries was even explicitly mandated by a ministerial decision (NFIDC Decision).2565  
Although all WTO Members thus agreed on this concern, several developed countries (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                            
Egypt to the WTO Negotiations on Agriculture (G/AG/NG/W/107, 6 February 2001) at 3; WTO 
Negotiations on Agriculture, Submission by Croatia (G/AG/NG/W/141, 23 March 2001), at 3. 
2558 It is reported that the US considered the WTO negotiations as a ‘totally new ballgame’ and thus 
rejected that the latest draft that had circulated in the OECD would be used as a starting point for the 
discussion in the WTO.  ‘US Proposal on Export Credits Likely to Mirror Industry Position’, Inside US 
Trade (31 May 2002). 
2559 This call by US negotiators was inspired by a paper from its oilseed, grain, wheat, and cotton 
industries. The paper referred in particular to various forms of export credit support offered by Australia, 
Canada, France, China, and India and also emphasized that, in light of Article 10.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, export credit support should not be disciplined similarly as direct export subsidies.  Both 
arguments were picked up by US negotiators.  ‘WTO Members Split over Approach for Export Credit 
Disciplines’, Inside US Trade (7 June 2002); ‘US Proposal on Export Credits Likely to Mirror Industry 
Position’, Inside US Trade (31 May 2002). 
2560 In the words of Pascal Lamy, who was EC trade commissioner at that time, parallelism was ‘bound to 
be the name of the game’.  The G-10, a group of countries with high levels of subsidies (see above Part 
II, Chapter 1, Section 1.5) was in favour of phasing out all export subsidies but also made it conditional 
on the principle of full parallelism.  ICTSD, ‘UNCTAD XI: Key Members Report Growing Consensus 
on Main Farm Trade Issues’, 8(21) Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest (16 June 2004), at 1-2; ICTSD, 
‘Agriculture Negotiations at the WTO ‘Framework Phase’ Update Report’, Quarterly Intelligence Report 
No. 11 (March 2004), at 5 and 8.         
2561 Of course, this is not an accident as some of its main Members have STEs in place (e.g., Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand). See, for example, Cairns Group Proposal on Export Credits, Export Credit 
Guarantees or Insurance Programmes (JOB(07)/69, 22 May 2007), at 2-3 (compare with the scope of 
the latest draft discussed below).   
2562 For example, Submission by ASEAN, Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in 
World Agriculture Trade, Submission by ASEAN (G/AG/NG/W/55, 10 November 2000), at 2. 
2563 ICTSD, ‘Agriculture Negotiations at the WTO – “Modalities” Phase Update Report’ (Geneva, 
September 2002), at 14-15. 
2564 WTO African Group: Joint Proposal on the Negotiations on Agriculture (G/AG/NG/W/142, 23 
March 2001), para 16.     
2565 Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform 
Programme for Least-Developing and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries, para 4; Article 16 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture.     
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EC, Australia, and New Zealand) as well as some large developing countries (e.g., Brazil, 
Argentina) warned that this should not open a large loophole.  The EC particularly argued that 
such a loophole would have the perverse effect of increasing developing countries’ debt 
burden.  Broadly speaking, these negotiation positions and arguments explain the dynamism 
of the drafting process until present. 
 
Two different approaches were suggested on how such export credit support had to be 
disciplined during the first substantive discussions mid 2002.2566  On the one hand, the Cairns 
group (sided by the US and several developing countries) proposed a ‘rules-based’ approach 
by which commercial terms of all different aspects of such support (i.e. duration, minimum 
interest rates, and premium rates) would be specified.  Export credit support not fulfilling 
these conditions would be considered ‘export subsidies’ and made subject to specific 
reduction commitments or simply be prohibited.2567  On the other hand, the EC (sided by 
Norway and Japan) proposed a ‘reduction commitment’ approach by which the subsidy 
component of export credit support would be calculated and be brought under the reduction 
commitments for direct export subsidies.  However, the US objected that such calculation was 
very difficult in practice and that this approach was already unsuccessfully explored in the 
OECD negotiations. 2568   
In the first draft modalities paper of 2003 (Harbinson Text) already, the choice for the rules-
based approach was made.  This draft spelled out detailed conditions for export credit support 
and made non-conforming support subject to ‘specific financing reduction commitments’.2569  
In the July Framework Agreement of 2004, the EC finally agreed upon the elimination of all 
direct export subsidies by a certain end date.  Incorporating the principle of ‘parallelism’, the 
Agreement included the elimination of (i) scheduled export subsidies, (ii) export credit 
support with repayment terms of beyond 180 days, and (iii) export credit support below 180 
                                                 
2566 See ICTSD, above n 2563, at 14-15.   
2567 ICTSD, ‘Agriculture: Little Progress in Export Competition Debate’, 6:24 Bridges Weekly Trade 
News Digest (26 June 2002), at 3. 
2568 The EC thus seemed to have changed its mind as it previously pleaded for a ‘rules-based’ approach in 
the OECD, but the exact reasons for this shift are unclear.  Aggarwal reveals that the EC considered a 
‘rules-based’ approach less transparent than the ‘reduction commitment’ approach in place for direct 
subsidies.  It was also reported that the EC aimed at diverting the attention from eliminating towards 
reducing direct subsidies.  Indeed, the ‘reduction commitment’ approach reflected the EC’s plea for full 
parallelism.  Another argument suggested holds that the EC defended this approach because some of its 
countries had extensive export credit support programmes in place.  R. Aggarwal, ‘Dynamics of 
Agriculture Negotiations in the World Trade Organization’, 39:4 Journal of World Trade (2005), 741-
761, at 754; ‘WTO Members Split over Approach for Export Credit Disciplines’, Inside US Trade (7 
June 2002). 
2569 Negotiations on Agriculture, First Draft of Modalities for Further Commitments – Revision 
(TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1, 18 March 2003), para 36 and attachment 5.  See also Chairperson’s Overview 
Paper, above n 2557, paras 33-34 and at 48-57.   
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days not fulfilling specific disciplines on, inter alia, minimum interest and premium rates.2570  
In December 2004, these commitments were incorporated in a new text on export credit 
support which resembled the Harbinson Text.2571  Although WTO Members failed to finalize 
the Doha Round, the EC ultimately agreed in Hong Kong (December 2005) to fix a date for 
the elimination of export subsidies and all other export measures with equivalent effect.2572  
However, the 2013 end date would only be confirmed once the modalities on export credit 
support, STEs, and food aid would be completed.2573   
For the negotiations of these modalities in April 2006, Chairman Falconer suggested to work 
further along the same lines.2574  Therefore, Falconer’s Reference Paper implemented the 
rules-based approach, whereby specific disciplines were elaborated. Indeed, the idea was that 
conforming export credit support would not be considered as ‘export subsidies’ either for the 
purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture or any other WTO Agreement.  Non-conforming 
export credit support, on the other hand, would be subject to specific export financing 
phasing-out commitments.  Falconer also emphasized to remain mindful of the entitlement of 
developing countries ‘as actual or potential users of export credits’.2575  While some questions 
still had to be solved, the general rules-based approach was no longer disputed.  It came thus 
as a surprise that the EC in reaction to this Reference Paper proposed a ‘very different 
approach’, which would only focus on core disciplines and return to a reduction commitment 
approach.2576  Whereas the subsequent Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture (July 
2006)2577 still adhered to the rules-based approach, negotiations ultimately changed track 
along the lines suggested by the EC as reflected in the latest negotiation text (see below 
Section 7.2.2).2578    
Seemingly not the EC’s main motivation behind its proposal, a plausible explanation to why 
the change of track was accepted might be found in the Appellate Body’s US – Upland 
                                                 
2570 The Doha Work Programme – Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 
(WT/L/579, 2 August 2004), paras 18-21, 24, 26.     
2571 See ICTSD, ‘WTO Agriculture Negotiations Progress on Technical Issues’, 8:40 Bridges Weekly 
Trade News Digest (24 November 2004). 
2572 WTO Members further agreed that export credit support up to 180 days ‘should be self-financing, 
reflecting market consistency, and that the period should be of a sufficiently short duration so as not to 
effectively circumvent real commercially-oriented discipline’.  Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 
(WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005), para 6. 
2573 The Hong Kong Declaration set 30 April 2006 as deadline, but this deadline was clearly not reached. 
2574 Chair’s Reference Paper, Export Credits, Export Credit Guarantees or Insurance Programmes (13 
April 2006). 
2575 July Framework Agreement, para 22.     
2576 Chair’s Reference Paper, Rev.1, Export Credits, Export Credit Guarantees or Insurance 
Programmes (10 May 2006).     
2577 Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture (TN/AG/W/3, 12 July 2006), Annex I. 
2578 With the important difference that non-conforming export subsidy support is simply prohibited in the 
latest draft.  For the first proposal reflecting the EC’s approach, see Working Document No. 1, Annex D, 
Possible New Article to Replace the Current Article 10.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture (6 November 
2007).  In line with the EC’s proposal, non-conforming export credit support was ‘to be eliminated 
within the binding levels of Members' export subsidies elimination Schedules’. 
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Cotton ruling dating from mid-2005.  Apparently, Falconer’s Reference Text, incorporating 
years of negotiations according to the rules-based approach, did not grasp the wider 
implications of the panel’s and Appellate Body’s US – Upland Cotton ruling.  Under 
Falconer’s Reference Text, export credit support conforming to the specific disciplines (e.g., 
being self-financing) would not be considered an ‘export subsidy’ and thus would not be 
prohibited.  On the other hand, non-conforming export credit support would, until the date of 
elimination, not be prohibited as long as it fulfilled specific reduction commitments.  Hence, 
all WTO Members would be allowed to schedule such specific reduction commitments at the 
end of the Doha Round.  However, the Appellate Body had already confirmed that under the 
existing rules non self-financing export credit support programmes (in the meaning of item 
(j)) for non-scheduled products are prohibited as such and that those for scheduled products 
are only allowed within existing reduction commitments.  Members having no scheduled 
products simply cannot offer subsidized export credit support.  Moreover, even if export 
credit support programmes would be self-financing under the current rules, they could still be 
considered ‘export subsidies’ if conferring a benefit to the exporter (Article 1 juncto 3 of the 
SCM Agreement).  Inadvertently, WTO Members targeting mainly US export credit support 
were thus drafting more flexible instead of more stringent rules on export credit support.  
Somewhat ironically, the principle of parallelism, fiercely defended by the EC during the 
negotiations as the ‘name of the game’2579, largely seems to have been already read into the 
current rules by the panels and Appellate Body.2580  The shift in approach thus might reflect 
the awareness among negotiators that subsidized export credit support is, in fact, already 
indirectly subject to the reduction commitments.  At the same time, the fact that countries 
were unintentionally drafting more flexibility puts further doubt on whether the Panel and 
Appellate Body indeed interpreted the current rules in line with the original drafters’ intention 
(see Section 5.1.1.1).  In the following section, a closer look is taken on how the latest 
proposal would effectively complement existing disciplines.    
 
7.2.2 Latest draft on disciplines for agricultural export credit support   
The most recent Draft Modalities for Agriculture dates from December 2008 and spells out 
new disciplines in Annex J, which would replace the current Article 10.2 Agreement on 
Agriculture.2581,2582 
                                                 
2579 See above n 2560. 
2580 Indeed, disciplines on direct subsidies and subsidized export credit support are similar.  The only 
difficulty lies in defining when export credit support is exactly at subsidized terms.  The EC seems to 
hold that ‘full parallelism’ is not obtained as long as straightforward rules are lacking to make this 
determination.    
2581 See Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, above n 2163, para 165 and Annex J.      
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The disciplines set out in Annex J further elaborate the export subsidy disciplines that are 
currently applicable.  Indeed, ‘(i)n addition to complying with all other export subsidy 
obligations under this Agreement and the other covered Agreements’2583, export credit 
support should be offered in conformity with Annex J.2584  Therefore, Annex J cannot be 
‘construed to imply any change to the obligations and rights under Article 10.1 or to diminish 
in any way existing obligations under other provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture or other WTO Agreements’.2585  Annex J would explicitly stipulate that ‘the 
second paragraph of item (k) of Annex I to the (SCM Agreement) shall not be applicable in 
the case of agricultural products’.  This clarification is at present redundant given that the 
latest version of the OECD Arrangement to which the second paragraph of item (k) refers 
does not apply to agricultural products.2586  Nonetheless, Annex J would unambiguously 
eliminate any (future) aspirations among OECD Participants to modify the disciplines on 
agricultural export credit support through item (k) paragraph 2. 
 
7.2.2.1. Scope of new disciplines on export credit support 
Export financing support, which is defined broadly,2587 is disciplined by Annex J if offered by 
one of the ‘export financing entities’ established at the national or sub-national level.  Parallel 
to the scope of the SCM Agreement as developed in the case law, it comprises support offered 
directly by public bodies2588 as well as indirectly through entrustment or direction of a private 
body.2589  Moreover, export credit support is captured in case it is offered by private financial 
institutions in which there is some form of government participation, even if the government 
exercises neither control nor direction/entrustment over the private body.2590  This seems to be 
looser than the government nexus mandated under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement 
and might substantially open the scope of Annex J in light of the various participations taken 
by governments in response to the current financial and economic crisis.  Furthermore, export 
                                                                                                                                            
2582 Observe that the 2008 Draft explicitly stipulates with regard to cotton that ‘(t)o the extent that new 
disciplines and commitments for export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes, (…) 
create new and additional obligations for Members as regards cotton, any such obligations shall be 
implemented on the first day of the implementation period for developed country Members, and by the 
end of the first year of the implementation period for developing country Members’.  See Revised Draft 
Modalities for Agriculture, above n 2163, para 169. 
2583 Emphasis added.  
2584 This is again reiterated with respect to the condition of self-financing.   
2585 Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, above n 2163, para 160. 
2586 Indeed, a precondition for export credit support to be in conformity with the OECD Arrangement is 
that it is subject to its provisions (Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 6.61).   
2587 Next to direct financing support and pure cover support, two other types are also explicitly 
mentioned.   
2588 These are controlled by the government.  Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, paras 7.50-
7.56, 7.352-7.56. 
2589 Article 2(a),(d) Annex J; Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement.  See also Appellate Body 
Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 116. 
2590 Article 2(b) of Annex J. 
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credit support offered by agricultural STEs is explicitly included, mainly on demand by the 
US and EC.2591   
 
7.2.2.2. Substance of new disciplines on export credit support 
Reflecting the new ‘core disciplines’ approach suggested by the EC, only two types of 
disciplines are imposed on such export financing support.2592 
First, the maximum repayment term of such support is uniformly set on 180 days, regardless 
of the agricultural product supported.2593,2594  Accordingly, the exceptions for cereals, oilseeds, 
and cotton inscribed on demand of the US in the 2000 OECD-draft are not upheld.2595  More 
fundamentally, no exception is also made for breeding livestock and agricultural vegetable 
reproduction material.  For these products, a different repayment term was generally 
considered more acceptable given the longer lifetime of such non-consumable agricultural 
products.2596  Only two types of exceptions on the 180 day rule are inscribed, both relating to 
developing countries.  First of all, all developing countries are given a four year phase-in 
period within which to implement the 180 day rule when they provide export financing 
support.  During the first two years, maximum repayment terms of 360 days could be offered 
and during the next two years, the maximum repayment term is lowered to 270 days.2597  
Next, as mandated by the NFIDC Decision and consistent with economic theory2598, LDCs 
and net-food-importing countries are given longer repayment terms when they make use of 
export credit support, but only for the importation of ‘basic foodstuffs’.  A repayment term 
between 360 and 540 days shall be given and an unspecified ‘further extension of such a time 
frame shall be provided’ in case of exceptional circumstances.2599  Hence, the 180 days rule is 
even not allowed as repayment term for such export credit support to these countries.  Some 
                                                 
2591 Article 2(c) of Annex J. 
2592 For example, no specific rules on minimum interest rates and transparency are inscribed. 
2593 Already from the beginning of the WTO negotiations, this 180 day rule, transposed from the latest 
OECD draft, was widely accepted for export credit support offered by developed countries for 
consumable agricultural goods. The July Framework Agreement incorporated this rule.    
2594 The starting point of credit is one of the much debated technical aspects in the negotiations.  Similar 
to the latest OECD draft, ‘the "starting point of a credit" shall be no later than the weighted mean date or 
actual date of the arrival of the goods in the recipient country for a contract under which shipments are 
made in any consecutive six-month period’ (footnote 2 of Annex J). 
2595 As mentioned above (n 2555), this was one of the stumbling blocks for reaching an agreement within 
the OECD because the US refused to drop these exceptions and Canada refused to leave them untouched.  
The fact that the US did not really hold to these exceptions in the WTO talks supports the theory that the 
US refusal in the OECD was in fact a tactical move to shift discussions to the WTO.  
2596 Here again, the latest OECD draft offered longer maximum repayment terms for breeding cattle (2 
years for contracts up to $150 000 and 3 years for contracts exceeding $150 000) and agricultural 
vegetable reproduction material (1 year). 
2597 After four years, the normal 180 days rule shall apply. 
2598 But other options would be superior (see below Part III, Chapter 8, Section 8.2) 
2599 It should be exceptional circumstances ‘which still preclude financing normal levels of commercial 
imports of basic foodstuffs and/or in accessing loans granted by multilateral and/or regional financial 
institutions within these timeframes’. 
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countries’ reluctance to open a large loophole thus seems to have blocked the option to 
completely exempt export credit support to LDCs and net food-importing countries. 2600 
Second, all export financing support programmes except for direct financing support have to 
be self-financing.  In particular, such a programme will be considered as not self-financing if 
premium rates inadequately cover operating costs and losses of that programme over a 
previous 4-year rolling period.2601  With respect to support offered by developing countries, 
this rolling period is specified at 6 years.  Alternatively, a programme will also be considered 
not self-financing under Annex J if it fails to respect the unspecified ‘long-term operating 
costs and losses’ standard of item (j) of the Illustrative List. 
 
If export credit support does not conform to the maximum repayment terms and/or the self-
financing obligation, it is considered inconsistent with Annex J.  In contrast to previous drafts, 
such non-conforming export credit support is not made subject to the reduction commitments 
for direct export subsidies or made subject to specific reduction commitments.  Instead, it is 
simply prohibited.  By consequence, such export credit support inconsistent with the 
Agreement on Agriculture will also be challengeable under Article 3 of the SCM 
Agreement.2602          
 
7.2.2.3. Evaluation of new disciplines on export credit support 
How should these substantive conditions that would be imposed under Annex J be 
appreciated in light of the ‘subsidy’-standards spelled out in the SCM Agreement and of the 
disciplines imposed on other agricultural export subsidies?  Three aspects of Annex J 
disciplines could be analyzed in this respect. 
First, how should the maximum repayment terms under Annex J be evaluated in light of 
commercial practice?  Although not necessarily reflecting commercial conditions, the Berne 
Union General Understanding could offer a useful initial touchstone.  It elaborates an 
understanding among Berne Union Members, which comprises of public as well as private 
providers of pure cover support, regarding inter alia terms of payment.2603  The Berne Union 
General Understanding stipulates that ‘it is normally sound underwriting practice for credit 
terms to be related to the nature of the goods and to be in line with sound conditions normally 
                                                 
2600 Given the fact that ‘only a tiny percentage of credits’ actually go to these Members, Falconer had 
nonetheless suggested not to unduly over-rate the risk of creating such a loophole.  Chair’s Reference 
Paper, above n 2576, at 6. 
2601 This rolling period was highly debated among the US and EC, suggesting 15 years and 1 year 
respectively.     
2602 In order to find a violation of this provision, the existence of an export subsidy in the meaning of 
Article 1 juncto 3 or the Illustrative List (item (j) or (k)) will have to be demonstrated. 
2603 Berne Union Agreements, Understandings and Obligations in the Export Credit Insurance Field – 
General Understanding (Berne Union General Understanding) (January 2001).  See also Background 
Paper by the Secretariat, above 2162, paras 19-21, 27, 38. 
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accepted in the market’.2604  Agricultural products are not treated separately.  Consumable 
agricultural products would be covered by the category of ‘consumable goods’2605 for which a 
maximum term of six months is inscribed.  This corresponds with the 180 days rule inscribed 
in Annex J for export credit support offered by developed countries and would, for example, 
imply that the US would have to substantially shorten its maximum repayment terms (up to 
three years) under its GSM-102 programme.  Under ‘Sector Agreements’ of the Berne Union 
Understanding, repayment terms are specified for non-consumable agricultural products.  For 
breeding animals, 180 days is the general rule but 2 or even 3 years repayment terms are 
allowed for cattle depending on the contract value.  For agricultural vegetable reproduction 
material, maximum terms are even permitted up to 360 days.  This flexibility on the 180 days 
rule for non-consumable agricultural products foreseen in the Berne Union Understanding 
would, however, not be allowed under Annex J.2606  Hence, regardless of whether terms 
beyond the 180 days rule would be offered in commercial practice, export financing entities, 
including private institutions in which governments have a participation, are mandated to 
limit export financing support for non-consumable agricultural products up to the 180 days 
repayment term.  Compared to the six months repayment term, the term developing countries 
are allowed to offer during a transitional period (360 days and 270 days) as well as the term 
mandated for such support for the importation of basic foodstuff in LDCs and net-food 
importing countries (between 360 and 540 days) clearly do not correspond to commercial 
practice and are thus at ‘subsidized terms’. 
 
Second, Annex J defines a specific previous 4-year rolling period to assess whether pure 
cover support is self-financing.  This is substantially shorter than the long-term period 
effectively taken into account in the US – Upland Cotton case under item (j) and on which 
basis the US also defined a long-term period as a ‘period of ten years or more’ in its 2008 
Farm Bill.2607  In contrast, under Annex J, the programme should be self-financing over a 
strict previous 4-years period even if atypical experiences have occurred.  Obviously, the 
shorter the self-financing term, the more difficult it is to compensate losses during a certain 
period of time with profits during another period of time.  Furthermore, a well-defined short 
self-financing term also facilitates monitoring and challenging an export credit programme 
and seems sensible as the focus should be on the actual operation of the export credit 
programme.2608,2609  To be sure, Members are still allowed to rely on the unspecified ‘long-
                                                 
2604 Article III of the Berne Union General Understanding.     
2605Article V(b) of the Berne Union General Understanding. 
2606 Except for developing counties during the implementation phase. 
2607 See above n 2462. 
2608 Because repayment terms are set at a maximum of 180 days, adequacy of charged premiums could be 
meaningfully assessed over a relatively short period.   
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term’ period of item (j) to demonstrate that a programme is not self-financing under Annex J.  
In this way, quantitative evidence related to future projections and non-quantitative evidence 
are still relevant.  By inscribing self-financing as one of its core obligations, however, Annex 
J incorporates a cost-to-government standard which is inherently disadvantageous for 
developing countries.2610,2611  This disadvantage seems only partly counterbalanced by a 
longer self-financing period for developing countries.2612   
Third, non-conforming support is inconsistent with Annex J and thus not made subject to the 
reduction commitments for direct subsidies or to specific reduction commitments, whereas 
direct export subsidies are allowed insofar reduction commitments are respected until the 
final elimination date.  Hence, the current draft goes well beyond the principle of ‘full 
parallelism’.   
 
Generally speaking, Annex J disciplines are more stringent than those actually imposed under 
Article 10.1 Agreement on Agriculture.  But export credit support fulfilling those aspects of 
Annex J that are less demanding could still be challenged on the basis of Article 10.1 because 
Annex J disciplines are formulated as additional.  For example, Annex J conforming export 
credit support could still be challenged as conferring a benefit to the recipient in the meaning 
of Article 1 SCM Agreement.  Such export credit support violates the Agreement on 
Agriculture and the SCM Agreement if offered to unscheduled products and to scheduled 
products above reduction commitment levels.  This raises the question as to the value of the 
flexibility that would explicitly be offered under Annex J.  Developing countries are allowed 
to offer repayment terms at non-commercial – and thus subsidized – terms during a 
                                                                                                                                            
2609 As an illustration, the US conceded before the Panel in US – Upland Cotton that its programmes 
historically incurred significant losses with respect to Poland and Iraq that were no longer reflected in 
accounts relating to cohorts since 1992. However, the US asserted that to subject the programme to the 
‘analytical yoke’ of the unique circumstances of the Polish and Iraqi defaults over 10 years ago would 
effectively require elimination of the programme altogether.  Although this pre-1992 period was not 
taken into account, it illustrates that an export credit programme could qualify as not self-financing if a 
long-term period is considered, simply because it operated at a significant loss at times which seem not 
particularly relevant anymore for assessing current subsidization.  See Panel Report, US – Upland 
Cotton, para 7.830. 
2610 Theoretically, this disadvantage would be neutralized in case disciplines on minimum interest rates 
would be established with respect to export credits benefiting from pure cover.  Disciplines on minimum 
interest rates were inscribed in previous drafts but only for official financing support and not for export 
credits benefiting from pure cover support.  Noteworthy, under the OECD Arrangement no minimum 
interest rates are inscribed for pure cover support either, which explains why the safe haven of item (k), 
para 2 is not available for pure cover support at the moment. 
2611 An open question is whether a violation of Annex J would imply that the WTO Member in question 
also has to ensure that the benefit-to-recipient standard is met.  If so, part of the disadvantage resulting 
from the cost-to-government standard would be neutralized (recall also above n 2481).      
2612 As under the current regime, the disadvantage is partly tempered by the benefit-to-recipient standard 
that is still available for an assessment under Article 10.1.  Contrary to Annex J, Article 10.1 only 
outlaws such subsidized pure cover support above reduction commitment levels.  Moreover, the long-
term period spelled out in item (j) is inscribed in Annex J and makes no distinction between developed 
and developing countries.    
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transitional period.  As these countries often do not have scheduled products, such ‘export 
subsidies’ in the meaning of Article 1 juncto 3 SCM Agreement would nonetheless be 
inconsistent with Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article 3 SCM 
Agreement. Of parallel note, all countries are required to offer longer repayment terms to net-
food importing countries and LDCs for their importation of basic foodstuffs.  Hence, an 
export credit programme tailored to these countries would even mandate export credit support 
at subsidized terms and would thus be vulnerable to an as such claim.  Again, such export 
credit support at subsidized terms violates Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture if 
extended above commitment levels.   
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8. CONCLUSION: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF DISCIPLINES ON EXPORT CREDIT 
SUPPORT 
8.1. OVERVIEW AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF DISCIPLINES ON EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT 
FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS  
Export credit support provided by ECAs that aims at filling in gaps left by the private 
financial market could be labeled as an export subsidy and is thus in principle prohibited 
under the SCM Agreement.  Mindful of the position of developing countries, panels declared 
that subsidized export credits fall under this prohibition even if no cost to the government is 
involved.2613  Consequently, the urge by the WTO upon its Members to spur export credits to 
developing countries in general and in light of the financial crisis in particular, can only be in 
accordance with the SCM Agreement if an exception for this prohibition is provided for.2614   
Such an exception available to all WTO Members is spelled out in the form of a ‘safe haven’ 
under paragraph 2 of item (k) Illustrative List, which refers to the OECD Arrangement.  By 
leveling the playing field among ECAs, the OECD Arrangement would neutralize the trade-
distortive potential of export credit support if exporters in different countries have access to 
export credit support at the terms set in the latest version of the OECD Arrangement.2615  But 
WTO Members should be aware of the exact scope of this safe haven.  First, it only shields 
official financing support with repayment terms of at least two years and fixed interest rates.  
Thus, ECAs are prohibited to extend short-term export credits for non-agricultural goods 
which aim at filling the gap in short-term financing caused by the financial crisis.2616  
Moreover, pure cover support is not accepted as long as the supported export credits are not 
made subject to the CIRR.  If such support is not available at the private market – which is 
often the case –, pure cover support is prohibited under the SCM Agreement as well.  The 
argument that the guarantee/insurance programme runs at no cost to the government, as 
prescribed by item (j) of the Illustrative List (and the OECD Arrangement), is irrelevant as a 
defence since no a contrario-reasoning is accepted.  Hence, at present, ECAs can not play 
their complementary role in providing pure cover support.  Second, matching of derogations, 
even though permitted under the OECD Arrangement, is not allowed under the SCM 
Agreement.  In this case, export credit support cannot be used as a self-defence instrument.  
                                                 
2613 By rejecting an a contrario reading of items (j) and (k), para 1. 
2614 Unless all support is channelled through international organizations.   
2615 Here, the term ‘trade-distortive’ is used in the meaning of altering trade flows and not in the meaning 
of creating extra trade above the free trade level.  The trade-creating effect is exactly legitimized on the 
basis of capital market failures. 
2616 In the US – Upland Cotton arbitration procedure, the US cited the call for more trade finance support 
made in the WTO Expert Group Meeting on Trade Finance to underpin its claim that Brazil’s request for 
countermeasures had to be considered in the context of the financial crisis and the need for credit 
availability.  However, Brazil correctly responded that the disciplines do ‘not change in times of crisis’ 
and subtly highlighted that the US had agreed with this position in Korea – Commercial Vessels.  Written 
Submission by the United States (9 December 2008), at 3-4; Written Submission by Brazil (13 January 
2009), at 25 – 27. 
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Instead, WTO Members have to take recourse to the WTO dispute settlement system.2617  
Third, export credit support covered by the safe haven is still countervailable and might also 
be challenged as an actionable subsidy.   
In addition to this safe haven, subsidized export credits, even if not in line with the OECD 
Arrangement, are not prohibited if offered by developing countries listed in Annex VII,2618 
though such support could still be actionable and countervailable under certain conditions.  In 
these countries, ECAs have policy space to play a complementary role in providing pure 
cover support and to use subsidized export credit support as an export-promoting tool.  
Hence, Aid for Trade to set up ECAs in those countries would be WTO-compatible.  As other 
WTO Members are not allowed to match support at below OECD Arrangement terms, 
exporters in these countries might also benefit from stringent disciplines imposed on other 
WTO Members.2619   
Finally, trade financing support offered by regional and international financial institutions for 
trade transactions with developing countries would likely not be subject to the obligations set 
by the SCM Agreement.  These institutions look at export credit support from the perspective 
of the importer or exporter in the developing country eligible for development assistance.  In 
general, all foreign exporters could apply for export credit support for their sales to these 
developing countries (import transaction).  In contrast to individual ECAs support, this 
support is thus not contingent upon exportation from a particular country.  Hence, such 
support would only be trade-distorting in the meaning of trade enhancement above the free 
trade level, but this could be perfectly legitimized on the basis of capital market failures in 
these importing developing countries.  On the other hand, only exporters of eligible 
developing countries may apply for export credit support (export transaction).  If such export 
credit support would fall outside the scope of the SCM Agreement, exporters from developed 
countries might qualify this as unfair competition because the same export credit support 
offered by its ECAs is disciplined by the SCM Agreement.  But for those eligible countries 
that benefit from S&D treatment under the SCM Agreement, export credit support would in 
any case be subject to more flexible rules.  Next to this legal argument, the presence of more 
fundamental capital market failures in eligible developing countries might offer an economic 
justification for such support targeted at their exporters.2620  In sum, the exclusion from the 
                                                 
2617 Or, they could impose CVDs to tackle the injury to their domestic industry.   
2618 Unless they have graduated from Annex VII. 
2619 Obviously, importers in developing countries would benefit from flexible rules imposed on export 
credit support offered by foreign ECAs.  
2620 Hence, such support (like the one offered under the TFFPs) would rather level the playing field than 
confer an unfair advantage upon these developing countries’ exporters.  Moreover, it would be less trade-
distorting than support offered by individual ECAs, because exporters of all eligible developing countries 
are able to receive support at these terms.  Lastly, it could also be justified on the basis of market failures 
outside the capital market (e.g., export promotion tool; see above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3; below 
Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1). 
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disciplines under the SCM Agreement of export credit support offered by multilateral 
financial institutions holds water from both a legal as well as an economic perspective.2621 
Turning back to export credit support offered by individual countries, ECAs in developed and 
higher-income developing WTO Members are thus only able to play a complementary role in 
trade financing for non-agricultural goods insofar provided for in the safe haven.  The fact 
that this lays in the hands of OECD Arrangement Participants was no concern as long as 
disciplines mainly targeted their export credit support. Yet, developing countries not listed in 
Annex VII currently have to conform to the most recent version of the OECD Arrangement to 
justify subsidized export credits, even though they do not participate in its revisions.  By 
revising the arrangement, OECD Participants recently attempted to bring something ‘simply 
inconsistent with the overarching principles and purposes of the WTO Agreement and the 
SCM Agreement’ under the safe haven.2622  This plainly demonstrates that an exception ‘left 
in the hands of a certain subgroup of WTO Members’ seems unjustifiable.2623  From the 
perspective of the OECD Export Credits Secretariat, ‘the main challenge for the OECD-based 
disciplines applicable to export credits is to remain relevant, robust and flexible in order to 
meet Members’ policy objectives and to be compatible with their other international 
obligations’.2624  From the perspective of developing countries, this challenge is only 
justifiable if it is put on the shoulders of a multilateral institution such as the WTO.   
 
8.2. OVERVIEW AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF DISCIPLINES ON EXPORT CREDIT SUPPORT 
FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS  
One of the objections articulated by the US before the Panel in US – Upland Cotton was that 
Brazil’s interpretation would imply that export credit guarantees would be subject to more 
disciplines than any other practice in the Agreement on Agriculture.  Export credit support 
would not only be subject to the obligations on export subsidies but also to additional 
disciplines that would be developed under Article 10.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture in the 
future.2625   
The thrust of this argument turned out to be accurate.  The case law has read subsidized 
export credit support into the scope of Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture and 
interpreted the anti-circumvention requirement in a way that made such support indirectly 
subject to commitments for listed types of subsidies.  Subsidized export credit support is even 
                                                 
2621 Moreover, developed countries will in practice not allow that such export credit offered by 
multilateral institutions would seriously undermine their export interests. 
2622 This refers to the amendment made regarding matching of derogations.  Panel Report, Canada – 
Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.140. 
2623 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para 5.132. 
2624 See Export Credits Secretariat, above n 2033. 
2625 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, above n 1738, WT/DS267/R/Add.1, Annex D, at D-17, D-32; 
Annex E, at E-14. 
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scrutinized more severely than listed types of export subsidies as a ‘threat’ of circumvention 
suffices to find a violation of Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Bringing 
subsidized export credit support under Article 10.1 implies that it could simply not be offered 
by those Members having no listed types of export subsidies, while others, mostly developed 
countries, could offer it up to their reduction commitment levels.  This ‘inverse’ S&D 
treatment is further reinforced by the cost-to-government standard, which might not be fully 
neutralized by the potential application of the benefit-to-recipient standard.  To be sure, the 
only advantage for developed countries in this respect is that complaining Members will more 
often have to take recourse to the more demanding benefit-to-recipient standard since 
developed countries’ programmes are more easily cost-recovering.2626    
Apparently, negotiators were also surprised by the interpretation offered in US – Upland 
Cotton as they were drafting more flexible rules.  But the latest negotiation text shows that 
they are now on track for drafting additional rules.  If this draft would be adopted, support not 
fulfilling the core disciplines on maximum repayment terms and self-financing would be 
outlawed as such.  The different treatment of WTO Members depending on whether they 
have scheduled products or not is thus largely deleted.2627 Although offered limited flexibility 
in terms of a longer self-financing period, developing countries are still disadvantaged by the 
cost-to-government standard reflected in the self-financing obligation. Furthermore, the 
temporal flexibility on repayment terms under Annex J seems of limited legal value as such 
subsidized support would be outlawed under the ‘additional’ Article 10.1 obligation.2628  
 
In sum, future disciplines would go beyond the principle of ‘full-parallelism’ and this 
principle is to a large extent already read into the current rules in the case law.  Contrary to 
certain forms of export credit support for non-agricultural products, there is no – and there 
will not be – any explicit ‘safe haven’ for subsidized export credit support for agricultural 
products.  Policy space allowing Members to play a complementary role to the private market 
seems less mandatory in the field of agricultural export credits as these mostly take the form 
of short-term credits for which private trade financing instruments are usually well 
developed.2629  Yet, this conclusion might have to be nuanced in a double way.  First, today’s 
experience shows that these private short-term export credits could quickly run dry in times of 
financial crisis.  The existing rules only allow those countries that have scheduled products 
(and up to reduction commitments) to offer export credit support for agricultural products 
                                                 
2626 Remind that the Arbitrator in US – Upland Cotton decided that implementation encompasses the 
benefit-to-recipient standard if a violation of item (j) has been found. 
2627 It could still play a role under the additional claim on the basis of Article 10.1. 
2628 This holds unless the developing country in question has scheduled agricultural products. 
2629 This might have to be nuanced for developing countries where a developed private financing market 
would be lacking. 
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filling in the gap left by the private trade financing market.  No flexibility to tackle such 
situations is foreseen in the latest draft negotiating text.  Second, in normal circumstances, 
policy space for subsidized export credit support could be considered legitimate to spur 
urgently needed food imports in LDCs and net-food importing countries.  Whereas current 
disciplines do not distinguish between recipient countries, the latest negotiating draft would 
mandate longer repayment terms for export credit support to importers of basic foodstuff in 
LDCs and net-food importing countries.  But once more, the legal value of such flexibility is 
doubtful as Article 10.1 does not allow WTO Members to offer subsidized export credits 
above reduction commitment levels.  In both circumstances (i.e., financial crisis and exports 
to net-food importing countries), the optimal strategy would again not take the form of 
subsidized export credit support by ECAs.  Instead, unbound food aid in cash form or export 
credit support offered by international organizations would be superior as these strategies 
would de-link support from exportation of a particular country.2630  Both policy options would 
not only be superior in economic terms but would also be justified in legal terms.  
Although questionable from a legal perspective, reading substantive disciplines on 
agricultural export credit support in the current provisions – as the WTO-adjudicating bodies 
have done – as well as drafting even more stringent disciplines in the way WTO Members are 
doing now should thus generally be welcomed from a policy perspective.  But this objective is 
only legitimate insofar S&D treatment is not put upside down and insofar as rules are 
articulated coherently.   
                                                 
2630 On international food aid, see above Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.2.3. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this concluding Part, the appropriateness of the balance between ‘policy space’ and ‘policy 
constraints’ in WTO disciplines on subsidies and countervailing measures is assessed.  This 
normative analysis of the SCM Agreement and Agreement on Agriculture is based on the 
premise that these trade agreements should help countries to foster global welfare.  To 
perform this normative assessment, insights generated under the previous Parts are 
confronted.   
 
In Part I, we explored why governments subsidize even though welfare theory shows that, 
under the perfect market assumption, this would contract their own welfare.  Complementary, 
Part I analyzed why other countries would respond on subsidized imports by imposing CVDs 
as this unilateral action likewise depresses their welfare.  Both puzzles were solved by taking 
market imperfections, political-economy arguments, and other non-economic rationales into 
account.  This economic analysis illustrated why governments de facto undertake both types 
of interventions (positive theory) and why these measures would be legitimate (normative 
theory).  The discussion revealed that policy space to offer subsidies could very well be 
important to spur economic growth and sustainable development in general.  At the same 
time, it was explained that governments could de facto be merely motivated to meet special 
interest groups’ narrow interests when considering subsidization or CVDs action.  
 
In Part II, the legal analysis started by tracing the origins of the current WTO disciplines.    
This historical overview shed light on why countries have been willing to conclude trade 
agreements that put restrictions on their freedom to subsidize and adopt CVDs.  Next, Part II 
scrutinized the actual scope of existing disciplines on subsidization under both the SCM 
Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture.  Here, the multilateral as well as the unilateral 
track available to WTO Members to respond to foreign subsidization were explained.  The 
case study on export credit support developed in Part III further specified the existing 
regulatory framework.   
 
Based on these economic and legal analyses, this concluding Part provides an integrative 
discussion on relevant issues touching upon the equilibrium between policy space and policy 
constraints.  After assessing concerns that have been raised on the scope of the SCM 
Agreement (Chapter 1), the discussion will turn to an evaluation of the regulatory regime 
applicable to developed countries (Chapter 2) and developing countries (Chapter 3), 
respectively.  Next, the question is addressed whether the existing leeway for unilateral CVDs 
action under the SCM Agreement could be considered justified (Chapter 4).  Finally, this Part 
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goes into the current debate on whether governments’ interventions in response to the 
financial and economic crisis have raised concerns on the reach of present WTO disciplines 
(Chapter 5). 
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1. THE SCOPE OF THE SCM AGREEMENT: SPECIFIC SUBSIDIES 
A specific subsidy exists under the SCM Agreement when a government makes a financial 
contribution or provides income or price support that confers a benefit to a specific recipient.  
The case law developed the ‘private market test’ to detect whether a financial contribution (or 
income or price support) indeed benefits a specific recipient.  The ‘specific subsidy’-
definition filters out whether a specific recipient has received such contribution (or support) at 
better than market terms.   
In general, three lines of concern are articulated on this ‘specific subsidy’-definition as 
inscribed in Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement and further drawn upon in the case law.  
First, not all government measures with similar trade-distorting effects are disciplined in the 
same way.  Second, subsidies with a corrective rather than distortive effect on markets are 
disciplined similar as those having no objective to correct market failures.  Third, by 
disregarding the effect on the recipient’s competitive situation, measures having no trade-
distorting effect could be covered under the subsidy definition and privatization might 
extinguish subsidization even though the trade-distorting effect is still present.   
Before addressing these three concerns, recall that the SCM Agreement does not outlaw the 
provision of specific subsidies covered under Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement as such.  
The definition serves a double purpose: it opens the door to the substantive disciplines on 
subsidies but at the same time limits the measures against which WTO Members could take 
CVDs action.  Part of the criticism related to the subsidy definition might be better tackled 
under the disciplines imposed upon such subsidies.  Other lines of concern might seem to be 
unavoidable in light of the subsidy definition’s threshold function. 
 
1.1. FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION ELEMENT: NATURE OF THE SUBSIDY 
1.1.1. Closed list of government interventions 
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement offers an exhaustive list of government interventions that 
could be qualified as a ‘subsidy’ under the SCM Agreement if they confer a benefit.  In the 
words of the Appellate Body, the financial contribution element ‘involves consideration of the 
nature of the transaction through which something of economic value is transferred by the 
government’.2631  Generally speaking, panels and the Appellate Body have offered a rather 
expansive interpretation of the three types of financial contribution (Article 1.1(a) of the SCM 
Agreement), whereas they seemingly endorsed a narrow reading of ‘income or price support’ 
(Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement).  Governments could subsidize by positive action 
when transferring monetary or non-monetary resources directly or indirectly through private 
                                                 
2631 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 52 (emphasis added). 
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actors.  Alternatively, they could subsidize by negative action when refraining to collect 
revenue otherwise due.  Only two types of government interventions are explicitly excluded 
from the subsidy-definition: the provision of general infrastructure, which in essence relates 
to the specificity element, and border tax adjustments on indirect taxes and import duties.2632   
 
The closed list inscribed in Article 1 of the SCM Agreement implies that other government 
measures generating similar effects are not covered under the SCM Agreement.2633  For 
instance, the Panel in US – Export Restraints correctly concluded that export restraints are not 
captured, even though such measures could very well benefit domestic producers (in this case 
downstream producers) in a similar way than in case a financial contribution is offered.2634,2635  
Moreover, the financial contribution element does equally exclude so-called ‘regulatory 
subsidies’ from the scope of the SCM Agreement.  This refers to the failure of a government 
to provide certain levels of regulation on, for instance, environmental protection or labor 
standards.2636  Such negative action by the government cannot be labelled as a subsidy 
because there is no (potential) direct transfer of funds (or liabilities), provision of goods or 
services, or revenue that is foregone.2637  This implies that such ‘regulatory subsidies’ (so-
                                                 
2632 See Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement and footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement. 
2633 Remind that export subsidies included in the Illustrative List are prohibited, regardless of whether 
they are covered under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. 
2634 Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para 8.75.   
2635 Janow and Staiger offer an alternative reasoning on which ground the US claim could be rejected.  
Applying the Lerner Theorem, they indicate that an export tax is equivalent to an alternative 
programme in which an export subsidy of the same magnitude is placed on every other export good and 
an import tariff of the same magnitude is placed on each imported good.  On this basis, they argue that 
an export tax confers a subsidy to production in every other sector of the economy.  Therefore, the 
Panel could have rejected the US claim on the basis of the specificity test.  Yet, their argument seems 
flawed in legal terms because, even if the export tax generates these non-specific benefits to all other 
sectors, it still confers a specific benefit for downstream domestic producers as they benefit from a 
reduced domestic price.  Hence, the specificity test will still be passed.  As Janow and Staiger 
acknowledge as well, their equivalence argument ‘does not for example rule out the possibility than an 
export tax on logs would have a large expansionary impact on the volume of exports of logs (…)’.  
Sykes also indicates that, from an economic point of view, Janow and Staiger’s view does not refute 
that an export tax benefits downstream producers.  J. Janow and R. W. Staiger, ‘US – Export 
Restraints, United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies (WT/DS194; DSR 
201:XI, 5767)’, in H. Horn and P. Mavroidis (eds), The American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies on 
WTO Case Law – Legal and Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 214-
248, at 242-244; A. O. Sykes, ‘The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative 
Perspective’, Working Paper (April 2009), 41 pp, at 30. 
2636See, for example, J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International 
Economic Relations, 2nd ed (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997), 441 pp., at 296; P. C. Mavroidis, P. A. 
Messerlin, and J. M. Wauters, The Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in the WTO 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 606 pp., at 303; M. Schlagenhof, ‘Trade Measures Based on 
Environmental Processes and Production Methods’, 29:6 Journal of World Trade (1995), 123-155, at 
145-146.  
2637 It could also not be considered as income or price support under 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement.   
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called ‘social dumping’) cannot be countervailed by importing countries.2638,2639  For example, 
developing countries could implement the 2008 Growth Report’s suggestion to allow export-
oriented firms to recruit workers on easier terms (e.g., in export processing zones) than those 
prevailing in the formal sector so as to overcome labor market failures (i.e., surplus labor) 
without any risk of unilateral or multilateral action by other WTO Members.2640  Lastly, an 
undervalued exchange rate (so-called ‘exchange dumping’) does, according to most scholars, 
not qualify as a specific subsidy under the SCM Agreement even though it has a similar effect 
as an export subsidy across the board.2641 
Hence, the relevance of the closed list included in the SCM Agreement is its limiting of the 
scope of government measures that can be countervailed and are disciplined under the SCM 
Agreement.  Indeed, as stressed by the Panel in US – Export Restraints, the ‘financial 
contribution’-requirement was precisely advocated by most countries to counter the purely 
effect-based definition of the US, under which any government measure having the effect of 
benefiting domestic producers could in theory be countervailed.2642  By somewhat 
downplaying the scope of ‘income or price support’, the case law seems to foreclose that an 
effect-based approach would be introduced under this alternative for the financial contribution 
element.  In my opinion, the rejection of an effect-based approach is legally sound.  After all, 
if ‘all government measures capable of conferring benefits would necessarily fall within 
Article 1.1(a)’, there ‘would be no need for Article 1.1(a), because all government measures 
conferring benefits, per se, would be subsidies’.2643  At the same time, such a closed list 
                                                 
2638 Already during the initial GATT negotiations, such ‘social dumping’ was discussed.  This referred 
to prison labor or sweated labor resulting in low prices.  It was agreed that anti-dumping duties could 
only be imposed with regard to ‘price dumping’.  As a result, neither CVDs nor anti-dumping duties 
can be imposed to counteract such regulatory subsidies.  See Committee II – Summary record of 
technical Sub-Committee (E/PC/T/C.II/48, 11 November 1946); Committee II – Draft report of the 
technical Sub-Committee. (E/PC/T/C.II/54, 16 November 1946).  
2639 This limited scope of the SCM Agreement is not always acknowledged in the economic literature.  
See, for example, J. Stiglitz, ‘A New Agenda for Global Warming’, 3:7 The Economists' Voice (2006), 
1-4. 
2640 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.  Commission on Growth and Development, The Growth 
Report – Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development (Washington DC: The World 
Bank, 2008), 190 pp., at 45-48; see also R. A. Torres, ‘Free Zones and the World Trade Organization 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, 2:5 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2007), 
217-223, at 218. 
2641 See below Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3. 
2642 Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para 8.75.  During the Uruguay Round, the US proposed to 
define the term ‘(actionable) subsidy’ as ‘any government action or combination of actions which 
confers a benefit on the recipient firm(s)’. See Submission by the United States, Elements of the 
Framework for Negotiations (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, 22 November 1989), section II.1(a).  See also 
Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 52, footnote 35. 
2643 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 52, footnote 35.  At the same time, this 
Appellate Body report also underscored that the scope of Article 1 is ‘broadened still further’ by the 
concept of ‘income or price support’ (para 52).   
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carries the risk that WTO Members might shift to government measures that do not qualify as 
a subsidy but that generate equivalent effects.2644,2645  
Yet, the list as interpreted in the case law is sufficiently broad to capture the most common 
forms of subsidies.  Indeed, as underscored by the Appellate Body, ‘a wide range of 
transactions falls within the meaning of "financial contribution" in Article 1.1(a)(1)’.2646  
Next, one might wonder whether those government actions falling outside its current scope 
really ought to be disciplined under the SCM Agreement.2647  Export restraints in the form of 
non-fiscal measures are principally outlawed under Article XI of the GATT, whereas export 
taxes could be scheduled under Article II of the GATT and could thus be subject to tariff 
negotiations.2648  Moreover, as Sykes indicates, allowing export restraints to be labelled as 
‘subsidies’ would generate difficulties in quantification and raise the question whether any 
regulation that lowers the price of inputs would be treated similarly.2649  More fundamentally, 
with regard to the so-called ‘social dumping’ or ‘exchange dumping’: what level of regulation 
or exchange rate would be appropriate (i.e., non-beneficial) under the SCM Agreement?  How 
would WTO-adjudicating bodies or WTO Members wishing to respect their WTO obligations 
define the appropriate benchmark in the absence of specific guidance?2650  Rather than 
                                                 
2644 See, for example, L. Rubini, ‘The International Context of EC State Aid Law and Policy: The 
Regulation of Subsidies in the WTO’, in A. Bondi, P. Eeckhout, and J. Flynn (eds), The Law of State 
Aid in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 149-188, at 160.  
2645 Luengo’s broad interpretation of the concept of ‘income or price support’ would de facto seem to 
open the list to government measures having an equivalent effect.  In his interpretation, government 
measures such as export restrictions that directly or indirectly have an impact on the income of the 
recipient would be covered.  See G. Luengo, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC 
Law (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006), 586 pp., at 119-123.  Rubini also observes 
that ‘income or price support’ might likely be interpreted by future panels in a way that, for example, 
export restraints would be covered.  See L. Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid – WTO and 
EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 484 pp., at 123-125. 
2646 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 52. 
2647 Disciplines on export restraints, which the US broadly defined as ‘any action or an act that holds 
back or prevents exports’, are better disciplined under the GATT.   
2648 On the regulation of export restraints under the GATT, see P. C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 506 pp., at 16-17, 42-62, 84-85.  The US interest in 
qualifying export restrictions as subsidies was that CVDs action could be undertaken against subsidized 
downstream imports instead of bringing a multilateral claim on the basis of, for instance, Article XI of 
the GATT.  See discussion in Note by the Secretariat, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(MTN.GNG/NG10/W/4, 28 April 1987), at 26-27. 
2649 Sykes, above n 2635, at 30. 
2650 In the words of Hudec:  
‘The question is whether some line can be drawn between the sort of competitive advantage 
created by things like subsidies, which have already been declared to be unclear, and the 
competitive advantage created by other differences in regulatory policy which arguably have the 
same effect, such as differences in environmental standards.  Logically, the fairness concept 
underlying these characterisations does not offer a plausible distinction between one source of 
advantage and another.  Anything that affects competition is potentially unfair.  Happily, 
however, logic has not been the controlling variable so far.  Governments seem to have 
recognized the practical need to limit the fairness concept at some point, even if the limitation 
makes no logical sense’.  
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bringing regulatory or exchange rate action under the ambit of the SCM Agreement, specific 
oversight preventing the risk of social or exchange dumping would be better intensified under 
other, more specialized international organizations or agreements. 
 
1.1.2. Subsidization by foregoing revenue otherwise due 
The inclusion of subsidization by negative fiscal action recognizes that a subsidy in its 
ordinary meaning is an acronym for a tax and that a negative tax is thus simply equivalent to a 
subsidy.  Subsidization by positive and negative action generates similar effects.  Although 
the inclusion of subsidization by negative fiscal action is therefore solid on economic 
grounds, articulating the appropriate benchmark for determining whether ‘revenue is 
foregone’ is not a straightforward exercise.  This is particularly relevant for direct taxes (and 
social security charges) as no border tax adjustments are allowed to level the playing field at 
either the import or export side.  Countries predominantly relying on direct taxes such as the 
US hold that the economic rationale underpinning this distinction between direct and indirect 
taxation is not convincing because direct taxes could very well be reflected in the final price.  
Again, the criticism holds that the measure’s nature (i.e., indirect versus direct taxation) 
rather than its potential effect determines whether it is covered under the SCM Agreement and 
that the system is thus biased not only against high regulatory standards but also against direct 
taxes.  What is more, it has been argued that the application of the relevant benchmark could 
even generate the result that measures having the same nature (i.e., direct taxes) and effect 
could, nonetheless, be disciplined differently.  The ‘but for’-test as well as the ‘legitimately 
comparable income’-test refers to the domestic fiscal system as relevant benchmark.  The 
concrete implications thereof are nicely illustrated by the US defense in the US – FSC case.  
The US argued that the European territorial tax system has the same economic effect as the 
FSC-exemption to its world wide tax system because both tax systems exempt foreign-source 
income of exporters.  After all, whereas under a territorial tax system all foreign-source 
income is exempted from taxation, a worldwide tax system in principle taxes all sources of 
income and therefore needs an exemption to exclude foreign-source income of exporters. The 
US concluded that the ‘WTO should not penalize a country using a world-wide system for 
incorporating elements of a territorial system in order to obtain comparable tax treatment for 
its exports’.2651  Yet, the EC objected that the US was responsible for having chosen a general 
tax system that puts its exporters at a disadvantage, and this view was in essence followed by 
the Panel in US – FSC: 
                                                                                                                                            
R. E. Hudec, Essays on the Nature of International Trade Law (London: Cameron May, 1999), 396 
pp., at 263. 
2651 Panel Report, US – FSC, para 7.122. 
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(T)he United States is free to maintain a world wide tax system, a territorial tax system or any 
other type of system it sees fit. This is not the business of the WTO. What it is not free to do is 
to establish a regime of direct taxation, provide an exemption from direct taxes specifically 
related to exports, and then claim that it is entitled to provide such an export subsidy because 
it is necessary to eliminate a disadvantage to exporters created by the US tax system itself. In 
our view, this is no different from imposing a corporate income tax of, say, 75 percent, and 
then arguing that a special tax rate of 25 percent for exporters is necessary because the 
generally applicable corporate tax rate in other Members is only 25 percent.2652 
 
Hudec commented that this ‘your own fault’-response by the Panel begs the following 
question: why should one government be allowed to create subsidy-like tax effects in one case 
but not in the other? In particular, why should the WTO reach a different result about a 
subsidy-like tax exemption for exporters depending on whether the country also exempts 
other foreign-source income? After all, the only difference between both systems is that the 
territorial tax systems exclude all foreign-source income, whereas the US FSC-exemption 
merely excludes foreign-source income of exporters. At first sight, there seems no economic 
logic available to explain this different stance.2653,2654   
Considered at a general theoretical level, however, such a different outcome is inevitable 
given that the ‘but for’-test as well as the ‘legitimately comparable income’-test refer to the 
domestic legal order, which evidently varies among WTO Members.  The example given by 
the Panel in US – FSC can serve as an illustration. Country A can apply a generally applicable 
corporate tax rate of 75 per cent with an exemption of 25 per cent for exporters, whereas 
country B might provide a generally applicable corporate tax rate of 25 per cent.  Moreover, 
the domestic level is the only appropriate benchmark in the absence of a level playing field.  
Indeed, the WTO-adjudicating bodies cannot rely on an agreed international benchmark (e.g., 
a common corporate tax rate of 75 per cent), and the WTO itself is not a standard-setting 
organization but is essentially a negative integration model.  In the words of the Panel, the 
choice of the tax system is ‘not the business of the WTO’ itself.  So, the benchmark has to 
refer to the domestic legal regime of the country in question.  As a consequence, Country B’s 
                                                 
2652 Panel Report, US – FSC, para 7.122. 
2653 See R. E. Hudec, ‘Industrial Subsidies: Tax Treatment of ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’, in E-U. 
Petersmann and M. A. Pollack (eds), Transatlantic Economic Disputes – the EU, the US, and the WTO 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 175–205, at 190. 
2654 Caution should be exercised when considering the territorial tax systems as ipso facto SCM-
compatible, given that the WTO did not yet have to decide on this. The US did not file a counterclaim.  
The Panel also emphasized that the ‘WTO-consistency of other Members’ tax systems, whether 
territorial or otherwise, is outside our terms of reference’ (Panel Report, US – FSC, para 7.123).  At 
first sight, it seems that, under both tests, the exemption of all foreign-source income under territorial 
tax systems would not constitute revenue otherwise due, given that the territorial tax system is the 
general rule and that the Appellate Body considered other foreign-source income as legitimately 
comparable income in US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC).  Yet, future panels or the Appellate Body might 
also broaden the scope of legitimately comparable income when scrutinizing the exclusion of foreign-
source income.  Although unlikely in my view, they might consider income of firms earned at home 
and abroad as legitimately comparable income. See commentary on the case provided by 
Worldtradelaw.net. 
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tax system will probably fall outside the reach of the SCM disciplines, whereas the tax 
exemption provided by Country A might constitute a prohibited (export) subsidy even if the 
economic effect upon exporters is largely similar.2655  It should be emphasized that the 
absence of an international benchmark generates no similar effect with regard to indirect taxes 
because differences between such taxes could be adjusted at the border in order for a level 
playing field to be created.   
 
1.2. BENEFIT ELEMENT: EFFECT OF THE SUBSIDY 
1.2.1. Market benchmark 
The private market test relies on the domestic market as the primary benchmark for deciding 
whether a benefit is conferred.  The aim is to determine whether the direct or indirect 
recipient is better off than ‘but for’ the financial contribution: could he have obtained such a 
financial contribution at similar terms on the private market?  Countries A and B can provide 
the same goods/service at the same price, but whether or not this might confer a benefit 
depends on the prevailing market conditions in each country.  In general, two implications of 
the private market benchmark as developed in the case law have been articulated. 
First, the private market test neglects whether this private benchmark price also equals the 
socially optimal price.  In the presence of market failures, the market price does not reflect all 
benefits (i.e., positive externalities) or costs (i.e., negative externalities) and the socially 
optimal price thus deviates from the market price.  Hence, a subsidy would be present even if 
this only lowers the price to the socially optimal price and thus internalizes a positive 
externality.  Conversely, a subsidy is not present in case the government fails to internalize 
negative externalities (i.e., socially optimal price is higher than the private market price).  On 
this basis, Stiglitz’ call to impose CVDs against US products because they do not bear the 
cost of environmental pollution seems legally flawed.  He argued that: 
 
A subsidy means that a firm does not pay the full costs of production. Not paying the cost of 
damage to the environment is a subsidy, just as not paying the full costs of workers would be. 
In most of the developed countries of the world today, firms are paying the cost of pollution to 
the global environment, in the form of taxes imposed on coal, oil, and gas. But American 
firms are being subsidized—and massively so.2656 
 
                                                 
2655 Notice that a general tax cut implemented by a regional government is treated as non-specific 
(Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement).  Conversely, a similar regional tax cut installed by the national 
government would be specific (Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement; see also Rubini, above n 2644, at 
173).  Hence, Countries A and B can take an identical tax measure but whether this might be 
disciplined and countervailable depends on their governance structure.  This flexibility given to 
regional governments is considered justified because it respects the federal structure of some WTO 
Members. 
2656 Stiglitz, above n 2639, at 2. 
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Yet, not paying for produced negative externalities is not considered a subsidy under the SCM 
Agreement. As elaborated above, low levels of regulatory standards as well as general low 
levels of taxation fall outside the scope of the subsidy definition.2657,2658  Finding inspiration in 
Article 14 of the SCM Agreement, panels and the Appellate Body have correctly decided that 
the private market price forms the appropriate benchmark.  The subsidy definition thus 
disregards the question on whether government interventions are corrective rather than 
distortive in nature.2659  In the discussion on export credit support (see Part III), it was 
illustrated that governments effectively fulfilling their complementary role to the private 
financial market would precisely offer financial contributions at beneficial terms.  Here again, 
it should be emphasized that the subsidy definition does not outlaw corrective subsidization 
as such.  In my view, it seems more appropriate to introduce more flexibility on corrective 
subsidies under the applicable disciplines instead of excluding such interventions from the 
scope of the subsidy definition in the first place.  This approach was exactly implemented by 
introducing ‘green light’ types of subsidization.  Likewise, this partly explains the rationale 
                                                 
2657 As explained above, the domestic market forms the benchmark for assessing whether revenue is 
foregone under a tax system. 
2658 See also J. Bhagwati and P. Mavroidis, ‘Is action against US exports for failure to sign Kyoto 
Protocol legal?’, 6:2 World Trade Review (2007), 299-310, at 302-303; S. Z. Bigdeli, ‘Incentive 
Schemes to Promote Renewables and the WTO Law of Subsidies’, in T. Cottier, O. Nartova, and S. Z. 
Bigdeli (eds), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 155-199, at 157-160; J. Pauwelyn, ‘US Federal Climate Policy and 
Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law’, Working Paper – 
Duke University (2007), 44 pp., at 14-15.  However, Howse and Eliason agree with Stiglitz that CVDs 
could be imposed in response to a lack of undertaking action under the Kyoto Protocol.  They suggest 
that the allowance to emit carbon constitutes the provision of a good (e.g., a right to emit carbon is 
given by the government) which confers a benefit, whereby an adjusted market price in a country that 
has installed an emission trading market (e.g., EC) is used as benchmark.  However, their creative 
interpretation seems to be based on an overly broad reading of Articles 1.1(a)(1)(iii) and 14(d) of the 
SCM Agreement and of the Appellate Body’s ruling in US – Softwood Lumber IV.  Reviewing the 
same case, de Cendra disagreed that an allowance can be defined as a good under the SCM Agreement.  
Hufbauer et al also concluded that ‘unlike a right to timber where timber itself is a good, a right to 
generate greenhouse gas emissions is not a right to a good because greenhouse gas emissions are not a 
good as the term is commonly used’.  Moreover, Howse and Elisason also overlook that the Appellate 
Body was very reluctant to open the door to market prices in other countries.  See R. Howse and A. 
Eliason, ‘Domestic and International Strategies to Address Climate Change: An Overview of the WTO 
Legal Issues’, in T. Cottier, O. Nartova, and S. Z. Bigdeli (eds), International Trade Regulation and the 
Mitigation of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 48-93, at 73-76; J. de 
Cendra, ‘Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An Analysis vis-
à-vis WTO Law’, 15:2 RECIEL (2006), 131-145, at 137; G. C. Hufbauer, S. Charnovitz, and J. Kim, 
Global Warming and the World Trading System (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2009), 166 pp., at 61-62. 
2659 Schwartz and Harper revealed a similar approach under the GATT system: 
‘A subsidy is treated in the GATT framework as a "distortion" of international trade,' that is, as 
creating a disparity between the actual costs incurred in producing a particular good and those 
which must be borne by the firm under- taking its production." In fact, however, much (perhaps 
all) government support can be defended as being a "correction" rather than a "distortion" of the 
market process.  The need for correction is said to derive from the existence of "externalities" 
(…)’. 
W. Schwartz and E. W. Harper, ‘The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade’, 70:5 
Michigan Law Review (1972), 831-858, at 833. 
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for S&D treatment given to developing countries.  Finally, it has been suggested that the 
specificity test could play a useful role to exclude corrective subsidies from subsidy 
disciplines and CVDs responses.2660  
Second, scholars have underlined that the benefit analysis only detects whether the financial 
contribution (or income or price support) an sich is provided at better-than-market terms and 
hereby disregards the broader regulatory framework.  Indeed, in case a firm receives a loan at 
below market rates, a benefit is conferred under the SCM Agreement without any 
consideration of the various taxes or regulatory burdens imposed upon the firm in 
question.2661  Because the financial contribution is isolated in the benefit test, it is simply 
irrelevant whether or not it is provided to compensate, for instance, for overvalued exchange 
rates, higher environmental standards, or location in a disadvantaged region.  To be precise, 
the only government-imposed burdens that can be compensated are indirect taxes or import 
duties since these can be adjusted at the border.2662  By disregarding whether the benefit is not 
offset by other taxes or regulatory burdens, the subsidy definition fails, according to Sykes, to 
sort out the net impact of the government on the firm’s competitive position.  Although 
recognizing that such an exercise would be ‘extraordinarily complicated and fraught with 
error’, he concludes that ‘to ignore the problem is to render the system unable to detect true 
subsidization of an industry except by chance’.2663  Although he seemed to share this concern, 
Hudec rightly considered that an exercise to single out the net effect would simply be 
impossible.2664  While largely neglected under the subsidy definition, this concern helps to 
explain why to some extent more flexibility was given to certain forms of subsidies.  The 
‘green light’ status of subsidies intended for implementing higher environmental standards or 
for firms to locate in disadvantaged regions was defended by the EC during the Uruguay 
Round precisely because it compensated for higher costs.2665  This line of reasoning is thus 
                                                 
2660 See below Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1. 
2661 A. O. Sykes, ‘Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, in P. F. J., Macrory, A. E. Appleton, and M. 
G., Plummer (eds), The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis – Volume 
II (Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2005), 83-107, at 86. 
2662 A legitimate concern of developing countries is that the limited scope for duty drawbacks works at 
their disadvantage (see below Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2). 
2663 Sykes, above 2661, at 100.  In Sykes’ opinion, the specificity test can also not rescue the WTO 
approach because even general government measures will likely generate a non-neutral impact. 
2664 According to Hudec, ‘(t)here are many differences between business conditions found in one 
country and another (and) (w)e know that there is no way to measure the net balance of advantage 
produced by such differences’.  See Hudec, above n 2650, at 263, 237-238.  Somewhat along the same 
lines, see also A. Green, ‘Trade Rules and Climate Change Subsidies’, 5:3 World Trade Review (2006), 
377-414, at 405. 
2665 Hence, the EC argued that such subsidies did not affect competition.  Submission by the European 
Community (MTN.GNG/NG4/W/36, 2 February 1990).  Yet, the conclusion that such subsidy does not 
affect competition is based on the unlikely assumption that the subsidy merely affected the location 
decision of the firm within the subsidizing member.  See also below n 2680; A. O. Sykes, ‘Second-Best 
Countervailing Duty Policy: A Critique on the Entitlement Approach’, 21 Law & Policy in 
International Business (1990), 699-721, at 717.   
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based on what could be labelled the ‘level playing field’-argument: by offsetting other taxes 
and regulatory burdens (or even market distortions), such subsidies would simply level the 
playing field and would therefore not distort competition.   
Even if one accepts that the benefit analysis narrowly focalizes on the terms of the financial 
contribution, the test fails to single out those contributions that generate an impact on the 
recipient’s competitive position.  This relates to the criticism formulated by Grossman and 
Mavroidis on the benefit test developed in the case law, which will be discussed in the next 
section.   
 
1.2.2. Distortive effect on competition 
Grossman and Mavroidis have criticized the ‘benefit’-definition developed in the case law for 
the reason that it does not discern those subsidies that effectively generate an effect on the 
market.2666,2667  Because the SCM Agreement aims at protecting producer welfare,2668 the 
definition of a subsidy must be one that ‘helps to identify policies that inflict such harm’.2669  
Accordingly, a benefit is in these authors’ view conferred when a competitive advantage is 
offered to firms vis-à-vis other firms.  Hence, the benefit test should not simply look at 
whether the recipient is generally better off (e.g., in terms of wealth) than but for the financial 
contribution.  Instead, it should examine whether its competitive position is improved 
compared to ‘but for’ the financial contribution.  Behind their alternative approach seems to 
be the recognition that a precondition for causing harm to foreign producers is that domestic 
firms’ output levels are increased as a result of a financial contribution2670, which in turn 
                                                 
2666 See G. M. Grossman and P. C. Mavroidis, ‘US – Lead and Bismuth II, United States Imposition of 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the 
United Kingdom: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?  Privatization and the Injury Caused by Non-
Recurring Subsidies? (WT/DS138; DSR 2000:V, 2595; DSR 2000:VI, 5623)’, in H. Horn and P. 
Mavroidis (eds), The American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies on WTO Case Law – Legal and 
Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 183-213;  G. M. Grossman and P. 
C. Mavroidis, ‘United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products form the 
European Communities (WTO Doc. WT/DS212/AB/R; DSR 2003:I, 5; DSR 2003:I, 73): Recurring 
Misunderstanding of Non-Recurring Subsidies’, in H. Horn and P. Mavroidis (eds), The American Law 
Institute Reporters’ Studies on WTO Case Law – Legal and Economic Analysis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 381-390; see also H. Horn and P. C. Mavroidis, ‘United States – 
Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada (WT/DS236; DSR 
2002:XI, 3597): What is a Subsidy?’, in H. Horn and Petros M. (eds), The American Law Institute 
Reporters’ Studies on WTO Case Law – Legal and Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 523-549.    
2667 See also Sykes, above n 2635, at 34-34. 
2668 This conclusion is stated from the perspective of positive theory.  Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Here 
Today, Gone Tomorrow?’, above n 2666, at 198-199.   
2669 Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?’, above n 2666, at 199-200.    
2670 A financial contribution could also prevent output levels from decreasing.  Therefore, the 
formulation that output levels would be lower ‘but for’ the financial contribution is more accurate.  
Moreover, the fact that output would be higher is a necessary but (strictly speaking) not a sufficient 
condition in order for foreign firms to be hurt, because such increased output should also depress (or 
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principally assumes that it directly or indirectly lowered their marginal costs (i.e., the cost of 
producing one extra unit of output).2671,2672 Indeed, a profit-maximizing firm sets output 
decisions in such way that marginal costs, which are a function of production costs, equate 
marginal revenue.  Put differently, a competitive advantage is present in case domestic firms’ 
output level (marginal costs)2673 would have been lower (higher) ‘but for’ the financial 
contribution.2674      
 
Regarding recurring subsidies, which are ongoing government transfers, Grossman and 
Mavroidis illustrate that an effect on output is in most cases easily established.2675  These 
recurring subsidies often take the form of subsidies for inputs (e.g., labor), which are variable 
costs, or output (i.e., production subsidies).  Hence, such recurring subsidies induce firms to 
generate more output as they directly lower marginal costs.2676  Somewhat more difficult to 
assess is the impact on output decisions of non-recurring subsidies, which are one-time 
financial contributions at below market prices.  These usually come in the form of direct or 
potential direct transfers of funds (e.g., grants, loans, loan guarantees) at below market prices 
for the acquisition of fixed assets (e.g., technology, plant, equipment).  A profit-maximizing 
firm will disregard the costs of such fixed assets in the short-run when deciding on production 
levels.  In considering their (level of) acquisition, the firm will assess whether its discounted 
profits outweigh the private costs of financing (net-present value).  If acquired, the firm’s 
                                                                                                                                            
suppress) the world price.  See, for example, R. Diamond, ‘A Search for Economic and Financial 
Principles in the Administration of United States Countervailing Duty Law’, 21 Law & Policy in 
International Business (1990), 507-608, at 539.  In this section, we assume that larger output also 
results in a fall of the world price and thus adopt the large country perspective. 
2671 The suggestion that the effect on the competitive position should be the focal point of the ‘benefit’ 
analysis somewhat resembles the plea of proponents of the so-called entitlement rationale in the 1980s 
(i.e., Goetz, Granet, Shwartz, and Diamond).  These authors advocated that CVDs should only be 
imposed insofar and to the extent marginal costs are lowered as a result of a subsidy.  An important 
difference seems to be that Grossman and Mavroidis more readily accept a subsidy initially affects the 
recipient’s output decision (see below n 2680).  See C. J. Goetz, L. Granet and W. F. Schwartz, ‘The 
Meaning of ‘Subsidy’ and ‘Injury’ in the Countervailing Duty Law’, 6 International Review of Law 
and Economics (1986), 17-32; R. Diamond, ‘Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law’, 29 
Virginia Journal of International Law (1989), 767-812; Diamond, above n 2670, at 507-608.  See also 
A. O. Sykes, ‘The Economics of “Injury” in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases’, in J. S. 
Bhandari and A. O. Sykes (eds), Economic dimensions in international law – Comparative and 
empirical perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 83-125, at 99.  
2672 Sykes illustrates that there could be circumstances were strictly speaking marginal costs are not 
reduced as a result of subsidization but were output levels have nonetheless increased.  Most cases of 
higher output levels do result from a reduction in marginal costs. 
2673 This was the focus of the proponents of the entitlement theory (see above n 2671). 
2674 Horn and Mavroidis, above n 2666, at 533; Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz, above n 2671, at 23.     
2675 However, the exact impact on the marginal costs might be difficult to establish.  See, for example, 
Diamond, above n 2671, at 788-791. 
2676 Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?’, above n 2666, at 202-204; Diamond, 
above n 2671, at footnote 34, 788-801; Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz, above n 2671, at 23.  According 
to Diamond, this holds unless the payment equals the additional costs to the firms of the behaviour 
necessary to qualify for the payment (e.g., per unit subsidy requires but also compensates the firm to 
locate in an area of higher transport costs).  Diamond, above n 2671, at 788. 
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production function will change, generating a shift in its profit-maximizing output level.2677  
The firm will again maximize profits by setting marginal costs equal to marginal revenue and 
the investment cost made to acquire the asset is a fixed one and will thus be disregarded.2678   
In discussing the effect of subsidization on the firm’s initial investment decision, two types of 
non-recurring subsidies are distinguished by Grossman and Mavroidis.  First, consider the 
impact of a non-recurring subsidy offered to help financing a fixed-scale investment.  Here, a 
dichotomy decision is presented: undertake the investment in full or not at all (e.g., building a 
plant at minimum efficient scale).  This will initially alter the firms’ competitive position if 
‘one or more firms that would not have undertaken the project absent the subsidy decides 
differently in response to the government’s contribution’.2679,2680  If so, the subsidy would 
result in production at a larger scale or induce more firms to become active in the industry.  
This might cause a fall in prices, inflicting harm upon foreign firms.  Second, consider the 
impact of a subsidy offered to help financing investment that may vary in size (e.g., capital 
equipment).  By reducing the cost of financing, the subsidy would result in a larger scale of 
investment.  This indirectly lowers marginal costs and thus induces more production.2681  
Again, the subsidy causes harm to foreign firms because output levels are boosted.   
 
In sum, the ‘benefit’-approach developed in the case law (and supported by Diamond2682) 
takes the market value as benchmark to determine the existence of subsidization: is a financial 
                                                 
2677 Diamond, above n 2671, at 801, footnote 84. 
2678 Diamond, above n 2671, at 802. 
2679 Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?’, above n 2666, at 205. 
2680 Compared to the proponents of the entitlement theory, Grossman and Mavroidis seem to be more 
inclined to agree that this condition will initially be fulfilled when the financial contribution is offered.  
Contrary to recurring subsidies for inputs and output, a non-recurring subsidy could according to the 
proponents of the entitlement theory (i.e., Diamond, Goetz, Granet, and Swartz) not only decrease but 
also increase marginal costs, in which case no harm would be caused to foreign producers as output 
levels would even be reduced.  A firm will accept a subsidy which raises its marginal costs insofar the 
level of the subsidy compensates for its loss in profits resulting from lower output levels.  Goetz et al 
have given the example of a subsidy inducing a firm to locate in an area with higher operating costs.  
Its competitive position would be negatively affected but acceptance of the subsidy is still rational as it 
compensates for those higher operating costs.  If so, no CVDs should be imposed by importing 
countries.  Diamond, above n 2670, at 538-539; Diamond, above n 2671, at 787-788; Goetz, Granet, 
and Schwartz, above n 2671, at 24. Yet, Sykes correctly specifies that this conclusion no longer holds if 
the plant with higher marginal costs (plant 2) does not substitute for another plant in a more efficient 
location (plant 1), but simply adds to existing capacity.  Even if marginal costs in plant 2 would be 
higher than in plant 1, the total profit-maximizing output level (at firm or industry level) would be 
higher than absent the financial contribution.  Hence, a marginal cost approach would require a 
determination of how the new plant has affected the investment or disinvestment not only of the 
subsidized firm but also of other firms in the subsidizing country.  Sykes, above n 2665, at 717. 
2681 The larger the subsidy, the greater the level of investment that equates marginal costs to marginal 
revenue.  Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?’, above n 2666, at 206. 
2682 Diamond holds that there is no interpretative basis for supporting Grossman and Mavroidis’ 
suggestion to take the effect of the financial contribution upon producers into account under the benefit 
element.  Such effect of the subsidy is only assessed under the causation element which is part of the 
‘adverse effect’-test (in case of actionable subsidies) and injury test (in case of actionable subsidies and 
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contribution made at better-than-market terms?  In contrast, the approach suggested by 
Mavroidis and Grossman looks at the financial contribution’s impact on the competitive 
position to determine the existence of subsidization: does a financial contribution improve the 
competitive position of the recipient?   
 
Both approaches have resulted in a different answer on the question whether privatization of a 
firm at arm’s length and for fair market value extinguishes the continued existence of a 
benefit derived from a prior non-recurring financial contribution.2683  In short, does 
privatization at fair market price extinguish benefits resulting from prior non-recurring 
subsidization?  After briefly recapitulating the Appellate Body’s response, we turn to the 
criticism by Grossman and Mavroidis.  Next, we examine Grossman and Mavroidis’ 
alternative regarding the allocation of the benefit of non-recurring subsidies.  This is equally 
based on their different benefit-definition.  
 
1.2.2.1. The impact of privatization on the benefit analysis 
Benefits of non-recurring subsidies are often allocated over the average useful life of the 
acquired assets in the relevant industry.2684  For instance, if the government has financed at 
favourable terms the acquisition of a machine with ‘utility value’ of ten years, the benefit of 
such subsidy under the ‘useful life’-approach would be spread over ten years.  The Appellate 
Body considered such ‘useful life’-practice permissible under the SCM Agreement, so long as 
the presumption is not irrebuttable.2685   
But is such allocation over the useful life interrupted by the firm’s privatization at arm’s 
length and for fair market value?2686  The Appellate Body in US – Countervailing Duties on 
Certain EC Products answered this question affirmatively.  Although it acknowledged that 
the utility value of the equipment acquired at subsidized terms does not extinguish because of 
privatization, it considered this element irrelevant under the ‘benefit’ analysis as this test 
looks at the market value: if a fair market value is paid at the moment of privatization, ‘the 
                                                                                                                                            
CVDs).  R. Diamond, ‘Privatization and the Definition of Subsidy: A Critical Study of Appellate Body 
Texturalism’, 11:3 Journal of International Economic Law (2008), 1-30. 
2683 For definitions of ‘at arm’s length’ and ‘fair market value’, see below n 2686. 
2684The benefits of recurring subsidies are usually considered fully absorbed in the year of receipt.   
2685 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 84; Appellate 
Body Report, US – Lead and Bismuth II, para 62. 
2686 At arm’s length means that privatization is ‘negotiated between unrelated parties, each acting in 
their own interest, or between related parties such that the terms of the transaction are those that would 
exist if the transaction had been negotiated between unrelated parties’. The fair market value test 
examines whether the purchaser paid ‘the full amount that the company or its assets (including the 
value of any subsidy benefits) were actually worth under the prevailing market conditions’.  These are 
the definitions applied under US CVDs procedures, as cited by the Panel in US – Countervailing 
Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 – EC), at footnote 313. 
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market value is redeemed’, and the benefit thus in principle extinguishes.2687  Relaxing its 
stance taken in US – Lead and Bismuth II, the Appellate Body decided that such a fair market 
price does not necessarily extinguish prior subsidization but only offers a presumption 
thereof.2688   
Grossman and Mavroidis have firmly criticized the Appellate Body’s reasoning that a fair 
market price could extinguish the continued benefit of past non-recurring subsidies.2689  They 
hold that the change of ownership – at fair market price or not – simply has no bearing on the 
question of the continuation of benefit, at least if the ‘benefit’-concept is understood correctly 
as an amelioration of its competitive position and not in terms of economic ‘wealth’ as the 
Appellate Body does.  The price at which a firm acquires assets should be qualified as a ‘sunk 
cost’, which does not affect their future profit-maximizing output decisions inasmuch 
marginal costs are left unaffected.2690  The enhanced competitive position resulting of the 
firm’s prior subsidization is not affected by the price paid for the change in ownership.  
Grossman and Mavroidis draw a parallel with non-recurring subsidies paid directly to private 
firms.2691  Ownership shares of private firms frequently transfer in the private capital market 
(by definition at a fair market price).  Hence, would this common practice also extinguish 
(parts of) the benefit of the non-recurring subsidy in the Appellate Body’s view, given that the 
new owner does not personally benefit (in wealth terms) from the subsidy?  This rhetorical 
question illustrates that a mere change in ownership does simply not affect the ameliorated 
competitive position of the firm in question, and thus leaves the harm caused to foreign firms 
untouched.  In their words, ‘a change in ownership – at fair market prices or otherwise – has 
no bearing on competitive conditions in the world market (…)’.2692 
A somewhat similar argument was advanced by the US before the Appellate Body in US – 
Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products when stating that ‘irrespective of the price 
at which the new owners acquire the state-owned enterprise, "the artificially enhanced 
competitiveness generated by the subsidies" will not be eliminated, as the firm will continue 
                                                 
2687 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 102. 
2688 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, paras 122-127.  
2689 Because the benefit element cannot be interpreted along the lines suggested by Grossman and 
Mavroidis, Diamond concurs with the Appellate Body’s reasoning on the effect of privatization, even 
though he would seem to principally agree with Grossman and Mavroidis’ criticism from a normative 
viewpoint (economic theory).  Diamond, above n 2682, at 6-8, 21-26. 
2690 Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Recurring Misunderstanding of Non-Recurring Subsidies’, above n 
2666, at 386-388.  As Diamond has explained, ‘new owners will set production based on short term 
marginal cost.  So long as the purchase price is a lump sum and is not a function of quantities which 
may vary in the future, such as sales or profit, marginal cost will be unaffected by the price new owners 
pay.  Whether the new owners pay a freely determined market price for the firm or a price which is 
below the market of the firm is, therefore, irrelevant’.  Diamond, above n 2671, at 809, footnote 105.  
2691 Palmeter is credited by Grossman and Mavroidis for articulating this parallel.   
2692 Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?’, above n 2666, at 201. 
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to produce "at the same costs and in the same volumes"’.2693  Yet, the Appellate Body rejected 
this argument that its costs and volume of production remain the same regardless of the sales 
price of privatization, ‘since these costs include, as a necessary component, the cost of 
capital’:   
 
For example, if a government makes a "financial contribution" that "benefit[s]" a state-owned 
enterprise, and then sells that enterprise for less than its fair market price, would this not 
normally result in a "better off" return for the private capital newly invested in that enterprise? 
Would that not suggest, as a consequence, that the under-priced enterprise may then attract 
more investment than it would have attracted otherwise, if the government had sold it for fair 
market price? Why would this government-induced additional investment not then reduce the 
enterprise's cost of raising capital (either by borrowing it from the bank or from, say, 
shareholders) and, ultimately, reduce the firm's overall costs of production?2694 
 
In my view, the Appellate Body’s reasoning seems to rightly qualify but not to refute the core 
of the argument articulated by the US and Grossman and Mavroidis.  On the one hand, the 
claim that the level of the sales price has no bearing whatsoever on subsequent, profit-
maximizing behaviour seems indeed too rigid as a below the market price could improve the 
firm’s financial position and thus generate a reduction in the cost of raising capital.  This 
could affect production costs and thus output decisions in the future.2695  On the other hand, 
the core thesis that the artificially enhanced competitiveness generated by prior non-recurring 
subsidies will not be eliminated by a fair market price is not rejected at all by the Appellate 
Body’s argumentation.2696  The Appellate Body’s response simply shows that an additional 
benefit regarding a firm’s competitive position could be generated when privatization is done 
at below market prices.2697  If, as proposed by Grossman and Mavroidis, the benefit analysis 
should consider whether the competitive position is altered as a result of privatization, the 
                                                 
2693 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 103. 
2694 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 103. 
2695 A similar question is whether a non-recurring (and unexpected) grant would be considered as 
conferring a benefit under the marginal cost approach.  It could indeed be argued that an untied grant 
may allow a firm to buy, for example, new equipment, hereby achieving a lower marginal cost.  
However, Diamond counters this argument as it ‘assumes that the firm, prior to the receipt of the grant, 
was not efficiently using capital.  If the firm was acting efficiently and a profitable investment in a new 
plant had been available, the firm would have made the investment even if the grant had not been 
received.  If it would not have made such a investment, it will not use the funds received from the 
government for that purpose’.  In his view, an untied and unexpected grant does therefore not affect 
output decisions.  See Diamond, above n 2671, at 787.  But Diamond’s reasoning seems to overlook 
that an investment might become profitable precisely because the cost of financing is lowered as a 
result of the grant.  Prior to subsidization, the profit-maximizing firm had to include the higher private 
cost of capital in its calculation on whether a project is profitable or not.  If a below the market price 
allows a firm to make an extra investment, marginal costs are indirectly lowered and output levels are 
increased as a result.  Nonetheless, in considering the effect of a reduction in the cost of financing 
resulting from subsidization, Diamond seems doubtful that it would often have an effect on the firm’s 
competitive position.  Diamond, above n 2671, at 806-807.         
2696 As illustrated above, the Appellate Body simply rejects this argument because the benefit analysis 
looks at the market price. 
2697 The US seemed to share this view as well: ‘the fact that the private owner pays full market price for 
the enterprise indicates only that the private owner is not receiving a new subsidy’.  Appellate Body 
Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 99. 
PART IV CHAPTER 1 – SCOPE OF THE SCM AGREEMENT 
 
 
 510
following propositions seem to hold.  First, the continuing benefit of prior non-recurring 
subsidies is not eliminated as a result of the shift in ownership, regardless of whether a fair or 
lower price is paid (subsidy 1).  Second, if a price lower than the market price is paid, an 
additional subsidy could be present as the lower cost of capital could further improve the 
competitive position of the privatized firm (subsidy 2).        
 
In conclusion, under the present case law, there is a presumption that privatization at a fair 
market price extinguishes the continued benefit of prior non-recurring subsidies.2698,2699  As 
accurately revealed by Grossman and Mavroidis, this case law could be criticized since a 
change of ownership – regardless of the actual price – does not affect the artificially generated 
competitive advantage.  In fact, a sale at below market price could only generate an additional 
benefit.  To be clear, it is sometimes suggested that the Appellate Body in US – 
Countervailing Duties on Certain EC Products has partly met this criticism of Grossman and 
Mavroidis by shifting from a irrebuttable to a rebuttable presumption of the extension of 
continued benefit.  But the somewhat peculiar relaxation adopted by the Appellate Body 
seems not to be related at all to the thesis articulated by Grossman and Mavroidis.2700  
Recapitulating the Appellate Body’s central view as it still stands today, ‘once a fair market 
price is paid for the equipment, its market value is redeemed, regardless of the utility the firm 
may derive from the equipment’, and only this market value is considered relevant under the 
benefit analysis .2701  
 
                                                 
2698 In order to implement the Dispute Settlement Body’s recommendations in the US – Countervailing 
Measures on Certain EC Products, the US has drafted a new privatization methodology.  This 
prescribes the ‘baseline presumption’ that non-recurring subsidies benefit the recipient over a period of 
time, usually the average useful life of the recipient's assets.  These subsidies are therefore allocable 
over that period of time.  The subsidy recipient can rebut this presumption by demonstrating that 
privatization, inter alia, occurred at arm’s length and for fair market value.  If demonstrated, ‘the 
injured party can still prove the benefit was not extinguished by showing that broader market 
conditions were not present or were distorted by the government.  To do so, the injured party must 
either demonstrate the absence of basic conditions for a properly functioning market or the existence of 
legal/fiscal incentives that distort terms of sale’.  See Panel Report, US – Countervailing Measures on 
Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 – EC), footnote 313. This new methodology was not as such 
challenged before the compliance Panel (footnote 206 and para 7.89).    
2699 The Panel in US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 – EC) decided that 
the CVDs administration has to determine in a sunset review whether privatization has occurred at 
arm’s length and for fair market value and cannot simply assume that this has been the case.  The Panel 
found support in previous case law as well as in the text of Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement.  The 
most relevant practical reason for rejecting the assumption as being sufficient is that it is unclear how it 
would be treated under a potential future assessment review (as an assumption or a determination).  See 
Panel Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 – EC), paras 7.198-
7.217. 
2700 Grossman and Mavroidis first articulated their viewpoint in a case note on US – Lead and Bismuth 
II.  See Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?’, above n 2666. 
2701 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 102 (emphasis 
in the original). 
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1.2.2.2. The allocation of non-recurring subsidies 
The debate on the effect of privatization has illustrated that even if the actual holder is not 
better off in wealth terms, its competitive position could have improved as a result of prior 
subsidization.  At the same time, Grossman and Mavroidis have argued that the recipient’s 
competitive position does not always ameliorate when he is made better off in wealth terms.  
On the latter basis, they have criticized the practice in CVDs investigations (e.g., in the 
US2702) in which the benefit of non-recurring subsidies is – apart from the privatization issue – 
ipso facto allocated over the ‘useful’ life of assets in the relevant industry.2703  Accordingly, 
they do not only take issue with the argument that privatization as such could break up 
continued benefit of past non-recurring subsidies, but also criticize that other elements 
relevant to this end are not considered.  In their view, it should be regularly assessed whether 
the level of capital investment (physical or intangible) would remain higher than it would 
have been ‘but for’ the subsidy.  For example, a low-interest loan might induce a firm to 
construct a plant that a profit-maximizing firm would not have undertaken given future 
expectations on the market.  Such investment is thus considered ‘marginal’ (i.e., above and 
beyond what would have occurred without the subsidy), resulting in extra output (i.e., 
improved competitive position), which could be legitimately offset by CVDs.  But what if in 
the following years consumer demand for the product in question would rise in such an 
exceptional way that it would become profitable for the subsidized firm to build the plant 
without the subsidy as well?  In those circumstances, the initial subsidy is no longer causing 
extra output levels.  As Grossman and Mavroidis have put it, ‘a plant that was marginal at the 
time of its construction can become inframarginal in the light of subsequent events’.2704  If so, 
the continued benefit has extinguished and no CVDs should be imposed anymore even if the 
useful life of the plant has not finished.  Hence, an administrative review of CVDs should 
determine how the competitive position would look like during the review period if the 
subsidy had never occurred.  If the CVDs procedure does not integrate such assessment, 
Article 21.1 of SCM Agreement is in Grossman and Mavroidis’ opinion violated as this 
                                                 
2702 In US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, the EC also agreed that the ‘useful life’-
approach is ‘normal and accepted practice’. The Appellate Body has confirmed that the ‘useful life’-
method is permissible as long as the presumption of continued benefit is not irrebutable.  See Appellate 
Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, para 84.  Diamond equally 
suggested that non-recurring subsidies should be countervailed over the ‘useful life’ of the assets as 
their effect on the marginal costs continues over that period.  See Diamond, above n 2671, at 805.   
2703 This is still the case under current US CVDs practice.  Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Here Today, 
Gone Tomorrow?’, above n 2666, at 207-210; Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Recurring Misunderstanding 
of Non-Recurring Subsidies’, above n 2666, at 398.  
2704 Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?’, above n 2666, at 208. 
PART IV CHAPTER 1 – SCOPE OF THE SCM AGREEMENT 
 
 
 512
provision prescribes that CVDs remain in force ‘only as long as and to the extent necessary to 
counteract subsidization which is causing injury’.2705   
However, two counterarguments could be formulated.  From a practical viewpoint, their 
suggestion seems to be extremely demanding to implement correctly.  Indeed, CVDs 
authorities should not only assess how the firm’s initial competitive position (and those of 
other firms in the domestic market) was altered at the moment of subsidization2706, but also 
how its competitive position would evolve ‘but for’ the subsidy over the entire useful life 
period.  From a theoretical viewpoint, even if the firm would also make the investment in the 
non-subsidy scenario at a certain moment in time, its competitive position could still be better 
at that moment because it has made that investment at subsidized terms.  After all, its 
financial position, and thus its cost of raising capital, might be better under the subsidy 
scenario.2707  So, even if market conditions would have changed in such a way that the 
investment becomes profitable without the subsidy, it does not ipso facto mean that the initial 
subsidy would no longer generate extra output levels.  Consequently, Article 21.1 of the SCM 
Agreement would not necessarily seem to be violated.  
 
1.2.2.3. Concluding remarks  
Reviewing the previous analysis, I concur with the initial point of the analysis drawn by 
Grossman and Mavroidis.  The benefit analysis should ideally filter out those financial 
contributions that improve the competitive position of domestic firms.  As the case of 
privatization demonstrates, even if the actual holder is not made better off in wealth terms, its 
competitive position could still be superior than but for the subsidy.  Accordingly, I share 
their fundamental criticism on the case law.  Indeed, privatization should not lead to the 
presumption that continued benefits of prior non-recurring subsidies are extinguished.  On the 
other hand, the firm’s competitive position could be assumed to have improved if 
demonstrated that a recipient is made better off in wealth terms.  Recurring input and output 
subsidies directly lower marginal costs and non-recurring subsidies also might very well 
induce higher output levels.  At minimum, the cost of capital would be lower as a result of 
                                                 
2705 Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Recurring Misunderstanding of Non-Recurring Subsidies’, above n 
2666, at 389. 
2706 The question on whether the subsidy indeed induced the extra investment (and to what extent) 
seems already extremely difficult to assess.  Diamond already acknowledged that defining the 
counterfactual in the initial situation might be difficult.  He did not suggest assessing the counterfactual 
again during the useful life period, as Grossman and Mavroidis propose. See Diamond, above n 2671, 
at 804.  Sykes even considers it ‘virtually impossible to determine how subsidies affect marginal costs’.  
Sykes, above n 2665, at 717.  
2707 This resembles the abovementioned Appellate Body’s argumentation that a price below the market 
(at subsidized terms) reduces the price of raising capital and thus production costs.  Again, it could be 
mentioned that Diamond seems to doubt that a reduction in the financing cost will often have an effect 
on the competitive position.  Diamond, above n 2671, at 807.  
PART IV CHAPTER 1 – SCOPE OF THE SCM AGREEMENT 
 
 
 513
non-recurring financial contributions, which could lead to an improvement in the firm’s 
competitive position.  Accordingly, in case of privatization at below market terms, an extra 
subsidy could potentially be revealed.  When market conditions change over time so that an 
investment would have been made anyway, the benefit of non-recurring subsidies might not 
entirely vanish.  Consequently, if a benefit in wealth terms is found, it could be reasonably 
assumed that the firm’s competitive position has improved and that a benefit is conferred 
under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.2708  Exactly measuring the effect on marginal 
costs might be too demanding to implement in practice.2709  Moreover, in case such subsidies 
would have no or only a marginal impact on firms’ competitive position, they would in 
principle be subsequently filtered out under the ‘adverse effects’ (actionable subsidy case) or 
‘material injury’ (CVDs action) thresholds.2710  At least in theory2711, only those subsidies 
causing such trade effects are indeed actionable or countervailable.2712  Especially for non-
recurring subsidies, it could be difficult to meet this threshold.2713  Only for multilateral 
actions against prohibited subsidies could demonstration of the trade effect be circumvented 
as these are prohibited as such.  To be sure, as the case law currently stands, the effect of 
subsidization on production levels could be largely neglected in CVDs investigations because 
the case law only mandates the establishment of a causal link between subsidized imports and 
injury instead of between subsidies and injury.  In my view, this forms a deficiency in the 
standard set for demonstrating the causal relationship requirement, rather than one in the 
standard set for subsidy determination. 
 
1.3. SPECIFICITY ELEMENT 
In Part II, the discussion has illuminated that only ‘specific’ subsidies are challengeable and 
countervailable but that the concept of specificity, loosely defined in the SCM Agreement, is 
interpreted rather broadly in the case law.2714  This implies that the hurdle of ‘specificity’ is 
rather easily passed before a panel or in a CVDs procedure.  At first sight, such a wide 
interpretation could be welcomed given the mixed rationales underpinning the specificity test.   
                                                 
2708 If no benefit in wealth terms is found (e.g., privatization at market price), it could potentially still be 
demonstrated that its competitive position has improved. 
2709 See also Green, above n 2664, at 406. 
2710 See also Diamond, above n 2682, at 19-21. 
2711 The pivotal question is how stringent the required nexus (causation standard) between subsidization 
and adverse effects and/or injury is interpreted.   
2712 Put otherwise, subsidies are neither actionable nor countervailable when they do not lead to higher 
levels of output and have no adverse volume or price effects on other WTO Members.   
2713 For certain types of subsidies, this was exactly circumvented with the presumption of ‘serious 
prejudice’ under Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement, but this presumption has expired. 
2714 See above Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.3. 
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First, a wide interpretation acknowledges that the economic rationale for the specificity test is 
not watertight.  Consider, for example, the US crop insurance subsidies that were ‘generally, 
available for most crops but (…) not generally available in respect of the entire agricultural 
sector in all areas’ and, on that basis, were considered specific by the Panel in US – Upland 
Cotton.  Put otherwise, the crop insurance scheme reached ‘a sufficiently discrete segment of 
the United States economy’.2715  Yet, should the Panel have concluded the opposite if such 
crop insurance subsidies were open to all agricultural products in all areas in the US?  Even 
in that case, the assumption that there is no trade-distortive effect because the subsidy does 
not affect the domestic resource allocation is not fulfilled, given it would benefit the 
agricultural sector over the industrial sector.  To be sure, the Panel might still have found that 
such a subsidy would be sufficiently specific under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.2716  But 
what if a subsidized insurance programme applied to all US products nationwide?  Here, it 
could be questioned whether such a nationwide subsidy programme could effectively be 
implemented without de jure differentiating between products on the basis of their 
characteristics and/or de facto being more used by certain enterprises.  Hence, the subsidy 
might very often turn out de jure or de facto specific and thus – again – affect resource 
allocation among domestic enterprises.  In sum, the partly flawed economic rationale would 
not seem to support a narrow definition of specificity.   
This brings us to the second rationale underpinning the specificity test, namely that it 
excludes general provisions by all governments, such as police, fire protection, education, or 
roads, from the SCM Agreement.  This rationale would also not necessitate a narrow 
interpretation of specificity as this test would principally aim at excluding governments’ 
provision of services/goods with public goods characteristics.  Hereby, the question arises as 
to whether these goods/services could effectively be provided without de facto benefiting 
certain enterprises more than others, but only to a lesser extent given that the link with the 
beneficiary is more diffuse.  For example, investing in higher or scientific education might 
benefit knowledge-intensive industries more than others.2717  Yet, this would be not 
sufficiently specific for certain enterprises to pass the specificity test.2718  Recall that, on the 
basis of Article 1.1(a)(iii) of the SCM Agreement, ‘general infrastructure’ would not even 
fulfil the subsidy definition.  Except for providing goods/services with public goods 
                                                 
2715 Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, para 7.1151. 
2716 Sykes has indicated that such a subsidy to all agricultural production would be deemed non-specific 
under US CVDs law.  See Sykes, above n 2635, at 32. 
2717 See A.O. Sykes, ‘International trade: Trade remedies’, in A.T. Guzman and A.O. Sykes (eds), 
Research Handbook in International Economic Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007), 62-112, at 
103. 
2718 See also footnote 26 of the SCM Agreement.  Although the green light status of Article 8 of the 
SCM Agreement has lapsed, this footnote 26 of the SCM Agreement illustrates that investing in 
fundamental research is not disciplined under the SCM Agreement. 
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characteristics, the specificity test might under certain strict conditions also serve as a 
threshold to exclude corrective government measures from subsidy disciplines or CVDs 
procedures.  This will be explained in the next section. 
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2. DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIZATION BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
2.1. DISCIPLINES ON DOMESTIC SUBSIDIES 
Already during the ITO negotiations in the 1940s, a bifurcation between disciplines on export 
subsidies and those on domestic subsidies was supported as countries acknowledged that 
domestic subsidies were less likely to distort trade and could play an important role in 
spurring industrialization.  Because only the GATT entered into force, however, no 
substantive limitation on subsidization emerged.  Two relevant instruments to react against 
foreign subsidization were foreseen, which could help safeguarding tariff negotiations: non-
violation complaints could be formulated when subsidization nullified benefits of tariff 
concessions (exporting market) and CVDs could be imposed to safeguard bound tariff levels 
(home market).  The inability of the original GATT framework to halt subsidy competition 
among countries to protect their exporters’ interest in third countries offered the impetus to 
start negotiations on disciplining export subsidies in the OEEC and the GATT, leading to the 
1960 Declaration.  Because domestic subsidies could also adversely affect their producers’ 
trading interests in foreign markets, the US started to push for substantive obligations on 
domestic subsidies during the Tokyo Round, which resulted in rather flexible disciplines for 
those countries that had signed the Subsidies Code.  In essence, other signatories had accepted 
these limitations on subsidization in return for stronger disciplines on CVDs.  The same 
dynamics also explained the further strengthening of the disciplines on both domestic 
subsidies and CVDs action in the Uruguay Round.  At the same time, countries had become 
more open to strengthened subsidy disciplines because of the severe budgetary impact of 
subsidy competition in times of – and inflicted by – an economic downturn.   
This somewhat simplified summary explains the presence of the existing disciplines on 
domestic subsidies for non-agricultural products (positive theory).2719  Turning to a normative 
perspective, two lines of criticism have been formulated regarding these disciplines on 
developed countries set out in Part III of the SCM Agreement.  First, since the expiration of 
the green light subsidies, these disciplines disregard whether subsidies serve a legitimate 
purpose by focalizing exclusively on their potential trade effect upon other Members.  
Second, Bagwell and Staiger have formulated a systemic criticism because existing subsidy 
disciplines would inhibit further tariff reductions.2720   
 
                                                 
2719 For more extensive overview of the negotiating history, see above Part II, Chapter 1. 
2720 I use the word ‘systemic’ to refer to the interaction between disciplines on different government 
instruments.  
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2.1.1. Substantive considerations: Subsidies as legitimate policy tool  
The provisions on domestic subsidies inscribed in the Subsidies Code clearly reflected a 
balancing exercise: it was explicitly stipulated that these were widely used as important 
instruments to promote social and economic policy objectives (some of which listed2721), but 
it was equally acknowledged that such subsidies could adversely affect the trading interests of 
other signatories.2722  Yet, the disciplines on these domestic subsidies were largely ineffective.  
At the same time, one should not forget that, given that no subsidy definition was agreed 
upon, there was no restraint upon other governments to impose CVDs if those permissible 
subsidies caused material injury to their domestic industry.2723   
Under rather strict conditions and limitations, three types of subsidies were given green light 
status under the original SCM Agreement: R&D subsidies, environmental subsidies, and 
regional support.2724  Importantly, potential adverse effects caused upon trading partners by 
such subsidies could not be responded to under either the multilateral (dispute settlement) or 
the unilateral (CVDs) track.  Only a very limited procedure before the SCM Committee could 
be launched when non-actionable subsidies caused ‘serious’ adverse effects.2725   
Since the expiration of this class of subsidies as of 1 January 2000, only the trade effect upon 
other WTO Members is considered relevant to decide upon the WTO-conformity and 
countervailability of domestic subsidies.  As the 2006 World Trade Report has put it, ‘no 
reference is made to the need to balance the effects on trading partners with Members’ 
interests in pursuing certain policy objectives’.2726  The only exception applies to the S&D 
                                                 
2721 This non-exhaustive list referred to: (i) elimination of disadvantages of specific regions; (ii) 
facilitation of restructuring of sectors; (iii) sustainment of employment; (iv) encouragement of R&D, 
especially in high-technology industries; (v) promotion of development in developing countries; and 
(vi) redeployment of industries to avoid congestion and environmental problems (Article 11:2 of the 
Subsidies Code). 
2722 Here, different types of adverse effects were distinguished.  Next to injury to the domestic industry 
of another signatory and nullification or impairment, ‘serious prejudice’ to the industry of another 
signatory (Article 11:2 of the Subsidies Code) was also included. 
2723 This aspect seems sometimes insufficiently emphasized by proponents of the soft disciplines 
imposed upon domestic subsidies under the Subsidies Code.  Green, for example, correctly observes 
that the wide scope for government subsidies under the Subsidies Code reflected a ‘recognition that it 
was very difficult, if not impossible, to identify permissible subsidies and therefore states should have 
the ability to adopt them’.  But there was no limitation on CVDs imposed upon such permissible 
subsidies as well.  See Green, above n 2664, at 407-408. 
2724 Previous drafts of the SCM Agreement had listed more types of green light subsidies but the EC 
had agreed to the US demand to reduce this list in exchange for less demanding language under Article 
6.1 of the SCM Agreement.  See Stewart T.P. (ed), The GATT Uruguay Round – A Negotiating History 
(1986–1992) – Volume 1 (Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), 1382 pp., at 911. 
2725 See above Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3.2.  According to the World Trade Report 2006, this 
implied that the trade-distortive potential was taken into account, even with regard to non-actionable 
subsidies.  The Report considered this similar to other provisions which require a WTO Member to use 
measures in the least trade-distortive way possible (e.g., Article 2.2. of the TBT Agreement).  WTO 
Secretariat, World Trade Report 2006 – Exploring the Links Between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO 
(Geneva: WTO Publications, 2006), 223 pp., at 200. 
2726 World Trade Report 2006, above n 2725, at 201. 
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treatment for developing countries, since this is also partly inspired by the corrective role of 
subsidization.  For developed countries, corrective subsidies are put on an equal footing with 
all other types of subsidies.  Here, the focus is on the potential adverse effect upon other 
WTO Members (or more precisely, upon their producers2727), regardless of the objective 
pursued.   
 
What is more, it at first glance appears that the current disciplines are even de facto biased 
against corrective subsidies.  As explained above, corrective government interventions, at 
least if they are fiscal in nature, might precisely take the form of a ‘subsidy’ as defined under 
the SCM Agreement.  Governments playing their complementary role to the private market 
make financial contributions at terms that are by definition not available on the private 
market.   
Moreover, as acknowledged in the 2006 World Trade Report, a conflict between the targeting 
principle, which should be adhered to for effectively correcting market failures, and the SCM 
Agreement provisions seems to be present.  First, the targeting principle might partly be at 
odds with the specificity element.  As Sykes indicates, in case where a principled justification 
for a subsidy exist, this ‘will likely arise narrowly and case-by-case’, so that the intervention 
will be specific.2728  Hence, some targeted corrective subsidies seem to rather easily pass the 
specificity threshold.  For example, subsidies directly stimulating the development of climate-
friendly goods will be specific under the SCM Agreement.2729  Second, respecting the 
targeting principle might also generate larger trade effects.  This would make corrective 
subsidies more vulnerable for actionable subsidy claims or CVDs actions.  Indeed, as the 
2006 World Trade Report observed: 
 
By targeting the assistance so that it is delivered to the target population, industry or firm, the 
welfare cost of the subsidy programme is lowered.  But, in a sense, this principle goes against 
the grain of WTO Agreements which consider a subsidy a problem the more specific it is.  
This is because the more specific subsidies are, the greater the assistance that they will be able 
to provide to an industry or to a firm, with potentially a greater output and trade response.  It is 
not the intention here to exaggerate this possible conflict, but only to highlight the careful 
balancing act that governments must perform to ensure that their pursuit of legitimate policy 
goals, with the use of subsidies, do not run counter to their obligations under international 
agreements.2730 
 
                                                 
2727 Consumer welfare does not enter the picture at all.  Recall that subsidization is welfare-improving 
for net-importing countries and foreign consumers.  
2728 According to Sykes, ‘WTO law does nothing to address the question whether the ostensible 
“subsidy” addresses some legitimate problem.  The specificity test, in particular, bears essentially no 
relationship to this question.  Indeed, where a principled justification for a subsidy exists, it will likely 
arise narrowly and case-by-case, so that the policy response will often appear “specific”’.  Sykes, above 
n 2661, at 101; Sykes, above n 2635, at 33. 
2729 As Green explains, ‘not all subsidies that promote environmental concerns may be specific but 
some valuable ones are targeted’.  Green, above n 2664 at 400-401, 405. 
2730 World Trade Report 2006, above n 2725, at 108. 
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Although the 2006 World Trade Report thus pointed to this potential conflict, it finally 
reached the conclusion that the SCM Agreement nonetheless leaves ‘room for targeting 
subsidies, depending on the criteria governments use for targeting’.2731  In this respect, the 
Report referred to Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement as this provision stipulates that 
specificity does not exist if objective criteria or conditions are established.2732 This is the case 
if criteria for receiving subsidies ‘are neutral, do not favor certain enterprises over others, and 
economic in nature and horizontal in application, such as number of employees or size of 
enterprise’.2733  Referring to this ‘objective criteria’-exemption, the 2006 World Trade Report 
concluded that any subsidy with a particular policy objective strictly adhering to these 
conditions would be free of the risk of counteraction by other WTO Members.   
Yet, this strong conclusion needs to be nuanced in a double way, though it might have some 
merit in the end.  First, it certainly offers no solution in case the market failure is related to an 
industry or group of industries, in which case the conditions for receiving subsidies should be 
fine-tuned to this sector.  Second, even if objective conditions are formulated and thus 
horizontal in application, those subsidies would still be labelled specific by virtue of Article 
2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement if they are for instance de facto predominantly used by an 
industry or group of industries.2734  Recall that the Panel in US – Softwood Lumber IV rejected 
that only subsidies deliberately limited to certain enterprises (intent test) are covered under de 
facto specificity because the specificity test is ‘concerned with the distortion that is created by 
a subsidy’.2735  Consider, for example, the case of R&D subsidies.  Even if their allocation is 
based on genuine objective criteria, they might de facto predominantly benefit research-
intensive industries, and thus might in the end be considered ‘specific’ under the SCM 
Agreement.2736  In sum, the ‘objective criteria’-exemption spelled out in Article 2.1(b) of the 
SCM Agreement does certainly not offer carte blanche to corrective subsidies targeted to the 
market failure.  The scope offered by this exemption to bring the subsidy’s objective back in 
through the backdoor of the ‘specificity test’ is not well defined.  Clearly, by crafting a 
category of ‘green light’ subsidies, the negotiating Members showed their awareness that 
                                                 
2731 World Trade Report 2006, above n 2725, at 201. 
2732 Insofar the eligibility is automatic and such criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to as well as 
‘clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable of verification’.  
Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. 
2733 Article 2.1(b), footnote 2 of the SCM Agreement. 
2734 Or if they are de facto specific under one of the other factors of Article 2.1(c) of the SCM 
Agreement.  It seems that the World Trade Report 2006 acknowledged this interpretation but did not 
draw the logical conclusion.  See World Trade Report 2006, above n 2725, at 198, 202. 
2735 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 7.116. 
2736 Likewise, Green gives the example of subsidies aimed at providing energy efficiency or emission 
reduction payments across all sectors.  These appear to be non-specific but might finally be qualified as 
de facto specific if there are a few industries (i.e., large emitters) which disproportionally use these 
subsidies.  Green, above n 2664, at 405. 
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corrective subsidies could very well be specific under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement but 
that these subsidies still (temporarily) deserved green light.2737   
The difficulty to give substance to both the ‘objective criteria’-exemption and the de facto 
specificity test seems to result from the different rationales underpinning the specificity test.  
On the one hand, the ‘objective criteria’-exemption (Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement) 
might implement the distinction between selective and functional government interventions 
whereby the former are generally considered more vulnerable to capture by private interests 
and thus less likely to effectively serve a legitimate objective.  Such selective interventions 
might sometimes also be less targeted to the origin of the market failure.2738  For example, 
subsidizing R&D across all sectors might in theory be more effective than subsidizing only 
high-tech sectors.2739  Yet, if the essential purpose of the specificity test is to isolate those 
subsidies having the potential to distort trade levels, the ultimate question is rather whether 
subsidies are de facto specific, regardless of whether their allocation is based on objective 
criteria.  This is established under Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement and the Panel in US – 
Softwood Lumber IV also seemed to articulate this purpose.   
 
In the following sections, it will be examined whether developed countries should be given 
more policy space to offer subsidies that serve a legitimate objective.  Should the effect-based 
approach of the current disciplines on domestic subsidies be altered with respect to corrective 
subsidies?  This discussion will be relevant to developing countries as well, insofar the 
reactivation of the green light status to some subsidies would further enlarge developing 
countries’ policy space as currently defined under the S&D treatment provisions. 
 
2.1.1.1. Research and development subsidies 
In Part I, we reached the conclusion that knowledge spillovers generated by R&D investments 
justify subsidization as an instrument of industrial policy in competitive as well as imperfectly 
competitive markets.2740   
In case knowledge spillovers are local in nature, a (national) welfare-maximizing country 
clearly has an incentive to subsidize R&D so as to internalize this spillover.  Such local 
knowledge spillovers are important factors explaining the emergence of innovative ‘clusters’, 
whereby productivity improvements are generated (i.e., external economies of scale).  
Moreover, world welfare is boosted as well, given that the rest of the world likewise benefits 
                                                 
2737 See Article 8.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. 
2738 This somewhat relates to the argument articulated by Sykes that the specificity test might be useful 
to target those subsidies more likely to be based on political-economy than on welfare motivations.   
2739 To be sure, the optimal strategy is to offer de jure specific subsidies if the market failure is sector-
specific (see above n 2728, 2729).   
2740 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.3. 
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from a terms of trade improvement resulting from this rise in productivity.2741  However, the 
new trade theory explained that countries benefit more when clusters are located in their 
territory, explaining their incentive to launch competitive subsidization in order to attract 
innovative clusters.  Interestingly, Norman and Venables have shown that world welfare is 
maximized when countries are unrestricted in such competition.2742  International disciplines 
restricting such subsidization would be world welfare-depressing since it would result in too 
many clusters, each operating at an inefficient low scale.2743  Nonetheless, as illustrated by 
fierce rivalry in the semi-conductor industry,2744 an activist trade policy carries the risk that 
local knowledge spillovers will turn out lower than expected.  In case knowledge spillovers 
leak abroad (e.g., through trade or FDI), national governments will become less inclined to 
offer subsidies.  When spillovers would be purely international in nature, a national welfare-
maximizing government would have no incentive to offer subsidies even though world 
welfare would again be boosted.2745   
Turning to R&D subsidies as a strategic instrument in oligopolistic markets, Bagwell and 
Staiger have demonstrated that R&D subsidies could be a somewhat more robust policy 
recommendation than export or output subsidies are, because they remain optimal under 
Cournot as well as Bertrand competition.  World welfare would be boosted as well since 
output is sub-optimally low in oligopolistic markets.  In case knowledge spillovers would be 
generated, domestic spillovers will increase the probability that national governments offer 
R&D subsidies in strategic settings and governments would still offer such subsidies when 
international spillovers are sufficiently high. 
Translating this economic underpinning for R&D subsidies into legal policy flexibility faces 
two hurdles: the need for simplification and the risk of circumvention.  First, the economic 
studies’ specific assumptions upon which a case for R&D subsidies rest cannot be fully 
reflected in legal disciplines.  Indeed, a certain level of simplification is needed for legal 
disciplines to be workable.  Such simplification runs the risk of crafting policy space for 
support that is not welfare-improving.  Yet, the justification for R&D subsidies seems to be 
                                                 
2741 Such a terms of trade benefit occurs when the R&D subsidy is offered by a large country.  No 
welfare effects on third countries are present when such R&D subsidy is made by a small country. 
2742 V. D. Norman and A. J. Venables, ‘Industrial Clusters: Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy’, 71 
Economica (2004), 543–558.   
2743 The limitation on subsidies has the effect of reducing clusters’ size but likewise increases their 
number as it induces more countries to offer subsidies so as to attract clusters. Norman and Venables, 
above n 2742, at 551-552.  
2744 See, for example, the claims brought before the WTO by Korea against CVDs imposed on DRAMs 
by the US, the EC, and Japan.  
2745 Interestingly, it was suggested during the GATT period that no (countervailable) subsidy would be 
present if knowledge generated through R&D assistance was not restricted.  The assumption is that 
other firms would easily catch-up since the knowledge is publically available.  Likewise, it was 
suggested no subsidy would be present in case the knowledge would be restricted (e.g., by a patent) and 
in case the firm returned the full amount of the assistance.  See Note by the Secretariat, Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/4, 28 April 1987), at 24-25.   
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sufficiently general to temper this concern.  Second, the major counterargument articulated 
against the re-activation of the green light status for R&D subsidies holds that money is 
fungible.2746  Hence, countries might label subsidies serving other purposes as ‘R&D 
subsidies’ so as to circumvent more stringent disciplines on such subsidies.  Here, specific 
conditions to qualify as R&D subsidies combined with a strong notification procedure might 
partly give in to this objection.  Moreover, alternative conclusions derived from both hurdles, 
namely to offer no extra policy space for R&D subsidies or to impose no substantive policy 
constraints on any subsidization (as Sykes seems to suggest) seem inferior anyway. 
In my view, the reinstallation of the green light status for R&D subsidies would therefore be 
justified.  Before its expiration, Article 8.2(a) of the SCM Agreement offered rather extensive 
leeway for such subsidization.  Hereby, a distinction was made between different types of 
R&D subsidies.  First, it was emphasized that support for fundamental research 
independently conducted by higher education or research establishments was not disciplined 
under the SCM Agreement because the generated knowledge was not linked to industrial or 
commercial objectives.2747  In contrast, support for R&D activities by firms or by higher 
education establishments on a contract basis was allowed upon the fulfillment of specific 
conditions.  Industrial research, which aimed at the discovery of new knowledge,2748 could be 
supported up to 75 per cent of its overall cost, whereas the next step of pre-competitive 
development activity,2749 could be supported up to 50 per cent.  Moreover, only certain types 
of costs, which are listed in Article 8.2(a) of the SCM Agreement, could be covered.2750  To 
temper the concern of circumvention and to ensure that support is a deliberative choice, the 
stipulated notification requirements could be strengthened if the green light status would be 
re-installed.  The weak spot of the notification procedure was that no substantive legal 
consequences were attached to a notification failure.2751    
Since the large majority of R&D investments are made in developed countries, it comes as no 
surprise that not all developing countries are in favour of re-installing this category of green 
light subsidies in its current form.  India, for instance, has argued that: 
 
                                                 
2746 See Submission by the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, 22 November 1989); Sykes, above 
n 2635, at 34. 
2747 Indeed, such support would rather be disciplined under the GATS.  Under the SCM Agreement, the 
provision of services should benefit a specific industry in order to be disciplined (Articles 1 and 2 of 
the SCM Agreement).  Hence, such support remains exempted from the SCM Agreement after the 
expiration of the green light status of R&D subsidies. 
2748 It should have the objective that such knowledge may be useful in developing new products, 
processes or services or in generating significant improvements to existing products, processes or 
services (footnote 28 tof the SCM Agreement. 
2749 See footnote 29 of the SCM Agreement. 
2750 It refers to costs of personnel, instruments, consultancy, overhead, or other running costs. 
2751 See above Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.3. 
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(…) the developed countries created a safe harbour for a substantial part of the activities on 
which the competitive strength of their firms rely.  While this provision may have benefited 
developing countries in a few cases, rare as they may have been, it would not allow them 
exemption from countervailing duty action in case assistance were to be provided for the 
acquisition of technology, which is essential for developing countries.2752   
 
Indeed, subsidies offered to acquire foreign technology (‘inside-the-frontier innovation’) 
differ from traditional R&D investments aiming at inventing new products and higher quality 
variants (‘outside-the-frontier’ innovation) for which the Article 8.2 carve-out was created.2753  
Although developing countries benefit from certain S&D treatment on subsidization to 
acquire this kind of technology, such subsidies are not shielded from potential CVDs action 
by trading partners.  Still, they could also benefit from foreign R&D subsidies by developed 
countries, not only on the basis of a terms of trade improvement but also in case such 
spillovers flow abroad through for instance trade or FDI.  On the other hand, one might be 
tempted to argue that developing countries could benefit from the extinction of the green light 
status for R&D subsidies.  After all, stringent limitations on R&D (and other) subsidies 
imposed on developed countries might make it more likely that developing countries could 
capture innovative clusters precisely because they benefit from S&D treatment on domestic 
(and export) subsidies and would never win a competitive subsidy war.  But again, potential 
CVDs action is not foreclosed and the pitfalls of an activist trade policy combined with their 
limited resources might warrant that such competitive subsidization is not an appropriate 
strategy for developing countries.  Moreover, as Rodriguez-Clare underscored, there is no 
guarantee that local production of high-tech goods will generate the same clustering benefits.  
Even if it does generate such effects, developed countries will have probably reaped these 
clustering benefits already, which will have resulted in low international prices.  Yet, the 
pitfalls of an activist trade policy do not imply that developing countries should not support 
R&D investments.  After all, such support would ameliorate their capacity to absorb foreign 
innovations.  Here, Rodriguez-Clare suggests the provision of R&D subsidies to stimulate 
clustering in those sectors in which developing countries have revealed their comparative 
advantage.2754  Overall, the concerns raised by developing countries should not avert the re-
installation of the green light status of R&D subsidies. 
 
Under the current disciplines, R&D subsidies of developed countries would in principle be 
actionable and countervailable if causing adverse effects to the interest of other Members or 
material injury to their domestic industry, respectively.  Only the ‘objective criteria’-
exemption under the specificity test might foreclose such trade effect test (Article 2.1(b) of 
                                                 
2752 Intervention by India on the Submission by the United States on Special and Differential Treatment 
and the Subsidies Agreement (TN/RL/W/68, 11 March 2003). 
2753 See also above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2.1. 
2754 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2.2.2; see also below Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2. 
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the SCM Agreement).  Providing R&D support exclusively to technology-intensive industries 
would certainly be specific (i.e., selective intervention).  In contrast, subsidizing R&D support 
directly and regardless of the sector might be superior in economic terms because it is more 
targeted and less prone to be captured by private interests, but such a functional intervention 
is at the same time also harder to implement in practice.  In legal terms, this support might be 
deemed non-specific if effectively based on objective criteria, with the caveat that it could 
still be qualified as specific if de facto predominantly used by an industry or group of 
industries (e.g., technology-intensive industries).   
 
2.1.1.2. Environmental subsidies 
As introduced in Part I, the 2009 WTO – UNEP Report has grouped governments’ 
interventions responding to the challenge of climate change into three broad categories: 
technical requirements to promote the use of climate-friendly goods and technologies, support 
for the development and deployment of such goods and technologies, and mechanisms to 
internalize the cost of greenhouse gas emissions (i.e., carbon/energy taxes and emission 
trading schemes).2755  The policy constraints imposed upon each of these interventions under 
the SCM Agreement are assessed in this section.   
 
2.1.1.2.1. Technical requirements 
As point of departure, remind that not implementing the ‘polluter pays’ principle does not 
qualify as a subsidy under the SCM Agreement.  This means that the failure to honour this 
principle by setting low regulatory standards cannot be countervailed by other WTO 
Members.2756  Hence, countries are free under the SCM Agreement to adopt a low level of 
regulatory environmental standards.  When they develop such non-fiscal measures, they could 
even exempt some specific industries from such requirements.  At the same time, if a country 
does introduce more stringent environmental requirements, financial or fiscal compensation to 
its firms for their implementation would actually be disciplined under the SCM Agreement.  
Until 2000, such assistance was under certain conditions exempted.  Indeed, green light was 
given to ‘assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental 
requirements imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and 
financial burden on firms’ (Article 8.2(c) of the SCM Agreement).  Still, such assistance had 
to limited to a one-time non-recurring subsidy covering at most 20 per cent of the cost of 
adaptation and had to be available to all firms which could adopt the new equipment and/or 
                                                 
2755 WTO – UNEP Report, Trade and Climate Change (Geneva: WTO Publications, 2009), 166 pp.. 
2756 See above n 2658. 
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production processes.2757  Sykes considered this green light status as problematic precisely 
because it conflicts with the ‘polluter pays’ principle.2758  Firms simply have to bear their 
pollution cost and should not be subsidized for not-polluting.  Yet, this argument fails to 
recognize that competitiveness or carbon leakage concerns might inhibit governments to take 
any action at all so as to implement this ‘polluter pays’ principle .  Under the carve-out, this 
principle was at least partly honoured because only 20 per cent of the costs could be 
recovered without risk of trade action by other WTO Members.  One should not forget that 
individual governments’ incentive is already too low to correct market failures generating 
international spillovers such as climate change.  Therefore, I agree with Hufauer et al that the 
reinstallation of this green light category should be advised.2759 
At the same time, the extinction of its green light status does not mean that such subsidies 
would actually be outlawed under the SCM Agreement.2760  If based on objective criteria and 
de facto non-specific, it would not even be disciplined under the SCM Agreement.  Yet, the 
fact that drafters installed the carve-out revealed their awareness that such regulatory 
standards (and thus also compensation for their implementation) could very well be industry-
specific.2761  Even in that case, it would only be actionable or countervailable if causing the 
required level of adverse trade effects.2762  On the other hand, financial or fiscal assistance 
contingent upon exportation would be prohibited.  Border tax adjustments compensating 
exporters for adaptation to higher environmental standards is certainly not allowed and would 
constitute a prohibited export subsidy.  But again, simply exempting export-competing 
industries from stringent regulatory requirements would not be covered under the SCM 
Agreement. 
Notice in concluding that the Agreement on Agriculture situates ‘payments under 
environmental programmes’ in the green box.  Here, the payment should only be limited to 
the extra cost involved in complying with the government programme.2763  Since the 
                                                 
2757 Regarding the other conditions, see Article 8.2(c) of the SCM Agreement. 
2758 Sykes, above n 2635, at 34. 
2759 Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim, above n 2658, at 110. 
2760 Bigdeli suggests that a benefit under the SCM Agreement might not be present if a regulatory 
burden on entities for environmental objectives would be compensated in one regulatory package by 
financial or fiscal measures.  Overall, it is highly questionable whether the regulatory burden would be 
considered in assessing the benefit of the financial contribution (see above Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 
1.2.1).  As Bigdeli acknowledges as well, this might not fit the logic of the SCM Agreement.  Article 
8.2(c) of the SCM Agreement was exactly inscribed to give green light to a well-defined level of such 
governmental compensation.  On the other hand, the example given by Bigdeli (i.e., free allowance of 
emission permits under cap-and-trade schemes) might indeed be a very limited exception to this 
general rule because of the intrinsic link between the financial contribution and the obligation (see 
below n 2808).  See Bigdeli, above n 2658, at 162-163.   
2761 Mavroidis et al seem to conclude that the ‘polluter pays’ principle is forced upon WTO Members.  
See Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters, above n 2636, at 312. 
2762 For challenging a non-recurring subsidy up to 20 per cent of the regulatory cost, this threshold 
might not be easy to pass. 
2763 Annex 2, para 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
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expiration of the peace clause, such payments could in theory also be challenged as an 
actionable subsidy under the SCM Agreement.  Likewise, they are not shielded from potential 
CVDs action.  
 
2.1.1.2.2. Support for climate-friendly goods 
Governments have developed financial and fiscal mechanisms to promote the development 
and deployment of climate-friendly goods and technologies (e.g., solar panels, wind turbines).  
Next to the positive environment externality generated by such goods and technologies,2764 
the WTO – UNEP Report lists a number of other market failures such as positive R&D 
externalities that would legitimize governmental fiscal or financial support.2765  These 
measures likely qualify as specific subsidies under the SCM Agreement and would thus be 
vulnerable for CVDs action and actionable subsidy claims if demonstrated that they cause the 
required level of adverse trade effects.2766  To counter such a response by trading partners, 
should a green box in the SCM Agreement be created to carve out such subsidies?2767  Bigdeli 
opposes such a carve-out for renewable energy product subsidies.  He holds that, if 
demonstrated that they cause adverse effects, this would mean that such subsidies are tipping 
the balance against more efficient foreign renewable energy producers.  Taking away the 
adverse effects of such distortive renewable energy subsidies would benefit renewable energy 
trade and environmental protection.2768  On the other hand, Green advocates the inclusion in 
the SCM Agreement of an explicit environmental exception along the lines of Article XX of 
GATT.2769  This would provide policy space for subsidies for environmental protection and, at 
the same time, permit the WTO to discipline these actions for arbitrariness or 
discrimination.2770  Adopting a middle course, I would rather suggest that the re-installation of 
the R&D subsidy carve-out with a strengthened notification procedure might go along way to 
                                                 
2764 This positive externality an sich might also be internalized by tackling the negative externality of 
pollution through regulation or taxation.  See also Bigdeli, above n 2658, at 155. 
2765 WTO – UNEP Report, above n 2755, at 110-111.    
2766 For a more in-depth analysis, see Bigdeli, above n 2658, at 163-182.  See also G. N. Horlick, ‘The 
WTO and Climate Change ‘Incentives’’, in T. Cottier, O. Nartova, and S. Z. Bigdeli (eds), 
International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 193-196, at 194. 
2767 Howse and Eliason propose that negotiations should address ‘the task of identifying a set of ‘green 
box’ renewable energy subsidies that Members agree to refrain from challenging, on account of 
consensus as to their positive environmental effects’.  Howse and Eliason, above n 2658, at 90. 
2768 Bigdeli, above n 2658, at 189. 
2769 Even though no panel or Appellate Body has explicitly expressed its view on this question, most 
authors correctly hold that Article XX of the GATT is not available to justify a violation of the SCM 
Agreement. See, for example, B. J. Condon, ‘Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law’, 
12:4 Journal of International Economic Law (2009), 895-926; Horlick, above n 2766, at 194. 
2770 The re-inclusion of the green light status to environmental subsidies would certainly be insufficient 
in his view.  Green, above n 2664, at 408-409.   
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meet the goal of spurring the development of climate-friendly goods.2771  Such government 
interventions would not only be defensible on the basis of positive externalities generated by 
increased production, which an sich could be tackled in a more efficient way than by simply 
subsidizing domestic producers.2772  Indeed, they would in addition be justified on the basis of 
the clear presence of R&D externalities in these sectors, which imply that production and 
trade levels are sub-optimal low under market conditions.2773   
 
Instead of focusing on the supply side, governments might subsidize consumers (e.g. tax 
credits for installing solar panels).  This would likewise boost investments in 
environmentally-friendly goods and could benefit foreign producers if implemented in a non-
discriminatory manner.2774  Such non-discriminatory subsidies offered to consumers would 
not be constrained under the SCM Agreement.  Indeed, this subsidy would not be specific to 
certain enterprises (Article 2 of the SCM Agreement)2775 and would not cause adverse effects 
upon other WTO Members as their producers might even benefit from consumer subsidies.2776  
Because part of the benefit of such consumer subsidies might flow abroad in the form of 
increased imports, domestic producers would rather put pressure upon their government to 
exclude foreign producers from such subsidy schemes.  Yet, such an amendment would 
                                                 
2771 Hufbauer et al have also suggested the installation of a peace clause for some climate-related 
domestic subsidies (such as R&D subsidies on alternative energy).  Yet, the added value of their 
proposal seems limited as their suggested subsidy peace clause provision does in their view not cover 
subsidies that are specific under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement but would offer ‘more legal certainty 
that generally available climate subsidies would not be challenged in WTO dispute settlement’.  
Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim, above n 2658, at 109.  
2772 See above n 2764.  Non-discriminatory consumer subsidies might also be more efficient to 
internalize the positive externality on the environment because goods will be sourced from the most 
efficient producer.    
2773 The Copenhagen Consensus Center asked an expert panel of leading economists to rank different 
policy responses to halt global warming.  A very substantive increase in R&D for non-carbon energy 
was ranked as first-best.  According to Lomborg, ‘every dollar spent on R&D could avert 11 dollars 
worth of climate damage’.  See L. Lane, J. Brickel, I. Galiana, C. Green, and V. Bosetti, Advice for 
Policymakers (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Consensus Center, 2009), 45 pp.; B. Lomborg, ‘Technology, 
Not Talks Will Save the Planet’, IMF Finance & Development (August 2009), 13-14. 
2774 See also OECD, ‘Sustainable Manufacturing and Eco-innovation: Towards a Green Economy’, 
OECD Observer – Policy Brief (June 2009), 7 pp., at 7. 
2775 This argument might be formulated in two ways.  If the direct recipient would be the focus of the 
specificity test, such a subsidy is not specific because it would be available to all users (i.e., consumers) 
and not limited to certain enterprises.  Conversely, if the focus of the specificity test would be on the 
ultimate beneficiary (e.g., solar panel producers), it would also not be specific to an industry ‘within the 
jurisdiction of the granting authority’ (Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement) given that foreign producers 
could likewise benefit.  The World Trade Report 2006 even more broadly considered that Article 2 of 
the SCM Agreement and other provisions in the SCM Agreement referring to producers of subsidized 
products imply that transfers to consumers ‘may not be covered’ by the SCM Agreement.  World Trade 
Report 2006, above n 2725, at 54. 
2776 See also Howse and Eliason, above n 2658, at 88, 89.   
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plainly violate Article III of the GATT and be less efficient in economic terms as it 
discriminates against more efficient foreign producers.2777   
 
Further, the WTO – UNEP Report points to the need for government interventions to spur 
R&D investments in the agricultural sector.2778  In this respect, the Report refers to the policy 
space given under the green box for such support, which indeed lists support for ‘research, 
including general research, research in connection with environmental programmes, and 
research relating to particular products’.2779  Strictly speaking, the WTO – UNEP report 
hereby overlooks that such support could still be actionable and countervailable under the 
SCM Agreement, even though substantiating these actions would likely fail given that such 
green box R&D support under the Agreement on Agriculture could not involve direct 
payments to producers or processors.2780 
 
Without going into detail, notice that subsidies stimulating the production of biofuels (i.e., 
ethanol or biodiesel) are likewise actionable and countervailable on the basis of the SCM 
Agreement.2781  Insofar such support would qualify as support for agricultural products, it 
would in addition be disciplined under the Agreement on Agriculture.  It has been advanced 
that the majority of such existing support measures would then fall in the ‘amber box’, in 
which case both the EC and US would surpass their commitment levels.2782 
 
2.1.1.2.3. Government interventions internalizing the cost of greenhouse gas emissions 
Governments have introduced price and market mechanisms to internalize the environmental 
costs of greenhouse gas emissions, a negative externality that is international in nature.  Two 
mechanisms are hereby distinguished: carbon/energy taxes and cap-and-trade systems.  Yet, if 
the ‘polluter pays’ principle is under such mechanisms (partly) introduced in some countries 
but not in others,2783 this might hamper the competitiveness of subjected producers and could 
equally undermine the effectiveness of environmental protection as those producers might 
                                                 
2777 For example, European producers have advocated limiting consumer subsidies for the installation 
of solar panels because such non-discriminatory subsidies boosted the imports of Chinese solar panels.  
See ‘Chinese Solar Firm Revises Price Remark’, New York Times (27 August 2009). 
2778 WTO – UNEP Report, above n 2755, at 88, 115. 
2779 Annex 2, para 2(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
2780 Such support would also have to fulfil the general conditions (Annex 2, para 1 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture). 
2781 For instance, the EC has recently imposed CVDs against biodiesel imports from the US.  See 
Council Regulation (EC) No 598/2009 of 7 July 2009 imposing a definitive countervailing duty and 
collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of biodiesel originating in the United 
States of America, (2009) OJ L/179.  
2782 Bigdeli, above n 2658, at 172-173. 
2783 The optimal solution would be to cooperate internationally to correct this international negative 
externality. 
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simply choose to relocate to countries with weaker environmental policies (‘carbon 
leakage’).2784 This initiates the question whether governments could alleviate both concerns 
by adjusting the costs imposed under such mechanisms at both the import and the export side.  
Because our focus is on subsidy disciplines, we merely examine the available policy space for 
border tax adjustments (BTAs) at the exporting side.2785  Moreover, regarding cap-and-trade 
systems, it is also open to discussion whether governments could respond to both concerns by 
allocating emission permits for free.2786   
 
2.1.1.2.3.1. Border tax adjustment on carbon tax 
In line with the GATT regime, the SCM Agreement incorporates the destination principle 
with respect to indirect taxes and the origin principle with respect to direct taxes (and social 
security charges).  Hence, border tax adjustments (BTAs) at the export side are allowed for 
indirect taxes, which are imposed directly or indirectly on products, but not on direct taxes 
because these are deemed to be imposed upon the producer.  However, are adjustments at the 
export side also permissible for taxes on inputs (e.g., energy) that are used in the production 
process but which are not incorporated in the final product?   
In the 1970 GATT Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments, GATT Contracting 
Parties already inscribed their divergent views on whether such tax occultes (hidden taxes) 
could be rebated and noted that it appeared that such adjustment ‘was not normally made’ 
except in countries having a cascade tax.2787  Item (h) of the Illustrative List attached to the 
Subsidies Code implemented the destination principle with regard to ‘prior-stage cumulative 
indirect taxes’ (PSCI taxes) such as cascade taxes.  This item explicitly confined rebates to 
those taxes on ‘inputs physically incorporated’.  Most commentators therefore concluded that 
energy taxes not physically incorporated in the end product could not be rebated under the 
Subsidies Code.2788,2789  Nonetheless, upon demand of India, the scope for rebates under item 
                                                 
2784 WTO – UNEP Report, above n 2755, at 98; G. Van Calster, International & EU Trade Law – The 
Environmental Challenge (London: Cameron May, 2000), 564 pp., at 421. 
2785 Recall that a symmetric application at both sides is not mandated under the WTO.  From an 
economic perspective, Mattoo et al have demonstrated that if BTAs would be imposed at the import 
side the appropriate policy is to implement it in a symmetric way and thus also make adjustments at the 
export side, even though the optimal policy from a purely trade perspective would be to have no scope 
for carbon-based BTAs.  See A. Mattoo, A. Subramanian, D. van der Mensbrugghe, and J. He, 
‘Reconciling Climate Change and Trade Policy’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 
5123 (November 2009), 44 pp. 
2786 This is implemented under the Australian cap-and-trade system. 
2787 See also Note by the Secretariat, Taxes and Charges for Environmental Purposes – Border Tax 
Adjustment (WT/CTE/W/47, 2 May 1997). 
2788 Reference was also made to Article VI:4 and Ad Note Article XVI of the GATT, which refer to 
adjustments made with regard to duties or taxes ‘borne by the like product’.  See G. C. Hufbauer, J. E. 
Shelton, Subsidies in International Trade (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 
1984), 283 pp., at 52-53.  G. C. Hufbauer, Fundamental Tax Reform and Border Tax Adjustments 
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(h) was broadened in the SCM Agreement to ‘energy, fuels and oil used in the production 
process and catalysts which are consumed in the course of their use to obtain the exported 
product’.2790  At the same time, US trade officials claimed that this amendment was not 
intended to fundamentally expand the right for BTAs on energy taxes for developed countries 
and emphasized that other developed countries shared their view.2791  So, are such BTAs on 
energy/carbon taxes authorized under the SCM Agreement? 
First of all, item (h) of the Illustrative List, dealing with PSCI taxes, does certainly not 
significantly expand the scope for such rebates.  To be sure, this interpretation does not 
derived from the view expressed by the US as little value should be accorded to such 
unilateral interpretation.2792  Instead, as explained by several scholars, energy/carbon taxes 
generally are single-stage taxes instead of multi-stage taxes and thus do not qualify as PSCI 
taxes that would be covered under item (h).2793  Certainly, energy taxes could become such 
PSCI tax when collected as part of a cascade system but such a system is no longer in place in 
developed countries and is likewise progressively abandoned in developing countries.2794  
According to some scholars, however, the limited scope of item (h) should not mean that 
BTAs on energy taxes are outlawed in practice.  After all, BTAs on energy taxes might still 
be saved under the residual category of ‘indirect taxes’ in respect of the production and 
                                                                                                                                            
(Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, January 1996), 89 pp., at 49; Schlagenhof, 
above n 2636, at 143. 
2789 In case energy taxes are physically incorporated in the final product (e.g. electrolysis), adjustment 
is considered allowed and not disputed.  P. Demaret and R. Stewardson, ‘Border Tax Adjustments 
under GATT and EC Law and General Implications for Environmental Taxes’, 28:4 Journal of World 
Trade (1994), 5-64, at 22-23.  Likewise, a tax on domestically produced fossil fuels could be rebated 
upon exportation under item (g) of the Illustrative List.  See WTO – UNEP Report, above n 2755, at 
105. 
2790 Emphasis added.  Compare item (h) juncto footnote 61 of the SCM Agreement with item (h) of the 
Subsidies Code.  See also Note by the Secretariat, Negotiating history of footnote 61 of the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (WT/CTE/W/16, 1 December 1995). 
2791 As cited in full by de Cendra, a US trade official wrote to the US Council for International Business 
that: 
‘The change in question [i.e. insertion of footnote 61] was proposed to address a specific and 
very narrow issue involving certain energy-intensive exports from a limited number of countries. 
It was never intended to fundamentally expand the right of countries to apply border adjustments 
for a broad range of taxes on energy, especially in the developed world. We have discussed the 
matter with other developed countries involved in the Subsidies Code negotiations. We are 
satisfied that they share our views on the purpose of the text as drafted and the importance of 
careful international examination before any broader policy conclusion should be drawn 
regarding border adjustments and energy taxes’. 
See de Cendra, above n 2658, at 140.  The US feared that European or Asian countries would 
implement such rebates (Hufbauer, above n 2788, at 50). 
2792 See also de Cendra, above n 2658, at 140; Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim, above n 2658, at 46.  
2793 J. A. Hoerner and F. Muller, ‘Carbon Taxes for Climate Protection in a Competitive World’, Paper 
for the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs (June 1996), 47 pp., at 32-33; Schlagenhof, 
above n 2636, at 144; de Cendra, above n 2658, at 140.  For the definition of ‘cumulative’ indirect 
taxes, see footnote 58 of the SCM Agreement. 
2794 Hoerner and Muller, above n 2793, at 34. 
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distribution of exported products (see item (g) of the Illustrative List).2795  Considering the 
diversity in opinions and lack of clarity in the legal texts, one cannot but conclude that the 
status of BTAs on energy/carbon taxes remains ambiguous under the SCM Agreement.2796   
 
2.1.1.2.3.2. Emission trading schemes 
As an alternative tool to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, countries are implementing 
emission trading schemes.  Under such cap-and-trade systems, an annual cap on total 
emissions is set and emission permits up to this ceiling are allocated either for free or by 
governmental auctioning.  Such allocated emission permits could next be traded among 
entities, implying that the emission reduction will be undertaken by the most cost-efficient 
entity.  Liable entities are thus required to hold emission permits (either initially allocated by 
the government or subsequently purchased on the market) covering their actual level of 
emissions.  Two somewhat opposite queries have puzzled international trade scholars.  First, 
could the burden imposed on domestic firms under such cap-and-trade systems be adjusted at 
the border?  Second, could emission permits allocated for free under such a cap-and-trade 
system be qualified as a specific subsidy and thus be disciplined under the SCM agreement?  
Whereas the first question thus seems to suggest that domestic firms are bearing an extra 
burden for which they might have to be compensated, the second seems to hint that domestic 
firms receiving free emission permits are subsidized, against which foreign countries might 
take action.2797  This apparent ambiguity results from the fact that a regulatory system is set 
                                                 
2795 Indirect taxes are defined as ‘sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, 
inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges’ 
(footnote 58 of the SCM Agreement; emphasis added).  Because they do not qualify as direct taxes, 
carbon/energy taxes are therefore covered under ‘indirect taxes’.  See Pauwelyn, above n 2658, 
footnote 47.  Likewise, Hufbauer et al make this argument but also formulate the counterargument that, 
even though energy taxes are indirect taxes, they might be exclusively dealt with under item (h) of the 
Illustrative List.  See Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim, above n 2658, at 45-66. 
2796 Three positions could be distinguished on whether carbon/energy taxes could be legally rebated 
upon exports.  Notice hereby that scholars often refer to different arguments even when they reach a 
similar conclusion.  First, authors generally considering BTAs on energy taxes as allowed: F. Biermann 
and R. Brohm, ‘Implementing the Kyoto Protocol without the USA: the Strategic Role of Energy Tax 
Adjustments at the Border’, 4 Climate Policy (2005), 289-302, at 297-298; Pauwelyn, above n 2658, at 
19; Van Calster, above n 2784, at 433-437.  Next, authors dismissing the legality of BTAs on energy 
taxes: Schlagenhof, above n 2636, at 143-144.  Lastly, mixed views are expressed by: Demaret and 
Stewardson, above n 2789, at 29-30; M. Genasci, ‘Border Tax Adjustments and Emissions Trading: 
The Implications of International Trade Law for Policy Design’, 1 Carbon and Climate Law Review 
(2008), 33-42, at 36; Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim, above n 2658, at 41-42; de Cendra, above n 
2658, at 140.   
2797 This complexity has resulted in opposite conclusions reached by trade experts. On the one hand, 
Shah concluded that free allocation of emission permits under cap-and-trade systems could be qualified 
as an actionable subsidy.  On the other hand, Pauwelyn reached the opposite conclusion.  A cost or tax 
(and thus not a subsidy) is still imposed upon liable entities when allowances are handed out for free, 
which could arguably be adjusted at the border for imports.  Under the first reading of exactly the same 
system, trading partners could undertake multilateral or unilateral action, while under the second 
reading, the cap-and-trade imposing country would be allowed to make border adjustments.  I will 
explain why both propositions seem to too extreme.  See Pauwelyn, above n 2658, at 21-22; V. R. 
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up creating a market whereby some or all permits might initially be allocated for free.  If so, a 
regulatory burden (i.e., the obligation to hold permits up to emission levels) is combined with 
a free allocation of permits.  Any suggested theory for analyzing cap-and-trade systems under 
the SCM Agreement has to solve both inquiries in a mutually consistent way. 
Starting with first query on whether the allocation of emission permits for free could be 
challenged (or countervailed) under the SCM Agreement, I would suggest the following 
solution.  Free allocation would seem not to be disciplined under the SCM Agreement if all 
permits are allocated for free, which is the approach taken under the initial cap-and-trade 
schemes in the EU.2798  Therefore, I tend to disagree with Shah’s conclusion that the German 
cap-and-trade system could be actionable under the SCM Agreement.2799  Yet, if such free 
permits were only granted for free to certain enterprises, they would seem to fall within the 
subsidy definition of the SCM Agreement.  An example thereof is Australia’s announced cap-
and-trade system (i.e., the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS)), under which only 
firms producing export goods that have a significant economic exposure to higher carbon 
prices (so-called ‘Emissions-Intensive Trade Exposed’ or EITI entities) will be allocated free 
emission permits.2800  Here, I concur with the conclusion of Feaver et al that this might 
constitute a specific subsidy under the SCM Agreement.  To underpin this proposed solution, 
the subsequent analysis under the SCM Agreement is advanced.2801 
The first threshold question is whether free emission permits can be considered as a ‘financial 
contribution’ under the SCM Agreement.  First of all, Feaver et al have argued that, in light of 
US – Softwood Lumber IV,2802 a free emission permit could fall within the scope of Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement as the provision of ‘goods’ by the government.2803  Yet, 
most other authors have rightly objected that an emission allowance does not seem to qualify 
                                                                                                                                            
Shah, ‘The Allocation of Free Emissions Allowances by Germany to its Steel Industry: A Possible 
Subsidy Claim under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties’, 22:3 American 
University International Law Review (2007), 445-478.  
2798 To be sure, Mattoo et al have advanced that, in economic terms, such free allowances might operate 
as production subsidies depending on the conditions set under the cap-and-trade system: ‘if the 
allowances are related to historical output (it has been proposed that they be related to output in the 
previous two years), then they would amount to a lump-sum transfer without any marginal impact on 
production decisions, and hence on trade. Alternatively, producers’ knowledge that future allowances 
are related to current output could have an impact on current decisions on output. In this case, 
allowances would be closer to a production subsidy’.  See Mattoo, Subramanian, van der Mensbrugghe, 
and He, above n 2785, at 4. 
2799 Shah, above n 2797. 
2800 See D. Feaver, W. McGoldrick, and V. Boyd-Wells, ‘Is Australia’s EAP a Prohibited Export 
Subsidy?’, 44:4 Journal of World Trade (2010), 319-347. 
2801 This would also meet the strong ‘trade policy grounds for treating allowances as subsidies’ that 
were raised by Hufbauer et al.  Deciding otherwise would mean that governments would be able ‘to 
avoid all subsidy disciplines by using the form of tradable emissions allowances to confer aid on 
favored industries or agricultural producers’.  Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim, above n 2658, at 62 
(emphasis added).  
2802 See above Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1.2. 
2803 Feaver, McGoldrick, and Boyd-Wells, above n 2800, at 335. 
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as a good.  Hufbauer et al have argued that ‘unlike a right to timber whereby timber itself is a 
good, a right to generate greenhouse gas emissions is not a right to a good because 
greenhouse gas emissions are not a good as the term is commonly used’.2804  Alternatively, 
Feaver et al and Shah have suggested that free emission permits would be covered under a 
‘direct transfer of funds’ (Article 1.1.(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement) because such permits 
have a market value and could be traded.2805  In support of this reading, recall that the 
Appellate Body has endorsed a broad interpretation of ‘funds’, which not only covers money 
but also financial resources and other financial claims more generally.  Still, I doubt whether 
the Appellate Body would deem free allowance permits to be sufficiently similar to the listed 
forms of direct transfers of funds so as to be covered under this form of financial 
contribution.2806  After all, non-listed forms (e.g., interest rate reduction) that were included 
shared the feature that the financial position of the borrower was improved.2807  Arguably, the 
cap-and-trade schemes’ intrinsic link between, on the one hand, the allocation of emission 
permits ánd, on the other hand, the obligation to hold emission rights up to actual emission 
levels might put in question whether the financial position of liable entities has in fact 
ameliorated.2808  Even if allowances are offered for free, the purpose of such cap-and-trade 
scheme is to increase the burden upon emitters (e.g., reduce emission levels) rather than to 
improve liable entities’ financial position.2809  Moreover, a potential downside of this 
qualification is that companies simply left out of the scheme (i.e., not made subject to 
emission ceilings) would never be captured as they are not given a direct transfer of funds.  
Therefore, I would only assess free allowance permits of a cap-and-trade system under the 
‘revenue foregone’ category (Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)).  Applying the test developed in the US – 
FSC cases, the relevant inquiry here is whether a WTO Member has given up an entitlement 
to raise revenue that it would otherwise have collected.  This benchmark refers to the fiscal 
treatment of ‘legitimately comparable income’ in the domestic system of the WTO Member 
in question.  Thus, like rightly concluded by Feaver et al, Australia would forego revenue 
under its cap-and-trade system because it would auction emission permits to all emitters 
except to those that qualify as EITI-entities.  Arguably, also when some large comparable 
emitters would not be made subject to the cap-and-trade scheme, revenue would be 
                                                 
2804 Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim, above n 2658, at 62. 
2805 Feaver, McGoldrick, and Boyd-Wells, above n 2800, at 333; Shah, above n 2797, at 463-464.  
2806 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 251. 
2807 Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 252. 
2808 Admittedly, this is a limited exception to the general rule that the subsidy definition disregards the 
regulatory burden imposed upon recipients.  In my opinion, this is justified by the intrinsic link 
between both elements in cap-and-trade schemes (see above n 2760).  See also Bigdeli, above n 2658, 
at 162. 
2809 Because the requirement to hold emission allowances does impose an opportunity cost, Pauwelyn 
has advanced the opposite argument, namely that ‘free allowances impose a cost or tax that could 
arguably be sold on the market’ (emphasis added).  Pauwelyn, above n 2658, at 22. 
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foregone.2810  On the other hand, no revenue would be foregone under cap-and-trade systems 
that allocate all emission rights for free (e.g., German system) because the benchmark is the 
fiscal treatment in the WTO Member in question.2811  This reasoning would have the 
advantage that it would, to some extent, treat carbon tax systems and cap-and-trade systems 
equally under the SCM Agreement.2812  WTO Members are not obliged to tax (auction) 
carbon emission (rights) but if they do so, they should tax (auction) all carbon emission 
(rights) in a comparable way.   
The presence of ‘revenue foregone’ also implies that a benefit is conferred.2813  In the 
Australian case, the EITI-entities enjoy a benefit as they are granted free emission allowances 
whereas other emitters in Australia have to purchase such permits.2814  In contrast, the benefit 
analysis might also offer an additional argument to assert that the German cap-and-trade 
system is likely not a subsidy under the SCM Agreement.  To arrive at a positive benefit 
conclusion, Shah compares the free allocation of permits with an ‘efficient emissions trading 
market’, whereby emitters would have to purchase permits and thus would pay fair market 
value.2815  Yet, the benchmark for the benefit analysis is not an abstract efficient market but in 
principle refers to domestic conditions.2816  Again, the difference in conclusion seems to result 
from his narrow focus on the value of emission permits, whereas I would suggest that the 
allocation of these permits is inherently connected to the obligation to hold such permits up to 
effective emission levels.2817  In Shah’s reasoning, emitters receiving free emission permits 
are subsidized under the SCM Agreement because the government transfers for free 
something having market value.  Yet, this line of reasoning seems to neglect that such 
                                                 
2810 Admittedly, no subsidy would exist under this analysis if some sectors are excluded from the 
obligation to cap emissions and all allowances are allocated for free to the sectors covered under the 
cap-and-trade system.  After all, no revenue would be foregone.   
2811 See also de Cendra, above n 2658, at 138. 
2812 With the important difference that if a cap-and-trade system is installed an incentive to reduce 
emissions is introduced also if emission permits are allocated for free.  In contrast, if no carbon tax is 
imposed, no such incentive exists.  Hence, deciding that a cap-and-trade system with free emission 
rights would be a subsidy under the SCM Agreement, whereas imposing no carbon tax at all would not 
be considered a subsidy would put the former system at a serious disadvantage and could not be 
endorsed from the perspective of environmental protection.    
2813 See above Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.2. 
2814 See also Feaver, McGoldrick, and Boyd-Wells, above n 2800, at 335-336. 
2815 Hufbauer et al adopt the same reasoning as Shah does.  If an emission allowance would be a good 
under the SCM Agreement, its free allocation would confer a ‘benefit’ as it could be traded afterwards 
on the market.  Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim, above n 2658, at 61, footnote 104. 
2816 Observe that the market is essentially created by the government in case of cap-and-trade systems. 
2817 Shah holds that ‘(i)n an efficient emissions trading market, installations have the incentive to invest 
in low carbon technology to avoid buying emissions allowances in the market.  However, when 
Germany allocates free emissions allowances, these incentives disappear because installations will not 
have to pay for allowances.  Therefore, under Germany’s NAP, installations receive allowances on 
terms more favourable than the terms they would otherwise receive in the market’.  Shah, above n 
2797, at 465-466.  Yet, this conclusion is too stark because the requirement to hold allowance permits 
and the right to trade these permits also gives firms an incentive to cut emissions so as to sell their 
rights on the market.  In case a low ceiling would be set, this would certainly increase firms’ production 
costs.  See also Pauwelyn, above n 2658, at 22; de Cendra, above n 2658, at 138. 
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allocation carries with it an obligation upon emitters to hold such permits up to their actual 
level of emissions. 
Likewise, Shah’s conclusion that the specificity test is passed when all emission permits are 
allocated for free is questionable.2818  When all emitters in the market receive these permits 
for free, such allocation would likely not be specific to certain enterprises under Article 2 of 
the SCM Agreement.2819,2820  I also differ from Shah’s argumentation that the fact that some 
sectors (e.g., transport or household) are exempted from the German cap-and-trade scheme, 
and thus do not receive free emission allowances, suffices to make such free emission permits 
specific.  Such reasoning precisely illustrates the odd legal consequences of a narrow focus.  
It assumes that the sectors left out of the cap-and-trade system are worse off (as they do not 
receive the specific subsidy), whereas they might in fact be better off (as they do not have to 
hold emission rights).  Turning back to the Australian cap-and-trade scheme, the exemption 
for EITI-entities does indeed seem ‘specific’ within the rather broad meaning given to this 
concept in the case law because it is targeted to carbon-intensive industries.2821  Moreover, 
when this exemption would qualify as de facto contingent upon exportation (Article 3.1(a) of 
the SCM Agreement), specificity is even assumed (Article 2.3 of the SCM Agreement).  Here, 
Feaver et al reveal that the exemption for EITI-entities is contingent upon exportation because 
one of the eligibility criteria is a 10% export requirement.2822  In light the Appellate Body 
interpretation in Canada – Autos, such a ratio specifying an obligation to export a certain 
proportion of production is in their view ‘contingent in law’ upon exportation and therefore 
qualifies as a prohibited subsidy under the SCM Agreement.2823  If no export contingency 
would be found, they correctly conclude that the free allowances to EITI-entities would still 
be vulnerable to an actionable subsidy claim and/or CVDs response.2824  
 
                                                 
2818 Shah, above n 2797, at 470.  In his alternative reasoning, Shah also forgets that the non-actionable 
subsidy category no longer exists.  See Shah, above n 2797, at 471-473. 
2819 Arguably, the objective-criteria exemption could be relied upon.  This would also not be de facto 
specific. 
2820 Shah argues that some sectors (e.g., transport and household) are left out of the cap-and-trade 
scheme and thus do not receive free emission allowances.  Yet, these sectors are also not subject to cut 
their emissions under the cap-and-trade scheme.  Shah, above n 2797, at 470. 
2821 Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim, above n 2658, at 89; Feaver, McGoldrick, and Boyd-Wells, above 
n 2800, at 337. 
2822 Feaver, McGoldrick, and Boyd-Wells, above n 2800, at 338-339. 
2823 While this final conclusion might be correct as firms are given an incentive to start exporting so as 
to meet this threshold, observe however that the ‘tie’ between export performance and subsidy 
allocation seems less strong compared to the Canada – Autos case.  Indeed, all entities meeting this 
(rather low) export requirement are eligible for free allowances and the level of free allowances does 
not increase with exportation but is related to their emission-intensity.   
2824 Feaver, McGoldrick, and Boyd-Wells, above n 2800, at 339.  Of course, both actions could still be 
undertaken even if the measure would be categorized as a prohibited subsidy. 
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This leads us to the second query on carbon-and-trade systems: Could the burden imposed 
under cap-and-trade systems be adjusted upon exportation?  On the one hand, the auctioning 
of emission permits could qualify as a ‘tax’ because a payment is made to the government for 
which taxpayers receive nothing identifiable in return.2825  Comparable to the analysis of a 
carbon/energy tax rebate, a similar argument could thus be made that auctioned emission 
permits could be recovered upon exports as a rebate of an ‘indirect tax’ (by virtue of footnote 
1 of the SCM Agreement and item (g) of the Illustrative List).2826  Ismer and Neuhoff 
emphasize that in case only a fraction has to be purchased from the government, the cost of 
buying the emission permits should be spread over all the allowances in calculating the level 
of rebates.2827,2828  If such rebates would be accepted, it would offer a WTO-compatible option 
to ease the burden of auctioned emission trading systems upon exporters.2829  On the other 
hand, as de Cendra correctly suggested, if all emission permits would be given for free 
instead of auctioned, no ‘tax’ would be imposed and no adjustment upon exportation could be 
made.  This would indeed be similar to the imposition of non-fiscal measures for which 
exporters could also not be compensated.2830  As such, the allocation of emission permits for 
free to all emitters would be neither a countervailable/challengeable subsidy nor a tax that 
could be rebated upon exportation.2831  
 
In conclusion, this rather complicated and speculative analysis of carbon tax and cap-and-
trade systems under the SCM Agreement has amply shown that the WTO framework is not 
the optimal instrument to discipline such systems.  Indeed, international environmental 
agreements outside the WTO framework are superior to allocate the burden of reducing 
emissions among different countries.  As long as no such satisfactory multilateral solution 
                                                 
2825 Ismer and Neuhoff have defined a tax as ‘a compulsory contribution imposed by government for 
which taxpayers receive nothing identifiable in return for their contribution’. According to de Cendra, 
the essential feature of a tax is the existence of a payment to the government.  See R. Ismer and K. 
Neuhoff, ‘Border Tax Adjustment: A Feasible Way to Support Stringent Emission Trading’, 24 
European Journal of Law and Economics (2007), 137-164, at 144; de Cendra, above n 2658, at 135. 
2826 But again, the initial question whether such a tax would be covered as an ‘indirect tax’ is not 
settled. 
2827 For instance, ‘(i)f half of the allowances in circulation were allocated to each business free of 
charge and the second half had to be bought for a price of 100, the price used for adjustment purposes 
would be 50’.  Ismer and Neuhoff, above n 2825, at 144. 
2828 On the complexities of implementing such BTAs on exports in case of cap-and-trade systems, see 
Genasci, above n 2796, at 39-41. 
2829 Hence, only the costs of auctioned emission permits on effectively exported products could be 
rebated.  Notice the difference with the Australian cap-and-trade system, whereby entities meeting the 
10% export requirement (i.e., being trade-exposed) and the emission-intensity requirement receive free 
permissions.  Their level of free permissions depends on their emission-intensity (the most intensive 
activities receive 94.5% of their required emissions for free, less emission-intensive firms are eligible 
for 66%).  On the details of the Australian exemption for EITI entities, see Feaver, McGoldrick, and 
Boyd-Wells, above n 2800, at 325-326. 
2830 de Cendra, above n 2658, at 135-136. 
2831 See above n 2797. 
PART IV CHAPTER 2 – DISCIPLINES ON DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
 
 537
among all major carbon emitting countries is achieved, individual countries’ action (and 
inaction) will evoke claims of ‘unfair trade’ and puzzle international trade lawyers’ minds.    
 
2.1.1.3. Assistance to disadvantaged regions 
Next to R&D subsidies and some environmental subsidies, the SCM Agreement provided a 
carve-out for assistance to disadvantaged regions (Article 8.2(b) of the SCM Agreement).  
Such a region had to be a geographical area with a definable economic and administrative 
identity that was considered ‘disadvantaged’ on the basis of objective and economic 
criteria.2832  Moreover, assistance had to be given pursuant to a general framework of regional 
development and qualify as non-specific (within the meaning of Article 2 of the SCM 
Agreement) within that region. 
Although disparities in income levels between regions might very well be explained in 
economic terms (e.g., clustering, differences in natural resources), such carve-out for 
assistance to disadvantaged regions might at the same time be legitimate for redistributive 
reasons.  Furthermore, systemic considerations could equally underpin the call for re-
activating its green light status.  Recall that, by virtue of Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement, 
general subsidies granted by the regional government itself are likely considered as non-
specific and thus exempted from disciplines under the SCM Agreement and CVDs action, 
which is deemed justified because it respects the federal structure of WTO Members.  On the 
other hand, such generally available regional subsidies granted by the national government 
would be specific.  Hence, the carve-out ensured that unitary WTO Members could likewise 
support disadvantaged regions without being captured by the SCM Agreement.  In this sense, 
the carve-out would put all WTO Members on an equal footing, at least with respect to 
support for disadvantaged regions.2833 
 
2.1.1.4. Multifunctionality in agriculture 
A number of developed countries (e.g., Japan, Korea, Norway, Switzerland, and the EC) rely 
upon the multifunctionality argument to defend larger policy space for agricultural support.  
Their argument is that agriculture cannot simply be treated like any other sector because it 
generates specific positive externalities such as landscape preservation and food security.  
Yet, these legitimate non-trade concerns certainly do not justify the large amounts of trade-
distortive support provided by developed countries.  As the discussion in Part I has revealed, 
this multifunctionality argument hinges on the assumption of ‘jointness of production’ if used 
                                                 
2832 See above Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.3.4. 
2833 As explained above in Part II, there is no economic rationale that could explain why similar 
subsidies would be disciplined differently simply on the basis of the granting authority. 
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to justify support linked to output levels.  This assumption does often not hold in practice.  
For instance, the objective of landscape preservation could be pursued in a more targeted way 
than by subsidizing output levels.  Likewise, the frequently mentioned objective to ensure 
food security might have to be nuanced insofar it is articulated by high-income countries.  
Indeed, a group of leading European agricultural economists has questioned the ‘food 
security’-argument in a threefold way.2834  First, developed countries, like European countries, 
have sufficient purchasing power to source food from the world market even in times when 
food prices are high. Equally, poor households could be assisted in a more targeted way than 
by subsidizing domestic support (e.g., social security system).  Second, in order to preserve 
the capacity to raise production if a future need would arise, targeted payments (e.g., to 
preserve soil fertility or maintain a critical level of farming activity) are more effective than 
blanket subsidies maintaining existing agricultural production levels.  Third, the argument 
that existing support levels in developed countries would be helpful to reach world food 
security is untenable.  Addressing food security concerns in developing countries would be 
better pursued by development assistance (e.g., to agricultural research and infrastructure) 
than by supporting domestic producers.  Indeed, large amounts of domestic support in 
developed countries seem rather detrimental to the vital objective of securing food security in 
developing countries in the long-term. 
In my view, the overall conclusion is that the multifunctionality argument can not justify the 
substantive leeway given to trade-distortive support under the Agreement on Agriculture.  
Under existing disciplines, WTO Members are allowed to offer an unlimited amount of blue 
box support as well as a de minimis level of production-stimulating support (i.e., de minimis 
box).  In addition, trade-distortive production stimulating support could be offered up to 
reduction commitment levels (i.e., amber box support sensu stricto).2835  Developed countries’ 
reduction commitments undertaken during the Uruguay Round were far from demanding.  
Hence, it should be welcomed that more serious cuts in trade-distortive support levels are 
tabled in the Doha Round.  Importantly, not only a gradual reduction in the overall level of 
trade-distortive support will have to be implemented but product-specific limits will also have 
to be respected.  In practice, major subsidizing developed countries such as the EC and US are 
already moving towards less trade-distortive decoupled payments and other forms of green 
box support.  However, their level of green box support has raised the concern that trade 
flows would still be distorted.  Yet, no limits are currently set on such green box support and 
the latest drafts circulating in the Doha Round do not provide for a ceiling as well.   
                                                 
2834 They advocated a further reform of the European Common Agricultural Policy.  See A Common 
Agricultural Policy for European Public Goods: Declaration by a Group of Leading Agricultural 
Economists (18 November 2009), 5 pp., at 2. 
2835 At least, insofar the WTO Member in question had such non-exempted amber box support in place. 
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Notwithstanding this leeway given under the Agreement on Agriculture on various types of 
domestic support, agricultural support is vulnerable to an actionable subsidy claim or CVDs 
action under the SCM Agreement.  Since the expiration of the peace clause, no restraint is any 
longer in place on challenging trade-distortive agricultural subsidies before the WTO.  In 
principle, the application of the SCM Agreement seems warranted in light of the weakness of 
the multifunctionality argument to justify large levels of production stimulating agricultural 
support.  Yet, the vulnerability to an actionable subsidy claim might make countries reluctant 
to cut tariff levels.  This systemic criticism on domestic subsidy disciplines imposed under the 
SCM Agreement has been formulated by Bagwell and Staiger.  We turn to their 
argumentation in the following section. 
 
2.1.2. Systemic considerations: Chilling effect on tariff negotiations 
Bagwell and Staiger have offered a fundamental systemic criticism on the SCM Agreement 
disciplines on domestic subsidies.  In particular, they have argued that these disciplines could 
have a ‘chilling effect’ on the willingness of governments to undertake tariff negotiations and 
that more flexible GATT disciplines are therefore preferred.2836  On the one hand, Bagwell 
and Staiger emphasize that governments should retain sufficient policy space to offer 
domestic subsidies so as to correct domestic market failures.  The targeting principle implies 
that domestic market failures should preferable be corrected by domestic instruments such as 
domestic subsidies and not by tariffs, as the latter also negatively affect consumers in the 
domestic market.2837  On the other hand, Bagwell and Staiger acknowledge that some restraint 
on domestic subsidization seems needed because such a subsidy could erode a market access 
commitment made as part of a tariff concession.  After all, a tariff could simply be replaced 
by a production subsidy combined with a consumption tax (i.e., equivalence).  Once a tariff 
concession is made, a country could be tempted to compensate its domestic import-competing 
industry with a domestic subsidy and, in this way, erode the market access commitment.2838  If 
a trading partner anticipates such reaction, it would be reluctant to accept the tariff binding in 
the first place and to bind its own tariffs as a quid pro quo.  Given these opposite perspectives, 
how should multilateral disciplines on domestic subsidies look like?  Bagwell and Staiger 
                                                 
2836 See K. Bagwell and R. W. Staiger, ‘Will International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World 
Trading System?’, The American Economic Review (June, 2006), 877-895; K. Bagwell, ‘Remedies in 
the WTO: An Economic Perspective’, Working Paper (January 9, 2007), 34 pp.; A somewhat similar 
argument was developed by Janow and Staiger, above n 2635, at 220-228. 
2837 Next to domestic market failures, Bagwell also indicates that subsidies can be useful to a 
government that seeks to redistribute income in a manner that enhances its political-economy welfare.  
However, this political-economy argument is hard to accept under a normative analysis.   
2838 By limiting market access, the domestic subsidy to the import-competing industry would put 
downward pressure on the world price.  This generates a terms of trade benefit to the subsidizing 
country and a terms of trade loss – and thus welfare loss – to the rest of the world.  Of course, this 
assumes that the subsidizing country is large.   
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have developed a model showing that the SCM disciplines are inferior to the GATT 
disciplines in case governments attach sufficient weight to correcting domestic market 
failures.  If a tariff is bound, a government could only stimulate domestic production by 
providing a production subsidy.  Yet, such a subsidy could subsequently be challenged, in 
which case it will have to be removed.2839  On the other hand, if a tariff would be unbound, it 
would be less likely that a domestic subsidy would be challenged as the government could 
still use a tariff as second-best option.  Indeed, a foreign government would not likely 
challenge such a domestic subsidy when the alternative, namely a tariff, would still be 
available and would make the foreign country even worse off.2840  Consequently, the best 
choice for countries that sufficiently value the use of subsidies might be to leave tariffs 
unbound.  As a result, the SCM Agreement could have a ‘chilling effect’ on countries’ 
willingness to enter mutually beneficial tariff negotiations.  In Bagwell’s words: 
 
This discussion suggests a “Goldilocks” principle for the treatment of domestic subsidies. If 
disciplines on subsidies are too lax, then subsidies can be used to erode market access 
concessions and governments will thus hesitate to undertake reciprocal tariff negotiations; 
however, if subsidies are disciplined too severely, then governments may also hesitate to 
negotiate tariff bindings, since tariffs then may be the best remaining means of assisting 
domestic import-competing industries.2841 
 
In Bagwell’s opinion, the non-violation complaint that was already present under GATT 
disciplines struck this balance ‘just right’.  If a subsidy was offered to exporting producers, 
the GATT disciplines allowed foreign governments to protect their import-competing 
industries with CVDs in case the subsidy caused material injury.  If a subsidy was offered to 
import-competing producers, a foreign government which had negotiated tariff bindings could 
formulate such a non-violation complaint.  As explained in Part II, both instruments to 
respond to foreign subsidization were indeed inscribed by the original drafters of the GATT 
so as to safeguard tariff negotiations.2842  In contrast, the SCM Agreement disciplines are 
considered too restrictive as they impose disciplines on domestic subsidies even when they do 
not nullify or impair any negotiated market access benefit.2843   
However, some elements could question aspects of this normative argument regarding SCM 
Agreement disciplines as formulated by Bagwell and Staiger.  First, as a technical 
clarification, their model is developed for interactions between large countries.  Indeed, as 
                                                 
2839 Bagwell and Staiger recognize that, from a legal perspective, the domestic subsidy should not 
necessarily be withdrawn (see above Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3.2.1).  But because the pressure 
upon governments to do so would be far greater under the SCM Agreement, their model assumes that 
such subsidies should be withdrawn.  See, Bagwell and Staiger, above n 2836, at footnote 11. 
2840 Indeed, a production subsidy to import-competing industries is less welfare-reducing for foreign 
countries than a tariff. Y-H. Yeh, ‘On Subsidies vs. Tariffs’, 38:1 Southern Economic Journal (July, 
1971), 89-92, at footnote 3. 
2841 Bagwell, above n 2836, at 26. 
2842 See above Part II, Chapter 1, Section 1.1. 
2843 Bagwell, above n 2836, at 26-27. 
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also Bagwell stresses, only large countries can affect the terms of trade through, inter alia, 
tariffs and domestic subsidies.2844  Because tariffs are optimal instruments for large countries 
to alter the terms of trade (i.e., to correct this ‘international distortion’), the superiority of 
production subsidies as optimal instrument to correct domestic distortions is not self-evident 
if only one of both instruments can be employed in the presence of both distortions.  Surely, 
this clarification does not undermine the idea that countries would shift to tariffs anyway in 
case domestic subsidies are unavailable and, thus, that third countries would in that case be 
always worse off.   
Second, only domestic subsidies that are specific and cause adverse effects could be 
challenged.2845  The hurdle for bringing such a claim – which requires a considerable amount 
of human and financial resources – as well as the fact that those subsidies will not per se have 
to be removed if a violation is found, might suggest that the dynamism underlying the 
‘chilling effect’ should somewhat be nuanced.2846  Likewise, the unilateral CVDs option 
requires substantial human and financial resources and does not necessarily lead to the 
removal of the subsidy.  If countries attaching importance to correct domestic market failures 
take on board these aspects of domestic subsidy claims and CVDs action, they might still 
agree to go into mutually advantageous tariff concessions.  Again, this observation qualifies 
but does not rule out the central idea of the Bagwell and Staiger model.   
Third, the burden on formulating a non-violation claim under the GATT era was set high by 
GATT panels and this restrictive interpretation is also followed under WTO law.  Given that 
it should be demonstrated that the effect of a tariff concession is systematically offset by a 
subsidy programme, the non-violation complaint was – and still is – not regarded as an 
effective instrument by GATT/WTO Members.2847  Here, the model of Bagwell and Staiger 
might suggest that this burden should not be interpreted so restrictively (i.e., normative theory 
perspective).  Yet, the requirement to demonstrate the causation element inherent in a non-
violation complaint (i.e., the benefit of a tariff concession is undermined by a subsidy) cannot 
be circumvented.2848   
Fourth, it is not demonstrated that Bagwell and Staiger’s theoretical model holds in practice.  
Indeed, it is unclear whether tariff negotiations are effectively undermined by the more 
                                                 
2844 Hence, the terms of trade theory of trade agreements would suggest that small countries should be 
free to adopt tariffs and subsidies.  Bagwell, above n 2836, at 4. 
2845 See above Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.2. 
2846 It is important to reiterate that domestic subsidies are not WTO-inconsistent as such but only if they 
have been proven to cause adverse effects to the interests of other WTO Members.   
2847 See above Part II, Chapter 1.  Citing the Panel in Japan – Film, the Appellate Body in EC – 
Asbestos also confirmed that the remedy in Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT ‘should be approached 
with caution and should remain an exceptional remedy’.  Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para 
186. 
2848 Although it considered that a non-violation complaint should be of an exceptional nature, the Panel 
in Japan – Film has put the causation standard relatively low as it only asked for ‘more than a de 
minimis contribution to nullification or impairment’. Panel Report, Japan – Film, paras 10.36, 10.84. 
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stringent rules on domestic subsidies.  In this respect, a puzzle left unexplained under their 
model is why countries have agreed to such strengthening of domestic subsidies in the 
Uruguay Round if doing so would undermine tariff negotiations (i.e., positive theory 
perspective).   
Fifth, two improvements of the SCM Agreement’s adoption are not incorporated in Bagwell 
and Staiger’s basic model. These authors suggest that one major limitation perceived by 
GATT Members and not integrated in their two-country model was the inability to address 
third-country issues under GATT rules.2849,2850  Therefore, stricter disciplines were drafted in 
the SCM Agreement because GATT/WTO Members wished to be able to challenge domestic 
subsidies causing displacement to their exporters in third-country markets.  According to 
Bagwell and Staiger, however, a better fix to this concern would be ‘to extend the reach of 
non-violation claims to third parties’.2851  Although they do no elaborate how this should be 
done exactly, inspiration for their proposal might be found in a non-adopted GATT Panel 
Report (Spain – Soyabean Oil).  This is the only GATT Panel that attempted to bring third-
country issues under the scope of the non-violation complaint.  Reviewing a non-violation 
complaint of the US against GATT-consistent restrictions imposed by Spain on the internal 
sale of soyabean oil, the GATT Panel came to the vague conclusion that it: 
 
(…) could not entirely exclude the possibility that the Spanish measures (…) could have had 
some effects on Spanish exports of soyabean oil in such a way as to displace exports of 
soyabean oil by the United States from some of its traditional markets, and thus possibly 
nullifying or impairing benefits accruing to the United States (…).2852 
 
Hence, the GATT Panel considered that such an internal restriction, similar to a domestic (or 
export) subsidy, could have an export-stimulating effect and hereby displace US exports to 
third countries.  However, it is telling that the Panel’s reasoning failed to clarify an essential 
aspect of the non-violation complaint: which benefits to the US under the GATT (e.g., tariff 
concessions) were exactly nullified?  Demonstrating that a GATT-consistent export-
stimulating measure (e.g., domestic subsidy) by one country (Spain; Country B) nullifies or 
impairs to another country (US; Country A) previous tariff concessions made by third 
countries (Country C) seems indeed notoriously difficult, if not simply impossible.  After all, 
tariff concessions made by Country C are unrelated to, and could principally not be nullified 
                                                 
2849 To be precise, the Subsidies Code also offered very limited potential to challenge subsidies causing 
adverse effects in third country markets. 
2850 As shown in the historical overview, this was in particular perceived as a limitation by the US.  
Importantly in my view, other countries agreed to draft domestic subsidy disciplines in exchange for 
stricter disciplines on CVDs.  The original GATT did not struck this part of the balance ‘just right’ 
because it in practice opened the door to impose CVDs beyond what was needed to respond to genuine 
foreign subsidization.  
2851 Their model could be extended along these lines (3-country model).  Bagwell and Staiger, above n 
2836, at 893.  
2852 GATT Panel Report, Spain – Soyabean Oil, para 4.14. 
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by,2853 subsequent subsidization by Country B.  This illustrates the intrinsic difficulties of 
extending the non-violation complaints to third country issues as suggested by Bagwell and 
Staiger.2854,2855   
A second improvement of the SCM Agreement is not incorporated in Bagwell and Staiger’s 
normative evaluation of the SCM provisions on domestic subsidies as well.  As Sykes 
underscores, under the GATT regime domestic subsidies that harmed import-competing 
industries could only be countervailed (unilateral option) and could not be challenged 
multilaterally.  This multilateral option is superior to unilateral CVDs as the latter introduce 
new distortions and may simply divert (inefficient) subsidization from the country imposing 
CVDs to other countries.2856   
In sum, two important new avenues to address injury caused by domestic subsidies are not 
integrated in Bagwell and Staiger’s plea for the GATT rules: existing disciplines allow the 
challenge of domestic subsidies causing injury in third-country markets (Country C) and, next 
to the old CVDs option, equally offer a multilateral option to tackle injury caused to import-
competing industries (Country B).  While their model should thus not lead to the conclusion 
that GATT rules are generally superior over the SCM Agreement, it might still suggest that 
injury caused in the subsidizing country (Country A) should be restricted to non-violation 
claims and should not be extended, as is done under the SCM Agreement Article 6.3(a), to 
situations were no prior tariff concessions were made.  It might be objected that such a limited 
amendment would imply that adverse effects in exporting markets (Country B and C) are 
disciplined more severely than those effects in the country of the subsidizing country.  But 
this asymmetry is similar to the one underlying the more stringent disciplines on export 
subsidies vis-à-vis tariffs (see below Section 2.2).  At first sight, amending the current SCM 
Agreement disciplines in this limited way might leave the improvements of the SCM 
Agreement in place (e.g., option to tackle adverse effects in foreign markets) but might, at the 
same time, partly block the potential ‘chilling effect’.    
 
                                                 
2853 Strictly speaking, Country A is still better off as a result of Country C’s tariff concessions, even 
when its share of exports to Country C is reduced because of subsidized exports from Country B.  Only 
in case all exports are competed out of Country’s C market as a result of subsidization, Country A no 
longer benefits from the tariff concessions.    
2854 Even if this could be extended, I do not see why such an extended non-violation complaint would 
be superior to the more detailed test for tackling adverse effects in third countries under the SCM 
Agreement.  The argument that third country subsidization would have a ‘chilling effect’ on tariff 
negotiations assumes that countries (e.g., US) would be reluctant to enter into tariff negotiations 
because reciprocal concessions of third countries would be eroded by subsidization of another GATT 
Contracting Party (e.g., Spain). 
2855 See also Sykes, above n 2661, at 98 and 102. 
2856 This is considered by Sykes as an improvement under the assumption that SCM Agreement 
disciplines are successful in distinguishing ‘good’ (efficient) from ‘bad’ (inefficient) subsidies.  In fact, 
this assumption does not hold in his view. 
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In conclusion, whereas the argument of Bagwell and Staiger might have to be questioned in 
some respect, their fundamental point could still be valid in theory: stringent rules on 
domestic subsidies could undermine tariff negotiations and this might have the perverse effect 
to push WTO Members towards the use of second-best instruments, namely tariff 
protection.2857  Yet, two final considerations should be taken on board in evaluating the 
potential threat of such ‘chilling effect’ in practice.   
First, given that tariff walls in developed countries are already largely struck down in the field 
of industrial products, any ‘chilling effect’ might be less severe in the field of non-agricultural 
market access (i.e., NAMA) negotiations.2858  For developing countries, who still have more 
latitude to impose tariffs, the S&D treatment provisions on domestic subsidies precisely 
prevent such ‘chilling effect’.  Indeed, only the non-violation complaint (e.g., nullification or 
impairment of tariff concessions)2859 seems present to challenge injury in the subsidizing 
developing country market.2860  On the other hand, the ‘chilling effect’ might more likely 
occur in the field of agricultural market access negotiations.  Tariffs are still widely employed 
to protect agricultural markets and the SCM Agreement disciplines on domestic subsidies 
unlimitedly apply to agricultural products since the expiration of the peace clause.  In the 
context of agricultural subsidies, economic studies have shown that the overwhelming 
majority of existing welfare losses is related to tariffs and not to domestic subsidies.2861  
Hence, such a ‘chilling effect’ of the SCM Agreement on agricultural tariff negotiations could 
have serious negative consequences.2862  This might support re-installing some sort of a 
limited peace clause whereby claims against adverse effects occurring in the subsidizing 
country would be confined to non-violation complaints.2863   
Second, even if bound tariff levels would still leave some room for tariff protection on 
industrial products, the fundamental change in business practices towards international 
fragmentation of production (i.e., offshoring) has shifted struggling domestic industries’ plea 
from tariff protection towards explicit subsidization.  This is illustrated by the wide use of 
                                                 
2857 This is certainly a second-best option from the viewpoint of the rest of the world and in most cases 
from the perspective of the subsidizing country as well.   
2858 Significantly, discussions on disciplining domestic subsidies started to intensify when tariff levels 
were reduced (i.e., Tokyo Round negotiations).  
2859 Strictly speaking, Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement is not a non-violation complaint but it 
includes the same standard of nullification or impairment 
2860 Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement. 
2861 See, for example, K. Anderson, W. Martin, and E. Valenzuela, ‘The Relative Importance of Global 
Agricultural Subsidies and Market Access’, 5:3 World Trade Review (2006), 357-376.  These authors 
argue that negotiations on agricultural subsidies have received relatively too much attention in light of 
economic theory.  Along the same lines, see B. Hoekman and D. Vines, ‘Multilateral trade cooperation: 
What next?’, CEPR Discussion Paper Series (September 2007), 34 pp., at 31. 
2862 As explained above, the SCM Agreement disciplines on domestic subsidies are fully applicable 
with regard to agricultural subsidies.    
2863 Mavroidis pleads for drafting a new peace clause.  Mavroidis, above n 2853, at 210. 
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subsidies in response to the economic crisis.2864  With vertically integrated supply chains, 
many domestic (downstream) industries would indeed be hurt if tariffs on the imports of parts 
and/or components are increased.  Hence, even if subsidy disciplines would have a ‘chilling 
effect’ on tariff negotiations, this change in business practices could reduce the likelihood that 
governments would effectively raise tariffs up to their bound level. Instead, next to the 
abovementioned legal and practical burdens for challenging foreign domestic subsidization, 
the simple ‘pot-and-kettles problem’2865 implies that governments could opt for domestic 
subsidization quite undisturbedly.  In this respect, the WTO Director-General’s Annual 
Report 2009 even seems to point to a perverse effect of further relaxing the disciplines on 
domestic subsidies along the lines suggested by Bagwell and Staiger. Given that subsidization 
requires substantive resources, developed countries de facto have more policy space to 
support their industry than developing countries do.  The Report raises the concern that such 
asymmetric use of subsidization might shift back some changes of production from 
developing towards developed countries.  After all, ‘anticipating that governments in rich 
countries are more likely to support the private sector using subsidies rather than tariffs in 
case of adverse economic circumstances, firms may choose to relocate some of their stages of 
production from poor to rich countries.’2866  Turning back to the flexible GATT disciplines on 
domestic subsidies would only facilitate this relocation and deepen the asymmetry between 
developed and developing countries. 
For these reasons, the systemic concern of a chilling effect on tariff negotiations resulting 
from disciplines on domestic subsidies could only underpin a limited amendment of the scope 
for challenging domestic support to agricultural products. 
 
2.2. DISCIPLINES ON EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
Under the perfectly competitive market assumption, it has been shown that no economic 
rationale could be given why governments would offer export subsidies.2867  Subsidies offered 
by small countries lead to welfare losses in the form of consumption and production 
distortions.  The welfare losses are even larger in case large countries subsidize export-
competing sectors because these incur an additional terms of trade loss.  Political-economy 
reasons might explain why these countries would, nonetheless, offer export subsidies.  In 
                                                 
2864 Grossman as cited in ‘The nuts and bolts come apart’, The Economist (28 March 2009), at 79-81.  
See also WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, Annual Report by the Director-General, Overview of 
Developments in the International Trading Environment – Part B: Shaping Factors for Trade: Looking 
into the Future (WT/TPR/OV/12, 18 November 2009), 39 pp., paras 103-122. 
2865 Challenging other governments’ domestic subsidization could make the claimant vulnerable to 
counterclaims.   
2866 Annual Report by the Director-General, above n 2864, para 120. 
2867 See above Part I, Chapter 1, Sections 1.1 and 1.2. 
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political-economy terms, an export subsidy could be considered as a gain to an exporting 
country (e.g., rewarded by exporters) and a cost to an importing country (e.g., harm to import-
competing industries).  If the perfect market assumption is relaxed, governments might also 
offer export subsidies in order to correct market failures or exploit strategic trade 
opportunities (profit-shifting rationale).2868   
Once it can be explained why individual governments offer export subsidies, a second puzzle 
emerges from a positive viewpoint: why do governments conclude multilateral disciplines on 
banning the leeway for export subsidies? From a normative viewpoint, it could additionally be 
assessed whether such policy constraints on export subsidies are justified.  If the purpose of a 
trade agreement is, as Adam Smith argued, to maximize ‘the wealth of nations’ (i.e., world 
welfare as whole), it should be assessed to what extent trade rules on curtailing export 
subsidies spur welfare of the world as a whole.2869    
 
Because third countries overall benefit from foreign export subsidies in the form of a positive 
terms of trade effect, ‘the rest of the world’ would in principle not be interested to prohibit 
export subsidies from large countries.2870  Contrary to an agreement outlawing or reducing 
tariffs, an agreement prohibiting export subsidies can therefore certainly not be based on the 
general rationale to eliminate ‘beggar-thy-neighbour policies’ (i.e. policies that overall have a 
negative effect on trading partners.)2871  To be precise, the rest of the world benefits but net-
exporting countries and exporters in general are hurt as a result of foreign export subsidies.2872 
Export subsidies thus have a ‘beggar-thy-neigbour-exporter’ feature.2873  Hence, those 
                                                 
2868 Export subsidies could not be legitimized on the basis of redistribution concerns, given that 
domestic subsidies are less distortive to the reach this objective. 
2869 A. O. Sykes, ‘Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" 
with Normative Speculations’, 58:1 The University of Chicago Law Review (Winter, 1991), 255-305. 
2870 As they are left untouched by export subsidies from small countries, other countries would be 
indifferent about any rules restricting such subsidization. 
2871 D. Rodrik, One Economics – Many Recipes – Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 255 pp., at 149, footnote 10; D. Rodrik, ‘Growth After 
the Crisis’, Paper prepared for the Commission on Growth and Development (May, 2009), 42 pp., at 
24;  In contrast, this ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ argument is relevant for explaining reductions on import 
duties as these duties imposed by a large country result in a higher world market price and accordingly 
in a negative terms of trade effect to the rest of the world.  Hence, the rest of the world and the world as 
a whole are hurt by such an import duty.  As is well-known, the positive terms of trade effect of an 
import duty could explain why a welfare-maximizing large country would impose such an import duty 
in the first place (theory of optimal tariffs; see above n 31).  According to Bagwell and Staiger, 
preventing such ‘beggar-thy-neigbour’ conduct exactly explains the reason for concluding multilateral 
trade agreements but this view is criticized by Ethier (see above n 522).  K. Bagwell and R. W. Staiger, 
The Economics of the World Trading System (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002), 224 pp.; W. J. Ethier, 
‘The Theory of Trade Policy and Trade Agreements: A Critique’, 23 European Journal of Political 
Economy (2007), 605-623.   
2872 Except in case of predatory subsidies, but there is little evidence that this occurs frequently.   
2873 On the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ aspect of profit-shifting subsidies (strategic trade settings), see J. A. 
Brander, ‘Strategic Trade Policy’, in G. M. Grossman and K. Rogoff (eds), Handbook of International 
Economics – Volume 3 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995), 1395-1455, at 1447. 
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exporters might put pressure upon their governments to offer export subsidies in response so 
as to compete for third-country export markets.2874  The fact that producers have more 
political-economy leverage than consumers explains why governments would be willing to 
respond to this call.2875  In oligipolistic markets with Cournot competition, exporting countries 
maximize welfare by offering export subsidies in response and thus start a subsidy war.2876  
Hence, the same political-economy or strategic trade arguments explain why those 
governments are willing to meet the call of their exporters and initiate a subsidy war.  
Alternatively, those countries might offer export subsidies in reply, and thus start a subsidy 
war, so as to induce foreign governments to stop subsidizing.2877    
In the non-cooperative equilibrium (Nash-equilibrium), such a subsidy war might give rise to 
a prisoner’s dilemma in which all exporting countries subsidize exports2878 but would be 
better off if they concluded an agreement to curtail subsidization.  Indeed, a subsidy war has 
severe budget implications, deteriorates exporting countries’ terms of trade, and, by canceling 
out each other’s subsidies, could result in a ‘zero-sum operation’ whereby no exporting 
country wins any market share.2879,2880  However, given that no country could unilaterally 
                                                 
2874 Import-competing industries are also hurt and might push for the imposition of CVDs.  But 
imposing CVDs would not undo the negative effects on their exporters in third country export markets. 
2875 See, for example, R. E. Baldwin, ‘The Economics of the GATT’, in Peter Oppenheimer (ed), Issues 
in International Economics (London: Oriel Press, 1978), 335 pp., 82-93, at 86. 
2876  The highest level of subsidies is given by the country in which the most competitive firm is 
located. D. De Meza, ‘Export Subsidies and High Productivity: Cause or Effect?’, 19:2 The Canadian 
Journal of Economics (May, 1986), 347-350; D. Collie, ‘Profit-Shifting Export Subsidies and the 
Sustainability of Free Trade’, 40:4 Scottish Journal of Political Economy (November, 1993), 408-419. 
2877 Indeed, by matching foreign export subsidization with export subsidies, the costs upon foreign 
governments to offer export subsidies increases (see below n 2887).   
2878 Hence, the welfare cost upon the exporting country to continue subsidizing exports in competitive 
markets increases if the (parallel) response by third countries is taken into consideration.  Only in case 
political-economy pressure is sufficiently high, governments will play the ‘subsidy game’ and thus 
offer export subsidies in competitive markets.  In oligopolistic markets where firms compete as 
Cournot competitors, welfare-maximizing countries subsidize exports even if other exporting countries 
also subsidize their exports (non-cooperative Nash equilibrium) (see above n 2876).    
2879 Collie has shown that in oligopolistic markets with Cournot competition, exporting countries will 
usually be worse off if there is a trade war than under free trade, but that one country may be better off 
if its firm is very competitive relative to the other firm.  Collie, above n 2876, 408-419; D. R. Collie, ‘A 
Rationale for the WTO Prohibition on Export Subsidies: Strategic Export Subsidies and World 
Welfare’, 11 Open Economies Review (2000), 229-245, at 235. 
2880 Also in models whereby markets are competitive and export subsidies are inspired by political-
economy considerations, governments have an incentive to curtail such export subsidies.  In general, 
curtailing export subsidies improves their terms of trade as well as the governments’ budget (the latter 
also shows up in political-economy models).  Grossman and Helpman have demonstrated why 
politicians motivated by self-interest would gain from concluding a trade agreement (‘trade talk’).  In 
this model, the benefits to politicians from concluding an agreement flow from the extra market access 
generated in third countries and from the reduction in government support for foreign firms competing 
in the import market for which they will be rewarded by export industries and import-competing 
industries respectively. G. M. Grossman and E. Helpman, ‘Trade Wars and Trade Talks’, NBER 
Working Paper Series No 4280 (February, 1993), 40 pp.  In an alternative model elaborated in the full 
text, exporting countries which cooperate take into account the negative terms of trade effect on other 
exporters and are thus less likely to offer such subsidies.  Bagwell and Staiger, above n 2871, at 177; 
see also Bagwell, above n 2836, at 28. 
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decide to stop subsidizing exports without its exporters losing sales (prisoner’s dilemma), an 
important incentive among exporting countries for drafting multilateral disciplines exists.2881  
The same political-economy or strategic trade models that could clarify why countries 
subsidize in the first place could thus equally explain why countries agree to limit such 
subsidization multilaterally.  To be clear, such a subsidy war among exporting countries in 
principle improves the welfare of net-importing countries as they benefit from a positive 
terms of trade effect.  From a static welfare perspective, net-importing countries would indeed 
be hurt from an agreement prohibiting export subsidies.  Still, net-importing countries could 
well be in favour of an agreement limiting export subsidies because of political-economy 
efforts by their import-competing industry2882 or because foreign export subsidies inhibit the 
emergence of a domestic export industry (i.e., dynamic welfare argument).     
As elaborated above, multilateral disciplines on curtailing export subsidies for non-
agricultural products as well agricultural products mainly aimed at ending a (potential) 
subsidy war between (potential) exporting countries (positive theory perspective).2883  At the 
same time, net-importing (developing) countries indeed raised concerns about the negative 
effects of limiting export subsidies2884 but these were only taken seriously insofar they aligned 
to the interests of subsidizing countries that on political-economy grounds wished to continue 
subsidization, which was the case in the field of agriculture.2885  The fact that agricultural 
export subsidies are not totally banned as of yet might indeed be explained on the basis of 
high political-economy pressure attached to them mainly in the EC,2886 which might be 
insufficiently counteracted by political-economy efforts of import-competing industries 
(regarding domestic markets) or export-competing industries (regarding third markets) in 
other countries.2887,2888   
                                                                                                                                            
2880 Or of their exporters if present.  See Bagwell, above n 2836, at 29.   
2881 Alternatively, the cooperative equilibrium could in theory be obtained in repeated games (tit-for-tat 
strategy). 
2882 Or, if present, of their exporters.  See Bagwell, above n 2836, at 29. 
2883 See also G. C. Hufbauer and J. S. Erb, Subsidies in International Trade (Washington DC: Institute 
for International Economics, 1984), 283 pp., at 8-9. 
2884 On agricultural products, see Bagwell and Staiger, above n 2871, at 165-166.  Regarding non-
agricultural products, developing countries, for example, expressed concerns about the disciplines 
imposed by the OECD Arrangement on developed countries.  These disciplines resulted in higher 
interest rates of export credits provided to their importers and therefore adversely affected their import 
opportunities.  They requested the GATT Ministerial Meeting ‘to address itself to the OECD 
Arrangement’ and to recommend that the OECD Arrangement would not apply to exports of capital 
goods to developing countries.  See Consultative Group of Eighteen, Nineteenth Meeting of the 
Consultative Group of Eighteen (CG 18/19, 26 July 1982), paras 36-37. 
2885 For instance, the preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture recognizes the possible negative 
impact of trade reforms on LDCs and net-food importing countries. 
2886 To be sure, these forces are also present in other countries (e.g., the US) with respect to ‘indirect’ 
forms of export subsidies (see above Part II, Chapter 1, Section 1.4; Part III, Chapter 7, Section 7.2.1). 
2887 On agricultural products, see Bagwell and Staiger, above n 2871, at 165-166.  The EC’s reluctance 
to cut export subsidies for agricultural products suggests that the EC gave more weight to political-
economy considerations than the US did.  Bagwell and Staiger, above n 2871, at 178-179.  Gardner 
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In order to formalize the incentive to conclude multilateral disciplines on export subsidies (on 
agricultural products),2889 Bagwell and Staiger have developed a three-country model.  Two 
countries are exporting countries (A and B) and the third country is an importing country (C).  
Three different situations are distinguished.  First, if countries do not cooperate, country A 
maximizes its welfare taking as given the subsidy policy of country B (Nash equilibrium).  As 
explained in Part I, country A would not subsidize but tax exports if no political-economy 
considerations are present.2890  Yet, if political-economy reasons are sufficiently high, country 
A would give an export subsidy in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, which would hurt 
country B and benefit country C.  Put otherwise, country A would subsidize if more weight is 
given to the increase in producer welfare than to the negative effect on its terms of trade.  
Second, if both exporting countries would cooperate, country A would take the negative 
impact of the shift in the terms of trade on country B into account in its decision on 
subsidization, but would neglect the positive effects thereof on country C.  As a consequence, 
country A would only subsidize if political-economy arguments outweigh the negative 
welfare effects on its own country as well as on country B.  Hence, if exporting countries 
maximize welfare in a coordinative fashion, they would only subsidize if political-economy 
factors are very high.  For a given level of political-economy considerations, exporting 
countries would subsidize less than under the first non-cooperative situation.  This subsidy 
reduction would depress the positive welfare effects on country C.  Third, if country A not 
only internalizes the negative impact on country B but also the positive impact on importing 
country C (i.e., maximizing total welfare), it would provide a so-called ‘efficient subsidy’ 
even if low political-economy considerations are present.  Again, for a fixed political-
economy factor, an ‘efficient subsidy’ would exceed the Nash subsidy (situation 1) which in 
turn would be higher than the cooperative subsidy (situation 2).  Given that the level of 
subsidization is higher under the welfare-maximizing assumption (situation 3) than under the 
cooperative situation (situation 2), Bagwell and Staiger conclude that the world as a whole 
                                                                                                                                            
explains in detail how the US export subsidies for wheat in the 1980s and first half of the 1990s should 
be understood as a response to the EC’s export subsidies demanded by influential agricultural special 
interest groups (wheat producers).  By playing the ‘export subsidy game’ and thus matching EC export 
subsidies, the US government aimed at increasing the EC’s costs of their export subsidy programme 
and inducing the EC to agree upon limiting export subsidies in the Uruguay Round.  The US legislation 
enacted in 1990 even included a ‘GATT trigger’, which required spending $1 billion on the Export 
Enhancement Program if no Uruguay Agreement had been reached by the end of June 1992.  This 
indeed happened as the deadline was missed.  See B. L. Gardner, ‘The Political Economy of US Export 
Subsidies for Wheat’, in A. O. Krueger (ed), The Political Economy of American Trade Policy 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996) 470 pp., 291-331. 
2888 World Trade Report 2006, above n 2725, at 190. 
2889 The model developed by Bagwell and Staiger focuses on agricultural negotiations but it is equally 
applied to non-agricultural negotiations.  See, for example, Bagwell, above n 2836. 
2890 See above Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1.2. 
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may lose from an agreement restricting export subsidies.2891  Therefore, these authors call into 
question ‘the wisdom of GATT/WTO restrictions against export subsidies’.2892  In their logic, 
an agreement improving world welfare would stimulate instead of prohibit export 
subsidies.2893  In the analysis of Janow and Staiger, a basic dilemma is therefore present in an 
international trade agreement restricting export subsidies: 
 
The simple point is that the standard economic rationale for the purpose of negotiations over 
trade policy is that trade volumes are inefficiently low when governments set their trade policy 
unilaterally.  As a consequence, from this perspective, the central task of trade negotiations is 
to expand trade volumes beyond their unilateral levels to more efficient levels.  Since 
agreements to restrict export subsidies are agreements to restrict trade volumes below 
unilateral levels, such agreements appear to run counter to efficiency.  Any economic 
argument in support of international agreements to restrict export subsidies must overcome 
this basic dilemma.2894, 2895 
 
In Bagwell and Staiger’s model, the welfare effect is influenced by a political-economy 
parameter.  Indeed, their welfare (or efficiency) argument (i.e., normative argument) rests on 
the model’s assumption of political-economy considerations.  However, whereas political-
economy reasons might very well explain why governments choose to subsidize exports and 
why exporting countries benefit from mutually lowering such export subsidies (i.e., positive 
theory perspective), incorporating such considerations seems to make their model less suitable 
for normative judgments on whether a government should be allowed to offer such subsidies 
(i.e., normative theory perspective).2896,2897  In my view, political-economy considerations 
                                                 
2891 Their model suggests that cooperation between exporting countries ‘indeed diminishes global 
efficiency’.  Bagwell and Staiger, above n 2871, at 178; Bagwell, above n 2836, at 28. 
2892 Bagwell and Staiger, above n 2871, at 179. 
2893 Bagwell and Staiger, above n 2871, at 180.  Bagwell also develops a two-country model whereby 
countries offer export subsidies on the basis of political-economy welfare functions.  Because these 
countries do not internalize the positive terms of trade effect of these export subsidies on each other if 
they set subsidy levels unilaterally, they would ‘achieve mutual gains though a trade agreement that 
facilitates a reciprocal increase in export subsidies’. Referring to both models (as well as to strategic 
trade models), Bagwell concludes that ‘these models offer the normative implication that an efficiency-
enhancing trade agreement should emphasize rules that facilitate trade expansion’.  Bagwell, above n 
2836, at 27-29. 
2894 See M. E. Janow and R. W. Staiger, ‘Canada – Dairy, Canada – Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Dairy Products and the Exportation of Milk (WT/DS113; WT/DS103; DSR 1999:V, 
2057, DSR 1999:VI, 2097; DSR 2001:XIII, 6829; DSR 2001:XIII, 6865; DSR 2003:I, 213; DSR 
2003:I, 255)’, in H. Horn and P. C.. Mavroidis (eds), The American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies on 
WTO Case Law – Legal and Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 249-
292, at 264.  This is also cited in Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters, above n 2636, at 462.  Janow and 
Staiger refer to Bagwell and Staiger, above n 2871, at 163-180. 
2895 According to Janow and Staiger, export-limiting agreements depress overall efficiency: ‘they are 
good for the sellers, but not for the buyers, and not for the sellers and buyers on the whole’ (Janow and 
Staiger, above n 2894, at 264).  Yet, export subsidy restrictions are not welfare-improving for exporters 
(‘sellers’) but only for exporting countries (i.e., government budget and domestic consumers benefit).     
2896 Given the structure of the relevant chapter in Bagwell and Staiger’s book, the model developed by 
Bagwell and Staiger at first sight seems to have been developed to explain the dynamism of reducing 
export subsidies (i.e., positive theory perspective).  However, at the end of the chapter (and in other 
articles as well), the authors derive normative conclusions from their model.  Bagwell even explicitly 
derives a normative conclusion from this model (see Bagwell, above n 2836).  Green and Trebilcock 
also seem to criticize the latter paper for blurring positive and normative theory.  See A. Green and M. 
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should indeed not be included in the definition of ‘welfare’ or ‘efficiency’ in models which 
aim to – or are used to – generate normative conclusions.2898  As explained in Part I, under the 
perfectly competitive market assumption adopted in the Bagwell and Staiger model,2899 global 
welfare is maximized if export subsidies are abolished, even though the rest of world and net-
importing countries are hurt.  If governments unilaterally set their trade policy, they do in 
practice offer export subsidies (in terms of the model, hereby indicating that political-
economy arguments are sufficiently important).  Yet, this leads to an inefficienlyt high level of 
trade: international trade is distorted because output is above and prices are below the free 
trade level.2900  Bagwell draws a parallel between their model and the strategic trade 
literature.2901 Yet, a fundamental difference between the Bagwell and Staiger model and 
strategic trade models is that output is indeed inefficiently low in oligipolistic markets and that 
export subsidy competition between exporting countries (i.e., non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium) could therefore be globally welfare-improving as it brings output closer to the 
perfect competition level.2902,2903 Hence, a prohibition on export subsidies in such markets 
does indeed not only hurt importing countries but could also be welfare-reducing from a 
global perspective.2904  However, Collie has shown that if governments’ opportunity costs of 
funds used to pay for the subsidies are sufficiently high, global welfare would again be 
improved when export subsidies are prohibited in oligopolistic markets.2905  Of course, 
                                                                                                                                            
Trebilcock, ‘Enforcing WTO Obligations: What Can We Learn from Export Subsidies?’, 10:3 Journal 
of International Economic Law (2007), 653-683, at 662-663. 
2897 See also above Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3.4.   
2898 Recall that the normative objective is, as Adam Smith has put it, to maximize global welfare.   
2899 Bagwell and Staiger, above n 2871, at 169. 
2900 According to Bagwell and Staiger, ‘rules that (…) facilitate a reduction in trade volume warrant 
special scrutiny’.  Bagwell and Staiger, above n 2871, at 180. 
2901 Bagwell and Staiger also differentiate their model from strategic trade models but not on this 
important element.  Bagwell and Staiger, above n 2871, at 168, 178-179; Bagwell, above n 2836, at 28-
29.   
2902 In an oligopolistic setting, the analogy drawn by Bagwell with anti-trust policy seems to be more 
valid.  In this analogy, sellers of a given product are the exporting countries and consumers are the 
importing countries.  According to Bagwell, restrictions on the use of export subsidies may represent a 
victory for exporting countries that comes at the expense of the ‘importing government and world-
welfare’.  Bagwell, above n 2836, at 28.  While the analysis regarding exporting and importing 
countries holds regardless of the market type, such a ‘cartel’ among exporting countries only comes at 
the expense of world welfare in an oligopolistic market and not in competitive markets.    
2903 Bagwell and Mavroidis also point to the similarity to the market being distorted by an import tariff.  
Hence, ‘an appropriate export subsidy could offset the import tariff and result in a more efficient trade 
volume’ (Bagwell and Mavroidis, above n 2911, at 169, footnote 252).  However, this valid point is 
respected under the SCM Agreement given that rebates of import duties on exported products are not 
considered subsidies under the SCM Agreement and are thus not disciplined.   
2904 Collie, above n 2879, at 230; D. Leahy and J. P. Neary, ‘Multilateral Subsidy Games’, 41:1 
Economic Theory (October, 2009), 41-66, at 2; J. A. Brander, ‘Strategic Trade Policy’, in G. M. 
Grossman and K. Rogoff (eds) Handbook of International Economics – Volume 3 (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1995), 1395-1455, at 1409; J. Eaton and G. M. Grossman, ‘Optimal Trade and Industrial 
Policy under Oligopoly’, 101:2 The Quarterly Journal of Economics (May, 1986), 383-406, at 396.    
2905 Collie shows that for certain values of opportunity costs of funding, these ‘costs’ are sufficiently 
low to explain why exporting countries nonetheless benefit from subsidizing in the non-cooperative 
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importing countries are still at the losing end from a static welfare perspective in case export 
subsidies are abolished.  In sum, I fundamentally disagree with Bagwell and Staiger’s 
conclusion that the world as a whole would lose from a prohibition on export subsidies in 
competitive markets.  Their conclusion seems to result form a confusion of positive and 
normative theory.  Only in the case of oligopolistic markets could a prohibition on export 
subsidies be considered world welfare-reducing under certain conditions.   
 
Drawing a clear distinction between positive and normative theory regarding the prohibition 
on export subsidies offers straightforward but interesting insights.   
Positive theory demonstrates that political-economy as well as strategic trade arguments could 
explain why countries start offering export subsidizing, why other exporting countries equally 
reply with export subsidies, and why those countries finally have an incentive to conclude a 
trade agreement ending such destructive subsidy war.2906  Grossman and Mavroidis have 
found evidence in the provisions of the SCM Agreement that its purpose is indeed to protect 
producer welfare, suggesting that countries are driven by political-economy motivations when 
concluding trade agreements.2907  Or, in the words of Mavroidis et al, the SCM Agreement is 
driven by a common will of ‘promoting (short-term) producers’ interests only’.2908   
From a normative perspective, however, an agreement prohibiting export subsidies could only 
be criticized in strategic trade settings in which, under certain conditions (e.g., opportunity 
costs of funds are not too high), such a ban would be world welfare-reducing.  Yet, an 
important implication from positive theory is that even if multilateral WTO disciplines would 
take this normative viewpoint on board and allow export subsidies under those conditions, 
exporting countries would still have the same incentive to agree among themselves in another 
setting to curtail such export subsidies.2909  Even in the absence of a binding legal agreement, 
repeated interaction among exporting countries could lead towards the non-subsidy 
equilibrium (‘tit-for-tat’ strategy), as demonstrated by the non-binding OECD Arrangement 
                                                                                                                                            
Nash equilibrium, but are, on the other hand, sufficiently high to explain why global welfare would be 
better off by prohibiting such subsidies.  D. R. Collie, ‘A Rationale for the WTO Prohibition on Export 
Subsidies: Strategic Export Subsidies and World Welfare’, 11 Open Economies Review (2000), 229-
245.   
2906 Destructive from the perspective of those exporting countries.   
2907 Because the disciplines on CVDs do not distinguish between situations where such CVDs would be 
welfare-improving from the perspective of the CVDs-imposing country (e.g., strategic trade settings) 
and other situations.  Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?’, above n 2666, at 199. 
2908 Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters, above n 2636, at 298.  See also P. C. Mavroidis, ‘Come 
Together? Producer Welfare, Consumer Welfare and WTO Rules’, in E-U. Petersmann (ed), Reforming 
the World Trading System - Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 590 pp., 277-289, at 287. 
2909 For instance, the Bagwell and Staiger model precisely shows that exporting countries have an 
incentive to conclude an agreement limiting export subsidies.  This incentive likewise exists in strategic 
trade settings. 
PART IV CHAPTER 2 – DISCIPLINES ON DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
 
 553
on limiting export credit support.2910  Hence, reintroducing more flexibility on export 
subsidies, as authors like Bagwell, Staiger, and Mavroidis and also Sykes in his most recent 
writings seem to propose,2911 might not even lead to a significant increase in export 
subsidies.2912  From a normative perspective, the intricacy of translating the conditions under 
which export subsidies improve world welfare into a limited legal exception2913 as well as the 
                                                 
2910 See above Part III, Chapters 2 and 3.  J. A. Brander, ‘Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial 
Policy’, in P. Krugman (ed), Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 1986), 23-46, at 39. 
2911 In previous writings, Sykes reached the conclusion that ‘from an economic standpoint, export 
subsidies are generally undesirable’ and that the SCM Agreement includes ‘a sensible prohibition on 
export subsidies’, which could even be ‘usefully extended to agriculture and services sectors’.  But in 
his most recent contribution, Sykes has apparently changed his opinion as he reached the conclusion 
that:  
‘Export subsidies are assuredly a mixed bag from a welfare standpoint. An across the board 
prohibition on them seems difficult to defend, however, unless one is prepared to assume (a) that 
export subsidies are on average welfare-reducing; and (b) tailored rules to sort the good from the 
bad are too difficult to devise. Although assumption (b) is plausible, the empirical basis for (a) is 
not evident’. 
Sykes’ general conclusion in the latter article holds that the laissez-faire approach to subsidies in the 
US system might make more sense than the WTO (and EC) approach.  On the other hand, Bagwell and 
Mavroidis seem to suggest undoing the prohibition on export subsidies and disciplining all types of 
subsidies (including export subsidies) only on the basis on the non-violation complaint.  In their words, 
‘keeping NVC as the sole response to subsidies (beyond imposition of countervailing duties, CVD) is 
an adequate response’.  However, it is hard to imagine how a non-violation complaint could impose 
any discipline at all on export subsidies as such claim holds that the benefit of a tariff concession – 
which occurs in the domestic market – is neutralized by a subsequent subsidy.  An export subsidy, 
which increases the price in the domestic market, could by definition not cause such effect.  Hence, the 
non-violation complaint as currently drafted would impose no discipline at all on export subsidies.  
Compare with Sykes, above n 2661, at 90-92, 106; Sykes, above n 2635, at 36-37, 39; K. W. Bagwell 
and P. C. Mavroidis, ‘Too Much, Too Little…Too Late’, in K. W. Bagwell, G. A. Bermann, and P. C. 
Mavroidis (eds), Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in International Trade (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 168-171. 
2912 Admittedly, the fact that the OECD Arrangement is still more flexible than the general export 
subsidy prohibition in the SCM Agreement shows that Participants to the OECD Arrangement have an 
incentive to curtail export subsidies but this did not yet result in a ban of support at better-than-market 
terms.  This is partly explained on the basis of the gap in the private trade finance market.  The more 
flexible standard also implies that exporters are de jure put on an equal footing, but those exporters de 
facto receiving support are still given a competitive advantage over exporters (or domestic producers) 
which do not get export credit support (or other support) from their government.  Moreover, the 
standard in the OECD Arrangement is drafted in such a way that it is de facto more flexible for 
developed countries.        
2913 For example, Collie has shown that world welfare would be depressed only if the opportunity costs 
of government funds is not too high (see above n 2905), which refers to an aspect that could obviously 
not be reflected in multilateral rules.  Recognizing that imperfectly competitive goods tend to be 
underprovided from the perspective of world welfare, Brander also observed that ‘decentralized 
strategic trade policies will not, except by remarkable coincidence, achieve outcomes that approach the 
world-level normative ideal, suggesting that international trade policy coordination should act as an 
important restraint on nationally-determined strategic trade policies’.  Given the difficulty in 
implementation, Mavroidis et al likewise seem to suggest that the best policy might be not to act except 
when all information is available.  Lastly, Eaton and Grossman have demonstrated that investment 
subsidies are more likely to be welfare-improving instruments in strategic settings than export (or 
output) subsidies, which might justify more restrictive disciplines on export subsidies.  J. A. Brander, 
‘Strategic Trade Policy’, in G. M. Grossman and K. Rogoff (eds), Handbook of International 
Economics – Volume 3 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995), 1395-1455, at 1448; Mavroidis, Messerlin, 
and Wauters, above n 2636, at 295.  Tangermann also highlights the practical difficulties to draft a 
limited exception.  See S. Tangermann, ‘Approaches to Export Subsidies: Disciplines for Export 
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fact that under most circumstances export subsidies depress world welfare also support a 
simple rule prohibiting export subsidies.2914  In addition, from a dynamic welfare stance, the 
prohibition is helpful to (potential) exporters in developing countries as these countries have 
less leverage to match foreign subsidies.2915  Therefore, the general world welfare-depressing 
effect of export subsidies legitimizes a simple prohibition on such subsidization, even if world 
welfare is not the main motivation to install such a prohibition in the first place (i.e., positive 
theory perspective).2916  Although several scholars would thus disagree with this conclusion, 
others concur that the ban on export subsidies indeed makes sense from a normative 
viewpoint.2917  The welfare benefits are captured by the subsidizing exporting countries and 
those benefits outweigh the costs of such prohibition to net-importing countries.  In non-
strategic settings, the multilateral prohibition therefore allows governments to implement a 
welfare-superior policy which it might apparently not reach in a unilateral setting because of 
pressure of special interest groups.2918  Accordingly, the normative welfare-argument for 
prohibiting export subsidies corresponds to a so-called ‘tie your own hands’-argument.  As 
Messerlin observes, WTO disciplines could enhance the domestic or internal sovereignty of 
its Members, whereby he refers to their capacity to resist powerful domestic special interest 
groups.2919  According to this author, the fact that WTO disciplines could help governments to 
resist pressure from special interest groups is an aspect that policy space supporters 
                                                                                                                                            
Subsidies in Primary and Non-Primary Products – Should There be Different Disciplines for Export 
Subsidies on Primary and Non-primary Products?’, in B. Balassa (ed), Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures – Critical Issues for the Uruguay Round (Washington: The World Bank, 1989), 104-121, at 
109-110.  
2914 An exception could be made in case market failures relate to export markets (see above case study 
on export credit support; Part III) and export subsidies are thus a first-best corrective instrument. 
2915 This was already recognized by India during the 1954-1955 Review Session of the GATT. 
2916 A parallel could be drawn with tariff negotiations.  Tariff reductions are also seen as a cost in 
political-economy terms, which has to be paid in exchange for foreign reductions in bound tariff levels.  
Yet, they represent a gain in welfare terms to the committing country, unless the optimal tariff 
exception applies.  
2917 Green and Trebilcock concluded that ‘export subsidies (…) appear on balance to be globally 
inefficient’. Likewise, Barceló found that ‘a universal ban on export subsidies would raise world 
welfare’.  As noted above, Sykes also considered in previous writings that the ban on export subsidies 
is justified economically (see above n 2911).  Green and Trebilcock, above n 2896, at 660-662; J. J. 
Barceló, ‘Subsidies and Countervailing Duties – Analysis and Proposal’, in R. Howse (ed), The World 
Trading System: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy – Volume 3 – Administered Protection 
(London: Routledge, 1997), 252-314, at 264; see also Hufbauer and Erb, above n 2883, at 8. 
2918 In strategic settings, the unilateral incentive to offer subsidies could be inspired by welfare 
considerations (i.e., profit-shifting export subsidies). 
2919 He made this observation by giving the example of ‘binding’ tariffs.  P. A. Messerlin, ‘Three 
Variations on “The Future of the WTO”’, 8:2 Journal of International Economic Law (2005), 299-309; 
P. A. Messerlin, ‘Enlarging the Vision for Trade Policy Space: Special and Differentiated Treatment 
and Infant Industry Issues’, The World Economy (2006), 1359-1407.  Noticing the limited potential 
benefits of interventions, Krugman concludes that ‘free trade can serve as a focal point on which 
countries can agree to avoid trade wars. It can also serve as a simple principle with which to resist 
pressures of special-interest politics’.  P. R. Krugman, ‘Is Free Trade Passé?’, 1:2 The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives (Fall, 1987), 131-144, at 144. 
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systematically neglect.2920  In my opinion, this is also an aspect that the normative conclusion 
derived by Bagwell and Staiger from their model overlooks.2921  Precisely because of this ‘tie 
your own hands’-argument, Finger and Winters criticize the exemptions on subsidy 
disciplines for low-income countries as it implies that the agreement offers ‘virtually no cover 
against lobbies seeking subsidies’.2922  They thus present a normative argument why export 
subsidization of ‘small countries’ should nonetheless be restricted in a multilateral framework 
even though such subsidies do not affect the terms of trade.2923  We return to this argument in 
discussing the policy space left for developing countries.    
 
In sum, the prohibition on export subsidies would enable exporting countries to resist special 
interest groups and these welfare benefits outweigh the costs of such a prohibition to net-
importing countries in competitive markets.2924  From a normative perspective, the costs upon 
net-importing countries do therefore not justify an exemption on export subsidies.  If 
countries would aim to consider the distributional consequences of such a prohibition, 
compensating net-importing countries by lump-sum transfers would be superior as this would 
not distort trade flows.  For example, the cost on net-food importing countries of 
implementing a general prohibition on agricultural export subsidies would in theory be better 
compensated by lump-sum transfers (e.g., development aid, Aid for Trade, in-cash food aid).  
Such development aid offers developing countries the option to subsidize imports of food and 
source it from the most efficient exporter (or invest in own food production), which not 
necessarily corresponds to the country previously subsidizing its exports.  Because such 
transition from direct or indirect export subsidies to genuine development aid might take 
some time, the adverse effects on net-food importing countries could warrant that the 
abolition of such export subsidies on agricultural subsidies should not be implemented 
overnight.  
 
But could a straightforward ban on export subsidies be justified in light of the fact that 
another trade instrument, namely a tariff, is still allowed up to its bound level?  Wondering 
about this difference in disciplines, Baldwin pointed to the apparent general conviction that 
                                                 
2920 P. Messerlin, ‘Enlarging the Vision for Trade Policy Space: Special and Differentiated Treatment 
and Infant Industry Issue’, above n 2919, at 1402. 
2921 See Bagwell, above n 2836, footnote 41.  Janow and Staiger also refer to this ‘tie your own hands’-
rationale (Janow and Staiger, above n 2894, at 260-261).  
2922 M. J. Finger and L. A. Winters, ‘What Can the WTO Do for Developing Countries?’, in A. O. 
Krueger (ed), The WTO as an International Organization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1998), 425 pp., 365-392, at 387. 
2923 Because terms of trade are not affected, other countries would not be interested in restricting 
subsidization of small countries (i.e., positive theory perspective).  This is partly reflected in the S&D 
treatment provisions (e.g., export performance criteria).      
2924 This would also be the result in oligopolistic markets in case the opportunity cost of funds is 
relatively high (above n 2905). 
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‘domestic producers are somewhat more entitled to domestic compared to foreign 
markets’.2925  But according to Bagwell, the terms of trade agreements theory suggests that 
export subsidies should be treated with greater leniency than tariffs.2926  At first sight, this 
systemic argument against the prohibition on export subsidies seems plausible given that the 
rest of the world benefits from a terms of trade improvement in case of export subsidies, 
whereas it is hurt by such an effect in case of tariffs.  Yet, from a global welfare perspective, 
both should simply be abandoned under the perfect market assumption and the fact that tariffs 
are given more leeway does not support the argument to give the same leeway to export 
subsidies.  Such a prohibition on export subsidies does also not bear the risk that countries 
would turn to increased tariff levels because the offensive interests of exporters in third-
markets can simply not be protected with tariffs.2927  Somewhat contrary, Kenen has 
suggested that one of the rationales for disciplining export subsidies was exactly to safeguard 
tariff negotiations.  When governments offer tariff concessions (which have a political-
economy cost), they expect that they can still protect their import-competing industry up to 
the bound level of the reduced tariff.  If this bound level could be eroded by export subsidies 
given by third countries, the effective level of protection could not be maintained.2928  Hence, 
this rationale for the prohibition of export subsidies acknowledges that cutting tariffs has a 
cost in political-economy terms and that tariff negotiations would be undermined if the bound 
tariff levels could subsequently be circumvented by the provision of export subsidies.  This 
systemic argument could offer an additional rationale for prohibiting export subsidies (of 
large countries) from a positive as well as normative point of view.2929  
 
                                                 
2925 R. E. Baldwin, ‘The Economics of the GATT’, in P. Oppenheimer (ed), Issues in International 
Economics (London: Oriel Press, 1978), 82-93, at 86.  Balassa also referred to this asymmetry.  B. 
Balassa, ‘Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Economic Considerations’, in B. Balassa (ed), 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures – Critical Issues for the Uruguay Round (Washington: The 
World Bank, 1989), 28-45, at 29.  
2926 K. Bagwell, above n 2836, at 30; see also Bagwell and Mavroidis, above n 2911, at 170.  
According to Messerlin, however, the ranking of the instruments of protection in the GATT, whereby 
tariffs are preferred to other border barriers such as quantitative restrictions or export subsidies, ‘is 
broadly consistent with the welfare balances that trade policy analysis associates with these trade 
instruments’.  P. Messerlin, Non-Discrimination, ‘Welfare Balances and WTO Rules: An Historical 
Perspective’, in E-U. Petersmann (ed), Reforming the World Trading System – Legitimacy, Efficiency, 
and Democratic Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 590 pp., 291-303, at 295.   
2927 Notice that Bagwell does also not argue that the prohibition on export subsidies could have a 
chilling effect on tariff negotiations.  Such an argument is made for disciplines on domestic subsidies 
(se above Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2).  
2928 For example, if the US cuts its tariff on imported steel to 10 per cent (bound and applied level), 
other countries could still enter the US at free trade price if they offer a 10 per cent export subsidy to 
their steel industry.  P. Kenen as cited in A. O. Sykes, ‘Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic 
Perspective’, 89 Columbia Law Review (March, 1989), 199-262, at 261; Sykes, above n 2635, at 36. 
2929 Strictly speaking, a ban on export subsidies is however not required given that the allowance to 
impose CVDs, which could be added on top of bound tariff levels, would in principle be sufficient to 
safeguard tariff levels.  See below on the systemic justification for CVDs, Part IV, Chapter 4, Section 
4.2.2. 
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This discussion on the normative rationale underpinning a prohibition on export subsidies has 
largely neglected the market failure argument for offering export subsidies.  Still, this is no 
oblivion as export subsidies are generally not first-best instruments to correct market failures 
in developed countries because these failures are mostly domestic in nature (targeting 
principle).2930  After all, production subsidies would always be superior to correct domestic 
market failures given they do not involve a cost to domestic consumers.  As a result, the 
market failure rationale can as such not explain why export subsidies are offered (i.e., positive 
theory perspective) and the presence of such market failures can also not justify the need for 
developed countries to have leeway to offer such export subsidies (i.e., normative theory 
perspective).  Furthermore, the market failure argument can neither explain nor legitimize the 
different treatment of agricultural export subsidies currently stipulated under the Agreement 
on Agriculture.2931  Hence, the Doha Round agreement to gradually phase-out these export 
subsidies for agricultural products (normally by 2013) should be endorsed, though its 
implementation is of course dependent on the successful conclusion of this Round.  As 
discussed in Part III, a limited exception on the principle prohibition of export subsidies could 
be made in case market failures occur in exporting markets (e.g., rationale for export credit 
support), though it would in theory be more efficient if such export credit support would be 
offered by international institutions.  Moreover, as discussed in the following section, export 
subsidies might be a useful development tool to overcome certain market failures in 
developing countries. 
 
                                                 
2930 See, for example, R. Howse and M. Trebilcock, The Regulation of International Trade, 3rd ed (UK: 
Routledge, 2005), 759 pp., at 276; Schwartz and Harper, above 2659, at 835. 
2931 The multifunctionality argument could at most legitimize some types of domestic support but can 
certainly not legitimize subsidies contingent upon exportation.  See also, Tangermann, above n 2913, at 
111-114; A. Dunkel, Trade Policies for a Better Future – The ‘Leutwiler Report’, the GATT and the 
Uruguay Round (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 7-69, at 47. 
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3. DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIZATION BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
3.1. DISCIPLINES ON DOMESTIC SUBSIDIES 
3.1.1. The prohibition on local content subsidies 
One type of domestic subsidies is simply prohibited under the SCM Agreement: subsidies 
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported inputs (Article 3.1(b) of the SCM 
Agreement).  The US – Upland Cotton case has revealed that this prohibition on local content 
subsidies is likewise applicable with regard to agricultural products. 
Developing countries enjoyed temporal flexibility on this prohibition, but this S&D treatment 
has expired by now (Article 27.3 of the SCM Agreement).  Often, such local content 
requirements were put in place as a condition to benefit from subsidization in export 
processing zones (EPZs).  The strategy was to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) through 
subsidization (e.g., rebates on direct taxes) and to ensure at the same time that a viable 
domestic upstream industry would further develop, for example through knowledge 
spillovers.  Overall, empirical evidence has shown that such local content requirements are 
not conductive for spurring economic growth, because these restrictive policies are unlikely to 
generate intra-industry spillovers.2932  Therefore, the prohibition to make subsidies contingent 
upon local content seems not problematic.  Obviously, developing countries could still spur 
the development of the domestic input industry by subsidizing this industry directly.  Such a 
subsidy would not be prohibited but would be covered under the general disciplines on 
domestic subsidies, to which we turn in the next section.  
 
3.1.2. Disciplines on all other types of domestic subsidies 
In contrast to the S&D treatment on export subsidies, S&D treatment on actionable subsidies 
does not differentiate between developing countries according to their income level but is 
similarly available to all developing countries.2933  However, the analysis in Part II revealed 
that the substance of their policy flexibility to offer such subsidies is not entirely clear.  
Surely, other WTO Members can take multilateral action against subsidization causing injury 
to their domestic industry as well as against nullification or impairment of tariff concessions 
or other GATT obligations (Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement).  Yet, no definitive answer 
exists on whether a serious prejudice claim could also be formulated against some types of 
subsidies (i.e., subsidies listed in Article 6.1. of the SCM Agreement).  I would expect that a 
future panel confronted with this question would rather opt for a restrictive reading of Article 
27.9 of the SCM Agreement that would exclude such type of claim.  Taking a normative 
                                                 
2932 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4. 
2933 Except for China. 
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perspective, a narrow reading of this Article 27.9 could be welcomed in light of the 
importance of subsidies to correct market failures as well as the risk that too stringent subsidy 
disciplines could undermine tariff negotiations (i.e., systemic argument).  
First, the success of outward-oriented development strategies has shown that substantive 
leeway for subsidization is important in the presence of market failures impeding economic 
growth and diversification (e.g., inducing self-discovery, overcoming coordination failures).  
Admittedly, even under the broad interpretation of Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement, a 
substantive part of domestic subsidies aiming at correcting market failures would not be 
vulnerable to a challenge on the basis of ‘serious prejudice’ because such challenge would 
only be allowed for those types of subsidies listed in Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement.2934  
Regardless of their nature, subsidies exceeding the threshold of 5% total ad valorem in terms 
of the cost to the government would be vulnerable to a serious prejudice claim.2935  The other 
types of measures listed in Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement mainly target subsidies to 
enterprises or industries in difficulties.  While one might suggest that these other types of 
subsidies are generally considered not justified on economic grounds, temporary subsidization 
of enterprises having a dominant position in an undiversified market might still be needed 
(i.e., congestion argument).  
Second, as Bagwell and Staiger have explained,2936 the supremacy of subsidies over tariffs to 
correct domestic market failures carries the risk that overly stringent subsidy disciplines 
would hamper tariff negotiations.  Such a ‘chilling effect’ would be present if developing 
countries would be reluctant to cut their tariff levels because their potential subsidies could be 
challenged before the WTO.  This would be detrimental from the perspective of both the 
subsidizing developing country as well as other countries.  For instance, a developing country 
might be resistant to reduce its bound tariff levels if it is aware that subsidies granted to firms 
in difficulties would be challengeable.  The options given under the restrictive reading of 
Article 27.9 to formulate a non-violation complaint as well as a complaint on the basis of 
injury to the domestic injury (which is the multilateral alternative of unilateral CVDs) would 
exactly safeguard further tariff negotiations.  Indeed, the first instrument would ensure that 
other WTO Members could effectively benefit from tariff reductions made by the subsidizing 
developing country, whereas the presence of the latter option could, in theory, make it 
credible to import-competing industries that bound tariff levels will not be eroded by foreign 
subsidization.   
 
                                                 
2934 Recall also that only ‘selective’ domestic subsidies are disciplined (Article 2 of the SCM 
Agreement) and that such serious prejudice claim would also be dependent on the successful 
demonstration of trade effects (Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement). 
2935 See, for example, Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos.   
2936 See above Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2. 
PART IV CHAPTER 3 – DISCIPLINES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
 560
Importantly, the S&D treatment on domestic (and export) subsidies partly shields developing 
countries from multilateral claims before the WTO dispute settlement system but does not 
preclude unilateral CVDs action taken by other WTO Members.  Article 27.10 of the SCM 
Agreement only increases the general de minimis standard in case such CVDs action is 
considered against developing countries’ subsidized imports.  Analyzing the potential for such 
CVDs action from a normative perspective, it seems that both the market failure rationale 
underpinning the case for subsidization and the systemic argument point in different 
directions.2937  On the one hand, the market failure rationale suggests that CVDs action 
against corrective subsidization could not be justified as it might target ‘fair’ subsidization.  
The imposition of CVDs is at odds with the explicit recognition in the SCM Agreement that 
‘subsidies may play an important role in economic development programmes of developing 
countries’.2938  On the other hand, CVDs could play a useful role to safeguard tariff 
negotiations because they provide importing countries with an instrument ensuring that their 
bound tariff levels will not be eroded.2939  Yet, two arguments cast doubt on whether great 
importance should be attached to the latter justification.  Firstly, the large majority of CVDs is 
imposed by a small group of developed countries (i.e., US, EC, and Canada) upon some 
industrial products.  Given that these countries already have very low levels of bound tariffs 
on industrial products, restricting the scope for CVDs action would likely not significantly 
hamper further tariff cuts.  Secondly, the multilateral option to challenge domestic subsidies 
when causing injury to an import-competing domestic industry would in principle offer a less 
trade-distortive alternative than unilateral CVDs actions, even though I admit that the time-
consuming multilateral option will not be considered equally effective by import-competing 
industries.  On balance, the value of subsidies as a corrective development tool and the trade-
distortive impact of (a threat of) CVDs actions, which in practice predominantly target 
developing countries’ imports, would justify further increasing the de minimis threshold for 
taking CVDs action against developing countries’ imports along the lines suggested by India 
in the Doha Round.2940 
 
Given that domestic subsidies for industrial products offered by developing countries thus still 
remain countervailable and actionable under some circumstances, the reinstallation of a kind 
of green light category of domestic subsidies would effectively offer some more policy space 
                                                 
2937 See also below, Part IV, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2. 
2938 Article 27.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
2939 This will be labelled the systemic rationale for justifying CVDs action in a multilateral trade 
agreement.  CVDs would allow governments to make a credible commitment to their import-competing 
industries that bound levels will be respected.  This would make it more feasible in political-economy 
terms to agree upon multilateral tariff reductions. 
2940 As explained in Part II (Chapter 6, Section 6.1.3), India has introduced such a proposal in the Doha 
Round.  This is not surprising given that India has been the main target of such CVDs action.   
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to developing countries.2941  Hoekman et al have formulated such a proposal for the 
reactivation of the green light status of R&D subsidies with respect to developing 
countries.2942  In particular, flexibility has to be given to tackle information externalities 
inhibiting self-discovery as suggested by Hausmann and Rodrik.2943  To be precise, Hoekman 
et al’s reasoning does not assume the mere reactivation of the R&D subsidies carve-out as in 
its current form stipulated in Article 8 of the SCM Agreement because this only gave leeway 
to assistance for research aiming at inventing and developing new products and processes 
(i.e., on-the-frontier innovations).2944  Instead, assistance promoting self-discovery aims at 
supporting firms to discover which existing products could be produced domestically at 
competitive prices (i.e., inside-the-frontier innovations).2945  While making an argument for 
policy space in order for developing countries to be able to induce self-discovery, Hoekman et 
al do not support complete policy freedom because multilateral disciplines could be useful to 
prevent capture by private interests and enhance the credibility of exit mechanisms.  They 
launch the idea to ‘adopt monitoring and surveillance mechanisms in the WTO that are aimed 
at increasing information on the effect and effectiveness of policies that aim at encouraging 
innovation’.2946  Rightly in my view, substantive legal policy constraints seem not to be 
proposed.  Increased notification and ‘soft’ surveillance might indeed temper the risk of 
government failures without undermining the need for policy space to use such subsidies as a 
development tool.  Yet, such improved international surveillance could only be set-up if the 
carve-out also places subsidization outside the reach of potential CVDs action by trading 
partners.   
 
Finally turning to agricultural domestic subsidies, Hoekman et al have advocated the 
rebalancing of the rights for developing countries to support their agricultural sector.  They 
                                                 
2941 Recall that non-actionable subsidies were still challengeable under certain limited conditions.  
Interestingly, the systemic concern formulated by Bagwell and Staiger would warrant that fully 
excluding such subsidies from any potential actionable subsidy claim (i.e., non-violation claim or 
injury to domestic industry claim) could likewise have a detrimental effect on tariff negotiations 
because trading partners would no longer be sure that subsidization will not erode tariff concessions. 
2942 In the Doha Round, Venezuela and Cuba also formally proposed the reinstallation of the green light 
non-actionable subsidies because of their importance as development tool.  See Improved rules under 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measure – Non-actionable subsidies 
(TN/RL/41/Rev.1, 10 March 2003). 
2943 Yet, Hoekman et al do not specify the criteria to be used to differentiate such S&D treatment 
between developing countries.  B. M. Hoekman, K. E. Maskus, K. Saggi, ‘Transfer of Technology to 
Developing Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options’, IBS Research Program on Political 
and Economic Change, Working Paper PEC 2004-2003 (May, 2004), 34 pp., at 22-23. 
2944 As elaborated above (Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4.3), assistance was allowed for covering part of 
the cost of ‘industrial research’.  This aimed at discovering new knowledge that could be useful for 
developing new products, processes, or services.  Moreover, the cost of ‘pre-competitive development 
activities’, which build upon such industrial research findings, was also covered. 
2945 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2.1. 
2946 See Hoekman, Maskus, and Saggi, above n 2943, at 22-23. 
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highlight that such support will often not qualify as permitted ‘green box’ support because 
this box does not address the types of market failures often found in these countries.2947  Here, 
one should not forget that developing countries do have certain policy space to offer such 
support under existing disciplines.2948  Next to support under the S&D box, all developing 
countries could offer de minimis levels (10 per cent) of (non-)product-specific support and, in 
theory, provide blue box support as well.2949  Moreover, developing countries that had non-
exempted subsidies in place during the Uruguay Round are allowed to offer an additional 
level of amber box subsidies up to their reduction commitment levels.  The S&D treatment of 
developing countries under the SCM Agreement might also render it unlikely that these 
subsidies would effectively be challenged as actionable subsidies under the SCM Agreement, 
even though such claims as well as CVDs action are not excluded.    
 
3.2. DISCIPLINES ON EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
3.2.1. Policy space given to some developing countries to offer export subsidies 
As documented in depth in Part I, two general arguments underpinning the need for policy 
space to subsidize exports in developing countries could be distinguished.2950  First, evidence 
that exporting firms are relatively more productive suggests that it might be appropriate to 
link subsidization aimed at overcoming market failures to export performance (i.e., carrot-
and-stick rationale), certainly because market failures are often considered relatively more 
prevalent in the trading sector.  This explains why even trade-skeptics such as Rodrik are in 
favour of export subsidies in order to overcome market failures related to discovery or 
clustering.  Second, the finding of a learning-by-exportation effect, often combined with the 
assumption that such learning spills over to other segments of the economy, provides an 
alternative justification for subsidizing exports (i.e., productivity improvement rationale).  
                                                 
2947 They list a number of subsidy interventions that should be allowed: (i) product-specific as well as 
general investment and input subsidies or other supports to households below the national poverty line 
in order to encourage agricultural and rural development; (ii) programmes that support product 
diversification in small, low income developing countries currently dependent on a very small number 
of commodities for their exports, including programmes involving government assistance for risk 
management; (iii) foodstuffs at subsidized prices aimed at meeting food requirements of the poor, 
which might for administrative reasons be best provided via producer subsidies (food security); (iv) 
transportation subsidies for agricultural products and farm inputs to poor remote areas; (v) programmes 
involving government assistance for the establishment of agricultural cooperatives or other institutions 
that promote marketing, quality control or otherwise strengthen the competitiveness of poor farmers.  
See Hoekman, C. Michalopoulos, and L. A. Winters, ‘More favourable and differential treatment of 
developing countries: towards a new approach in the WTO’, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 3107 (August 2003), 30 pp., at 20-21. 
2948 Thus, their conclusion that producer subsidies are generally not allowed because developing 
countries did not register subsidies during the Uruguay Round and ‘are bound by a commitment not to 
increase subsidies above historical levels’ seems too restrictive.  Hoekman, Michalopoulos, and 
Winters, above n 2947, footnote 23. 
2949 India, for example, has relied upon such blue box support. 
2950 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3.2. 
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This exactly explains the World Bank’s recent plea for proactive policies in developing 
countries to support trade and export (diversification) in particular.  It seems that the World 
Bank thus no longer questions that selective and functional government interventions might 
be needed to spur export diversification hampered by serious market failures, whereby the 
optimal strategy depends on the specific characteristics of each country (‘one size does not fit 
all’).2951  Already during the Uruguay Round, India underscored the need for policy space on 
export subsidies by referring to the prevalence of distortions in the domestic market: 
 
These distortions are caused inter alia by inadequate exploitation of economies of scale, factor 
market imperfections, underdeveloped infrastructure, high cost of inputs, fragmented capital 
markets, inadequate foreign-exchange market and poor marketing infrastructure. Subsidies 
therefore become necessary to compensate the industry or the exporter for such distortions.  In 
some cases, because of paucity of resources, developing countries have to limit their 
corrective measures to the export sector only.2952 
 
Hereby, the option to focalize on the export sector might exactly be justified on the basis of 
the carrot-and-stick and/or productivity improvement rationales.2953  Moreover, India 
considered these subsidies warranted because they compensate for higher costs due to the 
relatively higher prevalence of such distortions in developing countries.  As such, they would 
merely ‘level the playing field’ with exporters from more developed countries.2954   
 
At present, only a subset of all developing countries still benefits from S&D treatment on 
export subsidies.  Two different groups of developing countries should be distinguished.  
First, policy space to offer whatever type of export subsidy is offered to LDCs and those low-
income countries listed in Annex VII(b) that have not reached the level of $1,000 GNP per 
capita (in constant 1990 dollars) for three consecutive years.  Generally speaking, this 
                                                 
2951 Recall that the Report of the Growth Commission also considered that developing countries may 
need policy space ‘to promote their exports until their economies have matured and their competitive 
position has improved’.  Commission on Growth and Development, The Growth Report – Strategies 
for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2008), 190 pp., 
at 11. 
2952 Submission by India, Elements of the framework for negotiations (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/33, 30 
November 1989), para 7.   
2953 In response to the US proposal in the Doha Round to limit policy space on export subsidies, India 
also referred to the need for such policy space because of learning-by-exporting effects: ‘Technology 
improvement and productivity enhancement have been recognised as the key elements in economic 
development and the governments are generally eager to update the technology to realize the goal of 
economic development.  According to economists, it can be shown that export promotion measures like 
export subsidies are definitely beneficial to developing countries in updating technology, improving 
productivity and stimulating employment’.  See India’s replies to questions from the United States on 
its submissions (TN/RL/4 and TN/RL/26) (TN/RL/W/99, 6 May 2003).  The reference to stimulating 
employment might be based on the presence of surplus labor (labor market imperfections). 
2954 ‘The subsidies, including export subsidies, serve merely to offset an existing handicap even though 
they may not meet the test of general availability’.  India therefore (unsuccessfully, see below n 2960) 
proposed to place these subsidies outside the reach of actionable subsidy claims and CVDs action.  
Submission by India, Elements of the framework for negotiations (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/33, 30 
November 1989), para 7; See also in the Doha Round: India’s Replies to Questions from the United 
States on its Submissions (TN/RL/4 and TN/RL/26) (TN/RL/W/99, 6 May 2003).   
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differentiation in Annex VII between developing countries on the basis of their income level 
could be endorsed as the need for S&D treatment on export subsidies might be grossly related 
to their level of development.2955   Yet, the exclusion of newly-acceded developing countries 
with income levels equally below the $1,000 GNP per capita levels clearly fails to honour this 
principle.  The assumption that original WTO developing countries would have obtained their 
S&D treatment in return for higher levels of concessions does equally fail given that newly-
acceded developing countries have generally made concessions that were far more extensive.  
Hence, no justification could be given for their exclusion.   
Second, some small trading developing counties are allowed until 2015 to maintain specific 
programmes related to exemptions to exporters from the payment of import duties and 
internal taxes.  These exemptions are often implemented in so-called export processing zones 
(EPZs).  The set up of such EPZs is considered as an adequate development strategy so as to 
attract FDI and spur exportation in the first phase of development.2956  The incentives offered 
to exporters in EPZs include, for example, exemptions on direct taxes and on tariffs paid on 
capital inputs and thus go beyond the rebates that would be allowed by virtue of Article 1 
juncto the Illustrative List of the SCM Agreement.  Yet, these small trading developing 
countries will have to bring their incentive programmes into conformity with the SCM 
Agreement as from 2015.  This means that rebates offered to exporters will have to be 
confined to indirect taxes and tariffs on inputs consumed in the production process.2957,2958  
Notice that, according to Torres, improved infrastructure facilities which are often installed in 
EPZs (e.g., roads, ports, phone lines) are certainly not challengeable under the SCM 
Agreement.  Such facilities would be covered under the ‘general infrastructure’-exception 
(Article 1.1 (a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement) and thus be excluded from the scope of the 
subsidy definition.2959  Yet, it is not sure that infrastructure facilities limited to EPZs would be 
considered sufficiently generally available to be exempted from subsidy disciplines.  Until 
present, the case law has not offered more guidance on the interpretation of this vaguely 
described exception.   
 
                                                 
2955 It has been suggested that such differentiation between developing countries should also be 
inscribed under other WTO agreements because the general categorization of ‘developing country’ is 
not sufficiently fine-tuned.  Obviously, developing countries with higher income-levels oppose such 
further differentiation.  
2956 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4. 
2957 This means that those small trading partners will no longer be able to offer incentive schemes at 
more beneficial terms than other WTO Members so as to attract FDI.   
2958 Alternatively, the export contingency condition attached to incentives implemented in EPZs could 
be deleted.  If this strategy is adopted, these schemes would no longer be prohibited under the SCM 
Agreement but would still be vulnerable to actionable subsidy claims and CVDs action.  See Torres, 
above n 2640, at 220. 
2959 Torres, above n 2640, at 218. 
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This S&D treatment on export subsidies offered to a subset of low-income and small-trading 
developing countries is constrained in a double way.  First, such export subsidies (e.g., 
excessive rebates in EPZs) remain actionable and countervailable (Articles 27.7 and 27.10 of 
the SCM Agreement).2960  In my view, the importance of export subsidies as a development 
tool not only calls for raising the threshold to take unilateral CVDs action, but likewise 
suggests that the scope for actionable subsidies claims taken against export subsidies should 
be limited (Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement).2961  At present, it seems that WTO Members 
could base such claims on all types of adverse effects singled out under Article 5 of the SCM 
Agreement, whereas it would be appropriate to restrict such potential actions to the situations 
spelled out under Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement.  If this reasoning would be adopted, 
export subsidies would benefit from the same level of S&D treatment than the one offered to 
domestic subsidies.  
Second, the right to offer export subsidies also extinguishes in case a developing country has 
reached export competitiveness in a certain product (Article 27.6 of the SCM Agreement).  It 
seems unlikely that small-trading developing countries and LDCs will soon reach the required 
level of export competitiveness (3.25% in world trade) in any product.  Rather, this extinction 
might be of more significance to larger export-oriented developing countries listed in Annex 
VII(b), such as India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Egypt, and Pakistan.2962  Given that a 
positive determination of India’s export competitiveness in textiles has recently been made, it 
will have to gradually phase out its export subsidies over a period of eight years.  Although 
rather inscribed on request of other WTO Members to safeguard their trading interests, this 
export competitiveness exception also seems to serve as a useful exit mechanism in case 
export subsidies are no longer strictly needed.2963  Indeed, export subsidies seem no longer 
optimal once the infant industry has grown up.2964  For example, discovery-encouraging 
export subsidies to first-movers should only be temporary.2965  Nonetheless, the 2009 World 
Bank study not only underlined the importance of the ‘discovery phase’ but equally 
emphasized the significance of the ‘rapid-growth’ or acceleration phase of exports.2966  
                                                 
2960 Recall that export subsidies are deemed to be specific. 
2961 See discussion above under Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.2.   
2962 See S. Creskoff and P. Walkenhorst, ‘Implications of WTO Disciplines for Special Economic 
Zones in Developing Countries’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (2009), 42 pp., at 23. 
2963 See above Part II, Chapter 1, Section 1.4; Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1.1.3.  See, for example, 
Submission by the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, 22 November 1989), at 2; Communication 
from the United States (MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20, 15 June 1988), at 7. 
2964 Other instruments (e.g., domestic subsidies) might become more useful.  Rodrik even emphasized 
that incentives should only be provided to activities that are new to the domestic economy.  See Rodrik, 
‘One Economics – Many Recipes’, above n 2871, at 114.  
2965 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2.1. 
2966 R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, and P. Walkenhorst (eds), Breaking Into New Markets – Emerging 
Lessons for Export Diversification (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009), 265 pp.  See above Part 
I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2. 
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Because developing countries’ exporters often fail to penetrate new markets (i.e., 
geographical diversification), graduation on the basis of export competitiveness should not 
occur too swiftly.  This might underpin developing countries’ proposals to redefine this 
concept in a way that export competitiveness is not achieved as a result of short-term market 
fluctuations and to introduce the stop-the-clock mechanism in case their share in trade drops 
again below the prescribed threshold.  At the same time, the usefulness of this exit mechanism 
should urge WTO Members to solve their disagreements on the interpretation of essential 
elements revolving around export competitiveness (e.g., world trade, product level, starting 
point of graduation).  
 
The major downside of this policy space on export subsidies (and domestic subsidies2967) is 
the risk that governments are captured by producers’ interests when allocating subsidies.  
Therefore, some authors like Finger and Winters regret such flexibility as it prevents those 
countries to ‘tie their own hands’.2968  Yet, I would suggest that this inherent risk of any 
government intervention does not seem to justify further curtailing this policy flexibility 
under the WTO.  To recall the conclusion of the 2009 World Bank study: ‘laissez-faire 
policies combined with low tariffs are rarely sufficient to prompt dynamic export drives or 
overcome obstacles in other areas’.2969  The prevalence of market failures combined with the 
importance of dynamic export drives simply calls for flexibility on subsidizing exports in 
low-income developing countries.  Moreover, such an outward-oriented development strategy 
would generally be less prone to private capture than an import-substitution strategy because 
the former mostly entails a cost to the government whereas the latter generates tariff revenue.  
In addition, these low-income countries’ budgetary constraints might de facto prevent 
governments from overly subsidizing their exporting sector or entering into subsidy war.  
Development assistance used to promote the trading sector might also offer some oversight 
when based on soft or hard conditionalities.  Lastly, making such policy space subject to a 
development needs test under the WTO so as to prevent private capture does not seem a 
suitable option as well.  Until 2003, other developing countries were precisely given the right 
to grant export subsidies insofar these were consistent with their development needs (Article 
27.4 of the SCM Agreement).  Confronted with this test, however, the Panel in Brazil – 
Aircraft correctly deemed this provision as ‘troubling from the perspective of a panel’ 
because: 
                                                 
2967 See above Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 3.1.2. 
2968 Finger and Winters, above n 2922, at 387. 
2969 P. Brenton, R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, and P. Walkenhorts, ‘Breaking Into New Markets: 
Overview’, in R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, and P. Walkenhorst (eds), Breaking Into New Markets – 
Emerging Lessons for Export Diversification (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009) 1-35, at 27-28; 
see above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3.2.  
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An examination as to whether export subsidies are inconsistent with a developing country 
Member's development needs is an inquiry of a peculiarly economic and political nature, and 
notably ill-suited to review by a panel whose function is fundamentally legal.  Further, the 
SCM Agreement provides panels with no guidance with respect to the criteria to be applied in 
performing this examination. We consider that it is the developing country Member itself 
which is best positioned to identify its development needs and to assess whether its export 
subsidies are consistent with those needs.2970  
 
For these reasons, the policy space offered to some developing countries to subsidize their 
exports should be preserved.  At most, a more efficient notification procedure might increase 
the transparency on such export subsidies and reduce the risk of private capture.2971  On the 
other hand, explicitly recognizing that such subsidies are granted might not be warranted as 
long as these are vulnerable for CVDs action by trading partners. 
 
Before concluding, it should be reminded that the policy space offered to subsidize 
agricultural exports is conceptually different because it does not offer more extensive S&D 
treatment to the poorest developing countries.  Indeed, those developing countries having 
listed export subsidies under Article 9 of the Agreement on Agriculture are allowed to offer 
such listed (or non-listed) export subsidies up to their final commitment level as undertaken 
during the Uruguay Round.  On the basis of the latest proposal circulating in the Doha Round, 
these export subsidies would have to be phased-out by the end of 2016.  In addition, Article 
9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture offers flexibility to offer transport and marketing export 
subsidies, which in its broad interpretation would be available to all developing countries.  
Here, the latest Doha Round proposal provides for the extinction of this flexibility by 2021 
only.  In light of the renewed importance attached to the potential of the agricultural sector in 
developing countries, such policy space might be considered appropriate.2972  
 
3.2.2. The prohibition on export subsidies imposed upon other developing countries 
The principle prohibition on export subsidies for non-agricultural products (Article 3.1 of the 
SCM Agreement) is fully enforceable against all other developing countries since 2003.  As 
explained in Part I, authors belonging to the structuralist school have criticized the limitations 
set under the SCM Agreement upon developing countries’ freedom to offer subsidies, 
                                                 
2970 Therefore, the Panel considered that panels had to give substantial deference to the views of 
developing countries when confronted with this test.  See Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 7.89 
(footnotes deleted). 
2971 Article 25 of the SCM Agreement.  The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) already partly 
increases this transparency. 
2972 The need for diversification should not necessarily mean diversifying out of commodities into 
manufacturing goods though a single reliance on commodity trade might not be an optimal strategy 
given the volatility of this market.   
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whereby they primarily point to the ban on export subsidies.2973  In these authors’ view, those 
policy constraints would prevent developing countries to adopt the successful development 
path followed by the East-Asian Miracle countries and high-income countries in their early 
stages of development.  Precisely formulating this argument, Lee has elaborated upon a 
specific proposal to lift the ban on export subsidies with regard to developing countries and to 
give these countries policy space to offer a certain amount of (export) subsidies set in 
accordance to their development level.2974,2975  This level of so-called ‘development-
facilitation subsidies’ would be exempted from any potential multilateral (i.e., actionable or 
prohibited subsidy claims) or unilateral (i.e., CVDs) response by other WTO Members and 
only be subject to a procedural safeguard so as to prevent abuse.2976  Yet, Lee offers no details 
on the thorniest facet raised by his proposal: what amount of subsidies would be allowed for 
each developing country under such a sliding scale approach?  He only puts forward that this 
‘needs to be further debated with respect to their effect on development’.2977  Finally, Lee 
admits that his proposal might generate a detrimental subsidy race among developing 
countries, but this issue should be left to the judgment of the developing country in question: 
‘it will subsidize export industries that in its determination shows the best potential of 
success, and the possibility of these competing subsidies is part of the equation’.2978 
 
Bringing together our discussion on the strategy followed by the East Asian Miracle countries 
and the analysis of the prohibition on export subsidies,2979 one cannot but concur with the 
structuralist school’s overall conclusion that such development strategy can no longer be 
copied by larger developing countries under the current WTO framework.  In its revision of 
the factors explaining the East Asian success, the World Bank explicitly acknowledged the 
contribution of functional government interventions (i.e., targeting exports in general), though 
it was still somewhat more skeptical on the importance of selective interventions (i.e., 
subsidizing certain exporting sectors or industries in particular).2980  Yet, even functional 
interventions directly targeting exports in general, like subsidized credits or R&D subsidies 
                                                 
2973 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1. 
2974 Y-S. Lee, ‘Facilitating Development in the World Trading System – A Proposal for Development 
Facilitation Tariff and Development Facilitating Subsidy’, 38:6 Journal of World Trade (2004), 935–
954, at 948-954.  
2975 See also Y-S. Lee, ‘Economic Development and the World Trade Organization: Proposal for the 
Agreement on Development Facilitation and the Council for Trade and Development in the WTO’, in 
T. Chantal and J. Trachtman (eds), Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 291-319. 
2976 Next to notification to the WTO, this would provide for prior public notice as well as public 
hearings on its implementation.   
2977 Lee, above n 2974, at 951. 
2978 Lee, above n 2974, at 952-953. 
2979 On the East Asian Miracle, see above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1; for the analysis on export 
subsidies, see above Part II, Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1. 
2980 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1. 
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available to all exporters, would likely be captured under the current prohibition on export 
subsidies as these are deemed to be specific under the SCM Agreement (Article 2.3 of the 
SCM Agreement).2981  Making general available subsidies conditional upon export 
performance as part of a carrot-and-stick strategy is thus no longer allowed.  Therefore, even 
if one doubts that selective interventions were important to explain the East Asian Miracle, it 
cannot be denied that a similar strategy targeting exports can no longer be put in place by a 
group of developing countries.   
At the same time, the proposition that the success of this development strategy would urge a 
fundamental overhaul of the export subsidy disciplines with regard to developing countries 
might have to be nuanced as well. 
First, more open trade regimes in exporting markets (e.g., lower tariff barriers and a decreased 
scope for competitive subsidization by other countries) might suggest that the same level of 
policy space from which the East Asian Miracle countries benefited may not be necessarily 
required to penetrate export markets.  Indeed, it seems important to recognize that developed 
countries’ policy space for subsidization as well as for imposing CVDs has likewise been 
constrained since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.  This is a major advantage of the 
current system for larger developing countries that is often neglected by those authors 
pleading for more policy space to developing countries.  Take, for example, the rivalry 
between Brazil and Canada in the regional aircraft sector (Embraer versus Bombardier) that 
was fought out before the WTO (see above Part III).  One might criticize the fact that the 
SCM Agreement precluded Brazil from offering export credit support at subsidized terms to 
Embraer even when, as the Panel equally acknowledged, this might have been consistent with 
its development needs.2982,2983  At the same time, Brazil might never have won a subsidy war 
against Canada in the regional aircraft sector under the pre-SCM Agreement period.  The 
                                                 
2981 Recall that the condition of ‘export contingency’ is interpreted broadly under the case law.  
2982 In the words of the Panel: 
‘There could be any number of reasons why the provision of export subsidies might be 
consistent with a Member's development needs in such a case. For example, a developing 
country Member might be interested in the possible technological spin-off effects from the 
development and production of the product in question, or the need to establish a strong market 
presence and reputation in foreign markets as a stepping stone to introducing products with 
greater national value-added’. 
Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft, para 7.92. 
2983 Rodrik has exactly pointed to the outcome of this case against Brazil as an illustration that the 
WTO precludes development strategies employed by the East Asian Miracle countries:  
‘Brazil lost this case in the WTO, and will either remove the subsidies or have to put up with 
retaliation from Canada.  Successful performers such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Mauritius 
subsidized their export industries for years without incurring similar actions.’   
See Rodrik, ‘One Economics – Many Recipes’, above n 2871, at 226, footnote 13.  Yet, it should be 
stressed that Brazil was successful in its various counterclaims against Canadian export subsidies. 
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strengthening of the disciplines upon Canada under the SCM Agreement might have reduced 
the need for Brazil to offer export subsidies so as to compete in this market.2984  
Second, the tightening of export subsidy disciplines on developing countries that are higher 
on the development ladder might also be beneficial to lower income developing countries as it 
facilitates their penetration of new exporting markets.  Again, the fact that a group of low-
income developing countries still benefits from S&D treatment on export subsidies is 
regularly overlooked by proponents calling for more flexibility.  For example, in making their 
claim for export subsidies to induce self-discovery, Hausmann and Rodrik criticize that 
‘(n)ew international agreements in the context of the World Trade Organization have made 
such subsidies illegal’.2985  Yet, all countries used as examples to underpin their claim for 
government interventions’ inducing self-discovery are still allowed to use export subsidies to 
this end (e.g. India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Honduras).2986  Arguably, the value of their S&D 
treatment on export subsidies would be reduced if developing countries with higher income 
levels would also be allowed to employ such export subsidies.  
Third, domestic rather than trade instruments such as export subsidies might become more 
relevant for developing countries that have reached a certain income level, even though the 
cut-off point is difficult to define.  For instance, Rodriguez-Clare has argued that countries 
could in the first stage of development induce self-discovery along the lines suggested by 
Hausmann and Rodrik and that, once they have ‘discovered’ their comparative advantage, 
policies promoting clustering in some sectors should be put in place.2987  Instead of ‘hard’ 
industrial policies such as import substitution or export promotion used in the initial phase, 
‘soft’ industrial policies such as R&D subsidies, infrastructure investments, or regulatory 
reforms inducing clustering in some selected sectors should be employed in the next phase of 
development.2988  Even if one considers inducing self-discovery still important in the further 
                                                 
2984 Developed countries were already subject to a prohibition on export subsidies under the Subsidies 
Code.  Yet, the terms set under the OECD Arrangement were far less restrictive and the WTO dispute 
settlement system also improved the enforceability of this prohibition.  See also above Part III, Chapter 
1, Section 1.2.  
2985 R. Hausmann and D. Rodrik, ‘Economic Development as Self-discovery’, 72 Journal of 
Development Economics (2003), 603– 633.  In other publications, Rodrik recognizes that some 
countries benefit from an exemption on export subsidies but he often limits this S&D treatment to 
LDCs (see, for example, below n 2992).   
2986 Only one of the listed examples has recently graduated (i.e., Dominican Republic).   
2987Rodriguez-Clare gives the example of Costa Rica, which in the last decades effectively induced 
‘discovery’ through ‘hard’ policies such as aggressive export promotion and FDI attraction.  This has 
resulted in export diversification in agriculture (e.g., cut flowers and exotic plants) and manufacturing 
(e.g., textiles, medical devices, and microelectronic products).  A. Rodríguez-Clare, Microeconomic 
Interventions After the Washington Consensus (Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 
February 2005), 37 pp., at 23. 
2988 This would be more transparent and less costly.  Rodriguez-Clare’s suggestion to make a prior 
selection among all sectors which have shown to be successful in exporting (i.e., in which a country has 
revealed its comparative advantage) would likely be insufficient to categorize such grants as ‘export 
subsidies’ within the meaning of the SCM Agreement.  Note in this respect that the SCM Agreement 
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stage of development,2989 increased government capabilities might make it no longer needed 
to rely upon export performance so as to assess successful discoveries (i.e., carrot-and-stick 
argument).2990  In general, domestic market failures inhibiting further export diversification 
might not necessitate subsidies contingent upon exportation in case government capabilities 
and income levels have improved.2991  Therefore, policy space for domestic rather than export 
subsidies might turn out particularly relevant in later stages of development.  Once more, the 
reality that all developing countries are still enjoying more leeway to offer such domestic 
subsidies under the SCM Agreement seems not always sufficiently understood.2992   
Fourth, exempting export subsidies offered by all developing countries might even have an 
adverse impact on the dynamic of further tariff negotiations.2993  If, as under Lee’s proposal, 
WTO Members would be precluded from CVDs or multilateral action against foreign 
subsidization, they might become reluctant to make tariff cuts that could be further eroded by 
such (export) subsidization. 2994,2995   
For all these reasons, proposals to reinstall substantive leeway to all developing countries on 
export subsidies might be neither strictly needed nor realistic as they would be opposed by 
developed as well as low-income developing countries.  Yet, the activation of the prohibition 
                                                                                                                                            
explicitly provides that ‘(t)mere fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for 
that reason alone be considered to be an export subsidy’ (footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement).  The 
Appellate Body has also underscored that export orientation of a firm may form ‘a relevant factor’ but 
is insufficient on itself.  See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para 173 (emphasis in the 
original); Rodríguez-Clare, above n 2987, at 28. 
2989 See also above Part I, Chapter 4, Section 2.4.1. 
2990 Rodrik, for example, proposes to organize bids for public resources on the basis of pre-investment 
proposals so as to subsidize costs of self-discovery.  Rodrik, ‘One Economics – Many Recipes’, above 
n 2871, at 117. 
2991 The interventions listed by Rodrik as part of a successful industrial policy do not necessitate export 
subsidies.  Rodrik, ‘One Economics – Many Recipes’, above n 2871, at 117-119. 
2992 For instance, Rodrik seems to stress the importance of leeway on domestic subsidization. Hereby, 
however, he does not take into account the S&D treatment on such subsidies offered under the SCM 
Agreement:  
‘(T)he main external obstacle to the wider use of industrial policies by the larger developing 
countries is the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies.  This Agreement prohibits the use of subsidies 
which take the form of fiscal expenditures conditioned on export performance.  More seriously, 
it also renders “actionable” the use of subsidies that have the effect of increasing exports, even if 
they are not conditioned on exports. (Least developed countries are exempt from these rules). A 
literal application of this standard would rule of many kinds of industrial policies, the objective 
of which is precisely to increase the domestic supply of tradables’. 
See D. Rodrik, ‘Growth After the Crisis’, above n 2871, at 23.  Further, his observation seems not fully 
accurate because (i) S&D treatment on export subsidies applies to a broader group than just the LDCs 
group; (ii) LDCs do not benefit from more S&D treatment on domestic subsidies; and (iii) local content 
subsidies are not exempted but rather prohibited.     
2993 See also below (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.) on the systemic justification for CVDs action. 
2994 Such risk would be higher when green light is offered to export subsidies because of their more 
direct impact on trade compared to domestic subsidies.   
2995 Even with the CVDs option in place, the technical and financial resources needed to implement 
such unilateral actions in conformity with the SCM Agreement arguably makes them an inefficient 
instrument for many developing countries to protect their import-competing industries’ interest.  
Hence, these countries might still prefer substantive tariff overhang to be able to counter future 
subsidization. 
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on export subsidies with regard to developing countries is problematic insofar this ban is 
drafted in a way that reflects the interests of developed countries.  Firstly, the discussion in 
Part III has amply demonstrated that the current disciplines on export credit support are 
detrimental to developing countries, even though the case law has partly reduced this 
disequilibrium (items (j) and (k) of the Illustrative List).2996  Secondly, the fact that allowance 
for duty drawback systems is only foreseen for inputs ‘consumed in the production of the 
exported products’ (item (i) juncto Annex II of the SCM Agreement) also puts developing 
countries’ exporters at a disadvantage because they face relatively higher tariff levels on 
capital imports.2997  Although India’s proposal in the Doha Round to allow for rebates on 
capital goods is considered solid on economic grounds, developed countries lack any 
incentive to concur because it would ease internal pressure to lower tariffs on capital inputs 
by developing countries.2998  Likewise, India’s demand to allow for a uniform drawback rate 
for exporters seems not to be endorsed by most WTO Members either, even though the thrust 
of this proposal equally seems valid as it lowers the administrative burden upon developing 
countries to implement such resource-intensive drawback systems. 
 
According to Rodrik, disciplines imposed upon developing countries under the SCM 
Agreement might induce these countries to opt for undervalued currencies as a (inferior) 
strategy to boost exports.2999  In the next section, this particular functional intervention acting 
as a subsidy on exports is examined in light of existing SCM Agreement disciplines.3000  
Could an undervalued currency be challenged or countervailed under the SCM Agreement?   
 
3.2.3. Exchange rate policies under the SCM Agreement 
Economic research suggests that an undervalued currency could be a sensible strategy to 
boost exports in the first phase of development.3001  Because such a strategy comes at the 
                                                 
2996 Remind that the case law has rejected an a contrario reasoning of the cost-to-government standard 
in items (j) and (k), paragraph 1 of the Illustrative List and has restrictively interpreted the scope for 
invoking the safe haven (OECD Arrangement).   
2997 Allowing drawbacks on capital inputs is precisely one of the measures that developing countries 
still benefit who from S&D treatment on export subsidies have implemented as part of their EPZs 
policy.  However, these exemptions could still be challenged as actionable subsidies or be 
countervailed (see also below n 2998.   
2998 In expanding the scope for duty drawbacks under footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement juncto item (i) 
of the Illustrative List, such amendment would place drawbacks on capital inputs outside the reach of 
actionable subsidy claims or CVDs action as well. 
2999 D. Rodrik, ‘Growth After the Crisis’, above n 2871, at 15. 
3000 Policy tools to affect the real exchange rate are listed in D. Rodrik, ‘The Real Exchange Rate and 
Economic Growth’, Working Paper (October, 2008), 35 pp. 
3001 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2.  Mattoo and Subramanian hold that an undervalued 
currency is ‘the most mercantilist policy imaginable’ because it is both an import tax and export 
subsidy.  At the same time, they acknowledge that an undervalued currency ‘can be a tool for economic 
development—at least, ruling it out as a tool would be difficult to justify on economic grounds’.  They 
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expense of trading partners (i.e., in the form a trade deficit), an undervalued currency 
becomes, however, problematic in case it is sustained by a country that has a substantive 
share in world trade.  This is precisely the reason why China’s undervalued currency has 
attracted increased criticism over the last years.  The growing trade imbalance with China has 
prompted the question in the US whether an undervalued exchange rate could be challenged 
or countervailed under the SCM Agreement.3002,3003  For those developing countries still 
benefiting from S&D treatment on export subsidies, this question is relevant insofar the 
qualification as a specific subsidy would make their products benefiting from an undervalued 
exchange rate vulnerable to CVDs action.3004  Those countries like China that do not benefit 
from S&D treatment on export subsidies might in addition be confronted with a prohibited 
subsidy claim before the WTO.  
 
In essence, China operates an exchange rate policy whereby the yuan/dollar exchange rate is 
kept stable.3005,3006  Through interventions in the foreign exchange market (i.e., selling yuans 
in exchange for dollars), the People’s Bank of China prevents that its growing trade surplus 
would lead to a (faster) appreciation of the yuan vis-à-vis the dollar.3007  In economic terms, 
such an undervalued exchange rate works as a combination of an import duty and an export 
subsidy.3008  Overall, most scholars are rather sceptical that an effect similar to an across-the-
board export subsidy is sufficient to label it as an export subsidy in legal terms, although all 
acknowledge that this query is certainly not settled as of yet.3009,3010,3011  Overall, I concur that 
                                                                                                                                            
suggest applying a similar income threshold on exchange rate policies as the one inscribed under the 
SCM Agreement on export subsidy disciplines.  To be sure, they consider that an undervalued currency 
is actually not captured under the export subsidy definition of the SCM Agreement.  A. Mattoo and A. 
Subramanian, ‘Currency Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role for the World 
Trade, Organization’, Peterson Institute for International Economics – Working Paper Series (January 
2008), 31 pp., at 5 and 12. 
3002 At the moment of writing, the US Commerce Department is again considering whether this would 
qualify as a countervailable subsidy. 
3003 The argument that China’s exchange rate regime could be challenged under Article XV:4 of the 
GATT is not discussed.  Notice only that this claim requires demonstration that this regime ‘frustrates 
the intent of the provisions of this Agreement’. 
3004 An actionable subsidy claim would be unlikely but is not ruled out legally. 
3005 Exchange rate policies refer to the ‘determination of the value of the local currency expressed in a 
foreign currency’.  See E. Denters, ‘Manipulation of Exchange Rates in International Law: The 
Chinese Yuan’, ASIL Insights (November 2003). 
3006 For technical details on China’s current exchange rate regime, see R. W. Staiger and A. O. Sykes, 
‘Currency “manipulation” and world trade: a caution’, in S. J. Evenett (ed), The US-Sino Currency 
Dispute: New Insights from Economics, Politics and Law (London: CEPR, 2010), 109-113. 
3007 In fact, China allowed some appreciation of the yuan against the dollar in recent years but this 
appreciation would be larger without interventions.  Most commentators agree that the yuan is still 
undervalued. 
3008 See, for example, Staiger and Sykes, above n 3006; Mattoo and Subramanian, above n 3001, at 5. 
3009 Authors being sceptical on whether an export subsidy determination could be made: D. Ahn, ‘Is the 
Chinese Exchange-rate Regime WTO-legal?’, in S. J. Evenett (ed), The US-Sino Currency Dispute: 
New Insights from Economics, Politics and Law (London: CEPR, 2010), 139-145; C. Herrmann, ‘Don 
Yuan: China’s “Selfish” Exchange Rate Policy and International Economic Law’, in C. Herrmann and 
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an undervalued exchange rate, like the Chinese currency, would very likely not pass the 
different criteria (i.e., financial contribution, benefit, specific) to qualify as a challengeable or 
countervailable subsidy under the SCM Agreement.3012    
 
3.2.3.1. Financial contribution analysis 
Bringing an undervalued exchange rate under the financial contribution (or income or price 
support) element seems to contradict the closed list approach.3013  However, a variety of 
counterarguments have been articulated under all three types of financial contributions listed 
in Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.   
First, Magnus and Brightill consider that a financial contribution exists ‘any time a 
government and a company trade one thing for another, even yuans for dollars’.3014  After all, 
governments participating in exchange transactions are directly providing ‘goods’ (Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iii)) or transferring ‘funds’ (Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)) and, in case they rely on private 
banks to handle exchanges, they would ‘entrust’ private bodies to make such contributions 
                                                                                                                                            
J.P. Terhechte (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2010 (Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 2010), 31-51; G. Hufbauer and C. Brunel, The US Congress and the Chinese Yuan 
(Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2007), 20 pp.; G. C. 
Hufbauer, Y. Wong, and K. Sheth, US – China Trade Dispute: Rising Tide, Rising Stakes (Washington: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2006), 122 pp.; Staiger and Sykes, above n 
3006; Mattoo and Subramanian, above n above n 3001; J. P. Trachtman, ‘Yuan to fight about it? The 
WTO legality of China’s exchange regime’, in S. J. Evenett (ed), The US-Sino Currency Dispute: New 
Insights from Economics, Politics and Law (London: CEPR, 2010), 127-131; M. Waibel, ‘Retaliating 
against exchange rate manipulation under WTO rules’, in S. J. Evenett (ed), The US-Sino Currency 
Dispute: New Insights from Economics, Politics and Law (London: CEPR, 2010), 133-137. 
3010 Authors being less sceptical on whether an export subsidy determination could be made: M. 
Benitah, ‘China’s Fixed Exchange Rate for the Yuan: Could the United States Challenge it in the WTO 
as a Subsidy?’, 117 ASIL Insight (October 2003) (this author concludes that it would not be easy but 
still possible to make such determination); J. Magnus and T. C. Brightbill, ‘China's Currency Regime is 
Legitimately Challengeable as a Subsidy under ASCM rules’, in S. J. Evenett (ed), The US-Sino 
Currency Dispute: New Insights from Economics, Politics and Law (London: CEPR, 2010), 147-152; J. 
Magnus, ‘Chinese Subsidies and U.S. Responses’, Testimony before the U.S. - China Economic and 
Security Review Commission – Hearing on China’s World Trade Organization Compliance: Industrial 
Subsidies and the Impact on U.S. and World Markets (5 April 2004), 7 pp.    
3011 The so-called ‘China Currency Coalition’ (recently renamed to ‘Fair Currency Coalition’) is a 
group of US industry, service, and labor organizations that pleads for the imposition of CVDs against 
Chinese imports on the basis of its undervalued currency.   
3012 Recall that China does not benefit from any exception with regard to the prohibition on export 
subsidies. 
3013 To phrase the words of the Appellate Body, the financial contribution element ‘involves 
consideration of the nature of the transaction’ (Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para 
52) and exchange rate transactions do not seem to be included.  For authors expressing doubts on 
whether the financial contribution element would be passed: Ahn, above n 3009, at 142; Herrmann, 
above n 3009, at 49; Hufbauer and Brunel, above n 3009, at 10; Hufbauer, Wong, and Sheth, above n 
3009, at 21-22; Trachtman, above n 3009, at 130; Waibel, above n 3009, at 135. 
3014 In a previous contribution, Magnus had clarified that ‘all governments that participate in exchange 
transactions are providing financial contributions – either directly under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) or, if they 
rely on private banks to handle exchanges, via the “entrusts or directs” standard of Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iv)’.  Alternatively, he suggested that such exchange transaction would qualify as a ‘direct 
transfer of funds’ (Article 1.1(a)(i)). Magnus, above n 3010, at 4. 
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(Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv)).3015  Nonetheless, Hufbauer et al have accurately responded that such a 
strong conclusion would need ‘verbatim SCM language to prevail’ because it would imply 
that any central bank operation in the foreign exchange market would qualify as a financial 
contribution under the SCM Agreement.3016   
Second, it has been suggested that the Chinese government would provide a service (Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iii)) in the form of currency hedging as a result of keeping the exchange rate 
stable.3017  The argument goes that such a stable exchange rate regime would free Chinese 
exporters from hedging against foreign exchange risk.  Yet, bringing in this way fixed 
exchange rate regimes within the scope of the SCM Agreement would likely not be 
successful.  If such a service would be considered contingent upon exporting, this reasoning 
would generate the untenable conclusion that all fixed exchange rate regimes would simply be 
prohibited under the SCM Agreement.3018  If the service would not be considered contingent 
upon exportation because Chinese importers benefit as well, it would be non-specific under 
Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.   
Third, some have argued that China ‘foregoes revenue’ (Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)) because the 
undervalued exchange rate would make imports more expensive.  Hence, the government 
would forego tariff revenue.  Yet, this argumentation might be difficult to endorse as well.  
Indeed, Staiger and Sykes have questioned the economic validity of this argument because it 
is not sure that net tariff revenues would effectively fall back under such exchange rate 
regime.3019  Moreover, there is no precedence that any budget cost resulting from an 
undervalued exchange rate could qualify as revenue foregone.3020  Here, the financial 
contribution (i.e., revenue foregone upon imports) would seem to be too unrelated to the 
challenged benefit upon exporters (i.e., subsidy upon exports).   
 
3.2.3.2. Benefit analysis 
On the whole, the most credible suggestion regarding the financial contribution element 
would be to label foreign exchange transactions as a direct transfer of funds (Article 
                                                 
3015 Staiger and Sykes also suggest that exchange transactions by the government are ‘direct transfer of 
funds’ to entities trading in the foreign exchange market.  Although these transactions are mostly not 
made by domestic exporters, these authors underscore that such a direct transfer to exporters is not 
required under Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.  R. W. Staiger and A. O. Sykes, ‘ “Currency 
manipulation” and World Trade’, NBER Working Paper No. 14600 (December 2008), 42 pp., at 32-33. 
3016 Hufbauer, Wong, and Sheth, above n 3009, at 21, footnote 28. 
3017 This was argued by the ‘China Currency Coalition’ and referred to by Magnus (above n 3010).   
3018 Such a service would be considered extended at beneficial terms because no cost is charged.  
According to Magnus, ‘(a)s far as I can tell, exporters pay nothing for this service. “Nothing” might 
well be characterized as “less than adequate remuneration.” Indeed, if the currency regime really does 
include this feature, it might even be considered a per se ASCM violation under item (j) of the 
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies (ASCM Annex 1) (…)’. Magnus, above n 3010, at 5. 
3019 Staiger and Sykes, above n 3015, at 32-33. 
3020 Hufbauer and Brunel, above n 3009, at 10; Hufbauer, Wong, and Sheth, above n 3009, at 21-22. 
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1.1(a)(1)(i)).  But even if this too creative interpretation would be accepted, it should still be 
determined that such foreign exchange transactions confer a benefit (Article 1.1(b) of the 
SCM Agreement).  Again, this threshold is not easily passed.  Two different types of 
benchmarks seem to be suggested.   
On the one hand, the nature of the financial contribution might refer to the foreign exchange 
market to discern the appropriate benchmark.  Hereby, the benefit analysis would not focalize 
on exporters but on all entities trading in the foreign exchange market: is this transfer of funds 
to entities trading in the foreign exchange market extended at better-than-market terms?  Yet, 
as Magnus acknowledges,3021 there exists no separate private market in or outside China for 
dollar-to-yuan exchanges at privately negotiated prices (i.e., where a lower price would be 
paid for yuans than the rate set by the Chinese government).3022  Hence, actors operating in 
the foreign exchange market do therefore not seem to receive a benefit in the technical 
meaning of the SCM Agreement.   
On the other hand, most authors refer to the outcome of the government’s foreign exchange 
interventions to address the benefit analysis: the generated undervalued exchange rate would 
benefit exporters in particular.  Although the financial contribution (i.e., foreign exchange 
transaction) would in most cases not directly involve exporters, a benefit in the form of an 
undervalued exchange rate would be present.  As correctly emphasized by scholars, the pass-
through cases (e.g., US – Softwood Lumber IV) have shown that the recipient of the financial 
contribution and the beneficiary should not be one and the same person to qualify as a subsidy 
under the SCM Agreement.3023  So, one might suggest that the pass-through cases indicate 
that a direct transfer of funds to exporters is not strictly required.  However, a key difference 
with those pass-through cases is that the initial recipient does not seem to receive a benefit in 
the legal sense.3024  As argued in the previous paragraph, entities trading in the foreign 
exchange market do not seem to receive a benefit in the legal sense.  Even in case the benefit 
analysis would focalize on the appropriateness of the exchange rate, such an assessment by a 
panel or CVDs-investigating authority would not only be highly sensitive in political terms 
but also notoriously difficult in economic terms.3025  Indeed, what level of exchange rate 
would be singled out as benchmark to reach the conclusion that the actual exchange rate is 
undervalued?3026     
                                                 
3021 Magnus, above n 3010, at 5. 
3022 Magnus makes this argument with regard to the provision of a ‘good’ (Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the 
SCM Agreement). 
3023 Staiger and Sykes, above n 3015, at 32.  See above Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2. 
3024 The benefit upon the exporters is also inherent in the transaction in case of export credit support.  
3025 Moreover, Staiger and Sykes have explained that price adjustments might offset benefits of an 
undervalued exchange rate.  Staiger and Sykes, above n 3015. 
3026 Strictly speaking, a panel is not obliged to exactly quantify the benefit upon exporters under Article 
1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.  In contrast, a CVDs-investigating authority will have to make such 
calculation to make sure that CVDs are not imposed beyond the conferred benefit.   
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3.2.3.3. Specificity analysis 
Finally, if an undervalued exchange rate would meet the criteria of a subsidy under the SCM 
Agreement, it still has to fulfil the specificity element to be disciplined and countervailable 
(Article 2 of the SCM Agreement).  Because the exchange rate is generally applicable, this 
hurdle can only be met if it is shown that the undervalued exchange rate is contingent upon 
exportation.3027  Indeed, an export subsidy is deemed to be specific by virtue of Article 2.3 of 
the SCM Agreement.  Once more, conflicting views have been expressed on whether the 
export contingency element is fulfilled.  Some scholars hold that the exchange rate is not 
contingent upon exports since it applies across the board to all sorts of transactions (e.g., 
transfers for direct investments in China).3028  Others, however, conclude that an undervalued 
exchange rate is de facto tied to exports because it predominantly benefits exporters.3029  
Clearly, the latter view relies upon an expansive interpretation of the concept of de facto 
export contingency.3030  If this third element would be met, an undervalued exchange rate 
would be countervailable as well as prohibited under the SCM Agreement (Article 1 juncto 3 
of the SCM Agreement).3031   
 
3.2.3.4. Conclusion 
This discussion has amply demonstrated that it would be highly difficult to categorize an 
undervalued exchange rate regime as an ‘export subsidy’ under the SCM Agreement.  It 
would require a creative and expansive interpretation of all different elements stipulated in 
Article 1 juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement.  This lack of clarity suggests that WTO Members 
would have been much more specific if they had intended to prohibit an undervalued 
exchange rate regime as an export subsidy under the WTO.3032  As Ahn accurately explained, 
the fact that the detailed Illustrative List does not include this ‘well known – probably the 
most important – contributing factor for export promotion’ indicates that they did not meant 
to outlaw an undervalued exchange regime under the SCM Agreement.  Along the same lines, 
                                                 
3027 In the words of Hufbauer and Brunel, ‘(c)hanges in exchange rates and interest rates would seem to 
be the opposite of “specific” policies. They rank among the broadest measures that a government can 
employ to influence the economy’.  Hufbauer and Brunel, above n 3009, at 11. 
3028 See for example Ahn, above n 3009, at 142, Herrmann, above n 3009, at 49; Trachtman, above n 
3009, at 130; Waibel, above n 3009, at 136. 
3029 See Benitah, above n 3010; Magnus, above n 3010, at 6. 
3030 Observe in this respect that the financial contribution (i.e., foreign exchange transactions by the 
government) is certainly not contingent upon exportation. However, according to the latter group of 
authors, the alleged benefit upon exporters (i.e., undervalued exchange rate) would be contingent upon 
exports.   
3031 With regard to developing countries benefiting from S&D treatment on export subsidies, such an 
undervalued exchange rate would be challengeable as an actionable subsidy (Article 27.7 of the SCM 
Agreement). 
3032 The lack of clarity would also direct a panel towards the negotiating history as supplementary 
means of interpretation (Article 32 of the Vienna Convention).  
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Hufbauer and Brunel consider that ‘they would have said so – in the (SCM Agreement) or 
predecessor agreements, stretching back to the 1960s’.3033  In fact, there was no need to 
include devalued exchange rates as a form of export subsidy at the time the initial list was 
drafted (i.e., 1960 Declaration) because of the par value system operated by the IMF.  Already 
during the initial GATT/ITO negotiations on export subsidies, it was recognized that the risk 
of competitive devaluations was reduced under this system because such devaluations needed 
IMF approval.  Hence, oversight of the exchange rate was considered a matter dealt with by 
the IMF.  Since the collapse of the par value system in the 1970s, the risk of such competitive 
devaluations is no longer prevented by the IMF as leaves its Members in principle free to 
choose their exchange rate system.3034  Yet, if GATT Contracting Parties had meant to close 
this important loophole by qualifying an undervalued exchange rate as a prohibited export 
subsidy, they would – and should – have been much more explicit as this would generate a 
fundamental overhaul in the division of tasks between the IMF and the GATT/WTO.3035  
Interestingly and somewhat ironic in light of the current debate, the US tabled the precisely 
opposite proposal in the GATT when it abandoned the par value system and devalued the 
dollar in the beginning of the 1970s.  It fruitlessly suggested adding to the list of prohibited 
export subsidies:   
 
Special government measures to offset, in whole or in part, the price disadvantages on exports 
that result from its own or other countries’ exchange rate adjustments.3036 
 
To be clear, such compensation to exporters for its own or other countries’ exchange rate 
adjustments would actually qualify as a prohibited export subsidy under Article 1 juncto 3 of 
the SCM Agreement and thus be prohibited, unless a WTO Member benefits from S&D 
treatment on export subsidies.  In contrast, the argument that an undervalued exchange rate 
qualifies as a prohibited export subsidy could not be endorsed in the absence of a clear textual 
basis and support in the negotiating history.   
 
 
                                                 
3033 Hufbauer and Brunel, above n 3009, at 10; Hufbauer, Wong, and Sheth, above n 3009, at 21-23. 
3034 There is only an explicit obligation to avoid manipulating exchange rates, but the IMF lacks an 
effective mechanism to enforce this obligation.  On the obligations of IMF Members under the IMF 
Articles of Agreement, see Herrmann, above n 3009, at 40-45.   
3035 They could have either added it to the Illustrative List or discussed its inclusion under Article 1 
juncto 3 of the SCM Agreement. 
3036 Proposal by the United States, Supplementary List of Practices that Constitute an Export Subsidy 
(INT(73)58, 26 June 1973).   
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4. DISCIPLINES ON COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
Upon fulfilment of procedural and substantive requirements spelled out under the SCM 
Agreement, WTO Members are allowed to levy unilateral CVDs measures on imported 
products for the purpose of offsetting specific subsidies.  Recapitulating to some extent the 
theory set out in Part I, this section starts with an elaboration of the rationale for imposing 
such CVDs.  Why do individual countries choose to impose CVDs?  Conversely, why would 
other countries show an interest in limiting the reach of such CVDs in a multilateral trading 
system?  Both inquiries will lead us to the normative assessment of the scope for CVDs action 
that should be given under WTO.  This normative analysis will be developed through an 
introduction on the historical debate in the US on the purpose of its CVDs action.   
 
4.1. THE RATIONALE FOR IMPOSING AND RESTRICTING CVDS ACTION 
In Part I, it was explained that countries do not seem to be inspired by the objective to 
maximize national welfare when imposing CVDs.3037  After all, countries would rather send a 
‘thank you note’ to the subsidizing country instead of imposing CVDs in light of the welfare-
improving effects of subsidized imports (i.e., term of trade benefit).  In fact, only in very 
specific circumstances could CVDs be used as welfare-improving instruments.  Three such 
situations have been distinguished.  First, a large country could craft an ‘optimal CVD’ under 
which the created distortions would be more than compensated by a terms of trade gain.  Yet, 
information requirements to set up this ‘optimal CVD’ might be highly demanding and 
welfare would also fall back again to the pre-subsidy level in case such CVDs would 
effectively lead to the withdrawal of the foreign subsidy.3038  Second, in strategic trade 
settings, CVDs could be useful to claw back some rents deprived by foreign profit-shifting 
export subsidies.  But again, information requirements (e.g., on the strategic trade 
relationship) make it questionable whether CVDs could hereby be designed in a welfare-
maximizing way.3039  Third, in times of congestion in the labor market, CVDs could be useful 
to slow the adjustment process in the import-competing industry.  However, safeguards would 
be a more appropriate instrument to this end.   
In sum, the difficulty in each of these three situations to effectively employ CVDs as national 
welfare-maximizing instrument puts further doubt on whether governments are effectively 
concerned with the goal of enhancing welfare when considering CVDs action.  Rather, CVDs 
action in most cases only serves producers’ welfare in the import-competing market at the 
                                                 
3037 See above Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1.3. 
3038 Moreover, the static welfare analysis also neglects that trade protective instruments such as CVDs 
might hamper productivity improvements in the importing country.  See above n 55. 
3039 At the same time, Sykes observes that CVDs ‘may be less harmful on average in case they roughly 
fit the strategic trade paradigm’.  Sykes, above n 2665, at 707. 
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expense of national welfare.  This suggests that the rationale for imposing CVDs should be 
explained in political-economy terms (i.e., protecting the interests of producers) rather than in 
national welfare-maximizing terms.3040,3041   
Significantly, Grossman and Mavroidis have found support for this conclusion in the 
disciplines on CVDs measures elaborated upon in the SCM Agreement.3042  Indeed, as 
explained in Part II, CVDs action is not confined to those situations in which a presumption 
of a welfare loss has been demonstrated but only depends upon the demonstration of injury to 
the domestic industry.  Similarly, the 2009 World Trade Report concurred that disciplines in 
the SCM Agreement ‘support the idea that governments need countervailing duties to help 
domestic producers’ and that ‘(p)olitical economy considerations help to explain why 
governments might use countervailing duties’.3043,3044  Analogous political-economy 
considerations might arguably explain why alleged subsidizing countries have advocated 
multilateral disciplines restricting the leeway for CVDs measures.  To preserve the interests of 
their exporters to the US market, countries have systematically urged in different 
GATT/WTO rounds to put more stringent disciplines on this unilateral response in place.  
Here, their proposals, likely motivated by political-economy reasons, might be justified on 
welfare grounds as well.  Even in those limited situations where they could be considered 
welfare-improving for the country undertaking such unilateral action, CVDs come at the 
expense of welfare in the rest of the world and in the subsidizing country in particular.  Only 
if they would help governments to deter ‘wasteful’ subsidization (i.e., ‘tie their hands’), WTO 
Members might be grateful that such system for CVDs action is in place in trading partners.  
This brings us to the inquiry on whether a normative argument could be constructed justifying 
a multilateral trading system that gives leeway to impose CVDs.  Could such a system be 
defended even though governments’ motive to take such action is to protect the narrow 
interests of their producers and given the welfare effects are generally detrimental to both the 
CVDs imposing country and the world as whole? 
 
                                                 
3040 Jackson also concluded that the motive of governments in applying CVDs is ‘to maximize the 
producers who constitute important political constituencies within the country’.  J. H. Jackson, 
‘Perspectives on CVDs’, 21 Law & Policy in International Business (1990), 739-761, at 743.   
3041 Sykes notes that, in practice, CVDs also seem to be imposed in industries in which the forces of 
protection are active.  Sykes, above n 2661, at 103.  
3042 Grossman and Mavroidis, ‘Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?’, above n 2666, at 198-199. 
3043 The injury test also supported ‘the idea that the main rationale for countervailing duty law is to 
protect an entitlement of domestic producers to be insulated from the harmful effects of foreign 
subsidies rather than to promote global efficiency’.  WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2009 – 
Trade Policy Commitments and Contingency Measures (Geneva: WTO Publications, 2009), 171 pp., at 
xviii. 
3044 World Trade Report 2009, above n 3043, at xvii. 
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4.2. THE RATIONALE FOR ALLOWING CVDS ACTION UNDER A MULTILATERAL TRADING 
SYSTEM 
In the 1980s, a vivid discussion emerged on the purpose of the CVDs law in the US, by far 
the main user of CVDs and being under pressure in GATT negotiations to restrict the scope of 
its CVDs law.  Displaying a somewhat blurred distinction between positive and normative 
theory,3045 this debate was initiated by Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz and further elaborated 
upon by Diamond.3046  These authors criticized the deterrence or global efficiency rationale3047 
of CVDs law, according to which CVDs help to promote the efficiency of global resource 
allocation by deterring ‘inefficient’ (i.e., global welfare-reducing) subsidization.  In their 
view, this deterrence rationale is unconvincing because it ignores that subsidies might be 
appropriate to correct market failures and thus lead to a more efficient resource allocation 
(e.g., stimulating activities that generate positive externalities).3048  In short, by failing to 
distinguish ‘good’ from ‘bad’ subsidies, CVDs laws cannot be explained on the basis of 
deterring wasteful subsidization.  For that reason, these authors have postulated an alternative 
rationale for CVDs law, labeled the ‘entitlement rationale’:    
 
The entitlement rationale is equally consistent with a ‘property rights’ stance that views 
domestic firms having a right to ‘insulation’ from adverse and uncompensated international 
manipulations, even if such manipulations are efficiency-enhancing in a more global sense.3049 
 
Hence, according to the proponents of this entitlement theory, the purpose of CVDs is 
(should?) not (be) to deter subsidization but to offset its effect in the US.  In the words of 
Diamond, ‘the proper purpose (of CVDs law) is not to deter all foreign subsidies, but, rather, 
to assure domestic producers that foreign subsidies will not allow recipient firms to increase 
their direct competitive position in the US market’.3050  Therefore, the level of CVDs should 
not be based on the full amount of the benefit generated by the subsidy to the recipient, as the 
deterrent approach would suggest, but on the level of injury caused to the import-competing 
industry in the US market.3051  Only if – and to the extent that – subsidies affect marginal 
costs, firms will decide to increase output.  It is only in that case that import-competing 
                                                 
3045 Indeed, it is unclear whether they aimed at revealing the actual purpose of CVDs law (i.e., what its 
purpose is?) or its normative purpose (i.e., what its purpose should be?).   
3046 Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz, above n 2671, at 17-32; Diamond, above n 2671, at 767-812; 
Diamond, above n 2670, at 507-608. 
3047 This is also called the ‘efficient resource allocation’ rationale. 
3048 Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz, above n 2671, at 17-18; Diamond, above n 2671, at 778-780.  
Diamond also referred to the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code which acknowledged the potential proper 
role of domestic subsidies. 
3049 Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz, above n 2671, at 19 
3050 Diamond, above n 2671, at 811.  
3051 This difference in positions also fits the broader and older debate between the ‘injury-only’ school 
and the ‘anti-distortion’ view.  The first school is principally concerned with correcting the injury that 
comes from subsidized trade, whereas the latter school highlights the inefficient consequences of 
subsidization.  See Hufbauer and Erb, above n 2883, at 19-24. 
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producers will be negatively affected (i.e., lower output at a lower price) and that CVDs 
should be imposed.3052   
Yet, Sykes, Trebilcock, as well as Jackson rightly discovered an ambiguity in the entitlement 
theory: it fails to explain why such an entitlement to national producers could be normatively 
endorsed.3053  Why should producers be entitled to CVDs action offsetting injury imposed 
upon them, given that foreign subsidization could very well be global and national welfare-
improving?  Put differently, why should the (correct) dismissal of the deterrence rationale 
imply the adoption of the entitlement theory if the first-best option with regard to CVDs law 
seems rather simple from a welfare perspective: ‘abandon it’.3054  Insofar adherence to the 
entitlement theory would result in lower levels of CVDs, it could in Sykes’ view be welcomed 
as a kind of second-best reform in case abandoning CVDs is politically unfeasible.  Yet, he 
even doubted whether lower CVDs levels would be achieved if the entitlement rationale 
would be endorsed.3055   
 
This discussion perfectly introduces our examination on whether the SCM Agreement should 
allow for the imposition of CVDs (i.e., normative theory perspective).  Broadly speaking, 
three different lines of argumentation could be distinguished.3056  These are discussed in more 
detail.   
 
4.2.1. The deterrence justification 
Proponents of the deterrence or global efficiency justification would argue that CVDs 
promote the efficiency of global resource allocation by deterring wasteful subsidization.3057  
Thus, the threat or actual use of CVDs by trading partners would help national governments 
to withstand pressure from their producers who lobby for welfare-detrimental subsidies.  Yet, 
this justification is based on two assumptions that do not seem to hold: CVDs should only (or 
primarily) target wasteful subsidization and should be able to effectively deter such 
subsidization.   
                                                 
3052 A firm’s marginal revenue is a function of market demand, whereas it marginal costs is a function 
of production costs.  In contrast to variable costs, fixed costs do not vary with the level of production in 
the short-run.   
3053 Sykes, above n 2665, at 701; M. J. Trebilcock, ‘Is the Game Worth the Candle? Comments on a 
Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration of U.S. Countervailing Duty Law’, 
21 Law & Policy in International Business (1990), 723-737, at 728; Jackson, above n 3040, at 742. 
3054 Sykes, above n 2665, at 700, 701.   
3055 Sykes and Trebilcock also questioned whether it would be feasible to implement the entitlement 
theory in practice because determination of the subsidy effect on marginal costs seems notoriously 
difficult.  Sykes, above n 2665, at 717; Trebilcock, above n 3053, at 726-727. 
3056 These positions are distinguished by Sykes, above n 2928.  
3057 Magnus refers to the importance of the subsidy-deterring potential of CVDs.  J. R. Magnus, ‘World 
Trade Subsidy Discipline: Is This the “Retrenchment Round”?’, 38:6 Journal of World Trade (2004), 
985-1047, at 991. 
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First, as stressed by proponents of the entitlement theory, CVDs might in practice very well 
target legitimate foreign subsidies that aim at correcting market failures.  Also under the SCM 
Agreement, there is no guarantee whatsoever that CVDs merely target ‘wasteful’ subsidies.  
After all, subsidies offered by developing countries are not shielded from CVDs action, even 
though it is explicitly recognized in the SCM Agreement that subsidization may play an 
important role in these countries’ development strategies.  Moreover, CVDs action against 
developed countries is surely not confined to wasteful subsidization as subsidies that were 
previously offered green light status (e.g., R&D subsidies) have become countervailable.   
Second, even in case CVDs would target wasteful subsidization, the deterrence justification 
only holds when CVDs would effectively deter the allocation of such subsidies.  This first of 
all means that the deterrence justification could at most underpin CVDs action by large 
countries.3058  Indeed, CVDs imposed by small countries do not affect foreign producers and 
will therefore not alter foreign governments’ behaviour.  Assessing whether CVDs systems 
set up in large countries in reality deter foreign subsidization is rather complicated because 
the threat of such CVDs action might precisely prevent the allocation of subsidies in the first 
place.  Hence, the most effective way of deterrence (i.e., preventing the use subsidies) is not 
directly observable in the data.   
Back in the 1980s and on the basis of discussions with government officials, Jackson 
provided some anecdotic evidence documenting that potential US CVDs action induced other 
countries to rethink their subsidy programmes.3059  He therefore suggested that US CVDs laws 
had some effect on discouraging the use of subsidies.  Yet, Sykes was at that time more 
skeptical that the US CVDs action was indeed effective in this respect, because the unilateral 
imposition by a single country will deter subsidization by other countries only by hazard.3060  
Turning to the present situation, Sykes observes that only a limited number of WTO Members 
use CVDs and that they have merely taken such action in a relatively small number of cases.  
Such sporadic and uncoordinated CVDs action could simply divert subsidized products to 
other countries, which strongly reduces their deterrent effect.  Moreover, CVDs action will 
only be undertaken against subsidy programmes if and when those become known to trading 
partners.  When detection takes time, recipients will benefit from subsidization before the 
CVDs measure is put in place.3061  The 2009 World Trade Report concurred with Sykes’ 
                                                 
3058 See also Jackson, above n 3040, at 744. 
3059 Making an accurate distinction between positive and normative theory, Jackson concluded that ‘if 
the world would be better off if there were a general reduction of the use by governments of subsidies 
relating to products that flow in international trade, one could argue that the U.S. policies, motivated 
for entirely different reasons, may fortuitously or coincidentally be having a salutary effect on the 
world economy’.  Jackson, above n 3040, at 745, 755.   
3060 See also Sykes, above n 2928, at 260. 
3061 See Sykes, above n 2661, at 104. 
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argumentation and thus agreed that it is doubtful that the threat of CVDs action within the 
WTO system does much to discourage subsidization.3062 
 
Proponents of the deterrence justification would principally favour rather flexible procedural 
and substantive disciplines on the imposition of CVDs so as to maximize their deterrent 
effect.  For instance, making the lesser-duty-rule mandatory under the SCM Agreement would 
be unwise from this perspective.3063  To effectively deter foreign subsidization, CVDs should 
remain allowed up to the subsidy level calculated in terms of the benefit to the recipient, even 
if injury upon the domestic industry would be inferior.3064  Remind in this respect that Qiu has 
demonstrated that CVDs up to the ceiling set under the SCM Agreement (i.e., subsidy level) 
might even be insufficient in strategic settings to fully deter export subsidization for profit-
shifting reasons.3065  Next, the deterrent effect would likely be stronger if more large countries 
would effectively implement CVDs procedures and undertake such unilateral action.  This 
would suggest that the procedural burden to undertake such action should not be set too 
demanding, certainly not for larger developing countries. 
 
Yet, pursuing the objective to maximize the deterrent effect in rethinking the SCM Agreement 
disciplines seems not appropriate.  Even when leaving aside the question whether such 
deterrent effect could really be sufficiently boosted,3066 pursuing this goal would not alter the 
fundamental flaw in the deterrence rationale: CVDs simply do not detect and deter wasteful 
subsidization only.  What is more, even if only wasteful subsidies would be singled out under 
the SCM Agreement, an efficient multilateral track would be superior because its deterrent 
effect would not come at the welfare cost caused by unilateral measures.3067   
 
4.2.2. The systemic justification 
As elaborated above,3068 Kenen has suggested that the prohibition on export subsidies could 
play a constructive role to safeguard tariff concessions.  Finding inspiration in this idea, Sykes 
                                                 
3062 World Trade Report 2009, above n 3043, at xviii and 94-95; see also Sykes, above n 2661, at 104. 
3063 See Magnus, above n 3057, 991. 
3064 Even in that case, CVDs might not deter subsidization as they might divert subsidized products to 
other markets. 
3065 L. D. Qiu, ‘Why Can’t Countervailing Duties Deter Export Subsidization?’, 39 Journal of 
International Economics  (1995), 249-272.  Recall that CVDs would hereby not necessarily target 
export subsidies that are detrimental for world welfare because output is sub-optimally low in strategic 
settings.  Hence, one might argue that the lack of an effective deterrent effect should not be regretted 
given such CVDs fail to target ‘wasteful’ subsidies. 
3066 For instance, Sykes observes that countries lacking an import-competing industry would not only 
be legally prevented from taking such action (i.e., no injury to their domestic industry) but would 
obviously lack any incentive to impose such measures as well.  Yet, this implies that CVDs will be 
used in an uncoordinated fashion, hereby limiting their deterrent effect.  
3067 World Trade Report 2009, above n 3043, at 95; Sykes, above n 2661, at 106. 
3068 See above Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2.2. 
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acknowledges that, in theory, CVDs could serve a similar purpose because this unilateral 
response allows countries to effectively protect their domestic industry up to the bound level 
of tariff commitments.  Hence, the CVDs option enables governments to effectively commit 
themselves vis-à-vis their import-competing industries that tariff cuts will not be further 
eroded by subsidized imports.3069  In this way, CVDs would allow tariff concessions that 
would otherwise not have been made because of the risk of circumventing bound tariff levels 
by foreign subsidization.  In a way, this systemic justification would provide a normative 
underpinning for the theory developed by proponents of the entitlement rationale: protecting 
the narrow interests of domestic producers by setting up a CVDs procedure could be 
considered justified insofar it reduces the political costs of governments to conclude trade 
agreements and thus allows them to make stronger tariff commitments.  In short, the systemic 
justification acknowledges that trade concessions have a cost in political-economy terms and 
suggests that the CVDs instrument could help to reduce this cost.  As Sykes has put it, this 
rationale is based on the simple premise that ‘a little protection is better than a lot’.3070  The 
2009 World Trade Report equally considered that contingency measures (e.g., anti-dumping 
duties, CVDs, safeguards) could play a useful role in a trade agreement as they reduce the 
costs of signing such an agreement and thus allow countries to undertake deeper 
commitments.   
 
But again, the effective role of CVDs in facilitating tariff concessions lacks empirical 
evidence.  Sykes refutes a systemic justification of CVDs action precisely because of this lack 
of evidence documenting that the US CVDs law was pivotal to facilitate tariff concessions 
and that the overall level of protection would be greater in the absence of CVDs action.  
Sykes hereby highlights that: 
 
Nothing in the history of the U.S. countervailing duty laws suggests that they were enacted 
because of a concern that subsidies would be used to circumvent the lower tariffs that would 
prevail after a round of tariff concessions. To the contrary, the countervailing duty laws have 
existed since 1897, long before the formation of the GATT or the advent of major 
international tariff negotiations.3071   
 
Upon closer examination, the first CVDs law ever imposed by the US (1890s) seems to fit 
rather well with the systemic justification, even though it dates from before the onset of 
reciprocal tariff negotiations.3072  The US wished to cut tariff rates unilaterally (in order to 
reduce a Treasury surplus), but its sugar industry was at the same time confronted with 
subsidized imports.  To protect their interests in face of such a general tariff cut, the US 
                                                 
3069 See above Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2.2. 
3070 Sykes, above n 2928, at 261. 
3071 Sykes, above n 2928, at 262-263. 
3072 The operation of these first CVDs laws is explained in Diamond, above n 2670, at 564-565. 
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Congress decided to offer CVDs in case foreign countries would subsidize exports of sugar.  
Hence, this CVDs law was apparently considered useful to reduce the political cost of a 
unilateral general tariff cut.  In 1897, however, the US Congress increased tariffs to raise 
revenue and protect US industry.  Because foreign countries could undo the effect of the tariff 
by offering export subsidies, the US also decided that additional CVDs would be charged to 
imports benefiting from export subsidies.  Apparently, it was well understood that subsidized 
imports could erode tariff levels and that a specific tool, namely CVDs, could in theory 
effectively remedy this circumvention.  This example illustrates that CVDs laws could be 
useful so as to implement lower general tariff levels, even outside the context of reciprocal 
tariff negotiations.   
 
Obviously, such anecdotic evidence is insufficient to underpin the systemic justification for 
CVDs action.  In the absence of such evidence, no definitive judgment can be made on the 
strength of this argument.  Anyway, three propositions should hold to make the systemic 
justification valid.  First, the beneficial effect on tariff concessions should certainly 
compensate for the ‘little protectionism’ generated by the (threat of) imposition of CVDs.3073  
Again, empirical studies are not conclusive on the exact trade-distortive impact of CVDs 
policies.3074  Second, the import-competing industry should have confidence that CVDs are 
indeed an effective tool to preclude tariff erosion by foreign subsidization.  What matters 
seems not so much whether CVDs are really effective to this end, but rather whether the 
trading community beliefs that it could play this role.  Amply demonstrating that CVDs are 
not effective in leveling the playing field, Hudec seems to indicate that the illusion that CVDs 
could adequately respond to ‘unfair trade’ could have some merit on its own: ‘by claiming the 
ability to police unfair trade, the law implicitly assured the business public that the rest of 
foreign trade was fair – something like the way a hanging assures the public that the streets 
are safe’.3075  If the trading community recognizes that foreign policies having an equivalent 
effect are not effectively disciplined (e.g., undervalued exchange rates), the systemic value of 
                                                 
3073 Here, it should be emphasized that even the threat of CVDs action could affect trade flows. 
3074 An overview of the literature on the economic impact of contingency measures can be found in 
World Trade Report 2009, above n 3043, at 152-156.  Interestingly, Vandenbussche and Zanardi have 
found that anti-dumping measures not only negatively affect trade in the product on which the duty is 
imposed but that anti-dumping laws equally have a chilling effect on aggregate trade flows if they are 
used frequently.  Comparing new frequent users’ loss in imports due to such measures and their gains 
of further trade liberalization, Vandenbussche and Zanardi conclude that the chilling effect is ‘too large 
to be dismissed as a “small price to pay” for further trade liberalization’.  H. Vandenbussche and M. 
Zanardi, ‘The Chilling Trade Effects of Antidumping Proliferation’, 54 European Economic Review 
(2010), 760-777.  One might hypothesize that a somewhat similar chilling effect on aggregate trade 
could occur as a result of CVDs action if such action would indeed be frequently undertaken by a 
country.  Actually, any such effect would certainly seem to be lower as CVDs measures are far less 
often installed than anti-dumping measures.  On the use of CVDs action, see above Part II, Chapter 6, 
Section 6.1.3. 
3075 Hudec, above n 2650, at 262. 
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CVDs seems to be reduced.  Third, the systemic role of CVDs laws on tariff concessions 
obviously assumes that meaningful tariff cuts can still be made.  Hence, this systemic 
justification gradually loses strength when deeper multilateral tariff cuts are made.  This 
might question the validity of this justification for developed countries’ CVDs action.   
 
In case the systemic justification would be considered compelling, how would the disciplines 
on this unilateral action as set out in the SCM Agreement be evaluated?  In line with the 
suggestion made by proponents of the entitlement theory, CVDs should only remedy injury 
caused upon import-competing industries.  Indeed, it is only in that case that CVDs are 
needed to act as safety valve protecting tariff concessions.  Therefore, making the lesser-duty-
rule mandatory or rethinking the requirement to show a causal link between subsidized 
imports and injury might be on the agenda.  On the other hand, proponents of the systemic 
justification would agree with those of the deterrent justification that an expansion of CVDs 
action by large (developing) countries would be welcomed: the former would point to the 
increase in deterrent effect, whereas the latter would indicate that such CVDs facilitate these 
countries to enter into deeper tariff concessions.   
 
4.2.3. The absence of any justification 
Scholars that are not persuaded by either the deterrence justification or the systemic 
justification cannot but reach the conclusion that the first-best reform would be to abandon the 
scope for CVDs action under the WTO.3076  In the absence of a useful deterrent or systemic 
effect, the generally welfare-depressing impact of CVDs measures on both the CVDs 
imposing country as well as on the rest of the world suggests that governments would benefit 
if they mutually agree to exclude the option to undertake such unilateral action.3077  It would 
be superior to ‘tie their hands’ in this way in order for countries not to be able to adopt CVDs 
in the narrow interest of their import-competing industry.  Likewise, the same argument 
would hold if one considers that any useful deterrent or systemic effect of CVDs could be 
better obtained through the WTO dispute settlement system.  If this multilateral track is 
followed, trade-distortive measures will not be imposed unless non-implementation of the 
DSB recommendations would lead to the imposition of countermeasures.  Of course, this 
                                                 
3076 See, for example, Sykes, above n 2928, at 263; Sykes, above n 2661, at 106; Trebilcock, above n 
3053, at 732. 
3077 In those circumstances in which CVDs are welfare-improving for the CVDs-imposing country, its 
unilateral action comes at the expense of the rest of the world.  Even if CVDs action could legally be 
restricted to those circumstances, such action can therefore not be endorsed from a normative 
viewpoint.  Nonetheless, a reduced scope for CVDs might very well be considered more appropriate 
than the current system.   
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reasoning hinges on the assumption that the WTO dispute settlement system is deemed 
effective to this end.   
 
Proponents of the abolition of the unilateral track are well aware that such fundamental 
reform is not realistic.  In light of this ultimate objective, what types of reforms regarding 
disciplines on CVDs action could nonetheless be deemed legitimate?3078  First of all, the 
procedural rights upon consumers in CVDs procedures could be strengthened.  For instance, 
one could propose the obligation that consumer organizations and downstream industries are 
included in the list of ‘interested parties’ in CVDs investigations.3079  By upgrading the 
influence of those actors negatively affected by such measures, CVDs action serving the 
narrow interest of the import-competing industry would in the end be reduced.  Still, because 
such reform would reduce the deterrent and systemic effect of CVDs action, it would likely 
not find support among proponents of those theories.  Next, making the lesser-duty-rule 
mandatory as suggested under the systemic justification might also be considered appropriate 
because it would reduce the level of CVDs in case the subsidy level exceeds the injury to the 
domestic industry.  Finally, expansion of CVDs action by non-traditional users (e.g., large 
developing countries) would not be advisable because of the welfare-detrimental effect of 
such unilateral measures, unless this would make the traditional users like the US more open 
to strengthen existing disciplines.  Note in concluding that the international fragmentation of 
production might also make reforms limiting the scope for CVDs action more acceptable to 
WTO Members because of the welfare and political-economy costs of such measures on 
downstream industries.  For the same reason, further fragmentation would likewise make such 
reforms less needed because CVDs action will be less swiftly undertaken as a result. 
 
                                                 
3078 According to Sykes, the directions for such reform are not apparent.  See Sykes, above n 2928, at 
263. 
3079 See Articles 12.9 and 12.10 of the SCM Agreement.  See above Part II, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3.1. 
PART IV CHAPTER 5 – DISCIPLINES IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC RECESSION 
 
 589
5. DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES IN LIGHT OF POLICY RESPONSES TO THE ECONOMIC 
CRISIS 
In this final section, we address governments’ responses to the recent financial and economic 
crisis insofar these measures touch upon subsidy disciplines under the SCM Agreement.3080  
Some observers have questioned whether the SCM Agreement leaves sufficient policy space 
upon governments to adequately respond to the challenges of the current crisis.  Others, on 
the other hand, have precisely pointed to the weaknesses in the current system to prevent 
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ subsidies and have thus advocated more multilateral policy 
constraints. 
 
At first sight, any appeal to increase flexibility on subsidy disciplines during times of global 
economic downturn seems to be somewhat counterintuitive.  As shown by the experiences in 
the 1970s and 1980s, such a downturn puts pressure upon governments to enter into 
competitive subsidization so as to safeguard domestic production and employment. Hence, it 
would rather offer an incentive to strengthen subsidy disciplines in order to stop detrimental 
subsidy wars generating over-capacity and budgetary difficulties.  Given that the Subsidies 
Code was largely unsuccessful to halt such ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies, countries were 
ready to agree upon more stringent subsidy disciplines during the Uruguay Round.3081  Yet, a 
particular feature of the current crisis is that it precisely mandated increased government 
interventions to prevent a collapse of the financial system as well as to boost aggregate 
demand through stimulus packages (i.e., so-called Keynesian interventions).  Some observers 
hold that the strengthened disciplines on subsidies under the SCM Agreement would in legal 
terms – or at least in spirit – be at odds with such an increased role of the government in the 
economy.  By scrutinizing government interventions in light of the SCM Agreement, this 
discussion will show that this concern has to be tempered.  
 
First, several governments bailed out large financial institutions in distress as immediate 
response to the crisis, which was justified on the basis of the systemic risk that their potential 
                                                 
3080 For an overview of measures adopted by WTO Members, see Report to the TPRB from the 
Director-General on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-related Developments 
(JOB(09)/30, 26 March 2009).  An in-depth legal analysis of some of these interventions can be found 
in C. Brunel and G. C. Hufbauer, ‘Money for the Auto Industry: Consistent with WTO Rules?’, Policy 
Brief – Peterson Institute for International Economics (February 2009), 12 pp.; A. van Aaken and J. 
Kurtz, ‘Prudence or Discrimination? Emergency Measures, the Global Financial Crisis and 
International Economic Law’, 12:4 Journal of International Economic Law (2009), 859-894; R. H. 
Weber and M. Grosz, ‘Governments’ Interventions into the Real Economy under WTO Law Revisited: 
New Tendencies of Governmental Support of the Automobile Industry’, 43 Journal of World Trade 
(2009), 969-1012. 
3081 The Great Depression of the 1930s similarly inspired countries to negotiate disciplines on export 
subsidies after the Second World War, but such disciplines were finally not adopted because of the 
failure to ratify the Havana Charter (see above Part II, Chapter 1, Section 1.1). 
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bankruptcy would pose to the financial and real economy.  Insofar governments did not direct 
financial institutions to channel this support to (specific) domestic producers, this aspect of 
the recovery programme targeting the financial service sector is not disciplined under the 
SCM Agreement.3082,3083  Arguably, in case an explicit ‘lend national requirement’ would be 
attached to such support, the government would offer a subsidy in the meaning of the SCM 
Agreement given that it directs a private actor (i.e., the financial sector) to make a financial 
contribution (e.g., transfer of funds) that would otherwise not have been available to domestic 
producers.3084  In this case, however, such subsidies will only be actionable if it can be 
demonstrated that they are specific to certain enterprises within the subsidizing country and 
cause adverse effects upon other WTO Members.3085   
 
Second, with regard to Keynesian interventions implemented to boost aggregate demand, 
three different forms have been distinguished: measures increasing direct public spending, 
fiscal stimulus aimed at consumers, and fiscal stimulus aimed at producers.   
The first two forms of stimulus measures directly target public and private consumption 
respectively.  Both types do not trigger substantive disciplines under the SCM Agreement if 
they are implemented in non-discriminatory way.  After all, such measures do not qualify as a 
specific subsidy to enterprises within the jurisdiction of the granting authority and do not 
cause adverse effects upon foreign producers.3086,3087 Because they do not inherently 
                                                 
3082 Any distortion created in the service sector itself should be scrutinized under the GATS.  Generally 
speaking, the GATS does not substantively curtail such bailout measures because of the lack of strong 
subsidy obligations in the absence of specific commitments and the presence of important exceptions 
such as the prudential carve-out.  For an analysis of these financial sector bailouts under the GATS, see 
B. De Meester, ‘The Global Financial Crisis and Government Support for Banks: What Role for the 
GATS?’, 13:1 Journal of International Economic Law (2010), 27-63; van Aaken and Kurtz, above n 
3080, at 871-876. 
3083 The Appellate Body has emphasized that ‘entrustment or direction’ (Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the 
SCM Agreement) would not be present in ‘the situation in which the government intervenes in the 
market in some way, which may or may not have a particular result simply based on the given factual 
circumstances and the exercise of free choice by the actors in that market’.  Appellate Body Report, US 
– Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para 114. 
3084 According to the Appellate Body, ‘direction’ covers situations where the government exercises its 
authority over a private body (Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on 
DRAMS, para 116).  Relevantly, the Appellate Body also held that there could be ‘direction’ by the 
government even when the financial contribution is made on commercially reasonable terms (Appellate 
Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para 138).  Demonstration of such ‘direction’ of a private actor 
within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement would be much more difficult in the 
more likely case that such direction is implicit. On the standard for demonstrating ‘direction’, see 
above Part II, Capter 3, Section 3.2.1.2. 
3085 Likewise, specific subsidies would be countervailable if causing injury to the domestic industry. 
3086 See also Brunel and Hufbauer, above n 3080, at 9.  Examples of fiscal stimulus measures targeting 
consumers are tax credits for the purchase of cars or so-called ‘Cash for Clunkers’ programmes.  Under 
a ‘Cash for Clunker’ programme (as for instance, implemented in the US and Germany), a 
compensation is offered to owners of old cars if they purchase more energy-efficient cars.  If such 
consumer subsidies would discriminate against foreign producers, a tentative argument could be made 
that these subsidies are challengeable under the SCM Agreement disciplines on actionable subsidies in 
case such subsidies could be demonstrated to have passed-through to domestic producers.  Yet, a 
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discriminate between foreign and domestic producers, such consumption stimulating 
measures are not only WTO-compatible but they are also the most efficient way to boost 
global demand. 
In contrast, fiscal stimulus measures aimed at producers are more likely to fall within the 
ambit of the SCM Agreement disciplines.  Here, functional as well as selective interventions 
aimed at domestic producers could be discerned.   
Firstly, according to an IMF study discussed in Part I,3088 non-sector specific credit guarantees 
by governments for producers in financial distress could be legitimate when confronted with a 
capital market failure.  Such government guarantees in times of a credit crunch would qualify 
as subsidies under the SCM Agreement because these constitute potential direct transfers of 
funds that confer a benefit to the recipient.3089  If allocation is strictly based on objective 
criteria, however, such guarantees might be classified as non-specific under Article 2.1(b) of 
the SCM Agreement, unless it could be demonstrated that they are predominantly used by 
certain enterprises (de facto specificity).  Only in the case where such guarantees could be 
classified as specific to certain enterprises, an actionable subsidy claim or a CVDs action 
could be considered.   
Secondly, large selective interventions in which specific sectors are bailed out are more 
problematic in both efficiency and legal terms.  The prototypical example is the large support 
given to the car sector in a number of WTO Members, such as the US and certain EC 
countries.  These interventions took the form of loans, loan guarantees, or equity infusions.  
Such (potential) direct transfers of funds to a specific recipient at better-than-market terms fall 
within the reach of the SCM Agreement.3090  Again, such specific domestic subsidies are not 
prohibited as such but are only vulnerable to an actionable subsidy claim or unilateral CVDs 
action.  These interventions’ large scale suggests that bailouts might very well cause adverse 
trade effects upon foreign producers.   
                                                                                                                                            
straightforward claim that these discriminatory measures violate Article III of the GATT would be 
more likely in first order.   
3087 The relevant agreement with regard to direct public spending is the plurilateral Agreement on 
Government Procurement.  This agreement also incorporates a national treatment obligation but this is 
only useful for those WTO Members that have signed this agreement.  For an analysis of ‘buy national’ 
conditions attached to public spending under this plurilateral agreement, see van Aaken and Kurtz, 
above n 3080, at 871-881.  The suggestion put forward by some scholars that ‘buy national’ provisions 
in procurement programmes could be challenged as actionable subsidies under the SCM Agreement 
seems highly speculative in light of the subsidy definition under the SCM Agreement and the 
plurilateral nature of the Agreement on Government Procurement (juncto Article III:8(a) of the GATT). 
3088 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.5. 
3089 If the private capital market no longer offers credit at affordable terms, such government guarantees 
render credit transactions possible that would otherwise not have taken place.  The potential fee 
charged for such government guarantees will not compensate for this benefit.  Articles 1.1(a)(1)(i), 
1.1(b), and 14(c) of the SCM Agreement. 
3090 Brunel and Hufbauer also conclude that ‘government loans and guarantees to auto companies 
around the world invariably entail below-market interest or credit-guarantee rates’.  Brunel and 
Hufbauer, above n 3080, at 7. 
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In evaluating the success chances of the multilateral track, it is important to underline that 
demonstration of a threat of serious prejudice to other countries’ trading interests is sufficient 
to find a violation of Article 5 of the SCM Agreement and to trigger the remedies available in 
Article 7 of the SCM Agreement.  As Hufbauer and Brunel have emphasized, gathering 
sufficient data to show actual serious prejudice might be much more difficult in an early case 
against such bailouts.  In legal terms, it is not relevant that the complaining WTO Member 
would have similarly subsidized its own car industry.3091  Of course, in political terms, such 
competitive subsidization might decrease the probability that such multilateral claim is 
formulated.3092  Moreover, the time-consuming dispute settlement procedure and the fact that 
any remedy would not work retroactively might further reduce the appeal of this multilateral 
track.  Hufbauer and Brunel state that it is somewhat more probable that WTO Members 
would opt for the unilateral track to offset the (threat of) injury to their domestic industry.3093  
Hereby, WTO Members have to adhere to the specific procedural and substantive disciplines 
set out in the SCM Agreement before any provisional or definitive CVD could be imposed.  
Even if CVDs are put in place, it is implausible that such unilateral measure would effectively 
constrain bailouts in the car industry.3094  
 
Overall, the SCM Agreement thus seems to leave considerable policy space to implement 
Keynesian types of interventions.  One might even argue that existing disciplines 
insufficiently rule out that fiscal stimulus packages are implemented in a trade-distorting way.  
Reintroducing the catch-phrase developed in Part I, one could therefore conclude that the 
SCM Agreement seems to allow ‘Keynes at home’ but does not seem to ensure ‘Smith 
abroad’.3095  After all, the most inefficient and trade-distorting stimulus measures, namely 
those in which specific domestic sectors are bailed out by large government injections, are not 
straightly prohibited but only actionable and countervailable.  Somewhat ironically, the US 
proposed in the Doha Round negotiations to exactly prohibit those types of subsidies.3096  If 
such a prohibition had already been put in place at the onset of the economic downturn, this 
would have outlawed the bailouts in the car sector and might have pushed WTO Members 
towards the more efficient types of Keynesian interventions in order to boost global demand 
(i.e., those targeted at consumption).  On the other hand, a rigorous prohibition might have 
made WTO Members reluctant to implement any fiscal stimulus plan whatsoever (i.e., wait 
                                                 
3091 Brunel and Hufbauer, above n 3080, at 7-8. 
3092 Yet, the mutual claims by the US and the EC against each others aircraft subsidies indicate that this 
is not inconceivable as well.     
3093 Brunel and Hufbauer, above n 3080, at 8-9. 
3094 See also Hufbauer and Brunel, above n 3080, at 10. 
3095 See above Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2.5. 
3096 Proposal from the United States, Expanding the Prohibited “red light” Subsidy Category, Draft 
Text (TN/RL/GEN/146, 5 June 2007).   
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until ‘Keynes comes from abroad’) or might have inflicted more systemic protectionist 
tendencies.  Arguably, a careful way to partly limit the risk of competitive subsidization in the 
future could be the re-establishment of the presumption formulated under Article 6.1 of the 
SCM Agreement.  Here, the presence of serious prejudice would be presumed in case 
developed countries offer subsidies that cover operating losses sustained by an industry or 
enterprise, except for one-time non-recurring subsidies enabling an enterprise to develop a 
long-term solution and avoid acute social problems.  Yet, it seems doubtful that WTO 
Members will agree upon even the mere reactivation of this presumption under Article 6.1 of 
the SCM Agreement.   
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At one time, one could claim in US Congress that ‘the definition of a subsidy, like that of 
beauty, varies with the beholder whose eye is focused on the object under scrutiny’.3097  
Looking at the full spectrum of government actions, an ‘open-minded’ beholder could detect 
subsidies everywhere.  An effective police service or educational system could be regarded as 
a subsidy because they clearly benefit the domestic industry.  A creative observer could even 
label negative action by the government as a ‘regulatory subsidy’ when this government 
refrains from providing a certain level of regulation.  Overall, the range of subsidies will vary 
depending on the views of the beholder on the proper role of the government and the market.  
However, since 1995, the SCM Agreement has narrowed the field of vision.  Indeed, only 
specific subsidies within the meaning of the definition stipulated in the SCM Agreement are 
disciplined under this agreement and could thus be challenged before the WTO dispute 
settlement system.  Equally important, only those specific subsidies could be subject to 
unilateral CVDs action by other WTO Members.   
Beholders have articulated two important lines of criticism on the SCM Agreement’s 
demarcation of a subsidy.  First, some observers have advanced that the field of vision might 
have been overly constrained.  Yet, this study has shown how the subsidy-concept seems 
sufficiently broadly formulated and explained in the case law so as to capture the most 
common forms of subsidization.  It is sensible that some general government interventions, 
like low levels of environmental protection or an undervalued exchange rate, fall outside its 
scope.  The WTO’s dispute settlement system – and its institutional setting more generally – 
is not equipped to define the appropriate level of such interventions.  This certainly holds for 
individual CVDs-investigating authorities.  Allowing unilateral CVDs action against such 
general interventions would risk opening Pandora’s box.  Second, other beholders seem to 
have suggested that the subsidy-concept is too broadly defined.  In a sense, it has been 
revealed how the subsidy demarcation in fact fails to distinguish ‘beautiful’ from ‘ugly’ 
subsidies.  Indeed, by installing the private market test, the subsidy definition does not shield 
corrective subsidization from subsidy disciplines and potential CVDs action.  Except for 
excluding some general public goods, the specificity test seems also not very useful in 
drawing this distinction.  Corrective subsidies targeted to certain industries certainly pass this 
threshold and subsidies based on general objective criteria could also be de facto specific.  
Here, this dissertation’s analysis has suggested that the objective of the subsidy could be 
better taken into account under the respective disciplines rather than under the specific 
subsidy definition in the first place.  Otherwise, it would again rest upon the shoulders of the 
WTO dispute settlement system (and CVDs-investigating authority) to second-guess and give 
appropriate weight to Members’ objectives in offering subsidies.   
                                                 
3097 US Congress, House Committee on Agriculture (1972), cited by G. Schwartz and B. Clements, 
‘Government Subsidies’, 13:2 Journal of Economic Surveys (1999), 119-148, at 120. 
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The suggestion to consider the policy objective relevant under the respective disciplines leads 
us to the evaluation whether the substantive disciplines leave sufficient leeway for WTO 
Members to rely upon subsidization as legitimate policy tool.  On this question regarding the 
balance between policy space and policy constraints, this dissertation has reached the 
following findings with regard to developed and developing countries, respectively.   
 
Starting with the subsidy disciplines on developed countries, this study has documented the 
problematic aspect that the existing disciplines on domestic subsidies merely focalize on their 
potential trade effects upon other WTO Members and simply disregard whether these 
subsidies are granted to pursue a legitimate policy objective.  In this respect, the original SCM 
Agreement struck a more appropriate balance since it excluded some legitimate subsidies 
from multilateral disciplines and unilateral CVDs action.  Therefore, the reactivation of the 
green light status of well-defined R&D, environmental, and regional subsidies should be 
endorsed.  At the same time, the original SCM Agreement did also put more constraints on 
some forms of subsidization as it provided a rebuttable presumption that certain subsidies 
caused serious prejudice upon other WTO Members.  Arguably, such a presumption with 
regard to subsidies to loss-making firms could somewhat temper the risk of a detrimental 
subsidy competition among developed countries in times of a global economic downturn.  
While endorsing the policy flexibility under the original SCM Agreement for certain green 
light subsidies, this dissertation’s analysis does certainly not support other authors’ plea to 
return to the pre-SCM Agreement era.  The systemic concern that existing disciplines would 
undermine tariff concessions should not be overstated since developed countries’ tariff levels 
on industrial products are already largely cut.  At most, this systemic argument might justify 
the reinstallation of a limited peace clause under the Agreement on Agriculture so as to 
facilitate tariff negotiations on agricultural products.   
Turning to the prohibition on export subsidies, some scholars have criticized that this would 
run counter to efficiency because it would lead to trade levels lower than those set by 
individual countries.  Hence, any economic argument underpinning a multilateral restriction 
on export subsidies must overcome this basic dilemma.  However, I disagree with the 
argument’s central premise.  Its normative inference does not seem to acknowledge that such 
export subsidy competition is detrimental not only for the subsidizing country but also for 
world welfare as a whole.  The fact that world welfare would generally improve if export 
subsidies are ruled out justifies that such a ban is inscribed, whereas the fact that welfare in a 
previously subsidizing country would improve helps explaining why such a ban is inscribed.  
The normative welfare conclusion also justifies trimming down the existing policy space to 
offer agricultural export subsidies.  On the other hand, a specific and limited exception on the 
basic prohibition on export subsidies might seem justified if the market failure precisely 
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affects the trade transaction.  The capital market failure in trade financing of medium- and 
long-term transactions to developing countries and of short-term transactions in times of a 
financial crisis might warrant government intervention so as to support such trade flows.  The 
safe haven installed under the Illustrative List and referring to the OECD Arrangement 
precisely crafts an exception for governments to offer export credit support at subsidized 
terms.  Yet, this dissertation has revealed that the scope of this safe haven currently offers no 
justification for the most common type of such support (e.g., pure cover support) and for 
short-term support.  Consequently, the WTO Director-General is urging to offer export 
subsidies simply prohibited under existing WTO rules.  While this might suggest that policy 
space is overly constrained in this respect, the most effective way to offer support for trade 
financing is not legally constrained.  Indeed, export credit support offered by regional or 
multilateral financial institutions would be superior in both economic and legal terms. 
 
Regarding the legal framework applicable to developing countries, the SCM Agreement 
explicitly recognizes the importance of subsidies for spurring development.  At the same time, 
the SCM Agreement constrains these countries’ freedom to rely upon this policy instrument 
and does not foreclose that other WTO Members undertake unilateral CVDs action.  A group 
of low-income developing countries is still exempted from the ban on export subsidies, 
whereas some small-trading countries also benefit from a limited exemption until 2015.  
Economic theory and empirical evidence clearly justify this S&D treatment but likewise 
suggests that the exposure of their export subsidies to actionable subsidy claims and CVDs 
action is too unrestrained.  Graduation in case of export competiveness could, on the other 
hand, be useful as an exit-mechanism when explicit export promotion is no longer strictly 
needed.   
All other developing countries are currently subject to the prohibition on export subsidies.  
Hence, the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, resulting in essence from the bargain between 
developed countries over the years, has become fully applicable to these developing countries.  
Important in this respect, the discussion on export credit support has demonstrated that the 
case law has as much as possible prevented that this Illustrative List works against the interest 
of developing countries.  To this end, an a contrario reading of the cost-to-government 
benchmark formulated for export credit support has been rejected and the leeway to OECD 
Participants to modify the scope of the safe haven has been confined.  The fact that the safe 
haven still remains in the – somewhat tied – hands of the OECD Participants is a legitimate 
concern expressed by developing countries that has to be dealt with in future negotiations.    
Obviously, the general ban on export subsidies firmly restrains these developing countries’ 
policy options.  Nonetheless, the fundamental concern voiced by some observers that the 
SCM Agreement precludes developing countries to duplicate the successful development 
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strategy of East Asian Miracle countries has to be nuanced as well.  The prohibition on export 
subsidies imposed upon other countries at equal or higher development levels implies that 
similar leeway is not necessarily needed to penetrate export markets.  Furthermore, economic 
research has shown that policy space on domestic rather than export subsidies becomes 
pivotal for countries that have reached higher stages on the development ladder.  Often left 
unnoticed, the SCM Agreement does offer more policy flexibility in this regard, though it has 
been explained that the exact scope thereof is not fully clear.  Arguably, only multilateral 
claims based on nullification of tariff concessions or injury to the domestic industry could be 
formulated against developing countries’ domestic subsidies.  From a normative perspective, 
this narrow interpretation would be justified not only on the basis of the importance of 
corrective subsidies but also because it would facilitate further tariff concessions by 
developing countries (i.e., systemic argument).  Finally, procedural and substantive 
disciplines upon unilateral CVDs responses by other countries have been elaborated under the 
SCM Agreement.  In legal terms, the higher de minimis threshold makes it more difficult to 
impose CVDs against imports from developing countries.  In reality, however, this somewhat 
higher burden does not preclude that the large majority of CVDs action is taken by developed 
countries against imports from developing countries.  Neither the deterrence justification, nor 
the systemic justification could validate this asymmetric practice.  Hence, further raising the 
de minimis threshold to initiate such CVDs action against developing countries’ imports 
seems defensible.   
 
To summarize, this dissertation has pointed to some specific elements to rebalance existing 
disciplines on subsidization and CVDs measures in the forestalled Doha Round.  At the same 
time, a fundamental overhaul of the subsidy disciplines regarding developed and developing 
countries seems neither realistic nor warranted.  To be sure, this dissertation has likewise 
revealed that the beauty-metaphor still holds.  Just as beauty does, the need for policy space 
and constraints on subsidization will always provoke fundamental divergence among 
beholders. 
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